Discussion:
New perspective on ULTRA and the Mediterranean convoy war
(too old to reply)
Haydn
2014-04-25 20:45:15 UTC
Permalink
To anyone interested in the topic, a healthy re-appraisal of the
influence of ULTRA decrypts on the convoy war. From the Naval War
College Review:

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1f40e9ba-42c9-4861-bc7e-c2554ec2909b/The-Other-Ultra--Signal-Intelligence-and-the-Battl.aspx

Although the British had the edge in that department, the intelligence
contest was far from completely lopsided against the Axis, and ULTRA was
not a decisive asset in naval warfare.

Haydn
Bill
2014-04-25 21:38:19 UTC
Permalink
Post by Haydn
To anyone interested in the topic, a healthy re-appraisal of the
influence of ULTRA decrypts on the convoy war. From the Naval War
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1f40e9ba-42c9-4861-bc7e-c2554ec2909b/The-Other-Ultra--Signal-Intelligence-and-the-Battl.aspx
Although the British had the edge in that department, the intelligence
contest was far from completely lopsided against the Axis, and ULTRA was
not a decisive asset in naval warfare.
My understanding was that the ULTRA information used to launch attacks
against the Me 232 were decisive, butr that the M2 232's were only
introduced because of catastrophic losses in merchant shipping.

Oh, and Harry Hindsley wasn't an analyst, he was a cryptographer.
John Dallman
2014-04-25 23:31:42 UTC
Permalink
Post by Bill
My understanding was that the ULTRA information used to launch
attacks against the Me 232 were decisive
Me 323s, I presume?

John
Bill
2014-04-26 15:09:30 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Dallman
Post by Bill
My understanding was that the ULTRA information used to launch
attacks against the Me 232 were decisive
Me 323s, I presume?
Them too :-)
Rich Rostrom
2014-04-26 20:05:50 UTC
Permalink
Post by Haydn
To anyone interested in the topic, a healthy re-appraisal of the
influence of ULTRA decrypts on the convoy war. From the Naval War
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1f40e9ba-42c9-4861-bc7e-c2554ec2909b/The-Other-Ultra--Signal-Intelligence-and-the-Battl.aspx
Very interesting. The Italian advantage gained by
faster handling of short-term decrypts shows the
importance of speed in this area.

It is perhaps analogous to the efforts mode in
recent years by "high frequency traders" in
the securities markets. HFTers spend great sums
on the fastest equipment and even locate their
comm centers to save tiny fractions of a second,
and achieve significant profits.

Another point (mentioned once, but not really
explored, being off the topic of the essay)
is how many of the Allied air attacks were
by high-altitude level bombers, and were
ineffective. The continued heavy reliacnce on
this method looks pretty dumb.

In the Pacific, the Allies abandoned such
attacks fairly early on, AIUI - shifting
instead to skip bombing.

Yet another point - the author addresses
many attempted interceptions by aircraft
or submarines, but none by Allied surface
ships. (One or two harbor bombardment are
mentioned.)

That suggests Allied naval power in the
area was limited - and also that the
Allies dared not use surface ships
aggressively in these waters. For fear of
Axis air attack? But they had done so
earlier.

This also invites the question of why the
Allies could not block the massive Axis
deployment to Tunisia in 1942-1943, nor
prevent the Axis from supplying their
forces in Tunisia. (One account of the
last days of the Tunisia campaign mentioned
the capture of a large dump of unused
gasoline at... Hammamet? .., in the Cape
Bon peninsula.)
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
Roman W
2014-04-27 18:00:10 UTC
Permalink
On Sat, 26 Apr 2014 16:05:50 -0400, Rich Rostrom
Post by Rich Rostrom
Another point (mentioned once, but not really
explored, being off the topic of the essay)
is how many of the Allied air attacks were
by high-altitude level bombers, and were
ineffective. The continued heavy reliacnce on
this method looks pretty dumb.
Was it an effort to make the interception look "accidental" so that
the Axis forces did not guess that the Allies were reading their
communications?

RW
Rich Rostrom
2014-05-02 00:18:03 UTC
Permalink
Post by Roman W
On Sat, 26 Apr 2014 16:05:50 -0400, Rich Rostrom
...many of the Allied air attacks were by
high-altitude level bombers, and were ineffective.
The continued heavy reliacnce on this method looks pretty dumb.
Was it an effort to make the interception look "accidental"...
I can't see that at all. These were strike missions,
not scouting missions. If a dozen or more big aircraft
attack the ships, it's really hard to think that it's
accident.

No rational air force would send out such forces "blind".
Post by Roman W
so that the Axis forces did not guess that the Allies were
reading their communications?
That was done by other means: mainly, never sending
a strike until after the convoy had been spotted
by a patrol aircraft. Usually the Axis knew they
had been spotted, which seemed to show there were
no leaks.

Where ULTRA came into it was that the Allies could
send patrols to known convoy locations. IIRC, Axis
ships were spotted so much that the Axis thought the
Allies had 3-4x the actual number of patrol aircraft.

The Allies also took precautions within their own
ranks to disguise the use of ULTRA. If ULTRA reported
that a convoy would be at Point X, a patrol aircraft
would be dispatched there, but the crew would be told
only that Axis shipping _might_ be there. Two other
aircraft would be dispatched to other locations with
the same instructions.

Sending a single aircraft to the known location
every time would make it obvious to the crews that
the Allies already knew where the target was from
some secret source. This would spread among crews
and fitters, and some might be captured, or talk
somewhere Axis intelligence could listen. (Egypt
for instance.)
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
Haydn
2014-05-06 14:42:51 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rich Rostrom
Where ULTRA came into it was that the Allies could
send patrols to known convoy locations. IIRC, Axis
ships were spotted so much that the Axis thought the
Allies had 3-4x the actual number of patrol aircraft.
Mere geography placed enormous restrictions on Axis shipping routes and
made Allied search and strike missions all the easier.

A ship sailing from Italy to North Africa or back can either sail west
of Sicily or east of Sicily. In order for ships to reach the destination
port as soon as possible and therefore reduce Allied spotting and attack
chances while being deprived of any air cover, they couldn't sail too
far west or east of Sicily, nor could they take exceedingly extravagant
routes.

In other words, the set of routes available was very limited - also for
re-routing after an Allied spotting. As an Italian admiral put it
post-war, they could rack their brains to find alternative routes as
they wished, but they couldn't overcome geography. Convoys might avoid
one or more strikes, whether through decrypts or by sheer luck, but they
could not avoid all strikes always.
Post by Rich Rostrom
Sending a single aircraft to the known location
every time would make it obvious to the crews that
the Allies already knew where the target was from
some secret source. This would spread among crews
and fitters, and some might be captured, or talk
somewhere Axis intelligence could listen. (Egypt
for instance.)
The British cleverly devoted an effort also to try and sow discord
between Germans and Italians. They simply spread, or told their crews to
spread in case of capture, rumors about Italian sources providing the
British intelligence with devastating security leaks.

The Germans, always the holier than thou in the partnership and prone to
mistrust their allies, were more than inclined to believe those rumors.
Cases occurred of British prisoners "revealing", when interrogated,
Italian leaks that would have led to sinkings of Axis ships. On such an
occasion the incensed Germans required a thorough investigation, which
produced the complete discharge of the Italian suspects and -
interestingly - the realization that the leak source (if any) must have
been German rather than Italian.

In fact, by 1942 the Italian Navy had fully realized that there was
something very wrong with German communication security - that was the
closest the Axis ever got to the ULTRA secret. And they prompted the
Germans to do something about that, a suggestion the latter dismissed
out of hand.

Haydn
John Dallman
2014-05-06 16:09:04 UTC
Permalink
Post by Haydn
In fact, by 1942 the Italian Navy had fully realized that there was
something very wrong with German communication security - that was
the closest the Axis ever got to the ULTRA secret.
The Italians were fairly good at running intelligence, especially the
necessary periodic "is this all making sense?" review. According to
Holt's _The Deceivers_, they were the hardest Axis power to plant
disinformation on; they were always aware that anything coming from
agents in enemy territory had to be regarded with caution.

John
ADPUF
2014-05-07 17:51:31 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Dallman
Post by Haydn
In fact, by 1942 the Italian Navy had fully realized that
there was something very wrong with German communication
security - that was the closest the Axis ever got to the
ULTRA secret.
The Italians were fairly good at running intelligence,
especially the necessary periodic "is this all making sense?"
review. According to Holt's _The Deceivers_, they were the
hardest Axis power to plant disinformation on; they were
always aware that anything coming from agents in enemy
territory had to be regarded with caution.
John
That's centuries of experience in the field...
--
via AIOE
Rich Rostrom
2014-05-09 22:03:22 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Dallman
The Italians were fairly good at running intelligence, especially the
necessary periodic "is this all making sense?" review. According to
Holt's _The Deceivers_, they were the hardest Axis power to plant
disinformation on; they were always aware that anything coming from
agents in enemy territory had to be regarded with caution.
There is an interesting discussion by Vladimir
"Popski" Peniakoff in his memoirs.

In mid-1942, he came back from a long period
operating behind enemy lines in Cyrenaica, to
discover that he was at loose ends.

The front was at El Alamein, and Cairo at the
time was buzzing with projects for raids into
Axis rear areas. With his experience of desert
navigation and covert ops in the target area,
Popski was sought out by several of these
operations, and eventually accompanied one
force in a raid against airfields near Derna.

This raid was a partial success, but the other
raids were debacles, with nearly all the
participants killed or captured. This did not
surprise Popski, as the enthusiastic young
officers who had concocted them talked far too
much. (He sketched an idea of how the details
of the raids leaked and got to the Axis.)

In fall 1943, Popski, now leading his famous
"Private Army", was assigned to scout ahead
of Allied forces in southeastern Italy, and
to make contacts with Italian forces in the
area, who were now supposed to cooperate with
the Allies. (Popski found them indecorously
eager to do so.)

This led to social contact with the Italians
and naturally some reminiscing about the
African campaign. Popski met one young afficer
who had held an intelligence billet in Africa.
This officer told him that Italian intelligence
(and presumably German as well) had picked up
on all of those 1942 raids, and recited from
memory a fairly accurate order of battle for
the raid forces!
--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com
Haydn
2014-05-10 15:19:37 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rich Rostrom
This led to social contact with the Italians
and naturally some reminiscing about the
African campaign. Popski met one young afficer
who had held an intelligence billet in Africa.
This officer told him that Italian intelligence
(and presumably German as well) had picked up
on all of those 1942 raids, and recited from
memory a fairly accurate order of battle for
the raid forces!
Doubtless those were intelligence successes. Much is made of Seebohm's
Transmissions Battalion 621, the German tactical intelligence unit in
the desert, but the Italians had something even better with the I Group
led by the Alpine Captain Guiglia, who decrypted and read up to 100,000
British Army messages until January 1943. However, there were serious
problems and the gold that glitters can't blur the bleak portions of the
picture.

I was in Rome last week, at the Army Historical Office, and had a short
but very interesting talk with a lieutenant-colonel, a military history
author of repute. The conversation also touched upon the intelligence
issue. He pointed out the unbelievable information gaps that heavily
impacted the Italian conduct of the desert war.

The supreme headquarters in Rome accumulated all sorts of correct and
up-to-date information about British operational capabilities and
technical assets, yet for some reason part of that information either
was not relayed to the African commands, or the latter absurdly
dismissed it, or didn't tell the troops about it. He himself saw in the
archives a magnificent 1940 dossier prepared and sent by the Germans,
then translated into Italian, about British tanks - the Matilda II tank
is there with excellent photographs and all technical data, armor
thickness, weight, speed, as painstakingly noted by the Germans. But
when in December 1940 the British struck, troops and commanders in
Africa had no idea about the very existence of a thing called Matilda tank.

Even worse, this incredible informational blackout or short circuit went
on after 1940, and involved not only the Army, but the Air Force as
well. The Navy knew well that the dry docks at Alexandria were a key
asset for the Royal Navy and their destruction would have been
devastating for the British, yet the Air Force seemed to ignore that -
as if the information wasn't passed on to them, or they refused to take
it into consideration - and never tried to mount substantial attacks on
those critical assets. Kind of like the Japanese Army and Navy, which
barely talked to each other.

Haydn

Haydn
2014-04-27 18:00:35 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rich Rostrom
Very interesting. The Italian advantage gained by
faster handling of short-term decrypts shows the
importance of speed in this area.
An average 30 minutes for a SYKO decrypt vs. several hours, up to ten
and more, for German and British decrypts of enemy reconnaissance
communications. On the other hand, British intelligence was focused -
rightly - on the Germans, and anything Italian got low priority.
Post by Rich Rostrom
Another point (mentioned once, but not really
explored, being off the topic of the essay)
is how many of the Allied air attacks were
by high-altitude level bombers, and were
ineffective. The continued heavy reliacnce on
this method looks pretty dumb.
Most high altitude attacks from 1942 on were carried out by USAAF heavy
bombers. Were they using Norden bombsights in 1942 in the MTO?

Anyway, their hit or near-miss rates when bombing ships in motion may
not have been higher than those of Italian high altitude bombing
missions on British ships. US bombers instead proved devastating on
ships moored in port.
Post by Rich Rostrom
...the
Allies dared not use surface ships
aggressively in these waters. For fear of
Axis air attack? But they had done so
earlier.
Royal Navy surface attacks were either short range night sallies of
light forces out of Malta to prey on convoys, or shore bombardment
missions.

The latter were quite successful and effective in North Africa early in
the war (prior to the arrival of the Germans) and quite less so later
into the war, but while the British got away with them without suffering
any serious damage, Cunningham was never enthusiastic over exposing his
ships to severe danger for relatively little results to show for it.

The former were the activity of Force K, October through December 1941.
At night the Italians were blind, Force K was sort of an elite carefully
handpicked for the task, and Italian convoy leaders happened to make
some terrible mistakes in the handling of their ships under attack. The
Luftwaffe was away from Sicily through those months, and Malta was fully
operational also as an offensive base since the Italian Air Force could
just mount harassment raids.

In December an Italian minefield crippled Force K, and in 1942 the
Germans came back to Sicily with a Luftflotte. End of British surface
attacks.
Post by Rich Rostrom
This also invites the question of why the
Allies could not block the massive Axis
deployment to Tunisia in 1942-1943, nor
prevent the Axis from supplying their
forces in Tunisia.
No matter how strenuous the effort of aircraft and submarines, only
surface actions could sever a sea lane and shut down a supply line.
Force K almost did it in November 1941. Afterwards and until the Sicily
landings, Allied surface forces could not operate in the Sicilian
Straits except as a desperate measure to keep Malta supplied regardless
of losses.

Haydn
WJHopwood
2014-04-27 00:36:53 UTC
Permalink
Long lines
Post by Haydn
To anyone interested in the topic, a healthy re-appraisal
of the influence of ULTRA decrypts on the convoy war.
Although the British had the edge in that department, the
intelligence contest was far from completely lopsided against
the Axis, and ULTRA was not a decisive asset in naval warfare.
Well, maybe. But some general background appears to be in order
here inasmuch as the term ULTRA also covered intelligence from U.S.
code-breaking of Japanese codes including numerous intercepts of
messages between the Japanese Ambassador to Nazi Germany and
Tokyo. This provided Britain and the U.S with considerable advance
knowledge about Nazi intentions and operations

British ULTRA and the similar U.S. MAGIC were primarily in the
category of strategic intelligence rathr than operational intelligence,
although sometimes it called for immediate operational action. Great
efforts were made by both allies to conceal the very existence of their
code-breaking programs originally called ULTRA by the British and
MAGIC by the U.S.

Accordingly, shortly after the U.S. entered the war it became
apparent that code-breaking intelligence obtained by both allies
should be exchanged. British cryptanalysts were sent to the U.S.
and American analysts to Bletchley Park in England and the code-
name ULTRA was adopted by both allies as a cover-name for
information obtained from both ULTRA and MAGIC activities for
the sake of allied consistency in the attempt to conceal from whence
such information came.

As for the Naval War College's re-appraisal of ULTRA, the subject
of this thread, I have a problem with its criticism of Prof. F.H.Hinsley
and also of ULTRA in general. Although it attributes information
in "British Intelligence in the second World War" as "mainly written"
by Henley, it only "directly qoutes Henley once from that publication,
yet quotes another's opinion which tends to discredit something
Henley himself may or may not have written and which does not
jibe with Henley's summary of what appear to be the same North
African events in the book "Code Breakers--The Inside Story of
Bletchley Park," which Henley co-edited with Alan Strip.

WJH
Geoffrey Sinclair
2014-04-28 14:43:04 UTC
Permalink
To anyone interested in the topic, a healthy re-appraisal of the influence
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1f40e9ba-42c9-4861-bc7e-c2554ec2909b/The-Other-Ultra--Signal-Intelligence-and-the-Battl.aspx
Although the British had the edge in that department, the intelligence
contest was far from completely lopsided against the Axis, and ULTRA was
not a decisive asset in naval warfare.
What is the definition of decisive?

It seems another round of Ultra the decisive versus Ultra the insignificant,
in this case it is nice to see a case study with examples. It has been made
clear Ultra was an opaque view of the axis, lack of context, incorrect
information (Rommel's supply people seemed to have trouble counting
the supplies they had and the supplies they used, signaling they were
having shortages), changes of plan, missed or partial messages and so
on. In the Mediterranean the British used Ultra to build up a profile of
the axis merchant fleet, what cargo individual ships had carried, where
they had sailed to and so forth, to enable prediction of convoys and
cargo. The spur for this was apparently the fact a German ship made
it into Benghazi as Rommel was retreating in January 1942, despite
all the predictions the port was blocked or if not blocked could not
unload cargo.

The British rated the Italians as harder to fool than the Germans.
The Italian SIS certainly understood the benefits of fast work, it
is interesting to note in the examples given much of the necessary
information for the Italians could be gained from traffic analysis,
with the decryption a bonus. The lack of radar on board Italian
ships is highlighted by the need for SIS to warn the ships about
allied aircraft.

Admiral Cunningham noted to their credit the way the axis merchant
ship crews and convoy escort ships kept trying to supply Africa to
the end despite all the losses.

The review is using the Italian official figures for cargo shipments, the
17 months where the losses were 10% or less were June to November
1940, January to June 1941, January, February, April, May and July
1942. There was zero cargo loss to end November 1940, then 10.65%
in December.

The table is Luftwaffe sorties against Malta, % shipping losses, 1941

Jan / 451 / 2.81%
Feb / 387 / 1.46%
Mar / 511 / 8.89%
Apr / 637 / 8.04%
May / 755 / 8.01%

Minimal Luftwaffe activity over Malta for the rest of the year, cargo
losses were June 6.19%, July 19.13%, August 12.56%, September
28.27%, October 20.37%, November 62.32%, December 18.01%

Force K, the Malta based cruiser strike force, was created in
October 1941.

U-boats became active in the Mediterranean in late 1941, Ark Royal
and Barham were sunk in November.

On 19 December Force K was effectively destroyed after running
into a minefield, while Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were crippled
at Alexandria.

1942, Luftwaffe sorties versus Malta, axis cargo losses.
Jan / 1468 / 0.07%
Feb / 1935 / 0.85%
Mar / 4300 / 17.3%
Apr / 8788 / 0.78%
In late April and early May the 5 remaining submarines based at
Malta leave for Alexandria, 4 make it.
May / 2476 / 7.24%
Jun / 956 / 22.14%
Jul / 1819 / 6.45%
In late July and early August 4 RN submarines return to Malta,
soon joined by more.
Aug / 862 / 33.03%
In late August 217 squadron, Beaufort torpedo bombers, is
released to continue onto India, after 2 months at Malta 8 out
of the original 19 crews remain. The Beaufort strike force is
built up to 22 crews with 20 aircraft, number 86 and part of
number 39 squadrons.
Sep / 391 / 20%
Oct / 2842 / 44.2%
Nov / 105 / 25.85% (To Libya, cargo to Tunisia had no losses)

There is a nice but imperfect correlation between axis effort
against Malta and cargo losses. July is almost an anomaly
in terms of cargo losses, given the upswing that started in May.

By mid 1942 the fuel situation at Malta was so bad air tests
of repaired aircraft had been stopped, crews found out if
the aircraft had been properly fixed on its next combat
mission. Submarines were being used to ferry in supplies,
reducing the number available for offensive patrols. The
arrival of the Ohio in mid August was a major turning point.

About 9 torpedo aircraft was a maximum effort strike from
Malta in mid 1942, and it was not until around August the
strikes could be co-ordinated with Beaufighters who
would do escort and flak protection, enabling daylight
strikes with lower losses.

In addition to the Malta supply effort the Alexandria based
submarines were more concentrated on interdicting the
axis supply lines to the Greek and Italian islands in the
eastern Mediterranean, which did include the convoy
routes to Africa from Greece and Crete.

In September 1939 the RN had 56 submarines, of these 12
had been laid down between 1917 and 1919, the rest from
1924 onwards as part of a steady building program, there
were 41 RN submarines in January 1935.

By January 1942 the total had risen to 60, including 10 of
the WWI boats, plus 2 WWI boats from the USN, despite 37
losses, the number available was 72 by end August (including
the 10 RN WWI and 6 USN WWI boats) and 83 by end
December (17 dating from WWI), plus some submarines
from the Dutch Navy, 19 RN submarines were lost in 1942.
Note these figures include any under repair or refit.

Given the Doenitz rules of a third on patrol that equates to
around 24 on patrol from Norway to Alexandria, in August
1942, up from 20 in January, since few were retained in the
Indian Ocean. Then deduct the number used for training,
including for anti submarine forces.

Rommel started his 1942 offensive on 26 May, Tobruk fell
on 20 June, the first German units arrived at Alamein on
1 July, fighting occurred around the Alamein position for the
next month, then a lull for a month, then on 30 August
Rommel launched a major attack, which was called off on
2 September. It is clear the sinking of ships had nothing to
do with the attack being ended, though the general supply
situation did not help, but the sinkings gave a convenient
excuse given the supply requirements sent pre battle.

By October axis dispositions had been influenced by the
fuel situation, and it was understood that any lateral move
along the line was close to one way, the available fuel did
not allow forces to shuttle back an forth.

The first two convoys the paper discusses give an idea of
the amount of time available to intercept and the defences,

1) Left Taranto 13:00 on 2 July, arrived Benghazi 18:45 on
4 July, 3 merchant ships and 8 escorts.
2) Left Crete 21:40 on 8 July, arrived Tobruk 13:50 on
10 July, 6 merchant ships and 6 escorts.

In addition the short routes gave greater chances to salvage
damaged ships.

July 1942 marked a low point in British ability to interdict
axis supply convoys to North Africa, given the situation at
Malta and at Alamein. This can be seen by the size of the
strike forces, the number of convoys that were not attacked
and the composition of the strike forces, including the
anti submarine Hudsons and heavy bombers, though the
range of the latter comes into play given where allied
airfields were in August 1942.

The withdrawal of the Albacores from Malta indicates the
problems of operating with long supply lines. The RN had
many problems in trying to keep its aircraft units up to full
strength.

The fact much Ultra information came from the Luftwaffe
organising fighter and anti submarine escorts shows the
complexities, the convoys were easier to find but harder
to attack in daylight, hence the number of night attacks.

R V Jones makes the point the British had a good idea
of the German forces invading Greece in 1941, but lacked
the forces needed to stop them. The quote I have seen
about Ultra and the Mediterranean shipping war is that
Ultra was a force multiplier, enabling much better
outcomes for the forces deployed. Essentially Ultra
can be measured by looking at the number of successful
interceptions versus the allied forces deployed, after that
it is the combat units that need to score the hits. The
losses the British forces were taking reduced the overall
effectiveness of the forces, training had to be cut to fill
losses, many attacks failed due to inexperience. There
was essentially no opportunity to train for the Malta
based units. Ships were also harder to sink than the air
forces generally believed.

The review really could do with a look at the number
of forces actually available to intercept the convoys,
given as of July 1942 the Axis had 3 African ports.
The higher the number of successful searches per
aircraft sortie or attacks per submarine patrol the
more likely Ultra is helping the allies.

While the British understood the importance of fuel and
prioritised tankers it is interesting to note to the end of
January 1943 while 14% of all axis cargo shipped to
Africa had not arrived the losses were, 11.5% of vehicles,
11.7% of "other supplies", 12.1% of ammunition and
stores and 20.5% of fuel, Ultra would take credit for some
of the extra fuel losses. Also note 13.2% of the cargo
landed in Africa to end January 1943 was for civilians.

To complete the axis cargo loss figures, November 1942
to May 1943, monthly shipments to Libya and Tunisia,

18.5%, 31.7%, then in 1943, 21.3%, 22.8%, 35.7%
41.2% and 76.7%.

To the end of July 1942 the Germans in the Mediterranean
had lost 9 merchant ships to surface warships, 17 to
submarines, 10 to aircraft, 10 to mines and 6 to other
causes, total 52, in the final 5 months of 1942 another 24
were lost, 1 to surface warships, 9 to submarines, 5 to
aircraft, 3 to mines and 6 to other causes.

The Italian figures I have include losses outside the
Mediterranean, to end July 1942 losses were 27 to surface
ships, 134 to submarines, 86 to aircraft, 43 to mines and
34 to other causes, total 428, in the final 5 months of 1942
losses totaled 150, 5 to surface ships, 47 to submarines,
58 to aircraft, 6 to mines and 34 to other causes.

On another note expressed as a percentage of the tonnage
of ships entering or leaving Britain on foreign trade voyages,
which includes ships with cargo or in ballast, the world wide
axis anti merchant ship operations sank,

5% in 1940, 8% in 1941, 16% in 1942, 5% in 1943 and 1% in
1944.

It does make the loss figures look better given ships did
several voyages a year. Think of what it would look like as
a percentage of cargo ship tonnage entering and leaving US
ports.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
WJHopwood
2014-05-07 04:07:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Haydn
To anyone interested in the topic, a healthy re-appraisal
of the influence of ULTRA decrypts on the convoy war.
From the Naval War College Review:...
Although the British had the edge in that department, the
intelligence contest was far from completely lopsided
against the Axis, and ULTRA was not a decisive asset in
naval warfare.
It seems to me that the above referenced article goes at
unnecessary length to make a petty point in an effort to
discredit an exaggerated view by some historians of ULTRA's
contribution to U.S. intelligence in the North Africa theater.
Unfortunately, this picture comes at the expense of ignoring
the unquestionable value to the war effort of ULTRA's
contribution in many other wartime situations and areas.

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers" presents a quite
different, and, in my view, a more accurate picture of the part
played by communications intelligence in the North African
campaign. Interestingly, he does not mention the role of ULTRA
at all.

Kahn tells the story that shortly before the U.S. was at war
with the Axis, an Italian employee of the U.S. Embassy in Rome
(who was secretly a member of Italian intelligence) was able to
open an embassy safe and photograph documents pertaining to
a crypto system used by U.S. Military Attache's to communicate
with Washington. The system was called the ""Black Code" and
keys to it were passed on to the Germans by the Italian S.I.M.
Rommel was on the distribution list.

After we entered the war against the Axis powers, the "Black Code"
continued to be used by U.S. military attache's but was also being
intercepted and read by the Axis powers on a regular basis until the
U.S. finally got suspicious and discontinued the Black Code system.

Rommel was a top recipient of Black Code intercepts between
the U.S.military attache in Cairo and Washington and was thus able
to pick up much information about British strategy and tactics from
reports being sent to Washington by the Cairo U.S.Military attache.
For details on this see Kahn's "The Codebreakers, Chapter 14.

WJH
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