Discussion:
Marshall and His Generals
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Stephen Graham
2013-02-28 01:07:00 UTC
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Stephen R. Taaffe, _Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in
World War II_, Kansas, 2011.

Taaffe's recent scholarship has been on the problem of higher command in
the US armed forces. I first ran across him in his two volumes touching
on the American Civil War, _Command the Army of the Potmac_ and
_Commanding Lincoln's Navy_. This one focuses on the corps, army, army
group and theater commanders in the active theaters with substantial US
Army presence. He doesn't deal with Stilwell, Sultan or Wedemeyer in the
CBI. Nor does he deal much with the British and French commanders. A
little more compare and contrast would be interesting.

What comes through is that the hard level to find commanders for was at
corps level. In part that was due to the number of slots at that level -
around twenty-five - but also due to the nature of the duties expected:
primarily direct management of combat operations with relatively little
logistical responsibility. Taaffe makes the point that corps commanders
were relieved for performance issues, whereas army commanders were not.

A moderate amount of time and criticism is spent on the somewhat
strained relationship between Eisenhower and Devers.

Taaffe does briefly discuss ranking of the various commanders, both by
their superiors, primarily Eisenhower and Bradley, and in his
estimation. For corps command, Taaffe points out Collins and Truscott
and is relatively critical of the Pacific corps commanders other than
Eichelberger. At the army level, he cites Patton in Europe and
Eichelberger in the Pacific, though he notes that Eichelberger had an
easier set of tasks than Krueger. What was interesting to me was a note
in the middle of the book that singled out William Simpson of the Ninth
Army as the "best all-around army commander".

If you're interested in the general topic, the book is worth your time.
It's particularly interesting for me in the areas that are less covered
generally - the Pacific operations and Sixth Army Group in Europe.
Michael Emrys
2013-02-28 04:57:11 UTC
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Post by Stephen Graham
A moderate amount of time and criticism is spent on the somewhat
strained relationship between Eisenhower and Devers.
That might be interesting. I've always wondered what lay at the root of
that conflict and I've always felt that one of Eisenhower's biggest
mistakes personnel-wise was his underestimation of Devers' professional
performance.

Michael
Stephen Graham
2013-02-28 06:40:32 UTC
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Post by Michael Emrys
Post by Stephen Graham
A moderate amount of time and criticism is spent on the somewhat
strained relationship between Eisenhower and Devers.
That might be interesting. I've always wondered what lay at the root of
that conflict and I've always felt that one of Eisenhower's biggest
mistakes personnel-wise was his underestimation of Devers' professional
performance.
Taaffe suggests that the primary issues were a general personality clash
and disputes about allocation of resources between the ETO and the MTO.
The irony is that Devers and Eisenhower essentially traded positions at
the end of 1943. Devers had taken over as commander of ETOUSA when
Eisenhower moved to the Mediterranean for Torch. Then when Eisenhower
was transferred back to the UK for Overlord, Devers took over as overall
US Army commander in the Mediterranean.
Michael Emrys
2013-02-28 14:16:24 UTC
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Post by Stephen Graham
Taaffe suggests that the primary issues were a general personality clash
and disputes about allocation of resources between the ETO and the MTO.
I'm skeptical of that. That alone would not have made Ike a permanent
enemy. Devers was too good a general and Ike consistently underrated him
in reports to Marshall. Something some time had to trigger that kind of
bitterness.

Michael
Rich
2013-02-28 16:16:36 UTC
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Post by Michael Emrys
Post by Stephen Graham
Taaffe suggests that the primary issues were a general personality clash
and disputes about allocation of resources between the ETO and the MTO.
I'm skeptical of that. That alone would not have made Ike a permanent
enemy. Devers was too good a general and Ike consistently underrated him
in reports to Marshall. Something some time had to trigger that kind of
bitterness.
Michael
Michael, Stephan,

Russell Weigley judged Devers "too much of a gentleman", which
evidently caused considerable friction with a lot of his
contemporaries. He was also a teetotaler, which also may have
caused some problems. Eisenhower certainly wasn't a teetotaler
and had a notorious temper, whereas Devers reportedly was always
calm.

However, his relationship with Eisenhower is a question mark,
since neither so far as I know ever said just what the problem
was - so you have to make assumptions. A classmate of Patton,
Devers was promoted to brigadier general in 1940, a year before
Eisenhower gained his first star, and was promoted major general
in August 1941, when Eisenhower was still waiting for that first
star. So there may be some jealousy there. Devers was Artillery and
Eisenhower Infantry, so that may have started a rivalry too.

Cheers!
Stephen Graham
2013-02-28 17:31:14 UTC
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Post by Rich
Russell Weigley judged Devers "too much of a gentleman", which
evidently caused considerable friction with a lot of his
contemporaries. He was also a teetotaler, which also may have
caused some problems. Eisenhower certainly wasn't a teetotaler
and had a notorious temper, whereas Devers reportedly was always
calm.
However, his relationship with Eisenhower is a question mark,
since neither so far as I know ever said just what the problem
was - so you have to make assumptions.
This is a case where I carefully checked the endnotes and there was
nothing specific, as you said. There were referenced comments from
others, such as Bradley and Patton, also critical of Devers. But nothing
directly attributed to Eisenhower or Devers. And it's also notable that
the critical comments don't stem from Devers.
Rich
2013-02-28 17:52:00 UTC
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Post by Stephen Graham
And it's also notable that
the critical comments don't stem from Devers.
Exactly. I think he simply wasn't in the same "mold" as the other
officers of that generation that achieved high rank. It seems notable
that all the critical commentary was directed ***at*** Devers, but the
simple evidence of his performance - throughout his career - was
that he was an exemplary officer. He was at least as good a coalition
commander as Eisenhower and a much better combat commander than
Bradley, whose reputation exceeds his actual achievement.
Stephen Graham
2013-02-28 18:22:57 UTC
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Post by Rich
Exactly. I think he simply wasn't in the same "mold" as the other
officers of that generation that achieved high rank. It seems notable
that all the critical commentary was directed ***at*** Devers, but the
simple evidence of his performance - throughout his career - was
that he was an exemplary officer. He was at least as good a coalition
commander as Eisenhower and a much better combat commander than
Bradley, whose reputation exceeds his actual achievement.
Devers certainly comes off the best of the Western Allied army group
commanders during the war. Bradley is criticized but comes across as
generally competent enough.

At the army level, Hodges gets a fair amount of criticism.
w***@aol.com
2013-02-28 18:25:35 UTC
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(Devers)...relationship with Eisenhower
is a question mark,,,so you have to make
assumptions.
....There were referenced comments from
others, such as Bradley and Patton, also
critical of Devers. But nothing directly
attributed to Eisenhower or Devers....
There is an interesting op-ed in the archives
of the New York Times written by David P.
Colley, author of "Decision at Strasbourg:
Ike's Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army
Group at the Rhine in 1944" The op-ed
originally appeared in the Times in November
2009 and describs how Devers was poised on
the Rhine in November of 1944 to cross into
Germany but Ike wouldn't let him.
According to this story, other Generals
including Patton and Patch later said that
Ike's decision was a mistake and that the
Devers plan could have been successful, the
Battle of the Bulge might never happened,
and the war ended earlier had Ike let Devers
go ahead with what he wanted to do.
This op-ed also touches on the alleged
poor personal relationship between Ike and
Devers. The article is still available on the net
and can be seen at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/opinion/23colley.html

WJH
Rich
2013-02-28 19:40:10 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rich
contemporaries. He was also a teetotaler, which also may have
I stand corrected, by Devers' great-nephew who says he was not a
teetotaler and enjoyed a stiff drink. That claim may be a
misapprehension on the part of David Colley, who made the claim
in "Decision at Strasbourg".

Cheers!

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