Marines in ETO

[Merlin Dorfman]

I have heard that General Marshall did not want the Marines "showing
up" the Army as they perhaps did in WW I, so he forbade Marines as ground
troops in Europe.
(1) Is it true that, while Marines obviously served aboard ships and in
small numbers in other roles, they did not serve in numbers in ground
combat because of Marshall's objections?
(2) If true, how did he get this absolute authority over American ground
forces in the ETO? Was it formally granted by the Joint Chiefs or FDR?
Or did the Chiefs and FDR accede to Marshall's wishes?
(3) Large numbers of Marines fought under MacArthur in the Southwest
Pacific. Did Marshall not object to that, or not have the authority in
that theater, or ...?

[John Dallman]

Post by Merlin Dorfman
(3) Large numbers of Marines fought under MacArthur in the
Southwest Pacific. Did Marshall not object to that, or not have
the authority in that theater, or ...?

I have no idea about the US Army-Navy politics, but since the USMC was
the organisation that specialised in opposed landings, and there were
obviously going to be a lot of those in capturing islands across the
Pacific, it seems possible that using them there was simply a pragmatic
decision.

John

[news]

On Tue, 22 Apr 2014 18:19:54 -0400, Merlin Dorfman

Post by Merlin Dorfman
(3) Large numbers of Marines fought under MacArthur in the Southwest
Pacific. Did Marshall not object to that, or not have the authority in
that theater, or ...?

Given the primary role of the Marines was supposed to be amphibious
operations and that with two obvious exceptions (i.e. Sicily/Salerno
1943 , Normany 1944 - Torch was not considered especilaly 'amphibious'
from the US point of view) pretty much all the amphibious operations
were in the PTO one wonders how any reasonable objection could have
been made.

Clearly the USMC was going to be used SOMEWHERE in WW2!

[Merlin Dorfman]

On Wed, 23 Apr 2014 10:42:15 -0400, news wrote:

..

Post by news
Given the primary role of the Marines was supposed to be amphibious
operations and that with two obvious exceptions (i.e. Sicily/Salerno
1943 , Normandy 1944 - Torch was not considered especially 'amphibious'
from the US point of view) pretty much all the amphibious operations
were in the PTO one wonders how any reasonable objection could have been
made.

Torch, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Normandy, Southern France--certainly
not as many as in the Pacific but not to be "sneezed at."
Also wondering why Torch was not especially amphibious from the US
point of view.

Post by news
Clearly the USMC was going to be used SOMEWHERE in WW2!

By far the most extensive use of the Marines was in Nimitz's Pacific
area including the South Pacific: Guadalcanal and up the Solomons chain,
Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Peleliu, Okinawa.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Merlin Dorfman
I have heard that General Marshall did not want the Marines "showing
up" the Army as they perhaps did in WW I, so he forbade Marines as ground
troops in Europe. . . .
(3) Large numbers of Marines fought under MacArthur in the Southwest
Pacific. Did Marshall not object to that, or not have the authority in
that theater, or ...?

Admiral King and his relations with Marshall and Roosevelt
are obviously relevant here, as is the prewar Rainbow Plan
that resolved to give Europe priority if the USA found itself
at war with both Germany and Japan (as it turned out in
December 1941, by Axis rather than American initiative.)

The Chief Naval Officer was reputed to be jealously partisan
for the USN, i.e. wanted it to be able to "fight its own war" as
much as possible, and not be merely an auxiliary ferrying the
US Army to overseas theatres. He was also unusually anti-
British (notoriously unwilling to have the USN learn
from RN experience 1939-41. He probably thought the RN
had fought badly, half its aircraft carriers having been sunk.)

These forces (and prewar army/navy politics) combined to
make the ETO principally an army war and the PTO a navy
war, with Nimitz as theatre commander for the Central Pacific
and Macarthur (army) theatre commander for the South Pacific.
Macarthur had scope to claim army authority but knew
how far he depended on the USN for men and supplies,
thus had to stifle at least some of his feelings: and was
served by many staff officers who believed cheerful co-operation
between the USN and army were possible and necessary.
No bad feeling among army generals under Nimitz is reported.

Marshall might of course have been as anti-USMC as King
was supposed to be anti-army (and if so would probably have
kept this feeling to himself) but neither Marshall nor King
needed help or external prompting to agree generally to this
division of prime responsibilities. This left King with permanent
reasons to complain, so far as the Rainbow Plan gave the ETO
priority over the PTO, but some munitions were always in
short supply (cf. the removal of landing craft from the Mediterranean
theatre for use in Normandy on D-Day, allegedly because King
had diverted more than the navy's fair share to the PTO.)

In this context, there seems to have been no conflict between
USMC and army combat officers or corporals comparable with the
competition for resources between USN and army commanders
(e.g. use of Springfield vs. Garand rifles, shortage of sea patrol
(ASW) bombers, army vs. navy code-breakers etc.)

[Michael Emrys]

...Macarthur (army) theatre commander for the South Pacific.

Actually Macarthur was Commander Southwest Pacific. Command of the South
Pacific Area was first vested in Vice Admiral Ghormley and then in Vice
Admiral Halsey until 15 June 1944 at about which time it was merged with
SouWesPac.

Michael

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Merlin Dorfman
I have heard that General Marshall did not want the Marines "showing
up" the Army as they perhaps did in WW I, so he forbade Marines as ground
troops in Europe.
(1) Is it true that, while Marines obviously served aboard ships and in
small numbers in other roles, they did not serve in numbers in ground
combat because of Marshall's objections?

Not only Marshall's objections, but the
general distaste in the Army for having
ground forces present that would not be
equipped and trained to Army standards
or be under Army discipline or chain of
command (except as specially arranged).

And there was the obvious fact that
the PTO could use every available
Marine and then some. Sending some
fraction of the Corps to the ETO
would have greatly complicated the
Corps' internal operations, and to
no particular benefit.

The Marines were created as the Navy's
soldiers. It made far more sense to
deploy them in the theater where naval
operations were predominant.

Having noted all that - there _were_
some Marines in the ETO. Two cases
I know of:

During the D-Day landings, Marine
sharpshooters manned the bows of naval
vessels approaching the shore, to
shoot (and safe-detonate) any mines
in their paths.

A detachment of Marines was sent to
Iceland as guard force for the
U.S. Naval Air Station there.

(This invites a further question:
were there formal USN bases in
Britain, North Africa, France, or
Italy? And if so, were Marines
assigned there as guards?)

[a425couple]

Post by Rich Rostrom
And there was the obvious fact that
the PTO could use every available
Marine and then some. Sending some
fraction of the Corps to the ETO
would have greatly complicated the
Corps' internal operations, and to
no particular benefit.
The Marines were created as the Navy's
soldiers. It made far more sense to
deploy them in the theater where naval
operations were predominant.

Yes. (Or pretty much, replace "infantry" for 'soldiers'.)
The US Marine Corps is part of the Department of the
Navy. I believe Admiral Nimitz was the only US Navy
officer in charge of a major theater of operations in WWII
(Nimitz had the Pacific Ocean Areas ((POA)) ).
Standard and normal reporting lines are best kept intact.

Although this quoted official codefication only dates from 1947,
it grew from earlier understandings (especially 1834):
"Mission, The USMC serves as an expeditionary force-in-readiness
with three primary areas of responsibility:
- The seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and other land
operations to support naval campaigns;
- The development of tactics, technique, and equipment used by
amphibious landing forces in coordination with the Army and Air Force; and
- Such other duties as the President may direct."
(The first and second items definitely pertained more to Pacific than
Europe.)

Also the size of the USMC (only 6 divisions at it's peak) would not
have made much difference in Europe, but was major in the Pacific.
The PTO tempo of operations (short duration with very high intensity)
also more suited the USMC size.