Radio failure at Arnhem 1944.

[clifford wright]

Good day all!
This has been a long term research interest of mine for many years.
I am familiar and have used almost all the WW2 British army radios
and find very many of the explanations offered for these failures to
be pretty spurious.
FYI many year ago I contacted the Arnmem area as a radio amateur from
Cambridgeshire using a type 18 set as provided to the paratroops.
This was using a 20 metre long wire aerial.
The excuses about a wooded area affecting range do not ring very true.
They are obviously influenced by people's experience with more modern
VHF/UHF radios which are affected quite severly.
The 18 set was usually used at around 7 MHZ which is what I used for my
contact. With a wavelength of 40 meters this is rather like that used by
the Americans in the Vietnam war in heavy jungle.
Wet terrain is another,BUT this actually improves the performance as it
actas an an effective ground plane.
The other "tale" has been mismanufacture of the batteries. This only
applies to the lead acid base batteries used with a hand generator
however one protagonist of this theory got it all backwards!
One thing you NEVER do is completely discharge a lead acid battery
if you do then it really will be useless.
Of course the 18 set had a VERY ineficient aerial. However many houses in
the 1940's had an outside radio aerial of considerable length. Even with
a severe mismatch to the transmitter the use of one of these would have
enormously extended the range, but it was not done. Perhaps the Para's
needed a few radio hams in their number?

Overall there seem to have been so may problems that in my more paranoid
moments I have wondered about the possibility of sabotage. After all the
failure of Montgomery's northern thrust to Berlin meant that the
Russian'swould get there first.
Roosevelt was quite blind to Stalin's real nature and this would mean
that American influence would not have aided any British efforts toward
security.
According to some account they were getting ranges that were measured in
hundreds of metres and needed several relay' for 5 miles.
Th

In the event there is a lot of misinformation around on this topic.
One "expert" thought that the transmitters were crystal controlled
(not so). The power output is usually given a 0.25 watts, but even with
this power, in ground wave the range should be several miles, and with
skywave propagation at night far greater.

BTW can someone elighten me as to whether the BBC had a short wave
service in the 5-7 MHz range in 1944. I would not be surprised, but this
would explain the troops listening to the BBC on their type 18 receivers.
It might also indicate that it was the transmitters that were the
problem.
Arnhem has always fascinated me as one of my earliest memories is of the
vast fleets of aircraft and gliders flying over my home town on the 2
occasions of D day and the Arnhem landings.
Hoping to get some interest.
Clifford Wright ZL1BDA ex G3NIA




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[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Much original text cut to meet the quoting rule.

Post by clifford wright
This has been a long term research interest of mine for many years.
I am familiar and have used almost all the WW2 British army radios
and find very many of the explanations offered for these failures to
be pretty spurious.

In which case you are way ahead of almost everyone reading your
message.

Post by clifford wright
FYI many year ago I contacted the Arnmem area as a radio amateur from
Cambridgeshire using a type 18 set as provided to the paratroops.
This was using a 20 metre long wire aerial.
The excuses about a wooded area affecting range do not ring very true.
They are obviously influenced by people's experience with more modern
VHF/UHF radios which are affected quite severly.
The 18 set was usually used at around 7 MHZ which is what I used for my
contact. With a wavelength of 40 meters this is rather like that used by
the Americans in the Vietnam war in heavy jungle.
Wet terrain is another,BUT this actually improves the performance as it
actas an an effective ground plane.
The other "tale" has been mismanufacture of the batteries. This only
applies to the lead acid base batteries used with a hand generator
however one protagonist of this theory got it all backwards!

(snip)

There are quite a few web sites that come up with search strings
like paratroop, radio, Arnhem etc.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden

Has sunspots, wrongly tuned radios, and incorrect antenna choice.

http://www.vintage-radio.net/forum/showthread.php?t=76439

Talks of high iron content soils amongst other reports.

http://pa0pzd.com/army-navy/british-wireless-sets-and-receivers/wireless-set-no-22-2/

Talks about the need for day and night frequencies and the heavy
loss of sets and operators.

Post by clifford wright
Overall there seem to have been so may problems that in my more paranoid
moments I have wondered about the possibility of sabotage.

(snip)

No, more the same sort of planning and confidence that managed
to not see the presence of the SS panzers in the area.

Post by clifford wright
In the event there is a lot of misinformation around on this topic.
One "expert" thought that the transmitters were crystal controlled
(not so). The power output is usually given a 0.25 watts, but even with
this power, in ground wave the range should be several miles, and with
skywave propagation at night far greater.

It would seem a number of sets were in use, for local, divisional and
aircraft communications for example, some were crystal sets. I note
that specialist reconnaissance units, "Phantom", dropped with the
paratroops reported similar radio problems.

Post by clifford wright
BTW can someone elighten me as to whether the BBC had a short wave
service in the 5-7 MHz range in 1944. I would not be surprised, but this
would explain the troops listening to the BBC on their type 18 receivers.
It might also indicate that it was the transmitters that were the
problem.

(snip)

http://www.radioheritage.net/europe/years-1944.htm

Gives some ideas about stations and frequencies around.

Alter the 1944 to the relevant year for other pages.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/schedules/frequencies/

Is a modern list, noting all the different frequencies required.

In mid 1940 the RAF fighter pilots in France noted they could listen to
the BBC on their TR9D radios, which had a frequency range of 4.3 to
6.6 MHz, later in 1940 the fighters converted to TR1133, 100 to 120
Mhz.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[David Wilma]

I am a somewhat new radio amateur and am now interested in
the successes and failures of radio in the 1940s. Having used
the 40 meters and 20 meters I am acutely aware how solar
conditions affect propagation. Antennas are critical. Which
is to say I'm amazed that any tactical radio communications
succeeded at all in those years.

At Surigao Strait in 1944 the MTBs radioed the approach
of the Japanese fleet, but could not get through. Again I
wonder what factors contributed to that.

[WJHopwood]

Post by David Wilma
I am a somewhat new radio amateur and am
now .interested in the successes and failures
of radio in the 1940s. Having used the 40
meters and 20 meters I am acutely aware how
solar conditions affect propagation. Antennas
are critical.

Being a pre-war "Ham" radio operator myself,
(licensed in 1933 as W3CYQ) your post brings
back a lot of old memories. That was a time
when we "Hams" communicated with each
other in Morse, made our own CW
transmitters, and argued about such things as
which antenna position was best for
propagation--horizontal
or vertical.

Believe it or not, radio communications was not
as primitive as you seem to imply it was in the
30,s and 40,s. Although satellites and the
electronic "digital" age was then decades into
the future, we managed to communicate quite
well without either. At least nobody got 'hacked."

Selective Service (a.k.a the draft) became law in
October 1940. Like many "Hams" of draft age
who saw the draft coming and wanted to have a
choice of which military branch in which to serve,
I joined the Naval Communitions Reserve in May
of 1940 and In February 1941 my days as a "Ham"
radio operator came to an abrupt end when I was
called up for active duty. .

I general, from what I was able to learn about it in
my close to five years of active duty until the war
ended, radio equipment used throughout WWII
was not as primitive as you seem to suggest. The
effect on radio propagation of solar radiation on
the upper atmospheric area known as the
ionosphere was then well understood and
effectively dealt with by using a series of
intercept and operational relay stations which
for the most part assured reliable
communications.

Post by David Wilma
At Surigao Strait in 1944 the MTBs radioed the
approach of the Japanese fleet, but could not
get through. Again I wonder what factors
contributed to that.

John Prados in "Combined Fleet Decoded" notes
that the radios were not working on any of the PT
boats but only those in the LEAD PT GROUP which
then made visual contact with another PT group
asking for that other PT to make the contact report.
This was done.

That all of the lead group's radios were "not working"
suggests to me that there was probably nothing wrong
with the radios but that in a typical SNAFU the lead group
may not have been using the proper frequency given to
them to make reports of contact. .

In addition historian Samuel Morison in his book "The Two
Ocean Navy,"suggests a scenario where there were multiple
reports made by the numerous PT groups making contact in
the battle and doesn't say anything about failed radios,

WJH