Discussion:
Stalin in the battle for Moscow
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SolomonW
2015-11-19 15:42:04 UTC
Permalink
In his book "The battle of Moscow by Col Albert Seaton" he states the
following in his conclusion

"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Stalin was the sole military
commander and that the plans for the defence of Moscow, and the subsequent
counter-offensive were drawn up at his direction. Except that he was
commander of the largest of the four fronts, Zhukov took little or no part
in the planning of the counter-offensive ... Far from being dependent on
any of his generals, Stalin, caustic and insulting, treated them little
better than serfs."

What are your thoughts on this comment?
dumbstruck
2015-11-20 05:39:34 UTC
Permalink
Post by SolomonW
Far from being dependent on
any of his generals, Stalin, caustic and insulting, treated them little
better than serfs."
What are your thoughts on this comment?
In my brief spot reading of Zhukov's memoirs, I focused on his depiction
of working with Stalin. Stalin was shown as asking for plans, and then
approving the ones he liked, rather than providing much interference.
He would suck on an unlit pipe, and appear philosophical while consulting
with generals, which sounds like a stretch. He also claims Stalin was not
hiding or evasive during the first week of war, although that part wasn't
something he observed first hand.
SolomonW
2015-11-21 18:03:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by dumbstruck
Zhukov's memoirs,
Well in Zhukov memoirs, he praises Stalin for having saved Moscow.
Bob Martin
2015-11-22 21:31:08 UTC
Permalink
Post by SolomonW
Post by dumbstruck
Zhukov's memoirs,
Well in Zhukov memoirs, he praises Stalin for having saved Moscow.
Well, he would, wouldn't he?
IndSyd
2015-11-22 21:32:18 UTC
Permalink
Have read Zhukov's memoirs as you say
Post by dumbstruck
Zhukov's memoirs,
Well in Zhukov memoirs, he praises Stalin for having saved Moscow.

Stalin in 1941 as leader had disrupted military forces.
He however had the strategic thinking and determination to save
the USSR. IMHO he drew upon the lessons of history (he was a
knowledgeable student of Russian history) especially the
Napoleonic war and its geo politics.

I think he was the architect of the offensive and Zhukov the
chief executive. reasons:
1st The words in his Nov 7 Revolution anniversary speech suggest
that he strategically understood the importance of stopping the
Wehrmacht to turn the tide for a world wide war.
Incidentally reading many listeners who heard it opinions from
that time suggest Stalin captured people's mood and energized
them (authors: Alexander werth, journalists Grossman, etc.)
He then took the salute to troops marching to the front Nov 7
during the day another people confidence measure. He also
put his money where his mount is by not leaving Moscow and
evacuating with the govt east to Kuibyshev

2nd He had the logistics organization understanding and
resources to get the offensive set up. Recall Alan Brooks
(Chief british General Staff's comment on his grasp of
logistics at the Teheran conference)

3rd His own experiences in the Civil war after the Revolution
gave him some background in the tactics of war that must go
with the strategy for success.

So all in all he had the knowledge, determination and the ability.
The Red Army senior staff officers provided the detailed plans.

Did he treat Generals like serfs?
Well Shaposhnikov & Vasilevsky Stavka chiefs had mutually
respect relation with him for many of the war years. I think he
was as tough with his generals as with his Politburo ministers.
He couldn't have treated them like serfs to have got the
performance put out by Zhukov, Chuikov, Konev, Rokossovsky,
Timoshchenko, etc.
SolomonW
2015-11-23 15:37:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by IndSyd
He couldn't have treated them like serfs to have got the
performance put out by Zhukov, Chuikov, Konev, Rokossovsky,
Timoshchenko, etc.
Being a Russian Serf is not an easy job, there were ways to make you work.

Nor being a Russian general that got on the wrong side of Stalin was not
good for your health.
David Wilma
2015-11-26 21:35:47 UTC
Permalink
I suspect Stalin's background of sacrificing individuals for the
larger goal contributed to success. He had two things the
Germans did not have, land and lives. Stalin was willing to trade both
for success. His industrial capacity came into the picture, but
the Germans could match productivity, but for the need of labor.
IndSyd
2015-11-28 18:14:27 UTC
Permalink
Post by David Wilma
I suspect Stalin's background of sacrificing individuals for the
larger goal contributed to success. He had two things the
Germans did not have, land and lives. Stalin was willing to trade both
for success. His industrial capacity came into the picture, but
the Germans could match productivity, but for the need of labor.
The labor pool numbers between the USSR and Germany were not so
lopsided. All of Nazi occupied Europe was really their labor pool
and that makes them close except for the lack of motivation of the
occupied to work at full efficiency.

Yes Stalin was focused on the kick the German Army out of the
USSR goal and took measures to make it happen, took longer that
he and his staff planned for but it happened. I think the
motivation value of his speeches to teh people in 1941 after
the invasion, on the anniversary of the Revolution and in the
later war years was a major morale booster and gird your loins
and fight or work factor for the population. That was also a
major factor for the Red Army as was increasingly experienced
and capable generals.
Alan Meyer
2015-11-29 05:48:04 UTC
Permalink
Post by SolomonW
In his book "The battle of Moscow by Col Albert Seaton" he states the
following in his conclusion
"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Stalin was the sole military
commander and that the plans for the defence of Moscow, and the subsequent
counter-offensive were drawn up at his direction. Except that he was
commander of the largest of the four fronts, Zhukov took little or no part
in the planning of the counter-offensive ... Far from being dependent on
any of his generals, Stalin, caustic and insulting, treated them little
better than serfs."
What are your thoughts on this comment?
My thoughts are, Yes, but...

Yes, Stalin was in command of the battle, he imagined himself to be the
only trustworthy commander, and he ridiculed and disregarded much of the
advice from his generals. But, I think it would be a serious
misjudgment to give the credit to Stalin for winning the battle. The
real credit goes to Adolf Hitler.

Hitler and Stalin each attempted to outdo the other in making serious
mistakes. Stalin made more mistakes than Hitler, but the advantages on
his side were so great that he won in spite of that.

Stalin's mistakes began with the Red Army purges in the late 1930's.
They continued with his throwing away the Soviet Air Force in suicidal
attacks on the advancing Germans that resulted in most of the planes and
experienced pilots being lost. This was followed by misguided counter
offensives at Smolensk and misguided attempts to hold the lines
resulting in "cauldrons" at Smolensk, Kiev, Bryansk, Vyazma, and
elsewhere in which entire armies were captured, and much of the
available equipment captured or destroyed.

Stalin's basic strategy seemed to reduce to:

1) Attack wherever possible, even if the men on the scene say it's
hopeless. Stalin specialized in sending unsupported troops into lines
of German artillery and machine guns. Some of them didn't even have
rifles, being told to pick up guns from the ground as their comrades died.

2) Defend everywhere, even if the defensive positions cannot be held and
the men will be killed or captured, again disregarding the opinions of
the men on the ground.

3) Shoot anyone who baulks at 1) or 2).

As the war went on, Hitler more and more adopted this war losing
strategy while Stalin, more secure in both his winning position and in
trust of his generals, began to allow more creative and intelligent
thinking.

Here are the mistakes that Hitler made that cost him the battle of Moscow:

1) He started too late. The destruction of Yugoslavia set the invasion
plan back.

2) He held up the army too long in the center, deciding to move north
and south for a while and only starting the final offensive against
Moscow on October 2nd, leading to point 3.

3) He misjudged, or perhaps more accurately, failed to even think about,
the winter weather in central Russia. Neither motor vehicles, weapons,
or men were properly equipped for the sub-zero weather that was
encountered. There was no preparation for the mud, the ice, or the
miserable state of the railroads and roads needed to support the front,
or the resources needed to move supplies and ammunition.

4) He turned all of the local people against him with his "war of
annihilation" that considered all Slavs to be subhumans whose lives
meant nothing and whose property now belonged to him.

Fortunately for Stalin, although he had thrown away most of his formerly
formidable European armies, he still had an excellent army in Siberia,
well equipped and experienced for winter operations, that he was able to
bring to Moscow to save the day.

Even so, Stalin managed to get a huge number of them killed, but not
before they saved him and Moscow.

Alan
IndSyd
2015-12-07 15:40:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Meyer
My thoughts are, Yes, but...
Yes, Stalin was in command of the battle, he imagined himself to be the
only trustworthy commander, and he ridiculed and disregarded much of the
advice from his generals. But, I think it would be a serious
misjudgment to give the credit to Stalin for winning the battle. The
real credit goes to Adolf Hitler.
The 1941 situation was survival mode so the discussions with the
STAVKA Staff were intense according to many memoirs.
As I said before the USSR Generals had confidence in his leadership.
Post by Alan Meyer
Hitler and Stalin each attempted to outdo the other in making serious
mistakes. Stalin made more mistakes than Hitler, but the advantages on
his side were so great that he won in spite of that.
Great advantages can't be true for 1941 .
Post by Alan Meyer
Stalin's mistakes began with the Red Army purges in the late 1930's.
They continued with his throwing away the Soviet Air Force in suicidal
attacks on the advancing Germans that resulted in most of the planes and
experienced pilots being lost.
The Luftwaffe claimed most of the Red Air Force planes were
destroyed parked on the airports the victims of the June 22 surprises.
The silver lining was this saved a lot of pilots and they were available
for flying the more modern replacement airplanes.
Post by Alan Meyer
1) He started too late. The destruction of Yugoslavia set the invasion
plan back.
Not true, you can't campaign in that Eastern Europe area much before
June due to soggy ground from the Spring thaw & rains.
Note the German offensives 1942 & 1943 were launched in June not before.
Bagaration too waited till June for ground conditions and history reasons.
Post by Alan Meyer
3) He misjudged, or perhaps more accurately, failed to even think about,
the winter weather in central Russia. Neither motor vehicles, weapons,
or men were properly equipped for the sub-zero weather that was
encountered. There was no preparation for the mud, the ice, or the
miserable state of the railroads and roads needed to support the front,
or the resources needed to move supplies and ammunition.
No. My opinion- Hitler expected a victory before winter so did not implement
winter campaign logistics - warm clothing for soldiers, lower viscosity
lubricants, etc. Surely the Germans knew what winter temperature were from
historical climate records so the winter temperatures were hardly surprises.
Not preparing for winter was a conscious decision by Hitler & General Staff.
Dave Smith
2015-12-08 05:42:01 UTC
Permalink
Post by IndSyd
No. My opinion- Hitler expected a victory before winter so did not implement
winter campaign logistics - warm clothing for soldiers, lower viscosity
lubricants, etc. Surely the Germans knew what winter temperature were from
historical climate records so the winter temperatures were hardly surprises.
Not preparing for winter was a conscious decision by Hitler & General Staff.
Perhaps they thought about winter from a German perspective. It may get
cold in Germany but the cold in Russia is quite different from what they
imagined and they may not have really understood the difference between
a German winter and a Russian winter. It is not just little chillier.
The ground freezes solid, the flesh freezes after a few minutes of
exposure. Diesel fuel gels and the engines will not star. Engine oil
does not flow and the oil in artillery recoil mechanisms does not act
to buffer the recoil.
Kenneth Young
2015-12-08 15:40:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Smith
Perhaps they thought about winter from a German perspective.
This is a popular canard but the error was different. Cold weather
equipment was available what was not was transport. The equipment could
not get to the front without interfering with transport off food and
ammunition. Still Germany was set up for a short campaign armour had to
be returned to a factory for major repairs.
Dave Smith
2015-12-09 23:20:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kenneth Young
Post by Dave Smith
Perhaps they thought about winter from a German perspective.
This is a popular canard but the error was different.
Canard? I don't think so. It is hard for people who live in a moderate
climate to understand the effects of extreme climates. It is one thing
to feel chilly but it is something completely different to be exposed
to windchill factors that make exposed skin freeze within minutes. It is
one thing to know that engines turn over more slowly in cold weather but
there comes a point when batteries would not hold a charge, oil would
have no viscosity.
Post by Kenneth Young
Cold weather
equipment was available what was not was transport. The equipment could
not get to the front without interfering with transport off food and
ammunition.
I will suggest again that they is equipment designed for German, cold,
not for Russian cold.
m***@netMAPSONscape.net
2015-12-13 19:18:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Smith
Post by Kenneth Young
Post by Dave Smith
Perhaps they thought about winter from a German perspective.
This is a popular canard but the error was different.
Canard? I don't think so. It is hard for people who live in a moderate
climate to understand the effects of extreme climates. It is one thing
While Germany isn't as cold as Western Russia in the winter, nobody in
their right mind would call it "moderate".

Mike
IndSyd
2015-12-15 17:20:36 UTC
Permalink
On Sunday, December 13, 2015 at 2:18:47 PM UTC-5, ***@netmapsonscape.net wrote:

General winter came every year with known temperatures
regardless of wether Germans had experience such temperatures
or not. When the Afrika Korps went to the Libyan desert they
went equipped with sand filters and tropical gear, even though
the German summer was far more moderate!

So why not the same for the Soviet campaign?
I think because they expected a quick victory by
"kicking in the house of card". So no plans for winter,
so no winter logistics planned.
Later when they had to, they ran into the rail and other
problems described by posters above.
Dave Smith
2015-12-15 17:21:04 UTC
Permalink
Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
Post by Dave Smith
Canard? I don't think so. It is hard for people who live in a moderate
climate to understand the effects of extreme climates. It is one thing
While Germany isn't as cold as Western Russia in the winter, nobody in
their right mind would call it "moderate".
I don't understand your objection here. I don't know if you mean that
Germany's climate is not moderate or that Russia's climate is not
moderate. Is your objection about the word "moderate" where it should be
labelled as temperate? A couple sites I checked described Germany's
climate as moderate while others described it as temperate. It has
definite seasons but they do not generally get extreme cold or heat.
They set a cold temperature record of -13C a few years ago. The average
low temperature in Moscow is in the -9 to -10 range while record low
temperatures for January and February run are closer to -40.

If you look at maps of weather zones you will see that most of most of
Europe is the same temperate zone as most of southern Canada, the
northern two thirds of the US and south western Russia where Moscow,
Leningrad and Stalingrad (St.Petersburg and Volgograd) are located.
The Horny Goat
2015-12-18 16:44:06 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 15 Dec 2015 12:21:04 -0500, Dave Smith
Post by Dave Smith
If you look at maps of weather zones you will see that most of most of
Europe is the same temperate zone as most of southern Canada, the
northern two thirds of the US and south western Russia where Moscow,
Leningrad and Stalingrad (St.Petersburg and Volgograd) are located.
One of my more memorable life experiences was my 4 years in Winnipeg.
Now the Winnipeg Public Library has a reading room with a huge picture
window and I remember finding a book there covering the winter
campaign of 1941/42 which had an interesting twist - on each page it
had the temperature near Moscow at noon or midnight for every day from
Nov 1 -> March 1 and while I was reading the book I kept thinking "hey
that's warmer than here!"

Also back in the mid 80s it was common at the Winnipeg airport once
Labor Day was over and fall began to see German soldiers in the
WInnipeg airport milling around to catch buses to CFB Shilo (about 1
1/2 hours by bus) for armor training. Now the main feature of Camp
Shilo was thousands of acres of prairie with only a few hills and
nasty winter weather.....

(I left there in 1986 and haven't been back since so it may be going
on yet)
Dave Smith
2015-12-20 23:15:10 UTC
Permalink
Post by The Horny Goat
One of my more memorable life experiences was my 4 years in Winnipeg.
Now the Winnipeg Public Library has a reading room with a huge picture
window and I remember finding a book there covering the winter
campaign of 1941/42 which had an interesting twist - on each page it
had the temperature near Moscow at noon or midnight for every day from
Nov 1 -> March 1 and while I was reading the book I kept thinking "hey
that's warmer than here!"
I can appreciate that. I grew up in southern Ontario and I have lived
through more winters than I care to remember. Back in the mid 70s I
went out to Winnipeg to look for a job. I was used to winters where the
temperature bounced around the freezing point and occasionally dropped
down close to 0 F. When I stepped out of the Winnipeg airport and
experienced -40 for the first time it was a rude surprise. It was cold
in a whole new dimension.

That is the sort of thing that I was thinking about when I suggested the
difference between the German version of cold and the Russian cold.
Post by The Horny Goat
Also back in the mid 80s it was common at the Winnipeg airport once
Labor Day was over and fall began to see German soldiers in the
WInnipeg airport milling around to catch buses to CFB Shilo (about 1
1/2 hours by bus) for armor training. Now the main feature of Camp
Shilo was thousands of acres of prairie with only a few hills and
nasty winter weather.....
(I left there in 1986 and haven't been back since so it may be going
on yet)
The Horny Goat
2015-12-22 05:35:27 UTC
Permalink
On Sun, 20 Dec 2015 18:15:10 -0500, Dave Smith
Post by Dave Smith
Post by The Horny Goat
One of my more memorable life experiences was my 4 years in Winnipeg.
Now the Winnipeg Public Library has a reading room with a huge picture
window and I remember finding a book there covering the winter
campaign of 1941/42 which had an interesting twist - on each page it
had the temperature near Moscow at noon or midnight for every day from
Nov 1 -> March 1 and while I was reading the book I kept thinking "hey
that's warmer than here!"
I can appreciate that. I grew up in southern Ontario and I have lived
through more winters than I care to remember. Back in the mid 70s I
went out to Winnipeg to look for a job. I was used to winters where the
temperature bounced around the freezing point and occasionally dropped
down close to 0 F. When I stepped out of the Winnipeg airport and
experienced -40 for the first time it was a rude surprise. It was cold
in a whole new dimension.
That is the sort of thing that I was thinking about when I suggested the
difference between the German version of cold and the Russian cold.
Well t here's always the inimitable experience of standing on the
corner of Portage and Main (the best known street corner in downtown
Winnipeg) at -40 with the wind blowing through the downtown towers at
40 mph!

(My low point in that city was arriving on a January Friday night in
1982 thinking "boy do they roll up the sidewalks early here!" .... and
only learned about the extensive underground walkway system in the
downtown core the following Tuesday!

On a personal note I have also checked the day by day temperatures in
Leningrad during the 1941-42 winter and found that they were milder
than the Winnipeg winter of 1984-85. Obviously the average WInnipegger
ate better in the 1980s than Leningraders ate in that first terrible
winter)
m***@netMAPSONscape.net
2015-12-23 06:57:19 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Smith
Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
Post by Dave Smith
Canard? I don't think so. It is hard for people who live in a moderate
climate to understand the effects of extreme climates. It is one thing
While Germany isn't as cold as Western Russia in the winter, nobody in
their right mind would call it "moderate".
I don't understand your objection here. I don't know if you mean that
Germany's climate is not moderate or that Russia's climate is not
moderate. Is your objection about the word "moderate" where it should be
I live in a moderate climate; it ain't Germany
Post by Dave Smith
labelled as temperate? A couple sites I checked described Germany's
climate as moderate while others described it as temperate. It has
definite seasons but they do not generally get extreme cold or heat.
They set a cold temperature record of -13C a few years ago. The average
Which is odd, because the record low in Germany is -45, not -13 according
to wikipedia and a couple other sources. The average low in Moscow is
-10C, in February, -2C for Berlin in January.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin#Climate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_of_Moscow

Eastern Russia is definitely colder than Germany, but not as much as
you think. Germany has some pretty cold winters. There is no reason
for the Germans not to have understood the effects of the cold.

Mike
dumbstruck
2015-12-15 19:59:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Smith
climate to understand the effects of extreme climates. It is one thing
to feel chilly but it is something completely different to be exposed
to windchill factors that make exposed skin freeze within minutes. It is
one thing to know that engines turn over more slowly in cold weather but
there comes a point when batteries would not hold a charge, oil would
have no viscosity.
Tiger tanks used a hand crank for winter starting; an easy one-person
task with it's clever inertial energy-storing feature:
Didn't other vehicles
have crank start? I notice you can now buy pedal and pull-rope starters
for your car (have to stroke them a few minutes to charge a battery).

I grew up waiting for school bus to come with typically -70 windchill.
I always thought windchill and heat index was misleading. The slightest
adaption of even light clothing and habits can correct for this, with
the exception of the foot extremities. Patton was obsessed with keeping
feet dry and warm, and I seem to recall same issue with Spanish troops
around Leningrad. Lots of socks and sometimes obtain local style footware.

German memoirs have complained that cold weather supplies were at
times available, but intercepted by the rear echelon troops. While
they slept in triple the allowed number of blankets, there were
none left to put under the wounded who then froze to the floor of
boxcars and died enroute to Germany.

It takes some time to adapt to unfamiliar cold, but not long. You
learn not to touch cold steel with fingers after leaving behind the
first patch of skin. I recently saw a women in a ridiculous down parka
because the night temps fell to 70f instead of the usual 80, but with
adaptation she, like those from my childhood, might not feel the need
for jackets after -20 winter broke to a springlike 15f.
GFH
2015-12-16 15:40:12 UTC
Permalink
Post by dumbstruck
Post by Dave Smith
climate to understand the effects of extreme climates. It is one thing
to feel chilly but it is something completely different to be exposed
to windchill factors that make exposed skin freeze within minutes. It is
one thing to know that engines turn over more slowly in cold weather but
there comes a point when batteries would not hold a charge, oil would
have no viscosity.
Tiger tanks used a hand crank for winter starting; an easy one-person
Tiger tank production began in August 1942. The
Soviet T-34 and KV-1 were superior to any tank
the Germans had in the 1941-42 winter campaign.

GFH
Michele
2015-12-18 15:39:37 UTC
Permalink
Post by dumbstruck
Tiger tanks used a hand crank for winter starting; an easy one-person
Well, save when it did not work. For instance, in winter, especially in
cold winters.
William Clodius
2015-12-09 06:20:22 UTC
Permalink
Post by IndSyd
<snip>
3) He misjudged, or perhaps more accurately, failed to even think
about, the winter weather in central Russia. Neither motor vehicles,
weapons, or men were properly equipped for the sub-zero weather that
was encountered. There was no preparation for the mud, the ice, or the
miserable state of the railroads and roads needed to support the front,
or the resources needed to move supplies and ammunition.
No. My opinion- Hitler expected a victory before winter so did not
implement winter campaign logistics - warm clothing for soldiers, lower
viscosity lubricants, etc. Surely the Germans knew what winter temperature
were from historical climate records so the winter temperatures were
hardly surprises. Not preparing for winter was a conscious decision by
Hitler & General Staff.
I don't know about other winter preparations, but in terms of quantities
of winter clothing nominally available, the Germans were well stocked by
early fall. However the clothing was in warehouses within the territory
controlled by the Axis posers at the start of the invasion. By the time
they could, in principle, ship the clothing to the troops and expect the
troops to use it to replace their summer clothing and not discard it as
dead weight, transport was a big problem. They had not captured as much
Soviet rolling stock as they had hoped. The large distance between
depots decreased rail efficiency. Partisan activity diverted resources
to rail repairs that they had hoped to use for rail extension. Combat
decreased fuel stocks faster than hoped. With the slowed advance of the
railheads the distance from railheads to front lines was larger than
hoped over roads worse than hoped, so trucks broke down faster than
hoped and were not replaced due to a lack fo fuel and spare parts. The
planned conversion to horse transport did not go as well as hoped due to
the lack of appropriate fodder, the impact of the weather on equine
health, and the long distances from rail heads to front lines.

Then the Soviet army did not overthrow Stalin and sue for peace. The
Soviet reserves were larger than expected. The Soviets implemented a
scorched earth policy more effectively than hoped.

Fighting continued on at high intensity well beyond expectations, and
scorched earth tactics meant that a high demand on food, ammunition,
fuel, medicine, spare parts, fodder for horses, and replacement troops
continued into the winter. With the rail problems and the impact of the
mud then the snow on rail and horse transport, by mid-December of food,
clothing, ammunition, fuel, medicine, spare parts, fodder for horses,
and replacement troops the German's could effectively choose one and a
half. Ammunition got first priority. By going on the defensive, fuel
usage was cut to a minimum. There was almost no other transport capacity
for the other supplies. The German's could get some food, clothing, and
medical supplies by recquisitioning it a gunpoint from the local
population, but at cost of any goodwill from the anti-communists in that
population.

The belief that the German's lacked winter clothing is at least partly
due to the appeals for clothing that they made in late December. This
appears to have been initiated to improve morale on the homefront,
although it would not surprise me if some of the German high command was
in denial about the extent of the transport problems. Certainlyt Hitler
was in denial about the army's need for winter clothing, and food.
Alan Meyer
2015-12-21 05:04:22 UTC
Permalink
On 12/07/2015 10:40 AM, IndSyd wrote:
...
Post by Alan Meyer
Hitler and Stalin each attempted to outdo the other in making serious
mistakes. Stalin made more mistakes than Hitler, but the advantages on
his side were so great that he won in spite of that.
Great advantages can't be true for 1941.
Here's what I think the advantages were in November and December of 1941.

1. Stalin had fresh troops from the east. The Germans were tired and
stretched thinner and thinner.

2. The troops from the Siberian army were equipped for winter. German
troops
were not. This was true at the levels of both the individual soldier
and the
heavier equipment.

3. The Germans had overstretched their supply lines. That, combined
with the
difficulty in getting trucks to run or move in the intense cold, and with
horses freezing to death and all German transport attempting to move over
primitive roads for which they were unprepared, meant that supplies to the
front were far below standards.

In spite of these advantages, Stalin did manage to lose many more of his men
than he needed to by insisting on pushing the counter offensive beyond
what could reasonably be expected to succeed. But it was enough. The
Germans
were beaten.
Post by Alan Meyer
Stalin's mistakes began with the Red Army purges in the late 1930's.
They continued with his throwing away the Soviet Air Force in suicidal
attacks on the advancing Germans that resulted in most of the planes and
experienced pilots being lost.
The Luftwaffe claimed most of the Red Air Force planes were
destroyed parked on the airports the victims of the June 22 surprises.
The silver lining was this saved a lot of pilots and they were available
for flying the more modern replacement airplanes.
A great many planes were indeed destroyed on the ground on the first day
(1,489 out of 4,000+ according to
http://www.centennialofflight.net/essay/Air_Power/Russia/AP21.htm). However
Stalin ordered all that was left of the Red Air Force to counter attack
against hopeless odds. Not only the planes, but also the cream of the pilot
corps, were destroyed in the following days as the Red Air Force pressed
home
hopeless attacks with planes, pilots and tactics that could not compete
against the highly experienced Luftwaffe.
Post by Alan Meyer
1) He started too late. The destruction of Yugoslavia set the invasion
plan back.
Not true, you can't campaign in that Eastern Europe area much before
June due to soggy ground from the Spring thaw & rains.
Note the German offensives 1942 & 1943 were launched in June not before.
Bagaration too waited till June for ground conditions and history reasons.
We know that the original date set for Barbarossa was May 15. Apparently
Hitler and the General Staff thought that fighting in May was possible when
they made their plans.

I found some websites that provide average rainfall, by month. Checking for
Minsk in Belarus, on the direct road to Moscow from Germany, I see the
following averages (http://www.weatherbase.com/weather/weather.php3?s=5862).
The numbers are in inches of precipitation, based on records for 110 years.

Jan 1.7
Feb 1.6
Mar 1.6
Apr 1.8
May 2.4
Jun 3.2
Jul 3.5
Aug 3.2
Sep 2.4
Oct 2.0
Nov 2.1

The overall annual average is 27.5 inches, fairly moderate. The average
temperature in May is 54.9 F, also moderate.

It looks like an invasion in May would have been expected to provide
very good
weather, and conceivably enabled the Germans to reach Moscow at least five
weeks earlier.

However, you still may be right. According to the Wikipedia article
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa), "an unusually wet
winter
kept rivers at full flood until late spring. The full floods could have
discouraged an earlier attack ...".
Post by Alan Meyer
3) He misjudged, or perhaps more accurately, failed to even think about,
the winter weather in central Russia. Neither motor vehicles, weapons,
or men were properly equipped for the sub-zero weather that was
encountered. There was no preparation for the mud, the ice, or the
miserable state of the railroads and roads needed to support the front,
or the resources needed to move supplies and ammunition.
No. My opinion- Hitler expected a victory before winter so did not implement
winter campaign logistics - warm clothing for soldiers, lower viscosity
lubricants, etc. Surely the Germans knew what winter temperature were from
historical climate records so the winter temperatures were hardly surprises.
Not preparing for winter was a conscious decision by Hitler & General Staff.
I think you're absolutely right that Hitler and his staff expected a victory
before winter. He famously told his generals that "We have only to kick in
the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down".

I'm inclined to say that your phrasing of it is accurate, but not
incompatible
with mine.

Alan
Rich
2015-12-21 15:40:30 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Meyer
Here's what I think the advantages were in November and December of 1941.
1. Stalin had fresh troops from the east. The Germans were tired and
stretched thinner and thinner.
2. The troops from the Siberian army were equipped for winter.
Alan, these are two of the most persistent myths of the war in the East,
but they were exploded long ago in the 90's after the TsAMO archives were
opened in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The truth is:

28 divisions were transferred from Eastern military districts (Urals
Military District, Siberia Military District, Central Asia Military
District, Transbailkal Military District, and Far Eastern Front) from
23 June to 31 December 1941. Of those, 9 moved in June, which were all
transfers planned or in motion prior to the German invasion. Two more
were ordered west in June after the invasion began. Three more divisions
were ordered west in July, leaving 14 to move August-December.

Of the 14 moving June-July, six were committed to the defense of Moscow
by the end of the first week of July...and two were destroyed while the
other four were eviscerated by October.


Of the 14 others, three moved August-September...all to the Leningrad
Military District to stop the threat there. Six moved in October, of
which four could be considered sent to "defend Moscow", but only two
were "Siberian". The last five all moved in November, of which four
went to "defend Moscow", but none were "Siberian".

Also, of the 28, four were brand new, only being formed that spring.
Finally, another six divisions were formed in Siberia after 22 June.
And all went to Leningrad.

Cheers!
Rich Rostrom
2015-12-21 21:00:51 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Meyer
Post by IndSyd
Post by Alan Meyer
1) He started too late. The destruction of Yugoslavia set the invasion
plan back.
Not true, you can't campaign in that Eastern Europe area much before
June due to soggy ground from the Spring thaw & rains.
We know that the original date set for Barbarossa was May 15. Apparently
Hitler and the General Staff thought that fighting in May was possible when
they made their plans.
AIUI, the present consensus on this issue
is that the Yugoslavia/Greece campaign
probably delayed BARBAROSSA by about two
weeks. Not a huge difference, but not
trivial either.

Also, the Balkan operations drew off a
substantial panzer force and consumed
fuel and ammunition. The panzer divisions
that were engaged in the Balkans were not
available for the start of BARBAROSSA.

The Luftwaffe was also distracted by the
Balkans.

In neither case were the forces diverted
a major part of the BARBAROSSA force, but
they were not trivial, either - between
5% and 10% of the German force pool in
these categories.
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
William Clodius
2015-12-26 03:44:01 UTC
Permalink
.<snip>
2. The troops from the Siberian army were equipped for winter. German
troops
were not. This was true at the levels of both the individual soldier
and the
heavier equipment.
I suspect that a better statement was that the Soviet army in general
was better equiped for winter than the German army.
3. The Germans had overstretched their supply lines. That, combined
with the
difficulty in getting trucks to run or move in the intense cold, and with
horses freezing to death and all German transport attempting to move over
primitive roads for which they were unprepared, meant that supplies to the
front were far below standards.
I was under the impression that by that winter truck movement was
limited less by the efffects of cold and more by the lack of fuel.
<snip>
<snip>
Post by IndSyd
Not true, you can't campaign in that Eastern Europe area much before
June due to soggy ground from the Spring thaw & rains.
Note the German offensives 1942 & 1943 were launched in June not before.
Bagaration too waited till June for ground conditions and history
reasons.
We know that the original date set for Barbarossa was May 15. Apparently
Hitler and the General Staff thought that fighting in May was possible when
they made their plans.
We also know that the general staff work for Barbarossa showed a lack of
appreciation of many potential problems with the invasion: the size of
the Soviet army in general and the reserves in particular, the details
of the Soviet rail system, the support Stalin could expect, the logistic
requirements of the German troops, the quality of the Soviet equipment,
etc. Their expectations in early 1941 cannot be taken as a realistic
appraisal of anything.
I found some websites that provide average rainfall, by month. Checking for
Minsk in Belarus, on the direct road to Moscow from Germany, I see the
following averages (http://www.weatherbase.com/weather/weather.php3?s=5862).
The numbers are in inches of precipitation, based on records for 110 years.
Jan 1.7
Feb 1.6
Mar 1.6
Apr 1.8
May 2.4
Jun 3.2
Jul 3.5
Aug 3.2
Sep 2.4
Oct 2.0
Nov 2.1
The overall annual average is 27.5 inches, fairly moderate. The average
temperature in May is 54.9 F, also moderate.
Soil moisture is a function of not just rainfall, but also rate of
evaporation (an exponential function of temperature), residual snow (my
local climate is warmer than western Russia, but it is not unknown for
north facing slopes to retain snow into May, and for snow to falll in
late May), and the rate of drainage (much of wetern Russia is flat
plains with slow drainage).
It looks like an invasion in May would have been expected to provide
very good
weather, and conceivably enabled the Germans to reach Moscow at least five
weeks earlier.
However, you still may be right. According to the Wikipedia article
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa), "an unusually wet
winter
kept rivers at full flood until late spring. The full floods could have
discouraged an earlier attack ...".
Note that a wet *winter* implies moisture from snowmelt and not
rainfall.

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