Why did the Japanese invade Alaskan islands?

Post by "he da man"
Just watched a special on the conflict to kick the Japanese off U.S.
soil. What was not clearly explained, is why the Japanese bothered
to invade these worthless isles to begin with. Was it just a thumb
in the nose to the U.S., or was there any rational, strategic reason
for deploying troops there.? I believe the islands were called
Attu and Siska, ( though my spelling could be off)

I suppose that it might have been a bit of a moral booster for them and
morale killer for the US. It didn't take much effort to capture those
pieces of American territory. When they Americans came to take them
back the biggest battle was with the weather. Their only strategic
value was as airbases, and , given the weather, they didn't really fill
the bill.

WaltBJ

2010-10-04 01:22:45 UTC

Myunderstanding of the Aleutian occupation was that it was to prevent
the USA from establishing airbases there from which to raid Hokkaido,
as well as being a decoy for the Midway operation.
As for retaking Attu and Kiska, we could very well have just left the
Japanese there; they sure weren't going anywhere else. I was in
Ketchikan at the time, and I remember my father and grandfather
laughing at the idea of the Japanese Army coming down through Alaska
to invade the continental USA. Grandfather, especially, had hunted all
over Alaska; he'd been up there since 1904. After serving in Vietnam,
I can assure you that surface travel through that temperate maritime
rain forest on Alaska's shoreline is tougher to penetrate than the
jungles of Vietnam.
Walt BJ

Bill Shatzer

2010-10-04 04:29:29 UTC

Kiska.

Their main objectives were to prevent the islands from being used for
air strikes against the Japanese held Kurile Islands and to close the
North Pacific "reconnaissance gap" which the Doolittle raid task force
had slipped through undetected in April. With patrol bases on Midway and
Attu, the Japanese felt they could detect any repeat attempt and prevent
a repetition.

Des

2010-10-04 14:57:16 UTC

I read that this was a feint to draw attention from the fleet sent
against Midway and that US codebreakers knew this to be the case.
Google - Battle of Midway feint - for more details.

Shawn Wilson

2010-10-04 16:29:14 UTC

Post by Des

I read that this was a feint to draw attention from the fleet sent
against Midway and that US codebreakers knew this to be the case.
Google - Battle of Midway feint - for more details.

A lot of people SAY it was a feint, but apparantly from reading*
actual Japanese documents they were intended as an operation in their
own right, not a feint.

It certainly wasn't a good idea, but Japan attacking the US in the
first place wasn't genius level planning either. I think US naval
construction *during* WWII exceeded all Japanese naval construction
ever... We also had cities that could produce more steel than their
entire nation.

* I didn't read them, people who have read them say this. That was
ambiguous.

Chris

2010-10-04 18:34:01 UTC

On Oct 4, 12:29 pm, Shawn Wilson <***@gmail.com> wrote:

[Re: Aleutian Islands as feint for Midway]

Post by Shawn Wilson
A lot of people SAY it was a feint, but apparantly from reading*
actual Japanese documents they were intended as an operation in their
own right, not a feint.

They weren't a feint in the classic understanding because the timing
was all wrong. According to the Japanese official history, the plan
was for the Kido Butai to hit Midway and the Aleutians Attack Force to
hit Dutch Harbor on the same day. Nagumo, however, needed another day
in port to get his ships turned around from Operation C. When he told
Yammamoto this, Y just pushed back the KB's time off Midway by a day
and left all the other parts of the plan moving as before.

So they weren't intended as a feint so much as a subsidiary part. The
schwerpunkt was always going to be at Midway, but the idea was that
the USN wouldn't be able to react to the Aleutian operation because
they were focused on Midway- where, according to the plan, they would
meet their doom at the hands of the KB.

All of this is discussed in _Shattered Sword_ by Tully and Parshall.
They also trace where the idea that it was a decoy came from- it
appears to be from Fuschida's book _Midway: The Battle That Doomed
Japan_ which got a lot of things wrong- and has been known to be wrong
in Japan for many decades. Read T&P's excellent book for much more
that will change how you view the Battle of Midway.

Chris Manteuffel

Alan Meyer

2010-10-07 05:02:54 UTC

...

Post by Shawn Wilson
It certainly wasn't a good idea, but Japan attacking the US in the
first place wasn't genius level planning either. I think US naval
construction *during* WWII exceeded all Japanese naval construction
ever... We also had cities that could produce more steel than their
entire nation.

If I remember the numbers correctly from Richard Overy's book, _Why the
Allies Won_, Japan produced about 38,000 motor vehicles in 1938 while
the U.S. produced 4.2 million in that year. Germany only produced about
340,000 and Italy much less.

Neither Hitler nor the Japanese generals who started the war had any
real appreciation of the juggernaut they would be unleashing against
themselves. I'm sure the Japanese leadership didn't comprehend
America's industrial capacity and, to the extent they did, didn't
understand what a huge difference it would make in the war. They
imagined that human factors were the main thing and further imagined
themselves (as did the Nazis) to be superior men compared to Americans.

Alan

sctvguy1

2010-10-07 15:28:38 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
Neither Hitler nor the Japanese generals who started the war had any
real appreciation of the juggernaut they would be unleashing against
themselves. I'm sure the Japanese leadership didn't comprehend
America's industrial capacity and, to the extent they did, didn't
understand what a huge difference it would make in the war. They
imagined that human factors were the main thing and further imagined
themselves (as did the Nazis) to be superior men compared to Americans.
Alan

Yamamoto did know the great industrial capacity of the US and tried to warn
the military leaders, but they refused to listen to him. He just followed
orders, telling them he could give them a good six months of fighting, then
it was basically going to be over.

David H Thornley

2010-10-07 23:11:41 UTC

Post by sctvguy1
Yamamoto did know the great industrial capacity of the US and tried to warn
the military leaders, but they refused to listen to him. He just followed
orders, telling them he could give them a good six months of fighting, then
it was basically going to be over.

Admiral Nagano said, in prewar planning, that he could hold off the US
for about two years. This was very roughly two years before the Central
Pacific Offensive kicked off, in which the US fought through defended
Japanese island groups with only naval support.

Some Japanese seem to have realized that the war was doomed, but they
went ahead anyway.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Shawn Wilson

2010-10-08 19:58:38 UTC

He knew Japan would inevitably lose a long war, but could win a short
one. If the US quits at the end of the short war, Japan wins. And he
was right. They won the short war. Unfortunately, they could not
make the US quit or keep the US from waging a long war, and they lost
that.

Dave Smith

2010-10-08 21:40:19 UTC

Post by Shawn Wilson
He knew Japan would inevitably lose a long war, but could win a short
one. If the US quits at the end of the short war, Japan wins. And he
was right. They won the short war. Unfortunately, they could not
make the US quit or keep the US from waging a long war, and they lost
that.

There was a lot of luck involved on the part of the US. It was luck
that the dive bombers arrived just after the ill fated torpedo plane
attack and that they should catch the Japanese planes on the deck and in
the process of refuelling and re-arming. Some of the Japanese CAP had
gone down after the torpedo planes so there was less resistance than
their might have been. While the torpedo bombers were wiped out, the
dive bombers took out four Japanese carriers, a serious blow to the
Japanese navy.

David H Thornley

2010-10-08 23:18:22 UTC

Post by Dave Smith
There was a lot of luck involved on the part of the US.

Except that you're talking about winning the Battle of Midway,
a battle where the US did get luckier (although there was a lot
of courage, skill, and hard work involved). That didn't decide
the war, which the US was going to win no matter what the Japanese
did in 1942.

The US built something like nineteen more fleet carriers by the
end of the war, so naval superiority wasn't going to depend on
what happened to the US prewar fleet.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Bay Man

2010-10-09 16:13:03 UTC

Post by Dave Smith
There was a lot of luck involved on the part of the US.

Except that you're talking about winning the Battle of Midway,
a battle where the US did get luckier (although there was a lot
of courage, skill, and hard work involved). That didn't decide
the war, which the US was going to win no matter what the Japanese
did in 1942.
The US built something like nineteen more fleet carriers by the
end of the war, so naval superiority wasn't going to depend on
what happened to the US prewar fleet.

Totally correct. Similar, the Germans took France, but this never meant they
would win the war. In the long run the Germans and Japanese economies could
not last a long war against stronger economies. Both were banking on short,
quick wins, more gambles than anything else, hoping the enemy would make
peace.

Jim

2010-10-09 16:46:26 UTC

Post by Dave Smith
There was a lot of luck involved on the part of the US.

Except that you're talking about winning the Battle of Midway,
a battle where the US did get luckier (although there was a lot
of courage, skill, and hard work involved). That didn't decide
the war, which the US was going to win no matter what the Japanese
did in 1942.
The US built something like nineteen more fleet carriers by the
end of the war, so naval superiority wasn't going to depend on
what happened to the US prewar fleet.

Which does raise an interesting question. It was indeed lucky that the
US carriers were out of Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. How
would it have changed things if they were in port and disabled / sunk?
I guess in the long run we'd still have nuclear weapons in August 1945
and they could be delivered to Japan from China, but the Pacific war
would be very different until the new carriers come online.

Shawn Wilson

2010-10-09 17:54:26 UTC

Post by Jim

Post by David H Thornley
The US built something like nineteen more fleet carriers by the
end of the war, so naval superiority wasn't going to depend on
what happened to the US prewar fleet.

Well, 1942 would be different. Those new carriers started coming
online Dec 31, 1942. At that time the US pretty much lost all its
initial carriers. No matter what happens in 1942, '43-'45 will be
pretty much the same.

Dave Smith

2010-10-09 19:53:27 UTC

Post by Dave Smith
There was a lot of luck involved on the part of the US.

Except that you're talking about winning the Battle of Midway,
a battle where the US did get luckier (although there was a lot
of courage, skill, and hard work involved). That didn't decide
the war, which the US was going to win no matter what the Japanese
did in 1942.
The US built something like nineteen more fleet carriers by the
end of the war, so naval superiority wasn't going to depend on
what happened to the US prewar fleet.

Which does raise an interesting question. It was indeed lucky that the
US carriers were out of Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. How
would it have changed things if they were in port and disabled / sunk? I
guess in the long run we'd still have nuclear weapons in August 1945 and
they could be delivered to Japan from China, but the Pacific war would
be very different until the new carriers come online.

I also wonder what would have happened if the US had not won the Battle
of Midway. If the US carriers had all been sunk and the Japanese still
had their carrier fleet it would have been a major setback for the US.
Public morale is a major factor in a democracy. much more than in a
society like Japan Germany where they would not even consider surrender.
Granted, both did eventually surrender, but in the case of German the
top Nazis committed suicide, while the atomic bombings of Hiroshimo and
Nagasaki seems to have been the deciding factor.

Rich Rostrom

2010-10-09 20:56:29 UTC

Post by Jim
Which does raise an interesting question. It was indeed lucky that the
US carriers were out of Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. How
would it have changed things if they were in port and disabled / sunk?

Only two U.S. carriers were operational
with Pac Fleet at the time: ENTERPRISE
and LEXINGTON. SARATOGA was in
San Diego. If those two carriers had been
sunk, it would have been a serious blow
to the U.S., but far from decisive. The
U.S. had SARATOGA, RANGER, HORNET,
YORKTOWN, and WASP in service as well.

Probably it would have meant a greater
emphasis on areas where land-based
air power was available, i.e. New Guinea.

David H Thornley

2010-10-10 02:53:30 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Only two U.S. carriers were operational
with Pac Fleet at the time: ENTERPRISE
and LEXINGTON. SARATOGA was in

Also, note that both carriers were busy, and
were very often not in port. There was a
stroke of luck, in that Enterprise was due
in Pearl on December 6, but arrived a day late.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Bay Man

2010-10-10 18:08:58 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom

British carriers may have moved to the Pacific if the carrier were sunk at
Pearl, as HMS Victorious did under disguises of USS Robin.

sctvguy1

2010-10-10 21:15:59 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom

British carriers may have moved to the Pacific if the carrier were sunk at
Pearl, as HMS Victorious did under disguises of USS Robin.

British carriers would have been more useful in the Pacific, the ETO being
mostly within almost all land-based aircraft. That would be a thought: if
the British had transferred all their carriers to the Pacific early and
strengthened the US Pacific fleet. They had armoured decks also.

Duwop

2010-10-11 01:34:25 UTC

Post by sctvguy1

Post by Rich Rostrom

British carriers may have moved to the Pacific if the carrier were sunk at
Pearl, as HMS Victorious did under disguises of USS Robin.

British carriers would have been more useful in the Pacific, the ETO being
mostly within almost all land-based aircraft.

Which is why they were armoured. Brits made pretty good use of what
they had in the Atlantic and Med. Meaning they were kept busy. And
what they had early war wouldn't have been helpful in the Pacific
anyway.Besides, where would they stage out of? Where's their logistics
in the Pacific theatre?

Post by sctvguy1
strengthened the US Pacific fleet. They had armoured decks also.-

A good thing when ferrying aircraft to Malta, not so much otherwise.

David H Thornley

2010-10-11 01:59:49 UTC

Post by sctvguy1
British carriers would have been more useful in the Pacific, the ETO being
mostly within almost all land-based aircraft. That would be a thought: if
the British had transferred all their carriers to the Pacific early and
strengthened the US Pacific fleet. They had armoured decks also.

The primary Japanese anti-carrier weapon was the torpedo, which ignored
armored decks. It wasn't until the late war that the primary Japanese
threat turned into the dive bomber and the kamikaze. Until then, the
lesser aircraft capacity and operating capabilities would have been
real handicaps.

In the meantime, the British seemed to find uses for their carriers
in home waters and the Mediterranean. They really didn't have all
that much in the early Pacific war, with their best prewar carriers
(Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal) sunk before the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, and with unimpressive air groups on the rest.

1942 was a critical year for the British in the Med, and in 1943
they wanted carriers for such purposes as attacking Tirpitz and
guarding against the German surface fleet. It wasn't until 1944,
with the completion of more carriers and the continued destruction
of German naval power, that the British really had surplus
carriers.

Then, of course, they sent them to the Indian Ocean to fight the
Japanese there, and then to the Pacific.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Bay Man

2010-10-11 22:16:08 UTC

The Japanese did a good job at Pearl with planes. In late Dec 1941 no one
thought that planes would not be used by the Japanese to attack ships.

Post by David H Thornley
In the meantime, the British seemed to find uses for their carriers
in home waters and the Mediterranean. They really didn't have all
that much in the early Pacific war, with their best prewar carriers
(Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal) sunk before the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, and with unimpressive air groups on the rest.
1942 was a critical year for the British in the Med, and in 1943
they wanted carriers for such purposes as attacking Tirpitz and
guarding against the German surface fleet. It wasn't until 1944,
with the completion of more carriers and the continued destruction
of German naval power, that the British really had surplus
carriers.

Carriers were not a great use at attacking the Tirpiz, so keep some back for
that was overkill. The RN could see to the Tirpitz without carriers, it was
so large, with the RAF having longer range planes as the war went on. In
the Atlantic carriers were underused.

Post by David H Thornley
Then, of course, they sent them to the Indian Ocean to fight the
Japanese there, and then to the Pacific.

David H Thornley

2010-10-12 00:33:19 UTC

Post by David H Thornley
The primary Japanese anti-carrier weapon was the torpedo, which ignored
armored decks. It wasn't until the late war that the primary Japanese

The Japanese did a good job at Pearl with planes. In late Dec 1941 no
one thought that planes would not be used by the Japanese to attack ships.

I completely fail to see the relevance here.

The most effective Japanese anti-ship planes in the early war were the
torpedo bombers. Most of the damage to Battleship Row was done by
torpedos, the British ships off Malaya were sunk by torpedo bombers,
and all US carrier losses in 1942 were torpedoed. The damage done
to USS Yorktown at Coral Sea and Midway by dive bombers was repairable.
USS Hornet was being towed away from the Santa Cruz battle after bomb
hits, crashed Japanese aircraft, and two torpedos, but succumbed to
the third (but was still hard to sink).

Carriers with armored flight decks would have had only limited
advantages then.

Post by David H Thornley
guarding against the German surface fleet. It wasn't until 1944,
with the completion of more carriers and the continued destruction
of German naval power, that the British really had surplus
carriers.

Carriers were not a great use at attacking the Tirpiz, so keep some back
for that was overkill.

They did accompany British battleship groups on the Arctic runs, and
it was doubtless not obvious at the time that torpedo bomber attacks
weren't going to accomplish much.

In 1943, the British had four modern fleet carriers, plus the not-
entirely-satisfactory Furious. One of the modern ones, HMS Victorious,
did spend a lot of time in the Southwest Pacific area.

During 1943, the US completed some Essex-class fleet carriers and nine
Independence-class light fleet carriers, so there was no urgent need.

In 1944, of course, the RN started operating in force against Japan
in the Indian Ocean (with the loan of USS Saratoga for a time), while
the USN carrier forces were large enough to support a major invasion
while fighting off the Japanese Navy.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Bay Man

2010-10-12 18:44:17 UTC

Post by David H Thornley
The primary Japanese anti-carrier weapon was the torpedo, which ignored
armored decks. It wasn't until the late war that the primary Japanese

The Japanese did a good job at Pearl with planes. In late Dec 1941 no
one thought that planes would not be used by the Japanese to attack ships.

I completely fail to see the relevance here.

I do. In late 1941/early 1942, the US and the UK did not for one moment
believe that their carriers were safe from dive bomber attacks, thinking
none would come. The PoW and Repulse were also hit by conventional bombs.

The Japanese had a large carrier fleet with excellent planes. To assume they
would not dive bomb for another 2 or 3 years is naive - and they were not
naive.

If the US carriers were sunk at Pearl to say that the British carriers
immediately moving into the Pacific would be of no use is utterly ludicrous.

This is a case of being wise in hindsight again. Always put yourself at the
point in time and assess from there. How they viewed at that point. Not
what we knew 6 years later, so in some cases 50 -60 years later.

Post by David H Thornley
They did accompany British battleship groups on the Arctic runs, and
it was doubtless not obvious at the time that torpedo bomber attacks
weren't going to accomplish much.

Escort carriers were being made from merchantmen for that role.

Alan Nordin

2010-10-12 20:08:15 UTC

On Oct 12, 2:44 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese had a large carrier fleet with excellent planes. To assume they
would not dive bomb for another 2 or 3 years is naive - and they were not
naive.

I think you're misunderstanding. I believe what Mr Thornley is saying
is that IJN torpedo bombers [VT] were far more effective than the Dive
bombers [VB]. Therefore the USN CVs had more to fear from them.

If you look at IJN CV plane complements in 1942, they almost always
carried the same number of VT as VB and occaisionally more VB than
VT. I don't think the IJN emphasized when type of attack over the
other, it's just that one was more effective than the other.

Bay Man

2010-10-12 22:32:12 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 12, 2:44 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese had a large carrier fleet with excellent planes. To assume they
would not dive bomb for another 2 or 3 years is naive - and they were not
naive.

I misunderstood nothing. He was saying that armoured decked carriers were
of no significance in the Pacific immediately after Dec 7 1941. Which is
nonsense.

David H Thornley

2010-10-13 00:40:46 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 12, 2:44 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese had a large carrier fleet with excellent planes. To assume they
would not dive bomb for another 2 or 3 years is naive - and they were not
naive.

Of course not.

Somebody would have to be awfully naive to think I didn't realize
that the Japanese had dive bombers, and used them.

However, the Japanese relied a lot more on their torpedo bombers.
The large carriers generally carried roughly equal loads of
dive or torpedo bombers, although the smaller carriers tended
to have more torpedo bombers (if only because the Japanese dive
bombers of the period didn't have folding wings).

When attacking ships, the Japanese land-based bombers generally
used torpedos.

Post by Alan Nordin
I think you're misunderstanding. I believe what Mr Thornley is saying
is that IJN torpedo bombers [VT] were far more effective than the Dive
bombers [VB]. Therefore the USN CVs had more to fear from them.

Yup. The main threat was from torpedo bombers.

Of all the ships larger than cruisers the Japanese sunk in 1942,
only USS Arizona was sunk by a bomb, and that was a very special
bomb dropped very precisely. (HMS Hermes was about cruiser
size.) The others were sunk primarily by torpedos, although
the Japanese also used bombs. Typically, ships only damaged
by bombs would float and be repaired.

Since the Japanese rarely had anti-ship bombers without having
torpedo bombers, and the Japanese torpedo bombers were by far
the most effective against ships, the torpedo bombers were
the major problem.

Post by Bay Man
I misunderstood nothing. He was saying that armoured decked carriers
were of no significance in the Pacific immediately after Dec 7 1941.
Which is nonsense.

I'm afraid you've misunderstood a lot. I said the armored decks
were not very important in the Pacific in 1942. The carriers
would have been useful, if provided with adequate air groups, but
the extra armor very much cut into the size of the air groups
they could carry. Before late 1944 at the earliest, a carrier
was definitely better off with the larger air group than the extra
armor, which was of no use against the primary Japanese threat.

Of course, the RN carriers were busy in 1942, sufficiently busy
that USS Wasp was used on a couple of missions in the Mediterranean
before being shipped off to the Pacific.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Bay Man

2010-10-13 20:00:06 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 12, 2:44 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese had a large carrier fleet with excellent planes. To assume they
would not dive bomb for another 2 or 3 years is naive - and they were not
naive.

Of course not.
Somebody would have to be awfully naive to think I didn't realize
that the Japanese had dive bombers, and used them.
However, the Japanese relied a lot more on their torpedo bombers.

Wise-in-hindsight again. No one knew that as the war had just started.

Post by David H Thornley
I'm afraid you've misunderstood a lot. I said the armored decks
were not very important in the Pacific in 1942.

They were very important to the admirals of the time. The Japanese had many
carriers, occupied larges swathes of territory and had many types of planes
with bombs and torpedoes.

Post by David H Thornley
The carriers would have been useful,
if provided with adequate air groups,

If the US carriers were sunk at Pearl they were would have been essential
not just useful.

Post by David H Thornley
Before late 1944 at the earliest, a carrier
was definitely better off with the larger air
group than the extra armor, which was of
no use against the primary Japanese threat.

Pre 1944, no admiral ever thought that.

Post by David H Thornley
Of course, the RN carriers were busy in 1942, sufficiently busy
that USS Wasp was used on a couple of missions in the Mediterranean
before being shipped off to the Pacific.

In the Med they were and the armoured decks proved invaluable against
Italian and German planes. They were wasted in the North Atlantic. The RN
overestimated the Tirpiz. They had an obsession of getting her, as Hitler
had with Stalingrad. It would have been better for him to have withdrawn,
but poured men and men into the city, using up resources. The RN wasted
resources on one frightened ship, holed up in fjord, in a navy devoid of
surface ships, which as the war progressed, longer range planes could have
seen off. Indeed planes did see Tirpitz off eventually.

David H Thornley

2010-10-14 03:28:00 UTC

Post by David H Thornley
However, the Japanese relied a lot more on their torpedo bombers.

Wise-in-hindsight again. No one knew that as the war had just started.

What wasn't understood at the time was the competence of the Japanese
pilots.

The British should have understood the threat of torpedo bombers
very well, They pioneered the torpedo comber, and they generally
carried torpedo bombers as attack aircraft. The typical British
air group near the end of the war was primarily Avengers and
Corsairs.

Post by David H Thornley
I'm afraid you've misunderstood a lot. I said the armored decks
were not very important in the Pacific in 1942.

They were very important to the admirals of the time.

I'll bite. Which admirals?

The Japanese had

Post by Bay Man
many carriers, occupied larges swathes of territory and had many types
of planes with bombs and torpedoes.

Sure. Now, focus on your last word in the above sentence.

What use is an armored deck against a torpedo?

Pre 1944, no admiral ever thought that.

Which completely fails to explain the USN obsession with large
air groups (one reason USS Ranger was not a success was that they
tried to fit too large an air group on too small a carrier)
and operating them efficiently.

Presumably, some US admirals thought large air groups were
nice.

For that matter, the Japanese carrier Ryujo was designed to
carry too many aircraft for her size, so I'd assume some Japanese
admirals liked large air groups also.

And, of course, no Japanese carrier had an armored flight deck
until rather late in the war, and no US carrier before the Midway
class, so one is rather forced to the conclusion that those
navies considered large air groups more important than extra
armor.

Post by David H Thornley
Of course, the RN carriers were busy in 1942, sufficiently busy
that USS Wasp was used on a couple of missions in the Mediterranean
before being shipped off to the Pacific.

In the Med they were and the armoured decks proved invaluable against
Italian and German planes.

No, the armored decks generally proved to be ineffective. When HMS
Illustrious was seriously damaged by German dive bombers, only one
of their bombs hit the deck armor, and it penetrated. The only thing
the deck armor did was cause one bomb to explode higher inside the
ship than it would have otherwise.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Duwop

2010-10-14 15:24:46 UTC

Post by David H Thornley
I'm afraid you've misunderstood a lot. I said the armored decks
were not very important in the Pacific in 1942.

They were very important to the admirals of the time.

I'll bite. Which admirals?

What I'm really wondering is what sort of missions BayMan imagines
them be useful for in this theatre in 1942.
Stopping the Kido Butai's foray into the Inda Ocean maybe? Or any
sort of carrier vs carrier actions?

Bay Man

2010-10-14 20:00:15 UTC

Post by Duwop

Post by David H Thornley
I'm afraid you've misunderstood a lot. I said the armored decks
were not very important in the Pacific in 1942.

They were very important to the admirals of the time.

I'll bite. Which admirals?

What I'm really wondering is what sort of missions BayMan imagines
them be useful for in this theatre in 1942.

Carrying sacks of rice? There usefulness would have been the same as any
other flat top. The US would have used US attack carrier planes, not the
reccie planes the British used.

Post by Duwop
Stopping the Kido Butai's foray into the Inda Ocean maybe? Or any
sort of carrier vs carrier actions?

If they were deployed in force in the Indian Ocean with proper US carrier
planes, not Swordfish, they would have matched the Jap carriers.

Duwop

2010-10-15 04:54:55 UTC

On Oct 14, 1:00 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Duwop

Post by David H Thornley
I'm afraid you've misunderstood a lot. I said the armored decks
were not very important in the Pacific in 1942.

They were very important to the admirals of the time.

I'll bite. Which admirals?

What I'm really wondering is what sort of missions BayMan imagines
them be useful for in this theatre in 1942.

Carrying sacks of rice?

Well, about time for a dose of reality. Thanks.

Post by Bay Man
There usefulness would have been the same as any
other flat top.

For what mission again? Oh yeah, carrying rice is it? Funny how you're
unable to find a mission these amored wonders could suceed at in 1942.
That was your original complaint you know. Glad to see there might be
a smidgeon of reality going on here.

Post by Bay Man
The US would have used US attack carrier planes, not the
reccie planes the British used.

That would be correct! Well done. Nor could the British launch the
supreme ueber weapon of the war bar none: The Lancaster!

Post by Duwop
Stopping the Kido Butai's foray into the Inda Ocean maybe? Or any
sort of carrier vs carrier actions?

If they were deployed in force in the Indian Ocean with proper US carrier
planes, not Swordfish, they would have matched the Jap carriers.

If my uncle had....err, nevermind.

But they weren't were they? Not until much later. And as for matching?
No, they could not get as many aircraft into the air. The British CV's
of this period were closer to a small Japanese CVL in this regard. And
with little to no useful fighter protection. It's no accident there
was never any British Vs Japanese carrier battles. The admirals knew
better. Heck, they knew better than you do with 60 years of hindsight.

Brits did plenty well, just not everything as you would like to have
it.

Bay Man

2010-10-14 20:00:08 UTC

Post by David H Thornley
The British should have understood the threat of torpedo bombers
very well, They pioneered the torpedo comber, and they generally
carried torpedo bombers as attack aircraft. The typical British
air group near the end of the war was primarily Avengers and
Corsairs.

Pre and early WW2, the torpedo aspect was secondary to the reccie role of
the carrier planes. At the end of WW2 the RN changed its doctrine to the US
approach using the carriers and an out and out attack ship, using the US
planes.

Post by Bay Man
They were very important to the admirals of the time.

I'll bite. Which admirals?

All of them. None were fools - except King.

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese had
many carriers, occupied larges swathes of territory and had many types
of planes with bombs and torpedoes.

Sure. Now, focus on your last word in the above sentence.

It is best you focus on all of them.

Pre 1944, no admiral ever thought that.

The USN did not have an obsession with large air groups. That was essential
in the war they were fighting, while the British did not need large air
groups in the ETO. The problem with large air groups in WW2 with angled
flight decks was getting the planes off and back on the carriers. Getting
80 back at the same time was a long process. Which takes us back to the
British idea of spreading your load amongst smaller cheaper carriers. Which
they had up to this day - until the new carriers are commissioned - which
are USS Impendence sized.

Post by David H Thornley
Presumably, some US admirals thought large air groups were
nice.

They had their uses. Many US critics, criticize the current US approach of
still having large expensive air groups carriers.

Post by David H Thornley
For that matter, the Japanese carrier Ryujo was designed to
carry too many aircraft for her size, so I'd assume some Japanese
admirals liked large air groups also.

It was a trend at the time. :)

Post by David H Thornley
And, of course, no Japanese carrier had an armored flight deck
until rather late in the war, and no US carrier before the Midway
class, so one is rather forced to the conclusion that those
navies considered large air groups more important than extra
armor.

Well not until the end of the war, when they adopted the UK approach in
design but made the ships bigger.

Post by David H Thornley
Of course, the RN carriers were busy in 1942, sufficiently busy
that USS Wasp was used on a couple of missions in the Mediterranean
before being shipped off to the Pacific.

In the Med they were and the armoured decks proved invaluable against
Italian and German planes.

Without the armour, the ship would have sunk easily.

Joel Shepherd

2010-10-15 17:16:38 UTC

Post by Bay Man
They were very important to the admirals of the time.

I'll bite. Which admirals?

All of them. None were fools - except King.

Please: name one specifically. I'm dying to know. I personally haven't
read anything indicating that Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance or Fletcher
thought they were at a disadvantage because they didn't have armored
flight decks.

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese had
many carriers, occupied larges swathes of territory and had many types
of planes with bombs and torpedoes.

Sure. Now, focus on your last word in the above sentence.

It is best you focus on all of them.

Which means what, exactly? The USN didn't have "many types of planes
with bombs and torpedoes"? Or the USN didn't know about Japan's "many
types"? Of course they did, even if they under-rated their potential.

If anything, that only put more emphasis on the USN's carrier doctrine
of the time, which was that the side that made the first strike would
probably win. Carrier battles weren't won by taking a defensive stance
-- by passively preparing for and absorbing an enemy strike. They were
won by taking out the enemy's carriers before they could take out yours.

Pre 1944, no admiral ever thought that.

Baloney. Name one USN admiral who stated the armor was more important
than aircraft.

Post by Bay Man
The USN did not have an obsession with large air groups. That was essential
in the war they were fighting, while the British did not need large air
groups in the ETO. The problem with large air groups in WW2 with angled
flight decks was getting the planes off and back on the carriers. Getting
80 back at the same time was a long process. Which takes us back to the
British idea of spreading your load amongst smaller cheaper carriers.

I'm sorry: I thought the British idea was armor. And the engineering
reality of heavy flight deck armor was less aircraft capacity. The USN
also "spread its load" around, and that _was_ an issue of considerable
debate in the USN in 1942. Not armor: but whether carriers should
operate closely, both physically and operationally, to pack the maximum
offensive punch and for mutual defense, or whether they should operate
separately, to "spread the load". By late 1943, the "spread the load"
camp had lost.

Post by Bay Man
They had their uses. Many US critics, criticize the current US approach of
still having large expensive air groups carriers.

Which has jack all to do with decisions made in the 1930's and 1940's.

Post by David H Thornley
Of course, the RN carriers were busy in 1942, sufficiently busy
that USS Wasp was used on a couple of missions in the Mediterranean
before being shipped off to the Pacific.

In the Med they were and the armoured decks proved invaluable against
Italian and German planes.

Without the armour, the ship would have sunk easily.

Can you name one USN carrier that was sunk by arial bombs? Ever?

And they were un-armored. So what makes you think that British carriers
would have fared any worse w/o armor?

--
Joel.

Alan Nordin

2010-10-15 18:12:24 UTC

Post by Joel Shepherd
Can you name one USN carrier that was sunk by arial bombs? Ever?

USS Princeton. A single 550 lb bomb hit sank her on 10/24/44. Not a
CV, but a CVL. She succumbed to the fire which was started in the
hangar deck.

Alan Nordin

2010-10-15 18:56:13 UTC

Post by Joel Shepherd
Can you name one USN carrier that was sunk by arial bombs? Ever?

USS Princeton. A single 550 lb bomb hit sank her on 10/24/44. Not a
CV, but a CVL. She succumbed to the fire which was started in the
hangar deck.

Oops, my memory is at fault here, she had to be scuttled by torpedoes
from the Reno. Still, she took a huge amount of damage from secondary
explosions, she may have sunk by herself.

Joel Shepherd

2010-10-16 17:31:51 UTC

Post by Joel Shepherd
Can you name one USN carrier that was sunk by arial bombs? Ever?

USS Princeton.

Thanks for the correction. And I won't even move the goal post by saying
"I meant a fleet carrier." ;-)

--
Joel.

Alan Nordin

2010-10-17 18:29:24 UTC

Post by Joel Shepherd
Thanks for the correction. And I won't even move the goal post by saying
"I meant a fleet carrier." ;-)

Well, as I said, she was scuttled by torpedoes. Damage control &
salvage would have continued if a ship capable of towing her had been
available, but the Birmingham was caught in the worst of the secondary
explosions and had to retire. Much of the aft end of the Princeton
was blown off in the same explosion. Considering what the Franklin
went through and survived, the Princeton may very well have too.

Chris

2010-10-17 18:39:28 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
USS Princeton.

Thanks for the correction. And I won't even move the goal post by saying
"I meant a fleet carrier." ;-)

I have a hard time with any definition of 'fleet carrier' that somehow
excludes a carrier operating with TF 38/58. It seems to me that if it
operated as part of that task force, it's a fleet carrier. Now, it
might be a light carrier as opposed to a full size one, but they're
both fleet carriers.

Chris Manteuffel

Bay Man

2010-10-17 18:39:29 UTC

Post by Joel Shepherd
Can you name one USN carrier that was sunk by arial bombs? Ever?

USS Princeton.

Thanks for the correction. And I won't even move the goal post by saying
"I meant a fleet carrier." ;-)

A carrier is a carrier. It held 54 planes.

David H Thornley

2010-10-17 19:14:41 UTC

Post by Bay Man
Pre and early WW2, the torpedo aspect was secondary to the reccie role
of the carrier planes.

Which was a largely obsolete concept, which worked to some extent in
European waters because of the inefficiency of Germany and Italy in
naval matters.

After the failures of German naval air in 1940, the Luftwaffe worked
hard to develop good anti-ship capability, at which time the prewar
idea of the carrier as a primarily scouting platform was dead.

At the end of WW2 the RN changed its doctrine to

Post by Bay Man
the US approach using the carriers and an out and out attack ship, using
the US planes.

Not at the end of WWII. It was clear much earlier that this was the
proper way to use carriers, but the deficiencies of the RN carrier force
hindered its development.

Post by David H Thornley
I'll bite. Which admirals?

All of them. None were fools - except King.

King was not a fool, merely anti-British and caught in a bad
situation in early 1942.

Now, that you've said all admirals, I await quotes from Stark,
Raeder, Pye, and even some US carrier admirals like Spruance
and Fletcher and Halsey about the importance of armored decks.

Post by David H Thornley
Which completely fails to explain the USN obsession with large
air groups (one reason USS Ranger was not a success was that they
tried to fit too large an air group on too small a carrier)
and operating them efficiently.

The USN did not have an obsession with large air groups.

Meaning you don't know enough about the USN to comment. The USN most
certainly did work hard to create the largest air groups and the most
powerful strikes, including how to dense-pack aircraft on the deck.

You also didn't address the problems with USS Ranger, which was
certainly a worse carrier than if she'd been designed for a smaller
air group.

That was

Post by Bay Man
essential in the war they were fighting, while the British did not need
large air groups in the ETO.

Nope. The British needed large air groups, they just didn't have them.
HMS Illustrious would have been far better off with more than eight
fighters aboard when subject to heavy air attack.

The problem with large air groups in WW2

Post by Bay Man
with angled flight decks was getting the planes off and back on the
carriers. Getting 80 back at the same time was a long process.

But doable. The US was able to efficiently operate air groups of
about 80 planes per carrier without angled flight decks, although
those certainly would have helped. More than that was a problem,
although many carriers loaded up to 100 for the Okinawa campaign.

US carrier operations were designed for efficiency, with rapid
processing, much unlike British prewar practice.

Which

Post by Bay Man
takes us back to the British idea of spreading your load amongst smaller
cheaper carriers.

Except that the British weren't using cheaper carriers. The early
armored-deck carriers were larger than their US counterparts, and
they had plenty of armor. If they had been smaller and lightly armored,
like the light fleet carriers the British came up with towards the end
of the war, that might make sense.

Post by David H Thornley
Presumably, some US admirals thought large air groups were
nice.

They had their uses. Many US critics, criticize the current US approach
of still having large expensive air groups carriers.

In a completely and totally different context. These arguments have
very little bearing on WWII and are off topic here.

Post by Bay Man
class, so one is rather forced to the conclusion that those

Post by David H Thornley
navies considered large air groups more important than extra
armor.

Well not until the end of the war, when they adopted the UK approach in
design but made the ships bigger.

Through the end of the war for the US, as the Midway class had flight
deck armor only because of its size. They could also carry far more
aircraft than a single carrier could operate effectively. This came
in handy postwar, as the size of the aircraft grew considerably, but
again that's off-topic.

Nor was this the British design approach, since the flight deck was
still superstructure, only armored superstructure. The extension of
the hull up to the flight deck was a much later development, made
necessary by the size of the postwar carriers.

Post by David H Thornley
No, the armored decks generally proved to be ineffective. When HMS
Illustrious was seriously damaged by German dive bombers, only one
of their bombs hit the deck armor, and it penetrated. The only thing
the deck armor did was cause one bomb to explode higher inside the
ship than it would have otherwise.

Without the armour, the ship would have sunk easily.

In other words, you're claiming that Illustrious would have just
sunk, without any real chance to save the ship, if that one bomb
that hit the armor had exploded in the ship somewhere below the hangar
deck.

To repeat, the only effect of the armor was to slow down one
bomb of eight, the only one to hit the armor. Three bombs did
avoid the armor and exploded deep in the ship, which caused a great
deal of damage but didn't give the captain the feeling that the
ship was likely to sink.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Bill Shatzer

2010-10-14 04:26:57 UTC

-snip-

Pre 1944, no admiral ever thought that.

Certainly some American and Japanese admirals thought that - as both
countries built aircraft carriers with oversized air groups and
unarmored decks.

Even the undersized US carriers Ranger and Wasp (apprx 15,000 tons)
carried largish air groups of 70+ planes.

Chris

2010-10-15 04:53:12 UTC

On Oct 13, 4:00 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
In the Med they were and the armoured decks proved invaluable against
Italian and German planes.
From Appendix 13: "Notes on Damage to RN Armored Hangar Carriers", in

_Nelson to Vanguard_ by D.K. Brown, here is a complete list of all
hits on RN armored flight deck carriers in World War Two (Note, I
added the time in repair yards and USN experience as a comparison, but
everything else is from Brown):

Conventional methods of attack:

10 Jan 1941: HMS Illustrious is hit by a large number of 550 kg bombs-
of course, only one bomb hit the armored flight deck, and it
penetrated, exploding in the hangar.
16 Jan 1941: Two more bombs hit Lusty, one penetrates flight deck aft,
other is a near miss port. Illustrious in repair until December 1941,
when returned to UK with Formidable.
26 Jun 1941 [Note: this seems to be a typo for 26 May, which is when
Hough, _Longest Battle_ puts it]: 2 550 kg bombs hit Formidable,
"severely damaged under water. Spall from flight deck armor penetrated
center M/C space"- Formidable returned to UK with Illustrious in Dec
1941 after repairs in US.
12 Aug 1942: HMS Victorious "Small bomb [anti-personnel type] broke on
flight deck."
12 Aug 1942: HMS Indomitable. "2 hits, 3 near misses, 550 kg SAP. Hits
on flight deck just fore and aft of armor. One near miss caused
extensive damage." Under repair in US until returns to UK, Feb. 1943.
11 Jul 1943: HMS Indomitable "Torpedoed, fragments of belt went into
engine room." Under repair in US until returns to UK, May 1944.

Note the effectiveness of the armored flight deck against conventional
methods of attack: HMS Victorious being hit by a small anti-personnel
bomb is the only time a RN armored deck carrier was hit by a bomb and
did not have to spend half a year or more in Norfolk being repaired.
Otherwise, the armor did not prevent a mission kill- which is the
primary goal of hitting a carrier with bombs. That's 1 success
(against a very weak bomb) and three failures- plus the torpedo hit
which the armor obviously had no influence on. As a counter factual,
if instead of the armor these carriers had an additional 20-30
aircraft (about the operational difference between Ark Royal and
Illustrious, and therefore roughly the cost of the armor) would the
greater number of fighters have protected the carriers better?

Direct comparisons are hard because the IJN used smaller bombs, and
hit locations and such are always different, but compare with USS
Yorktown at Midway- hit by three (admittedly smaller) bombs- the first
around 1211, and was operating planes again by 1420. Another example:
Enterprise was hit by three bombs at Eastern Solomons: first at 1644,
and she landed her first aircraft at 1749. Other than the very small
bomb on Victorious, bomb hits on the armored flight deck always
required months in a yard to repair, unlike the wooden decks of the
USN.

Kamikaze's:

1 Apr 1945: HMS Indefatigable, "Kamikaze. Hit starboard side of
island. Deck indented over 15 sq ft by up to 2 in. No penetration.
Short but impressive fire. Note: Might not have pierced even an
unarmoured flight deck. Flight deck repaired in 30 min, island in 1
month."
6 Apr 1945: Kamikaze grazes Illustrious' island, "bomb exploded under
water, severe damage"- on April 14th she was withdrawn to Australia
because she could not continue due to the damage and had to return to
Britain for repairs, which were not finished until 1946.
4 May 1945: Kamikaze hits Formidable. "9 feet to port of CL FR 79.
Depression 24x20ft, hole 2ft square. Deep beam buckled. 3 fragments
pierced hanger deck, one went through BR to DB. Note: Fully
operational."
4 May 1945: HMS Indomitable: "1 Kamikaze abreast island, no serious
damage."
9 May 1945: Kamikaze hits Formidable. "Port of CL Fr 94. Deck
depressed 4 1/2 inches, beam distorted 3 inches. Heavy fire in parked
aircraft. Note: Might not have pierced even an unarmoured deck." She
resumed operations the next day.
9 May 1945: Kamikaze hits Victorious: "3 Kamikaze, remained
operational. First hit deck abreast of island, diving from starboard
to port. Bomb exploded in sea, no damage. Note: Might not have pierced
even an unarmoured flight deck. 2nd detonated on deck at Fr 30 between
lift and B 4.5 inch turret at junction of 3 in and 1.5 in D plates
over longitudinal bulkhead, 3 in depression and pierced. Hole 25 sq
ft, depression 144 sq ft. Bulkhead buckled, accelerator broken. Small
fires. Note: Deck protection invaluable. Temporary repairs while
operating. Back in action after 2 days. 3rd hit port side of CL, Fr
135. No damage Note: Might not have pierced even an unarmoured flight
deck."

So, let's total up the damage here: 8 Kamikaze hits. 1 forced the ship
out of the war despite her armored flight deck. Four of them Brown
notes as "might not have pierced even an unarmored flight deck"
because they were glancing blows with little power. One of them hit
the island- which was unarmored, and caused "no serious damage." And
so that leaves two of them where the armor was useful: the 4 May hit
on Formidable and the 2nd hit on Victorious on 9 May.

Again, let's provide a couple of examples of wooden-decked carriers
shrugging off a kamikaze hit: on 25th November, 1944 a Kamikaze hit
USS Essex, striking planes spotted for launch. She was operating
planes half an hour later, and remained on the line. On 9 October 1944
a Kamikaze hit USS Franklin, slid across the deck and dropped into the
water, resulting in no casualties and minor damage that did not
interfere with flight operations at all.

I'm afraid I just don't see much evidence for the superiority of armor
on the flight deck during World War Two. It does not seem to have kept
carriers from being mission killed by bombs, and does not seem to have
offered much special protection from Kamikaze's.

Chris Manteuffel

Duwop

2010-10-15 17:14:26 UTC

Post by Chris
Illustrious, and therefore roughly the cost of the armor) would the
greater number of fighters have protected the carriers better?

The additional fighters protect more than just their own carrier,
they protect the fleet and are useful for other missions such as
ground attack.

Mario

2010-10-15 23:49:43 UTC

Post by Chris
I'm afraid I just don't see much evidence for the superiority
of armor on the flight deck during World War Two. It does not
seem to have kept carriers from being mission killed by bombs,
and does not seem to have offered much special protection from
Kamikaze's.

All that data suggests that after the war carriers don't need an
armoured deck.

But what data was available before the war?

--
H

Chris

2010-10-16 04:12:01 UTC

Post by Mario
All that data suggests that after the war carriers don't need an
armoured deck.
But what data was available before the war?

I think you're asking why the RN was so keen on armored flight decks,
when the IJN and USN were much less interested, commissioning their
first such ships in 1944 and 1945 respectively.

It is my opinion that the RN developed armored flight decks because of
a mistake made during the founding of the RAF. When the RAF was
created, they were given control of all aircraft, including those that
would operate off a carrier. That meant that officers who wanted to
fly off a carrier were actually dual-commissioned, in both the RAF and
the RN, and had different ranks, different promotion boards, etc. By
the mid-1930's the RN felt that this was an unworkable system and
wanted to regain complete control of their aircraft.

However, in order for the RN to do that, they had to emphasize how
difficult it was to operate off a ship- and therefore land based
experience was useless. Because they made such a big deal of it, they
ended up making, in the words of Admiral Forbes, a "False God" of the
difficulty of operating off ships. The result was that the RN went to
war with low performance airplanes designed more for take-off and
landing than for fighting. This was driven home off Norway when Ju-88
bombers *with bombs* accelerated away from the RN's Gloster Gladiators
(which caused Admiral Forbes to write the memo quoted above). They
also emphasized the difficulty of overwater navigation- hence the Skua
and the emphasis on two person fighters, one man to navigate, one to
fly. Now don't get me wrong, these were hard problems, but both the
USN and the IJN, where the navies controlled the airplanes throughout,
were able to solve those problems and get reasonably performing
fighters. The RN, because of their political struggles, did not.

Given that, then armor does make sense: I would rather have flight
deck armor than more Gladiators or Skua's in a world with Ju-88's and
FW-190's. But what the designers missed was that it was a lot easier
to design good fighters to operate off a carrier than it was to move
the armor down a deck level. Airplanes are far more flexible and
fixable than the ships. The Seafire, Martlett and Corsair all gave the
RN the ability to at least hold their own against enemy land planes,
and I think that the historical record demonstrates that it was better
to have more of those than deck armor.

So, in short, I blame the RAF for this.

Chris Manteuffel

Bay Man

2010-10-17 18:45:57 UTC

Post by Mario

All that data suggests that after the war carriers don't need an
armoured deck.

But they were adopted after WW2, even by the US. They must have been a real
bad idea.

A number of kamikazes hit British carriers and they were not mission killed.
They sailed on.

David H Thornley

2010-10-17 19:32:10 UTC

Post by Mario

Post by Chris
I'm afraid I just don't see much evidence for the superiority
of armor on the flight deck during World War Two. It does not

But what data was available before the war?

As an addition to Chris' excellent analysis of the aircraft problem,
there's also the fact that aircraft were increasing rapidly in
capacity in the later 1930s and of course through WWII. This meant
that a carrier could perhaps be armored for reasonable bomb resistance
against mid-30s bombers, and that the Illustrious-type design might
have served well when the planners were coming up with it. However,
the USN was able to counter improved bombers with improved fighters,
and the RN was unable to counter improved bombers with improved
deck armor.

Take a look at some of the German and British battleship designs,
which went to large size without correspondingly large armament
in order to make the deck armor thicker.

Moreover, the RN had relatively little recent experience with
carrier design and building. Of the carriers available to the
RN at the start of the war, Argus, Hermes, Eagle, and Furious
were WWI-era. If you look at a 1919 Jane's Fighting Ships,
they're there (along with even older ones). Courageous and
Glorious were converted after the Washington Naval Treaty,
making good carriers out of white elephants, but they were
comparable to the US Lexington and Saratoga and the Japanese
Akagi and Kaga.

The US had built the unsatisfactory Ranger before settling on
the excellent Yorktown design, while the Japanese had built
the mediocre light carrier Ryujo before the much better
Soryu and Hiryu. Both the US and Japanese had experience with
relatively large numbers of capable fleet carriers, while the
RN had a mishmash, largely designed and built with strictly
WWI experience.

The RN pioneered a great many things with carriers, but 1930
through WWII wasn't a good time for their carrier design
and operation.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Alan Nordin

2010-10-13 04:38:01 UTC

On Oct 12, 6:32 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
I misunderstood nothing. He was saying that armoured decked carriers were
of no significance in the Pacific immediately after Dec 7 1941. Which is
nonsense.

No, he was saying armoured decks would not give much of an advantage
in the Pacific early in the war.

Whatever advantage they would give would be more than offset by the
armored deck limiting the size of the air group that could be
carried. For instance, the Yorktown class CVs carried around 78
planes at this time, the Illustrious class of somewhat larger
displacement carried around half as many.

Rich

2010-10-13 04:38:09 UTC

On Oct 12, 6:32 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
I misunderstood nothing. He was saying that armoured decked carriers were
of no significance in the Pacific immediately after Dec 7 1941. Which is
nonsense.

Yes indeed, you misunderstood nothing, which is not difficult for a
know-nothing. So in fact then you are aware that the RN armoured-deck
design compromised a number of requirements, among them air group
size, as well as number of elevators, and so ability to spot air
strikes rapidly. Or that the design requirement was actually only to
defeat 500-lb bombs dropped from a maxmum of 7,00 feet, so that when
confronted by 500-kg bombs and larger employed by the Luftwaffe and
IJNAF in dive-bombing the defensive "advantage" was actually nil? And
that the survival of the RN carriers was more a matter of luck in that
the bombing attacks they were subjected to rarely ***struck*** the
armored deck? Or, of course, that the near misses and blast damage
actually compromised the carriers that were hit, damaging their
structural integrity due to blast effects since the armored flight
deck was an integral part of the ship, and that as a consequence
postwar were almost all scrapped because it was too big a job to
repair them (the RN surveys condemning them were rather scathing in
fact)? For those interested in the sense, rather than the nonsense, of
the effects of that compromise, you can do no better than
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm

You might also be aware that your "example" of Repulse and PoW is
pretty lame as well. Six to eight torpedoes out of 49 hit, while only
two of 34 bombs did...all from land based rather than carrier type
aircraft.

David's remarks were actually quite cogent; AFAICS your's were the
only ones with a high nonsense content.

Bay Man

2010-10-13 19:59:55 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 12, 6:32 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
I misunderstood nothing. He was saying that armoured decked carriers were
of no significance in the Pacific immediately after Dec 7 1941. Which is
nonsense.

Yes indeed, you misunderstood nothing, which is not difficult for a
know-nothing.

Rich with his attitude again. The know nothing is you.

Post by Alan Nordin
So in fact then you are aware that the RN armoured-deck
design compromised a number of requirements, among them air group
size, as well as number of elevators, and so ability to spot air
strikes rapidly.

They did "not" compromise anything at all. For their intended purpose they
were superb and ideal. Indeed, the designs were so good a number of navies
in the world, post WW2 used ex British WW2 carriers right up until about 10
years ago.

The RN carriers were to compliment the battleships, so were US and Japanese
to a large extent. British carriers were not for outright attack, more as a
reccie role, to bring the battleships onto the enemy. Which largely
occurred in sinking the Bismarck. The carriers spotted the ship at various
times, and even crippled the ship, and BBs finished her off.

Hence no outright attack carrier aircraft was designed for British carriers.
The Swordfish was more like a helicopter, taking off virtually vertical when
into the wind. They were never far from a friendly port - the empire being
so big - and the role would have taken them within range of land based
planes hence the armoured decks. If they needed to carry 90 planes the RN
would have built larger armoured carriers. They never because they had no
need. There was also the point of having all your eggs in one basket. It
was best to spread the planes around carriers.

The US carriers were primarily for the vast Pacific. The planes had to be
attack planes, hence the US designed planes for that role, and the range
long. US Carriers could resupply from atolls.

BTW, the British carriers in the Pacific held 81 planed when parked on
decks. When in WW2 the BB was virtually rendered obsolete, the UK used US
purposed designed carrier planes - and even improved them as in the
Corsair - which was ignored by the US navy until the British perfected it
and developed a landing routine for it. Towards the end of WW2 jet planes
were being designed for specific carrier duties, giving a quantum leap.
There was no need to develop piston engined carrier planes.

Post by Alan Nordin
And that the survival of the RN carriers was more
a matter of luck in that the bombing attacks they
were subjected to rarely ***struck*** the
armored deck?

No luck at all. Many hits on the decks were encountered, even Kamikazes.
If bombs cut through the wooden US decks, the damage penetrated through the
flight deck then the consequences to the hanger space underneath would be
severe and then it was a dockyard job for repairs. Witness the frequency of
time spent in dock by USN carriers after kamikaze hits.

RN carriers took less damage from comparable hits and could resume
operations sooner. The main means of repairs on British carriers was mixing
concrete to flatten out dents in the flight deck. A USN liaison officer on
HMS Formidable off Okinawa was reported as saying "When a kamikaze hits a US
carrier, it's six months repair in Pearl. In a Limey carrier, it's
'sweepers, man your brooms'.

Post by Alan Nordin
You might also be aware that your "example" of Repulse and PoW is
pretty lame as well. Six to eight torpedoes out of 49 hit, while only
two of 34 bombs did...all from land based rather than carrier type
aircraft.

The pre-war US notion that carriers would not be in range of land based
aircraft was misjudged, as the US copied the UK designs during WW2. In fact
every major invention of the carrier was British from hurricane bows, steam
catapults, angled decks, arnoured flight deck was structural so did not take
up so much
topweight, etc' all which the US adopted.

The point was that planes were attacking carriers and making hits. No
admiral in early WW2, would dismiss a carrier's strength of an armoured
deck, thinking that it would not be bombed by planes. That was clearly put
across here.

Also, if the US carriers were wiped out at Pearl, any carrier of any type
would be grasped at to operate in the Pacific. If the UK carriers moved
around to the Pacific I would assume they would have taken on US attack
carrier planes, as HMS Victorious did when filling in.

Post by Alan Nordin
David's remarks were actually quite cogent; AFAICS your's were the
only ones with a high nonsense content.

You are reinforcing the wise-in-hindsight nonsense I read.

Alan Nordin

2010-10-13 20:59:31 UTC

On Oct 13, 3:59 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
BTW, the British carriers in the Pacific held 81 planed when parked on
decks.

I don't see how ferry complements are pertinent, when in action they
didn't operate anywhere near that amount.

David H Thornley

2010-10-14 12:28:48 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 13, 3:59 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
BTW, the British carriers in the Pacific held 81 planed when parked on
decks.

To come to Bay Man's defense slightly, I think he's referring to
deck parks, the practice of keeping some aircraft on deck permanently,
in order to have a larger air group than will fit in the hangars.
By doing that, two of the six British armored-deck carriers
could hold about 80 aircraft, and even the first three could hold
maybe up to 50.

Of course, this was only two of the six, and in order to do that
they wound up sacrificing hangar height, so that they couldn't
strike Corsairs below. In the Okinawan campaign, most of the
British carriers operated Corsairs and Avengers, but the one
with the most aircraft had Seafires and a few Fireflies as fighters.

This was the campaign where the armored flight decks were
particularly useful, since kamikazes had very little penetration
capability. A kamikaze hit that would penetrate at least as far
as the hangar deck (USN Essex-class carriers had armor on the
hangar deck) on a US carrier would be superficial on a British.
The standard joke was "Man your brooms!"

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Alan Nordin

2010-10-14 15:24:29 UTC

Post by David H Thornley
By doing that, two of the six British armored-deck carriers
could hold about 80 aircraft, and even the first three could hold
maybe up to 50.

Ah, but the two [Implacable class] were not available early in the war
as they hadn't been built yet. So the 80 aircraft number is
meaningless in this context.

Rich

2010-10-13 21:52:18 UTC

On Oct 13, 3:59 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Rich with his attitude again. The know nothing is you.

My only "attitude" is that willful jingoistic ignorance isn't
tolerable.

Post by Bay Man
They did "not" compromise anything at all. For their intended purpose they
were superb and ideal. Indeed, the designs were so good a number of navies
in the world, post WW2 used ex British WW2 carriers right up until about 10
years ago.

Spoken by someone who quite evidently has never read any of the
standard references on the subject, let alone the précis I referenced.
Ignorance truly must be bliss. So then, just which navies and carriers
were those pray tell? Would you care to enlighten one and all as to
which of the ***armoured-deck*** fleet carriers those were?

(snip ignorant twaddle)

Post by Bay Man
BTW, the British carriers in the Pacific held 81 planed when parked on
decks. When in WW2 the BB was virtually rendered obsolete, the UK used US
purposed designed carrier planes - and even improved them as in the
Corsair - which was ignored by the US navy until the British perfected it
and developed a landing routine for it. Towards the end of WW2 jet planes
were being designed for specific carrier duties, giving a quantum leap.
There was no need to develop piston engined carrier planes.

BTW, no "carriers" did not a "carrier" did, HMS
Implacable.Indefatigable could have as well, since they were
***designed to do so***, but did not and neither did any of the others
because they were ***not designed to do so***.

HMS Colossus: 24 Corsairs, 18 Barracudas = 42
HMS Formidable: approximate airgroup 36 Corsairs, 15 Avengers = 51
HMS Glory: 21 Corsairs, 18 Barracudas = 39
HMS Illustrious: approximate airgroup 36 Corsairs, 15 Avengers = 51
HMS Implacable: 48 Seafire, 21 Avenger, 12 Firefly = 81
HMS Indefatigable: 40 Seafire, 18 Avenger, 12 Firefly = 70
HMS Indomitable: 39 Hellcats, 21 Avengers = 60
HMS Venerable: 21 Corsairs, 18 Barracudas = 39
HMS Vengeance: 24 Corsairs, 18 Barracudas = 42
HMS Victorious: 36 Corsairs, 15 Avengers, plus Walrus amphibian = 52

Fifteen bombs struck Allied carriers in the Med during the entire war.
One of those bomb hits was actually defeated by the armoured flight
deck of an Illustrious-class, HMS Victorious, during PEDESTAL...and
that was an anti-personnel bomb dropped by an Re.2001. Indomitable
took two hits in the Med, both missing her armoured deck, but putting
her out of action from 12 August 1942 to February 1943. Formidable was
also hit by two 500kg bombs, one of which struck her deck armour,
which splintered, one fragment piercing her hanger deck and destroying
a boiler, putting her out of action for six months. Illustrious was
hit six times at sea and then a number of times while sheltering in
Malta, but only one 500kg bomb hit her deck armour and
penetrated...she was out of service for 16 months.

Kamikaze's were as much a factor resulting from lack of frequency as
anything. TF 58's 15 American carriers reportedly shot down 1,908
kamikaze's off Okinawa and ahd four carriers damaged, the British TF
57 shot down 75 kamikaze's and had four carriers hit as well. The hit
on Illustrious on 6 April missed her flight deck and did severe
damage...repairs's were completed in June - of the following year.
OTOH Formidable managed to survive two kamikaze hits but was condemned
postwar because of the cumulative war damage that had compromised her
structure - despite her armoured flight deck.

And so on...

(snip the rest of the twaddle)

Bay Man

2010-10-14 18:49:17 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 13, 3:59 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Rich with his attitude again. The know nothing is you.

My only "attitude" is that willful jingoistic ignorance isn't
tolerable.

On that I totally agree.

What twaddle indeed. Australia, The Netherlands, Argentina (they invaded
the Falkland Islands with an ex British carrier), Brazil, Canada and India
(who still have HMS Hermes decommissioned, which was laid down in WW2).
They were all ex WW2 British carriers. These were throw away designs at the
time. Indeed the carrier in WW2 was a throw away ship. Most of these
carriers were operating over 40 years after WW2 - in ships not meant to last
WW2.

Once again...They did "not" compromise anything at all. For their intended
purpose they were superb and ideal.

They were not designed to carry 90 planes or operate in a vast ocean for
months at a time. They were designed in the 1930s to operate near land and
only be at sea for about 10 days maximum. If the RN wanted a carrier to
hold over 90 planes and be at sea for months on end, they would have built
very different carriers for that purpose.

In the Pacific the British carrier fleet operated more towards land than the
US carriers, for obvious reasons - they were designed to do so.

< snip >

Nik Simpson

2010-10-14 22:14:56 UTC

Post by Rich
Spoken by someone who quite evidently has never read any of the
standard references on the subject, let alone the précis I referenced.
Ignorance truly must be bliss. So then, just which navies and carriers
were those pray tell?

You're confusing the light fleet carriers with the armored carriers. The
armored carriers with the exception of Victorious were quickly put in
reserve after the war, several of them because repairing the accumulated
war damage including warped hulls simply wasn't worth the effort.
Compare that to the US Essex class ships most of which survived till at
least the 60s and some even longer than that.

IF you are interested in actual facts about the RN thinking on carrier
design in the 30s, I suggest:

Nelson to Vanguard - Warship Design and Development 1923-1945
D.K Brown
http://www.amazon.com/Nelson-Vanguard-Warship-1923-1945-Pictorial/dp/155750492X/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpi_5

--
Nik Simpson

Bay Man

2010-10-15 00:03:17 UTC

Post by Nik Simpson
IF you are interested in actual facts about the RN thinking on carrier
Nelson to Vanguard - Warship Design and Development 1923-1945
D.K Brown
http://www.amazon.com/Nelson-Vanguard-Warship-1923-1945-Pictorial/dp/155750492X/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpi_5

I have the book.

Bay Man

2010-10-15 04:48:20 UTC

I have the book. The section on carriers is good. Note the 1942 designs
section Malta. He mentioned the requirements - in 1937 they were considering
quite small carriers of 12 planes.

I like the way he is not nostalgic and all for improved designs. He
criticises certain ship designs.

Rich

2010-10-14 17:56:16 UTC

On Oct 13, 3:59 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
No luck at all. Many hits on the decks were encountered, even Kamikazes.
If bombs cut through the wooden US decks, the damage penetrated through the
flight deck then the consequences to the hanger space underneath would be
severe and then it was a dockyard job for repairs. Witness the frequency of
time spent in dock by USN carriers after kamikaze hits.
RN carriers took less damage from comparable hits and could resume
operations sooner. The main means of repairs on British carriers was mixing
concrete to flatten out dents in the flight deck. A USN liaison officer on
HMS Formidable off Okinawa was reported as saying "When a kamikaze hits a US
carrier, it's six months repair in Pearl. In a Limey carrier, it's
'sweepers, man your brooms'.

Genius here likes to spout twaddle and when challenged thrown in some
denial, but never bothers to look at any available sources, apparently
in the belief that so long as he continues to deny it that a fact
remains untrue. In this case the facts are these:

USS Essex was hit by kamikaze on 11 April 1945, was repaired by 6 May
at Ulithi, hit again 14 May 1945, operational by October 1945 at Puget
Sound, repairs apparently took about two months, so a confirmed 26
days

USS Intrepid - 16 April 1945, fire out in one hour, operational in
three, repaired 19 May-29 June 1945 at San Francisco, so 41 days

USS Franklin - 13 October 1944, slid across the deck, no significant
damage, repaired at sea, so 0 days

USS Essex - 25 November 1944, repaired at sea, 0 days

USS Ticonderoga - 21 January 1945, hit twice, repaired 15 February-20
April 1945 at Puget Sound, so 64 days

USS Randolph - 11 March 1945, repaired 11 March-7 April at Ulithi, so
27 days

USS Lexington - 5 November 1944, fires out in 20 minutes and
operations resumed, repaired 9 November-11 December 1944 at Ulithi, so
32 days

USS Bunker Hill - 11 May 1945, hit twice, repaired by November at
Pearl Harbor, but time for repair unknown

Overall, for those cases where we know specifically how long repairs
took, seven Essex-class CVs were hit and took 190 days to repair or an
average of 27 days. Two did not require port repairs, so one-fourth

HMS Formidable was hit by kamikaze 4 and 9 May 1945 and then damaged
by the accidental discharge of guns in a Corsair arming on the hanger
deck. Repairs took between 22 May when she was detached from BPF and 6
July when she sailed from Sydney to rejoin, so a maximum of 44 days.

HMS Victorious was hit by a kamikaze 4 May 1945, reducing speed to 19
knots, but operations resumed 8 hours later, she was then hit twice on
9 May, damaging the forward elevator and slowing operations, repaired
5-28 June at Sydney, so 23 days.

HMS Indomitable was hit by kamikaze on 1 April 1945, but was
operational within an hour, hit by kamikaze 4 May 1945, but remained
operational, then on 9 May 1945 hit by another but remained
operational.

So three were hit requiring about 67 days of repairs or an average of
22.3 days each and one did not require port repairs, so one-third.

So "sooner" means a saving of less than five days...about 17%. In
reality there was even less difference in getting hit but continuing
operations. And it remains that the simple fact that the armoured
flight deck was a ***structural part of the ship*** was probably a
mistake in the design. Cumulative damage to the deck weakened the
structure of the entire vessel and made it uneconomical to repair,
leading to many of them being condemned postwar.

An armored flight deck was eventually incorporated in the Midway-
class, but only because their greatly increased size allowed them to
***add*** that design feature to the already armored hanger deck.
Unfortunately, the British wartime armoured deck carriers weren't
large enough to do so without making them too top heavy (the first Ark
Royal, with its double hanger deck, was forced to have neither an
armoured hanger deck or armoured flight deck to keep her CG low) and
compromised by leaving the hanger deck unarmored.

Bay Man

2010-10-14 18:55:08 UTC

"Rich" <***@msn.com> wrote in message news:c88fd98c-3965-4661-8c6b-***@x23g2000vba.googlegroups.com...

<snip his ramblings>

Post by Rich
USS Essex was hit by kamikaze on 11 April 1945, was repaired by 6 May
at Ulithi, hit again 14 May 1945, operational by October 1945 at Puget
Sound, repairs apparently took about two months, so a confirmed 26
days

The later Essex class was designed with some proven British innovations.
Armoured decks, hurricane bows, etc. The early US carrier would be 6 months
in Pearl.

Post by Rich
Cumulative damage to the deck weakened the
structure of the entire vessel and made it uneconomical to repair,
leading to many of them being condemned postwar.

The British carriers were not meant to last much longer than WW2. But did
in other navies. HMS Victorious was decommissioend in 1969 and HMS Hermes
was used into the late 1980s before being sold to India. A carrier is all
hanger - like building a tanker. They are pretty cheap just to build the
hull compared to a BB. The cost is in the planes. The planes on the new
British carriers cost twice as much as the ship.

If a carrier was written off in WW2, its engines, ancillaries, planes, etc,
could easily be used in another new hull. That was in the reasoning in WW2.

Nik Simpson

2010-10-14 22:09:27 UTC

Post by Bay Man
<snip his ramblings>

The later Essex class was designed with some proven British innovations.
Armoured decks, hurricane bows, etc. The early US carrier would be 6
months in Pearl.

You're just getting silly now, none of the Essex class carriers ever had
an armored. It's not something you can add as an afterthought because of
the massive increase in top weight. The first US carriers with armored
decks were the much larger Midway class ships, which were completed too
late to see service in WW2..

Post by Rich
Cumulative damage to the deck weakened the
structure of the entire vessel and made it uneconomical to repair,
leading to many of them being condemned postwar.

Do you have a source for the claim that nobody intended the armored
carriers to last beyond the war, experts on the subject like Brown and
Friedman somehow managed to miss this in their research. HMS Victorious
was rebuilt from the waterline in the 1950s, so her survival till the
late 60s was bit of an aberration, all the rest were scrapped, several
due damage to the hull caused by bombs and kamikazes during the war. As
to Hermes, she was one of the light fleet carriers which weren't armored
so their success and longevity of those ships really does little for
your argument.

A

Post by Bay Man
carrier is all hanger - like building a tanker. They are pretty cheap
just to build the hull compared to a BB. The cost is in the planes. The
planes on the new British carriers cost twice as much as the ship.
If a carrier was written off in WW2, its engines, ancillaries, planes,
etc, could easily be used in another new hull. That was in the reasoning
in WW2.

Assuming it didn't sink which rather spoils the engines, planes etc. And
no, carriers aren't simple and quick to build, unless you have the
almost limitless resources that the US had in WW2. The RN had trouble
enough completing what they had on order pre-WW2, with the 5 KGVs
entering service between 40-43, the Lions cancelled, and the six armored
carriers entering service in a similar timeframe to the KGVs, the idea
that the RN would build the armored carriers with the assumption that if
one got damaged they'd just build a new hull is hilarious.

--
Nik Simpson

Bay Man

2010-10-15 04:48:13 UTC

Post by Bay Man
<snip his ramblings>

The later Essex class was designed with some proven British innovations.
Armoured decks, hurricane bows, etc. The early US carrier would be 6
months in Pearl.

You're just getting silly now, none of the Essex class carriers ever had
an armored.

That was a typo. The Midway did.

Post by Nik Simpson
Do you have a source for the claim that nobody intended the armored
carriers to last beyond the war, experts on the subject like Brown and
Friedman somehow managed to miss this in their research. HMS Victorious
was rebuilt from the waterline in the 1950s, so her survival till the late
60s was bit of an aberration, all the rest were scrapped, several due
damage to the hull caused by bombs and kamikazes during the war. As to
Hermes, she was one of the light fleet carriers which weren't armored so
their success and longevity of those ships really does little for your
argument.

I am not just arguing for armoured carriers. Brown does mention the 1942
design process. Ships in WW2 were designed and built to win the war. That
was their intention. Not to win a future war that may or may not come
around. If they all needed scrapping in 1945 they had done their job. The
RN knew that post war many would be scrapped, as there was just too many of
them for no apparent use.

Post by Bay Man
A
carrier is all hanger - like building a tanker. They are pretty cheap
just to build the hull compared to a BB. The cost is in the planes. The
planes on the new British carriers cost twice as much as the ship.
If a carrier was written off in WW2, its engines, ancillaries, planes,
etc, could easily be used in another new hull. That was in the reasoning
in WW2.

Assuming it didn't sink which rather spoils the engines, planes etc. And
no, carriers aren't simple and quick to build, unless you have the almost
limitless resources that the US had in WW2.

Written off in that the hull is beyond repair - not sunk. Carrier's hulls
were cheap to make. They are literally just empty boxes with a flat top,
armoured or not armoured.

Post by Nik Simpson
The RN had trouble enough completing what they had on order pre-WW2, with
the 5 KGVs entering service between 40-43, the Lions cancelled, and the
six armored carriers entering service in a similar timeframe to the KGVs,
the idea that the RN would build the armored carriers with the assumption
that if one got damaged they'd just build a new hull is hilarious.

Read what I wrote and get the point. The carriers in WW2 were not built to
last, as would be a BB. And ancillaries from unserviceable ships were used
in others. In WW2, they didn't throw serviceable equipment away from hulls
that were beyond repair. Although a lot was used for maintenance in
cannibalisation.

Duwop

2010-10-15 05:14:54 UTC

Post by Nik Simpson
the massive increase in top weight. The first US carriers with armored
decks were the much larger Midway class ships, which were completed too
late to see service in WW2..

I've wondered if the deck wasn't simply built thicker to handle the
expected larger and faster aircraft. So that the thicker deck for
operational use was also useful as "armor". Major airport runways run
over 20' thick/deep to handle the jumbo jets for instance. Were they
armored, or just thicker to handle the larger jets?

Bay Man

2010-10-15 17:13:48 UTC

Post by Duwop

Post by Nik Simpson
the massive increase in top weight. The first US carriers with armored
decks were the much larger Midway class ships, which were completed too
late to see service in WW2..

A good point for once. I think a combination of both.

mike

2010-10-15 18:00:29 UTC

Post by Duwop
I've wondered if the deck wasn't simply built thicker to handle the
expected larger and faster aircraft. So that the thicker deck for
operational use was also useful as "armor". Major airport runways run
over 20' thick/deep to handle the jumbo jets for instance. Were they
armored, or just thicker to handle the larger jets?

One of the heaviest carrier A/C, the Douglas A3D, had a max weight
of 70,000+ pounds. Operated from angle deck Essex class CVs during
the '50s and 60s. Nickname for the all weather Nuclear Strike aircraft
was 'Whale'

The Deck was lengthened, angled, and steam Cats added with higher
power elevators, but deck really not strengthened past the 1st mod
program in 1947 for the then new N.A.A. AJ-1 Savage bomber.

**
mike
**

Mario

2010-10-14 21:24:19 UTC

Post by Rich
An armored flight deck was eventually incorporated in the
Midway- class, but only because their greatly increased size
allowed them to ***add*** that design feature to the already
armored *hanger* deck. Unfortunately, the British wartime
armoured deck carriers weren't large enough to do so without
making them too top heavy (the first Ark Royal, with its
double *hanger* deck, was forced to have neither an armoured
*hanger* deck or armoured flight deck to keep her CG low) and
compromised by leaving the *hanger* deck unarmored.

What's a _hanger_ deck?

Are you referring to _hangars_ where are usually kept airplanes?

(As a non-English-speaker I can easily detect spelling errors.)

--
H

Rich

2010-10-14 23:38:52 UTC

Post by Mario
What's a _hanger_ deck?
Are you referring to _hangars_ where are usually kept airplanes?
(As a non-English-speaker I can easily detect spelling errors.)

Thanks for the correction. As an English-speaker I can be reliably
expected to make numerous spelling errors, especially when I am making
hasty replies to arrant twaddle. Or is it errant twaddle? I suppose it
amounts to the same.

Cheers!

Joel Shepherd

2010-10-15 17:16:07 UTC

How did we segue from debating whether armored deck carriers would have
been useful in the first year or so of the Pacific war, to going on
about planes and tactical considerations that didn't materialize until
the last two years?

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 12, 6:32 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
I misunderstood nothing. He was saying that armoured decked carriers were
of no significance in the Pacific immediately after Dec 7 1941.

Right, so let's try to stay focused on that time period, instead of
going off in the weeds about Corsairs, which weren't in operation then,
and kamikazes, which weren't a threat then.

They did "not" compromise anything at all.

Baloney. Every country that produced carriers made compromises in their
designs. The British traded armored decks for reduced air group capacity
and, if I recall correctly, some handling issues. The Japanese traded
increased protection for their planes with slower operating tempos.
Japan and the US traded increased air group capacities for less top-side
armor.

Post by Bay Man
Hence no outright attack carrier aircraft was designed for British carriers.
The Swordfish was more like a helicopter, taking off virtually vertical when
into the wind. They were never far from a friendly port - the empire being
so big - and the role would have taken them within range of land based
planes hence the armoured decks. If they needed to carry 90 planes the RN
would have built larger armoured carriers.

It's not quite that easy. The US, for example, wanted to build larger
carriers earlier, but there were political considerations: treaty
limitations, engineering and material resources, etc. Although you seem
fond of it, the belief that any country could do X if they just wanted
to is an overly simplistic view.

And in any event, Britain _didn't_. Their carriers' air group capacities
were quite restricted. They would no more fit with the US Navy's
operational doctrine than USN carriers would fit with the RN's.

Post by Bay Man
The US carriers were primarily for the vast Pacific. The planes had to be
attack planes, hence the US designed planes for that role, and the range
long. US Carriers could resupply from atolls.

Moreover, US carrier operational doctrine held that the side that hit
first, won. "Every carrier we have knows what it means to be 'bopped'
with all planes on deck, because her hands were tied by uncertainty as
to her next move..." (Miles Browning, Halsey's chief of staff, pre-war)
It was an aggressive stance, and it drove design decisions towards being
able to deliver large, hard-hitting strikes quickly, and away from
defensive measures. I.e., if you need armor on your flight deck, it's
too late.

Post by Bay Man
and even improved them as in the
Corsair - which was ignored by the US navy until the British perfected it
and developed a landing routine for it.

OT for this thread, but the USN did not ignore the Corsair. The pilots
did not like it as a carrier-based plane because its long nose obscured
their view of the flight deck while landing. If the Brits addressed that
(how specifically: I'm curious) that's great, but "ignored" is not the
word I'd use to describe the USN's attitude towards it.

Post by Bay Man
If bombs cut through the wooden US decks, the damage penetrated through the
flight deck then the consequences to the hanger space underneath would be
severe and then it was a dockyard job for repairs.

Sometimes, not always.

Post by Bay Man
Witness the frequency of
time spent in dock by USN carriers after kamikaze hits.

Again, trying to keep our easily distracted focus on the 1941-1943 time
frame, Kamikazes weren't an issue. Of the seven USN carriers available
on December 7, 1941, how many were either sunk or forced back into
drydock due to torpedo damage? The record for surviving bomb damage was
significantly better. I can think of at least two cases of US carriers
being damaged by bombs and being back in action within hours in 1942
alone.

Post by Bay Man
The point was that planes were attacking carriers and making hits. No
admiral in early WW2, would dismiss a carrier's strength of an armoured
deck, thinking that it would not be bombed by planes. That was clearly put
across here.

They would, and did, given the other tradeoffs involved. And that's the
point. An armored flight deck isn't free. The USN made a conscious
choice to forgo thickly armored flight decks (though the carriers
generally did have light deck armor at either the flight or hangar deck
levels), in exchange for larger operational air group capacity.

Post by Bay Man
Also, if the US carriers were wiped out at Pearl ...

Which they wouldn't have been, because most of the carriers weren't
supposed to be there, and some (Yorktown and Hornet, if I'm remembering
correctly) weren't even in the same ocean at the time.

Post by Bay Man
, any carrier of any type
would be grasped at to operate in the Pacific.

If they were available. And that something is grasped for does not mean
it is optimal for that situation.

--
Joel.

Bay Man

2010-10-15 20:00:32 UTC

Post by Rich
So in fact then you are aware that the RN armoured-deck
design compromised a number of requirements, among them air group
size, as well as number of elevators, and so ability to spot air
strikes rapidly.

They did "not" compromise anything at all.

Baloney.

Nonsense. The British pre WW2 were contemplating 15 plane carriers,
according to Nelson to Vanguard by K Brown. The Ark Royal was no compromise
for its indented purpose. It was pretty spot-on. It lacked proper damage
control, which was not a compromise. It was original intended to stow 71
planes with a 900 foot deck. This was considered too ambitious for it
intended role. It was designed to accommodate the future monoplanes, so
held more aviation fuel.. Protection against 6" shells and 500lb bombs.
She could make the design speed over 30 knts with 3/4 of the available
power. She exceeded the design speed. She was predominately welded.
Yorktown carried 9 planes more, 63, using open hangars, while Ark Royal has
enclosed more armoured hangars. 54 planes (nominal 60) was considered more
than adequate, so no compromise for its intended role.

The RN pre war policy was short strikes using smaller lighter planes, which
did not require long flight decks.

Post by Joel Shepherd
The British traded armored decks for reduced air group capacity

They did not need the large air groups - hence why they were considering 15
plane carriers pre-WW2.

The RN wanted a full armoured flight deck and hangar with a large air group
in the early 1930s - well they would. It was considered too expensive and
not necessary for the role of British carriers by the powers above. One of
the biggest considerations was open or closed hangars. Fire protection
against fuel was quite advanced after WW1 fires.

Post by Joel Shepherd
And in any event, Britain _didn't_. Their carriers' air group capacities
were quite restricted. They would no more fit with the US Navy's
operational doctrine than USN carriers would fit with the RN's.

If the US carriers where sunk at Pearl the Ark Royal could hold about the
same amount of planes as Yorktown. So much for the jingoistic US contingent
here saying they were too small and ridiculously dismissing the armoured
decks as not necessarily because they though carrier would not be dive
bombed.

If the carriers were sun at Pearl, the US would have grabbed at a number of
UK carriers, with superior attributes, operating with them in the Pacific.
To suggest otherwise is madness.

Moreover, US carrier operational doctrine held that the side that hit
first, won.

In 1941 the US carrier doctrine was still largely to protect the fleet and
let the BBs do the work. The US was still constructing large BB during WW2.
They were not primarily designed for attacking land targets or operating in
range of land based planes. If they were, they would have built armoured
decks, like the British did, who knew full well they would be operating near
land.

Post by Bay Man
and even improved them as in the
Corsair - which was ignored by the US navy until the British perfected it
and developed a landing routine for it.

OT for this thread, but the USN did not ignore the Corsair.

The USN largely ignored it, regarding it as problematic to land and take
off. It was OK in the air. Why should they spend time "trying" to use it
when Wilcats were available? They offloaded the plane on the British, who
insisted on design changes and perfected a landing routine for the plane.
The British were the first to operate the plane effectively on active
service.

The success by the British attracted the USN to it adopting the landing
routine. The long nose meant it could not fit in the hangars of some British
carriers - who wanted Wildcats anyhow.

They would, and did, given the other tradeoffs involved.

They never. If British carrier were so bad to the jingoistic here, why did
the USN take Victorious on loan?

Post by Bay Man
Also, if the US carriers were wiped out at Pearl ...

Which they wouldn't have been,

Please.

Post by Bay Man
, any carrier of any type
would be grasped at to operate in the Pacific.

If they were available. And that something is grasped for does not mean
it is optimal for that situation.

They were more than optimal. Read above.

Nik Simpson

2010-10-15 21:27:23 UTC

If the carriers were sunk at Pearl, the US would have grabbed at a number
of UK carriers, with superior attributes, operating with them in the
Pacific. To suggest otherwise is madness.

Sadly, it's a contingency rendered moot by the lack of availability of
RN fleet carriers (armored or otherwise) in December 1941:

Ark Royal - gathering barnacles on the bottom of the med for a
month before Pearl Harbor

Illustrious - Being repaired from bomb damage, unavailable till
mid-42

Victorious - Available, but busy with the Home Fleet watching
Tirpitz et al.

Indomitable - Barely commissioned, just been repaired from
damaged sustained when she ran aground on her maiden voyage in
October '41

HMS Formidable - Just about finished repairs from two 1000kg
bomb hits in May '41

Implacable - Still a year away from being launched didn't see
service till '44

Indefatigable - Still a year away from being launched didn't
see service till '44

So there weren't any of them to spare.

--
Nik Simpson

Bay Man

2010-10-15 23:36:15 UTC

If the carriers were sunk at Pearl, the US would have grabbed at a number
of UK carriers, with superior attributes, operating with them in the
Pacific. To suggest otherwise is madness.

Victorious - Available, but busy with the Home Fleet watching
Tirpitz et al.

So available.

Post by Nik Simpson
Indomitable - Barely commissioned, just been repaired from
damaged sustained when she ran aground on her maiden voyage in
October '41

So available.

Post by Nik Simpson
HMS Formidable - Just about finished repairs from two 1000kg
bomb hits in May '41

So available.

So that is three.

Nik Simpson

2010-10-16 04:18:39 UTC

If the carriers were sunk at Pearl, the US would have grabbed at a number
of UK carriers, with superior attributes, operating with them in the
Pacific. To suggest otherwise is madness.

Victorious - Available, but busy with the Home Fleet watching
Tirpitz et al.

So available.

No, unless the RN is prepared to give up it's only worked up carrier and
carrier air group at a time when it was stretched to the limit in all of
its operational areas.

Post by Nik Simpson
Indomitable - Barely commissioned, just been repaired from
damaged sustained when she ran aground on her maiden voyage in
October '41

So available.

Not worked up, so not an effective fighting unit till sometime in '42.

Post by Nik Simpson
HMS Formidable - Just about finished repairs from two 1000kg
bomb hits in May '41

So available.

Again, just out of dockyard hands, so not worked up.

The point is that given the resources the RN had available in December
'41 there is very little chance that they are going to feel that they
can lend them the USN. Heck, they didn't even feel that they had one to
spare to go with PoW and Repulse to Singapore.

--
Nik Simpson

Bay Man

2010-10-17 18:41:05 UTC

If the carriers were sunk at Pearl, the US would have grabbed at a number
of UK carriers, with superior attributes, operating with them in the
Pacific. To suggest otherwise is madness.

Victorious - Available, but busy with the Home Fleet watching
Tirpitz et al.

So available.

No, unless the RN is prepared to give up it's only worked up carrier and
carrier air group at a time when it was stretched to the limit in all of
its operational areas.

They were not needed in the Atlantic.

Post by Nik Simpson
Indomitable - Barely commissioned, just been repaired from
damaged sustained when she ran aground on her maiden voyage in
October '41

So available.

Not worked up, so not an effective fighting unit till sometime in '42.

As Peal Harbour was Dec 41, it would be 42.

Post by Nik Simpson
HMS Formidable - Just about finished repairs from two 1000kg
bomb hits in May '41

So available.

Again, just out of dockyard hands, so not worked up.

So available.

Post by Nik Simpson
The point is that given the resources the RN had available in December '41
there is very little chance that they are going to feel that they can lend
them the USN. Heck, they didn't even feel that they had one to spare to go
with PoW and Repulse to Singapore.

HMS Indomitable was scheduled for air cover, she was damaged in the
Caribbean. PoW and Repulse were ordered to Australia, but the commander
ignored the orders.

All besides the point. The US would have grabbed at the British carriers.
Although US jingoists may disagree fro some strange reason - while they took
HMS Victorious later.

Bruce Burden

2010-10-17 19:05:59 UTC

Nik Simpson <***@gmail.com> wrote:
:
:>> Indomitable - Barely commissioned, just been repaired from
:>> damaged sustained when she ran aground on her maiden voyage in
:>> October '41
:
: Heck, they didn't even feel that they had one to
: spare to go with PoW and Repulse to Singapore.
:
Indomitable was supposed to accompany Repulse and PoW
to Singapore, but, as you note above, she had a slight problem
while working up in the Carribean.

Bruce

--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX.
- Thuganlitha
The Power and the Prophet
Robert Don Hughes

Alan Nordin

2010-10-16 04:12:06 UTC

On Oct 15, 4:00 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Yorktown carried 9 planes more, 63, using open hangars,

No, at Coral Sea Yorktown started the battle with 71 planes {20 F4F,
38 SBD & 13 TBD} at Midway she carried 75 planes {25 F4F, 37 SBD & 13
TBD} and her sister, Enterprise, carried 79 planes {27 F4F, 38 SBD &
14 TBD}. Later in the war off Leyte, Enterprise carried 92 {36 F6F,
34 SB2C & 19 TBM}.

Bill Shatzer

2010-10-16 05:21:58 UTC

They did "not" compromise anything at all.

Baloney.

Nonsense. The British pre WW2 were contemplating 15 plane carriers,
according to Nelson to Vanguard by K Brown. The Ark Royal was no
compromise for its indented purpose. It was pretty spot-on. It lacked
proper damage control, which was not a compromise. It was original
intended to stow 71 planes with a 900 foot deck. This was considered too
ambitious for it intended role. It was designed to accommodate the
future monoplanes, so held more aviation fuel.. Protection against 6"
shells and 500lb bombs. She could make the design speed over 30 knts
with 3/4 of the available power. She exceeded the design speed. She was
predominately welded. Yorktown carried 9 planes more, 63, using open
hangars, while Ark Royal has enclosed more armoured hangars. 54 planes
(nominal 60) was considered more than adequate, so no compromise for its
intended role.

Yorktown carried an air group of 71 a/c (20 F4Fs, 36 SBDs, 13 TBDs) at
Coral Sea and an air group of 75 a/c (25 F4Fs, 37 SBDs, 13 TBDs) at Midway.

All the US fleet carriers except the undersized and ill conceived USS
Ranger operated an air group of at least 70 a/c.

Chris

2010-10-16 17:03:26 UTC

On Oct 15, 4:00 pm, "Bay Man"
<***@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

Mr. Bay Man, I have a question about how these statements of yours

The Ark Royal was no compromise for its indented purpose.
The RN wanted a full armoured flight deck and hangar with a large air group
in the early 1930s - well they would. It was considered too expensive and
not necessary for the role of British carriers by the powers above.

The latter comment pretty much unavoidably means that Ark Royal was
indeed a compromise, contra your earlier statement. That the RN wanted
a carrier with the Ark Royal's air group size and the Illustrious
armored deck when AR was designed, but compromised because they felt
it was too expensive and would be in violation of the Washington Naval
Treaty's tonnage limitations seems to be the meaning of that latter
paragraph. So how can the former be true?

Two minor problems with this statement:
A) Ark Royal was sunk a month before Pearl Harbor, and so would not be
available to transfer to the Pacific.
B) Ark Royal was, in my opinion, a clearly superior design to the
Illustrious class that followed, in large part because it did not have
a armored flight deck.

More Ark Royal's would have been just fine in the Pacific- we know
that because they were pretty equivalent to the Yorktown and Soryu
classes, both of which put up excellent records in the Pacific War.
(The three classes were close enough to each other that tactical
factors- which side spotted the enemy the first, which had better C3I,
etc. would dominate any battle between them.) The problem is that the
RN did not choose to build more Ark Royal's.

In 1941 the US carrier doctrine was still largely to protect the fleet and
let the BBs do the work. The US was still constructing large BB during WW2.

If the evidence for the first statement is the latter, then what navy
constructed the last battleship ever finished? (Hint: their initials
are RN.) By the same logic, that would tend to suggest that the Royal
Navy held on to the doctrine of battleships 'doing the work' longer
than the USN.

[Re: US Carriers]

They were not primarily designed for attacking land targets or operating in
range of land based planes. If they were, they would have built armoured
decks, like the British did, who knew full well they would be operating near
land.

Interesting, then, that the RN does not seem to have been afraid of
using Ark Royal within range of land based aircraft while she was with
Force H. For example, in January 1941 she attacked the Italian
mainland- Genoa and La Spezia. The ship was repeatedly attacked by the
Italian and German air forces during a number of convoy battles.
And... she was never even hit by any air attack- she was lost to a U-
boat. Her unarmored flight deck does not seem to have deterred the RN
from operating her quite close to land targets.

But in discussing what a good design Ark Royal is, you're agreeing
with my point about armored flight decks, that they were a mistake.

Chris Manteuffel

Bay Man

2010-10-17 19:01:00 UTC

Post by Alan Nordin
On Oct 15, 4:00 pm, "Bay Man"
Mr. Bay Man, I have a question about how these statements of yours

The key words are "intended role".

Post by Alan Nordin
The latter comment pretty much unavoidably means that Ark Royal was
indeed a compromise, contra your earlier statement.

No. The request was overkill for the "intended role". Navies always want
really things.

Post by Alan Nordin
A) Ark Royal was sunk a month before Pearl Harbor, and so would not be
available to transfer to the Pacific.

The thread had moved on.

Post by Alan Nordin
B) Ark Royal was, in my opinion, a clearly superior design to the
Illustrious class that followed, in large part because it did not have
a armored flight deck.

You must be an American.

Post by Alan Nordin
More Ark Royal's would have been just fine in the Pacific- we know
that because they were pretty equivalent to the Yorktown and Soryu
classes, both of which put up excellent records in the Pacific War.

The Ark was a superior design to those.

Post by Alan Nordin
The problem is that the
RN did not choose to build more Ark Royal's.

K Brown clearly states the design process had moved on. The Ark was
conceived in the early 1930s. The ship would have survived the torpedo
attack if the damage control was implemented properly.

The ship was clearly a milestone carrier.

In 1941 the US carrier doctrine was still largely to protect the fleet and
let the BBs do the work. The US was still constructing large BB during WW2.

The point was USN not RN.

Interesting, then, that the RN does not seem to have been afraid of
using Ark Royal within range of land based aircraft while she was with
Force H.

Interesting,that she was designed to operate within range of land based
aircraft, unlike many US carriers.

Protection against 6" shells and 500lb bombs over magazines, fuel and
machinery of a 4.5" belt and 3.5" lower hangar deck.

Post by Alan Nordin
But in discussing what a good design Ark Royal is, you're agreeing
with my point about armored flight decks, that they were a mistake.

The IJN adopted them as did the USN ever since, they were such a really bad
idea. Try reading some books on carrier design.

Joel Shepherd

2010-10-16 17:31:43 UTC

Post by Bay Man
They did "not" compromise anything at all.

Baloney.

Nonsense. The British pre WW2 were contemplating 15 plane carriers,
according to Nelson to Vanguard by K Brown. The Ark Royal was no compromise
for its indented purpose.

Really? So each Navy thought it had the perfect carrier, and would not
-- even if they'd had the choice -- opted for a design with more
capacity, greater range, greater protection, or greater speed?

If what you're saying is that the RN (and every other navy) made choices
-- i.e., compromises -- to obtain the best carrier they could for the
conditions they expected to face, we're in agreement. If what you're
saying is that the RN had to make no choices -- compromises -- and thus
ended up with perfect carriers for all conditions -- as you put it later
"more than optimal" -- you're naive, and should be very careful about
applying the term "jingoistic" to others.

Post by Bay Man
It was pretty spot-on. It lacked proper damage
control, which was not a compromise.

Oh no, of course not. Who needs proper damage control, especially in
capital ship?

Post by Bay Man
She was predominately welded.
Yorktown carried 9 planes more, 63, using open hangars, while Ark Royal has
enclosed more armoured hangars. 54 planes (nominal 60) was considered more
than adequate, so no compromise for its intended role.

The Yorktown-class carriers typically carried four operational squadrons
-- one each of bombing, scout, torpedo and fighter -- at full strength
of 18 planes/each: 72 aircraft, not 63. They also carried some number of
spares to replace combat and operational losses. So at sea, a
Yorktown-class carrier could be expected to be carrying 80 aircraft,
give or take, of which 72 were fully operational. I don't know where you
got 63, but it's wrong, and the difference in capacity is significantly
more than you indicate.

Post by Joel Shepherd
The British traded armored decks for reduced air group capacity

They did not need the large air groups - hence why they were considering 15
plane carriers pre-WW2.

Given the difficulties they would face in operating near land-based
enemy air, I strongly suspect that had they been able to they would have
gladly carried larger fighter contingents for their own protection as
well as that of their escorts. But if you wish to insist that no, no,
they could have carried more planes, all they had to do is ask, but that
would be silly, because 54 was the perfect amount but maybe a little
high, let's just go for 15 instead ... then please do.

A more reasonable conversation might have centered on the facts of the
additional top-heaviness and cost imposed by having larger armored
flight decks and increased air group capacity -- you know, actual
engineering considerations -- and that if you want one, you're going to
have to give up some of the other, because resources aren't limitless.
But, apparently in Britain conversations like that never took place
because they were never necessary, even though they were in every other
navy.

Post by Joel Shepherd
It's not quite that easy. The US, for example, wanted to build larger
carriers earlier, but there were political considerations: treaty
limitations, engineering and material resources, etc. Although you seem
fond of it, the belief that any country could do X if they just wanted
to is an overly simplistic view.

The RN wanted a full armoured flight deck and hangar with a large air group
in the early 1930s - well they would. It was considered too expensive ...

So a compromise was made between cost and something else. Thank you.

If the US carriers where sunk at Pearl ...

To repeat, "the US carriers", to me, reads "all of the US carriers". Is
that what you mean? Or do you just mean the one or two carriers that
might have been at Pearl on 12/7/41 (Enterprise and Lexington).

The scenario of all the US prewar carriers being sunk at Pearl is not
realistic because, as I mentioned previously, some of those carriers
weren't even in the Pacific at the time.

Post by Bay Man
the Ark Royal could hold about the
same amount of planes as Yorktown.

Only if you consider 54 to be about the same as 80. See above.

Post by Bay Man
So much for the jingoistic US contingent
here saying they were too small.

54 versus 80.

Post by Bay Man
and ridiculously dismissing the armoured
decks as not necessarily because they though carrier would not be dive
bombed.

I think what's been questioned is the amount of protection afforded by
an armored flight deck. (You're aware, by the way, that the
Yorktown-class carriers -- not sure about Saratoga/Lex, Wasp or Ranger
-- did have armored hangar decks, correct?)

No one has denied that carriers could be and were attacked and damaged
by dive bombers. And I don't think anyone has outright said armored
decks wouldn't be nice to have.

What's been stated, however, is that in the Pacific, USN carriers
actually did a pretty decent job of surviving dive-bombing attacks
despite the lack of topside armor. However, they were much more
vulnerable to torpedo attacks. Name the one US carrier that was
operational through nearly all of 1942. Now name the one US carrier that
wasn't hit by a torpedo in 1942 (even though it was hit by multiple
bombs on two different occasions and each time returned to operation in
an hour or so).

Since, as I mentioned before, there are engineering limitations on how
much weight topside a ship can have and still be stable, choices had to
be made between "nice to have" armored decks and "nice to have" larger
air groups. The USN picked air groups -- made a compromise, which I know
the RN _never_ did, right?, not that anyone here is jingoistic -- and
what's been said is that operationally that turned out to be a
reasonable choice.

If the USN had to operate in the Med, maybe a different choice would
have been made. But the point is: a choice was necessary.

Post by Bay Man
If the carriers were sun at Pearl, the US would have grabbed at a number of
UK carriers, with superior attributes

Yes, no jingoism here. None at all.

The perfect RN carriers, carrying a whopping 54 planes instead of 80,
and just as vulnerable to the real ship-killer of the time -- torpedoes
-- are "superior" in all situations.

No, I don't sense any sort of jingoism on your part at all. Sadly, I
doubt if you do either.

Post by Bay Man
operating with them in the Pacific.
To suggest otherwise is madness.

Had the USN been that short of carriers -- which by early 1943, when the
Pacific entered a lull, they were and they did accept a loan to let one
of the two remaining prewar fleet carriers return for refit -- and if
the RN had carriers available, of course they would have used them if
there was need. But:
* There is no realistic scenario in which the US carrier fleet is
wiped out at Pearl Harbor.
* The USN did lose a lot of carriers in 1942 and the weapon that
killed them was the torpedo, not the dive bomber.
* There is not evidence that an RN carrier would have been any better
able to survive being torpedoed than a USN carrier of the time. Flight
deck armor doesn't change that at all.

So, there is a reason why the USN didn't beg or plead for RN carriers
from day one. The RN carriers simply weren't outright superior: they
packed significantly less offensive wallop (54 planes vs 72 operational).

Post by Joel Shepherd
Moreover, US carrier operational doctrine held that the side that hit
first, won.

True, but that does not imply they were primarily built to protect the
fleet. You've created a false dichotomy.

If USN carrier doctrine was that carriers protected the fleet, then it
wouldn't have made much sense for half or more of the air group to be
pure attack aircraft: dive bombers and torpedo planes. If you count
"scouting" squadrons as offensive, then in 1941, fully 3/4 of a USN
carrier's operational aircraft were attack aircraft. Kind of a strange
mix, if their role was to protect the fleet.

It may be the BB contingent saw the carriers' role that way, but happily
they didn't call all the shots.

If you want to find out how the USN viewed its carriers' roles in the
last couple of years leading up to Pearl Harbor, do read about some of
the interesting training exercises, and the writings of people like
Miles Browning, who I quoted. The attitude was not "sit back and protect
the BBs".

Post by Bay Man
If they were, they would have built armoured
decks, like the British did, who knew full well they would be operating near
land.

Again, a false dichotomy. The choice was not just "protect the BBs or
operate near land."

Post by Bay Man
The USN largely ignored it, regarding it as problematic to land and take
off. It was OK in the air. Why should they spend time "trying" to use it
when Wilcats were available?

You mean Hellcats. And in any event, this is after the 1941-42 period we
were talking about. Focus, please.

Post by Joel Shepherd
They would, and did, given the other tradeoffs involved.

They never. If British carrier were so bad to the jingoistic here, why did
the USN take Victorious on loan?

Why are you confusing "compromise" with "bad"? I never said British
carriers were "bad". I have said, as I think others have, that their
designs included different compromises than the USN's, and because of
that didn't fit that well with the USN's operational doctrine. That
doesn't mean they were "bad". It's like saying a lorry is "bad" because
it can't accelerate like a Porsche ... but then a Porsche can't haul a
few tons around, so is a Porsche "bad"?

Post by Bay Man
Also, if the US carriers were wiped out at Pearl ...

Which they wouldn't have been,

Please.

Please what? Any US carrier that was in Pearl Harbor on 12/7/41 probably
would have been destroyed: sure.

But you seem to be speculating about the whole USN carrier fleet being
wiped out, and that is simply not realistic, because some of those ships
weren't even in the Pacific in December 1941. At worst, two USN carriers
could have been in Pearl ... Two out of seven.

Post by Bay Man
They were more than optimal. Read above.

Again, you should be more careful about throwing the label "jingoistic"
around.

Many well-informed people in this newsgroup will freely acknowledge, for
example, that USN carriers did very poorly with regard to torpedo
protection. They were smaller than the USN wanted. Some of them were too
slow. They weren't perfect.

Yet you, who is accusing everyone else of jingoism, can't see RN
carriers as anything less than "more than optimal".

--
Joel.

Rich

2010-10-17 18:36:06 UTC

Post by Joel Shepherd
I think what's been questioned is the amount of protection afforded by
an armored flight deck. (You're aware, by the way, that the
Yorktown-class carriers -- not sure about Saratoga/Lex, Wasp or Ranger
-- did have armored hangar decks, correct?)

Although the ludicrousness of this argument has become boring - a
salient feature of any discussion when bayman gets involved - I'll try
to address this anyway.

Saratoga and Lexington were completed with unarmored flight decks, as
were all US carriers until the Midways, and an unarmored albeit
structural hangar deck, but retained the 2" armored third deck of the
original battlecruiser design that thicked to 3"-4.5" over the
steering spaces.

Wasp had no armor belt and the protective deck was limited to a 50-lb
(1.4") STS protective deck at the waterline.

The Yorktown design had an armored belt and a 60-lb (1.5") STS
protective hangar deck.

The Essex design had an armored belt and a 100-lb (2.5") STS hangar
deck.

For each design the compromise was displacement and stability...the
more weight added to a given displacement for armor and other things
then the greater the draft, which could then negate the value of
things like belt armor (an ongoing problem in the Lex and Sara)...and
the higher the weight was placed, like on the flight deck, the more
unstable the ship became.

Post by Joel Shepherd
No one has denied that carriers could be and were attacked and damaged
by dive bombers. And I don't think anyone has outright said armored
decks wouldn't be nice to have.
What's been stated, however, is that in the Pacific, USN carriers
actually did a pretty decent job of surviving dive-bombing attacks
despite the lack of topside armor. However, they were much more
vulnerable to torpedo attacks. Name the one US carrier that was
operational through nearly all of 1942. Now name the one US carrier that
wasn't hit by a torpedo in 1942 (even though it was hit by multiple
bombs on two different occasions and each time returned to operation in
an hour or so).

Yes and no. Fundamentally all the armored decks only were good to 500-
lb SAP or about twice that size HC bombs. Above that the armor
required to defeat heavy SAP bombs became prohibitive within the
displacements the designers had to work with.

And the American carriers met the torpedo challenge by extensive
compartmentalization that made them very tough customers. Lex took two
torpedoes and two bombs, but was crippled by poor early-war damage
control that led to the avgas explosion...and still required five
torpedoes (granted US torpedoes) to sink her. Yorktown took two
topredoes and five bombs and would have escaped except for the three
Long Lances that finished her off. Wasp took two Long Lances and at
least three US surface torpedoes to sink. Finally, the most remarkable
was Hornet, which took seven to eight bomb hits, three kamikaze
hits...and 16 torpedoes - three Japanese aerial, four Long Lance, nine
US - and a hosing of 5" rounds, before she sank.

OTOH Ark Royal foundered in tow after taking a single torpedo hit.

Cheers!

Bay Man

2010-10-17 19:34:22 UTC

Post by Bay Man
They did "not" compromise anything at all.

Baloney.

Nonsense. The British pre WW2 were contemplating
15 plane carriers, according to Nelson to Vanguard by
K Brown. The Ark Royal was no compromise
for its indented purpose.

Really?

Yes, really.

Post by Joel Shepherd
So each Navy thought it had the perfect carrier,

Ark Royal was an outdated design when launched as better designs were on the
drawing boards. She was perfect for her intended role.

Post by Joel Shepherd
If what you're saying is that the RN
(and every other navy) made choices
-- i.e., compromises -- to obtain the best
carrier

The Ark Royal was a near perfect fit for the intended role. The big
compromises were in the US carriers. They were meant to be at sea for months
on end with large air groups. Some of the air groups were too big to
operate effectively as angled flight decks were not invented at the time.

For their intended purpose, the US carriers were a good fit at the time of
design. The problem was that they never anticipated the rapid increase of
aircraft design, meaning planes could directly attack them. They never
anticipated close to shore operations. They were designed for fleet to fleet
battles.

Post by Bay Man
It was pretty spot-on. It lacked proper damage
control, which was not a compromise.

Oh no, of course not. Who needs proper damage control, especially in
capital ship?

Again... "It lacked proper damage control, which was not a compromise."
The lack of damage control was neglect.

Post by Joel Shepherd
The British traded armored decks for reduced air group capacity

They did not need the large air groups - hence why they were considering 15
plane carriers pre-WW2.

It was considered that large air groups wouldn't be needed and the designed
worked to those rules. No compromises.

The RN wanted a full armoured flight deck and hangar with a large air group
in the early 1930s - well they would. It was considered too expensive ...

So a compromise was made between cost and something else. Thank you.

No compromise. A large air groups was considered too big for the intended
role.

<snip>

pbromaghin

2010-10-13 19:57:53 UTC

Post by Bay Man
This is a case of being wise in hindsight again. Always put yourself at the
point in time and assess from there. How they viewed at that point. Not
what we knew 6 years later, so in some cases 50 -60 years later.

Quite the ironic statement considering your position in the "SS
Lancastria 17 June 1940" thread.

Bay Man

2010-10-13 21:00:08 UTC

Post by pbromaghin

Quite the ironic statement considering your position in the "SS
Lancastria 17 June 1940" thread.

That is what I did. The UK was not fighting the war in the air then, with
lots of planes laying around.

Bay Man

2010-10-09 15:46:24 UTC

Post by Shawn Wilson

There was only one war - not two. The Japanese, like the Germans, had
spectacular gains but nothing conclusive. Both were in combat on all
fronts.

Dave Smith

2010-10-09 20:06:23 UTC

Post by Bay Man
There was only one war - not two. The Japanese, like the Germans, had
spectacular gains but nothing conclusive. Both were in combat on all
fronts.

And the Allies weren't also at war on all fronts? Canada and the US had
multiple coastlines and sea lanes to defend. The Allies had troops at
home, at sea, in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, then in France and the low
countries.

Bay Man

2010-10-10 18:02:25 UTC

Post by Dave Smith

Post by Bay Man
There was only one war - not two. The Japanese, like the Germans, had
spectacular gains but nothing conclusive. Both were in combat on all
fronts.

And the Allies weren't also at war on all fronts?

The point was Germany and Japan.

Bay Man

2010-10-06 21:48:06 UTC

US forces were sent to liberate Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Not a soul
was on the island, yet 91 dead in the invasion. Strange but true.

The Japanese pulled out unbeknown to the US. How did they miss all the
ships and transports taking them away? The US had the islands to the west
and east at the time. US planes on bombing missions reported that there was
no more AA fire or signa of life below. Two or three P40s actually landed
on the runway and the pilots got out and looked around and saw no one. But
still they wouldn't believe them.

Would the US have been better off leaving the Japanese on US soil in the
Aleutians and diverting forces to much needed operations elsewhere? That is
what the British did with the Channel Islands, which locked up a fair amount
of German troops and equipment. And for the British to re-take the islands
would have entailed many much needed men and equipment, not to mention many
being killed in the process. The British were on their way through Germany
with the Germans on the Channel Islands unable to get off. The Germans
actually reinforced the islands thinking the British would invade - they
never.

Bruce Burden

2010-10-07 05:54:27 UTC

Bay Man <***@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
: US forces were sent to liberate Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Not a soul
: was on the island, yet 91 dead in the invasion. Strange but true.
:
"friendly fire", booby traps, frostbite and disease are
reasons I have seen for the casualties. Frostbite in mid-August?
:
: The Japanese pulled out unbeknown to the US. How did they miss all the
: ships and transports taking them away?
:
Having visited Price William Sound, I can see how it was done,
even during the longest days of the year. Bad weather is the norm
for the area.

It is more plausable than the Brits missing the "Channel Dash",
frankly, or perhaps more accurately, to be so late to respond.
:
: And for the British to re-take the islands
: would have entailed many much needed men and equipment, not to mention many
: being killed in the process. The British were on their way through Germany
: with the Germans on the Channel Islands unable to get off. The Germans
: actually reinforced the islands thinking the British would invade - they
: never.
:
According the "War in the Channel Islands: Then and Now",
the Royal Marines used the islands as a live fire training exercise
area. Apparently, the Islanders asked the RM to find another
training area, since their raids made the Germans rather cranky,
and added hardships for the Islanders.

Bruce

--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX.
- Thuganlitha
The Power and the Prophet
Robert Don Hughes

Don Phillipson

2010-10-08 18:56:12 UTC

Post by Bruce Burden
According the "War in the Channel Islands: Then and Now",
the Royal Marines used the islands as a live fire training exercise
area. Apparently, the Islanders asked the RM to find another
training area, since their raids made the Germans rather cranky,
and added hardships for the Islanders.

This seems rather unlikely:
1. When firing live ammunition for training purposes, armed forces
usually want to measure the results. This is extra difficult if the
target (for training or not) is 100 miles from your shores and
occupied by an enemy with reinforcements much nearer.
2. RM firearms are man-carried weapons. When RM forces
need artillery support, they usually get it from naval or allied
army artilllery (which have their own methods of training to
improve accuracy and effectiveness.)

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

Bay Man

2010-10-09 15:46:30 UTC

Post by Don Phillipson

1. When firing live ammunition for training purposes, armed forces
usually want to measure the results. This is extra difficult if the
target (for training or not) is 100 miles from your shores and
occupied by an enemy with reinforcements much nearer.

I think that was when France was Allied occupied.

Bill Shatzer

2010-10-07 20:40:41 UTC

Post by Bay Man
US forces were sent to liberate Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Not a
soul was on the island, yet 91 dead in the invasion. Strange but true.
The Japanese pulled out unbeknown to the US. How did they miss all the
ships and transports taking them away? The US had the islands to the
west and east at the time. US planes on bombing missions reported that
there was no more AA fire or signa of life below. Two or three P40s
actually landed on the runway and the pilots got out and looked around
and saw no one. But still they wouldn't believe them.
Would the US have been better off leaving the Japanese on US soil in the
Aleutians and diverting forces to much needed operations elsewhere?

Hard to say - certainly the Japanese would have found it difficult to
keep their garrisons in the Aleutians supplied. Although the weather
might have allowed them to sneak in something like Guadalcanal's "Tokyo
Express" from time to time. Disrupting the Japanese supply effort would
have required significant US Forces to be deployed in the area - perhaps
even more than were required historically after the US retook the islands.

And, after the islands were retaken, the bombing raids from the
Aleutians and the threat of US invasion diverted Japanese forces from
more critical areas and caused the Japanese to transfer significant
military forces to the Kuriles and northern Hokkaido which might have
been better utilized elsewhere.

Even ignoring the polical ramifications of leaving the Japanese in
unmolsted occupation of US territory, I think, on balance, retaking the
Aleutians was a net plus for the US.

james

2010-10-08 20:04:20 UTC

Post by Bill Shatzer

Hard to say - certainly the Japanese would have found it difficult to
keep their garrisons in the Aleutians supplied. Although the weather
might have allowed them to sneak in something like Guadalcanal's "Tokyo
Express" from time to time. Disrupting the Japanese supply effort would
have required significant US Forces to be deployed in the area - perhaps
even more than were required historically after the US retook the islands.
And, after the islands were retaken, the bombing raids from the
Aleutians and the threat of US invasion diverted Japanese forces from
more critical areas and caused the Japanese to transfer significant
military forces to the Kuriles and northern Hokkaido which might have
been better utilized elsewhere.
Even ignoring the polical ramifications of leaving the Japanese in
unmolsted occupation of US territory, I think, on balance, retaking the
Aleutians was a net plus for the US.

If I had to speculate, and I do, I'd suggest that given the timing,
the Japanese were hoping for a morale victory. The panic and paranoia
after Pearl Harbour had begun to subside, and the Aleutians were a way
of attacking US soil without risking a great deal. I'm sure it played
well in Japan and for a brief time hurt American morale as well.

It reminded me of the raid on Washington during the War of 1812. The
British had no intention of trying to keep Washington. Their purpose
was to get the Americans to move their troops away from the US/
Canadian Border, pick up own morale (things were stalemated
elsewhere) and panic the US government. Having said that, they should
have left after they easily accomplished this, and not go on to
Baltimore. The raid on New Orleans was to do the same thing, though it
failed.

JJR

2010-10-07 21:08:08 UTC

Post by Bay Man
US forces were sent to liberate Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Not a soul
was on the island, yet 91 dead in the invasion. Strange but true.

It sounds as if recovering the Aleutians was just an easy exercise;
well, it wasn't.
Even as some 550 GI's were killed in the battle for Attu, "casualties
caused by frostbite and exposure outnumbered those inflicted by the
enemy ten to one". (Coyle, War On Our Doorstep)
Of the 2800 Japanese on the island, 26 were taken POWs.
http://wikimapia.org/331879/Massacre-Bay

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese pulled out unbeknown to the US. How did they miss all the
ships and transports taking them away?

Quite simply - Kinkaid's fleet was not there at the moment. The blocking
detachment (New Mexico, Mississippi, some cruisers etc) engaged in a
mysterious shooting at a reported seven supply ships which were seen on
the radar, though never materialized. Short on fuel and ammo after that
"fight" they withdrew to resupply off Amchitka, thus leaving 72-hrs long
gap in the blockade. The Japanese were lucky to arrive exactly then, and
eight transports took entire 5,200 force. Fifty men left behind to
destroy the documents were later evacuated by a sub.

--
pzdr,
Jedrzej

"When we discover a minefield, our infantry attacks exactly as if there
were none."
Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974)

Alan Nordin

2010-10-08 18:42:54 UTC

Post by Bay Man
US forces were sent to liberate Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Not a

soul

Post by Bay Man
was on the island, yet 91 dead in the invasion. Strange but true.

Not so strange, most of the dead were from a destroyer hitting a mine.

Bay Man

2010-10-09 16:13:05 UTC

Post by Bay Man
US forces were sent to liberate Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Not a

soul

Post by Bay Man
was on the island, yet 91 dead in the invasion. Strange but true.

Not so strange, most of the dead were from a destroyer hitting a mine.

About 68-70 on the destroyer. Which was in the invasion. Also many were
maimed.

Alan Nordin

2010-10-09 17:54:52 UTC

On Oct 9, 12:13 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
About 68-70 on the destroyer. Which was in the invasion. Also many were
maimed.

If you want exact figures, Morison gives 70 KIA/MIA & 47 WIA on the
Abner Read.

I'm interested to know the source of your ascertion that AAF pilots
landed on Kiska before the invasion.

WaltBJ

2010-10-17 19:39:18 UTC