Battle off Samar

[Jim H.]

Yesterday (Saturday) marked the 70th anniversary
of one of the greatest stands against long odds of
WW II. The courage displayed by the tin can sailors
and the crews & airmen of Taffy 3 was outstanding.

What other stands against great odds occurred
during the war?

Jim H.

[Haydn]

Post by Jim H.
What other stands against great odds occurred
during the war?

May 21st-22nd 1941, in the Aegean Sea, two Crete-bound convoys carrying
German troops, each escorted by one single Italian torpedo boat,
respectively "Lupo" and "Sagittario", were intercepted by heavy British
naval forces made up by cruisers and destroyers.

In both cases the lone torpedo boat attacked the vastly superior enemy
force, surviving a hail of gunfire in wild running battles (Lupo
received 18 hits, all but three duds, and heavy casualties aboard).
According to some authors they also managed to inflict damage on British
ships - officially, damage was caused by subsequent German air raids.

The first convoy, despite the torpedo boat's aggressiveness, was taken
under British gunfire and mostly destroyed. The second convoy instead
made it back to port unscathed, the British failing to sink even one ship.

Both Italian ships' commanders were awarded the Gold Medal for Valor.
One British admiral (Glennie) was criticized for his battle management.
The other one (King) was sacked.

Haydn

[a425couple]

--- one of the greatest stands against long odds of
WW II. The courage displayed by the tin can sailors
and the crews & airmen of Taffy 3 was outstanding.
What other stands against great odds occurred
during the war?

One of the odd books I got in the last several months is
"Last Stand!: Famous Battles Against the Odds"
Paperback - May 10, 1993 by Bryan Perrett (Author)

http://www.amazon.com/Last-Stand-Famous-Battles-Against/dp/1854091883#

Chapters include:
The Defense of Wake Island 8-23 Dec 1941
The Defense of Outpost Snipe 27 Oct 1942
Sidi Nsir 26 Feb 1943
Betio Tarawa Atoll 20-23 Nov 1943
The Defense of the Admin Box, Arakan Burma 6-25 Feb 1944
Arnhem Bridge 17-20 Sept 1944

By the way, some might enjoy, over at the newsgroup
alt.binaries.pictures.military
from 10-14 to 10-27 were posted pictures
"Images of the Eastern Front" (fair number had descriptions)
that appeared to me amateur, and not published before.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Jim H.
What other stands against great odds occurred
during the war?

I think one could find _many_ examples
from the Eastern Front.

For instance, the "Rolik Group", four
men who defended a ravine on the banks
of the Volga in Stalingrad.

[Roman W]

On Mon, 03 Nov 2014 15:47:47 -0500, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Jim H.
What other stands against great odds occurred
during the war?

I think one could find _many_ examples
from the Eastern Front.
For instance, the "Rolik Group", four
men who defended a ravine on the banks
of the Volga in Stalingrad.

Or the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. Or the Warsaw Uprising year later.

RW

[Diogenes]

Read "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" by James Hornfischer.

Those men deserve to stand in Valhalla alongside Leonidas and his
Spartans.

Post by Jim H.
Yesterday (Saturday) marked the 70th anniversary
of one of the greatest stands against long odds of
WW II. The courage displayed by the tin can sailors
and the crews & airmen of Taffy 3 was outstanding.
What other stands against great odds occurred
during the war?
Jim H.

----
Diogenes

The wars are long, the peace is frail
The madmen come again . . . .

[Jim H.]

Post by Diogenes
Read "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" by James Hornfischer.
Those men deserve to stand in Valhalla alongside Leonidas and his
Spartans.

Post by Jim H.
Yesterday (Saturday) marked the 70th anniversary
of one of the greatest stands against long odds of
WW II. The courage displayed by the tin can sailors
and the crews & airmen of Taffy 3 was outstanding.
What other stands against great odds occurred
during the war?
Jim H.

----
Diogenes
The wars are long, the peace is frail
The madmen come again . . . .

That was what sparked my original posting... Hornfischer's book, which I read several years back, was about the Battle off Samar.

Jim H.

[David Wilma]

Reading Last Stand now for the second time. It's better than I remember.

[Diogenes]

On Sun, 02 Nov 2014 00:02:45 -0400, David Wilma

Post by David Wilma
Reading Last Stand now for the second time. It's better than I remember.

But those heroes stand as tall as ever.
----
Diogenes

The wars are long, the peace is frail
The madmen come again . . . .

[David Wilma]

One thing that surprised me in reading Hornfischer was the low
hit rate of naval gunnery. The Japanese eavesdropped on Pacific
Fleet gunnery practices before the war off California and determined
that the hit rate was 5 percent. Planners devised a tactic of hitting
short of targets to have shells detonate under the water near the target.

In the Battle off Samar and at Surigao Strait there were thousands of rounds
expended with few finding their marks. Torpedoes proved to be the
decisive weapon. The DDs, DE and CVE were sunk by gunfire though, but
only after many, many shots.

I know that field artillery isn't much better, but on land a near miss can still
be damaging. My point is that a lot of national effort was spent on weapons
and technology that didn't quite work as advertised.

Did World War II have other weapons that didn't deliver as advertised. The
Norden and Sperry bombsights come to mind. What others?

[Michael Emrys]

One thing that surprised me in reading Hornfischer was the low hit
rate of naval gunnery.

That's very true and the reason why some battles went on for hours. The
other side of that though is that a single hit can be devastating.

Michael

[Dave Smith]

Post by David Wilma
In the Battle off Samar and at Surigao Strait there were thousands of rounds
expended with few finding their marks.

It is actually amazing that they hit any moving target. Shooting at a
stationary target can be tricky enough even at short range. You have to
adjust your powder load, elevation and windage for the range. Then throw
in the dynamics of moving ships. Just like skeet shooting, you have to
lead your target so that your shot will strike a point where you expect
the target to be in the time it takes the projectile(s) to reach it.
With a clay pigeon at 30-40 yards that may be a couple feet.

These guys are shooting at moving targets that are miles away, far
enough that it is difficult to determine their exact distance, speed and
heading, and that makes it especially difficult to calculate where it is
going to be a minute after the guns are fired, because that is how long
the projectile will be in the air. This is further compounded by the
fact that your firing platform is also moving, and likely at a different
speed and heading from your target. This means that you had to be at a
certain point at the time you fire in order to lob a shell into the
path of that other ship. It is easy to see why they were quick to
switch to computerized firing systems when the technology became available.



Dave Smith

[Michael Emrys]

On 11/10/14, 10:39 AM, Dave Smith wrote:

[snip good description of the problems associated with ship to ship gunfire]

It is easy to see why they were quick to switch to computerized firing
systems when the technology became available.

Indeed. It is also easy to see why multi-gun broadsides with each gun
aimed slightly differently were favored. It is the same principle behind
the shotgun as it increases the odds that at least one shell will strike
the target. Gun laying radar was a great help as it not only gave a more
precise range to the target, it also sped up calculations of course and
speed of the target by those precise range and bearing figures
constantly and immediately updated.

Michael

[David Wilma]

Post by Dave Smith

Post by David Wilma
In the Battle off Samar and at Surigao Strait there were thousands of rounds
expended with few finding their marks.

It is actually amazing that they hit any moving target.

The navies had what amounts to a bomb sight device that used
analog technology to factor in the moving platform and the
moving target to compute a firing solution. The sailor who operated
the device was called a computer. (I had a conversation via ham radio with
a computer on the West Virginia at Surigao Strait. Fascinating.) I don't know
anything about the Japanese technology, but I'm sure it was comparable to the
U.S. versions.

As the DDs and DE at Samar lost their fire direction and ammo handing systems
to damage, the gun crews resorted to iron sights and passing ammo by
hand.

Every once in a while someone got lucky. A single shot from the carried St. Lo(?) is
believed to have taken out a cruiser when the shell hit the torpedoes.

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by David Wilma

Post by Dave Smith

Post by David Wilma
In the Battle off Samar and at Surigao Strait there were thousands of rounds
expended with few finding their marks.

It is actually amazing that they hit any moving target.

The navies had what amounts to a bomb sight device that used
analog technology to factor in the moving platform and the
moving target to compute a firing solution. The sailor who operated
the device was called a computer. (I had a conversation via ham radio with
a computer on the West Virginia at Surigao Strait. Fascinating.) I don't know
anything about the Japanese technology, but I'm sure it was comparable to the
U.S. versions.

Excellent discussion of the USN and IJN fire control systems at:

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-086.htm

Cheers,

[Haydn]

Post by David Wilma
I know that field artillery isn't much better, but on land a near miss can still
be damaging.

Near misses (from gunfire or bombs) causing concussion or splinter
damage could be dangerous, sometimes crippling. Splinters could wound or
kill seamen, concussion could flood engine rooms, etc.

Haydn

[Kenneth Young]

Post by David Wilma
Did World War II have other weapons that didn't deliver as
advertised. The
Norden and Sperry bombsights come to mind. What others?

The limitations of naval surface gunnery were known before WW1. Jutland
comes to mind. The most damaged German bc was hit thirty one times in
the entire action.

[Dave Smith]

Post by Kenneth Young

Post by David Wilma
Did World War II have other weapons that didn't deliver as
advertised. The
Norden and Sperry bombsights come to mind. What others?

The limitations of naval surface gunnery were known before WW1. Jutland
comes to mind. The most damaged German bc was hit thirty one times in
the entire action.

That leave me wondering which weapons system did not deliver. The big
guns seemed not to have taken out their targets. On the other hand, the
defensive components of the German ships apparently provided the
protection they were supposed to.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Kenneth Young

Post by David Wilma
Did World War II have other weapons that didn't deliver as
advertised. The
Norden and Sperry bombsights come to mind. What others?

The limitations of naval surface gunnery were known before WW1. Jutland
comes to mind. The most damaged German bc was hit thirty one times in
the entire action.

That leave me wondering which weapons system did not deliver. The big guns
seemed not to have taken out their targets. On the other hand, the
defensive components of the German ships apparently provided the
protection they were supposed to.

The British shells had poor bursting charges/fuses, prematurely
detonating before penetration, also the RN battlecruiser
rangefinders were poor, they were off by 2,000 yards at the
start, meaning they sacrificed their range advantage and
effectively took under fire the German cruisers on the far side
of the German battlecruisers.

Admiral Hipper wrote afterwards "It was nothing but the poor
quality of the British bursting charges that saved us from
disaster."

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by David Wilma
One thing that surprised me in reading Hornfischer was the low
hit rate of naval gunnery. The Japanese eavesdropped on Pacific
Fleet gunnery practices before the war off California and determined
that the hit rate was 5 percent. Planners devised a tactic of hitting
short of targets to have shells detonate under the water near the target.

Yes, it was a surprise when it was found shells could continue their
trajectory for a while after hitting the water, almost acting like
torpedoes, one reason why no further battleships were built, given
the extra cost to cope with the new threat.

Post by David Wilma
In the Battle off Samar and at Surigao Strait there were thousands of rounds
expended with few finding their marks. Torpedoes proved to be the
decisive weapon. The DDs, DE and CVE were sunk by gunfire though, but
only after many, many shots.

The Japanese spent most of the Samar battle assuming they were
fighting US fleet carriers and so fired AP, which tended not to explode
inside any US ships they hit. It was one reason they went for the wind
gauge instead of charging directing into the USN formation. Add the
use of smoke screens and passing showers.

Surigao strait was a night engagement, we do not know how many
shells hit, the attacking US destroyers reported lots of hits from
the other ships, we do know the USS Grant was hit 11 times after
being mistaken for a Japanese ship.

How many rounds are reported to have been fired at Surigao?

Post by David Wilma
I know that field artillery isn't much better, but on land a near miss can still
be damaging.

Near misses can be quite dangerous on land, sea and in the air.

Post by David Wilma
My point is that a lot of national effort was spent on weapons
and technology that didn't quite work as advertised.

Few weapons work as advertised, the usual marketing oversell
meeting the real world situation.

Post by David Wilma
Did World War II have other weapons that didn't deliver as advertised. The
Norden and Sperry bombsights come to mind. What others?

The tolerance for the bomb sights were relaxed in order to have enough,
just about the time the demand dropped. And of course there is the
inevitable degradation in performance between a lone sortie at a bombing
range with a clear target and bombing a real life target while under fire
and
needing to hold formation.

In any case it was really the bombing that failed to live up to pre war
theories.

Firstly the theories assumed medium altitudes, short range, no radar and
chemical and even biological weapons. What they then failed to do was
account for navigation, weather, target identification (simple error, smoke
screens, camouflage), effects of ground and air defences and, far more
importantly, did almost no studies on how much damage the bombs
actually did. Nor were there many satisfactory intelligence sources
developed during the war to accurately report what damage had been done.

Bomb sights were well down the list of error sources.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Michael Emrys]

...far more importantly, [the various air forces] did almost no
studies on how much damage the bombs actually did.

I think this is a key point. It is very easy to blow the roofs off of
factories, which looks very impressive in post-strike photos. Disabling
heavy machine tools, which are by their very nature quite robust, is
another matter entirely. In many cases once the debris had been swept
off, fresh electrical connections made, and the machines had if
necessary been re-calibrated, they were back in business.

Michael

[Dave Smith]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Yes, it was a surprise when it was found shells could continue their
trajectory for a while after hitting the water, almost acting like
torpedoes, one reason why no further battleships were built, given
the extra cost to cope with the new threat.

I thought that the reason that they stopped making battleships was that
they had been trumped by air craft carriers.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Dave Smith

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Yes, it was a surprise when it was found shells could continue their
trajectory for a while after hitting the water, almost acting like
torpedoes, one reason why no further battleships were built, given
the extra cost to cope with the new threat.

I thought that the reason that they stopped making battleships was that
they had been trumped by air craft carriers.

As noted above one reason was the cost of providing the underwater
protection needed against "near misses" cost a lot of tonnage, it
was something the USN discovered pre war, then
add the extra air threat, the understanding that soft items like radar
were now very important and the concept of armour became out
dated or simply prohibitively expensive in terms of tonnage and cost
in offensive weapons.

The 1939 RN Lion class were to mount nine 16 inch guns on 42,500
tons, the post war rework to keep the same main battery plus better
AA plus better underwater protection (from rockets in this case)
meant the ship was around 60,000 tons and actually longer than the
planned US Montana class with twelve 16 inch guns. Reducing the
tonnage back to around 44,000 tons meant a main battery of six
16 inch guns. Also apparently the shell defences, armour, hurt the
multi bulkhead torpedo defences, as they were supposed to deform
to absorb damage.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[c***@gmail.com]

Post by Dave Smith
I thought that the reason that they stopped making battleships was that
they had been trumped by air craft carriers.

As D.K. Brown- who knows more than anyone about shipbuilding, put it, it
wasn't that battleships were so vulnerable that meant they were replaced-
carriers are far more vulnerable than battleships. It was that carriers
could attack from hundreds of miles away, while the battleship could not,
that spelled the end of the big gun/big armor paradigm.

Chris Manteuffel

[Ray]

Post by c***@gmail.com

Post by Dave Smith
I thought that the reason that they stopped making battleships was that
they had been trumped by air craft carriers.

As D.K. Brown- who knows more than anyone about shipbuilding, put it, it
wasn't that battleships were so vulnerable that meant they were replaced-
carriers are far more vulnerable than battleships. It was that carriers
could attack from hundreds of miles away, while the battleship could not,
that spelled the end of the big gun/big armor paradigm.
Chris Manteuffel

Not entirely true. If the Japanee Admiral at Samar has pressed forward he
would have wiped out about 18 escort carriers a bunch more destroyer and when
in the gulf wiped out a bunch of LSTS and a bunch of landing craft and
freighters. Remember that it was battleships to the sought that turned back
even morse battleships from attacking the beaches.

Another aspect is that they were the bast means of destroying beach defenses.
It is worthwhile to examine the destruction of fortifications, tanks and troop
dispositions at Normandy. Morison in XI of his History of US Naval operations
goes into a lot of detail here. He was a cheerleader for the Nave but seems to
have been accurate.

[Rich]

Post by Ray
Not entirely true. If the Japanee Admiral at Samar has pressed forward he
would have wiped out about 18 escort carriers a bunch more destroyer and when
in the gulf wiped out a bunch of LSTS and a bunch of landing craft and
freighters. Remember that it was battleships to the sought that turned back
even morse battleships from attacking the beaches.

Unlikely Ray. In exchange for losing all six of his cruisers and two of his 11
destroyers, Kurita had sunk two DD, one DE, and one CVE. Two of Taffy 3's CVE
were still fully operational, as were the ten of Taffy 1 and 2, which had
completely broken surface contact. Furthermore, Oldendorf's battle line was
intact and in the way of Kurita getting into the anchorage. The only result of him pressing forward would have been the annihilation of his forces.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Rich
Furthermore, Oldendorf's battle line was
intact and in the way of Kurita getting into the anchorage.

You sure about that, Rich? It's been a long time since I read the
relevant part of the history of the battle, but my impression is that
Oldendorf's force was still making its way back from the Surigao Strait
and would have been out of position to block Kurita. I also seem to
recall reading that they had already shot off most of their AP shells
and would have needed to resupply before taking on capital ships. But
then, Kurita might have been running low by this time as well, so that
part might have been a stand-off.

Michael

[Rich]

Post by Michael Emrys
You sure about that, Rich? It's been a long time since I read the
relevant part of the history of the battle, but my impression is that
Oldendorf's force was still making its way back from the Surigao Strait
and would have been out of position to block Kurita. I also seem to
recall reading that they had already shot off most of their AP shells
and would have needed to resupply before taking on capital ships. But
then, Kurita might have been running low by this time as well, so that
part might have been a stand-off.

Yep. Sure. For locations, look at a chart and times. No way can
Kurita get to the anchorage before Oldendorf.

The expenditure of AP in the Surigao fight is known, as is
the AP carried. The following is AP Expended/AP Remaining:

West Virginia 93/107
Tennessee 69/327
California 63/177
Maryland 48/192
Mississippi 9/189
Pennsylvania 0/360

The cruisers were probably in worse shape, but Oldendorf could call on
29 DD plus another 40-odd screening the transports and it was the DD that
had proved to be as deadly against the Japanese, both at Surigao and at
Samar.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Rich
West Virginia 93/107
Tennessee 69/327
California 63/177
Maryland 48/192
Mississippi 9/189
Pennsylvania 0/360

Well, that pretty well covers that as far as I am concerned.

:-)

Michael

[Rich]

Post by Michael Emrys
Well, that pretty well covers that as far as I am concerned.

Yes, with as much as a three to one advantage in DD and the 5"/38 with
Mark 8 FC, the American destroyers will likely go through the Japanese destroyers,
now without cruiser support, like a hot knife through melted butter.
With the four Japanese BB being pounded by 14" and 16" AP (the Mark
3 FC in Maryland, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania would not be hampered
by darkness obscuring visual azimuths) they likely would then quickly
go under to destroyer torpedo attacks. And then of course there is the
ongoing air attacks.

[Michael Emrys]

And then of course there is the ongoing air attacks.

Would the surviving Taffies have enough anti-naval ordnance left for
that to be much of a factor? They had been making attacks all morning
and my impression was that they were essentially there to provide ground
support to the troops, and thus would not be carrying that much
anti-naval stores (torpedoes and AP bombs) in the first place. I suppose
they have continued to drop GP bombs, but against battleships those
would probably not have constituted much more than a nuisance.

Michael

[Rich]

Post by Michael Emrys
I suppose
they have continued to drop GP bombs, but against battleships those
would probably not have constituted much more than a nuisance.

The problem is that "nuisance" had proven to be very destructive that
morning, not least because it disrupted Japanese formations and fire
control solutions.

[David Wilma]

Post by Rich

Post by Michael Emrys
Well, that pretty well covers that as far as I am concerned.

Yes, with as much as a three to one advantage in DD and the 5"/38 with
Mark 8 FC, the American destroyers will likely go through the Japanese destroyers,
now without cruiser support, like a hot knife through melted butter.

Did not the U.S. DDs at Surigao expend their torpedoes? Or did they carry
extras that could be reloaded at sea?

[Rich]

Post by David Wilma
Did not the U.S. DDs at Surigao expend their torpedoes? Or did they carry
extras that could be reloaded at sea?

Yes, most did, but the 40-odd other DD's of the transport screen hadn't. And
no they reloaded from an AD (destroyer tender). I'd have to look to see if
any were in the invasion fleet train, but I expect they were.

[Jim H.]

On Friday, February 20, 2015 at 12:52:12 PM UTC-5, Rich wrote:
.....

Post by Rich
Yes, most did, but the 40-odd other DD's of the transport screen hadn't. And
no they reloaded from an AD (destroyer tender). I'd have to look to see if
any were in the invasion fleet train, but I expect they were.

The US might have suffered a few blue-on-blue incidents
if the 40 'cans, let alone 70 or so, had been turned loose
against Kurita. But his ships would literally have had no
way to turn. Imagine almost a hundred torpedoes, maybe more,
hitting the water at the same time, all coming your way....

Basing guesses about how the US escorts would have behaved
on what Taffy 3's actually did, I wonder if the US BB's, cruisers,
and CVE's would even have been needed.

Jim H.

[Michael Emrys]

Basing guesses about how the US escorts would have behaved on what
Taffy 3's actually did, I wonder if the US BB's, cruisers, and CVE's
would even have been needed.

In a straight up fight the BBs would have been more survivable, like as not.

Michael