"Peace in Our Time"

[Shawn Wilson]

Chamberlain questions-

1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he
just engaging in a delaying action?

2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Chamberlain questions-
1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he
just engaging in a delaying action?

I think he at least partly believed it; certainly
he, like almost everyone, passionately hoped so.

Post by Shawn Wilson
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

Factories going full blast? No.

Bear in mind this was still the Depression,
and none of these countries had money to spare.

Rearmament did continue. AIUI, after Germany
occupied the rump of Czechoslovakia in early
1939, the perceived likelihood of war greatly
increased, and the pace of re-armament also
increased. But it was very difficult, politically
and economically, to increase military spending
in peacetime.

[sctvguy1]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Chamberlain questions-
1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he just
engaging in a delaying action?

I think he at least partly believed it; certainly he, like almost
everyone, passionately hoped so.

Post by Shawn Wilson
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

Factories going full blast? No.
Bear in mind this was still the Depression,
and none of these countries had money to spare.
Rearmament did continue. AIUI, after Germany occupied the rump of
Czechoslovakia in early 1939, the perceived likelihood of war greatly
increased, and the pace of re-armament also increased. But it was very
difficult, politically and economically, to increase military spending
in peacetime.

It seemed that the RAF was the only one really pumping out the aircraft
and working on the radar system.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Chamberlain questions-
1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he
just engaging in a delaying action?

The indications are he hoped so, the continued expansion of British
war production showed he was also taking out insurance.

Post by Shawn Wilson
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

No one's factories were going full blast, it was peace time. The British
introduced conscription, and just about caught up to the German
aircraft production, RAF Fighter Command largely transitioned from
biplanes to monoplanes. The RAF had expanded from around a
nominal 60 squadrons in 1935 to 158 in September 1939, the
squadron expansion was mainly in the 1935 to 1938 period, 1939
was more about better aircraft.

UK tank production climbed from 419 in 1938 to 969 in 1939 versus
around 800 and 750 in Germany in those two years.

The RN building program was well underway.

The French were also modernising but were about a year or so
behind the British. Things like the 200 P-36 had arrived by mid
1939, the Martin 167 and the Douglas DB-7 were on order and
began arriving at the end of 1939.

So the western allies used the time to make major improvements in
their militaries.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Chamberlain questions-
1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he
just engaging in a delaying action?
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

Your questions are answered by most general histories of Britain
in this period.

1. Chamberlain's personal negotiations with Hitler were the
first "summit meetings" in modern history (except only for the
1919 Versailles Conference attended by US Pres. Wilson,
UK PM Lloyd George and several others.) Chamberlain was
a domestic affairs politician (finance minister 1931-37) before
becoming party leader and prime minister in 1937, not an
international affairs specialist.

Chamberlain nevertheless continued the revolutionary "New"
policy of the Versailles Conference, viz. settling international
disputes by conference and gentlemanly bargaining, instead of
wars. The common aim was to avoid ever again the ghastly
stalemate of 1914-1918. Opposition critics called this
"Locarno" policy of settlement by negotiation instead of
force "appeasement". Chamberlain thought he was being
modern by trying to make the system work in the 1930s
(as it succeeded in the 1920s, bringing Germany back into
the community of European diplomacy.) Not until the
Austrian Anschluss of 1938 did Chamberlain learn that
Hitler was no gentleman, i.e. his word could not be trusted.

2. Even before this, as finance minister in the middle 1930,
Chamberlain approved and funded a major programme of British
rearmament (reversing the disarmament trend of 1919-35), also
novel in its strategic shape (giving the Royal Navy top priority as
the UK's chief defence, the RAF second priority as the UK's main
offensive weapon, and the army last and least important.)
This was directly in response to perceived threats from
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. (Japan did not threaten
the UK homeland in the 1930s.)

[The Horny Goat]

On Fri, 22 Feb 2013 13:42:26 -0500, "Don Phillipson"

Post by Don Phillipson
1. Chamberlain's personal negotiations with Hitler were the
first "summit meetings" in modern history (except only for the
1919 Versailles Conference attended by US Pres. Wilson,
UK PM Lloyd George and several others.) Chamberlain was
a domestic affairs politician (finance minister 1931-37) before
becoming party leader and prime minister in 1937, not an
international affairs specialist.

As for 'summit meetings' I would have thought the Congress of Vienna
would have been the obvious example. Both the Tsar and the Austrian
Emperor played a fairly hands on role

[Bay Man]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Chamberlain questions-
1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he
just engaging in a delaying action?
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

Tooze:
Page 273
"If Hitler had wanted war on 1 October 1938, he could have had it. The
French and British had reached the point at which they could make no further
concessions. The armies of France and the Soviet Union had mobilized. The
Royal Navy stood at full alert. On 9 September 1938 it was Hitler who
stepped back not his opponents"

Page 274
"Hitler backed down and accepted the extraordinarily generous settlement on
offer at the hastily convened conference in Munich. In so doing, he almost
certainly saved his regime from disaster."

Hitler was more nervous at Munich in 1938. The USSR, France and the RN were
at action stations. Hitler backed away from war - he could have had it if
he wanted. However the Brits & French gave him too much in the negotiations
making it look too much like appeasement.

If the British and French said a clear "no" to everything Hitler demanded
over Czechoslovakia he would have backed down. Brinkmanship of course, but
the cards were stacked against Germany.

[Alan Meyer]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Chamberlain questions-
1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he
just engaging in a delaying action?

I don't know if anyone can answer that question except Chamberlain.
Some of his writings indicate that he had his doubts but thought that
appeasement was necessary anyway.

There are some illustrative quotes from Chamberlain at:

http://www.historyguide.org/europe/munich.html

Post by Shawn Wilson
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

They did increase preparedness, as they had been doing for several
years. See Geoffrey Sinclair's response.

I think the big problem was not lack of material preparedness but lack
of intellectual preparedness in the French military leadership,
especially Maurice Gamelin but many others too. I believe that France
was beaten by superior strategy and superior military leadership at all
levels, not by superior material preparation.

There were also social and psychological issues that affected
preparedness in the population. The memory of the first war was strong
in Britain and France. There was much sentiment that war was a game
between governments in which people with no stake in the outcome paid
the price. Neither the French nor the British people fully understood
how dangerous the Nazis were or how much was at stake even for ordinary
people. Most of them thought that almost any course of action was
preferable to war. And most of those who were knowledgeable about
military affairs would no doubt have agreed with Chamberlain that there
was no way to save Czechoslovakia by military action. The Munich plan
at least kept most of Czechoslovakia free and avoided a slaughter of the
Czechs by the Germans. Only the very well informed and prescient
understood that Czechoslovakia was completely doomed.

Of course I'm only speculating about this, but I speculate that if
Britons were given a choice between Chamberlain's approach and
Churchill's approach in 1938, they would have voted overwhelmingly for
Chamberlains's. Chamberlain had to have understood that.

Alan

[Shawn Wilson]

Post by Alan Meyer

Post by Shawn Wilson
Chamberlain questions-
1) Did he really believe it would be peace in our time, or was he
just engaging in a delaying action?
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness improve in the
time they bought (factories going full blast, troops intensively
training, etc)? Or did they fritter away their chances?

I think the big problem was not lack of material preparedness but lack
of intellectual preparedness in the French military leadership,
especially Maurice Gamelin but many others too. I believe that France
was beaten by superior strategy and superior military leadership at all
levels, not by superior material preparation.

They were prepared for WW 1 1/2, the Germans showed up prepared for WW
2... I agree.

Post by Alan Meyer
Of course I'm only speculating about this, but I speculate that if
Britons were given a choice between Chamberlain's approach and
Churchill's approach in 1938, they would have voted overwhelmingly for
Chamberlains's. Chamberlain had to have understood that.

Follow up question-

How much did Germany's military preparedness increase in that time
frame? Specifically, how did their relative positions change? Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?


Ultimately, in retrospect and with knowledge that he had neither 20-20
foresight nor knowledge of the secret inner plots and forces of Nazi
Germany, was Chamberlain actually wrong? (I will assume that vis a
vis internal British political and public opinion, he was perfectly
correct at the time)

We know the British/French/Belgians got curbstomped in 1940. I don't
see them not getting beaten as bad or worse in 1938. Pathetically
playing for time from a position of weakness was all he could hope to
do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

[Michael Emrys]

Pathetically playing for time from a position of weakness was all he
could hope to do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

For me the most irksome thing is that the Germans were not as powerful
in 1938 as was thought in the West. Particularly they had been
hoodwinked about the strength of the Luftwaffe. But also on the ground,
the Polish campaign had shown that the German army needed very much to
spruce up its act. Which it did in time for the 1940 campaign.

The biggest problem that the Allies may have faced in the late '30s was
their own reluctance to resort to force. That was understandable in the
aftermath of the First World War and the hope that the League of Nations
might truly make war obsolete, and in another context even commendable.
But faced with someone like Hitler who was bent on war in any case, it
was absolutely the wrong tack to take. If Hitler had met a firm riposte
when he tried to re-militarize the Rhineland, he might not have ever
gotten any farther.

This is not to say that World War II would necessarily not have
happened, as many forces were shaping up to a violent climax. But it
might have come about in a very different way.

Michael

[Bay Man]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Follow up question-
How much did Germany's military preparedness increase in that time
frame? Specifically, how did their relative positions change? Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?

The British and French were always ahead of the Germans. France alone
outstripped Germany in total arms.

Post by Shawn Wilson
Ultimately, in retrospect and with knowledge that he had neither 20-20
foresight nor knowledge of the secret inner plots and forces of Nazi
Germany, was Chamberlain actually wrong? (I will assume that vis a
vis internal British political and public opinion, he was perfectly
correct at the time)

Chamberlain was right in attempting to avoid war. He was wrong is assessing
Hitler and should not have give away Czechoslovakia. He stood up Hitler, who
backed down from war. He failure was giving Hitler too much rope. In the
primitive mind of Hitler he saw Chamberlain as a fool for giving too much,
as he would not do such a thing.

Post by Shawn Wilson
We know the British/French/Belgians got curbstomped in 1940. I don't
see them not getting beaten as bad or worse in 1938. Pathetically
playing for time from a position of weakness was all he could hope to
do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

In 1938 the Germans would have been stomped big time. Their army was geared
for attack, so much defence. The French could have rolled over the border
easily enough with their large tanks.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
Follow up question-
How much did Germany's military preparedness increase in that time
frame? Specifically, how did their relative positions change? Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?

The British and French were always ahead of the Germans. France alone
outstripped Germany in total arms.

How'd that work out for them in 1940?

Mike

[Alan Meyer]

On 02/25/2013 03:58 AM, Bay Man wrote:
...

Post by Bay Man
Chamberlain was right in attempting to avoid war.

I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished. We know that it
didn't save Poland. Chamberlain was hoping that giving away the
Sudetenland, where there were many ethnic Germans living, would save the
rest of Czechoslovakia, where there were very few.

He had some reason to believe that would work. In addition to Hitler's
word, which Chamberlain apparently valued much higher than it was worth,
there was the matter of Hitler's justification. For all of the years
that he had been in power, Hitler talked about gathering all of the
Germans into a greater Germany - from Austria, the Sudetenland, and
parts of Poland. He never spoke publicly about conquering everyone else
and Chamberlain therefore had some reason for believing that the rest of
Czechoslovakia would be spared.

I imagine Chamberlain saw himself as a surgeon, cutting off a diseased
arm (the Sudetenland), from a protesting patient in order to save the
patient's life.

Post by Bay Man
... He was wrong is assessing Hitler and should not have give away
Czechoslovakia. He stood up Hitler, who backed down from war. He
failure was giving Hitler too much rope. In the primitive mind of
Hitler he saw Chamberlain as a fool for giving too much, as he would
not do such a thing.

Would Hitler have backed down from war? Maybe. Maybe not. However, if
he had, I have no doubt that war was coming anyway, if not in 1938 then
in 1939 or 1940. I believe that in his own mind, Hitler was committed
to war and he had so thoroughly obliterated all internal opposition that
no one in Germany could have stopped him.

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
We know the British/French/Belgians got curbstomped in 1940. I
don't see them not getting beaten as bad or worse in 1938.
Pathetically playing for time from a position of weakness was all
he could hope to do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

In 1938 the Germans would have been stomped big time. Their army was
geared for attack, so much defence. The French could have rolled over
the border easily enough with their large tanks.

I don't think there was any will in France or in Britain to have rolled
over the German border. It seems to me that the evidence indicates that
if Britain and France had committed to declare war but Hitler invaded
Czechoslovakia anyway, the phoney war / sitzkrieg would have occurred in
1938-9 instead of 1939-40.

In the final analysis, I actually agree with your conclusions, though
not with your arguments.

War was coming. Given Hitler's mania, it was probably inevitable. What
the Allies needed to do was 1) Fight it while they were as strong as
possible - which meant that Poland and Czechoslovakia were still intact,
and 2) when Germany was as weak as possible, which meant they hadn't yet
destroyed the Czech and Polish armies or absorbed all of the Czech and
Polish resources, and hadn't yet signed the pact with the USSR (though,
admittedly, no one saw that coming.)

Would the Allies have won? There's no way to know. My suspicion is
that they would not. As Shawn Wilson said: "They were prepared for WW 1
1/2, the Germans showed up prepared for WW 2..."

Of course we're only speculating. The European situation had reached a
tipping point by 1938. The psychopathy of a single evil, hate filled
man and his throng of maniacs, thugs, and foolish believers, was pushing
all of the European countries over the edge. What would happen when
they went over does not seem to me to have been foreordained.

Alan

[Bay Man]

Post by Alan Meyer

Post by Bay Man
... He was wrong is assessing Hitler and should not have give away
Czechoslovakia. He stood up Hitler, who backed down from war. He
failure was giving Hitler too much rope. In the primitive mind of
Hitler he saw Chamberlain as a fool for giving too much, as he would
not do such a thing.

Would Hitler have backed down from war? Maybe. Maybe not.

He clearly did and Germany was not ready with puny tanks and a mass of other
shortages. The Pazer Mk3 only came operational in 1939. In 1938 the Germans
would beeen well beaten. The Brits and French held all the cards.

Germany's economy could only give Hitler small window to wage war and that
was late 1939. Even then they were short of most things. The biggest mistake
of the French was not rolling fully over the German border when Germany was
occupied in Poland. The German Army was not a defensive army.

Post by Alan Meyer
I don't think there was any will in France or in Britain to have rolled
over the German border.

There was not as they thought the Germans would come to their senses.

Post by Alan Meyer
In the final analysis, I actually agree with your conclusions, though
not with your arguments.
War was coming. Given Hitler's mania, it was probably inevitable.

But "at the time" they never saw it that way.

Post by Alan Meyer
Would the Allies have won?

Of course. The disparity between Germany and the Brits & French was marked.

The Germans showed up prepared for WW1. The Brits showed up for WW2. All the
BEF was motorized to men quickly, men never marched. Their initial plan to
invade France was a ww1 plan. Their army was not motorized with horses doing
most of the slow pulling. The French had superior tanks and full tank units
as well - and more of them. There are reports of one French Char B killing
hundreds of Germans before they managed to knock it out with artillery
pieces.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
In the final analysis, I actually agree with your conclusions, though
not with your arguments.
War was coming. Given Hitler's mania, it was probably inevitable.

But "at the time" they never saw it that way.

Post by Alan Meyer
Would the Allies have won?

Of course. The disparity between Germany and the Brits & French was marked.
The Germans showed up prepared for WW1. The Brits showed up for WW2.

So, why'd they look so bad in 1940 against the "WW1" Germans?

Mike

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
In the final analysis, I actually agree with your conclusions, though
not with your arguments.
War was coming. Given Hitler's mania, it was probably inevitable.

But "at the time" they never saw it that way.

Post by Alan Meyer
Would the Allies have won?

Of course. The disparity between Germany and the Brits & French was marked.
The Germans showed up prepared for WW1. The Brits showed up for WW2.

So, why'd they look so bad in 1940 against the "WW1" Germans?

The Germans in 1940 tried a gamble, a variation of the Blitzkrieg. It
worked, mainly because of allied incompetence. They tried it in the USSR
and it failed. The BEF only accounted fro about 9% of Dutch, Belgian and
French forces.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
In the final analysis, I actually agree with your conclusions, though
not with your arguments.
War was coming. Given Hitler's mania, it was probably inevitable.

But "at the time" they never saw it that way.

Post by Alan Meyer
Would the Allies have won?

Of course. The disparity between Germany and the Brits & French was marked.
The Germans showed up prepared for WW1. The Brits showed up for WW2.

So, why'd they look so bad in 1940 against the "WW1" Germans?

The Germans in 1940 tried a gamble, a variation of the Blitzkrieg. It
worked, mainly because of allied incompetence.

So then, it really didn't matter how many tanks or how good they were, for
the British/French, did it?

Mike

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
In the final analysis, I actually agree with your conclusions, though
not with your arguments.
War was coming. Given Hitler's mania, it was probably inevitable.

But "at the time" they never saw it that way.

Post by Alan Meyer
Would the Allies have won?

Of course. The disparity between Germany and the Brits & French was marked.
The Germans showed up prepared for WW1. The Brits showed up for WW2.

So, why'd they look so bad in 1940 against the "WW1" Germans?

The Germans in 1940 tried a gamble, a variation of the Blitzkrieg. It
worked, mainly because of allied incompetence.

So then, it really didn't matter how many tanks or how good they were, for
the British/French, did it?

In 1938 it did.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man
The Germans showed up prepared for WW1. The Brits showed up for WW2.

So, why'd they look so bad in 1940 against the "WW1" Germans?

The Germans in 1940 tried a gamble, a variation of the Blitzkrieg. It
worked, mainly because of allied incompetence.

So then, it really didn't matter how many tanks or how good they were, for
the British/French, did it?

In 1938 it did.

So, the British and French got dumber over the years?

Mike

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bay Man
The Germans showed up prepared for WW1. The Brits showed up for WW2.

So, why'd they look so bad in 1940 against the "WW1" Germans?

The Germans in 1940 tried a gamble, a variation of the Blitzkrieg. It
worked, mainly because of allied incompetence.

So then, it really didn't matter how many tanks or how good they were, for
the British/French, did it?

In 1938 it did.

So, the British and French got dumber over the years?

It appears so. If the Brits & French attacked Germany in 1938, Hitler would
have been able to execute his gamble.

[Bay Man]

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,
and the French and Poles would be on the offensive facing puny German light
tanks, with the Germans defending. The Blitzkrieg gamble was not adopted by
the Germans in 1938. Hitler would have been wiped out in 1938 and also in
1939. If the French rolled over the border on the 3rd Sept 1939 the Germans
would have diverted forces from Poland giving Poland relief and not
capitulation. British planes would be brought to the front and the BEF on
its way to reinforce. Denmark was not taken so the entrance to the Baltic
was free. German forces would be taken up elsewhere to invade Denmark.
Allied forces could secore the Baltic entrace. A large French and British
fleet could bombard Germany, shipyards, etc, and attack its small fleet from
the Baltic.

[m***@aim.com]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

Mike

[Stephen Graham]

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

Historically the Soviets were willing to fight in support of
Czechoslovakia. There's a question of how effective they would be.

The problem was that the Poles weren't and also had no desire to allow
Soviet troops onto their territory. This made it rather difficult for
the Soviets to actually do anything.

The ability of the British to mobilize Army forces at that time is also
questionable. I've forgotten when the troops deployed to Palestine to
deal with that crisis returned to the UK. Until they returned, the UK
had one deployable division.

[Bay Man]

Post by Stephen Graham

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

Historically the Soviets were willing to fight in support of
Czechoslovakia. There's a question of how effective they would be.
The problem was that the Poles weren't and also had no desire to allow
Soviet troops onto their territory. This made it rather difficult for the
Soviets to actually do anything.
The ability of the British to mobilize Army forces at that time is also
questionable. I've forgotten when the troops deployed to Palestine to deal
with that crisis returned to the UK. Until they returned, the UK had one
deployable division.

It was around 850,000 for the German Army and approx 220,000 for the British
Army. Almost half of the British Army were based around the world.
Recruitment was ongoing. I believe 2 divisions were ready for deployment in
1938. There was aprox 20,000 troops in Palestine in 1938 dealing with the
Arab revolt. First-line plane strength was around 2,900. The British placed
importance on the navy and RAF in resources. The French were expected to
provide the bulk of the ground forces in any engagement.

[Stephen Graham]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Stephen Graham
The ability of the British to mobilize Army forces at that time is
also questionable. I've forgotten when the troops deployed to
Palestine to deal with that crisis returned to the UK. Until they
returned, the UK had one deployable division.

I believe 2 divisions were ready for
deployment in 1938. There was aprox 20,000 troops in Palestine in 1938
dealing with the Arab revolt.

As I pointed out, the 1st Division was partially stripped of troops for
deployment in Palestine in 1937-8. Without those troops and equipment,
it wasn't deployable.

Post by Bay Man
First-line plane strength was around
2,900. The British placed importance on the navy and RAF in resources.
The French were expected to provide the bulk of the ground forces in any
engagement.

While the French would provide the majority of the ground forces, they
weren't willing to be the only power providing troops. One division from
the British wasn't going to suffice.

I don't blame them for this stance. The French and the Belgians paid a
heavy price in World War One and quite reasonably didn't want to do it
again.

[Bay Man]

Post by Stephen Graham

Post by Bay Man

Post by Stephen Graham
The ability of the British to mobilize Army forces at that time is
also questionable. I've forgotten when the troops deployed to
Palestine to deal with that crisis returned to the UK. Until they
returned, the UK had one deployable division.

I believe 2 divisions were ready for
deployment in 1938. There was aprox 20,000 troops in Palestine in 1938
dealing with the Arab revolt.

As I pointed out, the 1st Division was partially stripped of troops for
deployment in Palestine in 1937-8. Without those troops and equipment, it
wasn't deployable.

Post by Bay Man
First-line plane strength was around
2,900. The British placed importance on the navy and RAF in resources.
The French were expected to provide the bulk of the ground forces in any
engagement.

While the French would provide the majority of the ground forces, they
weren't willing to be the only power providing troops. One division from
the British wasn't going to suffice.
I don't blame them for this stance. The French and the Belgians paid a
heavy price in World War One and quite reasonably didn't want to do it
again.

In 1938 the Belgians were not willing to attack Germany. The British would
have mobilized a lot quicker than you think. Even the BEF in 1940 was only a
token force to the mass of the Dutch/Belgian/French forces - yet history
talks of it a British-French defeat, ignoring the more multiple Dutch and
Belgians. There again the British forces strength at the time was not in
the low priority army.

[Stephen Graham]

Post by Bay Man
In 1938 the Belgians were not willing to attack Germany. The British
would have mobilized a lot quicker than you think. Even the BEF in 1940
was only a token force to the mass of the Dutch/Belgian/French forces -
yet history talks of it a British-French defeat, ignoring the more
multiple Dutch and Belgians. There again the British forces strength at
the time was not in the low priority army.

As I understand matters, interwar British manning policies were pretty
much the same for all services. Units deployed overseas or on distant
stations were the strongest, though not at full war establishment. Units
in the UK were generally distinctly weaker. Standard recruitment
practices would take significant time to bring UK-based forces to full
strength.

For the Army, there was a decision in the mid-1930s to maintain two
infantry divisions in the UK in a deployable state in terms of manning
and equipment. Everything else was either lacking equipment entirely,
such as the armored formations, or at about half-strength. Thus, if more
troops were needed anywhere, such as Palestine, the ready troops in the
UK had to be drawn down.

Adding to the issue was the state of the Territorial forces. The
creation of the anti-aircraft defences in the mid-1930s had transferred
men and units from the traditional combat arms to the AA commands. By
the time of the Munich crisis, AA was up to strength, but the
traditional combat arms weren't in any shape to be mobilized. It wasn't
until the passage of the Conscription Act that there would be sufficient
resources to get those into shape.

Adding to the personnel issue was the general lack of modern equipment.
Armor simply didn't exist in any meaningful state; artillery was
antiquated and only just starting to be updated with new equipment.

So, no, the British forces weren't going to be used on the Continent in
1938 or early 1939.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Stephen Graham

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

Historically the Soviets were willing to fight in support of
Czechoslovakia. There's a question of how effective they would be.
The problem was that the Poles weren't and also had no desire to allow
Soviet troops onto their territory. This made it rather difficult for
the Soviets to actually do anything.

That was my primary concern; how do the Soviet troops even get into position?

Plus, Stalin may have been "willing" to do something, but I've never seen
evidence that he actually DID anything without lots of treaties guaranteeing
his free hand in other areas.

He was, after all, a Stalinist.

Mike

[Roman W]

On Mon, 25 Feb 2013 13:31:06 -0500, Stephen Graham

Post by Stephen Graham
The problem was that the Poles weren't and also had no desire to allow
Soviet troops onto their territory. This made it rather difficult for
the Soviets to actually do anything.

With Russian troops, it's much easier to get them IN then OUT later.

RW

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

[m***@aim.com]

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Mike

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war, Chamberlain
had
an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what threatening to
go to war for the Sudetenland would have accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force, deploying
squadron in Czech territory. And attacking German ships in the Baltic.

[m***@aim.com]

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force, deploying
squadron in Czech territory.

How'd they against the Luftwaffe in 1941-43?

Post by Bay Man
And attacking German ships in the Baltic.

With what? Snowballs and bad language?

Mike

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force, deploying
squadron in Czech territory.

How'd they against the Luftwaffe in 1941-43?

The time period is 1938.

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man
And attacking German ships in the Baltic.

With what? Snowballs and bad language?

Ships. Stop acting like an idiot.

[m***@aim.com]

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force, deploying
squadron in Czech territory.

How'd they against the Luftwaffe in 1941-43?

The time period is 1938.

When German planes were so much better than Soviet planes, and the pilots
better.

Naw, not gonna work.

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man
And attacking German ships in the Baltic.

With what? Snowballs and bad language?

Ships.

Didn't do all that well when they had the chance to actually do it.

Snowballs and harsh language might have been better.

Post by Bay Man
Stop acting like an idiot.

I'm not the idiot counting on, of all things, help from the Soviet navy
and air force.

THAT'S idiocy.

Mike

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force, deploying
squadron in Czech territory.

How'd they against the Luftwaffe in 1941-43?

The time period is 1938.

When German planes were so much better than Soviet planes,

The JU-88 was introduced in 1939. The me109 fighter was good. But the
Soviets had lots of planes, and some tested in combat like the Polikarpov
I-16 They had the world's largest air force. The USSR had a large heavy
bomber fleet.

Post by m***@aim.com
and the pilots
better.

An opinion. and wise in hindsight.

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man
And attacking German ships in the Baltic.

With what? Snowballs and bad language?

Ships.

Didn't do all that well when they had the chance to actually do it.

With the French and RN they have. German anti-shipping was bad in 1940 and
no better in 1938.

Post by m***@aim.com
Snowballs and harsh language might have been better.

Post by Bay Man
Stop acting like an idiot.

I'm not the idiot counting on, of all things,
help from the Soviet navy
and air force.

If the Soviets wanted to help the Czechs they could just roll through a
small part of Poland to get there. The Pole may even allow them to do it.
If the Soviets wanted to get at the Germans they would.

[Padraigh ProAmerica]

Re: "Peace in Our Time"

Group: soc.history.war.world-war-ii Date: Fri, Mar 1, 2013, 9:17am From:
***@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam (Bay Man)
<***@aim.com> wrote in message news:kgmndc$jjo$***@haven.eyrie.org...
Bay Man <***@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
<***@aim.com> wrote in message news:kgk2ot$bo1$***@haven.eyrie.org...
Bay Man <***@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
<***@aim.com> wrote in message news:kggjb8$oli$***@haven.eyrie.org...
Bay Man <***@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
USSR,
Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.
The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.
But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport
their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.
Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force,
deploying
squadron in Czech territory.
How'd they against the Luftwaffe in 1941-43?
The time period is 1938.
When German planes were so much better than Soviet planes,
The JU-88 was introduced in 1939. The me109 fighter was good. But the
Soviets had lots of planes, and some tested in combat like the
Polikarpov I-16 They had the world's largest air force. The USSR had a
large heavy bomber fleet.
and the pilots
better.
An opinion. and wise in hindsight.
And attacking German ships in the Baltic.
With what? Snowballs and bad language?
Ships.
Didn't do all that well when they had the chance to actually do it.
With the French and RN they have. German anti-shipping was bad in 1940
and no better in 1938.
Snowballs and harsh language might have been better.
Stop acting like an idiot.
I'm not the idiot counting on, of all things, help from the Soviet navy
and air force.
If the Soviets wanted to help the Czechs they could just roll through a
small part of Poland to get there. The Pole may even allow them to do
it. If the Soviets wanted to get at the Germans they would.

========COMMENT===========

Unlikely at that point in time; the Red Army command structure has been
gutted by Stalin. They were still struggling when Hitler launched
Barbarossa. Having more and/or better weapons means diddly when you
don't have the leadership to deploy them properly.

--
"When the facts change, I change my opinion. What do you do, sir?."--

John Maynard Keynes

[Bay Man]

Post by Padraigh ProAmerica
========COMMENT===========
Unlikely at that point in time; the Red Army command structure has been
gutted by Stalin. They were still struggling when Hitler launched
Barbarossa. Having more and/or better weapons means diddly when you
don't have the leadership to deploy them properly.

In 1941 the USSR was facing the full force of the German military. In 1938
that would not be the case.

[Alan Meyer]

Post by Bay Man
If the Soviets wanted to help the Czechs they could just roll through a
small part of Poland to get there. The Pole may even allow them to do
it. If the Soviets wanted to get at the Germans they would.

The Polish government had already made clear that they wouldn't allow
that. Sending an army "rolling through" another country, even a small
part of that country, is an act of war. It would have been crazy even
if Poland weren't an ally of France and Britain. It would have driven
many Poles into believing that Germany was their friend. And of course
it would have been military suicide to push an army forward at the end
of a long and narrow supply corridor.


I think that a major conceptual difficulty in the argument you've been
making throughout this thread, and one of the reasons why nobody seems
to agree with you, is that you may be thinking about the issues a little
too abstractly. Governments couldn't move armies and navies like chess
pieces. People, top leaders in all of the countries and ordinary folk
too in the democracies (and to a lesser but still significant extent in
the dictatorships) had to support the moves. And if the strategy went
awry you couldn't just knock over your king and setup the pieces for
another game.

The people in all of the countries were overwhelmingly opposed to war.
Even in Germany, Hitler didn't feel strong enough to tell the German
people that he was going to war against Poland in order to steal their
land and enslave their people. He had to drum up lots of false
propaganda about the treatment of Germans in Danzig and elsewhere, and
manufacture the ridiculous incident of the Polish attack on the German
radio station.

In France, Britain, and the United States most people were adamant that
there should not be war and their elected leaders listened.

Even when the Wehrmacht crossed the border in Poland and the British and
French were forced into war by treaty obligation and a sense of threat
to their own survival, there still wasn't popular support for a war.
The support that existed was for hunkering down behind the Maginot line
and defending themselves at as low a human cost as possible while hoping
that the Germans came to their senses.

Ultimately, popular opinion, well reflected in Chamberlain's action, was
short-sighted. I think you are 100% right that Chamberlain and Daladier
should have acted and Daladier knew it. But their hands were tied.

In the U.S., Roosevelt knew well the dangers that Germany and Japan
posed to U.S. and to liberty everywhere, but he couldn't do much about
it either. Had he spoken out too forcefully he would have lost the
election in 1940. Even after he won he had to move very cautiously in
his support for the Allies, dragging the Congress and people along as
fast as he dared.

I imagine that if I were alive in 1938 and you proposed your plan for
what to do about German demands at Munich, if I could have foreseen the
future I would have voted for what you are proposing. But alas, I
probably would have been as ignorant as everyone else and as foolishly
hopeful that there had to be some way to avoid war if we only tried
harder. I might have voted for Chamberlain's plan, or more likely I
think, remained undecided about what to do - which was all that Hitler
needed from people like me.

Alan

[m***@aim.com]

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com
Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to transport their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force, deploying
squadron in Czech territory.

How'd they against the Luftwaffe in 1941-43?

The time period is 1938.

When German planes were so much better than Soviet planes,

The JU-88 was introduced in 1939. The me109 fighter was good. But the
Soviets had lots of planes, and some tested in combat like the Polikarpov
I-16

Yes, they were tested -- against the Me109, in Spain, and was chopped to
pieces.

Post by Bay Man
They had the world's largest air force. The USSR had a large heavy
bomber fleet.

No, actually, they had some obsolete Tupolevs.

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com
and the pilots better.

An opinion. and wise in hindsight.

Well, history seems to render that as more "fact" than "opinion". And if,
as you admit it was correct, the point is made.

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man
And attacking German ships in the Baltic.

With what? Snowballs and bad language?

Ships.

Didn't do all that well when they had the chance to actually do it.

With the French and RN they have.

Well, no, they had the RN on their side in 1941, and it didn't really do
them any good, did it?

Post by Bay Man
German anti-shipping was bad in 1940 and

Really? Odd, 'cause that was one of the good years for U-boats.

Perhaps you should read a bit on WWII...

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com
Snowballs and harsh language might have been better.

Post by Bay Man
Stop acting like an idiot.

I'm not the idiot counting on, of all things,
help from the Soviet navy
and air force.

If the Soviets wanted to help the Czechs they could just roll through a
small part of Poland to get there.

And declare war on Poland?

Post by Bay Man
The Pole may even allow them to do it.

You should probably read a bit of history; it might render your arguments
inadvertantly lucid.

The Poles and the Soviets hated each other, probably more than they hated
the Germans.

Post by Bay Man
If the Soviets wanted to get at the Germans they would.

Well, they didn't do so well when they first got the chance at them. And
you have yet to demonstrate that they "wanted to get at the Germans"
in the first place.

Mike

[Bill Shatzer]

-snip-

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man
They had the world's largest air force. The USSR had a large heavy
bomber fleet.

No, actually, they had some obsolete Tupolevs.

Most of which had been retired to the transport and paratroop roles.

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com
Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to
transport
their
troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to allow it.

Their contribution would be by air, they had a massive air-force, deploying
squadron in Czech territory.

How'd they against the Luftwaffe in 1941-43?

The time period is 1938.

When German planes were so much better than Soviet planes,

The JU-88 was introduced in 1939. The me109 fighter was good. But the
Soviets had lots of planes, and some tested in combat like the Polikarpov
I-16

Yes, they were tested -- against the Me109, in Spain, and was chopped to
pieces.

Against other German types they had the edge.

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man
They had the world's largest air force. The USSR had a large heavy
bomber fleet.

No, actually, they had some obsolete Tupolevs.

But they worked and could drop bombs. The soviets flew from Moscow to
Settale pre-war, which prompted the introduction of ther B-17. The Tupolov
ANT-25 was the basis of the US U2.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_ANT-25

The point is the Russians had a large air force that could do damage. This
is not a childish mine is bigger than yours.

Post by m***@aim.com
Well, no, they had the RN on their side in 1941, and it didn't really do
them any good, did it?

The RN French and Soviet fleets would be in the Baltic.

Post by m***@aim.com
And declare war on Poland?

No just roll thought. The Poles would attack Germany a sthey were being
theatened.

Post by m***@aim.com
Well, they didn't do so well when they first got the chance at them. And
you have yet to demonstrate that they "wanted to get at the Germans"
in the first place.

They were on action stations in 1938. Keep up.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by m***@aim.com
Well, no, they had the RN on their side in 1941, and it didn't really do
them any good, did it?

Not a great deal in 1941, but eventually the Lend-Lease convoys, which
were mostly escorted by the RN, did them a noticeable amount of good.

Michael

[Bay Man]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by m***@aim.com
Well, no, they had the RN on their side in 1941, and it didn't
really do them any good, did it?

Not a great deal in 1941, but eventually the Lend-Lease convoys, which
were mostly escorted by the RN, did them a noticeable amount of good.

IN 1938 the RN, French and Soviets would be operating in the Baltic.

[Mario]

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by Alan Meyer
I agree with this. If it were possible to avoid war,
Chamberlain had an
obligation to try. Furthermore, it's hard to know what
threatening to go to war for the Sudetenland would have
accomplished.

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and the USSR,

Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied
to major western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to
transport their troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to
allow it.

Wasn't the Slovakia eastern tip bordering with Soviet Union?

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Mario

Post by m***@aim.com

Post by Bay Man

Post by m***@aim.com
Well, no, they wouldn't face the USSR at that point.

The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied
to major western power.

But in order to fight the Germans, they would have had to
transport their troops into position. Poland was "unlikely" to
allow it.

Wasn't the Slovakia eastern tip bordering with Soviet Union?

Not according to the maps I've seen.

http://www.worldmapsonline.com/europe1938.htm

The Soviets would have to go through Poland or Rumania, or overrun the
Baltic States and attack Germany directly.

Mike

[c***@gmail.com]

Post by Mario
Wasn't the Slovakia eastern tip bordering with Soviet Union?

Slovakia and the Ukraine share a common border today, but that's a direct
result of World War Two: Stalin demanded (and first Churchill at Tehran,
then both WSC+FDR at Yalta agreed) that the new eastern border of Poland
should be along the Curzon line rather than the one defined in the Treaty
of Riga. Poland was compensated for this loss by taking much of Prussia
from the Germans.

Chris Manteuffel

[Mario]

Post by c***@gmail.com

Post by Mario
Wasn't the Slovakia eastern tip bordering with Soviet Union?

Slovakia and the Ukraine share a common border today, but
that's a direct result of World War Two: Stalin demanded (and
first Churchill at Tehran, then both WSC+FDR at Yalta agreed)
that the new eastern border of Poland should be along the
Curzon line rather than the one defined in the Treaty of Riga.
Poland was compensated for this loss by taking much of Prussia
from the Germans.

And Silesia too.

Post by c***@gmail.com
Chris Manteuffel

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Bay Man
The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

Actually they did have an alliance with France, but it was vitiated by
British reluctance to join the fight. And without without the USSR
obtaining permission to cross Polish territory, it would not be able to
bring its army to bear, and France certainly was not willing to go it
alone against Germany.

Michael

[Bay Man]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Bay Man
The USSR was at action stations in 1938, although not allied to major
western power.

Actually they did have an alliance with France, but it was vitiated by
British reluctance to join the fight. And without without the USSR
obtaining permission to cross Polish territory, it would not be able to
bring its army to bear, and France certainly was not willing to go it
alone against Germany.

Michael, that is true. The Soviets wanted a USSR-French-Brits alliance that
guaranteed each others territory. If one was attacked they all join in.
Chamberlain and some of the French hierarchy were not keen. A bad move as
the Soviets surprisingly formed a pact with Germany in 1939, also supplying
them with food and ores to counter the RN blockade.

[Michael Emrys]

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR...

Who were a very, very long way from forming a strong alliance. For
instance, the Poles hated and distrusted the Soviets and would not grant
them transit rights. In 1938, the USSR had no border with Germany and no
way to come to grips directly with German forces absent those transit
rights. Poland also had border disputes with Czechoslovakia and would
take land from it in 1939.

In short, there was no unified will among the states you number to
effectively resist Hitler.

Michael

[Bay Man]

Post by Michael Emrys

Germany would be facing the UK, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR...

Who were a very, very long way from forming a strong alliance. For
instance, the Poles hated and distrusted the Soviets and would not grant
them transit rights. In 1938, the USSR had no border with Germany and no
way to come to grips directly with German forces absent those transit
rights. Poland also had border disputes with Czechoslovakia and would take
land from it in 1939.
In short, there was no unified will among the states you number to
effectively resist Hitler.

The Brits and French were the most closely linked. The USSR and the Czechs
were loser. In 1938, if a combined Anglo-French attack from the west, the
Czechs (with Soviet Air aid) and the Poles from the east attacked Germany
simulatwously they would have been swamped. Only the Brits & French would
need integrated commands.

[MCGARRY]

If the French rolled over the border on the

3rd Sept 1939 the Germans would have diverted forces from Poland giving
Poland relief and not capitulation. British planes would be brought to
the front and the BEF on its way to reinforce.

Hmm
From Wiki
Saar offensive: "from 7 to 16 September 1939. The purpose of the attack
was to assist Poland, which was then under attack. The all-out assault
was to have been carried out by roughly 40 divisions, including one
armored division, three mechanised divisions, 78 artillery regiments and
40 tank battalions. The offensive was stopped and the French forces
eventually withdrew amid a German counter-offensive on 17 October."

Obviuously they were just 4 days too late

[Rich]

Post by MCGARRY
Hmm
From Wiki
Saar offensive: "from 7 to 16 September 1939. The purpose of the attack
was to assist Poland, which was then under attack. The all-out assault
was to have been carried out by roughly 40 divisions, including one
armored division, three mechanised divisions, 78 artillery regiments and
40 tank battalions. The offensive was stopped and the French forces
eventually withdrew amid a German counter-offensive on 17 October."
Obviuously they were just 4 days too late

Sorry, but like most Wiki articles the obviousness is illusory. :(

The problem was mobilization - always an issue when it came to war
between Germany and France. On 1 September 1939 Germany had been
executing its full mobilization plan since 27 August and had been
partially mobilized since the spring. France's mobilization began
at 0001 hours 2 September, so Germany had an effect "jump" of six
days on them. Before mobilization began the entire regular army of
Metropolitan France, which included North Africa, consisted of 33
divisions and 2 Spahis brigades - the active army in France
consisted of just 25 divisions. To get to the roughly 40 divisions
required moving the 8 colonial divisions from North Africa to France
and mobilizing 7 others. See the problems developing?

The French mobilization consisted of activating 39 reserve infantry
divisions along with various reserve army corps and army units. The
schedule assumed that on M+7 (9 September) 41 divisions would be
available in France, North Africa, and the Levant:

36 DI (Infantry Division)
3 DC (Cavalry Division)
2 DLM (Light Mechanized Division)

On M+12 (14 September) there would be 63 divisions:

58 DI
3 DC
2 DLM

On M+17 (19 September) there would be 83 divisions:

78 DI
3 DC
2 DLM

On M+22 (24 September) there would be 86 divisions and mobilization
would be essentially complete:

81 DI
3 DC
2 DLM
2 DLM

The real problem was that French forces in the Saarland as of circa
8 September consisted only of
(courtesy David Lehmann and Louis Capdebosq):

IIIème Armée
Corps d'Armée Colonial (CAC)
12ème Division d'Infanterie Motorisée (DIM)
3ème Division d'Infanterie Nord-Africaine (DINA)

1er Corps d'Armée (CA) (1st Army Corps)
2ème DINA
42ème Division d'Infanterie (DI)

IVème Armée
9ème CA
6ème Division d'Infanterie Coloniale (DIC)
4ème DINA

20ème CA
11ème DI
21ème DI
9ème DIM
23ème DI

5ème CA
15ème DIM
3ème DIC

And were faced by:

1. Armee

XII. AK

79. ID (2.)
34. ID (1.)
15. ID (1.)
52. ID (2.)

Generalkommando der Grenzrtruppen Saarpfalz
6. ID (1.)
36. ID (1.)
9. ID (1.)
Grenz-Kommandantur Saarpfalz (total of 26 infantry, 9 MG,
6 engineer, and 10 AT companies, 29 artillery and five
flak batteries)

IX. AK -
71. ID (2.)
25. ID (1.)
33. ID (1.)

En route - 75. ID (2.), 209., 214., 223., 231.,
246. ID (all 3.), 268. ID (4.)

In other words, 10 divisions, with another 7 en route.
So 12 French divisions to attack at least 10 in fortified
positions. The best the French could hope for was to
concentrate at one sector and make a penetration that
might cause the Germans to strip forces from the Polish
front. The did achieve a penetration, but it did not
result in a German withdrawal. Instead, by the time
mobilization was complete, the German campaign in Poland
was ending and massive forces were being redeployed to
the French border.

BTW: Note that there were no "armored divisions" the DLM
were light mechanized divisions similar to the German
leichte-Division. They consisted of two light tank brigades
for a total of four battalions and 174 tanks, two mechanized
cavalry battalions, an artillery regiment, and division
services. They had few infantry and were intended to act
as mechanized cavalry, screening the movements of an army
or corps. There were ***no*** division-sized heavy tank
formations in the French Army until January 1940 when the
1re DCR was formed. Prior to that the B1 and B1-bis were
formed in battalions and brigades (Groupe de Bataillons
de Chars) attached directly to infantry corps for infantry
support. Furthermore, by the end of 1937 only 34 Char B1
were complete (3 others were used as test beds) and in
1938 the improved Char B1-bis had only begun production.
Possibly a single brigade of two battalions had completed
formation by the Munich Crisis. Otherwise, for "heavy tanks"
there were the 10 Char 2C, which were getting a bit elderly.

Cheers!

[Roman W]

Post by MCGARRY
Obviuously they were just 4 days too late

Given the coming Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September, did it
really matter?


RW

[Shawn Wilson]

On Feb 25, 1:58 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
How much did Germany's military preparedness increase in that time
frame? Specifically, how did their relative positions change? Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?

The British and French were always ahead of the Germans. France alone
outstripped Germany in total arms.

But also far inferior in organization. The French simply were not
capable of war at the pace of WWII. Neither were the British.

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
Ultimately, in retrospect and with knowledge that he had neither 20-20
foresight nor knowledge of the secret inner plots and forces of Nazi
Germany, was Chamberlain actually wrong? (I will assume that vis a
vis internal British political and public opinion, he was perfectly
correct at the time)

Chamberlain was right in attempting to avoid war. He was wrong is assessing
Hitler and should not have give away Czechoslovakia. He stood up Hitler, who
backed down from war. He failure was giving Hitler too much rope. In the
primitive mind of Hitler he saw Chamberlain as a fool for giving too much,
as he would not do such a thing.

Problem is, there was nothing the F/B/B could DO for Czechoslovakia.
They couldn't send troops or supplies. Invade Germany from the west?
Possible, but utterly, utterly alien to the entirely defensive mindset
everyone had. Their fundamental problem was their complete World War
1 1/2 mindset.

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
We know the British/French/Belgians got curbstomped in 1940. I don't
see them not getting beaten as bad or worse in 1938. Pathetically
playing for time from a position of weakness was all he could hope to
do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

In 1938 the Germans would have been stomped big time. Their army was geared
for attack, so much defence. The French could have rolled over the border
easily enough with their large tanks.

'Could' have, but were never going to.

[Bay Man]

Post by Shawn Wilson
On Feb 25, 1:58 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
How much did Germany's military preparedness increase in that time
frame? Specifically, how did their relative positions change? Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?

The British and French were always ahead of the Germans. France alone
outstripped Germany in total arms.

But also far inferior in organization.

That is being wise in hindsight.

Post by Shawn Wilson
The French simply were not
capable of war at the pace of WWII. Neither were the British.

The French and British actually were. The British motorization was to take
masses of men to focus points quickly. The French had whole tank units. The
tanks were not wholly dispersed amongst infantry.

Post by Shawn Wilson

Post by Bay Man
Chamberlain was right in attempting to avoid war.
He was wrong in assessing Hitler and should not
have given away Czechoslovakia. He stood up Hitler,
who backed down from war. He failure was giving
Hitler too much rope. In the primitive mind of Hitler
he saw Chamberlain as a fool for giving too
much, as he would not do such a thing.

Problem is, there was nothing the F/B/B could DO for Czechoslovakia.
They couldn't send troops or supplies. Invade Germany from the west?
Possible, but utterly, utterly alien to the entirely defensive mindset
everyone had. Their fundamental problem was their complete World War
1 1/2 mindset.

The German mindset was the same. They had enough artillery and shells as
they
expected a version of WW1. German generals were concerned that an attack
by
the French with initially British aircraft support, while they were dealing
with the Czechs would advance deeply into Germany as they would not be
capable of
transferring troops from east to the west fast enough - they marched with
horses.

Post by Shawn Wilson

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
We know the British/French/Belgians got curbstomped in 1940. I don't
see them not getting beaten as bad or worse in 1938. Pathetically
playing for time from a position of weakness was all he could hope to
do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

In 1938 the Germans would have been stomped
big time. Their army was geared for attack, so much
defence. The French could have rolled over the border
easily enough with their large tanks.

'Could' have, but were never going to.

Whatever that meant. The probabilities of Germany being stomped was great.
They were hopelessly unready.

[Mario]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
Problem is, there was nothing the F/B/B could DO for
Czechoslovakia. They couldn't send troops or supplies.
Invade Germany from the west? Possible, but utterly, utterly
alien to the entirely defensive mindset everyone had. Their
fundamental problem was their complete World War 1 1/2
mindset.

The German mindset was the same. They had enough artillery and
shells as they
expected a version of WW1. German generals were concerned
that an attack by
the French with initially British aircraft support, while they
were dealing with the Czechs would advance deeply into Germany
as they would not be capable of
transferring troops from east to the west fast enough - they
marched with horses.

Germany had plenty of railways.

[Bay Man]

Post by Mario

Post by Bay Man

Post by Shawn Wilson
Problem is, there was nothing the F/B/B could DO for
Czechoslovakia. They couldn't send troops or supplies.
Invade Germany from the west? Possible, but utterly, utterly
alien to the entirely defensive mindset everyone had. Their
fundamental problem was their complete World War 1 1/2
mindset.

The German mindset was the same. They had enough artillery and
shells as they
expected a version of WW1. German generals were concerned
that an attack by
the French with initially British aircraft support, while they
were dealing with the Czechs would advance deeply into Germany
as they would not be capable of
transferring troops from east to the west fast enough - they
marched with horses.

Germany had plenty of railways.

That they did but the generals were not at ease of the prospect. Also
railways would be immediate allied targets. Also the logistics behind such
a quick move.

[Stephen Graham]

Post by Bay Man
The French and British actually were. The British motorization was to take
masses of men to focus points quickly.

That would require the British to actually have masses of men to deploy.
They didn't.

Post by Bay Man
The French had whole tank units.
The
tanks were not wholly dispersed amongst infantry.

In 1938 and 1939, the French tanks were almost completely dispersed
amongst the infantry. The armored divisions (DCR) were a wartime
creation. There were two mechanized divisions (DLM) but the rest of
those were also wartime creations.

[Duwop]

Post by Stephen Graham
In 1938 and 1939, the French tanks were almost completely dispersed
amongst the infantry. The armored divisions (DCR) were a wartime
creation. There were two mechanized divisions (DLM) but the rest of
those were also wartime creations.

And being ad hoc wartime creations, they had no doctrine or training
to work even remotely effectively as an offensive unit.

[Bay Man]

Post by Stephen Graham

Post by Bay Man
The French and British actually were. The British motorization was to take
masses of men to focus points quickly.

That would require the British to actually have masses of men to deploy.
They didn't.

In 1938, what men they had did not march. They used Austin and Bedford
trucks.

Post by Stephen Graham

Post by Bay Man
The French had whole tank units.
The tanks were not wholly dispersed amongst infantry.

In 1938 and 1939, the French tanks were almost completely dispersed
amongst the infantry. The armored divisions (DCR) were a wartime creation.
There were two mechanized divisions (DLM) but the rest of those were also
wartime creations.

Not so. The French did have armoured tank divisions in 1938. Although if
they attacked Germany the Germans would not be swarming forwards in massed
compatible tanks as they did in 1940. The puny Panzer 2s wood have been
swept aside by the French tanks. In 1940, two French armoured divisions
fought the 3rd and 4th Panzers for four days, covering the First Army's move
up to the Dyle line. The French lost 105 tanks to 160 German. German
accounts suggest that had the French tanks kept advancing, rather than
breaking off the engagement waiting for the main force to be in place, the
whole German front in the north might have collapsed. Near Antwerp, the 9th
Panzers ran into another French armoured division, and this time the Germans
lost another hundred tanks for the loss of five French. And this was facing
the newer Panzer 3s, not puny Panzer 2s, which was all the Germans had in
1938. The French Somua S35 tank the best all-round tank on the battlefield
in 1940. Read Ernest May's Strange Victory.

All evidence in 1938/39 points to the Germans preparing for a long sustained
war of attrition, not a quick war of manoeuvre.

[Bay Man]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Stephen Graham
In 1938 and 1939, the French tanks were almost completely dispersed
amongst the infantry. The armored divisions (DCR) were a wartime
creation. There were two mechanized divisions (DLM) but the rest of those
were also wartime creations.

Not so. The French did have armoured tank divisions in 1938.

The DC units, which were much more up to the Panzer units with attached
logistics and mechanics were formed in 1939 after 1 Sept. However they did
have tank units prior, but not so self contained. The French doctrine was
to punch a hole in the enemy with the heavy Char Bs and the lighter tanks
follow up behind through the hole with the Char Bs falling back and being
repaired and reclaimed from the battlefield. The Germans all though WW2 were
excellent at fixing broken down and hit tanks and reclaiming them from the
battlefield.

[Michael Emrys]

The British motorization was to take masses of men to focus points
quickly.

Which is irrelevant in view of the almost total lack of mental
preparation on the part of the British officer corps to fight a WW II
type war against a major Continental power. The British army had become
over the previous century or so a constabulary force for the policing of
Britain's far flung empire. Granted, there were a handful of far-seeing
rebels among them who were on the track of modernizing the army into an
effective force, but they had virtually no impact on the mindset of the
vast majority of serving officers or the institutions of the army. Even
by the end of WW II they were only modestly competent at mechanized
warfare by and large and were certainly no virtuosos in any sort of
consistent way.

Michael

[Bay Man]

The British motorization was to take masses of men to focus points
quickly.

Which is irrelevant in view of the almost total lack of mental preparation
on the part of the British officer corps to fight a WW II type war against
a major Continental power. The British army had become over the previous
century or so a constabulary force for the policing of Britain's far flung
empire.

I think you forgot WW1.

Granted, there were a handful of far-seeing rebels among them who were on
the track of modernizing the army into an effective force, but they had
virtually no impact on the mindset of the vast majority of serving
officers or the institutions of the army.

Some must have got their way by motorizing the lot.

Even by the end of WW II they were only modestly competent at mechanized
warfare by and large and were certainly no virtuosos in any sort of
consistent way.

This is a digression to the main point..but... The Desert Rats may disagree
with you. In 1945 the British had superior armour to the US fighting
alongside them. If the German Bulge attack was against British armour they
would not have lasted so long. British armour was equal to German, but far
more versatile. As to mechanized warfare the British adapted tanks for
various roles - the Funnies. None else did to the extent the Brits did. The
Churchill could climb mountains and go where not other tanks could go. No
one matched the Brits in the range of armoured vehicles for dedicated tasks.
I would say the British were ahead of all others in 1944/45. Remember the
Centurion was introduced in the last week of WW2. Also the British invented
mechanized mobile warfare in WW1.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Bay Man
I think you forgot WW1.

Not at all. But WW I hardly made a dent in the British regimental
system, which happened to lay at the root of much of the excessive
conservatism among British officers.

Michael

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Bay Man
I think you forgot WW1.

Not at all. But WW I hardly made a dent in the British regimental
system, which happened to lay at the root of much of the excessive
conservatism among British officers.

I recall reading somewhere of this possibly
apocryphal remark by a British "regular" officer
on hearing the news that Germany had capitulated
in 1918:

"Thank god that's over. Now we can get back to
real soldiering!"

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Bay Man
I think you forgot WW1.

Not at all. But WW I hardly made a dent in the British regimental
system, which happened to lay at the root of much of the excessive
conservatism among British officers.

I recall reading somewhere of this possibly
apocryphal remark by a British "regular" officer
on hearing the news that Germany had capitulated
"Thank god that's over. Now we can get back to
real soldiering!"

The officer ranks has improve radically from WW1, but some of the old school
was still there for sure.

[Roman W]

On Tue, 26 Feb 2013 14:15:40 -0500, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
"Thank god that's over. Now we can get back to
real soldiering!"

I.e. shooting up the natives Amritsar style.

RW

[Stephen Graham]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Bay Man
I think you forgot WW1.

Not at all. But WW I hardly made a dent in the British regimental
system, which happened to lay at the root of much of the excessive
conservatism among British officers.

David French, in his _Military Identities: The Regimental System, the
British Army and the British People, 1870-2000_, argues that the
regimental system really wasn't at fault for this.

[Bay Man]

Post by Stephen Graham

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Bay Man
I think you forgot WW1.

Not at all. But WW I hardly made a dent in the British regimental
system, which happened to lay at the root of much of the excessive
conservatism among British officers.

David French, in his _Military Identities: The Regimental System, the
British Army and the British People, 1870-2000_, argues that the
regimental system really wasn't at fault for this.

Many US critics have suggested the regimental system to be adopted by the
US. It give pride in the soldiers to that bit extra - e.g., the Glosters at
Imgin river in Korea. The Cheshires are mainly recruited from the old
Cheshire boundaries. They all share a common local culture, accent, etc.
The US's Gi system of one big army from all over was adopted to ensure one
state cannot rebel using its own regiments. The exceptions are the
Marines - like a separate army and part of the navy, as in the UK, Rangers,
para units, exec. What comes to mind was Alabama in the early 1960s, if a
local regiment was influenced by Wallace there would have been trouble. The
US system is mainly for internal defence to retain the union.

The problem in WW2 with the Brits was class division. Officers, especially
top officers, were overwhelmingly from private schools. Some not that
bright but their accents, arrogance and manner gave them a image of being
above normal intelligence - pseudo intelligence.

[Stephen Graham]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Stephen Graham
David French, in his _Military Identities: The Regimental System, the
British Army and the British People, 1870-2000_, argues that the
regimental system really wasn't at fault for this.

Many US critics have suggested the regimental system to be adopted by the
US. It give pride in the soldiers to that bit extra - e.g., the Glosters at
Imgin river in Korea. The Cheshires are mainly recruited from the old
Cheshire boundaries. They all share a common local culture, accent, etc.

French makes the point that for the Regular Army the localization of
regiments was largely a sham. Most regiments drew from the large cities
or economically depressed areas regardless of their titular association.
Generally, less than 25% of the men came from the associated region. The
obvious exception was the Territorial Army. And, in any case,
regionalization only applied to the infantry and not all regiments of that.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Stephen Graham
French makes the point that for the Regular Army the localization of
regiments was largely a sham. Most regiments drew from the large cities
or economically depressed areas regardless of their titular association.
Generally, less than 25% of the men came from the associated region.

In "Johnny Cope in the Morning", one of the stories
in _McAuslan in the Rough_, George MacDonald Fraser
quotes a well-known music-hall gag from the time:

"Issacstein?"

"Present, sir."

"O'Flaherty?"

"Present, sir."

"Woinarowski?"

"Present, sir."

"Right - Cameron Highlanders, all present and correct, sir."

(The story is recalled by the narrator, Lieutenant
MacNeill, during the garboil over Private Crombie's
application to join the battalion pipe band - Crombie
being a new recruit from Merseyside, who is both a
good piper, and "black as the Ace of Spades.")

[Stephen Graham]

Post by Rich Rostrom
(The story is recalled by the narrator, Lieutenant
MacNeill, during the garboil over Private Crombie's
application to join the battalion pipe band - Crombie
being a new recruit from Merseyside, who is both a
good piper, and "black as the Ace of Spades.")

Fraser, who was the basis for MacNeill, is actually a good example of
the actual practice regarding regionalization. He was born in Carlisle,
England, though his parents were Scots. As a wartime conscript, he wound
up in the Border Regiment somewhat by happenstance. That was the proper
regional regiment for Carlisle. However, as an officer in the post-war
army, he was commissioned into the Gordon Highlanders.

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich Rostrom
(The story is recalled by the narrator, Lieutenant
MacNeill, during the garboil over Private Crombie's
application to join the battalion pipe band - Crombie
being a new recruit from Merseyside, who is both a
good piper, and "black as the Ace of Spades.")

You also had the reformed war-time units - they are there but mothballed. My
uncle was in the Liverpool Scottish, a part of the Kings Regiment . Most in
his unit were from the Liverpool area. They had full piped bands - the lot.
They performed well. He was on the first wave at D-Day. Half a mile across
the river in Birkenhead (virtually a part of Liverpool), which was in
Cheshire, while Liverpool was in Lancashire, they were mainly in Cheshire
based regiments. My uncles said he knew of no one from Birkenhead in his
unit.

The point is Regiments have their advantages and disadvantages. For some
countries they work well. They do give a sense of pride and loyalty, and
create inter-rivalry in an army - essential. Like the US Marines would
rather fight the US para units than the enemy. Even the lowly Pioneers had
a pride in their units.

[Michael Emrys]

The Desert Rats may disagree with you.

The Desert Rats got their asses handed to them on many occasions.
Granted, not all of the fault for that lay in their own ranks, but it
suited British propaganda needs to build up their image both during the
war and since.

Michael

[Bay Man]

Post by Michael Emrys

The Desert Rats may disagree with you.

The Desert Rats got their asses handed to them on many occasions.

They also kicked some ass as well.

[Haydn]

Post by Michael Emrys

The Desert Rats may disagree with you.

The Desert Rats got their asses handed to them on many occasions.
Granted, not all of the fault for that lay in their own ranks, but it
suited British propaganda needs to build up their image both during the
war and since.

The Desert Rats, tough though they were, would have lost Egypt, and with
it the Eastern Mediterranean, against 1.3% of the Wehrmacht (the Afrika
Korps) and 10.3% of the Italian Army (mid-1942 percentages), hadn't
Britain received massive American support on a global scale and in all
departments.

This, notwithstanding the deployment of one quarter to one third of the
whole RAF operational strength to the Mediterranean, North Africa and
the Middle East; an average of four Royal Navy battleships, one and a
half carriers, and sixteen cruisers in the Mediterranean any time; and
about fifteen British and Imperial army divisions, often the best
available. In June 1942, 15.7% of all British / Imperial field forces (7
divisions and 5 independent brigades, the cream of the crop) were in
North Africa, yet in that month British fortunes dipped and touched rock
bottom with "The Flap".

As General John Kennedy of the War Office put it, "we manage by terrific
efforts to pile up resources at the necessary places and then the
business seems to go wrong, for lack of generalship and junior
leadership and bad tactics and lack of concentration of forces at the
decisive point".

Haydn

[Bay Man]

Post by Haydn

Post by Michael Emrys

The Desert Rats may disagree with you.

The Desert Rats got their asses handed to them on many occasions.
Granted, not all of the fault for that lay in their own ranks, but it
suited British propaganda needs to build up their image both during the
war and since.

The Desert Rats, tough though they were, would have lost Egypt, and with
it the Eastern Mediterranean, against 1.3% of the Wehrmacht (the Afrika
Korps) and 10.3% of the Italian Army (mid-1942 percentages), hadn't
Britain received massive American support on a global scale and in all
departments.

All departments? "Massive"? Two very wide statements. Most UK forces used UK
equipment - guns, tanks, vehicles - the us mainly supplied Jeeps and
Shermans, which the Brits later even had to adapt calling it the Firefly.
Italy received massive German support and in many departments, especially
fuel. The Wehrmacht is "all" German forces, so that is being selective in
figures. The Italian army never recovered after the Brits mauled them. So
10% of what? The biggest US contribution was giving the UK the new Sherman
tanks with generally bigger guns than the Brit tanks is use at the time -
the Brits were first to use them. British tank and gun design & manufacture
was in limbo. Many excellent designs were being developed but not ready. The
Sherman was a stop-gap tank for the Brits.

Post by Haydn
This, notwithstanding the deployment of one quarter to one third of the
whole RAF operational strength to the Mediterranean, North Africa and the
Middle East

North Africa is in the Med. Where would it be deployed?

Post by Haydn
; an average of four Royal Navy battleships, one and a half carriers, and
sixteen cruisers in the Mediterranean any time; and about fifteen British
and Imperial army divisions, often the best available. In June 1942, 15.7%
of all British / Imperial field forces (7 divisions and 5 independent
brigades, the cream of the crop) were in North Africa, yet in that month
British fortunes dipped and touched rock bottom with "The Flap".

The Italians believed they were heavily outnumbered by the Brits, when the
reverse was the case. After the British routed the Italians, Anthony Eden,
said "Never has so much been surrendered by so many to so few."

The Italians and German were operating , "near to home". The Brits had to
take everything around the Cape - supply was always a major problem with the
Brits. The RN neutralized the Italian Navy which was always short of fuel.
By 1942, the Royal Navy had beaten the Italian fleet out of the Med, and
allowed their own transports free movement. The RN moved Polish Carpathians
to Tobruk by ship from Alexandria.

Post by Haydn
As General John Kennedy of the War Office put it, "we manage by terrific
efforts to pile up resources at the necessary places and then the business
seems to go wrong, for lack of generalship and junior leadership and bad
tactics and lack of concentration of forces at the decisive point".

That was the case at times. I am sure the Italians and Germans thought the
same of their own.

If you know the North African Campaign you will see that both sides
suffered from supply lines being extended. The pime problem. Hence why
Monty improved logistics and would not move until all was in place and
supply lines robust. The Germans could not take Cairo as they just were too
far extended at that point. Auchinleck had placed heavy defensive positions
in case the Germans foolishly moved forward. Monty went through at El
Alemein on largely Auchinleck's plan, but he made sure all supply lines were
fully in place. Many said he was too cautious. He was not, he made sure the
troops at the font were well supplied to ensure a victory. The Germans not
once defeated him.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Bay Man
In 1938 the Germans would have been stomped big time. Their army was
geared for attack, [not?] so much defence. The French could have rolled
over the border easily enough with their large tanks.

You are ignoring some decisively important social factors. France was
severely divided politically, leaving it with almost no will to confront
any major issue, such as the decision to fight a war, in a unified way.

You also underestimate how profoundly the First World War and its
aftermath had affected the British population, leaving large segments of
them with the feeling that virtually anything was preferable to war. To
them, giving away the Sudetenland was a no-brainer.

BTW, I don't quite know where you get the idea that the German army
would have been incompetent at defense. For virtually the entire
inter-war period various war games had been played by the officer corps
based on the premise that a foreign army had invaded from either the
east or west and the problem to be solved was to halt the invaders and
then defeat them. Particularly in the pre-Hitler days, the army that
they were prepared to fight with was considerably weaker than the one
they possessed in either 1938-39.

Michael

[Bay Man]

Post by Shawn Wilson
We know the British/French/Belgians got curbstomped in 1940. I don't
see them not getting beaten as bad or worse in 1938. Pathetically
playing for time from a position of weakness was all he could hope to
do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

Read my post with the Tooze quotes, you may not have seen it yet. Germany
would have been rolled over in 1938. If the French had advanced there would
be no gamble like the Blitzkrieg in 1938 for Germany - that was a last
minute plan in 1940 because their plans fell into Allied hands. It was only
good for attack not defence.

Germany were the weaker nation, not France and the UK. In 1938 Germany had
small light tanks, the Panzer Mkii, the Mk ii, the mainstay of the German
armour in WW2 only came in service in 1939. While the French had quite
heavy armour which was more advanced. The French Souma outclassed German
armour and was the base design of the US Sherman tank.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOMUA_S35

Look at Tooze here:

"Did Hitler intend to provoke a general war over Poland in September 1939 or
was it a serious miscalculation? Adam Tooze examines the views of leading
historians before offering his own, new, interpretation of the decisions and
events in Germany that ignited the Second World War."

"After his clashes with the German Army leadership over the Sudeten crisis
in 1938 Hitler had banned staff officers from bombarding him with
pessimistic assessments of the armaments situation. "

"The choice thereafter was not between 'guns or butter' but between 'guns or
exports'. In early 1937 and then again in early 1939 it was the armaments
programme that bore the brunt of the Nazi regime's efforts to live within
the balance of payments constraint. Armaments production was cut back, in
the first instance to reduce the demand for imported materials, most notably
iron and copper ore, and at the same time to release industrial capacity,
labour and raw materials for the production of exports. At its most crude
the trade-off involved exporting weapons intended for the Wehrmacht, or
machine-tools with which to make them, to pay for imports of food and raw
materials."

Wages of Destruction Tooze, page 270:
"the German army in 1938 was clearly not in a position to inflict a decisive
battlefield defeat on the French."

Page 269 goes into this well, stating that the Germans faced a French,
British, US and Czech coalition (the US being only a the supplier of
materials). The combined navies totally dwarfed the German navy, with
Germany facing another blockade. They Germans faced a massive material
deficit to the allies.

In 1938 the Germans knew the French were talking to the US about purchasing
a substantial amount of Boeing bombers.

[Mario]

Post by Shawn Wilson

Post by Alan Meyer

Post by Shawn Wilson
2) Did British/French/Belgian military preparedness
improve in the time they bought (factories going full
blast, troops intensively training, etc)? Or did they
fritter away their chances?

I think the big problem was not lack of material preparedness
but lack of intellectual preparedness in the French military
leadership, especially Maurice Gamelin but many others too.
I believe that France was beaten by superior strategy and
superior military leadership at all levels, not by superior
material preparation.

They were prepared for WW 1 1/2, the Germans showed up
prepared for WW 2... I agree.

Most French generals had preferred a war against Soviet Union.
They were quite right wing oriented.

Had Hitler been Communist the French (and UK) had attacked
Germany long before 1939.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

In article

Post by Shawn Wilson
Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?

From memory Hurricane production was only starting to ramp up in 1938
and mass production of the Spitfire had not started at the beginning of
the year. Britain definitely had better air defence in September 1939
than at Munich.

Ken Young

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
In article

Post by Shawn Wilson
Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?

From memory Hurricane production was only starting to ramp up in 1938
and mass production of the Spitfire had not started at the beginning of
the year. Britain definitely had better air defence in September 1939
than at Munich.

British Fighter production was lower in 1938 versus 1937 thanks
to the change over to new types, so something like 444 fighters in
1937, all biplanes except 6 Hurricanes, then 371 fighters in 1938,
including 128 Gladiators, 195 Hurricanes and 46 Spitfires (to end
August 1938 93 Hurricanes and 5 Spitfires had been built since the
start of their production). Then 1,357 fighters in 1939, including
320 Gladiators, 586 Hurricanes and 435 Spitfires.

The first Whitleys had appeared in July 1937, the first Hampdens in
September 1938 and the first Wellingtons in October 1938. The 82
Whitleys built to the end of August 1938 would be the entire RAF
modern heavy bomber force.

125 Blenheims were built in 1937, and another 476 in 1938

81 Battles in 1937, and another 381 in 1938.

The French were behind the British when it came to modern
aircraft production.

If the numbers in Production Plan 10 are correct then to the end of
1938 the Luftwaffe had received 198 Do17P, 127 Do17M, 20
Do17Z, 91 He111H, 131 He111P, 76 Ju87B and 168 Bf109E
(Plus over 1,000 Bf109A to D models)

In case you are wondering about Spitfire scarcity in 1940, the second
Hurricane production line opened in October 1939 versus June 1940
for the second Spitfire line. So in the first half of 1940 production was
around 3 Hurricanes per Spitfire, but overall for the year it was 2 to 1.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich Rostrom]

British Fighter production.,.. something like 444 fighters in
1937, all biplanes except 6 Hurricanes, then 371 fighters in 1938,
including 128 Gladiators, 195 Hurricanes and 46 Spitfires...
The French were behind the British when it came to modern
aircraft production.
If the numbers in Production Plan 10 are correct
then to the end of 1938 the Luftwaffe had received
... 168 Bf109E (Plus over 1,000 Bf109A to D models)

Wow.

These numbers indicate that as of 1938, Germany had
vaulted to a massive edge in modern monoplane fighters.

About 1,200 Bf 109s (of all models) versus less than
250 Hurricanes and Spitfires, and presumably a lot
fewer French fighters.

The Czech air force had _some_ planes, but hardly enough
to offset that disparity, and I doubt if they had many
modern types.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Shawn Wilson
Follow up question-
How much did Germany's military preparedness increase in that time
frame? Specifically, how did their relative positions change? Was
Britain/France a better match in 1940 than it had been in 1938,
assuming everyone was more capable in 1940?

The answer is overall Germany gained more than the western allies
in the time period, given its armament program and associated
military expansion was more advanced. However it is more than
military, it includes the pact with Stalin, and Hitler breaking the
Munich agreement in March 1939, thereby obtaining lots more
resources.

Given Poland stays neutral in 1938 then the Germans should be able
to occupy Czechoslovakia without much interference from Britain
and France.

In naval terms the Germans would be in a worse position and could
even cancel Bismarck and Tirpitz. In the air the 1938 numbers would
look better for the allies but the quality gap would be greater.

The army situation is harder to pin down, the Germans received a
lot of material from the disbanded Czechoslovakian army, they would
still receive some through a war but clearly less and clearly the various
armament plants would not be as productive. No one was producing
ammunition on the required scale and most of the numbers when it
came to weapons were counting obsolete equipment.

In the west the French army would be about the same strength, the
British had just made a decision that they would indeed put a force
into France, 2 divisions was the idea, and without conscription the
British ability to expand the army in time for 1939 was a lot lower
than the historical 1939/40 period.

A big advantage to Hitler was in 1939 he was confident Stalin
would stay out of the war. What an intact Poland would do in
1939 is less clear. They had no interest in a stronger Nazi
Germany, unless it was to stop Stalin.

Post by Shawn Wilson
Ultimately, in retrospect and with knowledge that he had neither 20-20
foresight nor knowledge of the secret inner plots and forces of Nazi
Germany, was Chamberlain actually wrong? (I will assume that vis a
vis internal British political and public opinion, he was perfectly
correct at the time)

I think the answer to that is we do not know, because it depends on
factors like the Polish and Soviet attitudes. If a viable eastern front
can be opened then Germany is going to be defeated quite quickly.

If Hitler stays on the defensive in the west in 1939 and carves up
Poland in agreement with Stalin, then going to war in 1938 will not
do that much, given the defeat in 1940 was much more about
organisation, not weapons.

However 3 of the 10 panzer divisions in 1940 used Czech built
tanks, and it is clear the western armies would be better equipped
in 1940 thanks to an earlier start to wartime production and probably
the air forces would be better off as well, but the same would also
apply to the Luftwaffe.

Post by Shawn Wilson
We know the British/French/Belgians got curbstomped in 1940. I don't
see them not getting beaten as bad or worse in 1938. Pathetically
playing for time from a position of weakness was all he could hope to
do, and he did that. Not heroic, but necessary.

In 1938 it would be Czechoslovakia that would be defeated short of
a viable eastern front.

If you look at the expansion of Germany before 1941 you realise that
at different times countries supported or opposed it but attitudes varied
and were never unanimous. If you asked the leadership in the west in
1938 and even 1939 to choose between Hitler and Stalin I expect a
solid majority to prefer Hitler. Then add a public that was very much
pro peace.

Right decision, Hitler takes Czechoslovakia in 1938, Poland in 1939,
bringing the USSR into the war on his side, then France in 1940.

No real change, see above for the one country at a time in 1938, 1939
and 1940.

Wrong decision, Poland at least and preferably the USSR go to war
against Germany in 1938. Given the purges and the smaller size the
Red Army in 1938 was likely to underperform even against its
historical 1941 standard so it leaves Poland at the end of the war.

And in any case the above only applies for a few years, after that
comes whether Europe stays at peace or ends up in another major
war. The less violent WWII is the more chance of another one.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Bay Man]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Given Poland stays neutral in 1938 then the Germans should be able
to occupy Czechoslovakia without much interference from Britain
and France.

That depends if the French do not roll over the border with their huge army
and superior armour and the USSR stay away. In 1938 the French & Soviets
were at actions stations, as was the RN and RAF. Read back on the thread.

[m***@aol.com]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Given Poland stays neutral in 1938 then the Germans should be able
to occupy Czechoslovakia without much interference from Britain
and France.

That depends if the French do not roll over the border with their huge army
and superior armour

Which got smoked a couple years later.

Post by Bay Man
and the USSR stay away. In 1938 the French & Soviets
were at actions stations,

Who were the Soviets going to invade? Poland or Rumania.

Post by Bay Man
Read back on the thread.

Or you could just read some history.

Mike

[Rich]

Post by m***@aol.com

Post by Bay Man
That depends if the French do not roll over the border with their huge army
and superior armour

Or you could just read some history.
Mike

Mike,

It didn't even matter that the Germans smoked them two
years later, the French Army simply wasn't "huge" in May
1938 compared to the Germans. The French had their active
army of 25 divisions in metropolitan France, including
the two existing DLM, the 3 horse cavalry divisions,
and 20 infantry divisions. The German active army consisted
of 36 infantry divisions and 3 Panzer divisions. Another
three regular divisions were forming in April before the crisis.

The superior armor bit is pretty much of a myth for May
1938 as well. At that time the French tank park consisted
of 34 Char B1 and about the same number of Char B1-bis,
50 Char D2, 76 machine gun-armed AMR 35 (which had such
severe reliability problems that out of 43 vehicles examined
in 1937 where the differential had already been replaced
five times, six needed to be replaced again), about 100
FCM 36, about 400 Renault R-35, and about 90 AMC 1935-S...oh,
and the 2,850 Renault FT 17. Of those, the Char D2 and the
AMC 1935-S (SOMUA) were probably the best, but the biggest
problem (aside from the mass of ancient Renaults and
reliability issues common to all the French tanks) was
that almost all of the tanks mounted machine guns, the
anemic SA18 37mm infantry support gun (with very limited
anti-armor capability), or the nearly equally ineffective
SA34 47mm gun. Meanwhile, the standard German 3.7cm PaK,
available in the thousands - it was produced in quantity
from 1930 onwards - was easily capable of penetrating the
armor of all the French tanks except the few Char B1,
Char B1-bis, and AMC 1935-S.

Cheers!

BTW, the odd formatting is because Google Groups screws up the
maximum line length whether you cut and paste from Word, Notepad,
Wordpad, or type directly into the reply box, which makes
replying difficult to say the least...

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@aol.com

Post by Bay Man
That depends if the French do not roll over the border with their huge army
and superior armour

Or you could just read some history.

Some for you Ritchie boy!

Tooze page 269:

"Beck did not engage in detailed comparison of forces. He did not need to.
It was obvious to all concern that the western grouping had an overwhelming
material advantage".

""internal sources make it clear that it [German forces] was far from ready
for war in the Autumn of 1938"

Page 270:
"the German Army was not in a position to inflict a decisive battlefield
defeat of the French"

Tooze points out the cooperation of the Brits, US and French was far greater
than in 1914, which then Germans were aware of. The US could be used as a
pool of manufacturing to bolster resources. Beck viewed it as "Czech, UK,
US, French coalition in 1938.

[Bay Man]

Post by m***@aol.com

Post by Bay Man
That depends if the French do not roll over the border with their huge army
and superior armour

Or you could just read some history.

I did, but not written by you.

BTW, a few Char Bs would roll over the Panzer 1s and 2s. The prime point
which went over many of your heads was that if the Germans went into
Czechoslovakia in 1938, they would be fighting, French, Britsh, Czech,
Soviet and most prob Polish foces, "all at once". Read Tooze.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Bay Man

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Given Poland stays neutral in 1938 then the Germans should be able
to occupy Czechoslovakia without much interference from Britain
and France.

That depends if the French do not roll over the border with their huge
army and superior armour and the USSR stay away. In 1938 the French &
Soviets were at actions stations, as was the RN and RAF. Read back on the
thread.

Translation Bay Man is once again denying reality.

The Soviet Army in 1938 was badly hurt by the purges, it was not
at actions stations, see how well they did against Finland a year
later. Nor were the French mobilised. And no, the French army
was not huge when compared to the German one and they had no
capacity to roll over the border unless the Germans let them.


The border between the two countries was quite defensible before
adding the various fortifications, in round terms about 200 miles,
slightly over half being the Rhine river. Unless the allies decided
to go through neutral nations the places to mount a major attack
were quite limited and quite known.

As for the French having superior armour the 1940 campaign showed
that to be incorrect. The lack of radios and one man turrets more than
offset the advantages they had before we talk tactics.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Padraigh ProAmerica]

Re: "Peace in Our Time"

Group: soc.history.war.world-war-ii Date: Thu, Feb 28, 2013, 9:17am
From: ***@froggy.com.au (Geoffrey Sinclair)
"Bay Man" <***@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote in message news:kglbp5$hbv$***@dont-email.me...
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <***@froggy.com.au> wrote in message news:***@westnet.com.au...
Given Poland stays neutral in 1938 then the Germans should be able to
occupy Czechoslovakia without much interference from Britain and France.
That depends if the French do not roll over the border with their huge
army and superior armour and the USSR stay away. In 1938 the French &
Soviets were at actions stations, as was the RN and RAF. Read back on
the thread.
Translation Bay Man is once again denying reality.
The Soviet Army in 1938 was badly hurt by the purges, it was not at
actions stations, see how well they did against Finland a year later.
Nor were the French mobilised. And no, the French army was not huge when
compared to the German one and they had no capacity to roll over the
border unless the Germans let them.
The border between the two countries was quite defensible before adding
the various fortifications, in round terms about 200 miles, slightly
over half being the Rhine river. Unless the allies decided to go through
neutral nations the places to mount a major attack were quite limited
and quite known.
As for the French having superior armour the 1940 campaign showed that
to be incorrect. The lack of radios and one man turrets more than offset
the advantages they had before we talk tactics.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

=================

AS the Soviets found out later in the wat, the German soldier fighting
in defense of the Fatherland was tenacious beyond belief. A
French-British attack in 1938 would have slame up against a virtual
steel wall- especially if the Germans only had to defend one front.

--
"When the facts change, I change my opinion. What do you do, sir?."--

John Maynard Keynes

[Bay Man]

Post by Padraigh ProAmerica
AS the Soviets found out later in the wat, the German soldier fighting
in defense of the Fatherland was tenacious beyond belief. A
French-British attack in 1938 would have slame up against a virtual
steel wall- especially if the Germans only had to defend one front.

The Germans would be fighting on a number of fronts in 1938. They would be
overwhelmed.

[Joe keane]

Post by Alan Meyer
Of course I'm only speculating about this, but I speculate that if
Britons were given a choice between Chamberlain's approach and
Churchill's approach in 1938, they would have voted overwhelmingly for
Chamberlains's. Chamberlain had to have understood that.

"That is my answer to those who say that we should have told Germany
weeks ago that, if her army crossed the border of Czechoslovakia, we
should be at war with her. We had no treaty obligations and no legal
obligations to Czechoslovakia and if we had said that, we feel that we
should have received no support from the people of this country."

Nothing ventured, nothing lost.

[Alan Meyer]

All of the participants in this group understand the difficulties
of discussing alternative histories. However, even with those
difficulties in mind, I'd like to propose some theses about the
European situation in 1938.

1. Germany, i.e. Hitler, was committed to war.

The reasons aren't to be found in German national interest or in
anything to do with preparedness or with particularities of the
international situation, and least of all with what guns, tanks
or airplane models were in production. They're found in the
psychopathology of the German dictator.

Hitler saw all of history as an evolutionary struggle between the
"races". He saw himself as the chief representative and leader
of the master race. He saw much of the rest of the world as
under the thumb of the evil Jewish race. This mania wasn't going
to go away. Hitler's determination to resolve the struggle by a
war was probably inviolable. He was not a man who was amenable
to reason about this or about many other things.

Maybe Hitler could have been forestalled by Allied solidarity
with the Czechs at Munich. Or maybe he wouldn't have been. But
either way, war was coming. It was a matter of "when" not "if".


2. The Soviet Union, i.e, Stalin, was committed to
self-preservation.

Stalin perceived the USSR to be surrounded by capitalist enemies.
Of these, Germany was the closest and most dangerous. However
his worst nightmare was that the western capitalist democracies
would unleash Hitler against him and hope that Germany and the
Soviet Union would destroy each other. He was certainly right
about a great many western politicians.

Had the western allies gone to war with Germany, it's very hard
for me to imagine that Stalin would have given them much more
than diplomatic support. At best, he would have joined in if he
saw signs that the western allies were either defeating or
stalemating the Germans and he could enter the war with good
reason to expect a victory and some spoils of war.

If this weren't true, why in the world would he have signed the
non-aggression pact with Germany?


3. The western allies were not going to "roll into" Germany.

It didn't happen in 1939. It didn't happen in 1940. In my view
it wouldn't have happened in 1938 or in 1941.

They weren't even willing to make a strike at the Saar. For that
matter, they weren't even willing to bomb Germany with anything
other than leaflets.

In order to start and win a war in 1938, the French and British
would have had to commit not just to "rolling into" Germany.
They would have had to commit to completely mobilizing their
populations and their industries to pour millions of troops into
Germany in a total war that would go all the way to Berlin and
kill or depose Adolf Hitler and his Nazi government. Anything
less than that would have just resulted in the Nazis regrouping
and coming back in force.

Daladier had no illusions about Hitler, but I see no evidence
that even he was ready to launch a total war, or that the French
Assemblee Nationale or the French general staff would have made
it happen even if Daladier attempted it. And Daladier was the
most committed anti-Hitler leader of the west. Chamberlain was
way behind him and Roosevelt, or at least the American Congress,
were way behind even Chamberlain.

If the allies had gone to war in 1938 it seems to me that they
would have done so with the same goals that they had in 1939,
namely to impose a defensive stalemate with as little fighting,
killing, and property destruction as possible. They're war aim
was "sitzkrieg".

-----------------

None of this is to say that Chamberlain was right or that the
Allies shouldn't have stood up to Hitler at Munich. I think they
should have. I just don't believe that if they had done so there
would have been no World War II, or that the defeat of Nazism
would have been substantially easier. Both Germany and Japan
were in the firm grip of warmongers and their imperialistic aims
were not going to be overthrown without the rest of the world
committing incredible amounts of blood and treasure to a life and
death battle.

Alan

[Bay Man]

Post by Alan Meyer
All of the participants in this group understand the difficulties
of discussing alternative histories. However, even with those
difficulties in mind, I'd like to propose some theses about the
European situation in 1938.
1. Germany, i.e. Hitler, was committed to war.

Not in 1938 at Munich he wasn't. Germany was not ready. Germany would have
been swamped by the surrounding countries who were prepared to fight them
then and there. An Anglo-French attack making progress into Germany would
have at least brought Poland to attack, and as Czech territory was under
threat of being stolen, they would have attacked when forces were draw to
the French. The USSRs contribution would have been token because of
geography.

Post by Alan Meyer
Maybe Hitler could have been forestalled by Allied solidarity
with the Czechs at Munich. Or maybe he wouldn't have been. But
either way, war was coming. It was a matter of "when" not "if".

At the time they did not think war was inevitable. No one had ever
encountered a maniac dictator who was bent on war. Hitler thought "out of
the box" and many could not see this. When he made assurances at Munich they
believed him to a large extent as major countries honoured major agreements.
Hitler immediately threw the papers to one side as signing gave him more
time.

Post by Alan Meyer
2. The Soviet Union, i.e, Stalin, was committed to
self-preservation.

So was everyone else to a degree.

Post by Alan Meyer
3. The western allies were not going to "roll into" Germany.

In 1938 if Hitler did not agree to peace, which he did at Munich, he was
basically at war. The French were already well prepared with a massive army
with far superior armour. Which was at action stations. The massive Soviet
army was also at action stations, as was the RN. Hitler backed down from war
and ripped up the agreement after.

[Michael Emrys]

Germany would have been swamped by the surrounding countries who were
prepared to fight them then and there.

But the thing is, and it is apparently the thing you will not see, is
that those countries *were not* prepared to fight. Perhaps Stalin was
prepared, but his army was separated by geography. And BTW, so were his
air forces, a fact that you appear to ignore.

Michael

[Bay Man]

Germany would have been swamped by the surrounding countries who were
prepared to fight them then and there.

But the thing is, and it is apparently the thing you will not see, is that
those countries *were not* prepared to fight. Perhaps Stalin was prepared,
but his army was separated by geography. And BTW, so were his air forces,
a fact that you appear to ignore.

If Hitler did not back down he would have had conflict, three countries were
ready. If he moved in to more territory, like Czechoslovakia, he would have
the Czechs to fight and immediately France with initial British support. The
Poles were under threat by Hitler in 1938 for sure. Guarded threats were
being made by Germany. If the Czechs, French & British moved into Germany
there would be a high probability the Poles would also do so. Then he would
be fighting on three fronts with an immediate naval blockade.

[m***@aol.com]

Post by Bay Man

Germany would have been swamped by the surrounding countries who were
prepared to fight them then and there.

But the thing is, and it is apparently the thing you will not see, is that
those countries *were not* prepared to fight. Perhaps Stalin was prepared,
but his army was separated by geography. And BTW, so were his air forces,
a fact that you appear to ignore.

If Hitler did not back down he would have had conflict,

He didn't back down; he got everything he wanted.

Mike