Francorchamps Fuel Dump - Apparently Conflicting Accounts

[Wesley Johnston]

I have come across an apparently little-known account of the Francorchamps,
Belgium fuel dump during the Battle of the Bulge. And I am trying to figure
out how it fits into the events that included the now-well-known firing of
part of the dump to stop the German advance up the
Stavelot-Francorchamps-Spa road. This prevented Kampfgruppe Peiper from
capturing the fuel and using it.

Since this is really peripheral to my research, I have not put a lot of
effort into it. But I am coming up with a puzzle: accounts from two
different units that were there do not mention the burning of part of the
dump. So i thought it worth this much effort.

First, let me cite what I have found (in a quick web search) about the
burning of the dump. Hugh Cole, in his official "green book" history (
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_11.htm ) wrote:

"By the end of the morning [Monday, 18 December 1944], however, the German
firing line had been built up to the point where the Americans could no
longer hold inside the village proper, particularly since the hostile tanks
were roving at will in the streets.

"Solis [Major Paul Solis, Executive Officer of the non-divisional 526th
Armored Infantry Battalion] ordered his detachment to retire to the top of
the hill above Stavelot [, but in the confusion of disengagement the
remaining antitank weapons and all but one of the rifle platoons fell back
along the Malmedy road. With German tanks climbing behind the lone platoon
and without any means of antitank defense, Solis seized some of the gasoline
from the Francorchamps dump, had his men pour it out in a deep road cut,
where there was no turn-out, and set it ablaze. The result was a perfect
antitank barrier. The German tanks turned back to Stavelot-this was the
closest that Kampfgruppe Peiper ever came to the great stores of gasoline
which might have taken the 1st SS Panzer Division to the Meuse River. Solis
had burned 124,000 gallons for his improvised roadblock ..."

Capt. Charles A. Mitchell of A/526 wrote this, which is on a CRIBA web page
( http://users.skynet.be/bulgecriba/Mitchell.htm ):

"Later in the evening [Sunday, 17 December 1944] Major Solis ordered me to
establish a roadblock on the south side of the river. (This was the last
time I saw Major Solis until the arrival of the 30th Infantry Division.)"

and

"Upon receiving a message from battalion headquarters to evacuate Stavelot
and set up a new position on high ground near the road to Spa, I began to
try to gather my troops for departure. The confusion was tremendous; we
were under constant shelling. I ran all over the area as I tried to get
information to all units by radio and/or word of mouth that we were to leave
Stavelot and proceed toward Spa.

"Those men, who could, returned to their half-tracks and proceeded in
orderly fashion to retreat as ordered. However, many of the vehicles missed
the road to Spa and proceeded instead toward Malmedy. Two half-tracks, one
of which was an antitank half-track, and their men, including Lieutenant
Wheelwright, and I in my jeep, driven by Sergeant Jack Mocnick proceeded
toward Spa up the Francorchamps road.

"We had progressed approximately a mile when we came to a huge gasoline
dump. Realizing the additional fuel would be a boon to the German troops,
Lieutenant Wheelwright and I decided to try to destroy it by igniting it.
Since two German tanks, which we could hear slowly laboring up the hill
behind us, had followed us out of town we needed to take immediate action.

"We first deployed the men on either side of the road and set up the 57mm AT
gun in the woods. We then fired a machine gun into the gasoline, which was
stacked in five-gallon containers on the left side of the road as far as the
eye could see. It did not ignite. The German tanks were now in sight. One
of the men then ran to the dump, quickly opened a can of the fuel and ran
with it to our position, spilling it out as he ran. A lighted match
provided the necessary spark to set the dump on fire. The first tank saw
the fire and turned around; the second tank followed.

"Sometime later, hearing activity in the woods behind us, we feared we were
surrounded by German troops. Frantically we tried to change our position
until one of the men shouted: "American troops"! It was the 1st Battalion,
117th Regiment of the 30th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Robert E. Frankland. Major Solis was accompanying these troops."

So this account definitely has Maj. Solis separate from the A/526 troops
moving up the road from Stavelot toward the fueld dump. And it is very
definitely Capt. Mitchell and Lt. Wheelwright who ignite the fuel and not
Maj. Solis, who they do not even see until "sometime later".

So here is the first apparent conflict among the accounts.

Next, I found another account that I had not read before, that of Pfc. Theo
Lauter of the 3814th Q.M. Gas Supply, which is also on a CRIBA web page (
http://users.skynet.be/bulgecriba/lauter.htm ). Lauter says that they left
the fuel dump sometime in the day on 18 December 1944 and withdrew to Spa
but that he and some others returned to the fuel dump that evening. He makes
no mention of the burning of a sizable portion of the fuel dump (which was
somewhere around 1 to 1.5 million gallons of fuel). But since he was not
there in the afternoon, this omission is not surprising. He does mention
that the fuel dump was being evacuated after he returned the evening of 18
December, by which time 30th Infantry Division was there (as well as 82nd
Airborne and 3rd Armored). So he confirms the presence of 30th Infantry.

And finally to the account that I have just read. It is a 31 December 1944
combat interview of Sgt. James W. Duncan of 147th Signal Corps of 7th
Armored Division. 7th Armored Division had moved about 60 miles south in two
columns on 17 December 1944, and Peiper's battle group cut off some of the
rear elements of both columns. Here is Sgt. Duncan's account:

"At About 1545 Sunday, 17 Dec, Lt. Woodrow Combs, Middletown, Ohio, Sgt.
Raymond Winslow, Long Island, N. Y., Sgt. James Duncan, Franklinton, La.,
and T/5 William N. Biery, Newport, Ky. left Heerlen, Holland [which would
have put them into the west column of 7AD's march] headed for the 7th
Armored Division's new location at Vielsalm, Belgium. These men, all members
of the Division Signal Co., were riding in two peeps. Between Spa and
Stavelot, in the little town of Francorchamps, they ran into a confused
group of men attempting to flee in panic. A Lt. with a full platoon of
Infantrymen (about 70) in two half tracks came into the town from the
direction of Stavelot and reported the Germans were just down the road and
continued to flee. His behavior agravated the panic. Lt. Combs in one of
the peeps made a personal reconnaissance of the roads and discovered an
abandoned ration dump and a gas dump of about 1,000,000 gals. He returned
and collected about 100 stragglers, mostly Inf. and some TD's (3or4) and
set up some road blocks. One 90mm TD was set up to cover the gas dump with
orders to fire it if the Germans should break through. While the infantry
held off attacks by German infantry and an undetermined number of tanks, a
colored trucking outfit with large trucks was loading and carting away the
cans of gas. On one occassion , the infantry fell back and Lt Comb and Biery
met them and told them that he had plenty of TD's set up on the hill to take
care of the tanks. The Sgt who was in charge of the infantry said that they
would take care of the German infantry if there were TD's to take care of
the tanks. Duncan and Winslow also stopped and turned back a portion of the
infantry's retreat. At 1300A, Monday , a Colonel from the 30th Inf Div
arrived and remarked "Thank God you saved the gas dump." He left and at 1800
returned with sufficient strength from the 30th. Div. to continue the
defence.

"The four men returned to Spa about 2300 or 2400 and spent the remainder of
the night there."

In addition to the narrative, there is a carefully drawn map, showing the
location of the dump. It began at the southern end of the hill just south of
Francorchamps, where the woods begins, and it extended to a point that was
about 2 miles "visually" up the road from Stavelot. The map also shows the
ration dump, which was north of the fuel dump and just west across the road
from the hill south of Francorchamps. The map also shows the road block
positions that were set up: just east of Francorchamps on the Manhay road, a
bit further east of that (where a road branches off to the north), and the
major defense of "ABOUT 70 INF" at the southern end of the dump. There is
also marked, just behind the dotted arc of the 70 men a spot marked west of
the road and labeled "ONE TD KNOCKED OUT." The narrative does not mention
any TD being knocked out.

1 - So these men were present at the dump the entire day of 18 December
1944, until sometime between 1800 and 2300 or 2400. And there is no mention
of the burning of the fuel.

2 - It is not clear who the infantrymen were that were fleeing through
Francorchamps on 17 December. The estimate of a full platoon as being 70 men
is way off, and it is hard to imagine 70 men in two half-tracks, but the
interview definitely says 70 men.

3 - What is also interesting in this account is that the evacuation of the
fuel dump was underway on 17 or early 18 December, apparently starting from
the end closest to Francorchamps. It is also clear that the troops set up by
Lt. Comb south of the dump did encounter enemy in combat, also apparently on
17 or early 18 December: "the infantry held off attacks by German infantry
and an undetermined number of tanks". In addition, there is the knocked-out
tank destroyer. So while there was a battle going on down in Stavelot, it
seems that some German troops did make it up to the line of defense that Lt.
Comb had set up south of the fuel dump. It also seems that Sgt. Duncan was
not on that line, since his account seems to be from reports from the line.

4- Sgt. Duncan puts the 30th Infantry Division Col.'s arrival at 1300 on 18
December 1944. But then the Col. departs and does not return with strength
until 1800, which may have been the troops that Capt. Mitchell reported
behind him -- was this when Capt. Mitchell saw Maj. Solis for the first time
since setting up south of the Stavelot bridge?

BOTTOM LINE:
There are clearly conflicts in these reports. Mitchell makes it clear that
he and Lt. Wheelwright and not Maj. Solis burned the fuel. And yet there is
no mention of the burning of the fuel in Sgt. Duncan's account. Was the
combat that Sgt. Duncan spoke of the same combat in which the fuel was
burned? It seems that it probably was -- that the A/526 men fell back to the
position at the south of the dump. But had the 70-man defensive arc
withdrawn before Capt. Mitchell arrived there? He makes no mention of them,
and Sgt. Duncan makes no mention of Capt. Mitchell. There's still a lot of
uncertainty here.
--

[Richard Macdonald]

Post by Wesley Johnston
So here is the first apparent conflict among the accounts.
Next, I found another account that I had not read before, that of Pfc. Theo
Lauter of the 3814th Q.M. Gas Supply, which is also on a CRIBA web page (
http://users.skynet.be/bulgecriba/lauter.htm ). Lauter says that they left
the fuel dump sometime in the day on 18 December 1944 and withdrew to Spa
but that he and some others returned to the fuel dump that evening. He makes
no mention of the burning of a sizable portion of the fuel dump (which was
somewhere around 1 to 1.5 million gallons of fuel). But since he was not
there in the afternoon, this omission is not surprising. He does mention
that the fuel dump was being evacuated after he returned the evening of 18
December, by which time 30th Infantry Division was there (as well as 82nd
Airborne and 3rd Armored). So he confirms the presence of 30th Infantry.

That depends on what one considers a sizable portion, 1M gallons would be
200,000+ jerrycans or equivalent of 18,000+ Barrels or a mixture of both.

Now to pour out a few thousand gallons to set fire and block the road is
not burning a significant amount of the dump, you could do it with less than
1 percent of the fuel in the area, that is basically not much more than
normal
wastage therefore and not really remarkable to the QM Corps.

I mean it's not like setting an oil field on fire (seen that).
--
Richard A Macdonald, CPA/EA
SSG (Ret), USA, ADA, 16P34
Dedicated student of Fr Luca Paccioli, Master Juggler.
Gib mir schokolade und niemand wird verletzt!!

[Duwop]

Post by Wesley Johnston
So here is the first apparent conflict among the accounts.

It's not so unknown, Henry Fonda recreated it in the movie "Battle of the
Bulge"
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0058947/


D

[Wesley Johnston]

It's not so unknown, Henry Fonda recreated it in the movie "Battle of the Bulge"

Please read my original note again. You will see that I said that the
incident itself is now famous. What I referred to as little-known is the
account of the fuel dump by a member of the 147th Signal Company of 7th
Armored Division.

[Wesley Johnston]

Post by Richard Macdonald

[Lauter] makes no mention of the burning of a sizable portion of the
fuel dump (which was somewhere around 1 to 1.5 million gallons of fuel).

That depends on what one considers a sizable portion, 1M gallons would be
200,000+ jerrycans or equivalent of 18,000+ Barrels or a mixture of both.
Now to pour out a few thousand gallons to set fire and block the road is
not burning a significant amount of the dump ...

"Sizable" was defined by Hugh Cole, quoted just prior to this account, in
which Cole says that 124,000 gallons (which would come out to 24,800
5-gallon jerrycans) were burned by Solis. So when reading the later accounts
(later in the order of my note, thus after Cole's account), I had been
expecting that such a large amount of fuel burning would be quite noticable.
But in looking at the detailed terrain maps (see my reply to D. Patterson's
note, where I go into detail on this), I can see how the 70-man defensive
line (described by Sgt. Duncan) might not realize that there was more of the
dump south of them and might not even have realized what was burning a mile
south of them.
--

[D. Patterson]

Much of the confusion can be accounted for by the widespread nature and
confusion of the engagement/s. The fuel dump is quite large and strung out
along the roadway from the hill. It is quite easy for different people
separated by a thousand yards and any part of a single hour or multiple
hours to have a drastically different viewpoint and report of the events
which took place. Add to this already great confusion and, mortal dangers,
and tunnel vision from adrenalin and focus on the immediate dangers and
tasks; it can be exceedingly difficult to remember the events clearly enough
to write them down later in proper accuracy and sequence. The omission of
reports about the fuel fire can be attributed to oversight in the written
account, failure to realize the now reduced fire was due to something other
than collateral damage from the firefights, the fuel fires may have been
outside the field of view, the fuel fires may have died down enough to be
mistaken from a distant point of view for burning vehicles, or erroneous
gossip from the soldiers with a closer view of the fires may have
misinformed the writer about the nature and origin of the fires. Never
underestimate the tremendous ease with which the "fog of war" can grossly
distort the view of events on and around the battlefield. Two experienced
combat aircrewmen aboard the same combat aircraft commonly report the same
events differently. It is often much worse in ground combat.

[Wesley Johnston]

Post by D. Patterson
The fuel dump is quite large and strung out
along the roadway from the hill. It is quite easy for different people
separated by a thousand yards and any part of a single hour or multiple
hours to have a drastically different viewpoint and report of the events
which took place.

In looking over the high-resolution (1:25,000) topographical maps of this
area, I think this may be the biggest part of the answer. Sgt. Duncan's map
of the fuel dump and the position of the 70-man defense at what he shows as
just south of the southern end of the dump simply does not fit with Capt.
Mitchell's description of where he burned the fuel.

Duncan shows the sight-line to Stavelot to have been 2 miles. (And I am not
sure, in looking at the location of the intervening forest, that Duncan was
actually saying that he could see Stavelot from what he thought was the
southern end of the dump.) Mitchell says that they went up the hill for
about a mile from Stavelot, which is where they burned the fuel. Cole places
the sight of the burning at " deep road cut, where there was no turn-out".

On the topographical map, the road does appear to go through the northern
end of a deep cut (which Cole reports as the site of the burning), just west
of Amérmont -- about a mile up from Stavelot and a mile down from where the
70-man defense is shown, which does fit with the distance estimates of both
accounts (Duncan and Mitchell). If this is indeed the place where the fuel
was burned, then the 70-man defense was a mile to the north, which means
that Duncan was wrong (by about a mile) about where the southern end of the
dump really was. Additionally, on the 1989 map, this point on the road where
the burning seems to have taken place is within a second (as your proceed
south toward Stavelot from Francorchamps) stand of forest, which could also
obscure it from viewers just a mile to the north.

Post by D. Patterson
From a mile away, your "fog of war" observations about possible other

interpretations of the burning, if it was seen at all, make sense. My main
personal motivating issue was just where the 70-man defensive line was in
relation to the point of the burning. And I think that I may now have the
answer to that, which can fit the apparently disparate accounts.

[Dacium]

Post by Wesley Johnston
"Solis [Major Paul Solis, Executive Officer of the non-divisional 526th
Armored Infantry Battalion] ordered his detachment to retire to the top of
the hill above Stavelot [, but in the confusion of disengagement the
remaining antitank weapons and all but one of the rifle platoons fell back
along the Malmedy road. With German tanks climbing behind the lone platoon
and without any means of antitank defense, Solis seized some of the gasoline
from the Francorchamps dump, had his men pour it out in a deep road cut,
where there was no turn-out, and set it ablaze. The result was a perfect
antitank barrier. The German tanks turned back to Stavelot-this was the
closest that Kampfgruppe Peiper ever came to the great stores of gasoline
which might have taken the 1st SS Panzer Division to the Meuse River. Solis
had burned 124,000 gallons for his improvised roadblock ..."

This is a third party account that has dubious accuary. Notice how he says
Solis' men light the fire. This could mean any one under Solis' command, or
anyone in the area below his rank. Although it does say he grapped the fuel
this was probably assumed, why would he grap it and then give it to other
men to pour. He is a major after all. Its seems like he is being referred to
simply because he was the highest officier in command of the area. The
officer in charge has his name against pretty much everything that is
reported to the higher division commands.

Post by Wesley Johnston
1 - So these men were present at the dump the entire day of 18 December
1944, until sometime between 1800 and 2300 or 2400. And there is no mention
of the burning of the fuel.

The fuel dump could be massive, like 2000 yards. There could be many hills
and other things in the way. Its also lilky that the defense line set up was
not at the very end of the dump - there was probably no clearly defined end,
it was probably in many sections. Its possible that tanks completely drove
past some sections oblivious.

Post by Wesley Johnston
2 - It is not clear who the infantrymen were that were fleeing through
Francorchamps on 17 December. The estimate of a full platoon as being 70 men
is way off, and it is hard to imagine 70 men in two half-tracks, but the
interview definitely says 70 men.

Probably coloumns of men along the each side of the road and two half-tracks
in the middle, usually they would say "2 halftracks in 70 men" though, so
that still doesn't fit. Who knows.

Post by Wesley Johnston
There are clearly conflicts in these reports. Mitchell makes it clear that
he and Lt. Wheelwright and not Maj. Solis burned the fuel. And yet there is
no mention of the burning of the fuel in Sgt. Duncan's account. Was the
combat that Sgt. Duncan spoke of the same combat in which the fuel was
burned? It seems that it probably was -- that the A/526 men fell back to the
position at the south of the dump. But had the 70-man defensive arc
withdrawn before Capt. Mitchell arrived there? He makes no mention of them,
and Sgt. Duncan makes no mention of Capt. Mitchell. There's still a lot of
uncertainty here.
From the written accounts you posted I doubt any of them have documented the

facts correctly. Do you have a map of the exact battle area and the roads?
Where were the lines formed and the exact shape of the dump? Remember the
dump itself would likely be spread out greatly along the road between spa
and stavelot, so much that there could be gaps of 300+ yards between dumb
sections. This distance is likely even more. I once read an account from
3814th(?) gas supply company of the 1st and they said most of the fuel was
removed from the dump. So its likely there could have been a gaps up to a
mile long. This company also returned on the evening of the 18th and they
make no mention of any fires. I remember this stuff because a father of a
friend was always adamant that if the captured the dump the it would of
extended the counter offensive quite considerably (since panzer divisions
were always waiting for fuel).

[Wesley Johnston]

In looking for something completely unrelated to the gas dump, I came across
another website that has information. It is a 56-page-long transcription of
the Combat Interviews of 30th Infantry Division, quite a contribution to
historians. The URL is http://www.30thinfantry.org/ardennes.doc
--