Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairHow exactly is a war in Italy to be avoided, is the idea the Italian
Government will subdue the German forces all the way to the
Alps? Even then is it possible the allies would use the bases
to try and strike into France, Austria and/or Yugoslavia?
You have assumed a great deal, you really need to see if the
assumptions are correct. What peace feelers were put out
by the Italian government while Mussolini was still in power?
Scads of them, since mid-1942 and increasingly since Alamein (which was
really experienced as a turning point). Badoglio put out his feelers.
So as the war was going well for the axis in 1942 the Italians were
putting out what you define as peace feelers, were the 1942 ones
about allied surrenders?
Could we please have a definition of "scads"?
Post by HaydnThe Royal House put out its feelers, mainly through courtesy of Princess
Maria Jose, wife of the heir to the Crown. And others, the Fascist regime
included, did likewise. Through Switzerland or other channels.
So what is defined as a peace feeler, a diplomatic conversation?
Was anything formally discussed by the Italian government, things
like minimum terms and some sort of terms passed onto the allies?
Or are we talking about encounters that are now classified as peace
discussions?
For example how do they compare with the Japanese efforts in
1945 via the USSR?
Post by HaydnWars, even world wars, don't stop politics and business being done between
enemy coalitions. It's naive to assume the opposite.
Actually it does stop business quite effectively, thanks to things like
cutting contacts.
Post by HaydnTop level meetings of British, German, US and Italian financiers and CEOs
all sitting around the same table took place throughout the war. Money,
especially, has no country it proudly belongs to.
So please spell out these top level discussions, how many, when
and where? There were few places the above nationalities could
all reach easily.
How many of the US-axis contacts were pre December 1941?
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairHow much support did the then government give them?
The government, ie. Mussolini, either allowed them, or took part in them.
Yet surprisingly there seems little to show for it, the various
terms and conditions, the formal meetings of representatives
authorised to discuss terms.
Where are the documents? The formal reports from say
ambassadors?
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairSo far as I can tell the attempts to surrender started after
Mussolini was removed from power.
Not the case, as I wrote above.
Actually all you have stated is some people were talking and
you have described them as peace feelers which are meant
to be taken seriously and over a period of time where the
axis went from apparently nearly going to win to taking
significant defeats. Which would mean the terms should
change.
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairAnd also the new
government did not make preparations that gave them a
chance to bring the army over to the allied side.
That's because partly, probing the Allies' willingness (or lack thereof)
to accept an Italian conditional surrender while being partners of the
Germans all the way and fending off their suspicions was worse than
treading on eggs, and preparations for a "switch of sides" would not have
passed unnoticed.
Which makes it rather hard to do what was really needed, hold the
German forces off for at least several days to a few weeks to give
the allies the time to transport troops and supplies to Italy.
Without that the allies are going to stay within allied air cover,
which means Salerno.
Post by HaydnPartly, while by 1943 a total Axis defeat appeared to be likely, it was
not an absolutely safe bet yet, and that had to be taken into account in
political calculations. What if the Germans had been somehow able to
snatch a draw or a negotiated armistice out of their growingly desperate
position? By striking a deal with Stalin, or by repelling a major Allied
invasion attempt. Those possibilities couldn't be ruled out, hence the
wavering up at the top of Italian policy making.
No, the wavering was not about those sorts of ifs, the removal of
Mussolini was quite a decisive action, after that the ifs were mainly
about exiting the war with minimal loss to Italy. Quite sensible
ideas but to deliver they needed the Italian military to do significant
fighting on the side of the allies.
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairIt was known Italian morale was low, and the allies did things like
a series of bomber raids on Italian targets in July and August,
including by Bomber Command.
Morale was low, but it was not beyond recovery. A seldom recalled little
episode: for a couple days after the invasion of Sicily on July 10th 1943,
rumors reached the Italian mainland of Allied landings thrown back into
the sea with heavy losses. Before the true news of the landings' success
was broken to the nation, there was a degree of morale upsurge across the
nation, recorded by several sources.
Which would be followed by a crash when the report was found
to be fiction.
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairSo in divisional terms the allies probably had a 1.5 to 1 or better
advantage.....
Is the idea the Italians will hold open the northern ports, and also
hold off the Luftwaffe? Plus provide extra shipping?
That was the idea.
How? At the very least they need to secure the airbases in northern
Italy to stop the Luftwaffe being able to heavily attack the allied
merchant ships, also the Italian ships need to make allied ports
and spend several days or more loading then return to Italy.
As noted before in a well equipped port it took about 3 weeks
to fully load and then fully unload a merchant ship.
The allies were short of shipping and have no air cover beyond
around Salerno, hence why they chose the place.
How far north could an allied convoy go and be safe from
air attack? How about how far north say a corps of troops
could be landed without being hit by superior forces while
finding its supply lines under heavy air attack? The sort
of attack that drives off the supporting warships.
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairSo how are the German forces already in Italy removed?
What made things immensely easier for the Germans in September 1943 was
the so far totally unexpected and unthinkable breakdown and collapse of
the Italian Army and Air Force (what was left of the latter anyway) and of
the government and the State. Caused by the mismanagement of the surrender
and armistice process, of which the Italians bear the blame the most of
course, but the Allies are not completely blameless either.
That is not an answer, the German forces in Italy were strong enough
to be difficult to dislodge and had open supply lines to Germany. To
minimise the chances of Italian loss the Italian military needed to fight,
the fact the Italian government did not even try this showed the allies
were rather correct in their actions. The big mistake was telling the
troops before Salerno of the surrender, given what awaited them.
Post by HaydnThe collapse was entirely unforeseeable until it came about.
It was quite foreseeable, leave the military leaderless and it will
disintegrate, telling people to stop shooting the enemy and
start shooting the allies tends to provoke confusion at least.
Lots of Italian soldiers took the announcement as time to
go home.
Post by HaydnThe scenario previously envisioned was that of a coordinated Allied and
Italian action including Allied landings (not amphibious assaults, but
"peaceful" landings in ports or unopposed disembarkations on friendly
shores) and Italians cutting the Germans off, attacking them everywhere
and delaying their movements long enough for the Allies to establish
themselves in force. Had that worked out, the Germans would have had no
alternative but extricating their units from the peninsula, more or less
as they would later do in Finland for instance.
Simply put you are dreaming. Start with the allies had enough shipping
to move the Salerno force, the requirement for near immediate combat
after arrival significantly increases the amount of shipping needed.
They could not funnel many more men and in particular the heavy
equipment into Italy quickly enough. Then add how supply intensive
air forces are, along with necessary things like radar stations.
The Italians had around 21 divisions in Italy, plus the various other
troops, about a million men, the Germans as noted before 16, but
only about 400,000 men all up.
Post by HaydnA real life case in point might be Corsica.
Or Kos and Leros.
Post by HaydnIn Corsica the Italian garrison didn't melt away or just stand idle, as
in Sardinia, but it fought back vigorously, inflicting considerable losses
on the Germans (a corvette wiped out an entire German troop convoy off the
port of Bastia almost single-handedly). The latter's tough reaction caused
severe losses and drove the Italians off the coast into the inland part of
the island, but they survived to regroup. Shortly afterwards an Allied -
mostly French - force landed on Corsica, joined up with the Italians in
the hills overlooking the eastern coast and together they cracked the
German defensive line outside Bastia and recaptured it, although the bulk
of the German garrison had already been ferried to the mainland.
The Germans had about 12,000 men on Corsica, the Italians 85,000,
lack of shipping and allied air and naval power meant the Germans
had trouble sending more troops. In any case the German plan was
to get the troops out of Sardinia, then evacuate Corsica. There are
around 40,000 Germans in Sardinia. All they needed was the areas
needed for evacuation, which they achieved.
The French resistance movement was active.
On 3 September 8th Army crosses into Italy.
On 8 September the surrender was announced, fighting in Corsica starts
almost immediately. Though much of that is the French fighting the
Germans.
On 9 September the allies landed at Salerno and Taranto, the latter
is mostly airborne troops transported in warships.
By 13 September the Germans had won the main battle in Corsica
On 14 September French commandos were landed in Corsica from a
submarine. The French force is built up to around 6,000 men over the
next two weeks using French destroyers, then later cruisers including
2 Italian ones.
By 15 September the allies think they are now not going to lose
at Salerno. On 16 September 8th Army units contact 5th army ones.
On 18 September the new allied commander of Sardinia arrived
at Cagliari.
On 21 September the Germans have evacuated Sardinia.
On 4 October the last Germans leave Corsica.
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairWhat exactly is massive support?
The Allies at Salerno survived all the Germans could throw at them (which
was pretty much in terms of firepower and attack strength) unaided by any
Italian "cover screen" and delaying / partisan actions.
You mean the SS panzer divisions under Rommel came south?
All 14 or so German divisions in Italy went south?
The allies certainly threw just about all they could back at the
Germans at Salerno. Spreading the allied force out would
most likely result in lots more allied losses.
Simply put the Germans did not want to go far south because
of allied strength, similarly the allies did not want to go too far
north because of German strength.
With Overlord firmly on the agenda the Mediterranean
theatre was going to have forces removed, not extra ones
added.
Post by HaydnOne can surmise things would have gone all the better for them, and all
the worse for the Germans, in case of organized Italian support.
I agree, given the above adds to allied capabilities without adding
to German ones. I still have trouble finding anything much more than
the historical 1944 winter line being reached in winter 1943.
The Germans had the ability to control Northern Italy given the
balance of forces there, which means Luftwaffe bases at least.
They have the ability to move forces into Italy faster than the
allies do.
Solid evidence Italy could fight and hold ground might convince
the allies to tray for Anzio instead of Salerno, I really doubt
any allied commander would want to go further north unless
it was clear the Germans were evacuating. And even Anzio
would requite solid evidence airfields in the areas could be
occupied and kept allied, enough for good fighter cover over
the forces and convoys.
Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairEven if the Italian army fights the Germans how will that ensure
the Germans are out of Italy by the end of 1943?
No certainty there. Wars are not riskless propositions...
And in the scramble for Italy the Germans are in the better position
versus the allies.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.