D-Day Omaha Beach Bombing Failure

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The 2d Bombardment Division began the day's operations for the Eighth
by dispatching, between 0555 and 0614 hours, 329 B-24's against OMAHA

Do you realize those attacks, by those separate groups occurred between
H-35 and H-16? Do you actually understand what you are reading and
posting?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Still nowhere any details why this largest of all air attacks failed.

Really? I think you have just proven that you can read, but cannot
comprehend. I'm afraid I don't think there is any way to help you.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-08-24 04:59:29 UTC

Reply to Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The 2d Bombardment Division began the day's operations for the Eighth
by dispatching, between 0555 and 0614 hours, 329 B-24's against OMAHA

Do you realize those attacks, by those separate groups occurred between
H-35 and H-16? Do you actually understand what you are reading and
posting?

So according the only delay table we have:

Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

H-35 and H-16 means a delay of 0 and of 5 seconds. If the water line
was the aim point "0" would hit the free beach and "5" the German sites
at the end of the beach. If the aim point was the German site positions
like some claimed, then "0" should hit them. But we know neither the
free beach are nor the sites were hit.

So for me it means the 1952 Air Force report I cited (and you quoted from
above):

Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945,
USAF Historical Division 1952
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090601-060.pdf

may simply be wrong. At least it is not in agreement with the other
very sparse sources we have.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Still nowhere any details why this largest of all air attacks failed.

Really? I think you have just proven that you can read, but cannot
comprehend. I'm afraid I don't think there is any way to help you.

Rich, dont blame me. The historical narrative of this most extraordinary
air operation in history is such badly screwed that only the original
secret reports of 1944 may be of any help. I think we have to read at
least 3 of the 5 I mentioned to get an idea what realy happened. As a
historian you must be eager to read this stuff, are you?

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Stephen Graham

2015-08-24 05:28:10 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
If the water line
was the aim point "0" would hit the free beach and "5" the German sites
at the end of the beach. If the aim point was the German site positions
like some claimed, then "0" should hit them. But we know neither the
free beach are nor the sites were hit.

I will observe again that you don't have a good idea of the relative
accuracy of World War Two level bombing. Go read up about CEP (Circular
Error Probability) and think about it.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-08-26 14:41:44 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham

I will observe again that you don't have a good idea of the relative
accuracy of World War Two level bombing. Go read up about CEP (Circular
Error Probability) and think about it.

You mean the CEP of a whole formation.
The attack was planed to be by a kilometer sized wing line of bombers
"abreast". If all went right it creates a rectangular box of bomb
impacts. I know of no other case were such a super wing formation
was used. The normal formation of the 8th AF was a box with the
intention to hit much smaller size targets than 1 km, more in the
100 m size or even less. I do not think we can compare that.

Another point was the danger to hit own troops. We know from the
British Bomber Command at Normandy that the bombers did no "creep
back" (early release by late arivers) of their drop point from the
target point. They did it in city raids in Germany but not here.
That affects the accuracy statistic a lot too.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

John Dallman

2015-08-26 15:48:37 UTC

We know from the British Bomber Command at Normandy that the bombers
did no "creep back" (early release by late arivers) of their drop
point from the target point. They did it in city raids in Germany
but not here. That affects the accuracy statistic a lot too.

Creep-back wasn't originally a deliberate tactic. When bombing at night,
aiming at fires or flares on the ground, and with visible AAA and less
visible night fighters around, it was awfully tempting to drop on the
first edge of the burning area that you came to. That produced a creep-
back effect, and since it was hard to prevent, it was exploited: you put
the initial markers on the far side of the target from the approach
direction and let creep-back move the average point of impact over the
target.

In daylight, you can see the actual target (modulo smoke, dust, cloud,
etc.) and the defences in Normandy weren't nearly the same scale.

John

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-26 16:52:55 UTC

<***@argo.rhein-neckar.de> wrote in message news:***@argo.rhein-neckar.de...

Again, leave attributions in.

Post by Stephen Graham

I will observe again that you don't have a good idea of the relative
accuracy of World War Two level bombing. Go read up about CEP (Circular
Error Probability) and think about it.

You mean the CEP of a whole formation.

So we have the next retreat, rather than understanding the known bomber
accuracy we are treated to another change of subject. No thinking.

The formation increased the overall errors as the aircraft had to
stay in formation rather than change course according to what
the bomb sight was reporting.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The attack was planed to be by a kilometer sized wing line of bombers
"abreast".

The special 6 element formations were different to the usual formations
but each group had a target, not each wing. The formations were 18 to
36 aircraft.

Only 8 groups had been equipped with H2X in June, it was up to 11 in
July. Hence the problems in providing pathfinders.

The final check for an 8th Air Force H2X strike was about 12 miles from
the target to give an idea of the scope for error.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
If all went right it creates a rectangular box of bomb
impacts.

Even if it goes wrong the bomb impacts usually mimic the size
and shape of the formation dropping the bombs.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I know of no other case were such a super wing formation
was used. The normal formation of the 8th AF was a box with the
intention to hit much smaller size targets than 1 km,

Ok we can all see here the beach is still considered the target,
not the ones the bombers were actually after. A 1 km wide wing
front is now claimed to be a 1 km wide target.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
more in the
100 m size or even less. I do not think we can compare that.

Are you really that ignorant of the airspace requirements for heavy
bombers?

The "more compact" version of an 18 bomber formation in April 1943
was 1,138 feet wide by 640 feet deep by 900 feet high. The 36 aircraft
formation of 1945 was 1,170 feet by 800 feet deep by 1,050 feet high.

The 8th air force went around in group formations.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Another point was the danger to hit own troops. We know from the
British Bomber Command at Normandy that the bombers did no "creep
back" (early release by late arivers) of their drop point from the
target point. They did it in city raids in Germany but not here.
That affects the accuracy statistic a lot too.

Has anyone else here noted the failure to understand what the
water line was and how using it effected friendly fire possibilities.

And as for creep back Bomber Command did better when doing
several tactical support missions in Normandy but did not eliminate
it.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Stephen Graham

2015-08-27 05:50:50 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
I will observe again that you don't have a good idea of the relative
accuracy of World War Two level bombing. Go read up about CEP (Circular
Error Probability) and think about it.

You mean the CEP of a whole formation.

So we have the next retreat, rather than understanding the known bomber
accuracy we are treated to another change of subject. No thinking.

It seems that in addition to a fundamental misunderstanding regarding
level bomber accuracy, there is a lack of understanding of why the heavy
bombers were used.

As I understand matters, it was more a matter of finding a possibly
useful role for the heavies in direct support of the landing rather than
a belief that they were particularly suited for the task of defeating
the coastal fortifications. Accuracy, training, and the nature of the
fortifications made it unlikely that substantial damage would be done.
But there might be some positive effect, so give it a try.

Incidentally, do you happen to know the bomb load makeup for these
sorties? I would imagine that it was a mix of 500 pound and 250 pound GP
bombs. Is that generally correct?

Rich

2015-08-27 14:43:06 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
Incidentally, do you happen to know the bomb load makeup for these
sorties? I would imagine that it was a mix of 500 pound and 250 pound GP
bombs. Is that generally correct?

Stephen,

Of 1361 heavy bombers dispatched, 1038 attacked, releasing 2944 tons
of bombs. On the beach installations 1015 of the 1198 bombers dispatched
attacked assigned targets with 17,639 x 100 HE, 5,076 x 500 HE, 146 x 1000
HE and 503 x 120 Fragmentation. At Caen 47 of the 163 aircraft dispatched
carried out their attacks as planned, dropping 526 x 500 HE and 83 x 1000 HE.

Most were instantaneous fuzed. Almost all the 500 and 1000-lb HE were
intended for the two missions against artillery positions further inland.

Cheers!

Stephen Graham

2015-08-27 16:09:48 UTC

Post by Rich
Of 1361 heavy bombers dispatched, 1038 attacked, releasing 2944 tons
of bombs. On the beach installations 1015 of the 1198 bombers dispatched
attacked assigned targets with 17,639 x 100 HE, 5,076 x 500 HE, 146 x 1000
HE and 503 x 120 Fragmentation. At Caen 47 of the 163 aircraft dispatched
carried out their attacks as planned, dropping 526 x 500 HE and 83 x 1000 HE.
Most were instantaneous fuzed. Almost all the 500 and 1000-lb HE were
intended for the two missions against artillery positions further inland.

Really? 1000-lb HE against the artillery positions? I realize that the
artillery positions were dug in. And reminded by Geoffrey's post, the
larger bombs increased the net weight carried. But the inverse cube
ratio means that the additional explosive delivered doesn't yield as
much in the (comparative) open. I'm not sure that a direct hit with a
1000-lb bomb is going to do all that much more to an artillery position
than a direct hit with a 500-lb bomb. Otherwise, more noise and the
crater will be a bit larger.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-27 16:48:49 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham

Really? 1000-lb HE against the artillery positions? I realize that the
artillery positions were dug in. And reminded by Geoffrey's post, the
larger bombs increased the net weight carried. But the inverse cube ratio
means that the additional explosive delivered doesn't yield as much in the
(comparative) open. I'm not sure that a direct hit with a 1000-lb bomb is
going to do all that much more to an artillery position than a direct hit
with a 500-lb bomb. Otherwise, more noise and the crater will be a bit
larger.

Agreed in the open the difference is unlikely to be great. However
some of the batteries did have protection. Not exactly sure of the
details.

The RAF night attacks on 5/6 June dropped around 8,600 by 1,000
pound and 6,000 by 500 pound bombs on the 10 batteries they were
assigned.

The 6/7 June interdiction attacks (road and rail) dropped 169 by 1,000
pound and over 15,000 by 500 pound bombs.

So it does look like someone thought 1,000 pound bombs would
be of use against the artillery positions.

Also the same point about bomb sizes applies, the following are
tonnages for the Lancasters, Halifaxes and Mosquitoes, including
pathfinders which dropped markers instead of or in addition to HE

5/6 June, 10 targets, 1,053 attacking, 5,198 long tons of HE

6/7 June, 9 targets, 967 attacking, 3,467 long tons HE

The Mosquitoes sent to Germany on the two nights largely dropped
4,000 pound bombs and are not counted above.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-27 22:16:06 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Also the same point about bomb sizes applies, the following are
tonnages for the Lancasters, Halifaxes and Mosquitoes, including
pathfinders which dropped markers instead of or in addition to HE
5/6 June, 10 targets, 1,053 attacking, 5,198 long tons of HE

4.94 tons per aircraft?

Even if the entire force was Lancasters, that seems
very high. But I suppose it's barely possible, especially
on a relatively short-range mission.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
6/7 June, 9 targets, 967 attacking, 3,467 long tons HE

3.59 tons per aircraft - this seems more
reasonable. Why a 38% difference, though?

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-28 16:41:13 UTC

4.94 tons per aircraft?
Even if the entire force was Lancasters, that seems
very high. But I suppose it's barely possible, especially
on a relatively short-range mission.

Barely possible? The maximum bomb load for a standard Lancaster
was 14,000 pounds, while it was 13,000 pounds for the Halifax III which
was the main version in use in mid 1944.

Or 6.25 and 5.8 long tons (2,240 pounds each) respectively.

Ranges with maximum bomb load 1,660 and 1,030 miles respectively
according to the RAAF official history.

By the way the average bomb load for the Lancaster for WWII was
around 4.5 long tons.

The following are from the daily intelligence reports, which are close
but not exactly the same as the official bomb tonnage figures,
note some sortie totals have been changed and the pathfinder
Lancasters are now reported separately to the bomber Lancasters
compared to the last time I posted the data. All Mosquitoes are
pathfinders and they only dropped target indicators. Aircraft reported
missing are assumed to have bombed their target, aircraft with
outstanding reports are counted as not bombing.

Crisbecq (name change) 92 out of 96 Lancasters, 2 of 5 Mosquitoes,
10/10 thin cloud. Bombing on Target Indicator reflections through
the cloud. West of Utah beach. The Lancasters dropped 12,978
pounds of HE on average per bomber

Houlgate, 102 out of 106 Halifaxes, 5 of 5 pathfinder Lancasters,
4 of 5 Mosquitoes, marking appears to have been rather
scattered. East of Sword beach. The Lancasters dropped an
average of 10,900 pounds HE plus target indicators, the
Halifaxes dropped 8,559 pounds on average per bomber.

La Pernelle,108 out of 122 Lancasters, 8 of 9 Mosquitoes,
bombed through 6-10/10 cloud, first markers scattered,
remarking was successful. (Well) North and West of Utah beach.
The Lancasters dropped target indicators and HE (they were
from 5 group), 12,287 pounds of HE on average per bomber

Longues, 92 of 94 Lancasters (1 pathfinder missing), 4 of 5
Mosquitoes, 9/10 cloud prevailed, markers somewhat scattered,
bombing lacked a good concentration. Between Omaha and
Gold beaches. The 68 Lancasters from the pathfinder units
dropped 12,559 pounds of HE on average per bomber plus
target indicators, the 24 Lancasters from bomber units 14,417
pounds. Either there in an error in the figures or the Canadians
were up to something, by the looks of things their load was
usually 14 by 1,000 pound plus 1 by 500 pound HE, all up they
dropped 334 by 1,000 pound and 24 by 500 pound HE.

By the way Wiki says the RAF dropped around 1,500 tons of
bombs on Longues, the RAF says 535.7 long tons.

Maisy, 100 out of 105 Halifaxes (1 report outstanding), 5 of 5
pathfinder Lancasters, 5 of 5 Mosquitoes. Good weather,
8-10/10 cloud at 17-20,000 feet, 2-3/10 cloud at 5-6,000 feet.
About half way between Omaha and Utah beaches. The
Lancasters dropped an average of 10,900 pounds HE plus
target indicators the Halifaxes dropped 11,220 pounds on
average per bomber.

Merville/Franceville, 70 out of 86 Halifaxes, 10 out of 13 Lancasters
plus 5 out of 5 pathfinder Lancasters, 3 of 5 Mosquitoes. 10/10 cloud,
markers disappeared into the cloud and crews bombed on the glow
beneath. Assessment of the results impossible. East of Sword beach.
The Halifaxes dropped 8,229 pounds on average per bomber. The 5
pathfinder Lancasters dropped an average of 10,900 pounds (as well
as target indicators) the other Lancasters dropped 13,000 pounds on
average per bomber.

Mont Fleury, 101 out of 114 Halifaxes (2 missing, 2 reports outstanding),
5 of 5 Pathfinder Lancasters, 5 of 5 Mosquitoes, through 10/10 cloud at
9,000 feet. Bombed on glow of target indicators. Gold Beach. The
Lancasters dropped an average of 10,700 pounds HE plus target
indicators the Halifaxes dropped 10,985 pounds on average per bomber.

Ouistreham, 105 out of 106 Lancasters (1 report outstanding), 5 out
of 5 pathfinder Lancasters, 3 out of 5 Mosquitoes, thin patchy cloud
allowed some visual identification. Sword beach. The 5 pathfinder
Lancasters dropped an average of 10,900 pounds of HE (as well as
target indicators) the other Lancasters dropped 11,710 pounds on
average per bomber.

Pointe du Hoe/St. Pierre du Mont, 108 of 115 Lancasters (3 missing),
7 of 9 Mosquitoes, attacked through 5-10/10 cloud. Just west of Omaha.
The Lancasters dropped target indicators and HE (they were from 5
group), 12,884 pounds of HE on average per bomber

St. Martin-de-Varreville, 94 out of 95 Lancasters, 5 of 5 Mosquitoes
through 10/10 cloud. Bombing on Target Indicator reflections through
the cloud. Utah beach. The Lancasters dropped 12,989 pounds HE
on average per bomber.

Remember individual groups had their own ideas on bomb loadings,
plus any variation in the targets.

8,662 by 1,000 pound (1,685 USA made, 6,396 medium case, 581
general purpose) and 5,987 by 500 pound bombs (510 USA made,
1,860 medium case, 3,596 general purpose) or 5,198.4 long tons.
Plus 12 by 1,000 pound and 214 by 500 pound target indicators,
of these the Lancasters dropped a total of 12 by 1,000 pound and 40
by 250 pound target indicators, not a great deal in tonnage terms
but note they were dropped as required, leaving open the probability
some of the TI carried were not used.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
6/7 June, 9 targets, 967 attacking, 3,467 long tons HE

3.59 tons per aircraft - this seems more
reasonable. Why a 38% difference, though?

For the reason I gave to Stephen, when it came to bomb tonnage
the heavy bombers carrying small bombs meant the bombers
tended to run out of bomb bay room and/or shackles well before
hitting the weight limit.

Look at the change in the mix of bomb weights between the two nights.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-28 18:59:13 UTC

"Geoffrey Sinclair" <***@froggy.com.au> wrote:

Thanks for the detailed information.

when it came to bomb tonnage the heavy bombers
carrying small bombs meant the bombers tended to run
out of bomb bay room and/or shackles well before
hitting the weight limit.

Not at all surprising. Was there any "cluster
bomb" project during the war? I.e. a large
casing containing multiple small bombs which
would disperse in flight? ISTR that that
technique was used with incendiary bombs.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Rich

2015-08-28 19:58:57 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Not at all surprising. Was there any "cluster
bomb" project during the war? I.e. a large
casing containing multiple small bombs which
would disperse in flight? ISTR that that
technique was used with incendiary bombs.

Yes, there was a 4-lb Frag, 23-lb Para-Frag, a 20-lb Frag, a
30-lb Frag, and a 90-lb Frag. However, only the 20 and 23-lb
were manufactured prior to January 1944 and were what was used
on D-Day. Six 20-lb Frag made up the "100"-lb AN-M1 Cluster Frag,
three 23-lb Para-Frag the "100-lb" AN-M4A1 Para-Cluster.
Confusingly, the AN-M1 was often called a "120"-lb Cluster
Frag in operational documents, even though its nomenclature was
"100-lbs" ..and even though it actually weighed 128 pounds. :)

The incendiary was a standard 500-lb cluster munition, but the
bomblets were 2, 4, or 6-lb (and a 10-lb manufactured in 1945).
There were also a small number of 500-lb magnesium bombs built.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-28 20:08:49 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Was there any "cluster
bomb" project during the war? I.e. a large
casing containing multiple small bombs which
would disperse in flight? ISTR that that
technique was used with incendiary bombs.

The USAAF packaged fragmentation bombs as well.

As far as I know there were no cluster HE bombs, not
surprising given the fusing and dispersal problems
modern cluster bombs have plus the overall weight of
the bombs versus the bomb lift and bomb bay room of
even the heavy bombers.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich

2015-08-27 17:03:27 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
Really? 1000-lb HE against the artillery positions?

Yep, although "artillery positions" is my shorthand. As I recall, almost
all of the 500 and 1,000-lb loads were used in the missions against Point
et Raz de la Percee, Hamel au Pretre, Cabourg, and Port en Bessin (east).
Those were also the only missions using fuze delay. All were either
inland or on the far flanks of the beaches where the heavier bombs were
even less likely to cause friendly fire losses.

What is interesting is that 11 specified targets were attacked, but the
First Army NEPTUNE "Prearranged Air and Naval Bombardment Plan" targeted
15 "defense localities" on OMAHA beach for bombing out of 18 defense
localities identified on the beach and 15 adjacent to the beach. Which
of course is many more than the 15 WN actually there.

Rich

2015-08-27 17:18:33 UTC

Post by Rich
What is interesting is that 11 specified targets were attacked

Sorry, but that should have been "13" specified targets rather than
11.

Stephen Graham

2015-08-27 18:57:31 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
Really? 1000-lb HE against the artillery positions?

Hmm. Admittedly I don't have a good idea of what those positions had.
And I'm also uncertain of how much cast concrete the standard 1000-lb
bomb could penetrate. At a certain thickness, the bomb would essentially
bounce before exploding. That would be something to see but I think I'll
pass on the opportunity. Otherwise, you're hoping that the bomb
penetrates something comparatively softer immediately adjacent to the
item of interest.

As Geoffrey points out, 1000-lb bombs were used on the transportation
targets with the expectation that an underground/structure internal
explosion would be more effective.

Post by Rich
What is interesting is that 11 specified targets were attacked, but the
First Army NEPTUNE "Prearranged Air and Naval Bombardment Plan" targeted
15 "defense localities" on OMAHA beach for bombing out of 18 defense
localities identified on the beach and 15 adjacent to the beach. Which
of course is many more than the 15 WN actually there.

Well, either bad photo interpretation or an excess of caution in
identifying targets.

Rich

2015-08-27 22:19:31 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
Hmm. Admittedly I don't have a good idea of what those positions had.
And I'm also uncertain of how much cast concrete the standard 1000-lb
bomb could penetrate. At a certain thickness, the bomb would essentially
bounce before exploding. That would be something to see but I think I'll
pass on the opportunity. Otherwise, you're hoping that the bomb
penetrates something comparatively softer immediately adjacent to the
item of interest.

Well, even as the small port it was Port en Bessin was considered a
port so was pretty heavily fortified. Point et Raz de la Percee was a
Luftwaffe radar site like Douvres and was pretty well built.

Yes, the AF already knew that the HE bombs would at best bounce. At
worst the case ruptured and the result was a low order detonation or
even just a deflagration. The SAP bombs did little better and were
rarely used. The only ones that were likely to do much were the 1,600
AP, but they were mostly used for ship targets.

Unfortunately, these were only suspicions derived from photo analysis
of various targets. The real evidence for how resistant reinforced
concrete was derived from Ordnance tests...the results of which were
not published until August 1945.

Post by Stephen Graham
As Geoffrey points out, 1000-lb bombs were used on the transportation
targets with the expectation that an underground/structure internal
explosion would be more effective.

Probably. I think they assessed those four targets as "harder".

Post by Stephen Graham
Well, either bad photo interpretation or an excess of caution in
identifying targets.

Not at all...more likely laziness on my part for not plotting the
target coordinates onto the defenses. The target list details what
they saw...but just how it corresponds to the reality I don't know.
The 18 plotted "defense localities" may be the same as the 15 WN or
the 15 targeted "defense localities" may be. I don't know.

Kenneth Young

2015-08-28 14:44:59 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
At a certain thickness, the bomb would essentially
bounce before exploding.

High capacity bombs had no penetrative ability. There is a need to
distinguish between anti-concrete bombs with delay fuses and
instantaneously fused anti-personal bombs. The former went up to 10 tons
in weight though that was only used against specialist targets like
U-Boat pens and the Tirpitz. The heaviest AP bomb in general use was IIRC
one ton. Note the B17 was limited in the maximum individual bomb size
carried as structural members went through the bomb bay. I have no idea
of the types of bombs dropped during D-day though Rich may have a
breakdown but any bombs without delay fuses are unlikely to damage
bunkers.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-28 16:39:44 UTC

Post by Kenneth Young
High capacity bombs had no penetrative ability.

Agreed.

The 12,000 pound Tallboy was classified as a medium case bomb,
as, I believe, was the 22,000 pound Grand Slam.

Post by Kenneth Young
The heaviest AP bomb in general use was IIRC
one ton.

Yes, Bomber Command had a 2,000 pound AP and dropped under
2,500 of them for the war.

The USAAF had a 1,600 and a 500 pound AP bomb as well as
1,000 and 500 pounds semi AP. In order 1,122, 4, 16,220 and
30,915 dropped in the European and Mediterranean theatres,
out of 6,284,271 bombs dropped.

Post by Kenneth Young
Note the B17 was limited in the maximum individual bomb size
carried as structural members went through the bomb bay.

Yes, the bomb bay was optimised for 8 by 1,600 pound AP
bombs from its conception as an anti shipping bomber and had
a V shaped central bulkhead, effectively splitting the bomb bay
into two compartments and so reducing the volume available.
This seems to have meant the maximum internal HE load in
WWII was 6,000 pounds. The B-24 had the same AP load but
could carry 8,000 pounds of HE internally.

Post by Kenneth Young
I have no idea
of the types of bombs dropped during D-day though Rich may have a
breakdown but any bombs without delay fuses are unlikely to damage
bunkers.

Delay fuse plus some ability to penetrate hard targets without
breaking up.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich

2015-08-28 16:47:45 UTC

Post by Kenneth Young
High capacity bombs had no penetrative ability.

Yep. Typically, striking an armor or reinforced concrete target
resulted in the case rupturing before the fuze actuated, resulting
in a low-order detonation, deflagration, or dud. Sometimes nose
instantaneously-fuzed bombs still failed and would "bounce", so
then exploding somewhere else...if the fuze worked (usually a tail
delay fuze was added to ensure something happened).

Post by Kenneth Young
There is a need to
distinguish between anti-concrete bombs with delay fuses and
instantaneously fused anti-personal bombs. The former went up to 10 tons
in weight though that was only used against specialist targets like
U-Boat pens and the Tirpitz. The heaviest AP bomb in general use was IIRC
one ton. Note the B17 was limited in the maximum individual bomb size
carried as structural members went through the bomb bay. I have no idea
of the types of bombs dropped during D-day though Rich may have a
breakdown but any bombs without delay fuses are unlikely to damage
bunkers.

For the USAAF in World War II, the types were:

General Purpose (GP), usually called an "HE" bomb:

100-lb
250-lb
500-lb
1,000-lb
2,000-lb

Light Case (LC), adapted from the British "cookie""

4,000-lb

Semi-Armor Piercing (SAP)

500-lb
1,000-lb

Armor-Piercing (AP):

1,000-lb
1,600-lb

The B-24H/J's on the OMAHA mission could carry:

2 x 4,000-lb bombs internally or;
4 x 2,000-lb bombs internally or;
8 x 1,000-lb bombs internally or;
16 x 500-lb bombs internally or;
52 x 100-lb bombs internally or:
Up to 2 x 4,000-lb bombs externally

B-17F/G's was:
2 x 4,000-lb externally and;
2 x 2,000-lb externally or;
2 x 1,600-lb externally or;
2 x 1,000-lb externally and;
8 x 1,600-lb internally or;
8 x 1,000-lb internally or;
12 x 500-lb internally or;
16 x 250-lb internally or;
24 x 100-lb internally

To a max load of:
(pre-external fitting) 9,600-lb
(post-external fitting) 17,600-lb
(extraordinary circumstances) 20,800-lb consisting of:

8 x 1,600-lb and 2 x 4,000-lb

Rich

2015-08-28 16:55:50 UTC

On Friday, August 28, 2015 at 12:47:46 PM UTC-4, Rich wrote:

Correction!

B-17F/G's was:
2 x 4,000-lb externally ***or*** (not "and");
2 x 2,000-lb externally or;
2 x 1,600-lb externally or;
2 x 1,000-lb externally and;
8 x 1,600-lb internally or;
8 x 1,000-lb internally or;
12 x 500-lb internally or;
16 x 250-lb internally or;
24 x 100-lb internally

Sorry!

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-28 19:57:59 UTC

Rich <***@msn.com> wrote:

Thanks for all the detail

To a max load of... (extraordinary circumstances)
20,800-lb consisting of: 8 x 1,600-lb and 2 x 4,000-lb

Good God!!

I'd heard of 12,800 lb as a "max overload",
but 20,800!

It's unfortunate that my father passed away
two years ago. He was a B-17 bombardier, and
his usual load (for missions over Germany)
was 6 x 500 lb.

He arrived in England a few weeks after D-Day,
but he flew the COBRA carpet-bombing mission -
where I would think the bomb-loads were maximal.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Rich

2015-08-28 20:30:04 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Good God!!

Post by Rich Rostrom
I'd heard of 12,800 lb as a "max overload",
but 20,800!

It was noted by Joe Baugher that it severely restricted range.
I suspect it may only mean a combat range of 100 miles or so.
Somewhere I used to have the fuel-bomb-range trade off matrix
for the B-17. The B-17E with 4,000-lb bombload had a range of
2,000 miles = a combat radius of c. 666 miles. The F with a
6,000-lb bombload had a 1,300 mile range. The G with a 4,000-lb
bombload had a range of 1,850 miles.

Post by Rich Rostrom
It's unfortunate that my father passed away
two years ago. He was a B-17 bombardier, and
his usual load (for missions over Germany)
was 6 x 500 lb.

I am sorry to hear that. My Dad died nine years ago this
October...long before I realized all the questions I should
have asked him.

Post by Rich Rostrom
He arrived in England a few weeks after D-Day,
but he flew the COBRA carpet-bombing mission -
where I would think the bomb-loads were maximal.

The 1,508 heavy bombers attacking in COBRA dropped a total
of 3,395 tons of bombs. They were to carry 70% 100-lb GP
and 30% Frags.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-28 20:08:08 UTC

100-lb, 250-lb, 500-lb, 1,000-lb, 2,000-lb

European theatre, bombs actually dropped by the USAAF

4,500 pound, listed as HE.

600 pound

500 pound Russian (Shuttle mission anyone?)

350 pound (probably another non US origin)

40 pound.

Light Case (LC), adapted from the British "cookie""
4,000-lb

None dropped in Europe, some used against Japan (The
list of bombs dropped against Japan has it own set of
oddities).

Semi-Armor Piercing (SAP)
500-lb, 1,000-lb
1,000-lb, 1,600-lb
2 x 4,000-lb bombs internally or;

Are you sure of this, I thought the bombs were too big to fit
into the bomb bay, Roger Freeman reports the 8th Air Force
received some M56 4,000 pound bombs and the B-24 could
not carry it internally, experiments were done using the B-17
wing racks. No reports of the B-24 using or trying 4,000 pound
bombs. I thought the 1,200 by 4,000 pound bombs the USAAF
reports dropping against Japan in 1945 were all from B-29.

4 x 2,000-lb bombs internally or; 8 x 1,000-lb bombs internally or;
Up to 2 x 4,000-lb bombs externally

Never heard of B-24 carrying 4,000 pound external bombs, any idea
of when it was tried?

2 x 4,000-lb externally OR; 2 x 2,000-lb externally or;
2 x 1,600-lb externally or;
2 x 1,000-lb externally and; 8 x 1,600-lb internally or;
8 x 1,000-lb internally or 12 x 500-lb internally or;
16 x 250-lb internally or; 24 x 100-lb internally

This is one thing I have been trying to confirm for a while now, are
you sure of the 8 x 1,000 pound internal option, the bomb bay
diagram I have indicates it was 6 x 1,000 pounds as a maximum,
the 1,000 pound HE had a noticeably bigger diameter than the
1,600 pound AP bomb.

There were 42 shackle positions in the bomb bay, the 1,600 pound
bombs used numbers 8, 11, 16, 20, 29, 32, 37, and 41, of these
numbers 11 and 32 were on the fuselage wall, the rest on the V
shaped central bulkhead.

The 1,000 pound bombs use the same central bulkhead shackles
as the 1,600 pound AP ones but their diameter meant there was no
room to use numbers 11 and 32.

By the way shackles 10 and 31 on the central bulkhead are used for
2,000 pound bombs. Over and above the room for the bombs is the
requirement the shackle can handle the weight.

(pre-external fitting) 9,600-lb

I thought it was 12,800 pounds maximum internal, the 8x1,600 AP bombs.

(post-external fitting) 17,600-lb

Widely quoted as maximum bomb load.

8 x 1,600-lb and 2 x 4,000-lb

This is one of those did they ever fly it moments, as opposed to theory.
With around 29,500 pounds total military load in the late B-17G, 21,000
pounds of bombs plus crew plus ammunition does not exactly leave a
lot of weight for fuel. The 10,000 pounds lighter maximum weight B-17F
used about 2,000 pounds of fuel for take off and climb to 25,000 feet,
10 crew, parachutes and oxygen would be another 2,000 plus pounds.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich

2015-08-28 20:45:19 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Are you sure of this,

Nope. :) The sources for bomb loads tend to be either
very generalized or very schematic or suspiciously
detailed with oddities and assumptions built in...
or all of the above. :) I've been trying to find the
B-17 loading chart without success. :(

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Never heard of B-24 carrying 4,000 pound external bombs, any idea
of when it was tried?

Nope, it may just have been bad data.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
This is one thing I have been trying to confirm for a while now, are
you sure of the 8 x 1,000 pound internal option, the bomb bay
diagram I have indicates it was 6 x 1,000 pounds as a maximum,
the 1,000 pound HE had a noticeably bigger diameter than the
1,600 pound AP bomb.

The same WRT the B-17 loads. I suspect that it was a transcription
error from 6 x 1,000 or 8 X 1,600 to 8 for each.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I thought it was 12,800 pounds maximum internal, the 8x1,600 AP bombs.

It's from Joe Baugher, who is usually reliable. Six 1,600-lb?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Widely quoted as maximum bomb load.

Yep.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
This is one of those did they ever fly it moments, as opposed to theory.

:) I suspect if they got it off the ground they dumped them as soon
as decently possible and then RTB. :) Here is what he says:

"Beginning with B-17F-30-BO, B-17F-20-DL, and B-17F-20-VE, external
bomb racks were fitted under the inner wings for the carriage of two 4000-pounds bombs. This brought the maximum short-range bombload to
17,600 pounds. Under certain conditions, eight 1600-pound bombs could
be carried internally and two 4000-pound bombs externally, raising
the total load to 20,800 pounds. However, with such a load the
effective range was quite small and all maneuvers were severely
restricted. Consequently, external bombs were only rarely carried
by the B-17F. Although all subsequent models had lugs and controls
for their attachment, the underwing racks were not installed at
the factory."

Rich

2015-08-28 21:44:47 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
This is one of those did they ever fly it moments, as opposed to theory.

Ah-hah! It gets more complicated, I have found the bomb load charts
for the 17-F and G and, lo and behold, they dropped two of the 1,600
bomb points in the G. Apparently then it was the late F models they
tried the 20,800-lb bomb load. If I read the 17F manual correctly, that
means at max takeoff weight of 65,000-lb and zero reserve, it had a
max range of 300 miles. So a combat radius of c. 100 miles - or less.
It was also restricted to the fields it could use and generally looks
like a dicey idea.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-30 19:28:05 UTC

Putting the two into one.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Are you sure of this,

B-17 bomb bay arrangement, looking towards the nose. 4 Racks,
from left to right, bottom to top, first rack has shackles 1 to 4 and
11 to 14, second rack 5 to 10 and 15 to 21, third rack shackles
26 to 31 and 36 to 42, fourth rack shackles 22 to 25 and 32 to 35.
The arrangement is symmetric, so 1 to 4 are "opposite" to 22 to
25 and so on.

100 pound bombs, shackles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, repeat
for right had side.

300 bound bombs shackles 2, 4, 6, 9, 13, 16, 19, 21, repeat for right
hand side.

500 pound bombs, shackles 2, 7, 10, 11, 18, 21, repeat for right had side,

1,000 pound bombs shackles 8, 16, 20, repeat for right had side,

1,600 pound bombs shackles 8, 11, 16, 20, 29, 32, 37, 41.

For 2,000 pound bombs shackles 10 and 31.

So while units could probably be creative the data suggests 6,000
pounds was the limit for the internal HE bomb load of a B-17.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Never heard of B-24 carrying 4,000 pound external bombs, any idea
of when it was tried?

Nope, it may just have been bad data.

Or an idea given they would not fit in the bomb bay but I have never heard
of a B-24 external bomb rack.

As for the B-24 the bomb bays do not feature in many of the published
photographs but it had a centreline bulkhead, essentially the fuselage
floor centre line strength girder kept going through the bomb bays, you
can see it if the bomb doors are open and the camera is level or slightly
above the B-24 in question, so essentially making four separate bomb
compartments, which means the 2,000 pound HE bomb was the biggest
HE bomb that could fit internally.

The same WRT the B-17 loads. I suspect that it was a transcription
error from 6 x 1,000 or 8 X 1,600 to 8 for each.

Possible.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I thought it was 12,800 pounds maximum internal, the 8x1,600 AP bombs.

It's from Joe Baugher, who is usually reliable. Six 1,600-lb?

Yes Joe is usually reliable.

I note 17,600 pounds would be 6x1,600 and 2x4,000 while 20,800 pounds
would be 8x1,600 and 2x4,000.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Widely quoted as maximum bomb load.

Yep.

So it seems like someone did a test and it became the new maximum
load even though it essentially left little for crew and fuel.

If you like the weight allowance for the wing "Tokyo Tanks" fitted into
later
F models being used for bombs.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
This is one of those did they ever fly it moments, as opposed to theory.

:) I suspect if they got it off the ground they dumped them as soon
"Beginning with B-17F-30-BO, B-17F-20-DL, and B-17F-20-VE, external
bomb racks were fitted under the inner wings for the carriage of two 4000
pounds bombs. This brought the maximum short-range bombload to
17,600 pounds. Under certain conditions, eight 1600-pound bombs could
be carried internally and two 4000-pound bombs externally, raising
the total load to 20,800 pounds. However, with such a load the
effective range was quite small and all maneuvers were severely
restricted. Consequently, external bombs were only rarely carried
by the B-17F. Although all subsequent models had lugs and controls
for their attachment, the underwing racks were not installed at
the factory."

There was at least one mission where the B-17 external racks were used
by the 8th Air Force.

part 2.

Post by Rich
Ah-hah! It gets more complicated, I have found the bomb load charts
for the 17-F and G and, lo and behold, they dropped two of the 1,600
bomb points in the G.

Where are the charts located?

Post by Rich
Apparently then it was the late F models they
tried the 20,800-lb bomb load. If I read the 17F manual correctly, that
means at max takeoff weight of 65,000-lb and zero reserve, it had a
max range of 300 miles. So a combat radius of c. 100 miles - or less.
It was also restricted to the fields it could use and generally looks
like a dicey idea.

Eliminating shackles 11 and 32 does not seem to be correct as they are
used for 500 as well as 1,600 pound bombs.

Yes the late F models were cleared to 65,500 pounds.

I think the answer is 12,800 pounds internal, made up of 8x1,600 pound AP
bombs, if Joe is correct then this was reduced in some versions to 6x1,600
pound. For HE it was 6,000 pounds, though see the RAF figures below.

Experiments with external racks meant up to 20,800 pounds could be taken
into the air in the F (the G weighed over a short ton more empty) but that
is
really an extreme trade off in the fuel/bomb load table, out of around
31,500
pounds of useful load.

Now a Lancaster I/III special, 36,000 pounds of load, 22,000 pounds of Grand
Slam, leaves 14,000 pounds, it has less crew and guns so say a pair of
external
2,000 pound bombs and it can join the B-17 bombing the next door airfield.

So the B-17 fights back by ditching its guns and turrets and so on. The RAF
finally tries catapulting heavy bombers to help cut fuel needs.

The RAF report on the Fortress I, B-17C, put the maximum bomb load at
7,400 pounds of bombs, alternative loads were 2x2,000 pound, 4x1,100
pound and 8x600 pound. So at 53,500 pounds loaded weight, with 7,400
pounds of bombs it took 37 minutes to climb to 30,000 feet at which it
could cruise at 240 mph for a total range of 1,900 miles. By the looks of
it maximum fuel load of 2,075 imperial gallons meant no bombs.

Roger Freeman has the YB-17, B-17A and B-17B credited with 8,000
pounds of bombs (4x2,000) but some carried externally. The C, D and
E are down to 2x2,000 pound.

The F at 9,600 pounds internal, 8,000 pounds external and the G the same
but in another book has the G maximum load at 13,800 pounds.

United States Military Aircraft has the YB-17 to C model maximum load at
10,496 pounds, the E onwards at 17,600 pounds.

The RAAF official history has the Fortress II (B-17F) having a range of
840 miles with 12,800 pounds of bombs, the mark III ups the range to
1,140 miles.

And I have not gone near the web sites where there are stories of 8,000
pound bomb loads in B-17 and 12,000 pounds in B-24.

http://www.91stbombgroup.com/Dailies/401st1944.html

Has some 16x500 pound bomb loads on 27 April 1944 to La Glacerie
and Richard Davis reports the 28 aircraft that attacked dropped an
average of over 7,800 pounds, in fact most of the attacks that day
dropped around 8,000 pounds per bomber, at Heudire the 7 attacking
aircraft dropped an average of 10,857 pounds. There were 2 B-17 to
each B-24 in the bomber force. The anti V1 raids were the place to use
external racks.

There is a photograph of the 410th squadron, 94th Bomb Group from
the July to November 1943 period with a pair of 1,000 pound bombs
on external racks, it looks like they could almost put 2 of the bombs on
each rack, so certainly 2x500 would fit if the rack allowed 2 bombs.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-29 19:54:30 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
the 1,000 pound HE had a noticeably bigger diameter than the
1,600 pound AP bomb.

Was that because of the heavier case on
the AP bomb? Steel would be denser than
explosive. Or was it just configuration,
i.e. the AP had an elongated shape and
narrower diameter for better penetration
of a "hard" target.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-30 19:28:11 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
the 1,000 pound HE had a noticeably bigger diameter than the
1,600 pound AP bomb.

Was that because of the heavier case on the AP bomb? Steel would
be denser than explosive. Or was it just configuration, i.e. the AP had
an elongated shape and narrower diameter for better penetration
of a "hard" target.

Both, more steel and a narrower diameter. Apart from the penetration
advantages/needs it would also enable a higher terminal velocity, which
again would help penetration.

Yes, explosive is a lot less dense than steel.

Quoting rules can require padding.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Mario

2015-08-30 19:28:29 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
the 1,000 pound HE had a noticeably bigger diameter than the
1,600 pound AP bomb.

Axial section pictures would be welcome.

Naval AP were very metal thick with a little explosive core
inside.

I suppose GP (HE) bombs had the least metal envelope and the
most explosive core possible.

Steel doesn't explode, and is much heavier than TNT.

--
oiram

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-27 14:48:27 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
It seems that in addition to a fundamental misunderstanding regarding
level bomber accuracy, there is a lack of understanding of why the heavy
bombers were used.

Yes, while some clearly hoped for good results the evidence was
clear bombing the sort of beach defences opposing Overlord was
unlikely to do very much to them. Even more so if light bombs and
instant fuses were to be used to avoid major cratering.

Post by Stephen Graham
As I understand matters, it was more a matter of finding a possibly useful
role for the heavies in direct support of the landing rather than a belief
that they were particularly suited for the task of defeating the coastal
fortifications. Accuracy, training, and the nature of the fortifications
made it unlikely that substantial damage would be done. But there might be
some positive effect, so give it a try.

I suspect that is the rational answer, I also suspect the bomber
commanders were willing to do the mission in the hope some good
could result but also reluctant to do it because of the expected
results versus what some people hoped would be the results, even
more so as the weather deteriorated.

Post by Stephen Graham
Incidentally, do you happen to know the bomb load makeup for these
sorties? I would imagine that it was a mix of 500 pound and 250 pound GP
bombs. Is that generally correct?

As far as I know the 500 pound bomb was the upper limit, 250 pound,
100 pound HE plus fragmentation were the main bombs dropped on
the coastal targets.

If you look at the attacks on coastal installations the bomb loads were
2.4 to 3.6 short tons per attacking aircraft, four of the six defended
localities were attacked with HE and fragmentation, 3 to 1.9 tons
of bombs per bomber, the strong points 1.8 to 3 tons per bomber,
average load for all attacks was 2.7 short tons.

To use Richard Anderson's list,
OMAHA Targets (2nd Bomb Division)
Colleville sur Mer
Pt et Raz de la Percee
St Laurent sur Mer
Vierville sur Mer

These were in fact the 4 attacks that dropped fragmentation bombs,
on "Defended Localities", so even less chance to destroy anything
dug in, the 40 pound fragmentation bomb generally came as either
a 120 pound or 500 pound bundle. The second hand reports I have
are the B-24s assigned to Omaha dropped mostly 100 pound HE
bombs.

Davis figures, Mission 394, morning, location \ target type \ attacking \
HE \ frag \ total (short tons)

Colleville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 79 \ 168.0 \ 42.7 \
210.7
Pt. et Raz de la Percee \ T/T Defended Localities \ 23 \ 45.0 \ 25.0 \
70.0
St. Lauret-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 124 \ 168.2 \ 163.8 \
332.0
Vierville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 83 \ 155.4 \ 69.8 \ 225.2

Between 2 and 2.7 tons per bomber.

Generally the heavier the HE bombs, to at least 500 pounds, the
bigger the bomb load the B-17 and B-24 could carry, so the B-17
could carry 24 by 100 pound HE as a maximum internal load.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Stephen Graham

2015-08-27 16:49:21 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
Incidentally, do you happen to know the bomb load makeup for these
sorties? I would imagine that it was a mix of 500 pound and 250 pound
GP bombs. Is that generally correct?

These were in fact the 4 attacks that dropped fragmentation bombs,
on "Defended Localities", so even less chance to destroy anything
dug in, the 40 pound fragmentation bomb generally came as either
a 120 pound or 500 pound bundle. The second hand reports I have
are the B-24s assigned to Omaha dropped mostly 100 pound HE
bombs.

Thank you as well for the information.

Those bomb load combinations really reinforce the notion that the intent
is to take care of anything or anyone in the open or in very lightly
protected positions. Fragmentation bombs wouldn't do anything to
fortifications nor would 100-lb HE. A 500-lb direct hit would be
unpleasant. But these positions were built to stand up to naval fire and
artillery.

Rich

2015-08-24 14:45:49 UTC

Sorry for the long lines, but this mail client sucks.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
H-35 and H-16 means a delay of 0 and of 5 seconds.

No. Remember the "time slot" for the bombing attacks of the beach
defenses was set for H-25 to H-5? However, the H-5 ***only applied
for a visual attack.*** So zero visually was H-5, zero with H2X was
H-10.

So the missions dropping at H-16 were within six minutes of zero and
utilized a 30-second delay. Those dropping at H-35 were within 25 minutes
of zero so did not require a delay... ***EXCEPT THAT TIMING IS FOR THE
LAST OF 11 GROUPS THAT BOMBED*** So most of the groups applied a delay of
some sort. I suspect it became "30 seconds" in the general historical
narrative since that was easier than describing the actual delay used
by each of the 11 groups and then calculating an average.

The water line was NOT THE AIM POINT. The 11 TARGETS were the AIM POINT.
How is it that you fail to understand that? The water line was a REFERENCE
POINT used to CALCULATE the AIM POINT.

(Note the following two paragraphs are reversed in order from the original
in order to more clearly describe the method used.)

"This was the technique used on D-Day. Eighteen to thirty-six aircraft
were flown abreast with the H2X aircraft in the center of the formation.
H2X operators carried maps and scope photographs of the invasion coast.
Long familiarization with vertical and scope photographs of the English
and French coast lines enabled them to identify the shipping and
shoreline patterns in their H2X scopes."

"The coordination method is also the best for bombing through a complete overcast.
A number of check points are chosen along the penetration route.
As the aircraft flies over each one, the H2X operator identifies them in
his scope and transmits the data to the bombardier who makes the necessary
adjustments in his bomb-sight. When the aircraft is about twelve miles from
the target the H2X operator transmits a final check. Now the aircraft is
moving toward the target along a definite track. The bombardier transposes
these computations into a dropping angle which is set in the bomb-sight.
When the indices meet, the bombs release automatically. If a break in the clouds occurs,
a visual sighting at the last minute is possible and minor corrections can be made."

The coastline was simply the last checkpoint from which the aim point was
calculated.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So for me it means the 1952 Air Force report I cited (and you quoted from
Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945,
USAF Historical Division 1952
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090601-060.pdf
may simply be wrong. At least it is not in agreement with the other
very sparse sources we have.

No. Yet again, you are simply refusing to understand what it says. You are
also failing to understand the context in which it is said.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rich, dont blame me. The historical narrative of this most extraordinary
air operation in history is such badly screwed that only the original
secret reports of 1944 may be of any help. I think we have to read at
least 3 of the 5 I mentioned to get an idea what realy happened. As a
historian you must be eager to read this stuff, are you?

The narrative isn't badly screwed up. Your reading and interpretation of
the narrative is badly screwed up. Given that I - and others - have tried
to explain it numerous times, adding details every time, only to have you
repeat the errors you have just been corrected on, I can only assume it
is willful on your part. In other words, you appear to be trolling. So I
do blame you.

And yes, as a historian I HAVE READ "at least 3 of the 5" you mentioned
as well as others. It is the only way to understand what really happened.
I find great pleasure in doing so.

I am not eager however to continue this circular argument with a troll.

Cheers!

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-08-26 14:42:43 UTC

Re to Rich (Anderson)

Post by Rich
And yes, as a historian I HAVE READ "at least 3 of the 5" you mentioned
as well as others. It is the only way to understand what really happened.
I find great pleasure in doing so.

My intention of this thread is to collect more information from
historical records. Several times I noted details to be unclear
or not understandable to me. The main cited report from August 1945
is too short in some issues. Thats why I was looking for more detailed
reports. The 5 I mentioned were this:

#1. Eighth Air Force Tactical Operations in Support of Allied Landings in
Normandy, 2-17 June 1944, 6 Nov. 1944 (Secret).

#2. Survey of Effectiveness of Bombing of Invasion Coast Defenses on D-Day,
USSTAF, 7 July 1944 (Secret).

#3. Use of Heavy Bombers in a Tactical Role, SHAEF (Secret).

#4. Historical Study of Air Support by the Eighth Air Force for the Land
Invasion of Continental Europe 2-16 June 1944, 27 October 1944, (Secret).

#5. Study of Experience Gained in Overlord ù Use of Heavy Bombers in a
Tactical Role, War Cabinet Joint Technical Warfare Committee,
13 Sept. 1944 (Secret).

As you read this reports, could you make some remarks? Which one would
you suggest as of most detailed about planing and execution? What may
be the best way to order a copy?
I promis you that I will give here citations from it even if it will
not support my present view of the plan.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Rich

2015-08-26 15:43:49 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
My intention of this thread is to collect more information from
historical records. Several times I noted details to be unclear
or not understandable to me.

That is all well and good, but every time "more information" was
provided you and "unclear" details were explained to you, you simply
begin repeating the misinformation and misunderstandings you were
just corrected on. Why, pray tell, should anyone want to continue
such an exercise, whatever your declared "intention" is?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
As you read this reports, could you make some remarks?

I, and others, already have. Yet you have ignored all those
"remarks" and then simply repeated the misinformation and
misunderstandings those "remarks" were intended to correct.
Why, pray tell, should anyone want to continue such an exercise,
whatever your declared "intention" is?

So, in short, no, I have no interest in making any further
remarks to you that repeat the remarks I have already made. To
do so would be feeding a troll.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-08-30 19:27:06 UTC

Re to Rich (Anderson)

collect more information from historical records. Several times I noted
details to be unclear or not understandable to me.

Rich, just because you wrote a book on D-Day does not mean I have
to accept every opinion of you. What I cited from this 1945 report
does not support your opinions and you gave no citations from
contemporary reports on the disputed points. Further we have still no
details why this attack failed at Omaha.

There is a serious lack of source information about what was why
planned and what went wrong. And that for the then largest, most
complicated and most ambitious air attack of WWII.

begin deleted text

My intention of this thread is to collect more information from
historical records. Several times I noted details to be unclear
or not understandable to me. The main cited report from August 1945
is too short in some issues. Thats why I was looking for more detailed
reports. The 5 I mentioned were this:

#1. Eighth Air Force Tactical Operations in Support of Allied Landings in
Normandy, 2-17 June 1944, 6 Nov. 1944 (Secret).

#2. Survey of Effectiveness of Bombing of Invasion Coast Defenses on D-Day,
USSTAF, 7 July 1944 (Secret).

#3. Use of Heavy Bombers in a Tactical Role, SHAEF (Secret).

#4. Historical Study of Air Support by the Eighth Air Force for the Land
Invasion of Continental Europe 2-16 June 1944, 27 October 1944, (Secret).

#5. Study of Experience Gained in Overlord ù Use of Heavy Bombers in a
Tactical Role, War Cabinet Joint Technical Warfare Committee,
13 Sept. 1944 (Secret).

end deleted text

Let me add to the above that I now want to get published this reports
as pdfs on the net for free download. I have no intention to write a
book on the topic and I usually prefer to read the sources anyway.
That may be true for some other users here too. I got told without
location data that could be an expensive task. If so, I see the option
for crowd funding and a collaboration with specialized historians.
Any suggestions to proceed are welcome.

As you read this reports, could you make some remarks?

I, and others, already have. Yet you have ignored all those
"remarks" and then simply repeated the misinformation and
misunderstandings those "remarks" were intended to correct.
Why, pray tell, should anyone want to continue such an exercise,
whatever your declared "intention" is?
So, in short, no, I have no interest in making any further
remarks to you that repeat the remarks I have already made. To
do so would be feeding a troll.

What you provided as information rules out your claim to have read
this 5 reports. You simply bragged to boost your personal image.
Otherwise you would have remarked at least for those others reading
this thread.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Rich

2015-08-30 20:58:39 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rich, just because you wrote a book on D-Day does not mean I have
to accept every opinion of you. What I cited from this 1945 report
does not support your opinions and you gave no citations from
contemporary reports on the disputed points. Further we have still no
details why this attack failed at Omaha.

Really? Let's see...so far we have found:

1. You are ignorant of the locations of the German defenses.
2. You are ignorant of the construction of the German defenses.
3. You are ignorant of the effects of the weapons on the defenses.
4. You are ignorant of how the bomb aiming was done.
5. You are ignorant of what aircraft and units were used.
6. You are ignorant of how the bombs were fuzed.
7. You are ignorant of what bombs were used and why.

Yet despite that mass of ignorance, instead of trying to learn
something you have busily substituted your opinion for what
you assume could/should have been done instead of trying to
comprehend what actually happened. So we have had to slog through
idiocies like .50 caliber machine guns "melting" reinforced
concrete fortifications.

We have all the "details" in the world. 100-lb GP, 120-lb Frag,
500-lb GP, and 1000-lb GP will do nothing against most of the
defensive structures used by the Germans. The 1 to 2-meter thick
reinforced concrete, usually with a 1 to 2-meter earth cover, were
effectively impervious to even direct hits by the heavier bombs. A
100-lb GP instantaneously fuzed bomb would only produce a surface
less than a meter deep. The 500-lb GP fractionally more. Neither
were likely to have any effect on the concrete structure below.
However, even if there was no earth cover, the best the 100-lb GP
might do is produce an exterior crater 0.15 meters deep. The
500-lb GP also would not penetrate, but at best on the thinnest
thickness might scab the interior surface - might. The 1000-lb
GP might blow through...the thinnest 1 meter thickness ***if***
there were no earth covering.

Of course, all that ignores the simple problem of hitting those
objects. Essentially, assuming each defensive structure was a 10
by 10 meter object, the 50% chance of single direct hit by heavy
bombers flying at 20,000 feet has been calculated as requiring
between 400 and 4,000 bombs. A 90% chance required 1,300 to
13,000 bombs.

So in a nutshell, the reality you continue to be ignorant of
is that even if all 22,715 of the 100-lb and 500-lb GP had been
delivered with extreme precision, there would have been only at
best a 90% chance of 17.473 bombs directly hitting the target...
and doing F-ALL. For the 146 1000-lb GP there was a 90% chance
- assuming best circumstances - of 0.112 bombs achieving a
direct hit...and doing maybe slightly more than F-ALL.

These are very simple weapons-defense interface calculations. They
aren't "opinions". They are simple facts. I already gave you the
sources BTW, but since you seem bent on ignorance I shan't give
them you to ignore again. BTW, I excluded the useless Frags, hope
you don't mind.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
There is a serious lack of source information about what was why
planned and what went wrong. And that for the then largest, most
complicated and most ambitious air attack of WWII.

No, there are copious amounts of sources, most of which have been
handed you. The problem is the serious lack of understanding on
your part. Compounding your ignorance:

1. You willfully ignore what really happened.
2. You willfully ignore the evidence presented you.
3. You willfully ignore the assessments of those persons who
have very evidently spent much more time and thought on the
subject than you have.

For the umpteenth time I am sick of your trolling. Begone TROLL!

(snip spam)

William Clodius

2015-08-30 22:05:53 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Re to Rich (Anderson)
<snip>

Post by Rich
That is all well and good, but every time "more information" was
provided you and "unclear" details were explained to you, you simply
begin repeating the misinformation and misunderstandings you were
just corrected on. Why, pray tell, should anyone want to continue
such an exercise, whatever your declared "intention" is?

I find it appropriate (again) at this point to note that from my point
of view the one that wins an argument is not the one with the final
word, but rather the one with the most pertinent data and the clearest
understanding of that data. I find Richard Anderson's and Geoffrey
Sinclair's presentation of the data far more convincing that anything
you have posted on this thread. I agree with them that the historical
narrative is not screwed up, and that if anything is screwed up it is
your attempts to try to fit that narrative into your claims.

To be more specific: what you have cited does not support your
positions, there is a large amount of information about what was planned
for the air attack and why the Air Forces expected it to fail. Rich and
Geoffrey have given you numerous pertinant citations and none of them
back your contentions on the attack.

Rich

2015-08-31 14:49:10 UTC

Post by William Clodius
To be more specific: what you have cited does not support your
positions, there is a large amount of information about what was planned
for the air attack and why the Air Forces expected it to fail.

Exactly. Eisenhower had been given operational control of the Allied
Strategic Air Forces for NEPTUNE and wanted to use them. Air Force
leadership complained the role chosen for them on D-Day as part of
the beach drenching program was a waste of resources. They were
correct, but Eisenhower insisted they be used s they were. He was wrong
and they were right, but they then did the best they could do fulfill
the mission requirements within the limitations they were given.

***END OF STORY***

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-31 18:17:46 UTC

Post by Rich
Eisenhower had been given operational control of the Allied
Strategic Air Forces for NEPTUNE and wanted to use them. Air Force
leadership complained the role chosen for them on D-Day as part of
the beach drenching program was a waste of resources.

Because they thought their attacks would not be effective?
Or because they thought such operations were beneath their
dignity, a diversion from them winning the war all by
themselves by annihilating Germany from the air?

Post by Rich
He was wrong and they were right but they then did
the best they could do fulfill the mission
requirements within the limitations they were given.

Is that really true, even in hindsight? Was there
no useful contribution the heavies could make to the
landing operations? Surely the "Transportation Plan"
attacks on German communications were useful to the
campaign. (Though AIUI the "bomber barons" objected
to that too.) Did/could the heavies usefully attack
German reserves on D-Day?

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

John Dallman

2015-08-31 18:51:49 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Because they thought their attacks would not be effective?
Or because they thought such operations were beneath their
dignity, a diversion from them winning the war all by
themselves by annihilating Germany from the air?

Both, I suspect. From my partial knowledge of Bomber Command, their heavy
bomber crews were not trained for this kind of operation, which is a
reasonable reason for objecting.

The heads of Bomber Command were also still claiming that they could
cause a German surrender by bombing alone, but I strongly doubt that many
other senior commanders or the War Cabinet believed this.

John

Rich

2015-08-31 20:17:55 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Because they thought their attacks would not be effective?

Of course, since everyone - air and ground commanders both, knew
that 100-lb GP bombs would have zero effect against any kind of
field or permanent defenses and the heavier bombs were to few (and
directed at targets further inland for the most part) and only
marginally more effective. They weren't actually idiots you know.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Or because they thought such operations were beneath their
dignity, a diversion from them winning the war all by
themselves by annihilating Germany from the air?

No, maybe you think they were idiots.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Is that really true, even in hindsight? Was there
no useful contribution the heavies could make to the
landing operations?

Yes, it is.

Sorry, but I do not need a substitute SENECA to argue with. We
are speaking ***SPECIFICALLY*** about the beach drenching mission.
I.e., the missions by Eighth and Ninth Air Forces directed against
the beach defenses on UTAH, OMAHA, GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD. We have
been treating the mission against Caen and the pre-dawn missions
against the coast and other artillery batteries separately.

Rich Rostrom

2015-09-01 21:10:53 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Because they thought their attacks would not be effective?

Of course, since everyone - air and ground commanders both, knew
that 100-lb GP bombs would have zero effect...
They weren't actually idiots you know.

But that implies that Ike must have been an idiot, for
insisting that a huge and useless effort be made.
Montgomery too, as chief planner of the landing operations.
Especially since "everyone... knew" it would be useless.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Or because they thought such operations were beneath their
dignity, a diversion from them winning the war all by
themselves by annihilating Germany from the air?

No, maybe you think they were idiots.

Not idiots, but certainly rather full of themselves,
with a greatly exaggerated idea of the effectiveness
of their bomber forces. It has been said that Harris
regarded increased bombing of Germany as the best
answer to just about any military question.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Is that really true, even in hindsight? Was there
no useful contribution the heavies could make to the
landing operations?

Yes, it is.
Sorry, but I do not need a substitute SENECA to argue with.

I'm not arguing; I asked for a definite statement of
what appears to be a rather surprising fact. It's the
most critical operation of the war for the US/UK,
thousands of highly capable aircraft are available,
and there is literally _nothing_ useful they can do?

I think it's fair to say that that's counter-intuitive.

You've made an excellent case for it, and refuted what
seem to be common myths about the operations. But it
remains surprising.

It also invites another question: if "100-lb GP bombs
would have zero effect", what effect could artillery
shells have? The US 5"/38 naval shell was only 55 lbs;
6" shells were only about 100 lbs; 8" shells were 260 lbs
HE, and 335 lbs AP. Yet I have read that direct fire from
US destroyers knocked out several key German bunker
positions?

Is this also a myth? Was naval bombardment actually
ineffective (aside from the occasional lucky hit by
the battleships)?

Inquiring minds want to know.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

William Clodius

2015-09-02 05:01:19 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Because they thought their attacks would not be effective?

Of course, since everyone - air and ground commanders both, knew
that 100-lb GP bombs would have zero effect...
They weren't actually idiots you know.

No. They asked the heavy bombers to make a short duration run over a
region with much more liimited air cover and AAA weaponry compared to a
run over Germany. While the chances of a big payoff were small,
compared to the normal costs of operations of the war the costs were
also small.

It was also something that had not really been tried before so there
was alway the hope that the analyses had missed something. Maybe many
Germans would be late in manning the bunkers untill the last minute so
more would be caught out in the open. Maybe the sky would be clear and
the morning haze less than normal so bombing would be as accurate as
possible. Maybe the Germans would be in the process of moving ammo and
fuel. Maybe ...

Between infantry and the airborne troops the allies landed more than
150,000 troops on June 6, and if not for beach congestion they would
have landed far more. When you plan to commit about a quarter million
troops, and those troops are intended to ensure the passage of millions,
you take every bit of insurance you can.

Post by Rich Rostrom
<snip>
It also invites another question: if "100-lb GP bombs
would have zero effect", what effect could artillery
shells have? The US 5"/38 naval shell was only 55 lbs;
6" shells were only about 100 lbs; 8" shells were 260 lbs
HE, and 335 lbs AP. Yet I have read that direct fire from
US destroyers knocked out several key German bunker
positions?

An artillery shell is a repetitive weapon, while heavy bomber were one
shot weapons. If a miss occurs the aim of a naval gun can be corrected
on the next try. Repetition combined with proximity fuses can also be
useful for suppression. Idealy the aiming is controlled by shore fire
control parties, but for various reasons they were of limited
effectiveness until early afternoon, though some were landed at H+30
(7AM). The general lack of operating radios, particularly among the
troops that climbed the bluffs, made all forms of fire ccontrol
difficult and dangerous to the troops. Spotter aircraft filled in as
much as possible, and were particularly valube for targeting th larger
Naval guns inland. In one case off Utah, a spotter whose boat was unable
to land directed fire from just off shore. In practice the naval gunners
often improvised, often targeting on shore gun flashes ,at least in one
case using the targets of a tank as identifying targets still of
interest.

In practice the targets of highest danger to the landings, the higher
caliber guns in the shoreline weapon nests, were usually hard to target
with naval guns as they were deliberately aligned to fire along the
coast and ship guns could get a good line of sight to their embrassures.
The exceptions were where fortifications were incomplete, primarilly
near the lower value D-1 draw. While small arms weapons in
fortifications, such as machine guns, faced the sea, their small
embrassures made them difficult targets for removal, though not for
suppression. Slit trenches were potentially more vulnerable, but were
on the bluffs, operating aginst troops with limited, if any,
communications to gun ships.

Discussionof gun support:
<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Normandy/Cominch/Neptune2.html>
Discussion of communications problems:
<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Normandy/Cominch/Neptune6.html>

Post by Rich Rostrom
Is this also a myth? Was naval bombardment actually
ineffective (aside from the occasional lucky hit by
the battleships)?
Inquiring minds want to know.

While naval gunfire was much more effective on June 6 than the high
level bombing, it was no panacea. With improvisation it helped a lot
with fire suppression for the troops on the beach, and in taking out the
more vulnerable weapon nests. Support for the (what proved to be) the
more critical troops on the bluuffs, was near nill until more radios got
up the bluffs, and the better emplaced weapons could only be taken out
by ground troops or tanks willing to move into the line of sight of the
guns so they could get the guns in their line of sight. For the landings
it relied almost entirely on the detroyers, as they could get close
enough to shore to do reasonable visual targetting. The heavier gunships
either dealt with larger inland guns using aircraft spotters, or guarded
the flanks against E-boats and U-boats. The suppression of Naval guns
was very effective.

William Clodius

2015-09-03 04:15:56 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
<snip>
In practice the targets of highest danger to the landings, the higher
caliber guns in the shoreline weapon nests, were usually hard to target
with naval guns as they were deliberately aligned to fire along the
coast and ship guns could get a good line of sight to their embrassures.
The exceptions were where fortifications were incomplete, primarilly
near the lower value D-1 draw. While small arms weapons in
fortifications, such as machine guns, faced the sea, their small
embrassures made them difficult targets for removal, though not for
suppression. Slit trenches were potentially more vulnerable, but were
on the bluffs, operating aginst troops with limited, if any,
communications to gun ships.

More typos than I will accept in the above. It should have read:

In practice the targets of highest danger to the landings, the higher
caliber guns in the shoreline weapon nests, were usually hard to target
with naval guns as they were deliberately aligned to fire along the
coast so that ship guns could not get a good line of sight to their
embrassures. The exceptions were where fortifications were incomplete,
on Omaha primarilly near the lower value E-1 draw. While small arms
weapons in fortifications, such as machine guns, faced the sea, their
small embrassures made them difficult targets for kills, though not for
suppression. Slit trenches were potentially more vulnerable, but were
on the bluffs, operating aginst troops with limited, if any,
communications to gun ships.

Kenneth Young

2015-09-02 14:44:17 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Yet I have read that direct fire from
US destroyers knocked out several key German bunker
positions?

Base fused semi armour piercing (common) shells are a considerably
different in effect from nose fused general purpose bombs gun fire tends
to be more accurate too. Some landing craft were adapted to give support
fire. From memory the RN had landing craft mounting 25 pdr or 4.7 inch
guns and the USN had craft mounting multiple 5 inch rocket launchers. The
bombing would have had some effect as not all defenders would have had
overhead cover. Fortifications required interval troops.

Rich

2015-09-03 14:42:36 UTC

Post by Kenneth Young
fire. From memory the RN had landing craft mounting 25 pdr or 4.7 inch
guns and the USN had craft mounting multiple 5 inch rocket launchers.

The 4.5" rockets had little effect since the range was so affected by
the wave motion. The 4.7" LCG were also of limited effectiveness since
while they were on the flanks of the landing and got close in, they
were vulnerable to counterfire and the surf made their own return
inaccurate since they had no directors.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-02 15:28:59 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Because they thought their attacks would not be effective?

Of course, since everyone - air and ground commanders both, knew
that 100-lb GP bombs would have zero effect...

This is a really bad edit, to put it mildly, to restore Rich's text.

"against any kind of
field or permanent defenses and the heavier bombs were to few (and
directed at targets further inland for the most part) and only
marginally more effective. "

Post by Rich
They weren't actually idiots you know.

But that implies that Ike must have been an idiot, for
insisting that a huge and useless effort be made.

No, the above claim requires the edit.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Montgomery too, as chief planner of the landing operations.
Especially since "everyone... knew" it would be useless.

Again the claim requires the edit.

No one expected the bombers to do a lot against dug in troops and
even less against the sort of structures guarding the beaches, if they
tried the results would be lots of relatively deep craters which the
army did not want, it was expecting to move out from the beaches
with lots of men and vehicles, craters would hinder this.

So instead they saturated the area with light bombs in the hopes
of causing casualties and cutting communication links. The air
commanders were not expecting to cause lots of casualties, they
were expecting to contribute. At Utah at least one bomb did hit
an important defence position and made the landings easier.

The trouble was the closer to H-hour the attack the likely greater
effect the bombing would have in helping the landings but the
greater the chance of friendly fire.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Or because they thought such operations were beneath their
dignity, a diversion from them winning the war all by
themselves by annihilating Germany from the air?

No, maybe you think they were idiots.

Then you are thinking in stereotypes.

Admiral Nimitz ended up with a large carrier fleet, so he went island
hopping to Japan, "best answer to just about any military question."
Formosa versus Philippines for example.

You could add he did not have large armies or large land areas so
his solution was very much shaped by the weapons and conditions
facing him.

Same for the heavy bomber forces, no one expected them to be
army support, the tactical air forces were there for that. The main
point and equipment of the heavy bomber forces was to attack
Germany, to degrade and hopefully destroy its economy.

Dear Admiral Nimitz, please send task force 58 to the Atlantic,
(or at least part of it), we want additional anti submarine assets
to cover moving troops across the Atlantic after D-Day. Think
he and the relevant admirals would be happy with the idea? It
would make the convoys safer. Germany first doctrine.

You might note after the defeat in the Battle of Berlin Harris became
much more cautious, avoiding deep penetration raids, including
objecting to Dresden for that reason.

Certainly many to most in the Air Force commands pre WWII were
expecting air power to be devastating, decisive and at the extreme
being able to effectively replace armies and navies. The longer the
war went on the more realistic the commanders became.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Is that really true, even in hindsight? Was there
no useful contribution the heavies could make to the
landing operations?

Yes, it is.
Sorry, but I do not need a substitute SENECA to argue with.

Very little they could do and the same applies to all the weapons
when it comes to fortified positions. The infantry and direct fire
weapons would be the most effective. Followed by artillery under
the command of a forward observer who could see the target.

The later heavy bomber attacks in support of army offensives did
better, they were more concentrated and the Germans only had
field fortifications, basically dug in, no concrete. Even then the
reports are the shock effect of that much explosive in a short
time was more important than the casualties caused. The army
had to quickly follow up the attack.

Post by Rich Rostrom
I think it's fair to say that that's counter-intuitive.

You are thinking in absolutes, totally work, totally fail.

Post by Rich Rostrom
You've made an excellent case for it, and refuted what
seem to be common myths about the operations. But it
remains surprising.

No you are simply going too far.

Post by Rich Rostrom
It also invites another question: if "100-lb GP bombs
would have zero effect", what effect could artillery
shells have? The US 5"/38 naval shell was only 55 lbs;
6" shells were only about 100 lbs; 8" shells were 260 lbs
HE, and 335 lbs AP. Yet I have read that direct fire from
US destroyers knocked out several key German bunker
positions?

The bombs terminal velocities were subsonic, it took until
the Tallboy before the sound barrier came into play.

The muzzle velocity of a US 5 inch 38 gun was 2,600 feet
per second, or around 1,800 mph. Higher the impact
velocity the higher the penetration, assuming the round does
not break up.

So the German L/43, L/48 and L/70 75mm guns as fitted on
their tanks, penetration at 100 metres was 98, 106 and 138
mm when firing a 6.8 kg shell, the first two guns using a 4.1
kg shell could penetrate 126 and 143 mm, the L/70 using a
4.75 kg shell 194 mm. The lighter the shell the faster the
gun will accelerate it, the smaller the shell diameter the
better it will penetrate are the basic rules.

Almost all shells can be considered, to a first approximation, as
AP by bomb standards, much lower percentage of explosive,
due to the need to survive the major acceleration when the gun
fires. Also look how big a diameter even a 100 pound bomb
had versus its artillery shell weight equivalent.

Also note the difference in trajectories of a bomb versus a
shell, even more so for the shell at close range

Post by Rich Rostrom
Is this also a myth? Was naval bombardment actually
ineffective (aside from the occasional lucky hit by
the battleships)?

On D-Day the naval gunfire was useful, however the main
coastal defences were designed to resist gunfire, including
being hard to see and hard to actually shoot at from the sea.
The Germans did understand the problem.

All the cruisers and above had spotter aircraft and engaged
their fixed targets, usually the coastal batteries, then targets
"of opportunity" through the day. The German coastal artillery
was suppressed, an important part of the plan. As noted the
destroyers at Omaha are rated as very effective when they
closed the beach.

So in summary the heavy bomber forces were ordered to
give up their primary mission, one they were equipped to
attack, for a raid that was known to be unlikely to cause large
German casualties and could easily cause allied casualties.
If you want to play politics, the claim the air attacks failed as
a way to explain what happened at Omaha, ignoring all the
other things that went wrong. Lots of downside for the air
commanders, little upside.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich

2015-09-03 14:42:13 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
But that implies that Ike must have been an idiot, for

No, it doesn't, for the many reasons others have already given. You
are assessing with 20:20 hindsight.

Post by Rich Rostrom
insisting that a huge and useless effort be made.
Montgomery too, as chief planner of the landing operations.

Neither Montgomery or Eisenhower were "chief planner" of anything
of the sort. That was done by the planning staffs of US First and
British Second Army, based upon landing craft allocations laid out
by Ramsay's staff. Then there were the general requirements laid
out by the joint staffs, obstacle clearing effort, DD tanks, beach
drenching, and the like. The result was schematic, but then with
individual modifications laid on in the details by the corps staffs.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Especially since "everyone... knew" it would be useless.

Funny, it made more sense before you edited my reply.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Not idiots, but certainly rather full of themselves,
with a greatly exaggerated idea of the effectiveness
of their bomber forces.

Nonsense. You have had it explained a number of times. Nobody ever
expected troops in fortifications would be affected by bombs known
to have zero effect on such fortifications. So evidently you really
do suppose them all idiots.

Post by Rich Rostrom
I'm not arguing; I asked for a definite statement of
what appears to be a rather surprising fact.

Odd, you are given definite statements and the reasoning behind them,
but then deny the response and repeat the question. I call that an
argument.

As others have said, bombs and artillery shells are not the same
thing. Also, there is little evidence the naval shelling affected the
beach defensive positions. Best evidence is that it was direct fire
ground weapons...tanks, SP AAA, bazookas, MG, and rifle fire, along
with direct assault - grenades and such, which did the job. Naval
gunfire knocked out two of the 76.2 mm guns at WN 73, but they were
in field fortifications and were some of the few positions exposed to
direct fire from the sea. Naval gunfire also took out the casemates at
Longues and elsewhere and suppressed the field artillery at Maisy and
elsewhere.

William Clodius

2015-09-01 04:26:42 UTC

It doesn't matter what any of their reasons were behind their arguments.
In any social organization decisions will impact the egos of the members
of the organization, and that is particularly true of the upper
management. But in addition to egos, blinders from habit, social
conections, social conventions, and wishfull thinking (for what we need
to have happen this other thing must happen so it will happen and we
don't have to worry about it,) wiil also be present. The good managers
will work at addressing their biases, but even the best will fall in
situations that they consider unimportant, or under time pressure. The
planning for Overlord was considered important by all, and was given
months of preparation time.

If the Air Force high commands hadn't given good arguments for their
positions, and hadn't done all they could to fulfill the ground forces
requests when they lost their argument, they would have been replaced.
High level bombing was not accurate, particularly in signifant cloud
cover. By this time it was obvious, even to its advocates, that except
in ideal conditions individual high level bombers had trouble targeting
a city center covering dozens of blocks. The critical German defenses
were resistent to anti-personnel weapons, and vulnerable to heavy cased
weapons only if directly impacted. H2S partly improved accuracy in one
direction. Perhaps if the attacks had been done on a day of clear
weather, rather than the morning after a storm, accuracy would have been
better, but it still wouldn't have been been what the ground forced
hoped for.

Remember what happend to General Leslie McNair, and many others,a month
and half later at the start of Operation Cobra.

Post by Rich
He was wrong and they were right but they then did
the best they could do fulfill the mission
requirements within the limitations they were given.

The transportation plan was a long term operation. There were dozens of
railyards, hundreds of kilometers of rail lines, and tens of thousands
of workers to repair them. Oil fields and refineries were at the exteme
range of operations from current bases. Mines in rivers and canals did
not have an immediate effect and were not recognized as being as
effecive as they turned out to be. (This was a perenial problem during
the war. Air crews preferred to drop bombs, and submariners preferred to
launch torpedos because the results were obvious.) In the short term the
movement of individual trains, and columns of reinforcements were best
addressed by more accurate bombing by medium bombers and fighter
bombers,

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-01 15:31:54 UTC

Because they thought their attacks would not be effective?

That is part of it. Even if they dropped AP, given the hit
probabilities.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Or because they thought such operations were beneath their
dignity, a diversion from them winning the war all by
themselves by annihilating Germany from the air?

That is an over statement, the heavy bomber commanders
believed the best use of their force was to attack Germany,
for the economic effects.

Harris made his pitch to end the war by bombing Berlin but
it required the USAAF to help, something it could only do
at about the time Bomber Command had to stop such attacks.

While I am sure some air force people still believed air power
alone was enough the general opinions were more realistic.
They could make it easier for the ground forces, not in effect
replace them. It then became what was the most effective way
to help. And remember the transport plan did not have enough
solid evidence to back it, the plan applied in Italy was working
but only after the allies attacked and forced the Germans into
needing more mobility and supplies was the plan shown to
have been effective.

There were still arguments about attacking bridges, with what,
and with what effect, so were they worth it. And so on.

The transport plan as implemented had plenty of possible flaws
that only operations could determine how bad they were. So
out came the concept of opportunity costs, maybe attacking
other targets would produce better results. In May came strong
indications attacks on oil targets really worried the Luftwaffe at least.

Post by Rich
He was wrong and they were right but they then did
the best they could do fulfill the mission
requirements within the limitations they were given.

You are now ranging over a lot of time before, during and after
D-Day.

The short answer is the heavy bomber contribution to the
transport plan was real but the least cost effective. The
marshalling yards they bombed had some effect on German
tactical mobility but because the Germans made the trains
up in Germany, ran them to France and then returned the
medium bombers and fighter bombers had a bigger effect
on such movement.

There were some raids that hurt the Germans, largely when
military trains were in the yards. The 29/30 March 1944 raid
on Vaires reportedly killed 1,200 to 1,300 waffen SS men.

Knocking out marshalling yards has a much bigger effect on
the economy than military mobility, as the attacks in France
proved. Essentially to stop the enemy army you need to
attack individual trains, tracks, bridges, tunnels, the smaller
aircraft did this better. To stop the enemy economy the
heavy bombers were the better weapon.

That being said the reality is even in 1944 the allies needed
the heavy bomber contribution to the transport plan given the
size of the network they were trying to degrade/stop. The
German military required a fraction of the overall capacity.

So the heavy bombers were needed and useful, and so they
helped Late May 1944 French rail traffic was down to 55%
of January (not sure if winter meant fewer trains or more as the
darkness helped prevent air attack), in almost the last week of
the month the allied fighter bombers had damaged 500 locomotives
and the marshalling yards were usually where the repair facilities
were. Destroying the Seine bridges dropped traffic to 30% of
January by D-Day, continued pressure dropped traffic to 10% of
January in July and in the area around Normandy effectively closed
the rail links. In other words the allies degraded capacity so much
that even after stopping all other traffic there was not enough capacity
for the German military.

This was done by systematically and continually attacking the network,
if you like a fighter bomber damaged an engine, another bombed the
track, another or medium bombers brought down a bridge or
blocked a tunnel, meantime the heavies damaged the repair
facilities. Now go out and retrieve the damaged locomotive and
move it back to a repair facility and fix it under those conditions.

The bomber commanders did protest the transport plan was
dragging them away from their primary target, at the same time
it was obvious to all Overlord was the key attack in 1944 in
Europe and the tactical air forces did not have the bomb lift.

When it came to attacking dug in troops the bombers and the
naval guns and the army artillery all understood it would require
a lot of effort to hurt the enemy. When dug in meant prepared
concrete bunkers with strong overhead protection the effect of
long range weapons was even less. Analysis of the fighter
bomber operations showed clearly their threat was one of their
main effects, stopping mobility, than came hitting transport
(trucks, trains, roads etc.), then came hitting the combat troops.
However if the enemy was forced to move the effectiveness of
airpower against troops went up dramatically, something seen
late in WWI.

The heavies "tactical" interdiction often consisted of obliterating
a village, dumping the rubble into the streets/cross roads and
so blocking movement.

Some of the heavy bomber tactical support of ground attacks
were rated as very effective, the sheer firepower, if the bombing
could concentrate, tended to knock out many of the troops caught
under the bombs for hours. Things like tank sights were knocked
out of alignment and engines ran rough even though the tank was
not hit. Something similar was reported for fighter bomber attacks,
the ground forces needed to quickly follow up the attack to extract
maximum effectiveness. Simply bombing the front line was usually
not cost effective.

The reality is bombing German reserves on D-Day was probably
going to be about as effective as bombing the beach defences,
and at least the latter may have some real effect on the landings.
Much better to use the smaller aircraft to ensure the reserves
were unable to move very far.

Note by the way the most effective fire support on Omaha were
the destroyers which closed the beach and did direct fire from
what was very close range for them. You can argue providing
such support from the start would have really helped, just ignore
the real threats of mines and coastal artillery and problems with
having enough room for them and the landing craft.

Essentially even now people argue the trade offs, at the time
there was even less information. Any one given raid usually
does not do a great deal of damage so was it worth it?
Somewhere between 1 and a number the attacks add up to
a real result, there is not some sort of clear cut answer. Also
remember WWII air raids were highly variable, from solid hit
to complete miss, even in 1944. To put it another way if the
German reserves arrived say a few days earlier than historical
can anyone say it would have made a real difference? Note
such an impact would be more noticeable the closer to 6 June they
arrived. The allied air superiority meant the Germans could not
mount the sort of large attack needed to imperil the beach head,
short of a lot of bad weather.

The men at the time were predicting the future. They adopted the
transport plan even though the target might be too big to damage
in a militarily effective way, plus whether the Germans could work
around any damage. The heavy bombers hit the targets least
likely to degrade German military traffic but at the same time the
damage they caused did degrade the network and contributed to
a systematic attack that proved very effective, but it cost a lot of
effort and casualties. And there were plenty of other targets
available for the heavies at least. Attacking fortifications was and
is about the least cost effective thing a military can do, on D-Day
the heavy bombers tried more in the hope it could help, it was the
most effective thing they could do that day to support the attack.

Think also of the airborne divisions, the cost of them (training,
selecting the better manpower), the cost of transporting them
versus the casualties and the effect they had. Landing more
troops on more beaches can be argued would have been
more cost effective, at the time it was a way of introducing
more allied firepower at the crucial start of the attack, plus
adding some depth to the first day's operations, so the
extra costs were judged worth it. Whether in the context of
the cost of such forces over the war so many paratroops
were justifiable is another matter. It is the same sort of logic
when it comes to the heavy bombers. The forces have costs,
strengths and weaknesses and at times will be "misemployed"
in the pursuit of a larger objective. And people will argue then
and now how things could be done better.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2015-09-01 21:13:51 UTC

The short answer is the heavy bomber contribution...

Thanks for a very detailed and informative response.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Mario

2015-08-31 15:13:44 UTC

Post by William Clodius
I find Richard Anderson's and Geoffrey
Sinclair's presentation of the data far more convincing

I do, too.

--
oiram

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-31 15:29:17 UTC

The one new point, the RAF did the low beach cover, the USAAF
did the medium to high cover. Not sure why, beyond a faint idea
P-38 were distinctive then came the Spitfire and that wing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Re to Rich (Anderson)

collect more information from historical records. Several times I noted
details to be unclear or not understandable to me.

Rich, just because you wrote a book on D-Day does not mean I have
to accept every opinion of you.

The line about entitled to own opinions but not facts come to mind.
And the statement above indicates an unwillingness to learn.

Meantime Rich has lots of facts, which keep being ignored.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What I cited from this 1945 report
does not support your opinions and you gave no citations from
contemporary reports on the disputed points.

Yes, we know Rich's facts do not fit, so they are now opinions.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further we have still no
details why this attack failed at Omaha.

Actually we have reams of data and much posted in this thread but
ignored if it does not fit.

Actually there is an immense amount, from just post WWII to today.

Given air attack are we now talking about the entire day's operations?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
begin deleted text

Oh good, does that mean you will actually answer all the text of
mine you keep deleting?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
My intention of this thread is to collect more information from
historical records.

The overall impression is rather one of trying to find what can
be made to agree to with the conclusion.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Several times I noted details to be unclear
or not understandable to me.

Yes, and this is mainly due to unclear equaling unacceptable.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The main cited report from August 1945
is too short in some issues. Thats why I was looking for more detailed
#1. Eighth Air Force Tactical Operations in Support of Allied Landings in
Normandy, 2-17 June 1944, 6 Nov. 1944 (Secret).
#2. Survey of Effectiveness of Bombing of Invasion Coast Defenses on D-Day,
USSTAF, 7 July 1944 (Secret).
#3. Use of Heavy Bombers in a Tactical Role, SHAEF (Secret).
#4. Historical Study of Air Support by the Eighth Air Force for the Land
Invasion of Continental Europe 2-16 June 1944, 27 October 1944, (Secret).
#5. Study of Experience Gained in Overlord ù Use of Heavy Bombers in a
Tactical Role, War Cabinet Joint Technical Warfare Committee,
13 Sept. 1944 (Secret).
end deleted text

Now please go through all the text of mine you deleted and answer
it. All of it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Let me add to the above that I now want to get published this reports
as pdfs on the net for free download. I have no intention to write a
book on the topic and I usually prefer to read the sources anyway.
That may be true for some other users here too. I got told without
location data that could be an expensive task. If so, I see the option
for crowd funding and a collaboration with specialized historians.
Any suggestions to proceed are welcome.

Purchase digital camera.

Visit national archives, Britain and America.

Spend a couple of weeks at each at least.

Meantime note specialised historians have their work and are
not available on request/demand.

By the way, "without location data that could be an expensive
task"

Any chance of mentioning where you found the reports you listed?

As you read this reports, could you make some remarks?

I, and others, already have. Yet you have ignored all those
"remarks" and then simply repeated the misinformation and
misunderstandings those "remarks" were intended to correct.
Why, pray tell, should anyone want to continue such an exercise,
whatever your declared "intention" is?
So, in short, no, I have no interest in making any further
remarks to you that repeat the remarks I have already made. To
do so would be feeding a troll.

What you provided as information rules out your claim to have read
this 5 reports.

Rich claimed,

"And yes, as a historian I HAVE READ "at least 3 of the 5" you mentioned
as well as others. It is the only way to understand what really happened.
I find great pleasure in doing so."

But Seneca of course amended, it does not fit.

Now it seems Seneca has decided Rich must be telling lies, obviously
Seneca posts reviews of all material Seneca reads, and on request
as well.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You simply bragged to boost your personal image.

No that is more the Seneca way.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Otherwise you would have remarked at least for those others reading
this thread.

No actually, Rich is not on some sort of retainer to examine material
people in this group decide to mention.

Once again we are all demoted to the Seneca support team, failure
guaranteed.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich

2015-08-31 18:59:12 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
#1. Eighth Air Force Tactical Operations in Support of Allied Landings in
Normandy, 2-17 June 1944, 6 Nov. 1944 (Secret).

Is simply the same data set as found in Third Phase and other USAAF
reports already mentioned, but presented in a different format.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
#2. Survey of Effectiveness of Bombing of Invasion Coast Defenses on D-Day,
USSTAF, 7 July 1944 (Secret).

Is TNA AIR 52/140. It is not digitized, but you can request a digital
copy from TNA for a fee. There is no obligation for them to provide it
to you for free or for I to give you further information for free.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
#3. Use of Heavy Bombers in a Tactical Role, SHAEF (Secret).

Is WO 232/51 is not a report on the Normandy bombing mission, it is
a file collection of miscellaneous reports plans, and correspondence
having to do with the subject of the use of heavy bombers in a
tactical role.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
#4. Historical Study of Air Support by the Eighth Air Force for the Land
Invasion of Continental Europe 2-16 June 1944, 27 October 1944, (Secret).

Appears to be "Air Support by the Eighth Air Force in the Land Invasion
of Continental Europe". "Historical Study of" is not actually part of
the title. It is held at AFHRA, Maxwell Air Force Base, is digitized,
but is not available online. You can request it in CD for a cost. There
is no obligation for the USAF to provide it to you for free or for I to
give you further information for free.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
#5. Study of Experience Gained in Overlord <UTF16-016F> Use of Heavy Bombers in a
Tactical Role, War Cabinet Joint Technical Warfare Committee,
13 Sept. 1944 (Secret).

Doesn't exist in TNA or NARA. The British War Cabinet's Joint Technical
Warfare Committee papers are in CAB 137, but there is no record of such
a study. In other words, I have no clue what you think you are
referring to.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What you provided as information rules out your claim to have read
this 5 reports. You simply bragged to boost your personal image.
Otherwise you would have remarked at least for those others reading
this thread.

Thanks to Geoffrey for showing how you lied again. I never said anything
of the sort. One of your list doesn't exist and another is not a stand
alone "report" at all.

So I "bragged to boost" my "personal image"? Are you truly that moronic?
I will be blunt, my professional services are charged at a rate of US$65
per hour. If you want further information from me I will be happy to
provide you with information on how to make your payments. Meanwhile,
BIOYA.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-09-05 18:37:52 UTC

Reply to Rich (Anderson)

wrote: #1. Eighth Air Force Tactical Operations in Support of Allied
Landings in Normandy, 2-17 June 1944, 6 Nov. 1944 (Secret).

Is simply the same data set as found in Third Phase and other USAAF
reports already mentioned, but presented in a different format.

#2. Survey of Effectiveness of Bombing of Invasion Coast Defenses on
D-Day, USSTAF, 7 July 1944 (Secret).

#3. Use of Heavy Bombers in a Tactical Role, SHAEF (Secret).

#4. Historical Study of Air Support by the Eighth Air Force for the Land
Invasion of Continental Europe 2-16 June 1944, 27 October 1944, (Secret).

#5. Study of Experience Gained in Overlord <UTF16-016F> Use of Heavy
Bombers in a Tactical Role, War Cabinet Joint Technical Warfare
Committee, 13 Sept. 1944 (Secret).

Like I wrote 20.08.2015, the above list I picked from the Bibliography
list near the end of my often cited and your well known

"The effectiveness of third phase tactical air operations in the
European Theater 5 May 1944 to 8 May 1945", prepared by the
Army Air Force Evaluation Board in the European Theater of
Operations, August 1945. (Secret) Declassified 1961

Post by Rich
So I "bragged to boost" my "personal image"? Are you truly that moronic?

Rich, after your very helpful remarks above I fully retract my suggestion
that you not read any or that you bragged. Instead I thank you in the name
of all interested in the historical truth about Omaha.

Just to explain the historical problem let me quote here

Post by Rich
We have all the "details" in the world. 100-lb GP, 120-lb Frag,
500-lb GP, and 1000-lb GP will do nothing against most of the
defensive structures used by the Germans. The 1 to 2-meter thick
reinforced concrete, usually with a 1 to 2-meter earth cover, were
effectively impervious to even direct hits by the heavier bombs. A
100-lb GP instantaneously fuzed bomb would only produce a surface
less than a meter deep. The 500-lb GP fractionally more. Neither
were likely to have any effect on the concrete structure below.
However, even if there was no earth cover, the best the 100-lb GP
might do is produce an exterior crater 0.15 meters deep. The
500-lb GP also would not penetrate, but at best on the thinnest
thickness might scab the interior surface - might. The 1000-lb
GP might blow through...the thinnest 1 meter thickness ***if***
there were no earth covering.

All you wrote above was known to the planers of D-Day. They had
good intel on the German fortifications and even blueprints of
some of them. But we have no report about their knowledge and
their long evaluation of the final air plan.

But we know at least one knowledge base they had. The bombing
of Pantelleria island in June 1943. It was Operation Corkscrew
and I found a report about the results:

Rogers, Edith C.: The Reduction of Pantelleria and Adjacent
Islands, 8 May-14 June 1943, Monograph 52, Air Force Historical
Research Agency. Maxwell AFB, 1947 (on the net as pdf)

I noted as remarkable:

- Only 150-200 killed of a 11000 garrison, p. 59

- Prof, Zuckermann: 1000 tons bombs per square mile in batteries area,
p. 60 (how much intended for Omaha?)

- indirect hits (near miss) 4 times more effective than direct hits,
- "many guns" covered by debris for 1-2 hours clearance work,
- "disrupted character or terrain" would have made ammunition supply
difficult and even walking from gun to gun an "considerable effort",
p.63

- of 112 gun sites 53 appeared neutralized by air bombardment:
2 by direct hits,
17 lifted from foundations by near misses,
34 damaged by debris and splinters. p. 66

- against batteries effective radius of 1000 lb bomb only 1.5 times
that of the 500 lb bomb. Gives 500 lb clear advantage. p. 66f

- But this bomb needs delay of 0.025 seconds for best results (debris
generation and ground shock). Then it was twice as effective against
gun batteries than instant fuze. Provided terrain soil allowed
penetration. p. 67f

Post by Rich
From the above it seems likely the D-Day planer never intended to

penetrate the heavy concrete structures. But they had a numerical
chance to do some effect. We dont know the numbers - but they had.
They even did experiments. Let me cite about the work they did to came
up with the final plan. This mission was the most intensly planed
one in the history of air power.

Sunday Punch in Normandy: The Tactical Use of Heavy Bombardment
in the Normandy Invasion. An Interim Report Headquarters, Army Air
Forces, 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL)
www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100929-060.pdf

The most important and by far the most elaborate D-day plans
concerned the first mission of the day, involving attacks immediately
prior to H-hour against coastal installations between the Orne and
the Vire estuaries on the Normandv coast of France. The 6 mile
coastal strip included all assault beaches except an adjacent American
beach, designated as Utah, which was the responsibility of the U.S.
Ninth Air Force.

Some 1,200 heavy bombers were to participate, flying in squadrons of
six aircraft. Following a carefully devised system of predawn assembly
aided by searchlights, navigation lights, Aldis lamps, buncher and
splasher beacons, and GEE equipment, the aircraft were to fly
predesignated courses to the target area, bombing in successive waves
until H-hour (or thereafter attacking secondary targets will inland).

Assault craft were to remain 1,000 yards offshore until H-hour, and a
5-minute interval was to elaps between the releases by the last wave
of bombers and the initial touchdown by the assault troops. These safety
factors represented the final compromise between the desire of the ground
forces to exploit immediately the demoralization resulting from the
bombing at the risk of casualties and the inclination of the air forces
to impose considerably greater intervals to minimize the dangers from
possible bombing errors.

Demoralization of enemy front-line defenders and disruption of
communication lines for reserve forces were the sole aims of the
pre-assault bombing. it was understood that only a small percentage
of the actual targets would suffer direct hits and smaller still would
be the number seriously affected. Bomb loadings were established of
100-lb. GP, 120-lb. fragmentation, 500-lb. GP, and 1,000-lb. GP, the
last for installations well clear of the beaches. Fuzing was to be
instantaneous to avoid cratering the beaches except for targets away
from the landing areas, where 1,10 nose-1/100 tail was permissible.

...
Less favorable conditions would demand the substitution of the plan
involving overcast technique. Pinpointing of targets would be
impossible, but since demoralization and immobilization of enemy
forces were the principal aim, it was considered that area bombing
of the sectors wherein lay the specific visual targets would provide
virtually the same effect.

Squadrons were to fly six abreast and bomb on the release of a
Pathfinder aircraft in one of the center squadrons. By such an
arrangement deflection errors were largely neutralized, but further
safeguards against errors in range were deemed necessary. Accordingly,
the interval between the final bombing and the initial touchdown was
to be increased to 10 minutes.

One other necessary change was the instantaneous fuzing of all bombs,
since the entire attack was to be directed against the assault beaches,
which must not be cratered.
...

Predawn assembly

The initial D-day bomber program called for take-off and assembly during
hours of darkness on an unprecedented scale. It was believed that the
use of radio aids, flares, and navigation lights would permit successful
accomplishment, but it was deemed wise to have a trial operation. This
was conducted on 1 May before a regular bombing mission. It involved
nine groups of 21 aircraft each from each of the three bombardment
divisions, with aircraft assembling in specified areas during the hours
of darkness and following designated routes to the south coast and back
to the base areas.

The aircraft in each group were dispatched in three waves, the first
composed of nine-plane squadrons and the second and third of six-plane
squadrons. The exercise was completely satisfactory, and on the basis
of this test the six-plane squadron was adopted for the D-day mission.

Loadings and fuzings

Extensive research was conducted to determine the types of bombs and
fuzings to be used. An AEAF Weapons Committee, with four representatives
of the Eighth Air Force, was established to consider these questions,
and several practice bombing missions were conducted, the most
comprehensive being held on 26 April, in which 12 nine-plane flights
were sent to the Studland Bay bombing range to determine the effect of
100-, 250-, and 500-lb. bombs with various fuzings.

It was learned that fragmentation and 100-lb HE bombs would be most
effective against personnel, vehicles, wire entanglements, and gun
positions not emplaced. Recommendations based on these findings were
incorporated in the over-all plan.

Ground force requirements

Certain adjustments in the bombing desired by Army planners were
necessary to conform to bomber capabilities. When requests for
destruction of fixed defenses, explosion of mine fields, cutting of
underground cables, elimination of barbed-wire entanglements or antitank
obstacles, demoralization of front-line troops, delay and disruption
of reserve elements, and the blocking of transport by bombing French
towns--when such requests were submitted by Army commanders it was
necessary to point out the probable degree of success against each
type of objective and then to secure priority ratings to that the
bomber strength could be apportioned as desired by the ground forces.

In many instances the destructive effect necessary could be obtained
only by use of heavy bombs with delayed fuzings, which would cause
he cratering the Army wished to avoid. The probability was emphasized
that direct hits on gun emplacements would not be in excess of 2 percent
of the tonnage dropped and that in most instances little damage would
result.

Nevertheless, the Army requested that the attempt be made to destroy
those on the flanks of the beaches, believing that some emplaced
positions could be put out of action, at least temporarily, and that
craters in this area would afford valuable protection to assault troops
sent to capture these strong points. Otherwise it was agreed that the
air cooperation should aim primarily at the demoralization of front-line
troops, with a possible bonus in the destruction of barbed wire and other
hazards...

About H2X tests:

This risk was carefully weighed by the ground commanders against the
advantage of a bomb carpet to clear their assault path. Confronted
with photographic evidence of the accuracy of bombing tests, they
elected to take the risk.

I see no reason to doubt anything of the above. I know from other
examples that the 8th AAF had the ability for an engineering science
based attack planing. They were no fools. Before we decide they had
no chance we should read what they did know and what intended why.

It seems now obvious that this plan report is neither published nor
even know by title. There is the possibility that it is no single
report but still a bunch of papers in some boxes. Because the plan
failed (at least at Omaha) to hit the main target area - there seems
an attitude to downplay its chances for success anyway.

In the above I read several times about "demoralization" effects
on the defenders. I found this interesting:

Michael P. Dahlstrom: The Role of Airpower in the Overlord Invasion:
An Effects-Based Operation. Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell
AFB 2007.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/
ADA471896

RAF Bomber Command, under Operation FLASHLAMP made a night bombing
attack on ten of the coastal batteries, seeking to drive the gun crews
into their shelters and disrupt operations while the assault teams
loaded into the smaller landing boats.92

Over 1,100 RAF heavy bombers took off late on the night of 5/6 June in
order to complete their operations close to the start of the naval
bombardment and the American day bombing attack. The timing was
devised to maximize continuity and give the Germans minimal time to
return to their posts and mount an effective attack.93

The RAF dropped over 5,900 tons of bombs on their targets, mostly
of the 1,000 and 500 lb types.94 The effects, as assessed shortly
after the landing by allied experts, found that the "Physical
damage to guns and casemates does not appear to have been very
extensive even when hits were registered near the guns."95

However, damage to nearby buildings and other installations appeared
to have impacted the efficiency of the gun crews.96 Of special note
was that information obtained from prisoners and a captured German
report indicated that "[German] personnel suffered so badly from shock
that while most of them were disinclined to come out of their shelters;
many were incapable of efficient work even when they did man the
batteries." 97

Now the above is from past D-Day. But could it be that this effect was
known to the planners of D-Day from elsewhere? It was not in the
Panteleria report I cited. One more reason to dig out this plan.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-06 19:27:54 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Rich (Anderson)

(snip)

Some deleted text of Rich's, to next >

"Of course, all that ignores the simple problem of hitting those
objects. Essentially, assuming each defensive structure was a 10
by 10 meter object, the 50% chance of single direct hit by heavy
bombers flying at 20,000 feet has been calculated as requiring
between 400 and 4,000 bombs. A 90% chance required 1,300 to
13,000 bombs.

So in a nutshell, the reality you continue to be ignorant of
is that even if all 22,715 of the 100-lb and 500-lb GP had been
delivered with extreme precision, there would have been only at
best a 90% chance of 17.473 bombs directly hitting the target...
and doing F-ALL. For the 146 1000-lb GP there was a 90% chance
- assuming best circumstances - of 0.112 bombs achieving a
direct hit...and doing maybe slightly more than F-ALL.

These are very simple weapons-defense interface calculations. They
aren't "opinions". They are simple facts. I already gave you the
sources BTW, but since you seem bent on ignorance I shan't give
them you to ignore again. BTW, I excluded the useless Frags, hope
you don't mind."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
All you wrote above was known to the planers of D-Day.

Does "all you wrote above" include the deleted parts?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They had
good intel on the German fortifications and even blueprints of
some of them. But we have no report about their knowledge and
their long evaluation of the final air plan.

No actually, you do not have such a report, other people do and
you ignore them when they give the details.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But we know at least one knowledge base they had. The bombing
of Pantelleria island in June 1943. It was Operation Corkscrew
Rogers, Edith C.: The Reduction of Pantelleria and Adjacent
Islands, 8 May-14 June 1943, Monograph 52, Air Force Historical
Research Agency. Maxwell AFB, 1947 (on the net as pdf)
- Only 150-200 killed of a 11000 garrison, p. 59

As expected as long as they had warning.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
- Prof, Zuckermann: 1000 tons bombs per square mile in batteries area,
p. 60 (how much intended for Omaha?)

You have been told this and told how long Omaha beach
was and keep ignoring it. Under 1,000 short tons for a start.

Pantelleria: According to the Richard Davis spreadsheets the night
bombers dropped 623.5 short tons of bombs in 13 raids between 23
May and 10 June 1943, the day heavy bombers dropped 1,830.5
short tons of bombs in 7 raids between 1 and 11 June 1943.

Then add the fighter bombers and the light and medium bombers,
one round terms figure is given as over 5,000 tons of bombs since
8 May 1943 for 45 allied aircraft lost.

http://www.combinedops.com/pantellaria.htm

Goes for 4,119 tons and 14,203 bombs. Note the size of the post
action report.

By the way where is the report that compares the fortifications
at Pantelleria and Omaha? Thickness, gun protection, that sort
of thing.

Oh yes, the navy bombarded the island starting 8 June, including
from midnight in invasion day and reported counter battery fire, so
be careful about who did what damage.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
- indirect hits (near miss) 4 times more effective than direct hits,
- "many guns" covered by debris for 1-2 hours clearance work,

So the near misses stood more chance of moving material than
a direct hit of destroying the gun.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
- "disrupted character or terrain" would have made ammunition supply
difficult and even walking from gun to gun an "considerable effort",
p.63

So in other words the Italian positions did not have their ammunition
in the same bunker or accessible below ground, unlike Omaha.

And now try assaulting from gun to gun or moving through the
bombed area, with vehicles.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
2 by direct hits,
17 lifted from foundations by near misses,
34 damaged by debris and splinters. p. 66
- against batteries effective radius of 1000 lb bomb only 1.5 times
that of the 500 lb bomb. Gives 500 lb clear advantage. p. 66f
- But this bomb needs delay of 0.025 seconds for best results (debris
generation and ground shock). Then it was twice as effective against
gun batteries than instant fuze. Provided terrain soil allowed
penetration. p. 67f

So in other words lots of craters and the hope of undermining at
least part of the structures.

By systematic attacks over weeks and intense attacks for over a
week, in generally good weather.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From the above it seems likely the D-Day planer never intended to
penetrate the heavy concrete structures.

You know the rest of the people here reached that conclusion months
ago now, and they understand why, to try meant creating lots of deep
craters for little chance of hitting.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But they had a numerical
chance to do some effect. We dont know the numbers - but they had.

Rich actually gave the numbers, the probabilities of a hit from heavy
bombers. You deleted them then claim not to know them.

Work it out, 14,203 bombs for 53 hits that caused enough damage
to guns.

Of course some positions could have been hit a couple of times, say
say 100 bombs "hit" and remember we are talking lots of non heavy
bomber sorties. Assuming of course none of the hits were naval
shells.

As expected the bombing did damage to control systems. And the
web site I quoted claim of air raid shelters destroyed is contrary to the
casualties.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They even did experiments. Let me cite about the work they did to came
up with the final plan. This mission was the most intensly planed
one in the history of air power.
Sunday Punch in Normandy: The Tactical Use of Heavy Bombardment
in the Normandy Invasion. An Interim Report Headquarters, Army Air
Forces, 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL)
www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100929-060.pdf

So now, after being told all this by the people here you only credit
the data when you can read a report.

(snip of quotes)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I see no reason to doubt anything of the above.

Really, given how you doubted it when people here reported it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I know from other
examples that the 8th AAF had the ability for an engineering science
based attack planing. They were no fools. Before we decide they had
no chance we should read what they did know and what intended why.

People have but you keep ignoring their results.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It seems now obvious that this plan report is neither published nor
even know by title.

Actually people have seen the report, and some summaries have
been published, like for example

Sunday Punch in Normandy: The Tactical Use of Heavy Bombardment
in the Normandy Invasion. An Interim Report Headquarters, Army Air
Forces, 1945.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
There is the possibility that it is no single
report but still a bunch of papers in some boxes. Because the plan
failed (at least at Omaha) to hit the main target area - there seems
an attitude to downplay its chances for success anyway.

No actually, you have decided once again if you cannot find the
data easily there is a conspiracy to hide it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
In the above I read several times about "demoralization" effects
on the defenders.

You mean like at Pantelleria? How much resistance did the
landing encounter?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
An Effects-Based Operation. Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell
AFB 2007.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/
ADA471896
RAF Bomber Command, under Operation FLASHLAMP made a night bombing
attack on ten of the coastal batteries, seeking to drive the gun crews
into their shelters and disrupt operations while the assault teams
loaded into the smaller landing boats.92
Over 1,100 RAF heavy bombers took off late on the night of 5/6 June in
order to complete their operations close to the start of the naval
bombardment and the American day bombing attack. The timing was
devised to maximize continuity and give the Germans minimal time to
return to their posts and mount an effective attack.93
The RAF dropped over 5,900 tons of bombs on their targets, mostly
of the 1,000 and 500 lb types.94 The effects, as assessed shortly
after the landing by allied experts, found that the "Physical
damage to guns and casemates does not appear to have been very
extensive even when hits were registered near the guns."95

8,662 by 1,000 pound (1,685 USA made, 6,396 medium case, 581
general purpose) and 5,987 by 500 pound bombs (510 USA made,
1,860 medium case, 3,596 general purpose) or 5,198.4 long tons,
or 5,822 short tons. in the intelligence reports.

Other ordnance dropped were target markers.

The official total for the night was 1,729 USA, 6,530 MC, 483 GP by
1,000 pound, 510 USA, 1,634 MC, 3,860 GP by 500 pound bombs
the above includes some bombs dropped by Mosquitoes which
also dropped 23 by 4,000 pound M2 bombs, bringing the total
tonnage of HE dropped that night to 5,283.9 long tons.

1,167 sorties, 1,089 effective, all against primary targets, 14,769
bombs dropped, or about 500 more than on Pantelleria.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
However, damage to nearby buildings and other installations appeared
to have impacted the efficiency of the gun crews.96 Of special note
was that information obtained from prisoners and a captured German
report indicated that "[German] personnel suffered so badly from shock
that while most of them were disinclined to come out of their shelters;
many were incapable of efficient work even when they did man the
batteries." 97
Now the above is from past D-Day.

So not a lot of hits reported on guns and bunkers.

Apparently the night of 5/6 June is after D-Day.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But could it be that this effect was
known to the planners of D-Day from elsewhere?

Pantelleria

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was not in the
Panteleria report I cited. One more reason to dig out this plan.

Oh I see, they did not include the final paragraph noting the
garrison did not fight the invasion.

And of course we cannot possibly go near those reports of allied
airpower intervening at the front line and the effects of that. Hint,
lots more suppression than morale than damage unless the enemy
was trying to move.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-09-10 20:37:11 UTC

Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

I just saw an US TV documentary by National Geographic about the
Atlantik Wall and specially Omaha. Good images but poor info
like usual by NG. At the end a historian said D-Day was probably
the most important event in the European history of the last
500 (!) years. I hope nobody here shares this opinion.

But it motivated me to continue here about the lost history of
the largest and most ambitious (outstanding) air operation in history.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Some deleted text of Rich's, to next >
"Of course, all that ignores the simple problem of hitting those
objects. Essentially, assuming each defensive structure was a 10
by 10 meter object, the 50% chance of single direct hit by heavy
bombers flying at 20,000 feet has been calculated as requiring
between 400 and 4,000 bombs. A 90% chance required 1,300 to
13,000 bombs.
So in a nutshell, the reality you continue to be ignorant of
is that even if all 22,715 of the 100-lb and 500-lb GP had been
delivered with extreme precision, there would have been only at
best a 90% chance of 17.473 bombs directly hitting the target...
and doing F-ALL. For the 146 1000-lb GP there was a 90% chance
- assuming best circumstances - of 0.112 bombs achieving a
direct hit...and doing maybe slightly more than F-ALL.
These are very simple weapons-defense interface calculations. They
aren't "opinions". They are simple facts. I already gave you the
sources BTW, but since you seem bent on ignorance I shan't give
them you to ignore again. BTW, I excluded the useless Frags, hope
you don't mind."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
All you wrote above was known to the planers of D-Day.

Does "all you wrote above" include the deleted parts?

Of course it does. The air planners of D-Day did know that.
Thats why I would very much like to find and read what they
had in mind. They did experiments and choose the small 100 lb
bomb as main ammunition. We only can spekulate why.

No actually, you do not have such a report, other people do and
you ignore them when they give the details.

You mean the above on the hit proability? Thats not from that
report. Like we saw by the reply of Rich even the name of the
planning report is unkown.

As expected as long as they had warning.

That point of you gave me to think. There was an air campaign before
D-Day to eleminate all German radar stations in the wider area. It
helped the airborne operation and the approach of the invasion fleet.
But could it be a crucial part in the morning bombardment plan too?
Was there a chance to surprise some of the defenders in sites without
roof? That option would further support the 100 lb bomb choice. To
bad we dont know what they thought.

...

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
By the way where is the report that compares the fortifications
at Pantelleria and Omaha? Thickness, gun protection, that sort
of thing.

size of openings, roofless sites...
Yes, where is this report? I bet they did some!

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But they had a numerical
chance to do some effect. We dont know the numbers - but they had.

Rich actually gave the numbers, the probabilities of a hit from heavy
bombers. You deleted them then claim not to know them.

The bombing of Omaha has nothing to do with the hit probability, the
CEP, from a bomber. They attacked by a (km size) wide wing formation
"abreast". That was the wide of the bomb carpet. Then they began
to drop the bombs (52 x 100 lb per B-24) - thats the lenght of the carpet.
We neither know the intended nor the actual size of the carpet. But
the size of the defence sites they wanted to hit was certainly much
smaller than the carpet. So they did know the numbers we dont.

(bomb drop statistics)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
1,167 sorties, 1,089 effective, all against primary targets, 14,769
bombs dropped, or about 500 more than on Pantelleria.

What does it tell? Not much. First it should be known how much
landed in target distance to be of some effect. Then to compare
the different effects of the very different bomb load used at
D-Day fortifications. Then to compare what was planned for
D-Day and what actual happened.

So not a lot of hits reported on guns and bunkers.
Apparently the night of 5/6 June is after D-Day.

Yes, but the above knowledge they got after after D-Day.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But could it be that this effect was
known to the planners of D-Day from elsewhere?

Pantelleria

No way. You can not take the result from many days of heavy
bombardment of Pantelleria and hope to achive something
similar in a few minutes. I found the above cited effect of
a single bombardment in no other source pre D-Day.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was not in the
Panteleria report I cited. One more reason to dig out this plan.

Oh I see, they did not include the final paragraph noting the
garrison did not fight the invasion.

Of course they did and gave details about broken water pipes and
that the Italian commander was concerned about the civilians on
the island. Thats why he asked his government for allowence to
surrender and got it. I see no relation of this fact with D-Day.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-11 14:46:18 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair
I just saw an US TV documentary by National Geographic about the
Atlantik Wall and specially Omaha. Good images but poor info
like usual by NG. At the end a historian said D-Day was probably
the most important event in the European history of the last
500 (!) years. I hope nobody here shares this opinion.

Important is relative, depending on your history.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But it motivated me to continue here about the lost history of
the largest and most ambitious (outstanding) air operation in history.

And it seems continue the exercise of starting with a conclusion
and ignoring anything that does not fit.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Some deleted text of Rich's, to next >

"We have all the "details" in the world. 100-lb GP, 120-lb Frag,
500-lb GP, and 1000-lb GP will do nothing against most of the
defensive structures used by the Germans. The 1 to 2-meter thick
reinforced concrete, usually with a 1 to 2-meter earth cover, were
effectively impervious to even direct hits by the heavier bombs. A
100-lb GP instantaneously fuzed bomb would only produce a surface
less than a meter deep. The 500-lb GP fractionally more. Neither
were likely to have any effect on the concrete structure below.
However, even if there was no earth cover, the best the 100-lb GP
might do is produce an exterior crater 0.15 meters deep. The
500-lb GP also would not penetrate, but at best on the thinnest
thickness might scab the interior surface - might. The 1000-lb
GP might blow through...the thinnest 1 meter thickness ***if***
there were no earth covering."

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
"Of course, all that ignores the simple problem of hitting those
objects. Essentially, assuming each defensive structure was a 10
by 10 meter object, the 50% chance of single direct hit by heavy
bombers flying at 20,000 feet has been calculated as requiring
between 400 and 4,000 bombs. A 90% chance required 1,300 to
13,000 bombs.
So in a nutshell, the reality you continue to be ignorant of
is that even if all 22,715 of the 100-lb and 500-lb GP had been
delivered with extreme precision, there would have been only at
best a 90% chance of 17.473 bombs directly hitting the target...
and doing F-ALL. For the 146 1000-lb GP there was a 90% chance
- assuming best circumstances - of 0.112 bombs achieving a
direct hit...and doing maybe slightly more than F-ALL.
These are very simple weapons-defense interface calculations. They
aren't "opinions". They are simple facts. I already gave you the
sources BTW, but since you seem bent on ignorance I shan't give
them you to ignore again. BTW, I excluded the useless Frags, hope
you don't mind."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
All you wrote above was known to the planers of D-Day.

Does "all you wrote above" include the deleted parts?

Of course it does.

Interesting, on that basis of delete is silent agreement you have
agreed your ideas are junk. Given how much evidence you have
deleted. Including in this post.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The air planners of D-Day did know that.

So they knew the fortifications, hit probabilities and damage
effects. Then below you decide they did not because Rich
did not include the actual reference details yet again.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Thats why I would very much like to find and read what they
had in mind.

No you do not, rather you want to find where they agree with
your fiction.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They did experiments and choose the small 100 lb
bomb as main ammunition. We only can spekulate why.

No you can only speculate why, the rest of us have been well
aware for some time now the requirement to avoid cratering
was the reason for the chosen bomb loads. Like the army
asked for.

AVOID CRATERING.

No we understand the more times you are told something
the less you believe it but the above is the reason. Since
you deleted my line about avoiding cratering from this
latest non reply.

Also note how much chance the bombs had of doing real
damage even if they hit, pushing things towards the loads
they actually dropped.

No actually, you do not have such a report, other people do and
you ignore them when they give the details.

You mean the above on the hit proability? Thats not from that
report. Like we saw by the reply of Rich even the name of the
planning report is unkown.

Ah I see, people telling you what they have read is completely
IRRELEVANT, you must read it for yourself. After AGREEING
the information was available now you decide it was not.

Why are you participating in any discussion here, since you
are uninterested in what people say?

Rich has access to the report, you do not, therefore the report
does not exist, or anything taken from it is ignored.

Very good.

Thanks for great confirmation that helping you is a waste of
everyone's time.

So tell us all where do you think Rich obtained the numbers
from? He notes he provided sources but it seems you have
decided he did not.

As expected as long as they had warning.

You mean the fact the Germans at the coast spotted the ships
before the airstrikes? And before the ships opened fire?

The fact the naval bombardment started in the Omaha area before
the bombers arrived? Texas opened fire at 05.30.

The fact thousands of aircraft make such a noise they announce
themselves.

Of course you have been told the times but as usual ignored them
as coming from carbon based life forms, not carbon based ink
and paper.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Was there a chance to surprise some of the defenders in sites without
roof? That option would further support the 100 lb bomb choice. To
bad we dont know what they thought.

Oh WE know what they thought, YOU are clueless.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
...

Ah yes, all the facts about the Pantelleria attacks are deleted.

Little things like the length of the attacks and the way non heavy
bombers were used.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
By the way where is the report that compares the fortifications
at Pantelleria and Omaha? Thickness, gun protection, that sort
of thing.

size of openings, roofless sites...
Yes, where is this report? I bet they did some!

Good to know you have no idea about the facts. As for supplying
the comparison Rich has given details of the Omaha fortifications,
you have decided to ignore that, so you could not possibly compare
the data the rest of us have with that in the Pantelleria report.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But they had a numerical
chance to do some effect. We dont know the numbers - but they had.

Rich actually gave the numbers, the probabilities of a hit from heavy
bombers. You deleted them then claim not to know them.

The bombing of Omaha has nothing to do with the hit probability, the
CEP, from a bomber.

You see it goes like this, the allies figured out the chances of hurting
the defences were low and at a real cost of cratering. So they went
for the light bombs with the hope they could suppress the defences
and cause damage to the lighter positions and communications.
At least where the army was planning to advance.

Therefore after the allies deciding the hit probabilities ruled out an
effective attack with heavier bombs Seneca is certain hit probability
has nothing to do with it.

Nor the known errors in bombing accuracy, the time delays close to
H hour have another explanation in Seneca land.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They attacked by a (km size) wide wing formation
"abreast". That was the wide of the bomb carpet.

Wing, 3 groups, 4 squadrons each of 6, so a whole maximum of
72 aircraft wide. The standard group formations varied, 18 aircraft
wide was one.

Times the 4 targets reported bombed and what do we have?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Then they began
to drop the bombs (52 x 100 lb per B-24) - thats the lenght of the carpet.
We neither know the intended nor the actual size of the carpet. But
the size of the defence sites they wanted to hit was certainly much
smaller than the carpet. So they did know the numbers we dont.

No what we have is someone who is certainly ignorant of just
about anything about D-Day air operations and deciding if they
do not know then no one else does either.

How about telling us what the timing delay was between the
individual bombs dropping, the longer the interval the longer
the bomb pattern. The air force reports tell us they attacked
specific positions.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(bomb drop statistics)

By the way the statistics below are from the night bombers,
not the day ones.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
1,167 sorties, 1,089 effective, all against primary targets, 14,769
bombs dropped, or about 500 more than on Pantelleria.

What does it tell? Not much.

Oh it tells us a great deal, but that must be ignored.

Like for example the planners knew the night bombers could only
attack with similar sorts of bombs and numbers as Panterellia.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
First it should be known how much
landed in target distance to be of some effect. Then to compare
the different effects of the very different bomb load used at
D-Day fortifications.

Furthermore we must also look at the effect of the attacks on
modern European politics, French cheese production and the
current rise in sea levels. Anything but deal with the facts.

So tell us all why we need the accuracy figure, why we then
need to compare the night raids to the day raids?

We know the artillery positions attacked were largely suppressed
but naval gunfire played a part in that. We know the day bombers
were usually carrying much lighter bombs.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Then to compare what was planned for
D-Day and what actual happened.

The day raids were to bomb closer to the beach than they
actually hit. The rest stays about the same for the air operations.

So not a lot of hits reported on guns and bunkers.
Apparently the night of 5/6 June is after D-Day.

Yes, but the above knowledge they got after after D-Day.

Actually the night of 5/6 June is before D-Day

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But could it be that this effect was
known to the planners of D-Day from elsewhere?

Pantelleria

No way.

Is anyone else having trouble reading this from laughing too much?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You can not take the result from many days of heavy
bombardment of Pantelleria and hope to achive something
similar in a few minutes.

Actually you can take a lot, like the hit probabilities and the
effects on real fortifications, the cratering, the casualties.

And yes you can hope to achieve the same sort of effect with
similar sized attacks in terms of bombs. Then apply the
downgrade for night and heavy bombers.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I found the above cited effect of
a single bombardment in no other source pre D-Day.

Above cited effect? The night bombers?

Deleted Seneca text,

"But could it be that this effect was
known to the planners of D-Day from elsewhere?"

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was not in the
Panteleria report I cited. One more reason to dig out this plan.

Oh I see, they did not include the final paragraph noting the
garrison did not fight the invasion.

You see the fact the Italians chose not to fight has absolutely
no bearing on the ability of air attacks to downgrade the
(temporary) willingness of the enemy to fight. The official
reason is the one we must choose, civilian water supply.

No looking at other reports of the effects of air raids. Only
reports Seneca has read count, people here telling Seneca
facts are ignored.

This of course is Seneca logic.

Deleted text,

And of course we cannot possibly go near those reports of allied
airpower intervening at the front line and the effects of that. Hint,
lots more suppression than morale than damage unless the enemy
was trying to move.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich

2015-09-09 21:05:25 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Now the above is from past D-Day. But could it be that this effect was
known to the planners of D-Day from elsewhere? It was not in the
Panteleria report I cited. One more reason to dig out this plan.

I am at a complete loss as to how to respond any more. You have been
given answers and evidence supporting those answers over and over again
and yet you keep coming back to your pat set of non-replies that simply
repeat massive clips of text of more or less relevance to the topic, but
which refuse to answer any of the questions put to you in turn.

What, pray tell, does the bombing attack of Pantelleria, spread over
some 19 bombing missions over a 20-day period, have to do with a single
mission required at Normandy? Tell me please, what does the effect of
multiple missions executed with primarily 1000-lb and 500-lb bombs have
to do with a single mission executed with primarily 100-lb bombs? What
does a mission designed to bombard a position over time have to do with
a time-constrained mission?

Of course, I don't expect an answer, but please stop spamming me with
random quotes that have little to do with the subject discussed.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-09-12 16:01:28 UTC

Reply to Rich (Anderson)

Post by Rich
What, pray tell, does the bombing attack of Pantelleria, spread over
some 19 bombing missions over a 20-day period, have to do with a single
mission required at Normandy? Tell me please, what does the effect of
multiple missions executed with primarily 1000-lb and 500-lb bombs have
to do with a single mission executed with primarily 100-lb bombs? What
does a mission designed to bombard a position over time have to do with
a time-constrained mission?

As far as I (and Geoffrey) know Panetelleria was the only knowledge
base they had about air bombing of modern concrete fortifications.
And the choice for 500 lb instead 1000 lb probably came from there.
Further the choice for 100 lb frag may be inspired by what they
noted there. But that we can only speculate because we lack the
report(s) about their planning.

Post by Rich
Of course, I don't expect an answer, but please stop spamming me with
random quotes that have little to do with the subject discussed.

I documented the very intense planning they did. Even with experiments.
Therefore they must have prepared reports on it. It further showed the
"ground forces" had the final word on details like fuzing - what lowered
the intended effectivens of the attack. Further it showed they created
an complex scheme for the night take off and assembly. They trained it
and it went well on D-Day. That is quite an achivement that was not
known at the begin of this thread. It was thought the assembly went
bad and thats why they were not on schedule. But that seems not true.

So the mayor question why the attack on Omaha failed ("was not on
schedule") is still open. We have neither reports on the planning
nor why the mission failed. If you claim to have it, please give
citations. If not for me, think about those others interested.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Rich

2015-09-12 20:35:25 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Rich (Anderson)
As far as I (and Geoffrey) know

Please don't try to validate your ignorance by trying to make it appear
as if another poster is agreeing with you. It is dishonest, but sadly
also exactly what I have come to expect from you.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I documented the very intense planning they did. Even with experiments.
Therefore they must have prepared reports on it. It further showed the
"ground forces" had the final word on details like fuzing - what lowered
the intended effectivens of the attack. Further it showed they created
an complex scheme for the night take off and assembly. They trained it
and it went well on D-Day. That is quite an achivement that was not
known at the begin of this thread. It was thought the assembly went
bad and thats why they were not on schedule. But that seems not true.

You just now realized the ""ground forces" had the final word on details
like fuzing"? Seriously? You do in fact actually know that the Allied
Strategic Air Forces that conducted the bombings were under the
operational control of SHAEF...so yes, in fact the "final word" was
their's, as was explained to you long ago when you first began babbling
about the "expected cratering" being part of the "failure". And you
somehow thought the "assembly went bad" and that was the cause of the
delays? Seriously? There were multiple bomber formations, assembling
in multiple locations, vectoring to multiple targets in a closely defined
area. Thus the reason for the range of time the bombing was planned for
and the structure of the delay system.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So the mayor question

The only "mayor question" remaining for me is why you continue to spam
this newsgroup.

William Clodius

2015-09-13 04:48:47 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
<snip>
The only "mayor question" remaining for me is why you continue to spam
this newsgroup.

Myself I wonder why people keep responding to someone they consider an
ignorant, dishonest spammer.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-13 20:05:24 UTC

Post by William Clodius

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
<snip>
The only "mayor question" remaining for me is why you continue to spam
this newsgroup.

Myself I wonder why people keep responding to someone they consider an
ignorant, dishonest spammer.

The attempt to educate.

The need to correct misinformation. Repeat a lie......

Trolls claiming to have knowledge disliking being corrected.

Comedy relief.

And the big one, teddy bear needing typing practice.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich

2015-09-14 14:36:19 UTC

Post by William Clodius
Myself I wonder why people keep responding to someone they consider an
ignorant, dishonest spammer.

William,

As Geoffrey mentioned, it is the habit such have of simply reposting
incorrect statements, which needs to be responded to. I have given
SENECA the benefit of the doubt too many times now. The only conclusion
I can make is the ignorance is deliberate. The dishonesty and spamming
my actually be an inadvertent byproduct of the ignorance.

Cheers!

Rich

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-09-14 14:37:10 UTC

Reply to Rich (Anderson)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
As far as I (and Geoffrey) know

Please don't try to validate your ignorance by trying to make it appear
as if another poster is agreeing with you. It is dishonest, but sadly
also exactly what I have come to expect from you.

He presented no other experience events for D-Day air than Pantelleria.
You did not mention any other and neither do I know any. So let me simply
ask, is there another?

This 8th AF air plan was prepared by all three (USAAF, Army and probably
Navy), presented to SHAEF and approved there. But before it was complete
there were 3 issues were the AF was reluctant to follow the Army request.
They decided to go to SHAEF and let them decide. In all three issues
SHAEF recommended that AF had to follow the Army request. I did not
cite that episode because it seemed not crucial to Omaha.

But it showed that the Army certainly had the final word on something
like fuzing and the bomb mix. Therefore if something was wrong
in this plan it was at least equaly or even more the Armys fault.

Post by Rich
about the "expected cratering" being part of the "failure". And you
somehow thought the "assembly went bad" and that was the cause of the
delays?

It was a suggestion by Geoffrey. Seemed plausible to me then. It
raised the question whether they trained the mission adequately.

Post by Rich
From the stuff I cited we saw they did adequately trained it and

it went smooth finaly. What of course again raised the question
what detail finaly went wrong.

Post by Rich
Seriously? There were multiple bomber formations, assembling
in multiple locations, vectoring to multiple targets in a closely defined
area.

Yes, an impressive acchivement.

Post by Rich
Thus the reason for the range of time the bombing was planned for
and the structure of the delay system.

With the last part of this sentence I do not agree, like you know.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So the mayor question

The only "mayor question" remaining for me is why you continue to spam
this newsgroup.

Nobody cited more from former classified reports on this matter than I
did. But in your contribution above I see no information provided,
just misunderstanding. I hope my explanations helped. That you and
Geoffrey perhaps slightly dislike me does not make me a spammer. Its
not spam if you read things you dont like.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Rich

2015-09-14 16:13:06 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
He presented no other experience events for D-Day air than Pantelleria.
You did not mention any other and neither do I know any. So let me simply
ask, is there another?

Why does it require "events"? The basic information published in TM9-1907,
"Ballistic Data, Performance of Ammunition" (Sep 1944)
and Vol. III of "Terminal Ballistic Data" (Sep 1945)
were part of an ongoing test and
evaluation effort by the U.S. Army Ordnance Department. The exact effect
versus the German defenses in Normandy were not known ahead of time,
but the general lack of bombing effectiveness against well-built
permanent and field fortifications was well known by 6 June 1944. Thus,
the USAAF admonition that the bombs and fuzing selected was ineffective.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This 8th AF air plan was prepared by all three (USAAF, Army and probably
Navy), presented to SHAEF and approved there. But before it was complete
there were 3 issues were the AF was reluctant to follow the Army request.
They decided to go to SHAEF and let them decide. In all three issues
SHAEF recommended that AF had to follow the Army request. I did not
cite that episode because it seemed not crucial to Omaha.

No, it was not "prepared by all three". SHAEF stated requirements for
what they wanted the air forces to do. the Planning was done by the air
forces based upon those requirements. The U.S. Army ground forces had no
role in that other than Eisenhower and some of his staff being ground
forces officers.

The discussion regarding bomb types and fuzing occurred prior to the
air forces planning stage; it was during the discussions when SHAEF
presented its requirements to the air staffs, heard their objections,
and finalized the requirements.

SHAEF did not "recommend" anything. It issued orders (requirements)
to the air component to need meet its needs.

You simply fail to grasp how the planning and organizational
hierarchy worked.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But it showed that the Army certainly had the final word on something
like fuzing and the bomb mix. Therefore if something was wrong
in this plan it was at least equaly or even more the Armys fault.

The U.S. Army ***ground forces*** had zero "final word" on the
fuzing and bomb mix. That requirement was driven from above by the
SHAEF requirements that the beaches not be heavily cratered and the
blue on blue risk be minimized.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was a suggestion by Geoffrey. Seemed plausible to me then.

Really? Where and when did he make that suggestion?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It raised the question whether they trained the mission adequately.
From the stuff I cited we saw they did adequately trained it and
it went smooth finaly. What of course again raised the question
what detail finaly went wrong.

The multiple details you have been given over and over again. In the
"stuff" you "cited" but failed to understand even after it has been
explained to you over and over again by those of us who supplied you
with most of those citations. That you then choose to ignore.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes, an impressive acchivement.

Okay.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With the last part of this sentence I do not agree, like you know.

We know. It is the why you have a problem getting across.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Nobody cited more from former classified reports on this matter than I
did. But in your contribution above I see no information provided,
just misunderstanding. I hope my explanations helped. That you and
Geoffrey perhaps slightly dislike me does not make me a spammer. Its
not spam if you read things you dont like.

Poppycock. You were supplied those "former classified reports" gratis
and ever since we have had to explain to you just what they meant, only
to be met by your wall of ignorance. No, your non-explanations do not
help because they are not "explanations" in any sense of the world.
Massive blocks of copied text without context are just massive blocks
of copied text. Reposting incorrect information and assessment does
not explain anything; it simply adds to the ignorance.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-14 17:02:13 UTC

Nothing new here.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Rich (Anderson)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
As far as I (and Geoffrey) know

Please don't try to validate your ignorance by trying to make it appear
as if another poster is agreeing with you. It is dishonest, but sadly
also exactly what I have come to expect from you.

He presented no other experience events for D-Day air than Pantelleria.

You mean the other stuff I mentioned in things like the fighter
bomber thread goes missing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You did not mention any other and neither do I know any. So let me simply
ask, is there another?

For about the tenth time, there is a large body of material about allied
air attacks in support of the battlefield. The results of the North African
and Italian operations were sent to the forces in England who adopted
the system but without fully understanding it. You know from the fighter
bomber operations posts?

Then add the US documents on what the bombs could do. The air
forces did have an idea of what they were dropping.

This 8th AF air plan was prepared by all three (USAAF, Army and probably
Navy), presented to SHAEF and approved there.

SHAEF heard the ideas about what was both possible and required
then issued orders.

The air plan was approved by the relevant headquarters, it was all
the operations.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But before it was complete
there were 3 issues were the AF was reluctant to follow the Army request.
They decided to go to SHAEF and let them decide. In all three issues
SHAEF recommended that AF had to follow the Army request. I did not
cite that episode because it seemed not crucial to Omaha.
But it showed that the Army certainly had the final word on something
like fuzing and the bomb mix. Therefore if something was wrong
in this plan it was at least equaly or even more the Armys fault.

It was a SHAEF plan, not surprising given it was a SHAEF operation
and once again it was what the bombers could do to help, with a clear
understanding the dug in positions were hard to hurt and the bombers
had real risks of doing friendly fire. Plus cratering areas the army
wanted to move through was counter productive and craters was
the price to pay for any attempt to hurt the more dug in positions.

Post by Rich
about the "expected cratering" being part of the "failure". And you
somehow thought the "assembly went bad" and that was the cause of the
delays?

It was a suggestion by Geoffrey. Seemed plausible to me then.

You see it is nice to note whatever I present will be ignored or
at best misused. The reality is in a complex operation SOME
parts will go wrong, and it becomes ALL parts. Some of the
formations did not assemble correctly.

Can I point out yet again not all the 8th Air Force units had
pathfinders, H2X equipped aircraft? So special arrangements
had to be made? That the mission was unique in many ways,
like no chance of a second bomb run, like tight time tables that
could not be easily altered, like lots of friendlies potentially
within the known bombing accuracy, like needing to drop the
bombs which meant ensuring H2X pathfinders were available
for all formations, like lots of separate targets?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It
raised the question whether they trained the mission adequately.

So the Seneca standard is perfection or failure.

Post by Rich
From the stuff I cited we saw they did adequately trained it and

it went smooth finaly. What of course again raised the question
what detail finaly went wrong.

What went wrong is largely in the Seneca mind.

The rest of us have sorted things out. The night heavy bombers
went after the main artillery positions, as did the heavier warships,
with the heavier bombs/shells.

The day heavy bombers tasked with bombing the beach defences,
with their known accuracy bombed inland from their official targets
at Omaha at least. With the need to avoid cratering they were
dropping bombs only likely to hurt open positions. It was what the
bombers could do, which was not very much against well dug in
troops, as everyone knew, digging in has a point.

Post by Rich
Seriously? There were multiple bomber formations, assembling
in multiple locations, vectoring to multiple targets in a closely defined
area.

Yes, an impressive acchivement.

But must be perfect in Seneca land.

Post by Rich
Thus the reason for the range of time the bombing was planned for
and the structure of the delay system.

With the last part of this sentence I do not agree, like you know.

How nice you do not agree with reality.

Have you talked to an air traffic controller yet? How the amount of
airspace available and needed meant the attacks had to be spaced
out in time? Once again in the "everything that would fly" mission of
24 December 1944 the lead bombers were near the German border
as the last cleared the English coast. There were actually 2 more
bomb groups active on D-day than in December, sending 1,805
bombers versus 2,046 in December. That part of the reason for
some of the Caen D-Day strikes was due to airspace restrictions?

How the known accuracy of the bombers and the possibility of them
arriving when the troops were near the beach resulted in a deliberate
set of time delays for dropping the bombs after given times being
put into the plan?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So the mayor question

The only "mayor question" remaining for me is why you continue to spam
this newsgroup.

Nobody cited more from former classified reports on this matter than I
did.

And then failed to understand most of it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But in your contribution above I see no information provided,
just misunderstanding.

Yes we know you will complain about a lack of material and then
ignore anything someone else contributes.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I hope my explanations helped.

No. Try more like self justifications.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That you and
Geoffrey perhaps slightly dislike me does not make me a spammer. Its
not spam if you read things you dont like.

Actually what you are doing is continually refusing to accept you
are wrong, posting data you clearly do not understand does not
change the way you ignore the facts.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-13 20:05:52 UTC

Nothing really new.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Rich (Anderson)

As far as I (and Geoffrey) know Panetelleria was the only knowledge
base they had about air bombing of modern concrete fortifications.

You mean things like the Mareth line?

I want to point out again there was a lot of material available on the
effects of air attack. Pantelleria was a good example for Normandy,
in terms of things like hit probabilities and damage assessments but
not the only one and limitations like the types of bombers, the length
of the attacks, the weather and the differences in the structures need
to be understood.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the choice for 500 lb instead 1000 lb probably came from there.

You mean like the RAF bomb mix? Plenty of 1,000 pound bombs,
like about four for every three 500 pound, whereas Pantelleria was
essentially saying at least reverse that.

But hey the fact the RAF bomb mix is so different to the reported
preferred mix is clear proof for Seneca the report was followed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further the choice for 100 lb frag may be inspired by what they
noted there. But that we can only speculate because we lack the
report(s) about their planning.

Actually as has been repeatedly pointed out you can only speculate
because you prefer to ignore reality. And I note the planning was
documented by Seneca, see below.

The USAAF bomb mix was chosen for the reasons given, to avoid
cratering.

They looked at how much cratering occurred versus how many of
the defences were destroyed at places like Pantelleria and decided
suppression and trying for things like communications links were the
way to go. With a bonus possible effects on the open positions.

Post by Rich
Of course, I don't expect an answer, but please stop spamming me with
random quotes that have little to do with the subject discussed.

I documented the very intense planning they did.

So you wrote all the reports you have been quoting?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Even with experiments.
Therefore they must have prepared reports on it. It further showed the
"ground forces" had the final word on details like fuzing - what lowered
the intended effectivens of the attack.

SHAEF had control of the heavy bombers forces.

And no, the fusing did not lower the intended effectiveness, it is amazing
how you twist the little data you bother to accept.

Fusing and bomb mix was chosen to minimise cratering, that created
an expected effectiveness.

You started with the idea the bombing could destroy enough/lots of
the bunkers and dug in troops and keep deciding that is what the
allies should have done, measuring everything against this. Always
ignoring the chances of the bombs doing real damage versus the
certainty of cratering an area the army wanted to move through.

Remember one of the lessons of previous amphibious attacks was
get inland as far and as fast as you can. Hindering yourself helps
the enemy.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further it showed they created
an complex scheme for the night take off and assembly. They trained it
and it went well on D-Day. That is quite an achivement that was not
known at the begin of this thread.

Not known by you, but you graciously assume if you do not know
then neither does anyone else. Hence the way you reject any
evidence presented by anyone else.

As a matter of logic, how exactly was the 8th air force supposed
to take off in daylight but then attack Normandy around sunrise
or shortly after? Sunrise was 05.58.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was thought the assembly went
bad and thats why they were not on schedule. But that seems not true.

Actually all the reports I have seen say the solid majority
assembled correctly and bombed within the allocated time
limits, but you have the idea it must be perfect or totally
wrong. Something the allies certainly did not think. They
knew for example the chances of a H2X set failing.

Also once again with so many squadrons in the air you decide
they were ALL late, without one piece of evidence, and I note
when challenged about this you admitted you lacked the
information, then asked for someone else to find it. And now
we are back with you keeping the same wrong conclusion.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So the mayor question why the attack on Omaha failed ("was not on
schedule") is still open.

You see Seneca rejects anything that does not fit the conclusion.
Start with failed is defined as hitting bunkers. Continue with ignoring
the reports of the cloud cover, H2X and bomber accuracy and the
problems of bombing so close to friendly troops.

Seneca has announced the bombing failed, what more does
the world need, apart from some people wanting the truth of
course.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We have neither reports on the planning
nor why the mission failed.

Lets see now, above we are told of the practice the 8th Air Force
undertook but that is not planning.

We have been told what the bombers attacked and with what sort
of bomb mix. All that is "not planning" in Seneca land.

We note Seneca took typewriter in hand and just above
announced,

"I documented the very intense planning they did."
and now says we have no reports on the planning.

Seneca says failed, stop disputing the preferred fiction.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
If you claim to have it, please give
citations. If not for me, think about those others interested.

He has been and you ignore it as it does not fit into your ideas.

Try rereading the thread, but firstly throw out your wrong
conclusions.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-09-16 20:24:53 UTC

Re to Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
As far as I (and Geoffrey) know Panetelleria was the only knowledge
base they had about air bombing of modern concrete fortifications.

You mean things like the Mareth line?

I looked at the Mareth line and found no evidence that it was heavy
bombed. It seems to me the battle there 1943 was more of a movement typ.
The RAF attacked mainly Axis forces in the open. Do you have other
reports on ML? Were at least some of the bunkers direct air bombed
during the battle?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I want to point out again there was a lot of material available on the
effects of air attack. Pantelleria was a good example for Normandy,
in terms of things like hit probabilities and damage assessments but
not the only one and limitations like the types of bombers, the length
of the attacks, the weather and the differences in the structures need
to be understood.

Yes, and that was part of the development of the D-Day plan. Thats
why I want to read it. Till now we not even know the title.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the choice for 500 lb instead 1000 lb probably came from there.

You mean like the RAF bomb mix? Plenty of 1,000 pound bombs,
like about four for every three 500 pound, whereas Pantelleria was
essentially saying at least reverse that.
But hey the fact the RAF bomb mix is so different to the reported
preferred mix is clear proof for Seneca the report was followed.

The RAF bombed other targets at D-Day than the 8th AF. It could be
they had blueprints from some of their targets and saw a chance that
1000 lb could penetrate something. Again we dont know because we lack
their plan report too.

Post by Rich
Of course, I don't expect an answer, but please stop spamming me with
random quotes that have little to do with the subject discussed.

I documented the very intense planning they did.

So you wrote all the reports you have been quoting?

?? I cited the "Sunday Punch" report that showed they did a lot of
planning. But nowhere found the actual planning report with the
numbers and knoweldge base.

But it certainly lowered the effectiveness of the air bombing.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You started with the idea the bombing could destroy enough/lots of
the bunkers and dug in troops and keep deciding that is what the
allies should have done,

I never suggested that. But it was deffinitive the instant fuze
wish of the Army that lowered the possible bombing outcome. This
is important by the post war discussion what the attack was able
to acchieve.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
measuring everything against this. Always
ignoring the chances of the bombs doing real damage versus the
certainty of cratering an area the army wanted to move through.
Remember one of the lessons of previous amphibious attacks was
get inland as far and as fast as you can. Hindering yourself helps
the enemy.

It was me who pointed out early here that cratering was problably
avoided along the reasons you mentioned above.

Not known by you, but you graciously assume if you do not know
then neither does anyone else. Hence the way you reject any
evidence presented by anyone else.
As a matter of logic, how exactly was the 8th air force supposed
to take off in daylight but then attack Normandy around sunrise
or shortly after? Sunrise was 05.58.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was thought the assembly went
bad and thats why they were not on schedule. But that seems not true.

Geoffrey, our topic here is Omaha beach. The heavy air part
here went totally wrong. I know you still count the bombs some
km inland at least a partial success. But the majority of
historians see Omaha air as a "fiasco", you know.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
knew for example the chances of a H2X set failing.
Also once again with so many squadrons in the air you decide
they were ALL late, without one piece of evidence, and I note

"not on schedule" at Omaha told the report.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
when challenged about this you admitted you lacked the
information, then asked for someone else to find it. And now
we are back with you keeping the same wrong conclusion.

Geoffrey, if you know better: Please give a cite for the planned
and the actual bomb time by the B-24 at Omaha. I lack them and
you lack them.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So the mayor question why the attack on Omaha failed ("was not on
schedule") is still open.

Geoffrey, if you ever came over with relevant citations everyone would
be glad. But you usual rumbling the road is hardly impressive on an
engineering like matter.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Seneca has announced the bombing failed, what more does

I cited that from the secret USAAF report of 1945 and from
a historical view in 2007.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
the world need, apart from some people wanting the truth of
course.

I want the truth. I want the planning report(s). I doubt that
this plan had no much chance to succeed - like some suggested.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We have neither reports on the planning
nor why the mission failed.

Make it short. Let me here include what you wrote a day before

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They attacked by a (km size) wide wing formation
"abreast". That was the wide of the bomb carpet.

Wing, 3 groups, 4 squadrons each of 6, so a whole maximum of
72 aircraft wide. The standard group formations varied, 18 aircraft
wide was one.

What was the planned and/or actual wide of a 36 bomber abreast formation?
Or of a 72 aircraft one if you have. Thats a crucial data to know.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Times the 4 targets reported bombed and what do we have?

No what we have is someone who is certainly ignorant of just
about anything about D-Day air operations and deciding if they
do not know then no one else does either.
How about telling us what the timing delay was between the
individual bombs dropping, the longer the interval the longer
the bomb pattern. The air force reports tell us they attacked
specific positions.

Of course. But you neither have the wide nor the lenght of the planned
carpets. That is necessary to calculate the bomb density. Thats about
the most crucial number to see what such a then new abreast wing was
able to do. And a way to compare it with the one number we have from
Pantelleria. The total tonnage you always like to present is less
relevant.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Rich

2015-09-16 21:50:05 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes, and that was part of the development of the D-Day plan. Thats
why I want to read it. Till now we not even know the title.

What title is that which we "know now"? You know, the one that you
think contains details on the "development of the D-Day plan" that
previously were unknown?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The RAF bombed other targets at D-Day than the 8th AF. It could be
they had blueprints from some of their targets and saw a chance that
1000 lb could penetrate something. Again we dont know because we lack
their plan report too.

No, the reason was that a minimum number of heavy bombs were to be used
on the beaches, but no such restriction was in place for the positions
further inland from the beach.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
?? I cited the "Sunday Punch" report that showed they did a lot of
planning. But nowhere found the actual planning report with the
numbers and knoweldge base.why do you thi

What is a "planning report", what "numbers and knoweldge [sic] base"
do you think it contains, and why do you think such a thing exists?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But it certainly lowered the effectiveness of the air bombing.

Which was a matter raised, discussed, and rejected...as we already
know.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I never suggested that. But it was deffinitive the instant fuze
wish of the Army that lowered the possible bombing outcome. This
is important by the post war discussion what the attack was able
to acchieve.

The "instant fuze wish of the Army" was no such thing as you have
been told over and over again. It was a requirement by the SHAEF
planning staff, not a "wish".

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was me who pointed out early here that cratering was problably
avoided along the reasons you mentioned above.

Yes, which was confirmed by me on 26 June in my first response to
you. So no "problably [sic]" about it. It is a fact, which feeds
into the fact of the bomb and fuzing choices made, but which you
simply can't seem to wrap your head around in your need to deny
what actually happened and why.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Geoffrey, our topic here is Omaha beach. The heavy air part
here went totally wrong. I know you still count the bombs some
km inland at least a partial success. But the majority of
historians see Omaha air as a "fiasco", you know.

Yes indeed, a result which was predicted beforehand, but accepted
as part of the cost of doing business. So what?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"not on schedule" at Omaha told the report.

Sigh. Yes, they were within the schedule. What "report" says
they weren't? And give me a title and page please.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Geoffrey, if you know better: Please give a cite for the planned
and the actual bomb time by the B-24 at Omaha. I lack them and
you lack them.

No you don't, you have been given them a couple of times. Denying
you have been given them is tantamount to declaring they don't
exist, which is insane. Have you been treated for mental illness?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Geoffrey, if you ever came over with relevant citations everyone would
be glad. But you usual rumbling the road is hardly impressive on an
engineering like matter.

Do you know what the expression "calling the kettle black" means? If
not, you should look it up. Except it doesn't really fit here. Your
idea of a citation appears to be "secret report 1945". Try again.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I cited that from the secret USAAF report of 1945 and from
a historical view in 2007.

Oh, sorry, no "secret USAAF report of 1945". BTW, do you think there
may have been at least a few other "historical views" in 2007? If yes,
then I suspect you reference the particular one you mean.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I want the truth. I want the planning report(s). I doubt that
this plan had no much chance to succeed - like some suggested.

WHAT IS A PLANNING REPORT? So yes, we've established for some time
that the general consensus of opinion was the air plan for the beach
defenses would be ineffective. So your doubt was confirmed some
71 years ago.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Make it short. Let me here include what you wrote a day before

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They attacked by a (km size) wide wing formation
"abreast". That was the wide of the bomb carpet.

Wing, 3 groups, 4 squadrons each of 6, so a whole maximum of
72 aircraft wide. The standard group formations varied, 18 aircraft
wide was one.

What was the planned and/or actual wide of a 36 bomber abreast formation?
Or of a 72 aircraft one if you have. Thats a crucial data to know.

You were already told what the formation was.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Of course. But you neither have the wide nor the lenght of the planned
carpets. That is necessary to calculate the bomb density. Thats about
the most crucial number to see what such a then new abreast wing was
able to do. And a way to compare it with the one number we have from
Pantelleria. The total tonnage you always like to present is less
relevant.

What are you raving about? What "planned carpets"? The density may be
calculated by the presumed size of the modified group formation you
were already given weeks ago. Do some work for yourself for once.

BTW, what "one number" do we get from Pantelleria given that operation
consisted of at least 19 major bombing missions conducted over 20 days
against multiple targets?

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-09-20 18:27:25 UTC

Re to Rich (Anderson)

On Wednesday, September 16, 2015 at 4:24:56 PM UTC-4,

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes, and that was part of the development of the D-Day plan. Thats
why I want to read it. Till now we not even know the title.

What title is that which we "know now"? You know, the one that you
think contains details on the "development of the D-Day plan" that
previously were unknown?

Thats the question. What is the title? I understand from below you
think it does not exist.

What is a "planning report", what "numbers and knoweldge [sic] base"
do you think it contains, and why do you think such a thing exists?

Because such a BIG thing like the B-24 at Omaha (and the other
beaches) could not be decided without a detailed plan. There
must be a report that explains their reasoning and expections
for the mission. And a later one that detailed what failed.

The "instant fuze wish of the Army" was no such thing as you have
been told over and over again. It was a requirement by the SHAEF
planning staff, not a "wish".

Well, the USAAF in "Sunday Punch" wrote:

In many instances the destructive effect necessary could be
obtained only by use of heavy bombs with delayed fuzings, which
would cause the cratering the Army wished to avoid.

Thats it came from. As Army was part of SHAEF, whats the point?
That the wish was reasonable we all agree anyway.

Yes indeed, a result which was predicted beforehand, but accepted
as part of the cost of doing business. So what?

"was predicted beforehand" who did that?
We know the bomber mafia did not like the mission. But was there
really reasonable prediction / calculation / note / report about
a fail before?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"not on schedule" at Omaha told the report.

Sigh. Yes, they were within the schedule. What "report" says
they weren't? And give me a title and page please.

"The effectiveness of third phase tactical air operations in the
European Theater 5 May 1944 to 8 May 1945", prepared by the
Army Air Force Evaluation Board in the European Theater of
Operations, August 1945. (Secret) Declassified 1961

Citations: "Omaha Beach was not bombed as scheduled" what caused the
"non-effectiveness of the heavy bombardment" there and was the
"dominating" factor for the ground force "difficulty" there. Pages
41-42. I cited full here on Sa 25.07.15 under "USAAF: Omaha Our Fault!"

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Geoffrey, if you know better: Please give a cite for the planned
and the actual bomb time by the B-24 at Omaha. I lack them and
you lack them.

No you don't, you have been given them a couple of times. Denying
you have been given them is tantamount to declaring they don't
exist, which is insane. Have you been treated for mental illness?

You? Do you really claim to have data that they were on schedule
and the secret USAAF report (cited above) was wrong?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Geoffrey, if you ever came over with relevant citations everyone would
be glad. But you usual rumbling the road is hardly impressive on an
engineering like matter.

Read again above.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I cited that from the secret USAAF report of 1945 and from
a historical view in 2007.

Oh, sorry, no "secret USAAF report of 1945". BTW, do you think there
may have been at least a few other "historical views" in 2007? If yes,
then I suspect you reference the particular one you mean.

I cited Dahlstrom how he saw it in 2007:

"The story of direct air support to the landing beaches is held by a
great many historians as a fiasco that created a bill paid for in
blood by the soldiers who landed on the beach, and in great numbers,
died there."

Michael P. Dahlstrom: The Role of Airpower in the Overlord Invasion:
An Effects-Based Operation. Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell AFB 2007.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I want the truth. I want the planning report(s). I doubt that
this plan had no much chance to succeed - like some suggested.

WHAT IS A PLANNING REPORT?

the thing Geoffrey thought it could be several volumes if it exists ;)
Something with the knowledge base in short and more numbers than
we have.

So yes, we've established for some time
that the general consensus of opinion was the air plan for the beach
defenses would be ineffective. So your doubt was confirmed some
71 years ago.

Who is "we"? Some historians in the last 60 years?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What was the planned and/or actual wide of a 36 bomber abreast formation?
Or of a 72 aircraft one if you have. Thats a crucial data to know.

You were already told what the formation was.

Not the planned size in yards (or feet).

I dont want your "presumed size". I want a citation from a 1944/45
report about the planned size in yards.

BTW, what "one number" do we get from Pantelleria given that operation
consisted of at least 19 major bombing missions conducted over 20 days
against multiple targets?

The only one given in the post war USAF Pantelleria report I cited.
Do you know any more? I would be interested!

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-09-17 16:12:00 UTC

As usual nothing new here.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Re to Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
As far as I (and Geoffrey) know Panetelleria was the only knowledge
base they had about air bombing of modern concrete fortifications.

You mean things like the Mareth line?

I looked at the Mareth line and found no evidence that it was heavy
bombed.

Oh sorry, I thought you understood things like a 500 pound bomb do
NOT become more effective when dropped by a heavy bomber.

After all at Pantelleria the heavy bombers were only part of the
attacking force.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It seems to me the battle there 1943 was more of a movement typ.

You mean you think the allies did not do bombing raids on the
line in the time before the battle? Like in the time between the
arrival of allied forces, around 16 February and the actual battle,
about a month later?

The bombings of Sicily? The defences there.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The RAF attacked mainly Axis forces in the open. Do you have other
reports on ML? Were at least some of the bunkers direct air bombed
during the battle?

The entire idea of the battle was to avoid the line, which changed
mid way through, but the direct attacks were repulsed.

Essentially allied air power supported the attacks before and
during the ground combats.

Yes, and that was part of the development of the D-Day plan. Thats
why I want to read it. Till now we not even know the title.

No, plenty of people know the title/plan, you did not and generously
hand your ignorance out to the rest of humanity.

Pantelleria was one example of allied air operations in the Middle
East sent to England, lots more data was sent as we know from the
way the allied air forces in England adopted the Middle East systems.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the choice for 500 lb instead 1000 lb probably came from there.

You mean like the RAF bomb mix? Plenty of 1,000 pound bombs,
like about four for every three 500 pound, whereas Pantelleria was
essentially saying at least reverse that.
But hey the fact the RAF bomb mix is so different to the reported
preferred mix is clear proof for Seneca the report was followed.

No only Seneca lacks the information, but again generously hands
the ignorance out to the rest of humanity.

The RAF was well aware of its targets that night, the heavier
artillery positions in the invasion area. They dropped the bigger
bombs as cratering was not an issue and it was the only way to
stand a chance of destroying dug in positions. The bombing,
including more by day, and the naval bombardments largely
suppressed the batteries but did not destroy them. But since
Seneca has been told this before naturally it is claimed the
information is not known.

By the way on D-Day MOST of the 8th Air Force was trying for
targets the army wanted to move through, that is not the same
as ALL. This has been told before and ignored.

Also what is a "plan report"? Clearly not the results I have reported?

Can I add if the RAF only "could" have some of the defence plans
that it could also apply to the USAAF?

deleted text,

"Actually as has been repeatedly pointed out you can only speculate
because you prefer to ignore reality. And I note the planning was
documented by Seneca, see below.

The USAAF bomb mix was chosen for the reasons given, to avoid
cratering.

They looked at how much cratering occurred versus how many of
the defences were destroyed at places like Pantelleria and decided
suppression and trying for things like communications links were the
way to go. With a bonus possible effects on the open positions."

Post by Rich
Of course, I don't expect an answer, but please stop spamming me with
random quotes that have little to do with the subject discussed.

I documented the very intense planning they did.

So you wrote all the reports you have been quoting?

?? I cited the "Sunday Punch" report that showed they did a lot of
planning. But nowhere found the actual planning report with the
numbers and knoweldge base.

So you have this idea the allied air plan of attack contained lots
of data on expected effects? How many volumes do you think
that would take? What sort of numbers?

The allied air plan contained what the bombers would hit and
with what sort of load, at what sort of time and in what sort
of formation, and the routes flown. This has been communicated
several times now, but still ignored.

The bomb ballistics report Rich has mentioned several times
now gives data on the weapon's effects, but again ignored
for some sort of plan to rule them all, everything in the one
place sort of idea. Wrong.

But it certainly lowered the effectiveness of the air bombing.

Actually no, unless in continuing ignorance someone thinks lots
of dug in positions could be hit and destroyed and the cratering
effects would be marginal on army mobility. Something the allies
knew to be wrong.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You started with the idea the bombing could destroy enough/lots of
the bunkers and dug in troops and keep deciding that is what the
allies should have done,

I never suggested that.

Really, not even the fighter bombers/?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But it was deffinitive the instant fuze
wish of the Army that lowered the possible bombing outcome. This
is important by the post war discussion what the attack was able
to acchieve.

Try SHAEF orders, not army wishes.

Tell us all, what would non instant fusing do to increase the
effectiveness? Come on, what exactly does the fusing do
to alter the result?

You must know, it is your conclusion and it does not include
hitting dug in troops and bunkers.

It was me who pointed out early here that cratering was problably
avoided along the reasons you mentioned above.

Actually you put forth an assumption,

" I assume there was never the
intention to bomb the beaches and create the field of craters promised
to the troops. "

Not known by you, but you graciously assume if you do not know
then neither does anyone else. Hence the way you reject any
evidence presented by anyone else.
As a matter of logic, how exactly was the 8th air force supposed
to take off in daylight but then attack Normandy around sunrise
or shortly after? Sunrise was 05.58.

No reply here.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was thought the assembly went
bad and thats why they were not on schedule. But that seems not true.

Geoffrey, our topic here is Omaha beach.

Actually I really doubt that, more Seneca beach.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The heavy air part
here went totally wrong.

You mean they unloaded inland from their targets and were at
best expected to have a marginal effect even if they bombed
the defensive areas correctly?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I know you still count the bombs some
km inland at least a partial success.

Actually the air force does so at times. Perhaps you can actually
show me claiming "partial success" beyond noting the air force
claims.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But the majority of
historians see Omaha air as a "fiasco", you know.

Actually Seneca sees it as a "fiasco". Most historians note the
bombing missed, along with the rockets for example. And
fiasco when applied tends to be about the beach assault in total
because so much of the plan miscarried.

And I note the above still fails to address the Seneca overclaim
about bomb times.

"not on schedule" at Omaha told the report.

Also once again with so many squadrons in the air you decide
they were ALL late, without one piece of evidence, and I note
when challenged about this you admitted you lacked the
information, then asked for someone else to find it. And now
we are back with you keeping the same wrong conclusion.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
when challenged about this you admitted you lacked the
information, then asked for someone else to find it. And now
we are back with you keeping the same wrong conclusion.

Geoffrey, if you know better: Please give a cite for the planned
and the actual bomb time by the B-24 at Omaha. I lack them and
you lack them.

Oh sorry, YOU HAVE THEM, you say they were "not on schedule"
ALL OF THEM.

So post them, not a phrase in a report.

What does not on schedule mean, you MUST know, still within
the allotted time window? Squadrons out of order? WHAT?

I know of one planned time, I know Rich has posted the time
window and details of how that relates to the bombing but I guess
once again you know the truth, until asked for it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So the mayor question why the attack on Omaha failed ("was not on
schedule") is still open.

Geoffrey, if you ever came over with relevant citations everyone would
be glad. But you usual rumbling the road is hardly impressive on an
engineering like matter.

You see people know I have posted the data, but of course it
does not fit so it is ignored.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Seneca has announced the bombing failed, what more does

I cited that from the secret USAAF report of 1945 and from
a historical view in 2007.

Oh I see which secret report? Which historical view?

" if you ever came over with relevant citations everyone would
be glad. But you usual rumbling the road is hardly impressive on an
engineering like matter."

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
the world need, apart from some people wanting the truth of
course.

I want the truth. I want the planning report(s). I doubt that
this plan had no much chance to succeed - like some suggested.

And you are wrong and need to reject the real data to keep
staying wrong.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We have neither reports on the planning
nor why the mission failed.

Make it short. Let me here include what you wrote a day before

So once again we are going to ignore the massive over
claim about planning.

deleted text,

We note Seneca took typewriter in hand and just above
announced,

"I documented the very intense planning they did."
and now says we have no reports on the planning.

Seneca says failed, stop disputing the preferred fiction.

I gather moving some of my text from my 12th September
message to here is all the reply I am going to receive for
that message.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They attacked by a (km size) wide wing formation
"abreast". That was the wide of the bomb carpet.

Wing, 3 groups, 4 squadrons each of 6, so a whole maximum of
72 aircraft wide. The standard group formations varied, 18 aircraft
wide was one.

What was the planned and/or actual wide of a 36 bomber abreast formation?
Or of a 72 aircraft one if you have. Thats a crucial data to know.

Oh sorry, Rich posted the data in late August, and I repeated it on
the 25th, so I guess that must mean you did not read it.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Times the 4 targets reported bombed and what do we have?

No what we have is someone who is certainly ignorant of just
about anything about D-Day air operations and deciding if they
do not know then no one else does either.
How about telling us what the timing delay was between the
individual bombs dropping, the longer the interval the longer
the bomb pattern. The air force reports tell us they attacked
specific positions.

Of course.

So what is the timing delay? You obviously have it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But you neither have the wide nor the lenght of the planned
carpets.

Lets see now, I posted the formation width, but that does not
count, I posted the bombers were after specific targets, rather
than essentially trying to create a "road" of bombed areas
for the army to follow but hey, that clearly is nothing because
Seneca has announced the allies were trying for bomb carpets.
No facts but please admire the press release.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That is necessary to calculate the bomb density.

Why?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Thats about
the most crucial number to see what such a then new abreast wing was
able to do.

Why?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And a way to compare it with the one number we have from
Pantelleria.

What is the one number, the bomb tonnage per unit area? You
know dropping the heavier bombs the Omaha beach bombers
were NOT dropping? How about all those fragmentation bombs?

Do you really understand anything about bombing operations?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The total tonnage you always like to present is less
relevant.

I see the area the bombs dropped in means more than the number
of bombs dropped? Each bomb has a probability of hitting a
target and unless the target is bigger than the bomb areas, unlikely
with heavy bombers, even more so in bad weather, then big bomb
areas reduce the chance of hits.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-09-20 18:27:45 UTC

Re to Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
As far as I (and Geoffrey) know Panetelleria was the only knowledge
base they had about air bombing of modern concrete fortifications.

You mean things like the Mareth line?

I looked at the Mareth line and found no evidence that it was heavy
bombed.

Oh sorry, I thought you understood things like a 500 pound bomb do
NOT become more effective when dropped by a heavy bomber.
After all at Pantelleria the heavy bombers were only part of the
attacking force.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It seems to me the battle there 1943 was more of a movement typ.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The RAF attacked mainly Axis forces in the open. Do you have other
reports on ML? Were at least some of the bunkers direct air bombed
during the battle?

The entire idea of the battle was to avoid the line, which changed
mid way through, but the direct attacks were repulsed.
Essentially allied air power supported the attacks before and
during the ground combats.

You did know I searched for reports on the effect knowledge base
before D-Day. You presented me Mareth Line and I did a two day
empty search. Now it seems you never had anything from there.
Indeed from your writing before you never really claimed to have
one. You wrote like a politician or lawyer. Or a clever pretender.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes, and that was part of the development of the D-Day plan. Thats
why I want to read it. Till now we not even know the title.

No, plenty of people know the title/plan, you did not and generously
hand your ignorance out to the rest of humanity.

So simply tell it. Just wrote down the title you have in mind here.
Instead you always pretend to know something and gave it before and
will not repeat it. You are a pretender.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
?? I cited the "Sunday Punch" report that showed they did a lot of
planning. But nowhere found the actual planning report with the
numbers and knoweldge base.

What you describe here is a mission plan. It has bomb load, target
and time. But it does not include information why things were choosen
that way (a short of the knowledge base) nor numbers or details on the
expected effects. You simply speculated that from post war knowledge.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The bomb ballistics report Rich has mentioned several times
now gives data on the weapon's effects, but again ignored

It was from after the war. I want to know what the planners
of D-Day had in mind. Not was later historians thought they
had in mind.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
for some sort of plan to rule them all, everything in the one
place sort of idea. Wrong.

Because you dont know it means it can not exist, right?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Also once again with so many squadrons in the air you decide
they were ALL late, without one piece of evidence, and I note

"not on schedule" at Omaha told the report.

Also once again with so many squadrons in the air you decide
they were ALL late, without one piece of evidence, and I note

Shall I cite the report parts a third time?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
when challenged about this you admitted you lacked the
information, then asked for someone else to find it. And now
we are back with you keeping the same wrong conclusion.

If you think you know better than the USAAF report I cited than
YOU have to back it.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Seneca has announced the bombing failed, what more does

I cited that from the secret USAAF report of 1945 and from
a historical view in 2007.

Oh I see which secret report?

That is the one I meant as the "secret report":

"The effectiveness of third phase tactical air operations in the
European Theater 5 May 1944 to 8 May 1945", prepared by the
Army Air Force Evaluation Board in the European Theater of
Operations, August 1945. (Secret) Declassified 1961

I cited from it many times now.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Which historical view?

Let me repeat from my post at Thursday 20.08.15:

Instead a 2007 Air Force study described the present historical view:

"The story of direct air support to the landing beaches is held by a
great many historians as a fiasco that created a bill paid for in
blood by the soldiers who landed on the beach, and in great numbers,
died there."

Michael P. Dahlstrom: The Role of Airpower in the Overlord Invasion:
An Effects-Based Operation. Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell AFB
2007.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They attacked by a (km size) wide wing formation
"abreast". That was the wide of the bomb carpet.

Wing, 3 groups, 4 squadrons each of 6, so a whole maximum of
72 aircraft wide. The standard group formations varied, 18 aircraft
wide was one.

What was the planned and/or actual wide of a 36 bomber abreast formation?
Or of a 72 aircraft one if you have. Thats a crucial data to know.

Oh sorry, Rich posted the data in late August, and I repeated it on
the 25th, so I guess that must mean you did not read it.

That is what he wrote / you repeated:

Each were targeted by one B-24 group comprised of six six-aircraft
squadrons, which were scheduled to attack between H-25 and H-5.

While each group was described as being "on line abreast" it appears
what actually was used was a modified 36-aircraft group box. While
the standard formation was 520 yards wide the modified was double
that...i.e., roughly a kilometer wide (the exact layout of the
formation is still in question). Add in the complication the B-24
was difficult to fly in tight formations and the actual width was
probably greater.

So "it appears" it was "a modified" and "double that ... roughly".
And finaly more detail "is still in question".

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
From this reply I see no evidence that Rich had a WWII report where

the planned wing size nummber in yards was given. Instead of assuming
and speculation things, what about simple citations? Why do you think
I give citations from reports?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But you neither have the wide nor the lenght of the planned
carpets.

If a large wing "abreast" formation begins to drop bombs, this
does not create an area of bomb hits? Are you in the word game
that it shall not be called a carpet? Shall we call it a "road",
realy?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That is necessary to calculate the bomb density.

Why?

To know the bomb load per area. You still ask why?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Thats about
the most crucial number to see what such a then new abreast wing was
able to do.

Why?

Because this - and not the total tonnage - gives a nummber for the
intended effect.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And a way to compare it with the one number we have from
Pantelleria.

What is the one number, the bomb tonnage per unit area? You
know dropping the heavier bombs the Omaha beach bombers
were NOT dropping? How about all those fragmentation bombs?
Do you really understand anything about bombing operations?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The total tonnage you always like to present is less
relevant.

That you dont have this nummber proves that you dont have the plan
report you always pretended to have. Seems it was not in the mission
report and you are now caught.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-26 16:53:39 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Re to Rich (Anderson)

Post by Rich
And yes, as a historian I HAVE READ "at least 3 of the 5" you mentioned
as well as others. It is the only way to understand what really happened.
I find great pleasure in doing so.

My intention of this thread is to collect more information from
historical records.

So far the opposite is being displayed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Several times I noted details to be unclear
or not understandable to me.

And then discarded the information clarifying the situation.

And I note once again anything anyone else has added is ignored.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
As you read this reports, could you make some remarks?

People have been and they feel little reason to do anything more as
you continually ignore what they say.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Which one would
you suggest as of most detailed about planing and execution?

Which one to you think given you claim to have read them all.

Why is it up to someone else to do the work?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What may
be the best way to order a copy?

Reports are available on the net in electronic form at the
web sites listed by other posters.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I promis you that I will give here citations from it even if it will
not support my present view of the plan.

The situation is reality does not support your present view of the
plan and fundamentally your promises are meaningless given the
way you have been ignoring the data.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-24 15:50:14 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The 2d Bombardment Division began the day's operations for the Eighth
by dispatching, between 0555 and 0614 hours, 329 B-24's against OMAHA

Do you realize those attacks, by those separate groups occurred between
H-35 and H-16? Do you actually understand what you are reading and
posting?

I see, immediately change the subject, noted the times above and
how far away Normandy is from the USAAF bases?

Do you understand Rich is reporting the actual bombing times?
Why are they rejected?

Why?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.
H-35 and H-16 means a delay of 0 and of 5 seconds.

Now we have BETWEEN H-35 and H-16 being tuned into attacked
at EITHER H-35 or H-16.

Is this really what you think?

It seems quite clear you do not understand what is going on, instead
going quote shopping for that one phrase that fits the conclusion.

Start with the fact at around 100 metres per second 5 seconds would
be 500 metres, is the idea Omaha beach was uniformly 500 metres
from tide line to defences?

I do like the German site positions are the targets only "like some claimed"
why is the USAF historian Richard Davis wrong when reporting the results
of his examination of the target folders, mission reports?

Then we have the new idea, 0 delay from the waterline would hit the those
German positions, so they are now on the waterline.

Have you actually understood the expected accuracy of the bombers?

Have you gone near an air traffic controller about what sort of traffic
density is possible? Therefore how much time was required given
the number of aircraft?

Tell us all why this is wrong.

1) Absolute orders, do not bomb before the identified water line.
2) Absolute orders, aim for your briefed target.
3) Absolute orders, if you are arriving within the specified times
add the specified time delay to your "pass over the waterline" time
even if that means risking missing your target.

The waterline was a reference line, not a target, nor was the beach.

No what we have is you once again misunderstanding and then
deciding the world has the problem, not you.

By the way the reason there are sparse sources is you are rejecting
material that does not fit.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Still nowhere any details why this largest of all air attacks failed.

Really? I think you have just proven that you can read, but cannot
comprehend. I'm afraid I don't think there is any way to help you.

Rich, dont blame me.

Have you considered why people keep reporting you are incorrect?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The historical narrative of this most extraordinary
air operation in history is such badly screwed that only the original
secret reports of 1944 may be of any help.

You know, the mission reports, the ones we have all been telling
you about, but of course summary narratives written later is what
you prefer for the quotes that fit.

And the results being drawn are wrong.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I think we have to read at
least 3 of the 5 I mentioned to get an idea what realy happened. As a
historian you must be eager to read this stuff, are you?

Tell you what, people are reading all sorts of material, for work, for
interest and so on.

How about someone posts their current reading list say on the evolution
of language, and makes the comment "As a historian you must be eager
to read this stuff, are you?" Why did Gaul develop a written version of
its language under the influence of the Roman and Greek traders, but
then drop it in favour of Latin after the Romans took control, meantime
the Britons only developed a written version of their language after the
Romans had control of the area and then clearly did not adopt Latin in
a large way, so it did not end up speaking one of the Latin/Romance
family languages today.

By the way Ancient Rome itself may have had more Greek than
Latin speakers, there are just so many books and even TV on
this subject, hundreds of hours of things to look at. "As a
historian you must be eager to read this stuff, are you?" Just
how far apart was Latin to the Celtic Gaul and Briton and for
that matter Gaul and Briton Celtic to each other, and so on.

How many years ago did you demote the rest of humanity to doing
what you want, when you want, in particular stopping telling you that
you are the one who is wrong?

To put this the way people are seeing it, you have arrived with the
news confirming the moon is made of cheese, delivery mechanism
cows jumping over it, quote proved, see all those books, but the
new idea is the cheese is really yellow, not green. For example the
Wallace and Gromit expedition of 1992 showed yellow cheese.
"Look Gromit, cheese" quote proved. Even before we use the
taste tests.

Hence you can ignore the way the Apollo landings found only
dust and rocks.

And I know you cannot comprehend this.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

William Clodius

2015-08-25 04:23:36 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Rich
<snip>
Rich, dont blame me. The historical narrative of this most extraordinary
air operation in history is such badly screwed that only the original
secret reports of 1944 may be of any help. I think we have to read at
least 3 of the 5 I mentioned to get an idea what realy happened. As a
historian you must be eager to read this stuff, are you?

I find it appropriate at this point to note that from my point of view
the one that wins an argument is not the one with the final word, but
rather the one with the most pertinent data and the clearest
understanding of that data. I find Richard Anderson's and Geoffrey
Sinclair's presentation of the data far more convincing that anything
you have posted on this thread. I agree with them that the historical
narrative is not screwed up, and that if anything is screwed up it is
your attempts to try to fit that narrative into your claims.

Unfortunately, while I am sure that the other responders are bringing up
new material in their responses, for me it is getting lost in the
repetition of material that contradicts your interpretation, but you
continue to ignore. I suggest that others consider just letting this
(and related threads involving this poster) simply drop.

yauming

2015-08-21 04:50:00 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
D-Day Omaha Beach Bombing Failure
Still nowhere any details why this largest of all air attacks failed.
The soldiers of the largest air power nation ever set feet on a heavily
defended beach without any prior or present air effect. This was an
embarrassing result for the USAAF, maybe the most serious of WWII.
Specially for the "bomber mafia" who neglected the fighter-bomber.
I can only suspect this circumstances have something to do with the
still limited public knowledge about this operation.
## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.

They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

Even in Armies - politics is very important.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-21 18:07:21 UTC

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

Post by yauming
Even in Armies - politics is very important.

Quite, now consider the heavy bomber commanders (RAF and USAAF)
made it very clear they stood little chance of really damaging the
defences, now if you like you can decide whether that was because they
did not want the mission, so politics, but they were accurate. I am sure
the navy would have made a similar point unless they could clearly see
the target, whether direct or via spotter aircraft.

Hence why there were rockets and artillery pieces on some landing craft.

The whole point of digging in and things like bunkers, or for that matter
tanks and battleships, is building something so one or more strong direct
hits are required.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-22 16:46:37 UTC

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

Immediately after the battle. The B-17 crews
reported scoring many hits on the carriers.

Later on, it became obvious that high-altitude
level bombing was almost totally ineffectual
against ships underway at sea.

After that, the USAAF dropped any claims about
hits scored at Midway.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-23 18:38:17 UTC

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

Immediately after the battle. The B-17 crews
reported scoring many hits on the carriers.

The information I have it was 3 hits on 2 carriers for the
morning strike.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Later on, it became obvious that high-altitude
level bombing was almost totally ineffectual
against ships underway at sea.
After that, the USAAF dropped any claims about
hits scored at Midway.

The after action reports, including from prisoners (Hiryu engine
room crew mainly) would help sort out what happened. The
B-17 attacks all missed.

The USAAF chronology actually has the following, for 5 June 1942

Battle of Midway. 4 B-26s, in
conjunction with US Navy (USN) torpedo bombers, attack a carrier; 2 of the
B-26s are shot down. In further morning action 14 B-17s attack a task force
approaching Midway at a distance of 145 miles (232 km); they claim several
hits on carriers and 2 Zekes shot down. In the late afternoon 2 B-17s attack
a carrier force at 31-40N 179-10W, claiming hits on a battleship and a
carrier and 9 aircraft shot down; 4 other B-17s claim a hit on heavy cruiser
185 miles (296 km) from Midway. 6 B-17s, en route to Midway from Hawaii,
bomb
ships 170 miles (272 km) from Midway, claiming hits on a burning carrier,
the
HIRYU, hit earlier in the battle, and a destroyer, which is claimed sunk.

Meantime,

http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1947/01/07/page/3/article/army-disputes-navys-midway-victory-claim

Which has the AAF in 1947 claiming the B-17 scored 22 hits, 6 probable
hits, and 46 near misses, from 62 sorties, so over 1 "effective" bomb per
sortie. Also the four B-26 scored 3 torpedo hits on 2 carriers. This was
after the USSBS agreed with the USN at zero hits, as did the post war
interrogation of the IJN officers.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

yauming

2015-08-23 18:37:44 UTC

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

My memory on this is hazy.

But as I recall the USAAF boasted that their high level bombers had sunk
or helped to sink the Japanese carriers.

http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0611.html#article

a425couple

2015-08-23 18:38:37 UTC

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

from:
http://midway-divebomber.blogspot.com/
"I ran through microfilm files of the New York Times. In the week after the
Midway Battle the Times ran a front page headline, "ARMY FLIERS BLASTED TWO
JAP FLEETS AT MIDWAY."

The Times editorialized on June 9: "So far as we can now learn, the main
damage to the Japanese fleet off Midway was inflicted by our land-based
airplanes. The battle shows what land-based air power can do to naval and
air power attacking from the open sea when that land-based air power is
alert, well-trained, courageous, and exists in sufficient quantity."

Secretary of War Henry Stimson recorded complacently "our big bombers have
played a decisive part in the battle and the facility with which they have
hit and injured capital ships of the enemy marks a great change in the
previous view of high altitude bombing. The Navy also got into it with its
carriers. They had rather a hard time with the enemy carriers who
outnumbered them."2

In Japan the survivors of the battle were isolated to keep secret the defeat
suffered by the Imperial Navy. Only the emperor was informed and he chose
not to inform the Army. Army planners, inaccurately briefed about pilot and
carrier losses at Coral Sea and Midway, continued to believe that the
Imperial Combined Fleet was healthy and secure.3

Admiral Nimitz declined to challenge Army Air Force claims for the B-17s or
other published stories about the Battle of Midway. There was no point in
letting the Japanese Navy or the American public know how serious were our
losses or how close to disaster we had come.4

Admiral Nimitz was right in classifying the decisive details of the battle,
and not only as it concerned the Japanese. Under conditions existing at that
time he had to avoid media criticism of his carrier fleet's leaders, and
unnecessary grief for the families of so many pilots and crewmen who had
lost their lives in futile attacks during the battle. The loss of so many of
our first line pilots and crews was staggering. At that stage of the war in
1942 the U.S. Navy needed comforting, not more controversy.

---- long snip of interesting stuff ----

An exhaustive report issued by Admiral King to the Secretary of the Navy in
April of 1944 still credited damage to the Japanese Fleet by the Midway
based aircraft, Army B-17s, torpedo planes, and the submarine Nautilus.
Again the role of the dive bombers was diminished. 16

As I continued my research, pondering the oral histories, first hand books,
web sites, biographies and autobiographies, I began to sense more of the
conditions that might have influenced our Navy's public relations attitudes
at that time. Under the circumstances the story of the dive bombers'
dramatic victory was easily overlooked.

--- snip---
Shortly after the Battle of Midway, Admiral Nimitz's Official Battle Report
was written by him with Commander Ernest Eller, a writer and public
relations expert. James Forestall, Under Secretary of the Navy flew out from
Washington to Pearl Harbor to consult. This was a carefully worded document.
Release was delayed until June 28th allowing the Air Force to grab the early
headlines claiming credit for the victory. "

-- rest is quite interesting,

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-08-24 04:59:13 UTC

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

I'm not the OP but I know it too. I once saw the first US Newsreel
("March of Time"?) after the battle of Midway. Here really the USAAF
airmen claimed they did it. There was no other voice or opinion
and that was it. At the time the Navy was still searching for their
downed airmen the USAAF took the cake. In reality they not even got
one single near miss!

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-24 16:04:18 UTC

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

The USAAF claimed hits, including key ones, not the entire fleet sunk
which was the point of my query. I knew they had claimed hits.

As for the B-17 attacks on the carrier fleet before the USN strikes,
Shattered Sword reports, and I quote, knowing you fully believe
such quotes, "both Hiryu and Soryu were bracketed by near
misses, to the consternation of the Japanese. In the end,
though, the American heavies scored no damage."

Page 180, 1st edition hardback, Potomac Books, 2005. Never
classified as secret.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-08-26 14:42:11 UTC

Re to Geoffrey

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

The USAAF claimed hits, including key ones, not the entire fleet sunk
which was the point of my query. I knew they had claimed hits.
As for the B-17 attacks on the carrier fleet before the USN strikes,
Shattered Sword reports, and I quote, knowing you fully believe
such quotes, "both Hiryu and Soryu were bracketed by near
misses, to the consternation of the Japanese. In the end,
though, the American heavies scored no damage."

You know a near miss can be more damaging than a direct hit.
One can assume a near miss or report it as probable. (Specialy
in case of an USN dive bomber.) But with no damage in the after war
evaluation it was no near miss then. Just a miss.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Page 180, 1st edition hardback, Potomac Books, 2005. Never
classified as secret.
Geoffrey Sinclair

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-26 16:54:21 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Re to Geoffrey

Will you please put attributions in.

Post by yauming
The "Billy" Mitchell faction in the USAAF is very strong.
They even claimed to have sunk the IJN fleet at Midway
by high level bombing.

When was this?

The USAAF claimed hits, including key ones, not the entire fleet sunk
which was the point of my query. I knew they had claimed hits.
As for the B-17 attacks on the carrier fleet before the USN strikes,
Shattered Sword reports, and I quote, knowing you fully believe
such quotes, "both Hiryu and Soryu were bracketed by near
misses, to the consternation of the Japanese. In the end,
though, the American heavies scored no damage."

You know a near miss can be more damaging than a direct hit.

You know your continued attempts to ignore what you write when it
is shown to be wrong are so obvious.

I note you claimed the USAAF "In reality they not even got
one single near miss!"

Instead of correcting the record we are treated to this attempt to
announce near misses are good followed by no they are not.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
One can assume a near miss or report it as probable. (Specialy
in case of an USN dive bomber.)

Really, why are dive bombers with their attack profile more likely
to correctly record their hits and misses?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But with no damage in the after war
evaluation it was no near miss then. Just a miss.

Oh, I see, a quote saying near misses is invalid because it does
not fit with your original claim.

So all those near misses you postulate causing damage to
bunkers are "just a miss". Tell us all how close does the
bomb have to come to be a Seneca near miss.

The only logic being displayed is Seneca is right, even if that
requires complete reversals.

Live with the fact the bombers are recorded as scoring near misses
by the IJN, and your change of definition cannot change that. Or
else stop using quotes as proof, only real damage counts. Like
actually damaged bunkers.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-21 18:09:02 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
D-Day Omaha Beach Bombing Failure
In the early morning of 6th June 1944 the US strategic bomber force was
send on a tactical mission to the coast of Normandy. It was the largest
and most complicated air attack in history ever.

Mission 394, 6 June 1944, 1,131 fighter, 1,889 bomber sorties

Mission 760, 24 Dec 1944, 895 fighter, 2,031 bomber sorties to
30 primary targets, airfields, communication centers, rail targets.
2 fighter groups had been temporarily transferred to the 9th Air Force
is the reason for fewer fighter sorties.

Bomber Command sent another 338 bombers to 2 other German
airfields, looks like fighter command provided the escort, 232 sorties.

24 December was the 8th Air Force everything that could fly mission.

It is correct with all the night sorties, including the paratroop drop, plus
that way most of the day units flew 2 missions that the D-Day operations
were the largest and most complex, but that is all units, the morning
heavy bomber missions were smaller than 24 December.

The 2nd TAF and 9th Air Force flew about half the D-Day number of
sorties on 24 December.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I never found a book
that went in details of this unprecedented air operation. Recently I
Fighter-Bombers over OMAHA") a few citations describing it from a 1945
"The effectiveness of third phase tactical air operations in the
European Theater 5 May 1944 to 8 May 1945", prepared by the
Army Air Force Evaluation Board in the European Theater of
Operations, August 1945. (Secret) Declassified 1961
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org
This report gave some unique statements.
- There was an experimental evaluation of the attack plan.
- Bombers attack in line formations "abreast".
- Use of H2X radar with aiming point at water line (see below too).

Oh good total failure to actually note what the targets were, despite all
the data posted.

Please provide the relevant orders that the waterline was the target.

Please explain why the target lists provided are considered wrong.

Richard Andersons' more detailed list of targets, training and tactics,

"For the 11 targets specified in "OMAHA Beach" proper the distance
is roughly 8 kilometers. Those were:

Pointe et Raz de la Percee
The "Fortified House"
Vierville Draw (D-1)
Hamel au Pretre
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) West
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) East
St Laurent Draw (E-1) West
St Laurent Draw (E-1) East
Colleville Draw (E-3) West
Colleville Draw (E-3) East
Cabourg Draw (F-1)

Each were targeted by one B-24 group comprised of six six-aircraft
squadrons, which were scheduled to attack between H-25 and H-5.

While each group was described as being "on line abreast" it appears
what actually was used was a modified 36-aircraft group box. While
the standard formation was 520 yards wide the modified was double
that...i.e., roughly a kilometer wide (the exact layout of the
formation is still in question). Add in the complication the B-24
was difficult to fly in tight formations and the actual width was
probably greater.

So for the "beach" proper, 11 kilometers width of formations to attack
8 kilometers width of targets. Which meant the formations would attack
in succession as they approached on their 20 minute attack window, but
each was responsible for coordinating their actual arrival to the delay
requirements.

There were also two additional formations, one of four and the other
of five squadrons, targeting Port en Bessin west and east respectively.
Combined they represented another 1.5 kilometer-wide formation.

BTW, in terms of training for the mission, the first hand-made H2X sets
were delivered for operational testing in October 1943, but production
sets were only available beginning in February. Operational training
for the mission began in April at Alconbury, which was a four week
course. The actual practice missions couldn't be done until May.

Quite a few aircraft for such a constricted airspace."

End quote.

Meantime here is the 6 June USAAF heavy bomber target list, by
target category

Industrial area, Caen
Rail Bridge, Pontaubault

Choke Point, Alencon, Almenche, Argentan, Caen, Conde-sur-Noireau,
Constance, Coutances, Falaise, Flers, Lisieux, Pont L'Evegue, St. Lo,
Thury Harcourt, Vire (619 sorties credited with attacking)

Coastal Installations, Arromanches, Colleville-sur-Orne, Longues,
Merville/Franceville, Molineaux, Mont Fluery, Ouistreham, Tailievilie,
Ver-sur-Mer (357 sorties credited with attacking)

Defended Locality, Asnelles-sur-Mer, Colleville-sur-Mer,
Courselles-sur-Mer, Pt. et Raz de la Percee, St. Lauret-sur-Mer,
Vierville-sur-Mer (417 sorties credited with attacking)

Strong Point, Berneires-sur-Mer, La Riviere, Le Hamel, Lyon-sur-Mer,
Meuvaines, Petit Enfer, Port en Bassin, St. Aurin-sur-Mer. (211 sorties
credited with attacking)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
- A drop delay schedule synchronized with planed landing craft advance
- The intention of "saturation bombing of the beach areas".

Oh good, total failure to actually note what the targets were.

One phrase is worth more than any number of mission reports.

Tell us all, what were the "beach areas"? The landing craft obstacles,
the sand/shingle, the bluffs, the seawall, the approaches? Something
else? Thought of using the mission reports?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
- Result: "Omaha Beach was not bombed as scheduled" what caused the
"non-effectiveness of the heavy bombardment" there and was the
"dominating" factor for the ground force "difficulty" there.

So let us understand this, the idea is being late affected their aim.

How?

Is the idea the delay table came into force?

Then came the decision to add a further delay in order to keep the Mean
Point of (Bomb) Impact no less than 1,000 yards from the forward wave
of the landing craft. So the following bomb release delay schedule was
created,

Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

Remember the bomber formations had width and depth.

Then comes the problem of finding the actual bomb release times
of the Mission 394 2nd Bombardment Division B-24s assigned to
Omaha Beach defences, times that would vary at least by group
and probably by squadron given the formations being flown. Times
that appear to be in the mission reports and absent from the published
histories.

Since you have the result, please tell us all the official and actual
bombing times of the forces involved, I will list all the units for you, it
will be good to have all the times, CBW is Combat Wing, BG is
Bombardment Group, Sqn squadron, PF Pathfinder, the unit had
been designated as bad weather leaders and had some radar
equipped bombers,

2nd CBW
389th BG (B-24, 564 (PF), 565, 566, 567 sqn),
445th BG (B-24, 700, 701, 702, 703 sqn),
453rd BG (B-24, 732, 733, 734, 735 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

14th CBW
44th BG (B-24, 66 (PF), 67, 68, 506 sqn),
392nd BG (B-24, 576, 577, 578, 579 sqn),
492nd BG (B-24, 856, 857, 858, 859 sqns)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

20th CBW
93rd BG (B-24, 328, 329, 330, 409 sqn),
446th BG (B-24, 704, 705, 706, 707 sqn),
448th BG (B-24, 712, 713, 714, 715 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

95th CBW
489th BG (B-24, 844, 845, 946, 847 sqn),
491st BG (B-24, 852, 853, 854, 855 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

96th CBW
458th BG (B-24, 752, 753, 754, 755 sqn),
466th BG (B-24, 784, 785, 786, 787 sqn),
467th BG (B-24, 789, 790, 791 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

After all the times are required to claim "Omaha Beach was not
bombed as scheduled" All times please.

There you go, at least 14 bombing times and up to 4 times that depending
on whether squadrons bombed "independently".

The 448th Bomb Group sent four elements of 6 B-24, taking off at 6
minute intervals, they were to bomb line abreast and were meant to
hit the beach defences at Cerisy at 06.28 or 2 minutes before H hour.

There would be no second bomb runs. Radar operators were warned
to expect returns from lots of surface vessels near the shoreline.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The here in the newsgroup following discussion showed there was no
acceptance on the historical truth of some of this statements and neither
any agreement on conclusions.

And more of the truth can be found in documents you continually ignore.

Actually there was agreement, except for you.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It seems the here known books on D-Day did
not support all the above details. But it further showed a lack of
information about this details and why the operation failed at Omaha.
Why was it not "on schedule"?

Now after you have supplied all the bombing times above, like you
must have, then we can look at the times and see what is going on.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The speculations on this question showed very readed and educated users
here. But it raised the suspicion that most books on the topic may neglect
or distort crucial parts of this unique air operation.

No what it raises is confirmation once you have an idea reality
is not allowed to upset it. And it becomes a conspiracy if it does
not start as one.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I went to search for further digitized reports from 1944-45. The above was
from the "Army Air Forces Evaluation Board". I found several interesting
reports by this unit but nothing on D-Day. I looked for Maxwell AFB but
came not further on digitized sources. The US National Archives seem in
Maizie H. Johnson, comp., Preliminary Inventory of the Textual Records
of the Army Air Forces, NM 53 (1965).
Sarah D. Powell and Maizie H. Johnson, comps., Supplement to Preliminary
Inventory No. NM-53, Textual Records of the Army Air Force, NM 90 (1967).
I got the impression this is all still paper based.

Quite correct, the vast majority of WWII records are still paper only, the
sheer bulk of records.

So for example, the contracts, the specifications, the correspondence about
rivets needed for aircraft wings. Multiply that out by all the machines and
parts that make up the machines and people who made them.

And if you think the above is trivial the different standards for such items
had a real impact, hence the wartime and post war attempts to come up
with international standards.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The UK WWII Archive
in Kew has a digitized version of their find aid in a database accessable
by internet. Here I saw interesting records mentioned but with the
explicit remark they are not digitized.
Because I only want some summary report I concentrated on a bibliography
listed somewhat near the end of the above 1945 report. I selected the
#1. Eighth Air Force Tactical Operations in Support of Allied Landings
in Normandy, 2-17 June 1944, 6 Nov. 1944 (Secret).
#2. Survey of Effectiveness of Bombing of Invasion Coast Defenses on
D-Day, USSTAF, 7 July 1944 (Secret).
#3. Use of Heavy Bombers in a Tactical Role, SHAEF (Secret).
#4. Historical Study of Air Support by the Eighth Air Force for the Land
Invasion of Continental Europe 2-16 June 1944, 27 October 1944,
(Secret).
#5. Study of Experience Gained in Overlord - Use of Heavy Bombers in a
Tactical Role, War Cabinet Joint Technical Warfare Committee, 13 Sept.
1944 (Secret).
For #1 I found here
http://www.biblio.com/book/eighth-air-force-tactical-operations-support/d/378785240
an offer for an "(ebook) 7 Pages. CD ROM" $5. The same could be a pdf on
archive.org with 5 pages. But instead of "2-17 June 1944" it was only of
June 2. Not of any help.

So in other words archive wants you to pay for the main part of the report.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So of this five reports I found none on the net. But during my search I
Sunday Punch in Normandy: The Tactical Use of Heavy Bombardment in
the Normandy Invasion. An Interim Report, Headquarters, Army Air
Forces, 1945 (CONFIDENTIAL)
www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100929-060.pdf
It got a "New Imprint" by the Center for Air Force History, Washington,
D.C. 1992 and is as html on the net too.
p. 25f: If the decision to bomb ahead of our troops through overcast
was breath-taking in its boldness, the results were epochal. A short
distance offshore lay the LST's and other craft carrying the invading
force. Confident of cooperation from planes they could not see, the men
of the assault wave started ashore at the precise instant established
beforehand. Exactly on schedule, the first wave of bombers came over,
laying its bombs on the shore line and proceeding inland. The entire
force of bombers had to clear the attack point within 5 minutes or fun
the risk of dropping bombs on friendly forces.

Actually as Rich has pointed out they had more time than that.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Absolutely according to
plan the heavy bombers performed their mission, laying their carpet of
bombs before the attacking Allies. So effective was their bombing, and
with such a minimum of damage to friendly forces was the operation
carried out, that many lives were saved. Ground commanders were lavish
with their praise. Another milestone of modern warfare had been passed.
The above could be the most impressive PR spin report of WWII.

Seen the German reports of how the D-Day fighting went according to
the German plan?

By the way after deciding this report is so full of false data that is must
be discarded are you capable of understanding the other reports you
want to believe can also have incorrect data and simplifications?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With its
low classification it was spread far "to provide for combat personnel in
all theaters a succinct summary of the planning and execution of the
tactical use of heavy bombardment in the invasion of Normandy." (Foreword).
"The story of direct air support to the landing beaches is held by a
great many historians as a fiasco that created a bill paid for in
blood by the soldiers who landed on the beach, and in great numbers,
died there."
An Effects-Based Operation. Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell AFB 2007.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/

The fiasco idea is an exaggeration, essentially the opposite to it all
went perfectly.

The naval support, the army support (DD tanks, artillery in landing
craft and DUKW for example) also proved inadequate.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 1952 Air Force study described an almost flawless approach but a close
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090601-060.pdf
Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945,
USAF Historical Division 1952
After the take-offs, ranging from 0155 to 0529 hours, the predawn
assembly of six-plane flights was eminently successful, except for
three flights wich could not make contact with the H2X leaders. In
climbing through the overcast, a number of aircraft became seperated
from their units, but they were able to form on to other flights, all
of wich adopted the six-squadron abreast formation behind the designated
H2X Pathfinder aircraft. ...

So far the above says they were mostly able to formate correctly. It
will be interesting to see what formations took off at 05.29 given the
distance to Normandy from the USAAF bases.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The 2d Bombardment Division began the day's operations for the Eighth
by dispatching, between 0555 and 0614 hours, 329 B-24's against OMAHA
beach area. ...

I know this is silly but have you noticed the supersonic speed required
for bombers taking off at the above times to then bomb Normandy
before 06.30 hours?

The above times, would be the bombing times and if correct, the last was
15 minutes before H-hour, and again,

Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

So at most a 10 second delay.

As Richard Anderson has noted for Omaha,

"The first is the TIME SLOT (singular) in which ALL bomb groups
were ordered to attack. That TIME SLOT was H-25 to H-5. For all
groups attacking the designated 11 beach defense positions."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
p. 26: the consensus was that the immediate beach areas showed only
limited evidence of bombing damage, but areas behind the beachhead
ranging from 300 and 400 yards to three miles inland showed extensive
evidence of concentrated bomb patterns.

As far as people can tell. Note by the way how wide parts of Omaha
beach are at low to half tide?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 1953 Air Force study gave some more details, like H2X aim point was

Once again, no.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
p. 77ff: The difficult assemblies were made according to plan, and in
six-squadron-abreast formations behind pathfinder airplanes the armada
streamed toward the coast of Normandy. There, as will be recalled,
overcast bombing techniques were employed. But, in order to provide
an extra margin of safety for the vast fleet of invasion vessels lying
off shore, the release was deliberately delayed 10 seconds beyond the
H2X-scope indication of the water line, a factor of utmost importance
in assessing the effetiveness of this operation.

Ah, I see, the bombers were all attacking at zero minus 15 to zero minus 10,
despite the known problems of airspace availability.

And no, the target was not the water line, that was the point at which the
delay was counted from. IT WAS NOT THE TARGET. If what the
bombers thought was the target was in the sights before the delay
expired it was accepted the attack would risk missing, versus the target
being misidentified and the bombs dropped short.

Can we all please have an explanation why the mission reports, which give
things like targets, are considered wrong, and it was the waterline that was
the target.

Come on, why were they bombing the waterline, something that was
moving as the tide came in.

Perhaps the following is in order, 8th Air Force bombing accuracy,
September to December 1944, when there were more H2X sets
available and better trained operators. H2X in 4 to 5/10 cloud,
percentage of bomb tonnage, 4.4% within 1,000 feet, 22.8% within
0.5 miles, 48.5% within 1 mile. H2X in 10/10 cloud, 0.2% within
1,000 feet, 1.2% within 0.5 miles, 5.6% within 1 mile.

These are for all targets and the 4 to 5/10 cloud attacks covers the
dropping of 3,978 short tons of bombs, the 10/10 cloud attacks
dropped 56,172 short tons of bombs.

Also accuracy attacking the same target, versus bombing order,
bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point, 1st 82%, 2nd 60%,
3rd 48%, 4th 47%, 5th etc. 30% etc. The problems of smoke
and dust obscuring visibility.

Certainly a coast area should have above average H2X accuracy,
but these are the sorts of average accuracy the heavy bombers
were actually achieving.

In case you are wondering, visual bombing in good to fair
visibility, 30% within 1,000 feet, 64.3% within 0.5 miles, 82.4%
within 1 mile. So this is the average result in the best conditions.

There was a very good reason for delaying bomb drops near
H-hour, work out what a 0.5 mile short drop would hit.

Remember how small screens were in 1944? And at altitude
the H2X set "saw" the ground for miles around the aircraft.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Between 0555 and 0730 hours, 1,083 B-17's and B-24's dropped nearly
3,000 tons of high explosive and fragmentation bombs, instantaneously
fuzed to avoid cratering, from an altitude of 14,000 to 18,000 feet.
Of these, 1,015 bombers hit the beaches, 47 attacked chokepoints in
the city of Caen just south of one of the British beaches, and 21 were
obliged to drop on alternate targets because of navigational troubles.
The Employment of Strategic Bombers in a Tactical Role 1941 to 1951
Army Air Forces Numbered Historical Study No. 88
Air University 1953 (Secret) Unclas. 1959
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/

The above figures are essentially from the 8th Air Force Monthly report,
which, as already been reported in this discussion, is incorrect, the most
accurate list is that of Richard Davis,

Davis figures, Mission 394, morning, location \ target type \ attacking \
HE \ frag \ total (short tons)

Arromanches \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 115 \ 364.2 \ - \ 364.2
Asnelles-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 48 \ 96.2 \ - \ 96.2
Berneires-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 29 \ 53.2 \ - \ 53.2
Colleville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 79 \ 168.0 \ 42.7 \
210.7

Colleville-sur-Orne \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 6 \ 18.0 \ - \ 18.0
Courselles-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 60 \ 111.8 \ - \ 111.8
La Riviere \ T/T Strong Points \ 29 \ 54.2 \ - \ 54.2
Le Hamel \ T/T Strong Points \ 24 \ 45.2 \ - \ 45.2
Longues \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 36 \ 107.5 \ - \ 107.5
Lyon-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 37 \ 102.0 \ - \ 102.0
Merville/Franceville \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 73 \ 261.0 \ - \
261.0

Meuvaines \ T/T Strong Points \ 13 \ 23.8 \ - \ 23.8
Molineaux \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 12 \ 34.5 \ - \ 34.5
Mont Fluery \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 12 \ 29.2 \ - \ 29.2
Ouistreham \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 42 \ 139.8 \ - \ 139.8
Petit Enfer \ T/T Strong Points \ 24 \ 72.0 \ - \ 72.0
Port en Bassin \ T/T Strong Points \ 14 \ 39.5 \ - \ 39.5
Pt. et Raz de la Percee \ T/T Defended Localities \ 23 \ 45.0 \ 25.0 \
70.0

St. Aurin-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 41 \ 115.5 \ - \ 115.5
St. Lauret-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 124 \ 168.2 \ 163.8 \
332.0

Tailievilie \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 13 \ 34.2 \ - \ 34.2
Ver-sur-Mer \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 48 \ 114.3 \ - \ 114.3
Vierville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 83 \ 155.4 \ 69.8 \ 225.2

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Despite the intensive air and naval bombardment of coastal defenses,
those defenses were, by and large, intact when the invasion force
"hit the beach." This was particularly true at Omaha beach, where
American forces suffered serious casualties and critical delays.
Despite a massive series of attacks by Eighth Air Force B-17s, B-24s
and medium bombers in the early hours of June 6, the invading troops
were hung up on the beach. The air commanders themselves had, in fact,
predicted that the air and naval bombardments would not achieve the
desired degree of destruction of German defensive positions.

So at the moment the air commanders are reporting what was actually
correct. Arthur Harris made the same point, the bombers needed to
drop lots of bombs in the area in the hope some would score direct hits.
Otherwise the bombing was likely to be ineffective in terms of destroying
dug in forces.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The Army's general optimism that air would cleanse the beaches before
its approach, however, was shattered. Only the subsequent success of
fighter-bombers operating against the battlefield would revive the
Army's confidence in air support. Indeed, throughout the post-
Normandy campaign - and in the Second World War as a whole - the
fighter-bomber proved overwhelmingly more valuable in supporting and
attacking ground forces in the battle area than did the heavy or even
the medium bomber.
Hallion, Richard P.: D-Day 1944: Air Power Over the Normandy Beaches
and Beyond, Air Force History Support Office, Bolling AFB 1994

Good, that seems to be the USAAF results. The Bomber Command ones
were reported to be better.

Also of course the heavy bombers did not do a lot of "tactical support",
so we have a limited set of attacks, versus nearly a year of fighter bomber
support.

And yes, the medium bombers were better used as interdiction.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Still nowhere any details why this largest of all air attacks failed.

1) The targets were dug in and heavily protected.
2) The weather meant less accurate bomb aiming methods.
3) The tight timing meant at least some formations had to deliberately
delay their drops to avoid friendly fire.

That do for a start? Or rather a repeat of information supplied and
then ignored.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The soldiers of the largest air power nation ever set feet on a heavily
defended beach without any prior or present air effect.

Incorrect, there was an effect, the batteries in the area, the communication
links.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This was an
embarrassing result for the USAAF, maybe the most serious of WWII.

Really? Did the landing fail? How does the US Army escape things
like its decisions about weights the troops carried, amount of artillery
on landing craft. How about the USN launch position and what that did
to DD survivability for a start?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Specially for the "bomber mafia" who neglected the fighter-bomber.
I can only suspect this circumstances have something to do with the
still limited public knowledge about this operation.

Yes we are sure at the end of the day you have discovered a grand
conspiracy to hide your version of the truth. After all the documents
being referenced have been in the public arena for decades,
obviously a hide in plain sight approach by the great conspiracy.

So tell us all how was the fighter bomber neglected by the USAAF?
The fighter units not issued bombs? The 9th Air force an all bomber
force?

So tell us all if the 8th Air Force had spent D-Day on the ground would
you be busy telling us how that was right or wrong?

The allies deployed all the firepower they had in an overall plan to
support the landings at all times during D-Day, the heavy bombers
were tried on the understanding they were unlikely to destroy many
of the defences but in the hope some would be hit (as at Utah at
least but a medium bomber raid), communications would be cut
(electronic and road, which did happen, delaying things like artillery
support and reports to HQ) and lower quality German troops would
suffer a morale effect.

By the way, have you considered your claim that bombs detonating
50 metres from a bunker are effective and that it would mean the
heavy bombers should have been quite effective? Or does the bomb
achieve some special properties when dropped by a fighter?

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2015-08-24 04:59:45 UTC

Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

(list of all units involved)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
458th BG (B-24, 752, 753, 754, 755 sqn),
466th BG (B-24, 784, 785, 786, 787 sqn),
467th BG (B-24, 789, 790, 791 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
After all the times are required to claim "Omaha Beach was not
bombed as scheduled" All times please.

Geoffrey, it was not my claim you cited but what I found in the
then secret report of August 1945. Here let me cite it again:

Omaha Beach was not bombed as scheduled, and the
difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold here in itself
demonstrates the net value which resulted from air
attacks in other sectors.
p. 42

If you doubt that statement of 1945 YOU should supply some evidence
for your opinion.

Seen the German reports of how the D-Day fighting went according to
the German plan?

The German press reports in 1944 already began to approach the level of
"Comical Ali" of Bagdad 2003 fame. The Allies were usualy more reliable
even before 44. But that the USAAF faked the result in such an extreme
way at the expense of the Army next door. I never read something like
that, not even in German records. Imagine what the Army guys who survived
Omaha thought by reading this:

Ground commanders were lavish with their praise. Another milestone
of modern warfare had been passed.

Not a single bomb hit the beach! It seems they could try this spin
because the truth was in papers all stamped secret. At the time
they were declassified in the 1960s a new narration was already
established that still prevails today. Nobody has citations from
the then secret reports of 1944 that explained what was planed and
what went wrong.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 1953 Air Force study gave some more details, like H2X aim point was

...

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And no, the target was not the water line, that was the point at which the
delay was counted from. IT WAS NOT THE TARGET. If what the

I always wrote "aim point". So we agree now that they aimed at the water
line, took a delay and came that way to the targt point. Ok?

(...)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Certainly a coast area should have above average H2X accuracy,
but these are the sorts of average accuracy the heavy bombers
were actually achieving.

They did experiments before D-Day. Instead of citing the 1944 averages
would you not like to read what results they achived in this special
situation? I mentioned 5 then secret reports, at least one may have
this data.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2015-08-24 15:48:56 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

No, it is not a reply, given all the data that has been deleted.

Starting with the first exaggeration about largest and most
complicated raids.

Try and understand reality, it is much more interesting.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(list of all units involved)

Geoffrey, it was not my claim you cited but what I found in the
then secret report of August 1945.

Can I point out which secret report? You are using at least 5.

Ah I see, can we take it as read you do not support the material
you post?

Do you think ALL the bombers did not attack as scheduled?
Some? None?

What do you think, and if you think it what sort of evidence do
you have beyond one phrase?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Omaha Beach was not bombed as scheduled, and the
difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold here in itself
demonstrates the net value which resulted from air
attacks in other sectors.
p. 42
If you doubt that statement of 1945 YOU should supply some evidence
for your opinion.

Oh sorry, I thought giving the briefed time of the one group I did find
is evidence, but no of course not, that has always been deleted or
misunderstood. Instead ONE line in a report that agrees is used.

Richard Anderson quote,

"Do you realize those attacks, by those separate groups occurred between
H-35 and H-16?"

You know, evidence you misunderstood.

Now I know this will go nowhere but try and understand, you are busy
picking phrases, not results, you are busy saying report one is wrong,
because the bombs dropped behind the beach but report two is right
when things were not on schedule.

By the way what is on schedule, right to the minute, within X minutes?
Within the allotted time band?

You rather totally ignore the actual bombing accuracies and what
that would mean even if there was no deliberate delay. The bombers
could all have bombed within the allotted times and still bombed long,
that is they put in their own delay, anxious not to hit their own troops,
given they were told how important it was to avoid friendly fire or
simply had trouble accurately finding their target.

Seen the German reports of how the D-Day fighting went according to
the German plan?

The German press reports in 1944 already began to approach the level of
"Comical Ali" of Bagdad 2003 fame. The Allies were usualy more reliable
even before 44.

So your statement is wrong and you knew it was wrong.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But that the USAAF faked the result in such an extreme
way at the expense of the Army next door.

Oh good, now we have an extreme fake. Double special
conspiracy sighted.

How exactly did they fake it, paint bomb craters?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I never read something like
that, not even in German records. Imagine what the Army guys who survived
Ground commanders were lavish with their praise. Another milestone
of modern warfare had been passed.
Not a single bomb hit the beach!

For yet another time, the BEACH was NOT the target.

Is that possible to comprehend?

And the ground commanders did send messages of praise, but
not the ones at Omaha and not all for the morning bombings.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It seems they could try this spin
because the truth was in papers all stamped secret.

You have of course noted the dates of the original reports?
Like October 1945? May 1945?

Or is that not possible?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
At the time
they were declassified in the 1960s a new narration was already
established that still prevails today. Nobody has citations from
the then secret reports of 1944 that explained what was planed and
what went wrong.

So what are your ideas of the writing and declassification dates
of the reports?

Like the Employment of Strategic Bombers in a Tactical Role
1941 - 1951, written in 1953, declassified in 1959. USAF
Historical Study No. 88.

Yes we know you are fighting the great conspiracy, of whatever
it currently is.

Let me correct this, Chester Wilmot in Struggle for Europe first
published in 1952 notes the Omaha beach bombing "most of
the bombs fell behind, not upon, the beach defences"

Now we know this will be rejected because he says defences,
not just beach, despite it being a quote.

Walter Lord, "The Longest Day", first published in 1960 notes
the bombs fell behind the beach. However you might prefer the
movie version which I believe does not mention this.

Also note Study 88 decides 1st phase, counter air and reconnaissance
was D-50 to D-30 minutes, 2nd phase D-30 to D-1 was preparation for
the assault and the 3rd phase was softening and interdiction activities
immediately before and during the assault itself.

It notes the bombs dropped 300 yards to 3 miles inland. It notes V
corps complained, and it still claims some success, mainly morale
and interdiction.

deleted text,

By the way after deciding this report is so full of false data that is must
be discarded are you capable of understanding the other reports you
want to believe can also have incorrect data and simplifications?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 1953 Air Force study gave some more details, like H2X aim point was

...

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And no, the target was not the water line, that was the point at which the
delay was counted from. IT WAS NOT THE TARGET. If what the

I always wrote "aim point". So we agree now that they aimed at the water
line, took a delay and came that way to the targt point. Ok?

No we do not agree. The aiming point is the target. What is your
unique definition of aim point, of course I should have guessed. How
about since the beach is THE target it must mean the water line is
part of the target. Simple and simply wrong.

The rest of humanity understands the water line was a marker, they
were not to bomb before it, then if they were within given time bands
they were to delay the drop on their identified target for the given time
if required.

Is it actually possible for you to change your mind, evaluate new facts?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(...)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Certainly a coast area should have above average H2X accuracy,
but these are the sorts of average accuracy the heavy bombers
were actually achieving.

They did experiments before D-Day. Instead of citing the 1944 averages

Good, now go and look the dates I reported, September TO December
1944, the final 4 months of the year.

The above really shows how you do not comprehend almost anything
you are reading on this topic.

Are you dyslexic or have some sort of reading problem diagnosis?
Because that is how it is looking.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
would you not like to read what results they achived in this special
situation? I mentioned 5 then secret reports, at least one may have
this data.

Oh I see, I give the details of what reports on bombing results are
actually available but now I am directed to "5 then secret reports"
which you have read but all you can say is they MAY "have this
data". Do they have it or not? How come you do not know after
reading them?

End of this reply, the rest is all the data ignored from the previous
message.

Oh good total failure to actually note what the targets were, despite all
the data posted.

Please provide the relevant orders that the waterline was the target.

Please explain why the target lists provided are considered wrong.

Richard Andersons' more detailed list of targets, training and tactics,

"For the 11 targets specified in "OMAHA Beach" proper the distance
is roughly 8 kilometers. Those were:

Pointe et Raz de la Percee
The "Fortified House"
Vierville Draw (D-1)
Hamel au Pretre
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) West
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) East
St Laurent Draw (E-1) West
St Laurent Draw (E-1) East
Colleville Draw (E-3) West
Colleville Draw (E-3) East
Cabourg Draw (F-1)

Each were targeted by one B-24 group comprised of six six-aircraft
squadrons, which were scheduled to attack between H-25 and H-5.

While each group was described as being "on line abreast" it appears
what actually was used was a modified 36-aircraft group box. While
the standard formation was 520 yards wide the modified was double
that...i.e., roughly a kilometer wide (the exact layout of the
formation is still in question). Add in the complication the B-24
was difficult to fly in tight formations and the actual width was
probably greater.

So for the "beach" proper, 11 kilometers width of formations to attack
8 kilometers width of targets. Which meant the formations would attack
in succession as they approached on their 20 minute attack window, but
each was responsible for coordinating their actual arrival to the delay
requirements.

There were also two additional formations, one of four and the other
of five squadrons, targeting Port en Bessin west and east respectively.
Combined they represented another 1.5 kilometer-wide formation.

BTW, in terms of training for the mission, the first hand-made H2X sets
were delivered for operational testing in October 1943, but production
sets were only available beginning in February. Operational training
for the mission began in April at Alconbury, which was a four week
course. The actual practice missions couldn't be done until May.

Quite a few aircraft for such a constricted airspace."

End quote.

Meantime here is the 6 June USAAF heavy bomber target list, by
target category

Industrial area, Caen
Rail Bridge, Pontaubault

Choke Point, Alencon, Almenche, Argentan, Caen, Conde-sur-Noireau,
Constance, Coutances, Falaise, Flers, Lisieux, Pont L'Evegue, St. Lo,
Thury Harcourt, Vire (619 sorties credited with attacking)

Coastal Installations, Arromanches, Colleville-sur-Orne, Longues,
Merville/Franceville, Molineaux, Mont Fluery, Ouistreham, Tailievilie,
Ver-sur-Mer (357 sorties credited with attacking)

Defended Locality, Asnelles-sur-Mer, Colleville-sur-Mer,
Courselles-sur-Mer, Pt. et Raz de la Percee, St. Lauret-sur-Mer,
Vierville-sur-Mer (417 sorties credited with attacking)

Strong Point, Berneires-sur-Mer, La Riviere, Le Hamel, Lyon-sur-Mer,
Meuvaines, Petit Enfer, Port en Bassin, St. Aurin-sur-Mer. (211 sorties
credited with attacking)

Tell us all, what were the "beach areas"? The landing craft obstacles,
the sand/shingle, the bluffs, the seawall, the approaches? Something
else? Thought of using the mission reports?

So let us understand this, the idea is being late affected their aim.

How?

Is the idea the delay table came into force?

Then came the decision to add a further delay in order to keep the Mean
Point of (Bomb) Impact no less than 1,000 yards from the forward wave
of the landing craft. So the following bomb release delay schedule was
created,

Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

Remember the bomber formations had width and depth.

Then comes the problem of finding the actual bomb release times
of the Mission 394 2nd Bombardment Division B-24s assigned to
Omaha Beach defences, times that would vary at least by group
and probably by squadron given the formations being flown. Times
that appear to be in the mission reports and absent from the published
histories.

Since you have the result, please tell us all the official and actual
bombing times of the forces involved, I will list all the units for you, it
will be good to have all the times, CBW is Combat Wing, BG is
Bombardment Group, Sqn squadron, PF Pathfinder, the unit had
been designated as bad weather leaders and had some radar
equipped bombers,

2nd CBW
389th BG (B-24, 564 (PF), 565, 566, 567 sqn),
445th BG (B-24, 700, 701, 702, 703 sqn),
453rd BG (B-24, 732, 733, 734, 735 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

14th CBW
44th BG (B-24, 66 (PF), 67, 68, 506 sqn),
392nd BG (B-24, 576, 577, 578, 579 sqn),
492nd BG (B-24, 856, 857, 858, 859 sqns)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

20th CBW
93rd BG (B-24, 328, 329, 330, 409 sqn),
446th BG (B-24, 704, 705, 706, 707 sqn),
448th BG (B-24, 712, 713, 714, 715 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

95th CBW
489th BG (B-24, 844, 845, 946, 847 sqn),
491st BG (B-24, 852, 853, 854, 855 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

96th CBW
458th BG (B-24, 752, 753, 754, 755 sqn),
466th BG (B-24, 784, 785, 786, 787 sqn),
467th BG (B-24, 789, 790, 791 sqn)
Planned time of bombing: Seneca to supply.
Actual time of bombing: Seneca to supply.

After all the times are required to claim "Omaha Beach was not
bombed as scheduled" All times please.

There you go, at least 14 bombing times and up to 4 times that depending
on whether squadrons bombed "independently".

The 448th Bomb Group sent four elements of 6 B-24, taking off at 6
minute intervals, they were to bomb line abreast and were meant to
hit the beach defences at Cerisy at 06.28 or 2 minutes before H hour.

There would be no second bomb runs. Radar operators were warned
to expect returns from lots of surface vessels near the shoreline.

The fiasco idea is an exaggeration, essentially the opposite to it all
went perfectly.

The naval support, the army support (DD tanks, artillery in landing
craft and DUKW for example) also proved inadequate.

I know this is silly but have you noticed the supersonic speed required
for bombers taking off at the above times to then bomb Normandy
before 06.30 hours?

The above times, would be the bombing times and if correct, the last was
15 minutes before H-hour, and again,

Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

So at most a 10 second delay.

As Richard Anderson has noted for Omaha,

"The first is the TIME SLOT (singular) in which ALL bomb groups
were ordered to attack. That TIME SLOT was H-25 to H-5. For all
groups attacking the designated 11 beach defense positions."

Ah, I see, the bombers were all attacking at zero minus 15 to zero minus 10,
despite the known problems of airspace availability.

And no, the target was not the water line, that was the point at which the
delay was counted from. IT WAS NOT THE TARGET. If what the
bombers thought was the target was in the sights before the delay
expired it was accepted the attack would risk missing, versus the target
being misidentified and the bombs dropped short.

Can we all please have an explanation why the mission reports, which give
things like targets, are considered wrong, and it was the waterline that was
the target.

Come on, why were they bombing the waterline, something that was
moving as the tide came in.

Perhaps the following is in order, 8th Air Force bombing accuracy,
September to December 1944, when there were more H2X sets
available and better trained operators. H2X in 4 to 5/10 cloud,
percentage of bomb tonnage, 4.4% within 1,000 feet, 22.8% within
0.5 miles, 48.5% within 1 mile. H2X in 10/10 cloud, 0.2% within
1,000 feet, 1.2% within 0.5 miles, 5.6% within 1 mile.

These are for all targets and the 4 to 5/10 cloud attacks covers the
dropping of 3,978 short tons of bombs, the 10/10 cloud attacks
dropped 56,172 short tons of bombs.

Also accuracy attacking the same target, versus bombing order,
bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point, 1st 82%, 2nd 60%,
3rd 48%, 4th 47%, 5th etc. 30% etc. The problems of smoke
and dust obscuring visibility.

Certainly a coast area should have above average H2X accuracy,
but these are the sorts of average accuracy the heavy bombers
were actually achieving.

In case you are wondering, visual bombing in good to fair
visibility, 30% within 1,000 feet, 64.3% within 0.5 miles, 82.4%
within 1 mile. So this is the average result in the best conditions.

There was a very good reason for delaying bomb drops near
H-hour, work out what a 0.5 mile short drop would hit.

Remember how small screens were in 1944? And at altitude
the H2X set "saw" the ground for miles around the aircraft.

The above figures are essentially from the 8th Air Force Monthly report,
which, as already been reported in this discussion, is incorrect, the most
accurate list is that of Richard Davis,

Davis figures, Mission 394, morning, location \ target type \ attacking \
HE \ frag \ total (short tons)

Arromanches \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 115 \ 364.2 \ - \ 364.2
Asnelles-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 48 \ 96.2 \ - \ 96.2
Berneires-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 29 \ 53.2 \ - \ 53.2
Colleville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 79 \ 168.0 \ 42.7 \
210.7

Colleville-sur-Orne \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 6 \ 18.0 \ - \ 18.0
Courselles-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 60 \ 111.8 \ - \ 111.8
La Riviere \ T/T Strong Points \ 29 \ 54.2 \ - \ 54.2
Le Hamel \ T/T Strong Points \ 24 \ 45.2 \ - \ 45.2
Longues \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 36 \ 107.5 \ - \ 107.5
Lyon-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 37 \ 102.0 \ - \ 102.0
Merville/Franceville \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 73 \ 261.0 \ - \
261.0

Meuvaines \ T/T Strong Points \ 13 \ 23.8 \ - \ 23.8
Molineaux \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 12 \ 34.5 \ - \ 34.5
Mont Fluery \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 12 \ 29.2 \ - \ 29.2
Ouistreham \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 42 \ 139.8 \ - \ 139.8
Petit Enfer \ T/T Strong Points \ 24 \ 72.0 \ - \ 72.0
Port en Bassin \ T/T Strong Points \ 14 \ 39.5 \ - \ 39.5
Pt. et Raz de la Percee \ T/T Defended Localities \ 23 \ 45.0 \ 25.0 \
70.0

St. Aurin-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 41 \ 115.5 \ - \ 115.5
St. Lauret-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 124 \ 168.2 \ 163.8 \
332.0

Tailievilie \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 13 \ 34.2 \ - \ 34.2
Ver-sur-Mer \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 48 \ 114.3 \ - \ 114.3
Vierville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 83 \ 155.4 \ 69.8 \ 225.2

So at the moment the air commanders are reporting what was actually
correct. Arthur Harris made the same point, the bombers needed to
drop lots of bombs in the area in the hope some would score direct hits.
Otherwise the bombing was likely to be ineffective in terms of destroying
dug in forces.

1) The targets were dug in and heavily protected.
2) The weather meant less accurate bomb aiming methods.
3) The tight timing meant at least some formations had to deliberately
delay their drops to avoid friendly fire.

That do for a start? Or rather a repeat of information supplied and
then ignored.

Yes we are sure at the end of the day you have discovered a grand
conspiracy to hide your version of the truth. After all the documents
being referenced have been in the public arena for decades,
obviously a hide in plain sight approach by the great conspiracy.

So tell us all how was the fighter bomber neglected by the USAAF?
The fighter units not issued bombs? The 9th Air force an all bomber
force?

So tell us all if the 8th Air Force had spent D-Day on the ground would
you be busy telling us how that was right or wrong?

The allies deployed all the firepower they had in an overall plan to
support the landings at all times during D-Day, the heavy bombers
were tried on the understanding they were unlikely to destroy many
of the defences but in the hope some would be hit (as at Utah at
least but a medium bomber raid), communications would be cut
(electronic and road, which did happen, delaying things like artillery
support and reports to HQ) and lower quality German troops would
suffer a morale effect.

By the way, have you considered your claim that bombs detonating
50 metres from a bunker are effective and that it would mean the
heavy bombers should have been quite effective? Or does the bomb
achieve some special properties when dropped by a fighter?

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-24 20:45:04 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
No we do not agree. The aiming point is the target.

Not necessarily. The "aiming point" would have to be
something visible to the bombers at high altitude.
either visually, or on radar.

But the target might be something _not_ visible;
therefore the bombers would be given a nearby
"aiming point" and drop at some offset from there.

If the target was an underground installation, this
would be necessary.

In the case of the D-Day bombings - the target was
the defenses, and with the attack going in at dawn
with some cloud present, the target could not be
seen. Certainly radar would not show the defenses.
But radar would show the waterline; the bombers
would use that as the aiming point(s), and drop
just behind it.

I think perhaps the failure at OMAHA was that the
Allied planners did not realize how much of the
defenses there were within 100 meters of the
waterline. They had two conflicting goals - to bomb as
close in time as possible before the first wave hit
the beach, and to bomb as close in space as possible
the front line of the German defenses.

If they maximized on both counts, there would be grave
danger of short bombs striking the landing forces.
They kept the time goal, and adjusted the space goal
to avoid that. One guesses that perhaps they wanted to
maximize tactical surprises, and to have the landing
start before the Germans recovered from the bombing.

ISTM that this was a chimera - the beach defenders
were tactically alerted anyway, and they were not
bombed, and so were not suppressed.

If the planners had relaxed the time goal, and moved
the bombing to 15 or 30 minutes ahead of the landings,
the bombers could have dropped starting at the
waterline. There would have been some shorts, but the
ships and landing craft would have been safe, I think.
There would have been some undesired cratering of the
beach; but the beach defenses would have been damaged
and possibly breached.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Rich

2015-08-24 22:06:53 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Not necessarily. The "aiming point" would have to be
something visible to the bombers at high altitude.
either visually, or on radar.

Sorry Rich, but no that was not how the blind bombing with
H2X was conducted. The target remained the aim point. However,
it was plotted on a photomap, which was then matched to the
H2X scope image. The course was calculated and input to the
bomb-sight with the bombs dropped automatically on the
designated aim point. See my previous post.

The problem is you are slipping back into the error of
believing the waterline was the aim point. It wasn't. It
was a reference point - a checkpoint - that could be
matched to the course and allow a non-visual calculation
of where the target - the aim point - was.

Rich Rostrom

2015-08-25 15:51:49 UTC

... the waterline was ... a reference point - a checkpoint - that could be
matched to the course and allow a non-visual calculation
of where the target - the aim point - was.

That's exactly what I said - I thought -
although there may be a difference in
terminology.

The other question is...

ISTM that the first line of the German coast
defenses were not hit with any effect. That
is, the bunkers, obstructions, and resistance
nests overlooking the beach.

Was there any intent on the Allies' part for
the high-altitude level bombers to strike
these defenses?

If so, did the bombers hit them? If they
missed, why did they miss?

If not, why not? One recognizes that this
line of defenses was a very narrow target,
but it was _the_ most critical element of
the defenses.

The above summary applies to OMAHA; the
controversy seems to be about the bombing
there. To what extent did bombing affect
the defenses at GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD?
Did it contribute to the much greater
immediate success there?

Or was it the different terrain, i.e. no
bluffs?

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Rich

2015-08-25 16:58:16 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
That's exactly what I said - I thought -
although there may be a difference in
terminology.

I'm beginning to side with William Clodius on this. :)
You went back to calling it the "aiming point". :)

Post by Rich Rostrom
The other question is...

I seem to think we have been discussing just those (plural)
questions, over three threads, since 26 June. What more
do you want me to say?

The questions seem to indicate you have not paid
attention and have a limited understanding of
how the German defenses were laid out - in all
particulars. I suggest a first step would be
reading my book, Balkoski's books, and any of
the dozens of books and websites on the Atlantic Wall.

Post by Rich Rostrom
The above summary applies to OMAHA; the
controversy seems to be about the bombing
there. To what extent did bombing affect
the defenses at GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD?
Did it contribute to the much greater
immediate success there?

The bombing was conducted in exactly the same way
with essentially the same effects, by exactly the
same bomber forces, at JUNO, GOLD, and SWORD. I truly
hate to be rude, but that is what I said way back in June.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Or was it the different terrain, i.e. no
bluffs?

The terrain and the better state of German defenses
and obstacles played the major part in what happened.

William Clodius

2015-08-26 04:57:27 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
<snip>
Was there any intent on the Allies' part for
the high-altitude level bombers to strike
these defenses?
If so, did the bombers hit them? If they
missed, why did they miss?
If not, why not? One recognizes that this
line of defenses was a very narrow target,
but it was _the_ most critical element of
the defenses.
The above summary applies to OMAHA; the
controversy seems to be about the bombing
there. To what extent did bombing affect
the defenses at GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD?
Did it contribute to the much greater
immediate success there?
Or was it the different terrain, i.e. no
bluffs?

The initial bombing runs on OMAHA, GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD were very
similar in their approach with similar numbers of aircraft, targets,
timing, and altitudes. There was intent to damage German defenses, but
skepticism on the part of the Air Forces that given the bombing
altitudes, likely cloud cover, need to avoid collateral damage, and
apparent quality of German bunkers that the effect would be significant.
The ground forces were more optimistic.
In the event, all attacks (except the medium bombers on Utah) had fairly
minor effects on German operations. The Grmans took cover and as quickly
as possible in well prepared locations, waited awhile to be sure the
bombing had pssed and took to their guns. The bunkers and their more
immobile weapon systems were relatively immune to bombs. While it would
be surprising if there were no German casualties, they were too few to
significantly affect the German defenses. The only weapon system I can
recall being taken out by the bombing is a Wurfrahme near Juno whose
firing cable was cut.

Greg Schuler

2015-09-18 17:40:09 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
D-Day Omaha Beach Bombing Failure

<snip everything>

Almost a month in and no mention of Tooze. Honestly,
for the sake of the group, this is reaching Bayman-sian
proportions.

Succinctly, the AF missed because precision bombing
at altitude was really hard in 1944. The heavies were
involved because the AF needed something to do and who
knew if the bombing might provide some support. Surprise,
it didn't work as planned and at Omaha the invasion
forces struggled to gain purchase and breach beach
defenses that the air power had not decimated as some
thought.

It happens. Move along please.

Rich

2015-09-18 19:00:22 UTC