What if the British were less aggressive in WW2?

[SolomonW]

During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war. Many decisions as such were
made that were questionable. Some examples a diversion to Greece, when the
troops should have been used in North Africa. Another would be an
ineffectual air bombing of Germany rather than more use of air against
U-boats.

What would have happened if the British had been less aggressive?

[Hans Christian Hoff]

Post by SolomonW
During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war. Many decisions as such were
made that were questionable. Some examples a diversion to Greece, when the
troops should have been used in North Africa. Another would be an
ineffectual air bombing of Germany rather than more use of air against
U-boats.

I suppose you mean to ask what would have happened if the British had
been less energetic in their warfare against the aggressor ? Luckily we
were never to know !

Regards

Hans

[William Black]

Post by SolomonW
During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war. Many decisions as such were
made that were questionable. Some examples a diversion to Greece, when the
troops should have been used in North Africa. Another would be an
ineffectual air bombing of Germany rather than more use of air against
U-boats.
What would have happened if the British had been less aggressive?

How do you get more air power used against U-boats when the U-boats
avoided the areas where the aircraft could operate?

Now I have no idea about how effective and what sort of range the
maritime reconnaissance version of the Lancaster was but I imagine it
wasn't wonderful or I could have found out on the net...

[SolomonW]

Post by William Black
Now I have no idea about how effective and what sort of range the
maritime reconnaissance version of the Lancaster was but I imagine it
wasn't wonderful or I could have found out on the net...

There is a lot more to air power than Lancasters


What happened is that the British were prepared to release Halifaxs for the
U-boat war because they wanted to keep the Lancasters for bombing.

Still as Halifax showed these planes were useful against U-boats.

[William Black]

Post by SolomonW

Post by William Black
Now I have no idea about how effective and what sort of range the
maritime reconnaissance version of the Lancaster was but I imagine it
wasn't wonderful or I could have found out on the net...

There is a lot more to air power than Lancasters

True, but it isn't as simple as you seem to think.

What's important is closing the gap in the middle of the Atlantic.

As far as I'm aware the first aircraft that had sufficient range to do
this was the Consolidated Liberator.

But these versatile aircraft were in great demand and large numbers of
the maritime patrol variant weren't made available until May 1943.

Now the range of the Liberator was about the same as that of the
Lancaster, which was available earlier.

So I'll try again...

Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by William Black

Post by SolomonW

Post by William Black
Now I have no idea about how effective and what sort of range the
maritime reconnaissance version of the Lancaster was but I imagine it
wasn't wonderful or I could have found out on the net...

There is a lot more to air power than Lancasters

True, but it isn't as simple as you seem to think.
What's important is closing the gap in the middle of the Atlantic.

Yes, but only after the coastal areas are secured, and escort carriers
are also a way of doing mid Atlantic cover.

Post by William Black
As far as I'm aware the first aircraft that had sufficient range to do
this was the Consolidated Liberator.

Not quite, the standard B-24 required modifications, the time it took
for the RAF to do such modifications was a source of friction with
the USAAF in 1941 and 1942.

Similar modifications would be needed for a very long range
Lancaster.

Post by William Black
But these versatile aircraft were in great demand and large numbers of the
maritime patrol variant weren't made available until May 1943.

The UK received 24 B-24s in 1941 and another 124 in 1942, all
delivered to the UK. The RAF chose to form B-24 bomber squadrons
as well as the VLR Coastal Command Units.

The first Coastal Command B-24 squadron was around in July 1941
but had few aircraft, and still only had 10 by January 1942. By
October 1942 there were 3 squadrons with 42 aircraft, they were
down to 31 aircraft on 1 January 1943, up to 54 on 1 April 1943.

By 1 October 1943 there were 6 squadrons with 97 aircraft.

Plus of course the USAAF and USN units but I think these operated
aircraft that were not modified to the VLR standard.

Post by William Black
Now the range of the Liberator was about the same as that of the
Lancaster, which was available earlier.
So I'll try again...
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

The Lancaster was clearly the superior bomber versus the Halifax and
Stirling, it could carry more bombs, bigger bombs, over longer distances,
at higher speeds, at greater altitudes. That made it the choice aircraft
for bombing.

Hence why the Halifax was given to Coastal Command, and why the
Warwick ended up in all sorts of versions but only a few of which were
officially bomber, the original design intention.

Note the later radial engined Halifax versions closed the performance
gap, but that was in 1944 and 1945.

Hence why in order the Stirling, from November 1943, the Halifax,
from January 1945 and finally the Lancaster (around November
1945, the Lancastrian) were delivered as transport or glider tug
or paratroop versions. By the end of 1945 the Lincoln was in
full production, with 317 built in 1945.

Apparently officially 1 Lancaster was delivered as a mark Ic, which
implies Coastal Command, but not until February 1945, part of, by
the looks of it, a plan to build enough for at least 1 squadron.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Halmyre]

Post by William Black
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

Air Chief Marshall Arthur Harris?

--
Halmyre

[William Black]

Post by Halmyre

Post by William Black
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

Air Chief Marshall Arthur Harris?

His comments about parachutists are famously on record, but not on
marine patrol aircraft.

And despite the almost God like powers some people ascribe to him, he
was not in a position to dictate to anyone about deployment of aircraft
types except those he'd had assigned to his command.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Halmyre

Post by William Black
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

Air Chief Marshall Arthur Harris?

Not likely because:
-- the commitment to enlarge Bomber Command (to a
target establishment of 2,000 heavy bombers) was made by
the Air Council, a higher level than Harris.
-- the allocation of newly-delivered aircraft was similarly an
Air Council responsibility.

Cf. also the marginal reputation of Coastal Command
compared with Bomber and Fighter Commands, the RAF's
principal offensive and defensive weaponds, discussed in
another post. (This reputation was incorrect: but it
continued, sustained by the personalities of commanding
air marshals. This was why Rhubarbs (offensive fighter
sweeps over France in daytime) continued despite
heavy casualties in 1941-42. Fighter Command seemed
just as indifferent to losses as Bomber Command. Rhubarbs
seem best to support the OP's thesis that the British were
too aggressive for their own good.)

[alo]

Post by William Black
Now the range of the Liberator was about the same as that of the
Lancaster, which was available earlier.
So I'll try again...
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

Bomber Harris (Sir Arthur Harris).... his plan to bomb Germany into
surrender required every Lancaster coming off the production line to
put into operational units in Bomber Command.

[William Black]

Post by alo

Post by William Black
Now the range of the Liberator was about the same as that of the
Lancaster, which was available earlier.
So I'll try again...
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

Bomber Harris (Sir Arthur Harris).... his plan to bomb Germany into
surrender required every Lancaster coming off the production line to
put into operational units in Bomber Command.

Harris didn't have that much power.

[alo]

On Sun, 07 Nov 2010 15:27:09 -0500, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by alo

Post by William Black
Now the range of the Liberator was about the same as that of the
Lancaster, which was available earlier.
So I'll try again...
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

Bomber Harris (Sir Arthur Harris).... his plan to bomb Germany into
surrender required every Lancaster coming off the production line to
put into operational units in Bomber Command.

Harris didn't have that much power.

He had the ear of Winston Churchill... in the early part of the war,
when Germany was in the ascendancy, the only way the UK could strike
back at Germany directly was via Bomber Command.

Harris was focused on defeating Germany via a massive heavy bombing
campaign.

With little else available (at the time) Churchill enabled him to
build up the strength of Bomber Command to meet this aspiration. The
first 1000 bomber raid was only achieved by stripping training units
of their aircraft, and indeed their aircrew. Tensions between the
three armed services were stretched (especially with the Royal Navy)
as Sir Arthur Harris's narrow vision excluded more rational use and
planning of the UK's growing air power.

[William Black]

Post by alo
On Sun, 07 Nov 2010 15:27:09 -0500, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by alo

Post by William Black
Now the range of the Liberator was about the same as that of the
Lancaster, which was available earlier.
So I'll try again...
Does anyone know why Coastal Command weren't issued with the Lancaster
marine variant?

Bomber Harris (Sir Arthur Harris).... his plan to bomb Germany into
surrender required every Lancaster coming off the production line to
put into operational units in Bomber Command.

Harris didn't have that much power.

He had the ear of Winston Churchill... in the early part of the war,
when Germany was in the ascendancy, the only way the UK could strike
back at Germany directly was via Bomber Command.

Do you have some proof that Churchill had the ability to direct bombers
to Bomber Command at the cost of other arms of the service?

I have seen no such proof that he ever interfered at that level but left
that sort of thing to experts.

[Alan Meyer]

Post by SolomonW
During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war. Many decisions as such were
made that were questionable. Some examples a diversion to Greece, when the
troops should have been used in North Africa. Another would be an
ineffectual air bombing of Germany rather than more use of air against
U-boats.
What would have happened if the British had been less aggressive?

If we extend the time frame back a bit, I would include the Norway
campaign as another example, and I think the most obvious cases, in
addition to Greece and Crete may be Dieppe and the aerial bombing
campaign. Certainly in the latter two cases, there was very little to
be gained (I'm talking about bombing before 1943, and even during much
of 43.)

Obviously, the war would have turned out the same way had they been less
aggressive, and there would probably have been fewer British casualties.

I think of the aggressiveness that you cite as being due in part to
Churchill's aggressive personality, his need to hit back, to do
something, to refuse to passively accept that Germany had the upper hand
in the war.

But it was not all a matter of Churchill's personality. Part of the
reason for the aggressiveness was political. Churchill wanted to
demonstrate to all of the people of Europe that Britain was serious
about fighting the war. If they fought, they could count on Britain to
be committed to the war. They wouldn't be abandoned to their fate.

I believe that was the major motivation in Greece. The British must
have known how precarious, if not downright suicidal, their
participation would be. But the Greeks needed to know that they had a
real ally, not just a great power that was manipulating them to fight
and die in a hopeless cause.

Later, after Greece fell and Russia was invaded, the British knew that
they needed to demonstrate some effort to the Free French and other
resistance forces, to the Spanish and Turks to keep them away from any
German alliances (and, in the best of all worlds bring them in on the
Allied side), and most of all, to the Soviets.

I think that in Churchill's mind these were both political and moral
imperatives.

Whether they had any positive effect on the war however is certainly
questionable.

Alan

[SolomonW]

Post by Alan Meyer
Later, after Greece fell and Russia was invaded, the British knew that
they needed to demonstrate some effort to the Free French and other
resistance forces, to the Spanish and Turks to keep them away from any
German alliances (and, in the best of all worlds bring them in on the
Allied side), and most of all, to the Soviets.

Much was in this period in an attempt to placate Stalin because of no
second front. Churchill stated that when he went to Moscow, then he had
nothing except air bombing to offer Stalin.

[Chris]

Post by Alan Meyer
I believe that was the major motivation in Greece. The British must
have known how precarious, if not downright suicidal, their
participation would be. But the Greeks needed to know that they had a
real ally, not just a great power that was manipulating them to fight
and die in a hopeless cause.

Given that Italy invaded Greece, the Greeks stopped them, and then
Germany invaded Greece, and then Britain came to its aid, I seriously
doubt that being manipulated by the British was a major concern for
most Greeks.

While I have some sympathy for the position that Greece was a
necessary political statement, the question that comes to mind is why
was it necessary to involve 60,000 men in a "precarious, if not
downright suicidal" operation. Would not the same message have been
sent equally well with 20,000 men? With the advantage of hindsight
Crete's obvious geographic advantages as a sea and air base makes it
much more valuable than the Greek mainland which simply can't be
effectively defended or supplied against a continental power with
sufficient Luftwaffe support. Perhaps putting 20,000 men ashore on the
Greek mainland, and another 20,000 directly to Crete would have been a
much better plan than putting 60k on the mainland, then having to pull
them off again and dropping 30k troops, already defeated once and
without most of their heavy equipment, on Crete, only to have to pull
them off again.

Chris Manteuffel

[Louis C]

Post by Chris
Would not the same message have been
sent equally well with 20,000 men?

20,000 men would send the message that Britain was ready to dispatch a
token force, the better to evacuate it at the first sign of trouble.

So the message wouldn't have been the same. Remember, part of the
reason why the British felt they had to make a statement was the
perception that they'd left their other allies down in 1940.

I'm not claiming the British should necessarily have sent a full
force, mind you, just pointing out the difference between the two.


LC

[Chris]

Post by Louis C
20,000 men would send the message that Britain was ready to dispatch a
token force, the better to evacuate it at the first sign of trouble.

How would anyone outside the British government be able to tell the
difference between 20,000 men and 60,000? Anyone on the ground in
Greece would have had grave difficulty seeing more than a few thousand
British troops at any given point even at 60K. The 60K historically
put ashore singularly failed to delay the German advance by much, so
anyone reading the newspaper wouldn't really notice much of a
difference either. The only people who would really know the
difference would be the higher level people in the Greek government
and military, and the same level in the British government and
military. One presumes that the Greeks would be grateful for any help
at all: if the British told them 'sorry, but 40k is all we can spare
and we need to protect Crete as a logistical base with half of that'
would the Greeks be angry at the British? I am doubtful.

The basic problem is that supplying an army in high intensity combat
would be essentially impossible once the Luftwaffe got airbases set up
in Yugoslavia and Northern Greece, no matter how effective the British
and Greek armies were. The same logistical realities that smashed the
Japanese at Guadalcanal would break the British in Greece: you can't
operate merchant ships without air superiority, and without merchant
ships you can't support large numbers of troops in contact. If the
British needed to do something like Operation Pedestal every week or
so even the RN would have eventually had to fold, no matter how many
ships they had. The idea of supplying 60k men with tanks and heavy
equipment using just warships like the Tokyo Express is laughable.
Note the major difference between Sealion and here is the slow,
unmanageable merchant ships; to defeat Sealowe all the British needed
to do was have their warships- well armed, fast and maneuverable-
survive enemy air attack. To supply an army in Greece they must keep
their slow, plodding, almost defenseless merchant ships alive.

Post by Louis C
So the message wouldn't have been the same. Remember, part of the
reason why the British felt they had to make a statement was the
perception that they'd left their other allies down in 1940.

In April 1941 Britain has only Greece as an ally. The Greeks are, as I
argued above, logistically doomed once Germany attacked, and my guess
is, without ever looking into the issue at all, that they knew it too.
There is also a bitter French Vichy government desperately trying to
blame the British for the terrible outcome of Fall Gelb. The French
were not going to be salved by anything that the British do in Greece-
the experience of their defeat is simply too large for even a miracle
defensive stand that actually holds the Germans to matter. There are
neutral Turkey and Spain, which Britain really wants to keep neutral,
but they won't be dissuaded from joining the war by a hopeless
sacrifice for a British ally, but by the possibility that a resurgent
Britain will really put the hurt on them- so the more Britain looks
like a winner, the better Britain does with them- humiliating defeats
like Crete are bad and need to be prevented. There are the USSR and
the US, but again how would 60,000 men being risked impress either of
those nations?

So I'm left with the idea that the British felt guilty over the Fall
of France and sacrificed 40,000 troops (losses during both Greece and
Crete)- and Crete, a potentially quite useful base that they could
keep- to ease some of that guilt.

Chris Manteuffel

[Louis C]

Post by Chris
How would anyone outside the British government be able to tell the
difference between 20,000 men and 60,000?

They wouldn't be able to tell exactly how many troops there were, on
the other hand 20,000 was about enough to garrison Crete and service
RAF & RN bases in Greece. 60,000 (or 50,000, or 70,000) meant a small
corps' worth of ground troops. That's a real commitment, one that can
be talked about, written about, photographed, etc. People would be
able to tell the difference, even if they didn't know the exact troop
count.

Post by Chris
The 60K historically
put ashore singularly failed to delay the German advance by much, so
anyone reading the newspaper wouldn't really notice much of a
difference either.

Well, of course the British hadn't expected their force to be routed
that quickly. Had he somehow known the sort of disaster he was
courting, I believe even Churchill would have cut his losses.

But then, I wasn't defending the notion of sending a ground contingent
on military grounds, just pointing out that, assuming the force sent
could make at least a token stand (an assumption that wasn't
sufficiently challenged at the time), there were real political
reasons to send more than a division's worth of troops.

Post by Chris
The only people who would really know the
difference would be the higher level people in the Greek government
and military, and the same level in the British government and
military.

You mean the people who get to talk to newspapers?

Post by Chris
One presumes that the Greeks would be grateful for any help

Grateful or not, they would take what they were given. What else could
they do? So I don't think that the British needed to worry overmuch
about Greek gratitude.

Post by Chris
The basic problem is that supplying an army in high intensity combat
would be essentially impossible once the Luftwaffe got airbases set up
in Yugoslavia and Northern Greece, no matter how effective the British
and Greek armies were.

That's part of the problem, yes. Please note that the logistical
equation isn't as clear-cut as you make it, however. Projecting
significant air power through the Balkans wasn't easy. Difficult
terrain, poor communications. The British could hope to do a small
Malta, or a small BoB in Greece. I'm not claiming this makes the idea
a good one, just that it was more than the non-starter you describe.

Post by Chris
In April 1941 Britain has only Greece as an ally.

...which is why it was hoping to acquire more. So showing a
willingness to take risks for an ally's sake was worthwhile. That
doesn't mean that the political benefits outweighed the military risks
in the event, just that it wasn't a case of thoughtless
aggressiveness.

Post by Chris
There is also a bitter French Vichy government desperately trying to
blame the British for the terrible outcome of Fall Gelb.

In 1940, the BEF was smaller than the British commitment to France had
been by the same time in 1915, without even counting the losses that
the WWI BEF had taken during the first months of the war. That was a
fact, which Britain could only gloss over, but which bitter Vichy
French and far more effective German propaganda relayed. Other
neutrals were understandably wary of Churchill's calls to pick up
fights with the Axis, at a time when the British track record
consisted of evacuations (first Norway, then France).

Again, I'm not claiming that the British were right. My point is that,
IF the military cost could be made bearable (a big "if", as it turned
out), then there were sound reasons to support Greece beyond a token
land force and some Crete-based air power.

Post by Chris
There are
neutral Turkey and Spain, which Britain really wants to keep neutral,
but they won't be dissuaded from joining the war by a hopeless
sacrifice for a British ally

Of course, the British didn't expect the operation to be "a hopeless
sacrifice" when they went ahead with it. They knew the odds were
against them, but the magnitude of the catastrophe came as a surprise.

Post by Chris
There are the USSR and
the US, but again how would 60,000 men being risked impress either of
those nations?

Actually, Britain taking a plucky stand for Greece, sticking its neck
out to strike a blow for the cause of liberty against tyranny (never
mind the fact that Greece was anything but an epitome of liberty at
the time), was quite popular with the US. Churchill was a shrewd judge
of US public opinion.

Post by Chris
So I'm left with the idea that the British felt guilty over the Fall
of France and sacrificed 40,000 troops (losses during both Greece and
Crete)- and Crete, a potentially quite useful base that they could
keep- to ease some of that guilt.

I don't think the British could have kept Crete after Greece had
fallen, and IIRC there were no plans for doing so. Nor do I believe
that Churchill felt particularly guilty over the Fall of France. He
supported the idea for what he perceived to be its own merits.


LC

[Chris]

Post by Louis C
People would be
able to tell the difference, even if they didn't know the exact troop
count.

Point taken.

Post by Louis C
Projecting
significant air power through the Balkans wasn't easy. Difficult
terrain, poor communications.

If the Brits were going to try and stay for more than a few weeks, the
Germans would certainly be able to bring enough Luftwaffe forward and
support it to cripple the RN- Fliegerkorps X is available and had
already made clear that operations near land would be difficult. The
difficult logistics would be solvable, given time. Historically, the
British and Greeks were unable to last long enough to demonstrate
that, but it was inevitable.

Post by Louis C
The British could hope to do a small
Malta, or a small BoB in Greece.

Neither of those required supplying troops in high intensity combat.
Troops in combat go through ammo, fuel, equipment, medicine and spare
parts at a much higher rate than troops sitting in garrison like at
Malta and BoB. They would need lots of merchant ships. And those
merchant ships would need to be run through a Luftwaffe gauntlet
regularly.

Post by Louis C
In 1940, the BEF was smaller than the British commitment to France had
been by the same time in 1915, without even counting the losses that
the WWI BEF had taken during the first months of the war.

Certainly true. Britain was much more reluctant to send troops in the
second war than the first. Then again, Germans noted a distinct lack
of enthusiasm in 1939 relative to 1914. I would hazard a guess that
France was similar. Everyone remembered the horrors of WWI as a check
on their willingness to commit to the war.

Post by Louis C
Other
neutrals were understandably wary of Churchill's calls to pick up
fights with the Axis, at a time when the British track record
consisted of evacuations (first Norway, then France).

But given my contention that they could not hold Greece long term, the
best possible outcome of any intervention would necessarily be an
evacuation ala Narvik.

Post by Louis C
Actually, Britain taking a plucky stand for Greece, sticking its neck
out to strike a blow for the cause of liberty against tyranny (never
mind the fact that Greece was anything but an epitome of liberty at
the time), was quite popular with the US. Churchill was a shrewd judge
of US public opinion.

Yes, certainly the political value of coming to Greece's aid was high.
I'm just suggesting that fewer troops would have had the same
political value and been less costly.

Post by Louis C
I don't think the British could have kept Crete after Greece had
fallen, and IIRC there were no plans for doing so.

IIRC you are correct that Crete was going to be abandoned, but I am
not convinced that it needed to be if the occupiers had enough heavy
weapons. It is far enough away from the Greek mainland that Luftwaffe
based on the mainland could not effectively interdict merchant ships-
though they could hit ships in port. My hunch is that if Britain had
put troops with their heavy equipment ashore Germany would not have
even attempted the Fallschirmjager invasion, because they would have
seen that there paras had no chance.

Chris Manteuffel

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by Chris
Neither of those required supplying troops in high intensity combat.
Troops in combat go through ammo, fuel, equipment, medicine and spare
parts at a much higher rate than troops sitting in garrison like at
Malta and BoB. They would need lots of merchant ships. And those
merchant ships would need to be run through a Luftwaffe gauntlet
regularly.

Just did a quick check of Shores and Cull (Air War for Yugoslavia,
Creece and Crete) They list 90 Allied merchant ships of 1,000+ tons
lost to air attack beween March 22, 1941 and May 26, 1941.

Including 43 vessels sunk in the four days between April 21-24 alone.

It would have been a formidable gaunlet to run.

[Louis C]

Post by Chris
If the Brits were going to try and stay for more than a few weeks, the
Germans would certainly be able to bring enough Luftwaffe forward and
support it to cripple the RN- Fliegerkorps X is available and had
already made clear that operations near land would be difficult.

Fliegerkorps X wasn't a magic wand. The RN took suffered heavy losses
off Crete because there was no friendly fighter cover and Axis bases
were nearby. If the British are in Greece, with fighter cover and with
more fighters in Crete to protect the sea lanes, the Luftwaffe will
have a fight on its hands interdicting their supply lines.

Post by Chris
The difficult logistics would be solvable, given time.

Certainly. Given time and resources, the Germans would likely crush
the British. Of course, drawing off the major German effort for 1941
to a relatively unimportant area like Greece would be a nice bonus for
the British, at least that would mean German resources wouldn't be
available elsewhere.

Post by Chris

Post by Louis C
The British could hope to do a small
Malta, or a small BoB in Greece.

Neither of those required supplying troops in high intensity combat.

True, though logistics would cut both ways in that particular case.
German logistics in the Balkan campaign weren't easy either, even
though I do agree with your long-term assessment.

Post by Chris
Certainly true. Britain was much more reluctant to send troops in the
second war than the first. Then again, Germans noted a distinct lack
of enthusiasm in 1939 relative to 1914. I would hazard a guess that
France was similar.

I wasn't blaming the British, and French credit had sunk very low by
1941 in any case. My point was that Britain could be considered an
unreliable ally by then.

Post by Chris
But given my contention that they could not hold Greece long term, the
best possible outcome of any intervention would necessarily be an
evacuation ala Narvik.

Churchill wanted to fight the notion that Britain came in, saw, and
evacuated before getting into a serious fight. I'm not saying that's
necessarily a fair assessment, but that particular view was bandied
about, Churchill couldn't know exactly how influential it was, and he
- IMO correctly - felt he had to do something to redress it.
Remember that English-language history draws heavily from English-
language sources, which themselves, for natural reasons, draw on
British sources. While some saw 1940 as Britain's greatest hour,
plucky little island carrying on the fight and all that, for others
the effete and decadent British had been definitely eclipsed as the #1
European power and were now fighting for their existence from their
island.

Post by Chris
Yes, certainly the political value of coming to Greece's aid was high.
I'm just suggesting that fewer troops would have had the same
political value and been less costly.

Fewer troops would obviously have been less costly, but they wouldn't
have had the same political value. Sending fewer troops would probably
have been more cost-effective than what Britain did, however.

Post by Chris
IIRC you are correct that Crete was going to be abandoned, but I am
not convinced that it needed to be if the occupiers had enough heavy
weapons.

The Axis had good bases around Crete to interdict the traffic there.
The island needed a large garrison or it would be untenable, a large
garrison needs large amounts of supply, plus those needed for the
civilians. Add to that the fact that the main 3 ports were on the
northern coast, and I don't think the British could have held on Crete
short of investing more resources than they could have at the time.


LC

[Michele]

"Chris" <***@gmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio news:2c294f2c-3d51-4c02-a012-***@v20g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...

One presumes that the Greeks would be grateful for any help

Post by Chris
at all: if the British told them 'sorry, but 40k is all we can spare
and we need to protect Crete as a logistical base with half of that'
would the Greeks be angry at the British? I am doubtful.

The Greeks would be. Actually they were angry enough with the help actually
sent. Some of them, say Tsolakoglou, thought that the British help was a
token that had only bought the British some time, at the expense of Greece.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by SolomonW
During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war. Many decisions as such were
made that were questionable. Some examples a diversion to Greece, when the
troops should have been used in North Africa. Another would be an
ineffectual air bombing of Germany rather than more use of air against
U-boats.
What would have happened if the British had been less aggressive?

The specific examples undermine the general question.
E.g.1: Greece 1941. Britain sent troops into Greece to implement
Churchill's diplomatic policy seeking to keep all Balkan countries neutral
or pro-Allied. This policy failed (because Jugoslavia, Greece, Romania
etc. all came into the Axis sphere one way or another.) But we cannot
say the diplomatic failed because either British diplomacy or the
British army was too aggressive.

E.g.2: bombing German targets in 1941-42 while the U-boat bases in
France were first created and then made bomb-proof is a notorious error
of Bomber Command (viz. half-hearted and tardy implementation
of Cabinet orders to give priority to anti-U-boat warfare). But it was not
caused by excessive aggression of either air marshals or aircrews.

[SolomonW]

E.g.2: bombing German targets in 1941-42 ... But it was not
caused by excessive aggression of either air marshals or aircrews.

Using planes and radar resources for bombers when they were needed as
maritime patrol aircrafts was wrong and came out of a desire by the British
to attack Germany. The same could be said for their reluctance to use
aircrafts in mining operations.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by SolomonW

E.g.2: bombing German targets in 1941-42 ... But it was not
caused by excessive aggression of either air marshals or aircrews.

Using planes and radar resources for bombers when they were needed as
maritime patrol aircrafts was wrong and came out of a desire by the British
to attack Germany.

The catch here is the low status of Coastal Command in 1941 because
of (in past time) the late 1930s decision to create the Fleet Air Arm viz.
"take away from the RAF" responsibility for maritime patrol. In present
time (1941) Coastal Command was not very good at finding and sinking
submarines at sea or destroying naval installations on shore, mainly
for lack of specialized training and equipment (e.g. Anson, Hudson and
Blenheim aircraft.) There was a further problem of top-level command,
viz. whether the RAF or the RN was "in charge" of aerial ASW.

Limitations of technique and equipment were overcome in 1942-43
(e.g. operational research to design patrol routes, e.g. radar in
Beaufighter
and Liberator aircraft) but command remained split: some Coastal
Command squadrons were directed by the RN commander of
Western Approaches (based at Liverpool, also in command of convoy
escort fleets) and those on the south and east coasts were directed by
the RAF in London. At the same time, the RAF always decided which
men and which aircraft Coastal Command would get.

By 1944 Coastal Command was expert in both escort and submarine-
hunting duties: but it needed years to learn these tasks. This delay
is not attributable mainly to Air Marshal Harris's admitted obsession with
bombing Germany: things were a lot more complicated than that.

[SolomonW]

Post by Don Phillipson
This delay
is not attributable mainly to Air Marshal Harris's admitted obsession with
bombing Germany: things were a lot more complicated than that.

The same could be said almost word for word about air bombing but that did
not stop planes being sent on missions to bomb.


In 1941-42, the coastal command desparately wanted more planes and felt
that they could be useful. I doubt that those planes if supplied would not
have been useful.

[Louis C]

Post by SolomonW
During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war.

You don't win wars by fighting them passively. With hindsight, we know
that the Soviet Union and the United States were going to be dragged
into the war, so the British could have just sat back and consolidated
their position while waiting for the two heavyweights to come in. The
wartime British leadership had no such knowledge. They had to fight
the war on the assumption that both the USA & USSR would remain
neutral throughout, the former a friendly neutral and the latter a
hostile one. That meant being aggressive.

Further note that Churchill didn't have insight into Hitler's
decisions either. By the turn of 1941, Britain was doing very well in
the Mediterranean & Middle East: it was only a matter of time before
Italian East Africa would be overrun, and the direct offensive against
Egypt had been stopped, with good prospects to resume the offensive
against Tripoli later that year. The Greeks were holding firm against
the Italians. So far, so good.
Then suddenly, Germany took interest and everything went wrong:
Illustrious was - with all due apology to Bay Man's trust in armored
flight decks - almost sunk and rendered inoperable for months, Malta
was neutralized as an airbase, Rommel kicked the British back all the
way to Egypt, and it looked like the Balkan dominoes would start
falling. The British didn't know that Germany wasn't headed for the
Middle East. Indeed, there were indications that it might well be:
Rommel's offensive, build up against Greece, diplomatic pressure on
Turkey, sponsoring a revolt in Iraq, making the Vichy French more
"cooperative" in Lebanon-Syria, all these moves could be part of a
master plan aimed at the British position. Supporting Greece made
sense: it might delay the German juggernaut sufficiently to derail it,
it would send a strong signal to Turkey and hopefully prevent that
country from siding with the Axis.

Post by SolomonW
Many decisions as such were
made that were questionable. Some examples a diversion to Greece, when the
troops should have been used in North Africa.

I generally agree with your assessment, but how can you characterize
it as "aggressive"? After all, what the British did was forfeit the
prospects of a later offensive against Tripoli in order to shore up an
ally's defensive position. Hardly aggressive, is it?

Post by SolomonW
Another would be an
ineffectual air bombing of Germany rather than more use of air against
U-boats.

Most of the early-war Bomber Command wouldn't have been of much use
against U-boats. Not targetting the U-boat bases while they were still
being built was clearly an error, and one later recognized as such.
When the Germans occupied Vichy France and started preparations to
build U-boat pens on the Fench Mediterranean coast, the USAAF promptly
bombed the works, and as a result the ground was so disrupted as to
make any further effort on that particular location worthless (or
prohibitively expensive). The Allies had learned that particular
lesson, but it was an oversight, not exactly aggressiveness.

It is true that the Allies could have used more ASW patrol planes, and
that Singapore could have used a fraction of the resources that were
expended nightly in ineffective raids over Germany. But successful
offensives can only be undertaken by prioritizing them. If you allow
non-essential tasks to have their say, you will never have the
resources to attack. Strategic bombing was the only offensive weapon
available to Britain at that stage, and it was logical of Churchill to
prioritize it. Just because most of us, using hindsight, can think of
ways to bring Bomber Command through its learning curve at a fraction
of the cost doesn't mean the decision was irrational.

Post by SolomonW
What would have happened if the British had been less aggressive?

Another example was Dieppe. The raid was clearly a failure, yet it
taught the British some important lessons about air support,
coordinating forces in an amphibious assault, and the desirability of
special tanks. All of these came to good use in the later Allied
amphibious invasions. And the Germans overreacted to the raid as well,
shifting resources at a time when there was no longer any threat.


LC

[Hans Christian Hoff]

Post by Louis C

Post by SolomonW
During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war.

You don't win wars by fighting them passively. With hindsight, we know
that the Soviet Union and the United States were going to be dragged
into the war, so the British could have just sat back and consolidated
their position while waiting for the two heavyweights to come in. The
wartime British leadership had no such knowledge. They had to fight
the war on the assumption that both the USA& USSR would remain
neutral throughout, the former a friendly neutral and the latter a
hostile one. That meant being aggressive.

You will find much about this in Martin Gilbert: "Continue to pester,
nag and bite - Churchill'd war directives" ( ISBN-13: 978-1844135530)
where it is pointed out that Churchill himself considered some of the
schemes risky to say the least, but that it was considered to be of
paramount importance to show activity, both to avoid defeatism at home
and to show the Americans that the English would do their share also if
the US entered the war. The Dieppe raid was probably the worst calamity
to come out of this way of thinking.

Regards

Hans

[Louis C]

Post by Hans Christian Hoff
The Dieppe raid was probably the worst calamity
to come out of this way of thinking.

Much as it pains me to agree with Churchill on strategy, and with due
allowance for the absolute mess that the Jubilee planning was -
practically the perfect lesson on how not to conduct an operation, I
have to point out that Dieppe is probably a good example of what
Britain should do to help her ally.

Trying to somehow optimize British strategy would imply due
consideration that a successful invasion of the Continent was not to
be had in 1942, and that raids were not generally cost-effective. The
obvious decision would be to do nothing and save the resources for use
elsewhere. Of course, doing that would let the Germans concentrate on
winning the war in the East. I'm certainly not claiming that Dieppe
made the difference between victory and defeat in Russia, but by
forcing Germany to divert resources to guard against an hypothetical
Allied landing in France, the British forces were probably at their
most useful.

It was also important to wrest strategic initiative away from the
Axis, which the British were doing at the time. Of course, that would
eventually have happened sooner or later, but keeping the Axis off-
balance was probably one of the most valuable contributions that
British forces could make in 1942. Had Dieppe been planned a little
better, it could even have gone down in history as a successful
operation.


LC

[Haydn]

The Dieppe raid was probably the worst calamity to come out of this way of
thinking.

The choice I take as "Way of Thinking's Operational Worst" is the 1943
Aegean Sea adventure. Dieppe looks almost better than that.

It's also true that in the Aegean the British met German decisiveness and
operational tempo at their best.

Haydn

[SolomonW]

Post by Louis C
With hindsight, we know
that the Soviet Union and the United States were going to be dragged
into the war, so the British could have just sat back and consolidated
their position while waiting for the two heavyweights to come in.

Even at that stage, it would have been clear to Churchill that, unless the
US enters the war, Britain alone could not defeat Germany. His policies
were largely directed in an attempt to get the US into the conflict.

<..>

Post by Louis C
Supporting Greece made
sense: it might delay the German juggernaut sufficiently to derail it,

This is extremely unlikely beside what at the time was there in Germany to
delay? At best all the British could do was delay Germany.

Post by Louis C
it would send a strong signal to Turkey and hopefully prevent that
country from siding with the Axis.

As it would prove that Britain could be depended to support her allies,
however even at the time it was a questionable act. Later it was seen as
wrong.


<..>

Post by Louis C
I generally agree with your assessment, but how can you characterize
it as "aggressive"? After all, what the British did was forfeit the
prospects of a later offensive against Tripoli in order to shore up an
ally's defensive position. Hardly aggressive, is it?

I can see your point. I see it as taking on another war, without resources.

<..>

Post by Louis C
Another example was Dieppe. The raid was clearly a failure, yet it
taught the British some important lessons about air support,

It did but it was an aggressive action that was silly. It probably was
caused by a mix up of signals internally then as a plan.

[Louis C]

Post by SolomonW
Even at that stage, it would have been clear to Churchill that, unless the
US enters the war, Britain alone could not defeat Germany. His policies
were largely directed in an attempt to get the US into the conflict.

Britain alone couldn't defeat Germany.
- The fully mobilized Commonwealth, free of any interference from
Japan and with assistance from some neutrals, might have a go.
- Britain + the Soviet Union had a chance.
- Britain + the USA had a chance

All of the above scenarios were possible, and Churchill had to plan
for them.

Post by SolomonW
This is extremely unlikely beside what at the time was there in Germany to
delay? At best all the British could do was delay Germany.

If it looked like Germany was moving south east, *and* the Allies
managed to make a stand in Greece, then a limited front might
coalesce, Anzio-like if you wish. Or more like Salonika in WWI. German
logistics into the Balkans weren't particularly good, so there was an
admitedly faint chance of holding. Even if Greece didn't hold,
delaying the Axis was worthwhile as it would delay the invasion of
Turkey and the Middle East. Any delay meant more time to bring
equipment into these theaters (remember, the British were still
building up), as well as the chance of a large neutral turning ally.
Time was on Britain's side.

Again, I'm not claiming that putting that force into Greece was a good
idea - in fact, I believe it wasn't. But the general rationale wasn't
idiotic, and certainly wasn't a case of over-aggressiveness.

Post by SolomonW

Post by Louis C
I generally agree with your assessment, but how can you characterize
it as "aggressive"? After all, what the British did was forfeit the
prospects of a later offensive against Tripoli in order to shore up an
ally's defensive position. Hardly aggressive, is it?

I can see your point. I see it as taking on another war, without resources.

They hadn't taken on anything, that other war had taken them on.
Remember, Italy had attacked Greece, not the other way around, and the
British already had forces supporting the Greeks, mostly RAF and RN.
What was decided was to despatch additional forces, including a
sizeable (at least by British standards) ground contingent.

Post by SolomonW

Post by Louis C
Another example was Dieppe. The raid was clearly a failure, yet it
taught the British some important lessons about air support,

It did but it was an aggressive action that was silly. It probably was
caused by a mix up of signals internally then as a plan.

I think the concept itself, as opposed to the way it was planned and
carried out, wasn't necessarily silly. Anything that the British could
do to draw off forces from the East was valuable. Keeping the Germans
on their toes in the West meant their dedicating resources to
fortifying the whole coastline, keeping units in reserve as opposed to
redeploying them to Russia, etc. Also, the British had to test their
amphibious assault capability. So the idea of a hit and run operation
was sound, in my opinion. The execution certainly wasn't, up to and
including the persistent under-estimation of German tactical skill.


LC

[SolomonW]

Post by Louis C
Britain alone couldn't defeat Germany.
- The fully mobilized Commonwealth, free of any interference from
Japan and with assistance from some neutrals, might have a go.

No way unless we are talking of an atomic bomb. The British could not
afford the losses that would be required. Beside Britain could not afford
the war without significant US support.

Post by Louis C
- Britain + the Soviet Union had a chance.

Yes, some would argue that Russia alone might be able to do it after 1942.

Post by Louis C
- Britain + the USA had a chance

Indeed in this scenario, Russia would be waiting to jump in once Germany
was weaken

Post by Louis C
All of the above scenarios were possible, and Churchill had to plan
for them.

Indeed.

<..>

Post by Louis C
German
logistics into the Balkans weren't particularly good, so there was an
admitedly faint chance of holding.

Very faint, the odds were much bigger for a spectacular defeat.


<..>

Post by Louis C
They hadn't taken on anything, that other war had taken them on.
Remember, Italy had attacked Greece, not the other way around, and the
British already had forces supporting the Greeks, mostly RAF and RN.
What was decided was to despatch additional forces, including a
sizeable (at least by British standards) ground contingent.

I would say sending a sizable force of troops is taking on something.

<..>

Post by Louis C
I think the concept itself, as opposed to the way it was planned and
carried out, wasn't necessarily silly. Anything that the British could
do to draw off forces from the East was valuable. Keeping the Germans
on their toes in the West meant their dedicating resources to
fortifying the whole coastline, keeping units in reserve as opposed to
redeploying them to Russia, etc. Also, the British had to test their
amphibious assault capability. So the idea of a hit and run operation
was sound, in my opinion.

Is there any evidence that any of this went into the planning of Dieppe? Or
is this something rationalised by people after the event?

Post by Louis C
The execution certainly wasn't, up to and
including the persistent under-estimation of German tactical skill.

There was quite a lot that happened wrong at Dieppe, much more then this.
One good point an operation that goes terribly wrong can be very
educational to the losing side.

[Bill]

On Sat, 30 Oct 2010 12:16:41 -0400, SolomonW

Post by SolomonW
During WW2, for a considerable period from the fall of France up to D-Day
the British fought very aggressively the war. Many decisions as such were
made that were questionable. Some examples a diversion to Greece, when the
troops should have been used in North Africa. Another would be an
ineffectual air bombing of Germany rather than more use of air against
U-boats.
What would have happened if the British had been less aggressive?

Allies would have dropped away.

British troops were sent to Greece because 'something had to be seen
to be done'.

Everyone knew it was hopeless.

Even with the British behaving very aggressively people continued to
make nasty comments with Joe Kennedy saying that 'democracy was
finished...' and Gandhi being nasty about the UK's survival prospects.

With people of that level of importance making public statements about
Britain's lack of ability to survive the only possible response is the
Royal Navy's normal operating procedure:

'An insane level of aggression.

[Roman W]

Post by Bill
finished...' and Gandhi being nasty about the UK's survival

prospects.

Wasn't it a calculated move on his part to hasten India's
independence?

Post by Bill
With people of that level of importance making public statements about
Britain's lack of ability to survive the only possible response is the
'An insane level of aggression.

"Never mind the manoeuvres, just go straight at them". (Nelson)

RW

[Bill]

On Tue, 12 Mar 2013 18:05:43 -0400, Roman W

Post by Bill

Post by Bill
finished...' and Gandhi being nasty about the UK's survival

prospects.
Wasn't it a calculated move on his part to hasten India's
independence?

He was turning down a deal designed to make India independent at the
earliest opportunity.

In the end the British had to impose a date as Congress always
insisted on long drawn out negotiations.