Poor leaders looking good just due to intel?

[dumbstruck]

I'm reading Walter Schellenberg's memoirs about the SD secret
service getting foreign and domestic intelligence for Himmler https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Schellenberg . Intel is
power, not only against the enemy but in competition with
your peers (which was very intense within nazi leadership).

As Himmler seems quite a strange mix of accomplishment and
mediocrity (fired as a farm hand, battlefield general, etc),
I wondered if his success rested mainly on his unique access
to intel rather than leadership. Walter depicts Heydrich as
puppetmaster of the whole reich due to selective feeding of
intel to promote feuds and firing. Was only loyal to Himmler.

Himmler was originally a propaganda guy who only succeeded by
fanatical perspiration, and not a bit by working smart. He
transitioned to sort of enforcement and hooked up with
Heydrich and became a sinister success. But was it due to
Heydrich and his successors only? Walter depicts how powerful
intel mischief can be by feeding, say, Goering and generals
selective secrets about each other to create conflict.

It also made me think about Montgomery who got so much better
intel than his predecessors to come to fame. Were there other
Brit generals who could have performed better in France if
not earleir bumped out of consideration by selective intel?
Maybe others (I think Patton cultivated own intel sources)?

Hard to say for sure, because I encounter a lot of mention of
spy success from the German side in memoirs that don't seem
to be recognized by historians. Not only in Africa (more than
just the Cairo leak) but also in the UK. Supposedly Britain
blocked all axis spies, but Walter tells how one in Scotland
was responsible of calling in a sub to sink the Royal Oak
when noticing an opening in the Scapa Flow sub fence.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by dumbstruck
It also made me think about Montgomery who got so much better
intel than his predecessors to come to fame.

Why do you say that? Station X was reading
Rommel's Enigma traffic pretty much all along.

IMHO, Montgomery's advantage in intelligence was
that the _Axis_ lost _their_ best sources in that
theater about the time he took over. The leak
through the US Military Attache in Egypt was
closed at at the beginning of July 1942.

Then during First Alamein, Seebohm's Radio
Intercept company was overrun by an Australian
counter-attack. The Germans lost their services,
and the British learned how bad their radio
security was.

This was certainly an advantage to Montgomery
over Auchinleck, but not enough to account for
the difference in their results.

[Haydn]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Then during First Alamein, Seebohm's Radio
Intercept company was overrun by an Australian
counter-attack. The Germans lost their services,
and the British learned how bad their radio
security was.

Seebohm's 621st Company surely was a valuable asset but its actual value
has been inflated post-war. Its Italian Army colleagues of I Team, a
more discreet, lower profile, longer lasting unit led by Alpine
artillery captain Giacomo Guiglia, intercepted and read over 100,000
British tactical radio messages December 1940 through January 1943. The
loss of Seebohm's outfit was a nuisance, not a intelligence disaster.

In general, from early 1941 on and through nearly the end of the North
African campaign the Axis could break British tactical communications
about as effectively as the British would break Axis tactical
communications. The problem, as usual with the exploitation of
intelligence sources on both sides, is that often the information
gathered was of little or no practical use or it became available too
late to be of any real use for battlefield purposes.

Post by Rich Rostrom
This was certainly an advantage to Montgomery
over Auchinleck, but not enough to account for
the difference in their results.

Correct. British intelligence superiority never was the main cause of
the Axis defeat.

Haydn

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Haydn
Seebohm's 621st Company surely was a valuable asset but its actual value
has been inflated post-war. Its Italian Army colleagues of I Team, a
more discreet, lower profile, longer lasting unit led by Alpine
artillery captain Giacomo Guiglia, intercepted and read over 100,000
British tactical radio messages December 1940 through January 1943. The
loss of Seebohm's outfit was a nuisance, not a intelligence disaster.

Point taken, but remember also that when the Australians
overran Seebohm's group, they captured the group's files.

When the British looked at the files later, they were
shocked to learn just how much intel was being given
aware in careless radio chatter. Between then and
Second Alamein (AIUI) British radio discipline was
tightened substantially, and there wasn't as much for
the Axis to hear.

[dumbstruck]

Post by Haydn
Correct. British intelligence superiority never was the main cause of
the Axis defeat.

This is a point that I wish could be passed on to documentary
writers. Cable TV is rerunning a lot of those (including Nat
Geo and Smithsonian) with the theme that Allies won only thru
code breaking (and logistics). That the Germans and Japanese
were real professional soldiers, versus the Allies (or at least
US) were happy-go-lucky amateurs with a windfall advantage.

Even beside the German breaking of UK naval codes, Axis memoirs
show a frequent knowledge of Allied transmissions - incl. Japanese.
Not that everybody knew how to use or whether to believe it.

Back on African discussions, where I don't know where to begin
to quote. I was reminded of an audio biography of Rommel whose
most striking claim was that Rommel's initial success was badly
received in Berlin. He was supposed to run a bare bones African
operation, but his aggressiveness required an unsustainable
amount of supplies. Like in WW1 he was actually reckless, and I
guess eventually got shot up in Africa where he lost confidence.

In both world wars he luckily had a superior like Kesselring who
shielded him from criticism about risking cutoff of forward
troops for example. I think he used better judgement in France,
but in WW1 Italy and WW2 Africa he got more respect from his
opponents than his upper command chain - maybe with good reason.

[dumbstruck]

Alright, I better put aside the African theater which is less fresh in
my mind. Europe on the cusp of war is depicted by Walter S. as
overabundant in intel to the point where the receivers become
skeptical about info which was actually correct. Not only Stalin
disbelieved genuine detailed plans of German attacks, but so did
the Poles who had an agent romancing several secretaries of top
German army planners.

But disbelief wasn't always wrong because counterspy efforts
sometimes were feeding abundant false info. I'm sure we all know
examples, but Walter relates how Stalin tricked Heydrich this way.
Well, I wonder how Schellenberg's interesting accounts stand up
over time... I am reading a version published soon after the war and
his death, when the editors had little info to crosscheck it with.

Walter sometimes has daily meetings with Himmler, who is stranger
than strange. A bizarre mixture of pendantic schoolteacher and sadist.
Similar to accounts of Hitler's small talk, something between autistic fact discussions and amateur academic. Neither Himmler or Heydrich has
the tyrannical style you might expect, but a strange feline evasive style
to cover-their-a** if something displeases Hitler.

If I extrapolate Walter S. observations just a bit, here is how a
particular war crime policy might evolve. Not top-down commands
or even secret whispers... the early days of nazi party made them
wary of leaks (Hitler originally spied against nazis). Hitler wants
plausible deniability for retiring with respect after winning the war.

Himmler might guess Hitler would take a liking to a certain evil policy.
He dares not simply order this policy, but calls for suggestions
from several high level consultants like Walter. He receives all with
absolute enigmatic neutrality, but puts the one he wants into action.
Spies will report the results to Hitler, sometimes negatively. Himmler
then has a scapegoat to punish ("bad info") and distance himself from
his bad guess of what would please Adolph.

[Alan Meyer]

Post by dumbstruck
...
If I extrapolate Walter S. observations just a bit, here is how a
particular war crime policy might evolve. Not top-down commands
or even secret whispers... the early days of nazi party made them
wary of leaks (Hitler originally spied against nazis). Hitler wants
plausible deniability for retiring with respect after winning the war.
Himmler might guess Hitler would take a liking to a certain evil policy.
He dares not simply order this policy, but calls for suggestions
from several high level consultants like Walter. He receives all with
absolute enigmatic neutrality, but puts the one he wants into action.
Spies will report the results to Hitler, sometimes negatively. Himmler
then has a scapegoat to punish ("bad info") and distance himself from
his bad guess of what would please Adolph.

Like most tyrants, Hitler valued absolute personal loyalty to himself.
This would be most especially important in the Reichsfuhrer-SS and
commander of the Gestapo. Some degree of independent thinking might be
tolerated in a successful military commander like Rommel (though only
within strict limits), but would be intolerable in Himmler's position.
So I would think that Himmler demonstrations of absolute loyalty and
willingness to kiss-a** over a period of many years, were key
qualifications.

There is a chapter in Ian Kershaw's _Hitler, The Germans, and the Final
Solution_ called "Working towards the Fuhrer". Kershaw argues that many
of the men involved in the Holocaust had the ability to figure out what
Hitler wanted, and then either propose it, or, carefully of course, do
it without a direct order. This enabled Hitler to keep his hands clean,
at least in his own mind.

Your paragraphs above describe a considerable mastery of that technique.

Alan

[Haydn]

Post by dumbstruck
Hard to say for sure, because I encounter a lot of mention of
spy success from the German side in memoirs that don't seem
to be recognized by historians. Not only in Africa (more than
just the Cairo leak) but also in the UK. Supposedly Britain
blocked all axis spies, but Walter tells how one in Scotland
was responsible of calling in a sub to sink the Royal Oak
when noticing an opening in the Scapa Flow sub fence.

I wouldn't exceedingly trust memoirs by spy masters or intelligence
chiefs. For sure they are useful material, but to handle with care and
plenty of grains of salt. (Like all memoirs for that matter). The
authors may understandably be inclined to inflate their own and their
service's successes while glossing over own mistakes and failures.

For some, or many, claims they make we only have their own word or
little more than that. There are no primary sources to substantiate them
- whether any such sources ever existed, or have been tampered with,
removed or destroyed -, and suspicions about their authenticity
inevitably rise.

Even official works on intelligence are not immune from such suspicions.
American authors Alexander S. Cochrane Jr. and Timothy Mulligan happened
to discover severe problems with British TNA/PRO intelligence documents
and Sir Hinsley's official work on British intelligence in WWII.

Haydn

[Rich]

Post by Haydn
Even official works on intelligence are not immune from such suspicions.
American authors Alexander S. Cochrane Jr. and Timothy Mulligan happened
to discover severe problems with British TNA/PRO intelligence documents
and Sir Hinsley's official work on British intelligence in WWII.

Reference please. I know Cochrane was CMH, but I am unfamiliar with Mulligan?

Just exactly what "severe problems" did they discover? Which files? Are
we talking the HW decrypt's at Kew? Where in Hinsley?

[Haydn]

Post by Rich

Post by Haydn
Even official works on intelligence are not immune from such suspicions.
American authors Alexander S. Cochrane Jr. and Timothy Mulligan happened
to discover severe problems with British TNA/PRO intelligence documents
and Sir Hinsley's official work on British intelligence in WWII.

Reference please. I know Cochrane was CMH, but I am unfamiliar with Mulligan?

Cochrane, A. S. Jr., MAGIC, ULTRA and the Second World War: Literature,
Sources and Outlook, "Military Affairs", vol. 46, 2, April 1982.

Mulligan, Timothy, The German Navy Evaluates Its Cryptographic Security,
October 1941, "Military Affairs", vol. 54, 4, October 1990.

Post by Rich
Just exactly what "severe problems" did they discover? Which files? Are
we talking the HW decrypt's at Kew? Where in Hinsley?

Cochrane states TNA/PRO records declassified and made available to
researchers since 1978 often consist of mere, flimsy summaries of the
real decrypts, sent from Bletchley Park to London. There are
considerable gaps in that documentation. Indexes and a great many
original decrypts are no longer available.

Mulligan states the Operational Intelligence Centre war diary and many
messages were destroyed soon after the end of the war. In 1982, when he
was at Kew, many reports and documents mentioned by Hinsley were
detained by Ministries and not freely and promptly available to researchers.

As for Hinsley's big work, inconsistencies, incorrect statements and
some "overlooking" (as far as the Italian Navy is concerned) have
recently been pointed out.

Hinsley exaggerates ULTRA's effectiveness in the Mediterranean war. He
lumps together decrypts from various sources (Enigma, chiefly) to state
that up to 2,000 Hagelin messages a day could be cracked and read,
whereas in fact C 38m machines yielded a much leaner intelligence
harvest. In fact only one important sinking, a submarine carrying
frogmen to attack the British submarine base at Haifa, can be put down
(partly) to C 38 decrypts.

He says that in 1942 ULTRA more than made up for the scarcity of recon
aircraft on Malta (only 3 according to him) when even British sources
maintain there never were fewer than a dozen such planes throughout
1942, and 25% more in the summer.

He says ULTRA's success led the Axis to believe the Royal Navy had many
more submarines than the real number deployed to the Med, which is not
true: the Axis was never duped into believing that.

As late as 1993 Hinsley would state the Axis intelligence did never use
electromechanical computers, which is not true: since early 1942 the
Germans used Hollerith punched cards machines and the Italians, IBM
computers produced by the local IBM branch (which by the way makes one
wonder about the operational links between American and Italian
corporations just as their respective countries were officially at war
with one another).

Hinsley forgets the significant fact that about a half of the 1940-43
Italian decrypts at TNA were decoded... after the Italian 1943
armistice, when the Italians handed their British colleagues the codes.

Haydn

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Haydn
Hinsley forgets the significant fact that about a half of the 1940-43
Italian decrypts at TNA were decoded... after the Italian 1943
armistice, when the Italians handed their British colleagues the codes.

Were these later decrypts of current traffic,
presumably of the forces of the RSI? One would
think the RSI had sense enough not to use keys
they knew were in Allied hands.

[Haydn]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Haydn
Hinsley forgets the significant fact that about a half of the 1940-43
Italian decrypts at TNA were decoded... after the Italian 1943
armistice, when the Italians handed their British colleagues the codes.

Were these later decrypts of current traffic,
presumably of the forces of the RSI?

No. That was 1940-43 traffic. Reportedly there is a 1944 memo by Hinsley
himself where he suggests that the list of Italian submarines' messages
of October 1940, which the British could never decode and read up until
then, be included in a report about Italian codes. Those decrypts had
been provided by the Italian Navy intelligence rump that had remained in
Southern Italy and was cooperating with the Allies.

RSI naval codes stood almost entirely unbroken until the end of the war
and with a couple minor exceptions the Allies never cracked them. They
needed not to. They got all naval information they might wish to know
from German decrypts, and RSI activities were not a major headache.

BTW, while Hinsley, as Rich rightly points out, may not have been aware
of facts and figures that would be disclosed later, and he did not even
work on the Mediterranean chapters of the intelligence history, he is
the main author/editor of both the official history and the Codebreakers
book. So I think it stands to reason he is responsible for the content
of those works even though some parts may not be his own.

Haydn

[Rich]

Post by Haydn
Cochrane, A. S. Jr., MAGIC, ULTRA and the Second World War: Literature,
Sources and Outlook, "Military Affairs", vol. 46, 2, April 1982.
Mulligan, Timothy, The German Navy Evaluates Its Cryptographic Security,
October 1941, "Military Affairs", vol. 54, 4, October 1990.

Thank you, since those were the only two works I could find for them I
suspected they were what you were using. However, do you not notice one
very major problem? Cochrane's article is immediately after the initial
declassification releases. Mulligan's is from a point when only about
25% of the files were declassified. Neither had access to all of the
materiel, which Hinsley did when writing.

Post by Haydn
Cochrane states TNA/PRO records declassified and made available to
researchers since 1978 often consist of mere, flimsy summaries of the
real decrypts, sent from Bletchley Park to London. There are
considerable gaps in that documentation. Indexes and a great many
original decrypts are no longer available.

Cochrane apparently assumed what he had access to was everything that
existed, which was incorrect on his part. In 1979-1980 only a fraction
of the ULTRA files had been declassified. Si I have no doubt that all
he had to work with were the flimsies...and few of those.

Post by Haydn
Mulligan states the Operational Intelligence Centre war diary and many
messages were destroyed soon after the end of the war. In 1982, when he
was at Kew, many reports and documents mentioned by Hinsley were
detained by Ministries and not freely and promptly available to researchers.

So he published in 1990 from work he did in Kew in 1982. Again, no
wonder. When I worked at NARA on the ULTRA files first, in 1989, I
had to have clearance and work in a secure cage. At that time the
archivist we worked with told us that about 25% of the record group
contents had been declassified. A large part, especially those dealing
with sources and methods and the German and Italian code breaking were
still classified and had not been released by NSA/GCHQ in the belief -
misguided of course - it would keep certain information from the Sovs.

Post by Haydn
As for Hinsley's big work, inconsistencies, incorrect statements and
some "overlooking" (as far as the Italian Navy is concerned) have
recently been pointed out.

BTW, how did Cochrane, publishing in 1980 from work he did in 1979,
criticize Hinsley's work in toto, since only Volume 1 had been
published by then? I can see Mulligan doing such a critique, but your
implication is that both did. Are there any others besides these two
who developed the same critique, but using more recent scholarship?
Insofar as I can see, current critcism of Hinsley's work is distilled
to "that they were books about committees, written by committees and
for committees" (Dr. Michael Goodman, author of the Official History
of the Joint Intelligence Committee.)

Post by Haydn
Hinsley exaggerates ULTRA's effectiveness in the Mediterranean war.

Sorry, but you implied WRT Hinsley's work "suspicions about their
authenticity inevitably rise". How does exaggeration qualify as a
lack of authenticity? How is exaggeration a "severe problem"? Hinsley
may be guilty of inflating ULTRA's influence, but not his own and there
is zero evidence that sources "have been tampered with, removed or
destroyed".

Post by Haydn
He says that in 1942 ULTRA more than made up for the scarcity of recon
aircraft on Malta (only 3 according to him) when even British sources
maintain there never were fewer than a dozen such planes throughout
1942, and 25% more in the summer.

It is not unusual for intelligence analysts to ignore operational
realities. I know there were two reconnaissance squadrons based
out of Malta during the period, but the number of serviceable
aircraft is a different matter. Anyway, again, I fail to see how
that meets the criteria of a "sever problem" which apparently must
permeat the work.

Post by Haydn
He says ULTRA's success led the Axis to believe the Royal Navy had many
more submarines than the real number deployed to the Med, which is not
true: the Axis was never duped into believing that.

How much did Hinsley have access to classified data on German and
Italian intrusions into Allied codes? I suspect not very much, given the
compartmentalization of that information. Most of those records were only released by NSA/GCHQ after 2000.

Post by Haydn
As late as 1993 Hinsley would state the Axis intelligence did never use
electromechanical computers, which is not true: since early 1942 the
Germans used Hollerith punched cards machines and the Italians, IBM
computers produced by the local IBM branch (which by the way makes one
wonder about the operational links between American and Italian
corporations just as their respective countries were officially at war
with one another).

Again, most of the information simply wasn't available to him or anyone
else for that matter, until well after 1993.

And again, neither of those meet the criteria of "suspicions about their
authenticity", records having been "tampered with, removed or destroyed"'
or a "severe problem". It is simply a consequence of the way things
work.

Post by Haydn
Hinsley forgets the significant fact that about a half of the 1940-43
Italian decrypts at TNA were decoded... after the Italian 1943
armistice, when the Italians handed their British colleagues the codes.

He forgot? How do you know? Just as likely since he never worked the Med,
he simply didn't know. IIRC, the original "Secret History" volumes Hinsley
et al used as the basis for their work, doesn't mention that (I admit it
has been ten years since I went through the 11-odd volumes and only copied
the BoB and NWE ones, so I am going solely by memory).

Cheers!

[Haydn]

Post by Rich
Thank you, since those were the only two works I could find for them I
suspected they were what you were using. However, do you not notice one
very major problem? Cochrane's article is immediately after the initial
declassification releases. Mulligan's is from a point when only about
25% of the files were declassified. Neither had access to all of the
materiel, which Hinsley did when writing.

No doubt about it, but at least one researcher today says the situation
at TNA with intelligence material hasn't changed that much ever since.
I've never been there and can only report what I read/hear.

Post by Rich
BTW, how did Cochrane, publishing in 1980 from work he did in 1979,
criticize Hinsley's work in toto, since only Volume 1 had been
published by then? I can see Mulligan doing such a critique, but your
implication is that both did. Are there any others besides these two
who developed the same critique, but using more recent scholarship?

I'd like to know, too.

Post by Rich

Post by Haydn
Hinsley exaggerates ULTRA's effectiveness in the Mediterranean war.

Sorry, but you implied WRT Hinsley's work "suspicions about their
authenticity inevitably rise". How does exaggeration qualify as a
lack of authenticity? How is exaggeration a "severe problem"?

The "severe problem" reference was based on Cochrane's and Mulligan's
experience with PRO records rather than Hinsley's work.

Post by Rich
Hinsley
may be guilty of inflating ULTRA's influence, but not his own and there
is zero evidence that sources "have been tampered with, removed or
destroyed".

I was simply relating what I found in Cochrane's article.

Thank you for the discussion and the other good points you make.

Haydn

[Rich]

Post by Haydn
No doubt about it, but at least one researcher today says the situation
at TNA with intelligence material hasn't changed that much ever since.
I've never been there and can only report what I read/hear.

Who was that? My experience from being there is very different as I
said. And I have only gone through some of the extensive HW files for
the GCHQ; I have spent little time in the CAB, WO, AIR, and ADM, let
alone the extensive series on the SOE released in the HS, AIR, WO,
FO, and PREM series. I rather suspect what you are detecting is the
problem any "one researcher" has in accessing such a mass of materiel
rather than a problematic nature of the archival "situation".

Post by Haydn
I'd like to know, too.

Good to see you realize the problem with making too much of
Cochrane's and Mulligan's now partially outdated findings.

Post by Haydn
The "severe problem" reference was based on Cochrane's and Mulligan's
experience with PRO records rather than Hinsley's work.

Then, given the massive additional releases of files from multiple
agencies since the early and restricted access releases they had
available, I think you would agree there is no "severe problem"? I
note that as late as 2013 more files were released dealing with
the role of British intelligence in the Second World War and early
Cold War.

Post by Haydn
I was simply relating what I found in Cochrane's article.

Which I think you will agree is now badly outdated and inaccurate?

Post by Haydn
Thank you for the discussion and the other good points you make.

You are welcome. Apologies for being late with this reply, but I was
traveling for work and didn't have time last week.

Cheers!

[dumbstruck]

Post by Haydn
I wouldn't exceedingly trust memoirs by spy masters or intelligence
chiefs. For sure they are useful material, but to handle with care and
plenty of grains of salt. (Like all memoirs for that matter). The
authors may understandably be inclined to inflate their own and their
service's successes while glossing over own mistakes and failures.

I've been trying to detect his bias. He comes across as modest...
succeeding in spite of his blunders, or failing after a noble effort.
He wrote it in prison (didn't they usually ban writing paper?) and I
might guess he was angling for a job as a UK spy on Russians. The
editors said he was bitter the US spy agency hired his colleague
rather than him for that.

He arranged the famous kidnapping of Brit spies in Holland, getting
shot at by his own men in the mixup. He lobbies to avoid prosecution
or bad treatment of Brit spies, and when ordered to kidnap the ex
king of England he works out a way to sabotage it in late stages.
Argues with Hitler that he should respect the tenacity of the
Brits more... it seems a bit over the top.

He often waits too long to arrest people who appear to be Russian
spies, maybe to emphasize his humanity and reluctance to use
violence. A key German spy in Japan who convinced Stalin Japan
would not attack them so he could focus on the German attack was
suspected by Walter to be bolshavik for years. He only half
heartedly chased after Otto Strasser with a vial of super-typhus...
I wonder who actually did get assassinated this way and was thought
to have a natural death?

I wish there was some lookup facility to help interpret the
veracity of primary WW2 materials like memoirs. I had read
Speer not knowing the huge doubts later arising, and I guess
there are whole books detailing those. But Walter and some
others just leave me wondering. At least it is interesting
to see how a spy bureaucracy seems to work, and how Europe
was filled with economic immigrants who were tempted to spy
for their country of origin.

[Haydn]

Post by dumbstruck
I wish there was some lookup facility to help interpret the
veracity of primary WW2 materials like memoirs.

A large portion of the history of secret services, covert operations and
special forces actions will forever be shrouded in mystery and doubt,
despite the keenest reconstructions which are inevitably based, partly
at least, on memoirs written by participants in those very actions.

As an example, shortly before WWII one of the major Italian
codebreakers, Navy captain Giorgio Verità Poeta, died very prematurely
at just age 36. Suspicions have long been lingering pointing at the
involvement of MI5 in that premature death, but no conclusive evidence
has ever been found. And it's unlikely it will ever be.

Haydn

[WJHopwood]

Post by Haydn
A large portion of the history of secret services,
covert operations and special forces actions will forever
be shrouded in mystery and doubt, despite the keenest
reconstructions which are inevitably based, partly
at least, on memoirs written by participants in those very
actions.

An excellent observation to which I would add that the
accuracy of memoirs or just the plain memories of many
participants in wartime events other than participants
in covert operations tend to become more suspect as
time advances. In that connection, there is
an article in the July issue of The Journal of Military
History which covers just such a problem facing
younger military historians who depend much upon
the memoirs and testimony of participants to obtain
a complete picture of events.
Titled "Buchenwald Stories: Testimony, Military
History,and the American Encounter with the Holocaust."
the author is Associate Professor Adam R. Scipp of
Texas A&M. In a long article, Professor Scipp examines
a large amount of written and oral material obtained from
U.S. servicemen who had witnessed the liberation of
Buchenwald and other Nazi concentration camps. His
point is that in the decades since the war both the written
and oral testimony of such veterans has been
instrumental in shaping American public opinion with
regard to the Holocaust and the war.
The problem to historians, however, is that the
testimony of the many soldier-liberators has shifted
in important ways during the subsequent decades
"reflecting .changes in American engagement with
both the war and the Holocaust."
In essence, Prof Scipps points out the many
personal testimonies, lectures, and memoirs over the
decades by those who claimed to have inspected
Buchenwald's gas ovens and seen the sign over the
entrance which was remembered by many in numerous
translations boiling down to something like "work will
set you free.'
The problem however was that there were no gas
ovens at Buchenwald and numerous testimonies had
confused Buchenwald with Auschwitz and orher such
camps on both counts.
And so the article goes in detail, after detail, of how
WWII history has been distorted over the years in many
small ways by many people for many reasons. Not
mentioned are some of the big ways in which WWII
history has also been re-written--the Japanese evacuation
from the west coast is one which comes to mind.

WJH

[dumbstruck]

Post by Haydn

Post by dumbstruck
I wish there was some lookup facility to help interpret the
veracity of primary WW2 materials like memoirs.

A large portion of the history of secret services, covert operations and
special forces actions will forever be shrouded in mystery and doubt,
despite the keenest reconstructions which are inevitably based, partly
at least, on memoirs written by participants in those very actions.

OK, but put aside the supersecret stuff, and there is still a rich
set of observations that sometimes actually could be cross checked. Eg.
his exasperation with Ribbentrop got him thinking Rib. had a specific
medical problem making him irrational... what did the Nuremberg doctors
say? One of them had extensive private analyses published after death.

Schellenberg's memoirs cry out for a knowledgable introduction or book
review. But it was published so early, the intro is kind of dazed... wow,
is this manuscript really genuine they ask... yes, we think so because...

The only review I can find is interesting: "sometimes information
released many years later by the Soviets has proven him wrong in his
understanding of events, but by and large he told it as he saw it.
The shenanigans engaged in by Nazis are astounding and would be
unbelievable except that they were true and confirmed by independent
sources!". But it was by an amateur, an actual cat lady it appears.

Contrast this with secret diary of the Russian ambassador to London
which the editor fully discusses in the Boston Globe (link:)
http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2015/10/07/the-secret-diary-stalin-man-churchill-squad/iCGkqUynjw62nqXpSdXVVN/story.html
If you can see that link he explains why espionage historians will
be amazed by what Ivan Maisky could learn just by asking top Brit
politicians (often devastating depictions) or socialist sympathizers.

By the way these diaries and memoirs I mention were published after
death so the writers could not be asked about them. Contrast that
to the ambassador's long writeups on how WW2 was started which are
included in that link. Delusional depiction of prewar Russia standing
up to Hitler. In that case he was writing as a Soviet spokesperson
to the Boston Globe audience vs his newly published personal diaries.

[SolomonW]

Post by dumbstruck
Were there other
Brit generals who could have performed better in France if
not earleir bumped out of consideration by selective intel?

Well a good example might be Crete, Bernard Freyberg had very good intel,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete#Intelligence

"Allied commanders knew of the imminent invasion through Ultra intercepts.
Freyberg was informed of the air component of the German battle plan and
started to prepare a defence near the airfields and along the north coast."

What he lacked the resources to do much about it.