Discussion:
Air superoriy over germany
(too old to reply)
Chris Allen
2014-01-31 15:42:10 UTC
Permalink
I have watched several documentories on Youtube about the air campaign
over Germeny.

I understand the first "real" US raids began late 1942 and they belived
they did not need fighter escorts. Throughout most of 1943 they
suffered so greatly from the lack of escorts, they nearly abandoned
daylight bombing. Then in late 1943 effective escorts joined the
bombers. These fighters were mainly Thunderbolts, followed later by
Mustangs. This combination turned the tide so that by DDay, the
Luftwaffer was almost irrelevant.

I also understand the Mosquito was orginally developed to bomb from high
altitude at high speed. Never the less it quckly proved to be very
useful in many other roles including escort fighter. It was apparently
so difficult to shoot down that German pilots would count 1 Mosquito as
2 "kills".

If all the above is correct, why didn't Mosquitos escort the bombers
before Thenderbolts and Mustangs came on the scene?
m***@verizon.net
2014-02-01 00:48:15 UTC
Permalink
Post by Chris Allen
I have watched several documentories on Youtube about the air campaign
over Germeny.
I understand the first "real" US raids began late 1942 and they belived
they did not need fighter escorts. Throughout most of 1943 they
suffered so greatly from the lack of escorts, they nearly abandoned
daylight bombing. Then in late 1943 effective escorts joined the
bombers. These fighters were mainly Thunderbolts, followed later by
Mustangs. This combination turned the tide so that by DDay, the
Luftwaffer was almost irrelevant.
I also understand the Mosquito was orginally developed to bomb from high
altitude at high speed. Never the less it quckly proved to be very
useful in many other roles including escort fighter. It was apparently
so difficult to shoot down that German pilots would count 1 Mosquito as
2 "kills".
If all the above is correct, why didn't Mosquitos escort the bombers
before Thenderbolts and Mustangs came on the scene?
For the same reason the US didn't copy some of the superior German machine guns. Call it the "it wasn't made here" attitude.
Don Phillipson
2014-02-01 17:34:04 UTC
Permalink
I have watched several documentories on Youtube about the air campaign over
Germeny.
I understand the first "real" US raids began late 1942 and they belived
they did not need fighter escorts. Throughout most of 1943 they suffered
so greatly from the lack of escorts, they nearly abandoned daylight
bombing. Then in late 1943 effective escorts joined the bombers. These
fighters were mainly Thunderbolts, followed later by Mustangs. This
combination turned the tide so that by DDay, the Luftwaffer was almost
irrelevant.
I also understand the Mosquito was orginally developed to bomb from high
altitude at high speed. Never the less it quckly proved to be very useful
in many other roles including escort fighter. It was apparently so
difficult to shoot down that German pilots would count 1 Mosquito as 2
"kills".
If all the above is correct, why didn't Mosquitos escort the bombers
before Thenderbolts and Mustangs came on the scene?
Movie documentaries are likely to omit essential background
information, such as the successive stages of US heavy bombing
doctrine. Before deployment in England, USAAC doctrine was
that "flying fortresses" did not require fighter escort. Losses on
the raids over Germany (after earlier raids on French and Low
Countries targets that barely reached German fighter airfields)
convinced US bomber generals otherwise, so they sought RAF
help to escort the bombers. This was provided, but with difficulty
because the RAF was organized differently from the 8th Air
Force and neither had any experience in deploying escorts
to rendezvous with bombers 200 miles from home.

US policy therefore changed, to require fighter escort and
to increase the number of long-range fighters already
deployed in 8th Air Force. Not until 1943 did Thunderbolts
and Mustangs in sufficient numbers reach England, and
early escort missions were not particularly efficient. A
practical difference was that US bombing methods
could be rehearsed in US airspace before deployment
overseas, but fighter tactics could not be rehearsed
in advance. 8th Air Force fighter escorts had to learn
by practical experience, which took time, and their
commanders had to learn how Germany deployed
defensive forces (about which in 1943 the RAF had
only limited knowledge and the USAAC had none.)

Both British and US commanding generals largely
"fought their own wars" independently. They co-ordinated
when obliged to (by early USAAC losses, or by Eisenhower
to prepare for D-Day etc.) but each had its own agenda
and each was organized to complete that agenda. E.g.
RAF Mosquitos were fully occupied (a) as night bombers,
(b) as defensive night fighters or on "interdiction" raids.
Using RAF Mosquitos as daytime fighter escorts would
require deferring the RAF agendas that already kept
them fully occupied, i.e. was theoretically possible but
very difficult (first requiring new training for Mosquito
pilots.) US air generals agreed it was better to provide
their own escort fighter forces. despite delays.

Actual losses in 1944-45 confirm it untrue that " by DDay, the
Luftwaffer was almost irrelevant." Only in 1945 did the
Luftwaffe run out of trained pilots and fuel; there were always
plenty of replacement machines and engines.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Phil McGregor
2014-02-03 16:17:56 UTC
Permalink
Post by Don Phillipson
Luftwaffe run out of trained pilots and fuel; there were always
plenty of replacement machines and engines.
Well, for *some* values of 'plenty' ...

It is known, for example, that German oil shortages constrained operations
of all the German armed services from 1941 or so - and it is likewise known
that all of the branches were constrained as to how much of anything they
could build because of raw material shortages.

So, one presumes, there were always 'plenty' of replacement machines and
engines *within the operational constraints forced on the Luftwaffe by
external factors' ... which is not *quite* the same as an unmodified
'plenty,'

Phil McGregor
--
Author: Space Opera (FGU), Rigger Black Book (FASA); Farm, Forge & Steam
(PGD), Orbis Mundi, Displaced, Audace ad Gloriam and Road to Armageddon
(PGD)
Geoffrey Sinclair
2014-02-02 18:49:49 UTC
Permalink
I have watched several documentories on Youtube about the air campaign over
Germeny.
I understand the first "real" US raids began late 1942 and they belived
they did not need fighter escorts.
First bomb raid 29 June 1942 (RAF Boston/A-20 crewed by USAAF)
First fighter mission 26 July 1942.
First heavy bomber raid 17 August 1942.
First bombing raid on Germany 27 January 1943.

During 1943 a pattern emerged of alternating attacking France and
Germany, which meant the overall losses as a percentage of sorties
was low, but the reality was unescorted bombers were taking
unacceptable losses.
Throughout most of 1943 they suffered so greatly from the lack of escorts,
they nearly abandoned daylight bombing.
Nearly abandoned is over stating the case, there were around 10 trial
night sorties. Essentially the whole force would need retraining and
the USAAF knew it had longer range fighters on the way. The 8th
Air Force, like every other air force, wold have its bomber operations
restricted by the range of its fighters.

In the first half of 1943 the US fighters and bombers largely fought
separate wars, any fighter escort usually came from the RAF, limited
by the range of the Spitfire.

As the year went on more effort was made to provide insertion and
withdrawal cover. The Luftwaffe largely ignored escorted heavy
bomber strikes, since any escorts had to turn back well before any
target in Germany. Then the range of the US fighters began increasing.

At the end of June 1943 the 8th Air Force had 3 operational P-47
groups, by the end of 1943 it was 9 P-47 and 2 P-38, plus the
P-51 units "borrowed" from the 9th Air Force.
Then in late 1943 effective escorts joined the bombers. These fighters
were mainly Thunderbolts, followed later by Mustangs. This combination
turned the tide so that by DDay, the Luftwaffer was almost irrelevant.
P-47s remained half the 8th Air Force fighter strength until April 1944,
peaking at 10 groups, 4 P-38 groups also served. The P-38s were
phased out between July and September 1944, converted to P-51,
most of the P-47 groups were also converted.

The final fighter strength was 1 P-47 and 14 P-51 groups.

First P-47 mission 10 March 1943 but problems delayed widespread
use until April and May.

First US fighter escorts over Germany on 28 July 1943, P-47s.

Last bomber mission that did not have escorts all the way to the target,
14 October 1943, second Schweinfurt.

First P-38 mission from England (since 1942) 16 October 1943.

First P-51 mission 1 December 1943.

The Luftwaffe day fighter pilots suffered almost 100% casualties (including
wounded) in the first 5 months of 1944, draining the force of experience,
but in numerical terms the Luftwaffe day fighter force was growing. The
Luftwaffe bomber force was used against England around the same time,
suffering high losses that were not replaced.

The Luftwaffe was not irrelevant at D-Day, it had been made ineffective
by the losses in 1943 and 1944, plus the sheer size of the allied air forces
in Britain.

In terms of allied fighter kill claims, for the RAF June and July 1944 are
the fourth and fifth highest months, after May, August and September 1940.

For the USAAF fighters in the European Theater of Operations, June 1944
is sixth and July 1944 tenth in terms of air to air kill claims. The top 5
are,
in order, December, May, September, August and November 1944.

After being driven out of France the Luftwaffe tried again to intercept the
heavy bombers late in 1944
I also understand the Mosquito was orginally developed to bomb from high
altitude at high speed.
High speed yes, high altitude no. Altitude came in 1944.
Never the less it quckly proved to be very useful in many other roles
including escort fighter. It was apparently so difficult to shoot down
that German pilots would count 1 Mosquito as 2 "kills".
The Mosquito was not normally used as an escort fighter, some of the
Coastal Command anti shipping strikes used some of the Mosquitoes
as fighter escorts as at low altitude the Mosquito being used was
significantly faster than the German fighters. Later RAF P-51s were
used, freeing the Mosquitoes to be strike aircraft.

The counting 1 Mosquito as 2 kills is for night raids, as the Mosquito
bomber had comparable or better performance than the Luftwaffe
night fighters, making them hard to catch. Luftwaffe fighter operations
against Mosquito day raids were more successful.
If all the above is correct, why didn't Mosquitos escort the bombers
before Thenderbolts and Mustangs came on the scene?
First problem is altitude performance, until 1944 Mosquitoes did not
have the two stage supercharged engines, so they peaked at about
22,000 feet, not really good enough given the altitudes of the B-17
and B-24.

Second problem is the Mosquito fighter in 1943 had comparable
performance to the Bf109 and Fw190, while being larger, heavier
and less maneuverable, Mosquitoes would have had real trouble
in a straight fighter versus fighter encounter.

Third problem is popularity, everyone wanted the Mosquito, for
reconnaissance, bombing, night fighting and long range fighter
missions normally outside of German fighter range, like the Bay
of Biscay. The RAF night fighter units needed the Mosquitoes to
cope with later German bombers, the Beaufighters were too slow.

Fourth problem is production. To the end of October 1943 production
was 565 night fighters and 289 fighter bombers, less losses, for the
operational units and the training system.

The first fighter bomber sorties were in October 1943, admittedly
delayed as the units converting to Mosquitoes had been flying
light bombers like the Ventura.

P-47 production in 1942 was 532, rising to 4,428 in 1943.

The 1943 Mosquito was the wrong aircraft to use as a long range
escort over Germany and not available in the sort of numbers
required.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Alan Meyer
2014-02-03 04:58:58 UTC
Permalink
On 01/31/2014 10:42 AM, Chris Allen wrote:
...
Post by Chris Allen
If all the above is correct, why didn't Mosquitos escort the bombers
before Thenderbolts and Mustangs came on the scene?
The U.S. had a relatively long range twin engined fighter, the P-38
Lightning, that was probably a better bet for escort duty than the
Mosquito. The P-38 was lighter, smaller, and more maneuverable while
still having a long range. P-38's were heavily used and highly
successful in the Pacific, where range was very important, and were used
in all other theaters, including England as bomber escorts. However,
although individual pilots were successful with the plane, it was not
the equal of the Bf-109 or Fw-190 in top speed, climb, or
maneuverability. One pilot I knew who flew both the Lightning and the
Mustang in combat told me that the P-38 didn't have enough "oomph",
meaning acceleration, for combat against the 109's that he faced.

I suspect that the Mosquito would have done worse than the P-38 as an
escort fighter. High speed is necessary but not sufficient for
fighting. High rate of climb and high maneuverability are also
critical, and the Mosquito didn't have enough of those. It might be
able to run down a German fighter but, once it got close, I believe the
German fighters would be able to elude it by climbing or turning. And
if the German fighters got above it they could use increased speed in a
dive to catch it and shoot it down.

The Mosquito was a great airplane, but it wasn't a fighter.

Alan
c***@gmail.com
2014-02-05 16:15:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Meyer
The Mosquito was a great airplane, but it wasn't a fighter.
It wasn't an Air Superiority Fighter- designed to engage and shoot down
enemy fighters. It made a reasonable Interceptor Fighter- designed to shoot
down enemy aircraft with limited maneuverability (whether bombers or
nachtjager).

Chris Manteuffel
Rich Rostrom
2014-02-07 03:54:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Chris Allen
If all the above is correct, why didn't Mosquitos escort the bombers
before Thenderbolts and Mustangs came on the scene?
I have never heard of the Mosquito being used as an
escort fighter, a role it seems most inappropriate for.

The function of an escort fighter is to engage and shoot
down enemy fighters that are trying to attack the bombers.

The Mosquito was fast and long range, but not very
maneuverable (compared to a typical fighter). It was
designed as a bomber after all.

The U.S. P-38 Lightning was designed as a long range
fighter, but was not effective as a bomber escort
either - it was more maneuverable than a Mosquito,
but still much less agile than any single engine
fighter.

Also, the Mosquito was a larger and more expensive
aircraft than almost any fighter. It had two
engines, a two-man crew, and was hand-crafted
of shaped wooden members.

Production was limited, and it was not available
in numbers comparable to single-engine fighters.

Also, it was in great demand for its designed bomber
role and for high-altitude photo-reconnaissance
missions. As a bomber it was used for "pathfinder"
missions. It _was_ used as a nightfighter and
interceptor, hunting German bombers. It should be
noted that in this role agility doesn't really
matter - the British also used twin-engine Beaufighters,
while the Germans used twin-engine Me-110s and even
converted Ju-88 bombers.

Finally, the Mosquito only entered service in May 1942.
The P-47 was already in service.

The P-51 was already in service with the Allison engine;
the Merlin version which was so successful as an
escort appeared in 1943.
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
Loading...