Post by yaumingA few more questions. Could the Allied forces have
done anything better to improve on the D-Day odds
at Omaha?
Of course, no operation is perfect. The launch position closer,
the DD tanks closer still, less weight on the men's backs, the
landing craft artillery support in more seaworthy craft to start with.
The heavy bombers flying along the beach.
Post by yaumingI'm just a little surprised that after the experience in
assaulting enemy beaches in the Pacific - the US didn't
develop more mechanised support (like the British
"funnies") or develop better close air support into the invasion,
ie. jeep carriers with dive bombers or Corsair fighter bombers.
The F4U/FG flew a total of 146 action sorties (ones that saw
combat) off US CVE for the war, and all in 1945, another 6,488
action sorties off fleet carriers, almost all in 1945. Of the dive
bombers only the SBD flew from escort carriers, 196 action
sorties for the war.
Of the 30,699 action sorties from CVE 12,925 were FM, 136 F4F,
5,572 F6F and 11,427 TBF/M.
The US did develop a close air support force, it was officially
called the 9th Air Force and it generated 3,050 action sorties on
6 June 1944, versus 147,094 USN and USMC action sorties from
carriers for the war.
Carriers find it hard to generate large sortie totals, then add where
was the sea room for a carrier force to operate near Normandy.
The funnies arrived very late, just enough for the British, the US
Army ideas were further behind. The Marine Corps LVT idea was
developed and some were later used in Europe for river crossings
by Commonwealth forces. The 13 ton armoured LVT began serial
production in April 1943, around 900 built to the end of March 1944,
most were essentially fire support, the troop carrier version could
carry 18 men. Otherwise it is the unarmoured 8 ton LVT, which
could carry 24 (-1, -2 versions) or 30 (-3, -4 versions) men. Their
use at Tarawa found the open top and no armour were problems.
The LVT-3 and -4 entered production at the end of 1943, one -3 and
eleven -4 built that year, there were 4,119 unarmoured LVT built to
the end of March 1944, which would include most to all of the 4,187
-1 and -2 versions. To land the historical troop totals at Utah and
Omaha beaches on D-Day would require at least 1,900 30 man LVT,
so more if the 24 man versions were in use, but obviously less as
some units would require landing craft given their equipment.
There were 510 LVT(A)-1 and 450 LVT(A)-2 the latter being the troop
carrier, so in theory almost all would be available for Overlord if they
had been reserved but it would be their first test. The LVT(A)-4 did
not enter production until 1944.
How well they would have gone against the man made obstacles and
the nature made shingle beach is unknown.
Remember the allies were on a learning curve.
In terms of sizeable amphibious operations first there was Dieppe, where
the WWI lesson of strong naval gunfire support was relearned and that
amphibious assaults into urban areas is simply combining the two hardest
ground operations, do not do it. Then came Guadalcanal, which confirmed
amphibious operations where you do not have command of the sea and
sky are a very bad move. Next was Torch where the landings on the
Atlantic coast lost some 25% of the landing craft, confirming the sort of
anticipated loss rates. Then came Sicily, where some of the invaders were
met with heavy weapons in the form of armoured attacks, and proved
naval gunfire support was a good thing but it would have been best to
ensure more army heavy weapons were ashore, equals more LSTs and
LCTs. Sicily also showed the US the standard amphibious supply
technique was only geared to small forces on small landings. If an Army
was coming ashore and they were going to move large distances it was
imperative a proper Army logistics system was put in place, not just a large
number of beachhead supply and control units. Ignoring the various
landings in the Solomon Islands since they were against lightly defended
beaches on isolated islands we come to Salerno. This was the first time
the opponent had major mobile reserves, including tanks, and the chance
to deploy them. The result was the beachhead roped off and for a time in
peril of being destroyed. It could be argued it was held by the air and
naval power but only freed by the threat from the arrival of ground troops
from another landing, partly because there were no follow up troops. Then
came Tarawa with the Dieppe like lesson of how many casualties would be
taken assaulting a defended coast, especially if fire support is not
available
as the troops touch down and, if possible, while they try and cross the
beach. Such fire support had to be delivered close inshore which meant
largely from converted landing craft. Anzio once again showed how hard it
was to break out of a beachhead but also how hard it was to destroy one
as long as the ships could support and the invader had good control of the
air. The assaults on the Marshall islands in February 1944 showed better
techniques could cut the casualties for opposed landings.
The invasion of Sicily had shown amphibious shipping losses were much
lower than expected, well down on the 25% figure for the craft used in the
Atlantic Ocean beach landings in Torch. This was good, but the down side
was the shipping was needed for a much longer period afterward than
planned to supply the troops, indeed some of the shipping was still being
used for Sicily when the allies invaded Italy. This was bad as the landing
craft in particular had not been designed for prolonged use, after all if
you
were going to lose so many each invasion why make them that durable?
The result was a long repair bill at the end of the operation and less
shipping for follow up assaults than had been expected. This had obvious
implications for the post invasion build up for Overlord.
Geoffrey Sinclair
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