Close fighter-bomber support Omaha Beach June 6, 1944

[yauming]

Hi. Pardon me if the question has been posed before but why didn't the US

invading troops have close fighter-bomber support on Omaha Beach
on the morning of June 6, 1944?


Was it because of overcast weather?
I recall reading the medium bombers missing their mark due to cloudy weather.

But wouldn't the US have access to the USAAF thunderbolts who could have flown lower?


2nd question - the US already had a great deal of experience dealing in

amphibious assaults in the Pacific. Was a lot of the knowledge gained there

transferred to the Western theatre? Or was there some sort of personal/

interservice rivalry that hampered this... ie MacArthur being in the Pacific

and Ike in the West.

Many thanks for your assistance

[Rich]

Post by yauming
Hi. Pardon me if the question has been posed before but why didn't the US
invading troops have close fighter-bomber support on Omaha Beach
on the morning of June 6, 1944?
Was it because of overcast weather?
I recall reading the medium bombers missing their mark due to cloudy weather.
But wouldn't the US have access to the USAAF thunderbolts who could have flown lower?

No pardon required, it's a reasonable question.

Fundamentally, no doctrine of close battlefield air support existed in the
USAAF in the ETO at this time. Air support of ground forces was confined to
battlefield interdiction.

Otherwise, air support for NEPTUNE was executed as bombing attacks on
coast artillery positions and area bombing of identified coast defense
zones by medium and heavy bombers.

Post by yauming
2nd question - the US already had a great deal of experience dealing in
amphibious assaults in the Pacific. Was a lot of the knowledge gained there
transferred to the Western theatre? Or was there some sort of personal/
interservice rivalry that hampered this... ie MacArthur being in the Pacific
and Ike in the West.

The US and Britain also had a great deal of experience in amphibious
assaults in the Mediterranean, but they had very limited experience in
an amphibious assault on a defended beach. In the Pacific, just two such
had occurred GALVANIC in November 1943 and FLINTLOCK in January 1944. In
the Med, only Salerno had featured some beach defenses.

MG Charles Corlett, who had been in command for FLINTLOCK was transferred
to the ETO in April 1944 to command XIX Corps. He raised some questions
about the NEPTUNE assault plan, but only succeeded in making a nuisance
of himself and a lot of enemies. The major problem was his "solution" -
AMTRACS - simply weren't available in the number needed and it is very
questionable whether or not they would have made a difference. The other
problem was that by late April and early May it was impossible to make
significant planning changes without disrupting and further delaying the
invasion, which wasn't in the cards either.

BTW, MacArthur never would have given up his fiefdom. :)

Post by yauming
Many thanks for your assistance

You're welcome.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Rich

Post by yauming
Hi. Pardon me if the question has been posed before but why didn't the US
invading troops have close fighter-bomber support on Omaha Beach
on the morning of June 6, 1944?

MG Charles Corlett, who had been in command for FLINTLOCK was transferred
to the ETO in April 1944 to command XIX Corps. He raised some questions
about the NEPTUNE assault plan, but only succeeded in making a nuisance
of himself and a lot of enemies. The major problem was his "solution" -
AMTRACS - simply weren't available in the number needed and it is very
questionable whether or not they would have made a difference. The other
problem was that by late April and early May it was impossible to make
significant planning changes without disrupting and further delaying the
invasion, which wasn't in the cards either.

Another difference was between British and American methods
of fighting:
1. British doctrine of air support in land combat was developed
in the North African campaign (under Tedder, one reason Eisenhower
chose him as deputy commander SHAEF). Some RAF squadrons
assigned to close support on D-Day had prior experience in the
Desert Air Force. None of the USAAC squadrons had such experience.
(I believe no 12th Air Force units were transferred to 8AF in Britain.)

2. Influenced by the Dieppe disaster (1942) the British developed
"Hobart's Funnies" = special-purpose armoured vehicles for
beach assault (flame throwers, portable bridges, armoured bulldozers
etc.) Half the inventory was offered to US forces for
the D-Day invasion, but were refused because it was too late
to introduce new tactics with new equipment. (Some DD floating
tanks were assigned US D-Day beaches, but launched too far
out to sea so that most sank before reaching land.)

[Rich]

Post by Don Phillipson
Another difference was between British and American methods
1. British doctrine of air support in land combat was developed
in the North African campaign (under Tedder, one reason Eisenhower
chose him as deputy commander SHAEF). Some RAF squadrons
assigned to close support on D-Day had prior experience in the
Desert Air Force. None of the USAAC squadrons had such experience.
(I believe no 12th Air Force units were transferred to 8AF in Britain.)

Indeed, no 12th Air Force units were transferred to Ninth Air Force in
Britain, which was responsible for the American contribution to the AEAF.
However, despite the transfer of Desert Air Force units to England and the
AEAF, the RAF similarly had difficulty transferring the doctrinal and
tactical lessons of air-land close support from the Med to NWE as the
USAAF did.

Post by Don Phillipson
2. Influenced by the Dieppe disaster (1942) the British developed
"Hobart's Funnies" = special-purpose armoured vehicles for
beach assault (flame throwers, portable bridges, armoured bulldozers
etc.) Half the inventory was offered to US forces for
the D-Day invasion, but were refused because it was too late
to introduce new tactics with new equipment. (Some DD floating
tanks were assigned US D-Day beaches, but launched too far
out to sea so that most sank before reaching land.)

Not exactly. It was only through the efforts of two men, Lt.Col. George
C. Reeves of the Department of Tank Design and Lt. John James Denovan,
R.C.E. that the wrong conclusion - armor cannot be used in an amphibious
assault - wasn't the result of the influence of Dieppe. The two of them
were essentially single-handedly responsible for the development of the
A.V.R.E. Technically, only the A.V.R.E. and the D7 and D9 armoured
bulldozers of the 1st Assault Brigade R.E. were "Hobart's Funnies" on
D-Day, the Churchill flame throwers and Crabs were both separate at the
time and only attached for operations.

Nor was "half the [A.V.R.E.] inventory ever "offered" to US forces or
"refused" by them. That notion was the invention of Percy Hobart postwar,
which idea was then promoted by Chester Wilmot. The truth is actually
the "US forces" - ETOUSA - requested a large number of various specialized
vehicles and equipment, but they weren't supplied because there was barely
enough to fulfill the needs of the British establishment committed to
the invasion (and at that 41 Assault Regiment R.E. was still equipping
in England on D-Day).

Nor were any American DD tanks "launched too far out to sea". They were
actually launched at the prescribed distance given in the plan. It wasn't
the distance that caused them to sink; it was the course they attempted
to follow in trying to make landing at the correct beach.

BTW, exactly the same number of DD units - one battalion/regiment per
regiment/brigade assault beach were assigned for all the beaches.

Cheers!

Richard C. Anderson Jr.
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers
and D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009

[Rich]

Post by Rich
the invasion (and at that 41 Assault Regiment R.E. was still equipping
in England on D-Day).

Sorry, but I thumb-fingered that. Of course, it should read "42" Assault
Regiment R.E., NOT "41".

Cheers!

[Alan Meyer]

Post by Rich
...
Nor were any American DD tanks "launched too far out to sea". They were
actually launched at the prescribed distance given in the plan. It wasn't
the distance that caused them to sink; it was the course they attempted
to follow in trying to make landing at the correct beach.
...

"launched too far out to sea" can mean one of two very different things.

1. The tanks were launched before the landing ships reached the planned
launch point.

What I have read agrees with your statement. They were indeed launched
at the prescribed launch point.

2. The prescribed launch point was too far out to sea for the weather
and wave conditions on D-Day.

My understanding is that, in that second sense, the tanks were launched
too soon and too far from shore. Worse, the first tank left the landing
craft and promptly sank. In spite of that, the others all launched
anyway, almost all of them also sinking. The men at the scene chose to
follow orders exactly rather than use judgment, which turned out to be a
catastrophic choice.

I'm sorry I can't give you a citation for this account. I read it in
one of the histories, maybe Atkinson, maybe Roberts.

Alan

[William Clodius]

<snip>
2. Influenced by the Dieppe disaster (1942) the British developed
"Hobart's Funnies" = special-purpose armoured vehicles for
beach assault (flame throwers, portable bridges, armoured bulldozers
etc.) Half the inventory was offered to US forces for
the D-Day invasion, but were refused because it was too late
to introduce new tactics with new equipment. (Some DD floating
tanks were assigned US D-Day beaches, but launched too far
out to sea so that most sank before reaching land.)

Hobart's story was that Montgomery (his brother-in-law) suggested that
they set aside 1/3 of the 'Funnies" for the US invasion forces not 1/2.
Given that the US was in charge of only two of the five beaches, it
would heve been surprising if they had intended to set aside half. In
the event there seems to have been a surprising lack of paperwork on
this topic, given the detailed paperwork involved in modern military
bureaucracies.

Discussions typically focus on reports on the presentations in late
January and early February. There are brief mentions in Alan Brooke's
diary, and Eisenhower's letters, and a few other informal documents with
minimal detail. In the early post-war period Hobart made his claim to
Chester Wilmot that Bradley was unenthusiastic about the "Funnies", that
Bradley had defferred the decision to his staff, and no request resulted
from the Americans. A few years later Bradley, I believe in his first
"memoir", claimed that he would have accepted the use of "Funnies" if
they had included Shermans. Bradley's phrasing is odd in that the
"Funnies" included some types, the Crab Flails in particular, that were
Sherman based, and the informal documents indicate that the late January
demonstration he is thought to have attended included some of the
Sherman based "Funnies."

No one that I know of has reported a formal proposal for evaluation, or
of any paperwork forwarded to AGF or McNair, whose approval, in most
situations, was required for the acquisition of major equipment. Though
Operation Overlord was obviously a high priority special case, and
modified Sherman's would be more politically acceptable than modified
Churchills. There was one memo found from a British officer from
mid-February that claims to be forwarding (to the appropriate officials)
an American request for Sherman based Funnies, including the DD tanks.
But I have heard of no follow-on to this memo either by the British,
explaining why they were unable to fulfilll it, or by the Americans,
explaining why they were no longer interested.

It is known that one of the "Funnies" the memo mentioned, the Sherman
version of the "crocodile" flamethrower, was never successful, and that
the delivery of some of the Funnies to the Commonwealth forces were last
minute, and Hobart's Division never reached it's expected level of
special equipment. This suggests that the British may have found it
impractical to supply the Americans without seriously impacting their
own needs. Anyone suggesting that the construction effort might have met
the American request by an increase in its workforce and supplies should
read "The Mythical Man-Month." See Rich's comments

<snip>
Nor were any American DD tanks "launched too far out to sea". They were
actually launched at the prescribed distance given in the plan. It wasn't
the distance that caused them to sink; it was the course they attempted
to follow in trying to make landing at the correct beach.

I would phrase that differently. The developers of the DD tanks had a
recomended maxium launching distance, that was less than the distance at
which the American DD tanks were launched. The Navies were unwilling to
accept that distance as it potentially exposed the LCTs to attack from
shore based artillery. Instead they gave instructions allowing a larger
maximum launching distance, leaving it to the joint decision of the
comanders of the tanks and LCTs associated with a given DD tank force.
The launching distance for the unfortunate DD battalion intended for one
half of Omaha Beach was beyond the recomended distance by the
developers, but just within the maximum allowd in the formal plans. The
reason why that larger launching distance was a problem was not obvious
and was only recognized decades later whenthe locatons of most of the
lost tanks were discovered.

Many of the DD teams in encountering the rough waters off Normand decidd
to not launch their tanks and instead land them directly on the beach.
The unfortunate batallion decided the water was favorable and launched
most of thir tanks just within their maximum range. A couple of tanks
were lost quickly, but most seem to have quickly adapted to the rough
seas. However as the strong currents took them off course they
compensated by gradually turning against the currents. This then
presented their longer sides to the wave action coming in to shore, and
the length of these sides made them mor vulnerable to swamping from the
waves. As a result most of the tanks seem to have sunk within a few
hundred yards from the shore. However it is not clear that anyone
involved anticipated this problem.

While they could handle the longer launching distance as long as they
sailed directly to the shore, launching closer would have given the
currents less time to drive them off course, and minimized the change in
orientation that proved so fatal. They were launched too far out to sea,
but no one at that time had a good enough understanding of the
conditions to realize that a closer launching distance (or a lanuch
position further to the west) was necessary for that beach at that time.

<snip>

[Rich]

Post by William Clodius
Hobart's story was that Montgomery (his brother-in-law) suggested that
they set aside 1/3 of the 'Funnies" for the US invasion forces not 1/2.
Given that the US was in charge of only two of the five beaches, it
would heve been surprising if they had intended to set aside half. In
the event there seems to have been a surprising lack of paperwork on
this topic, given the detailed paperwork involved in modern military
bureaucracies.

Indeed, most miss the marital connection between Montgomery and Hobart,
but I have never seen that they were really close - unsurprising given
they both failed to suffer fools gladly. :)

The story they concocted is odd in that it seems to include elements of
truth in amongst the shady parts. Yes indeed, it is difficult to dig
out the paperwork. Steve Zaloga reminded me of the existence of the
American request. Otherwise though there isn't much. Part of the problem
is the U.S. Armor Section at ETOUSA was a late organization and there is
almost no paperwork of any kind for them prior to March 1944.

Post by William Clodius
Discussions typically focus on reports on the presentations in late
January and early February. There are brief mentions in Alan Brooke's
diary, and Eisenhower's letters, and a few other informal documents with
minimal detail.

Yes, indeed it is evident that both senior American and British officers
witnessed the January demonstrations. It is mentioned in the 1st ABRE
documents, by Brooke and Eisenhower, and also by some of the officers
there at the pointy end. Rollo Ward mentioned it in at least one of his
letters to me before he died IIRC.

Post by William Clodius
No one that I know of has reported a formal proposal for evaluation, or
of any paperwork forwarded to AGF or McNair, whose approval, in most
situations, was required for the acquisition of major equipment. Though
Operation Overlord was obviously a high priority special case, and
modified Sherman's would be more politically acceptable than modified
Churchills. There was one memo found from a British officer from
mid-February that claims to be forwarding (to the appropriate officials)
an American request for Sherman based Funnies, including the DD tanks.
But I have heard of no follow-on to this memo either by the British,
explaining why they were unable to fulfilll it, or by the Americans,
explaining why they were no longer interested.

Indeed, no "proposal for evaluation" was made, because U.S. Army
Ordnance embarked on the development of its own version of an A.V.R.E.
as early as August 1943, but with less urgency. The end result was as
should be expected...an initial prototype ready in July, followed by cancellation by AGF (not at the hands of McNair BTW, he was dead then).

The American request for "devices" is documented, but as you say the
reply and paper trail afterwards is less transparent. Indeed, the request
assumed that the devices would all be fitted on the Medium M4 and no
requirement was given for Churchill-based devices. The reason was lack
of time for training in non-US type vehicles, but it would have been
problematic anyway since issues hadn't even begun to British units
except for 617 Squadron, which was acting as a testbed.

Post by William Clodius
It is known that one of the "Funnies" the memo mentioned, the Sherman
version of the "crocodile" flamethrower, was never successful, and that
the delivery of some of the Funnies to the Commonwealth forces were last
minute, and Hobart's Division never reached it's expected level of
special equipment. This suggests that the British may have found it
impractical to supply the Americans without seriously impacting their
own needs. Anyone suggesting that the construction effort might have met
the American request by an increase in its workforce and supplies should
read "The Mythical Man-Month." See Rich's comments

Yep. Although it wasn't so much the Sherman Croc was unsuccessful as it
was overtaken by American designs...and, yet again, the Sherman conversion
was too late to completion.

Post by William Clodius
I would phrase that differently. The developers of the DD tanks had a
recomended maxium launching distance, that was less than the distance at
which the American DD tanks were launched. The Navies were unwilling to
accept that distance as it potentially exposed the LCTs to attack from
shore based artillery. (snip)

Yep again, except the "recommended distance" for the DD was kind of a
flexible number. :) The "planned distance" was 5,000 yards. However,
the 70th Tank BN chose to launch at 3,000 yards, but only because the
various mishaps with the control craft had thrown things so behind
schedule the decision was made to launch closer to save time. Armor in
Operation NEPTUNE says it was 6,000 yards, which is odd, since it is
1,000 yards more than planned. I suspect they measured the actual course
rather than the straight line distance to the beach (the Navy AAR says it
was the planned 5,000 yards). AiON also says there were 10 to 18 knot winds,
which far exceeds other estimates.

Post by William Clodius
Many of the DD teams in encountering the rough waters off Normand decidd
to not launch their tanks and instead land them directly on the beach.
The unfortunate batallion decided the water was favorable and launched
most of thir tanks just within their maximum range. (snip)

Yep again, except that the decision was made by agreement between the Army
tank company commander and the Navy LCT flotilla commander.

All in all, a very complex and contoversial subject.

Cheers!

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Rich
MG Charles Corlett, who had been in command for FLINTLOCK was transferred
to the ETO in April 1944 to command XIX Corps. He raised some questions
about the NEPTUNE assault plan, but only succeeded in making a nuisance
of himself and a lot of enemies. The major problem was his "solution" -
AMTRACS - simply weren't available in the number needed and it is very
questionable whether or not they would have made a difference. The other
problem was that by late April and early May it was impossible to make
significant planning changes without disrupting and further delaying the
invasion, which wasn't in the cards either.

Another difference was between British and American methods
1. British doctrine of air support in land combat was developed
in the North African campaign (under Tedder, one reason Eisenhower
chose him as deputy commander SHAEF).

And adopted/modified by the US units in the Mediterranean.

The manuals were sent to Britain, the ground and air units there
then needed to change their doctrine to the new one, which
essentially happened after the invasion and its real world
experience.

Post by Don Phillipson
Some RAF squadrons
assigned to close support on D-Day had prior experience in the
Desert Air Force. None of the USAAC squadrons had such experience.
(I believe no 12th Air Force units were transferred to 8AF in Britain.)

Correct that no US Mediterranean air units were transferred back to
Britain, the 9th Air Force HQ was.

As for RAF units transferred from the Mediterranean to England in late
1943 and early 1944 the first thing to note is the RAF often transferred
the number plate, not the personnel, so for example X squadron could
officially disband overseas and be reformed with new personnel in
England. However in this case it appears most of the personnel in the
units were transferred.

Bomber Command had 3 squadrons on detached service in the
Mediterranean in the second half of 1943.

Units assigned to the 2nd Tactical Air Force or Fighter Command
theoretically available for battlefield support as of 6 June 1944 were
114 Mosquito, Mustang, Spitfire, Tempest, Typhoon or Wellington
squadrons, ignoring the Mosquito units in number 2 Group, but
including reconnaissance units.

Nine squadrons returned from the Middle East in the first half of 1944.

219 sqn, arrived February 1944, Mosquito NF XVIII / XXX

33 sqn, arrived April 1944, Spitfire F IX
74 sqn, arrived April 1944, Spitfire HF IX
80 sqn, arrived April 1944, Spitfire F IX
126 sqn, arrived April 1944, Spitfire LF IX
127 sqn, arrived April 1944, Spitfire HF IX
229 sqn, arrived April 1944, Spitfire F IX
274 sqn, arrived April 1944, Spitfire F IX

69 sqn, to UK arrived April 1944, Wellington night reconnaissance.

Also,

345 sqn or French Air Force Unit GC II/2 "Berry", formed in Britain
from at least some French personnel from North Africa in February
1944, Spitfire V. What combat experience, if any, the personnel had
at the time is unclear.

Only 69 squadron was assigned to 2nd TAF on D-Day.

126 squadron was at Culmhead in Cornwall, 219 squadron was
at Bradwell Bay (on the coast slightly north of east of London),
otherwise the Spitfire squadrons were in south east England, 80,
229 and 274 at Detling, 33, 74 and 127 at Lympne, 345 at
Shoreham.

So the returning squadrons appear to be designated fighter units,
not fighter bomber, in anticipation of an expected strong reaction
by the Luftwaffe to the invasion. Not a lot of army support experience
seems to have been transferred.

As an aside the RCAF sent 6 squadrons from Canada in late 1943
or early 1944 which became 438, 439, 440 Typhoon and 441, 442
and 443 Spitfire.

Post by Don Phillipson
2. Influenced by the Dieppe disaster (1942)

The tanks at Dieppe were if anything a problem, none made it off
the beach, their main success was providing shelter for the infantry.

Post by Don Phillipson
the British developed
"Hobart's Funnies" = special-purpose armoured vehicles for
beach assault (flame throwers, portable bridges, armoured bulldozers
etc.) Half the inventory was offered to US forces for
the D-Day invasion, but were refused because it was too late
to introduce new tactics with new equipment. (Some DD floating
tanks were assigned US D-Day beaches, but launched too far
out to sea so that most sank before reaching land.)

Not quite, as Rich has pointed out there were problems in just
equipping the British forces. Any offer made seems to have been
an informal one and based on enthusiasm limited by availability.

And the DD tanks "too far" is both correct and incorrect, too far
as it turned out but not for reasons of range, rather the problems
of the wind and currents.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[William Clodius]

<snip>

Post by Don Phillipson
2. Influenced by the Dieppe disaster (1942)

The tanks at Dieppe were if anything a problem, none made it off
the beach, their main success was providing shelter for the infantry.

Minor correction. I believe 15 got off the beach proper, but none got
past the tank obstacles between the seawall and the town. They also
provided fire support as well as shelter. But their contribution
certainly was far less thatn expected, let alone hoped for.
<snip>

[Alan Meyer]

Post by yauming
Hi. Pardon me if the question has been posed before but why didn't the US
invading troops have close fighter-bomber support on Omaha Beach
on the morning of June 6, 1944?

It's a good question for which the answers given by others may be
correct. However I'll add another consideration.

There were a lot of Navy ships just offshore with enormous firepower and
good observation and communications. They may have had the ability to
place more accurate fire on the German positions with quicker response
and less danger to the Americans at the shoreline. Perhaps the
commanders thought that the Navy could handle the job better than the AAF.

That's just a speculation. I haven't read anything one way or the other
about it.

Alan

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Alan Meyer
There were a lot of Navy ships just offshore with enormous firepower and
good observation and communications. They may have had the ability to
place more accurate fire on the German positions with quicker response
and less danger to the Americans at the shoreline. Perhaps the
commanders thought that the Navy could handle the job better than the AAF.

With all due respect, unless things have dramatically changed in the
last 70 years Navy commanders think Navy men can do ANYTHING better
than Air Force men both of a military and a non-military (ahem!)
nature. I have no doubt that opinion was the norm in 1944.

[Jim H.]

On Sunday, May 31, 2015 at 1:07:19 AM UTC-4, Alan Meyer wrote:
....>

Post by Alan Meyer
There were a lot of Navy ships just offshore with enormous firepower and
good observation and communications. They may have had the ability to
place more accurate fire on the German positions with quicker response
and less danger to the Americans at the shoreline. Perhaps the
commanders thought that the Navy could handle the job better than the AAF.
That's just a speculation. I haven't read anything one way or the other
about it.
Alan

I'm wondering if it was an 'either-or' situation.
If they'd used both, I suspect the odds of losing
a plane (or bunch of them) to 'friendly' fire were not
negligible. I'm thinking, without documentary evidence, that
the air from well off shore to maybe 10-15 miles inland,
contained a fair amount of inbound flying metal, from about
5" caliber on up to 14" or 16", traveling in ballistic arcs.

If they went all-air, there might have been the danger of
collisions in over-crowded airspace, with pilots busy looking for
targets. I'm also wondering if they felt that controlling
enough airplanes to deliver an equal amount of support was
even possible with the commo gear of the era.

And yes, this is all uninformed speculation in my part, just guesses.


Jim H.

[William Clodius]

Post by yauming
Hi. Pardon me if the question has been posed before but why didn't the US
invading troops have close fighter-bomber support on Omaha Beach
on the morning of June 6, 1944?

<snip>

Note that even if such support had been planned, the most useful period
would have been during and immediately after the first wave. Useful
support would have required radios, My memory is that all of either the
operators or the radios or both that were intended to direct naval
gunfire were lost in that wave. While I believe some of the later forces
had radios, naval gunfire support had to be improvised.

[JL McClellan]

Post by yauming
Hi. Pardon me if the question has been posed before but why
didn't the US
invading troops have close fighter-bomber support on Omaha
Beach
on the morning of June 6, 1944?
Was it because of overcast weather?
I recall reading the medium bombers missing their mark due to
cloudy weather.
But wouldn't the US have access to the USAAF thunderbolts who
could have flown lower?
2nd question - the US already had a great deal of experience
dealing in
amphibious assaults in the Pacific. Was a lot of the knowledge
gained there
transferred to the Western theatre? Or was there some sort of
personal/
interservice rivalry that hampered this... ie MacArthur being
in the Pacific
and Ike in the West.
Many thanks for your assistance

According to the official Chronology of the US Army in WWII, on
June 6, 1944:
"Powerful air and naval bombardment precedes and follows
landings. Strategic aircraft join with tactical in pounding
assault zone."

The postwar Report by the Chief Commander SHAEF states that
"While our assault forces were tossing on the dark waters of the
Channel en route for France, the night bombers which were to
herald our approach passed overhead. Shortly after midnight the
bombing commenced, and by dawn 1,136 aircraft of RAF Bomber
Command had dropped 5,853 tons of bombs on 10 selected coastal
batteries lining the Bay of the Seine between Cherbourg and Le
Havre. As the day broke, the bombers of the US Eighth Air Force
took up the attacks, 1,083 aircraft dropping 1,763 tons on the
shore defenses during the half-hour preceding the touchdown. Then
medium, light, and fighter-bombers of the Allied Expeditionary
Air Force swarmed in to attack individual targets along the
shores and artillery positions farther inland. The seaborne
forces bore witness to the inspiring moral effect produced by
this spectacle of Allied air might and its results as they drew
in toward the beaches.

During the remainder of the day, the heavy bombers concentrated
their attacks upon the key centers of communication behind the
enemy's lines, through which he would have to bring up his
reinforcements. Fighters and fighter-bombers of the AEAF roamed
over the entire battle area, attacking the German defensive
positions, shooting up buildings known to house headquarters,
strafing troop concentrations, and destroying transport. During
the 24 hours of 6 June, the Strategic Air Forces flew 5,309
sorties to drop 10,395 tons of bombs, while aircraft of the
tactical forces flew a further 5,276 sorties.

The lightness of the losses which we sustained on all these
operations is eloquent of the feeble enemy air reactions and
testifies to the effectiveness of our diversionary operations.
Such reconnaissance and defense patrols as were flown by the
Germans were mainly over the Pas-de-Calais area while over the
assault beaches and their approaches only some 50 half-hearted
sorties were attempted. Our heavy bombers were permitted to carry
out their allotted tasks without any interference from enemy
fighters. One result of this absence of opposition was that our
own fighter-bombers were able to operate in small units of one or
two squadrons, thus permitting their all-important harassing
attacks to be more continuously maintained and their activities
to cover a wider field. Not until two days after the initial
landings did the enemy reinforce his air strength over the
invasion zone to any appreciable extent.

As the night bombers were finishing their work in the early hours
of 6 June, the Allied sea armada drew in toward the coast of
France."

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by yauming
Hi. Pardon me if the question has been posed before but why didn't the US
invading troops have close fighter-bomber support on Omaha Beach
on the morning of June 6, 1944?

They did, P-47 units dive bombed pre specified targets then stayed
in the area to strafe targets of opportunity. They rapidly discovered
the need to conserve ammunition and how hard finding things in
bocage can be.

However while the Mediterranean fighting had come up with a good
doctrine for combined land and air operations most of the units in
Britain lacked the experience in actually doing the operations, and
it took time after the invasion for them to understand the gap between
the theory they had been originally taught then changed as a result of
the Mediterranean experiences and how it really worked.

Post by yauming
Was it because of overcast weather?
I recall reading the medium bombers missing their mark due to cloudy weather.

Most of the bombing missed thanks to the weather.

Post by yauming
But wouldn't the US have access to the USAAF thunderbolts who could have flown lower?

Yes but there are still height limits for things like flak and bomb blast.

Post by yauming
2nd question - the US already had a great deal of experience dealing in
amphibious assaults in the Pacific. Was a lot of the knowledge gained
there transferred to the Western theatre? Or was there some sort of
personal/interservice rivalry that hampered this... ie MacArthur being in
the Pacific and Ike in the West.

There were lessons learnt and people transferred.

As for experience many of the Pacific landings were deliberately against
lightly defended areas and were in regiment or divisional strength. More
importantly the Japanese could not deploy large numbers of troops with
heavy weapons against the allied bridgehead, though they could deploy
surface warships.

The allied landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy provided many lessons
in putting an an army sized force ashore and enabling it to fight
effectively.

It showed where the enemy can deploy extra troops and heavy equipment
the landings can be roped off but as long as warships and airpower can
support the landings it is very hard to drive the troops back into the
water. The examples of the German's ability to rope off a bridge head was
a reason why some people were worried until the Cobra attack succeeded.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[yauming]

Pardon me - I'm having some problems posting a reply back.
I'm getting an error message about a word wrap problem?

Pardon the snip.

Thank you Rich and Geoffrey and all the others for their kind
contribution to the thread.

I read from another thread on the same subject and fight-bomber
support seems a lot more complicated than I originally thought.

But what about a large commando raid that came from in-land?
Would a large airborne assault that commenced the night before
the dawn invasion have made a difference?

A friend of mine posted that query to me. Obviously the attack
would encounter fierce resistance from the bunker troops -
and the Allied naval dawn bombardment would have inflicted
friendly fire. But perhaps the element of surprise would have
helped to pin down the garrison troops while the beach
landing force attacked in dawn.

I'm sure Ike and the other D-Day planners would have
thought about doing the same thing.

But for reasons I don't know - did not.

I guess there is a good reason but I don't see it.

[Rich]

Post by yauming
I'm sure Ike and the other D-Day planners would have
thought about doing the same thing.
But for reasons I don't know - did not.

I almost hate to mention it for fear of sounding snide, but you
do of course realize there were already three division-size
airborne "raids" executed on 6 June? And that there was also the
equivalent of three seaborne "commando raids" landed as well?

I am not sure where the additional resources were supposed to
come from?

BTW, the "wrapping" problem is with your news server. The way to get
around it is to artificially restrict the width of your text when
typing it in. Try to keep it to less than the width of the text you
are replying to by inserting returns into the text.

Cheers!

Rich Anderson

[yauming]

Hi Rich - Yes I know there were large airborne drops in other areas as well. :)

I just thought a sizeble airborne attack force (I dunno maybe -
in battalion
strength??) against the German bunkers at Omaha at night
would have helped to neutralise the bunkers - a night rear attack -
or at least have helped to divert their attention away from the
Allied sea invading force in the morning....

The Germans did something similar against the Belgian forts.

But I guess the Germans would have been smart enough
to have protection against a rear attack too?
I don't know the rear defensive layout of the German positions
at Omaha.

Thanks for not flaming me - just curious that's all.

[Rich]

Post by yauming
The Germans did something similar against the Belgian forts.

Yep. In daylight though.

Post by yauming
But I guess the Germans would have been smart enough
to have protection against a rear attack too?

They were most definitely all-around defensive positions. Given how
difficult many of the airborne operations against specific positions
were such as Merville, I question how easy such a thing would be.

Post by yauming
Thanks for not flaming me - just curious that's all.

I went against my usual instincts... :)

[Rich Rostrom]

... a sizeble airborne attack force (... maybe - in
battalion strength??) against the German bunkers at
Omaha at night ...
The Germans did something similar against the Belgian forts.

Yabbut that was in 1940, when no had any experience
of making or opposing airborne attacks.

The Belgian army made almost no preparations against
such attacks.

I would further add that the Belgian army of 1940
was a peacetime army, and its quality was not the
highest. (Not morale or equipment, but commanders
and officers who were ... stale.)

Whereas the German army of 1944 was very recently and
very thoroughly tempered in battle, had practiced or
been exposed to the latest techniques, and generally
performed at a high level.

So there was a huge difference in what could work
in Belgium in 1940 and in France in 1944.

[yauming]

Thank you all for the considered responses.
They have certainly enlightened me.


A few more questions. Could the Allied forces have
done anything better to improve on the D-Day odds
at Omaha?

I'm just a little surprised that after the experience in
assaulting enemy beaches in the Pacific - the US didn't
develop more mechanised support (like the British
"funnies") or develop better close air support into the invasion,
ie. jeep carriers with dive bombers or Corsair fighter bombers.

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by yauming
Thank you all for the considered responses.
They have certainly enlightened me.
A few more questions. Could the Allied forces have
done anything better to improve on the D-Day odds
at Omaha?
I'm just a little surprised that after the experience in
assaulting enemy beaches in the Pacific - the US didn't
develop more mechanised support (like the British
"funnies") or develop better close air support into the invasion,
ie. jeep carriers with dive bombers or Corsair fighter bombers.

I don't believe the escort carriers were ever used operationally with
either dive bombers or Corsairs.

The standard TO&E for the CVE air groups was a mixture of FM-1/2
Wildcats and TBF or TBM Avengers. Hellcats were used as the fighter
component on a couple occasions in place of the Wildcats but I don't
think Corsairs were ever used operationally on escort carriers. Ditto
dive bombers.

While escort carriers were used for training and carrier qualifications
for most aircraft, including the F4U and SB2C. those aircraft were just
too large to effectively operate from the limited deck space of the
escort carriers.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by yauming
A few more questions. Could the Allied forces have
done anything better to improve on the D-Day odds
at Omaha?

Of course, no operation is perfect. The launch position closer,
the DD tanks closer still, less weight on the men's backs, the
landing craft artillery support in more seaworthy craft to start with.
The heavy bombers flying along the beach.

Post by yauming
I'm just a little surprised that after the experience in
assaulting enemy beaches in the Pacific - the US didn't
develop more mechanised support (like the British
"funnies") or develop better close air support into the invasion,
ie. jeep carriers with dive bombers or Corsair fighter bombers.

The F4U/FG flew a total of 146 action sorties (ones that saw
combat) off US CVE for the war, and all in 1945, another 6,488
action sorties off fleet carriers, almost all in 1945. Of the dive
bombers only the SBD flew from escort carriers, 196 action
sorties for the war.

Of the 30,699 action sorties from CVE 12,925 were FM, 136 F4F,
5,572 F6F and 11,427 TBF/M.

The US did develop a close air support force, it was officially
called the 9th Air Force and it generated 3,050 action sorties on
6 June 1944, versus 147,094 USN and USMC action sorties from
carriers for the war.

Carriers find it hard to generate large sortie totals, then add where
was the sea room for a carrier force to operate near Normandy.

The funnies arrived very late, just enough for the British, the US
Army ideas were further behind. The Marine Corps LVT idea was
developed and some were later used in Europe for river crossings
by Commonwealth forces. The 13 ton armoured LVT began serial
production in April 1943, around 900 built to the end of March 1944,
most were essentially fire support, the troop carrier version could
carry 18 men. Otherwise it is the unarmoured 8 ton LVT, which
could carry 24 (-1, -2 versions) or 30 (-3, -4 versions) men. Their
use at Tarawa found the open top and no armour were problems.

The LVT-3 and -4 entered production at the end of 1943, one -3 and
eleven -4 built that year, there were 4,119 unarmoured LVT built to
the end of March 1944, which would include most to all of the 4,187
-1 and -2 versions. To land the historical troop totals at Utah and
Omaha beaches on D-Day would require at least 1,900 30 man LVT,
so more if the 24 man versions were in use, but obviously less as
some units would require landing craft given their equipment.

There were 510 LVT(A)-1 and 450 LVT(A)-2 the latter being the troop
carrier, so in theory almost all would be available for Overlord if they
had been reserved but it would be their first test. The LVT(A)-4 did
not enter production until 1944.

How well they would have gone against the man made obstacles and
the nature made shingle beach is unknown.

Remember the allies were on a learning curve.

In terms of sizeable amphibious operations first there was Dieppe, where
the WWI lesson of strong naval gunfire support was relearned and that
amphibious assaults into urban areas is simply combining the two hardest
ground operations, do not do it. Then came Guadalcanal, which confirmed
amphibious operations where you do not have command of the sea and
sky are a very bad move. Next was Torch where the landings on the
Atlantic coast lost some 25% of the landing craft, confirming the sort of
anticipated loss rates. Then came Sicily, where some of the invaders were
met with heavy weapons in the form of armoured attacks, and proved
naval gunfire support was a good thing but it would have been best to
ensure more army heavy weapons were ashore, equals more LSTs and
LCTs. Sicily also showed the US the standard amphibious supply
technique was only geared to small forces on small landings. If an Army
was coming ashore and they were going to move large distances it was
imperative a proper Army logistics system was put in place, not just a large
number of beachhead supply and control units. Ignoring the various
landings in the Solomon Islands since they were against lightly defended
beaches on isolated islands we come to Salerno. This was the first time
the opponent had major mobile reserves, including tanks, and the chance
to deploy them. The result was the beachhead roped off and for a time in
peril of being destroyed. It could be argued it was held by the air and
naval power but only freed by the threat from the arrival of ground troops
from another landing, partly because there were no follow up troops. Then
came Tarawa with the Dieppe like lesson of how many casualties would be
taken assaulting a defended coast, especially if fire support is not
available
as the troops touch down and, if possible, while they try and cross the
beach. Such fire support had to be delivered close inshore which meant
largely from converted landing craft. Anzio once again showed how hard it
was to break out of a beachhead but also how hard it was to destroy one
as long as the ships could support and the invader had good control of the
air. The assaults on the Marshall islands in February 1944 showed better
techniques could cut the casualties for opposed landings.

The invasion of Sicily had shown amphibious shipping losses were much
lower than expected, well down on the 25% figure for the craft used in the
Atlantic Ocean beach landings in Torch. This was good, but the down side
was the shipping was needed for a much longer period afterward than
planned to supply the troops, indeed some of the shipping was still being
used for Sicily when the allies invaded Italy. This was bad as the landing
craft in particular had not been designed for prolonged use, after all if
you
were going to lose so many each invasion why make them that durable?
The result was a long repair bill at the end of the operation and less
shipping for follow up assaults than had been expected. This had obvious
implications for the post invasion build up for Overlord.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich]

Post by yauming
I'm just a little surprised that after the experience in
assaulting enemy beaches in the Pacific - the US didn't
develop more mechanised support (like the British
"funnies") or develop better close air support into the invasion,
ie. jeep carriers with dive bombers or Corsair fighter bombers.

There were only three by my count by then to draw experience from.
Betio, Makin, and Eniewetok. None of them even closely resembled
the operational realities of NWE. All were isolated island garrisons.
All could have been hammered at leisure without the enemy being
able to reinforce. At Eniewetok there was even a convenient small
island adjacent to the big one, which made an excellent place to
place supporting artillery.

At none of them did "close air support" prove significant or a
game changer. The general assessment rather seemed to confirm
the inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of "dive bombers" versus
such targets. And England made a much more stable aircraft
carrier platform than the Kaiser Karriers. :)

Cheers!

[yauming]

Thank you very much for all your
considered replies!! I've once again benefited
from this education.

Just perhaps one last question:

How many Germans troops - the 352nd Division - were
actually guarding Omaha Beach on June 6th?

The 352 had 9 battalions?

One regiment had been diverted to look for paratroopers.
Leaving how many soldiers left to guard?

I'm just a bit confused because the history books
interchange between regiment and battalion. And I'm
not sure how many men were in each - the
actual size not paper strength.

[Rich]

Post by yauming
I'm just a bit confused because the history books

Read my book and all is revealed. :)

Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich

Post by yauming
I'm just a bit confused because the history books

Read my book and all is revealed. :)
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall

Yes the maps are quite useful. :-)

I still prefer the title,

My other tank is even funnier.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Jay Karamales]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Rich

Post by yauming
I'm just a bit confused because the history books

Read my book and all is revealed. :)
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall

Yes the maps are quite useful. :-)

Ooh I'll take that as a compliment. Thanks Geoffrey.

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by yauming
Thank you very much for all your
considered replies!! I've once again benefited
from this education.
How many Germans troops - the 352nd Division - were
actually guarding Omaha Beach on June 6th?

It seems the 352nd was close to TO&E strength - some 12.000 troops of a
TO&E of just under 13,000. Actual combat troops composed about half of
those.

Post by yauming
The 352 had 9 battalions?

Three infantry regiments (914th, 915th, 916th) plus an artillery
regiment (352nd) and assorted support elements such as engineers.

Post by yauming
One regiment had been diverted to look for paratroopers.
Leaving how many soldiers left to guard?

The 916th was in reserve and was diverted to hunt for paratroops.
Neither of the forward deployed regiments was involved in that.

Post by yauming
I'm just a bit confused because the history books
interchange between regiment and battalion.

The reorganized German TO&E called for 3 infantry regiments, each with 2
infantry battalions plus anti tank and heavy weapons units.

Post by yauming
And I'm
not sure how many men were in each - the
actual size not paper strength.

As noted, for the 352nd ID actual strength was close to paper strength
albeit some of the personnel were Osttruppen.

[yauming]

Considering the Allied forces lost 10,000 troops on Omaha beach - that's not a bad effort - compared to say Gallipoli.

Who killed most of the German defenders then - was it small arms fire or the naval bombardment?

[Rich]

Post by Bill Shatzer
It seems the 352nd was close to TO&E strength - some 12.000 troops of a
TO&E of just under 13,000. Actual combat troops composed about half of
those.

As for most German units in Ob. West the answer is incomplete because
the records are so incomplete. What we know for sure is the division
was organized on 5 November 1943 from remnants of the 321.
Infanterie-Division, which had been destroyed on the Eastern Front.
Strength as of 1 March was 12,734 and at least 335 HiWi. As of 1 April
it was reported to be 494 men overstrength, although that probably
only refers to the German component. As of 1
June the division had 333 officers (only half with combat experience),
2,164 NCO (30 percent understrength), and 1,455 HiWi. Unfortunately, its
enlisted strength does not appear to have been reported.

Post by Bill Shatzer
Three infantry regiments (914th, 915th, 916th) plus an artillery
regiment (352nd) and assorted support elements such as engineers.

Each regiment consisted of two battalions, plus an infantry gun and an
antitank company in addition to the regimental HQ.

Post by Bill Shatzer
The 916th was in reserve and was diverted to hunt for paratroops.
Neither of the forward deployed regiments was involved in that.

II./Gren.-Regt. 916 was the division reserve, while the whole of
Gren.-Regt. 915 was corps reserve, along with the division pionier
and fusilier battalions. Elememts of 716. Inf.-Div. were also
attached.

Post by Bill Shatzer
As noted, for the 352nd ID actual strength was close to paper strength
albeit some of the personnel were Osttruppen.

Technically there were no Osttruppen, there were HiWi or Hilfswillger.
Osttruppen were organized combat units, but HiWi were more uniformed
camp followers. Only the attached IV./Gren.Regt. 726 was an Ost unit
(Ost-Btl. 439). Otherwise, there was a strong contingent of
"Reichsdeutsche" especially "Volksliste III" in all "German" units
by this time. The were persons of German descent born outside the Reich.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by yauming
But what about a large commando raid that came from in-land?
Would a large airborne assault that commenced the night before
the dawn invasion have made a difference?

Not without an incredible level of precision landing large numbers
of troops. Look at the historical result of the airborne operations.

Note there could be no bombing of the beach defences at least.

What sort of success should the naval bombardment assume?
The assault troops? The risk of friendly fire would be huge.

Post by yauming
A friend of mine posted that query to me. Obviously the attack
would encounter fierce resistance from the bunker troops -
and the Allied naval dawn bombardment would have inflicted
friendly fire. But perhaps the element of surprise would have
helped to pin down the garrison troops while the beach
landing force attacked in dawn.
I'm sure Ike and the other D-Day planners would have
thought about doing the same thing.

No they did not, for quite sound military reasons. To assault the
beaches pre dawn the troops had to be landed close enough, that
means within range of at least the artillery. Essentially in contested
landing zones.

Then add the three or four companies of immediate reserve troops,
held behind the beach defences at Omaha, they would have to be
fought through. Then add the troops further west along the coast,
while I do not have the full details it seems all up about a division's
worth of troops from around Omaha to the mouth of the Aure. So
you would need to assign an airborne division to have any chance
of having the numbers on the ground. Note a big part of the US
airborne mission was securing the inland routes to/from Utah, that
would have to be half abandoned

See the way the Aure river runs parallel to the coast behind
Omaha beach. It forms a useful barrier.

Finally why just for Omaha? Why not for all the beaches? How do the
planners work out Omaha is the one beach that needs such support.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.