A site on the "was it necessary?" question

[Mario]

2 pages:
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm

and more

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm
and more

Had there been no Pearl Harbor, there would have been no Hiroshima.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Bill Shatzer

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm
and more

Had there been no Pearl Harbor, there would have been no Hiroshima.

Well, more to the point, if Japan had signalled a willingness to negotiate
immediately (or soon) after the Potsdam Declaration, there would have been
no Hiroshima, either.

Mike

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bill Shatzer

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm
and more

Had there been no Pearl Harbor, there would have been no Hiroshima.

Well, more to the point, if Japan had signalled a willingness to negotiate
immediately (or soon) after the Potsdam Declaration, there would have been
no Hiroshima, either.

The Potsdam Declaration rather precluded any "negotiations"

The allies were not seeking a willingness to negotiate. The choices
available to Japan were rather stark - unconditional surrender on the
basis of the Potsdam declaration or "prompt and utter destruction".

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Bill Shatzer

Post by Bill Shatzer

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm
and more

Had there been no Pearl Harbor, there would have been no Hiroshima.

Post by Mario
Well, more to the point, if Japan had signalled a willingness
to negotiate immediately (or soon) after the Potsdam Declaration,
there would have been no Hiroshima, either.

The Potsdam Declaration rather precluded any "negotiations"

Not at all; there were terms specified in the declaration. Any of the
unspecified items were negotiable, and the position of the Emporer
was open to to clarification. Indeed, when the Japanese first heard
the declaration, they (Hirota, I believe) stated "Evidently, it's not
unconditional" All the Allies were looking for from Japan (as opposed
to Germany) was a complete MILITARY surrender.

Post by Bill Shatzer
The allies were not seeking a willingness to negotiate. The choices

Actually, they were. They were amazed at Japan's complete refusal to
open talks.

Post by Bill Shatzer
available to Japan were rather stark - unconditional surrender on the
basis of the Potsdam declaration or "prompt and utter destruction".

And had they contacted the US, do you seriously believe we would have
dropped the bomb anyway?

Mike

[WJHopwood]

On Thursday, June 2, 2016 at 11:13:07 PM UTC-4,

Post by Bill Shatzer
The allies were not seeking a willingness to
negotiate. The choices available to Japan were
rather stark - unconditional surrender on the
basis of the Potsdam declaration or "prompt
and utter destruction".

True, but IIRC Japan did belatedly attempt to
negotiate by sending a message to the Allies
through Switzerland and Sweden. The essence
of this message was that they would accept the
Potsdam terms. but only with one condition,
which was as follows:
"...with the understanding that the said
declaration does not compromise any demand
which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty
as a Sovereign Ruler."
This elicited a reply from the Allies which
contained the vague statement "...the ultimate
form of government of Japan shall, in accordance
with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by
the freely expressed will of the Japanese people...."
Upon receipt of this response, the Japanese
officials, argued among themselves over the
translated meaning of the the Allied phrase. but
really having little choice, they finally reached a
consensus to accept it. This, and with the decision
by both Japanese Foreign Minister Togo and the
Emperor that the phrase was acceptable , Japan
finally surrendered.

WJH

[William Clodius]

<snip>
True, but IIRC Japan did belatedly attempt to
negotiate by sending a message to the Allies
through Switzerland and Sweden.

...
Most of which was true except the message was not only sent through
Switzerland and Sweden, but also, after deciding the delay of the
indirect mcommunication was undesirable, was sent in Morse code directly
to the US and UK using the Domei cable connections for the transmission
of Japanese news to the outside world.

They could, of course, have used that connection at any time to start
negotiations directly with the allies, once they had identified terms
close to what they considered acceptable to both the allies and the
Japanese government. Unfortuanately, Japan ruled by "concensus", and,
until the second bombing, terms acceptable to allies were unacceptable
to the remaining militarists in the government. While the militarists
could sometimes force consensus in the rest of the government once they
had an internal consensus, those desiring peace were not in a position
to force consensus,

[WJHopwood]

On Saturday, June 11, 2016 at 12:28:36 PM UTC-4,

Post by William Clodius

<snip>
True, but IIRC Japan did belatedly attempt to
negotiate by sending a message to the Allies
through Switzerland and Sweden.

...
Most of which was true except the message was
not only sent through Switzerland and Sweden,
but also, after deciding the delay of the
indirect mcommunication was undesirable, was
sent in Morse code directly to the US and UK
using the Domei cable connections for the
transmission of Japanese news to the outside
world.

A small detail but as the above reference to
Domei's "cable connections" may imply to some
that Domei sent the direct message to the the
US. and UK. by cable. Actually the transmission
of such messages to destinations outside of
Japan by Domei during the war were done by a
network of radio stations in Japan and Japanese
occupied territories and using multiple frequencies
along with presumably directional antennas for
specific targets of reception.
The 1965 publication "The Longest Day"
compiled by the Japanese Pacific War Research
Society confirms the use of this radio network
method and notes that this particular message was
"beamed directly from Tokyo to the United States."

WJH

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm
Had there been no Pearl Harbor, there would have been no Hiroshima.

DL posts here details of seven particular Japanese initiatives
to open negotiations (e.g. seeking the USSR as a mediator)
but his summary of the Potsdam Declaration (eccentrically
called here the Potsdam Proclamation) omits the warning
threatening "prompt and utter destruction" by an (undescribed)
new weapon if the terms were not accepted. DL also omits
later debate about "mokusatsu" (which may be translated as
either = ignore or = consider later.) He mentions Alperowitz
and Bernstein but omits Paul Fussell (author of Thank God
for the Atomic Bomb.)

DL further suggests:
"The reason for the emphasis on military solutions, as opposed
to diplomatic efforts, may lie in the emotionalism and the desire
for revenge that accompanies war." I.e. he does not mention
casualties (either (a) current casualties in all theatres, or (b)
estimated US casualties if the USA invaded Japan), which
are documented as a prime consideration in Washington,
and he does not mention the atom bomb as a "warning to
Russia" (a favourite of some commentators.)

[William Clodius]

Post by Don Phillipson
<sni>
DL posts here details of seven particular Japanese initiatives
to open negotiations (e.g. seeking the USSR as a mediator)
but his summary of the Potsdam Declaration (eccentrically
called here the Potsdam Proclamation) omits the warning
threatening "prompt and utter destruction" by an (undescribed)
new weapon if the terms were not accepted.

No mention of a "new" weapon at all was made. The prompt and utter
destruction could have been an increased conventional bombing campaign,
he invasion of Japan, the intervention of the Soviet Union, chemical
weapons, or biological weapons. While the prompt suggested some drastic
change, there were other ways to have a drastic change.

Post by Don Phillipson
DL also omits
later debate about "mokusatsu" (which may be translated as
either = ignore or = consider later.) He mentions Alperowitz
and Bernstein but omits Paul Fussell (author of Thank God
for the Atomic Bomb.)

FWIW one of his other pages is devoted to some of discussion on H-Net
that followed the publication of a critical review of his book.However
the quotes at first galnce all seem to of people critical of the critics
of Alperovitz. It gives every impression of bias.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm
and more

"Necessary"? No, Japan was going to be defeated no matter what? The
question would be "What would be the effects of not dropping the bombs
vs dropping them"

Japan was not ready to surrender, no matter the wishes of the majority of
the Japanese people (and the Cabinet and the Emporer.) Their bureaucracy
required unanimity, not "vast majority", in order to surrender. And the
hawks were obviously unpersuaded even after the nukes.

Russian diplomacy? Sato (the ambassador) threatened to resign because he
was never given clear instructions on what to ask for (hardly surprising,
because the Cabinet couldn't agree among themselves. See above about
"unanimity".)

Direct contact with the US? Maybe. Would have been worth a shot. But the
US DID reach out to Japan with the Potsdam Declaration (not to mention
a few other back-door channels.) Rebuffed. Some claim that "mokusatsu"
was misinterpretted, but a) there was no way the US could know this
and b) the Japanese press took the most extreme meaning of the term to
be the intention, and publically broadcast it. And the Japanese never
contacted the US to clarify or begin actual negotiations.

So, you have Japan still entrenched in Asia, still fighting (and killing)
You have the Russians rolling up northern Asia, and maybe readying
themselves for an invasion of Hokkaido (assuming Japanese left that
undefended and moved forces to southern Japan), you had a bunch of PoWs
taking "unnecessary resources", you had school children training with
bamboo spears (my mother-in-law was one of those) to charge the invaders,
and a government that can't make a decision to stop the war.

I'm not seeing a rosier outcome for Japan at this point.

As for some of the other things in the docs above, Konoye would havre
been considered a Class A war criminal; it was under him that most of
the serious ruptures with the US occurred. And what would they have
offered him that they didn't deliver with Potsdam?

Mike

[Dave Smith]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
"Necessary"? No, Japan was going to be defeated no matter what? The
question would be "What would be the effects of not dropping the bombs
vs dropping them"
Japan was not ready to surrender, no matter the wishes of the majority of
the Japanese people (and the Cabinet and the Emporer.) Their bureaucracy
required unanimity, not "vast majority", in order to surrender. And the
hawks were obviously unpersuaded even after the nukes.

I can buy the argument that the Japanese would not ready to surrender.
They may have been down and out, but the island hopping campaign showed
very clearly that the Japanese were not inclined to surrender. American
forces had taken horrendous casualties while attacking Japanese forces a
fraction of their size. Re-supply had been a major issue but now they
would be on home turf.

Meanwhile, the US had spent a huge pile of money developing the atomic
bomb. This was the perfect opportunity to test it. It was also an
opportunity to show the Russians the power of a weapon the US had that
they Russian did not.

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
Russian diplomacy? Sato (the ambassador) threatened to resign because he
was never given clear instructions on what to ask for (hardly surprising,
because the Cabinet couldn't agree among themselves. See above about
"unanimity".)

Russian diplomacy was more a matter of smoke and mirrors.

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
Direct contact with the US? Maybe. Would have been worth a shot.

I suppose that we can try to forget that the Japanese had been playing
diplomatic games with the US, all the while planning to attack Pearl
Harbor as part of its aggression across the Pacific. I think it is
pretty clear that the western Allies learned after WW I about the
relative value of conditional and unconditional surrender.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Dave Smith
I suppose that we can try to forget that the Japanese had been playing
diplomatic games with the US, all the while planning to attack Pearl
Harbor as part of its aggression across the Pacific. I think it is
pretty clear that the western Allies learned after WW I about the
relative value of conditional and unconditional surrender.

Couple things:

1) They didn't demand unconditional surrender from Japan.

2) They really weren't playing games with the negotiations, at least
not in any meaninful sense. The people negotiating didn't know anything
about an impending attack. The man who gave the final go-ahead wasn't
PM until October. The PM during most of the planning stages was adamantly
opposed to war with the US. I can't find any solid data on when Tojo was
informed of the plans, but I suspect it wasn't until he became PM.

Mike

[Dave Smith]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Dave Smith
I suppose that we can try to forget that the Japanese had been playing
diplomatic games with the US, all the while planning to attack Pearl
Harbor as part of its aggression across the Pacific. I think it is
pretty clear that the western Allies learned after WW I about the
relative value of conditional and unconditional surrender.

1) They didn't demand unconditional surrender from Japan.

Tell that to the people at the Potsdam Conference in 1945.
"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional
surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and
adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative
for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
2) They really weren't playing games with the negotiations, at least
not in any meaninful sense. The people negotiating didn't know anything
about an impending attack. The man who gave the final go-ahead wasn't
PM until October. The PM during most of the planning stages was adamantly
opposed to war with the US. I can't find any solid data on when Tojo was
informed of the plans, but I suspect it wasn't until he became PM.

Okay. The people who were negotiating directly with the US may not have
known about the impending attack, but it is obvious that many others
did. There were enough people in on the deal that a significant fleet
had been sent to conduct the surprise attack. It was also conducting in
conjunction with attacks across the Pacific. When the Japanese are
supposedly negotiating with the US and are secreting sending out a huge
force to carry out a number of attacks that counts as playing games with
negotiations. They obviously weren't interesting in negotiating or
living by the promises made. It ranks up there with Hitler's promises
not to make any more territorial claims in Europe and then invading
Poland, and the mutual nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union that led
to the invasion of Russia.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Dave Smith

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Dave Smith
I suppose that we can try to forget that the Japanese had been playing
diplomatic games with the US, all the while planning to attack Pearl
Harbor as part of its aggression across the Pacific. I think it is
pretty clear that the western Allies learned after WW I about the
relative value of conditional and unconditional surrender.

1) They didn't demand unconditional surrender from Japan.

Let's look at it, shall we?

Post by Dave Smith
"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional

^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Post by Dave Smith
surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

So, unconditional surrender of the armed forces.

Not unconditional surrender, as there were territorial guarantees,
guarantees for the safe return of Japanese forces, guarantees of
industrial capacity, limits on the occupation, etc. Those are all terms,
or "conditions", if you will.

And, of course, before section 13, which carries the only mention of the
word "unconditional", there is
"Following are our terms", in section 5 (which prefaces a list of terms
of the surrender.)

I don't recall Germany receiving such guarantees. Or is there a different
defintion of "unconditional" here?

Post by Dave Smith

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
2) They really weren't playing games with the negotiations, at least
not in any meaninful sense. The people negotiating didn't know anything
about an impending attack. The man who gave the final go-ahead wasn't
PM until October. The PM during most of the planning stages was adamantly

Okay. The people who were negotiating directly with the US may not have
known about the impending attack, but it is obvious that many others
did.

The people training didn't know what they were training for, other
than "war". Konoye's negotiations were in good faith, as we knew from
various intercepts. Tojo wasn't in on the plan, so far as I can tell,
until he becamme PM.

Post by Dave Smith
There were enough people in on the deal that a significant fleet
had been sent to conduct the surprise attack. It was also conducting in

Which didn't sail until late November; the negotiations after the final
US embargoes began in June.

Post by Dave Smith
conjunction with attacks across the Pacific. When the Japanese are
supposedly negotiating with the US and are secreting sending out a huge
force to carry out a number of attacks that counts as playing games with
negotiations. They obviously weren't interesting in negotiating or
living by the promises made.

So, we weren't really interested in negotiating, because we were beginning
to re-enforce the Philippines?

Sorry, that's just silly.

Post by Dave Smith
It ranks up there with Hitler's promises
not to make any more territorial claims in Europe and then invading

Uh, no, sorry, it doesn't. Hitler all along was planning the conquest of
Europe, had said so since the early 20s. The Japanese were negotiating
with the US in an effort to re-acquire access to US raw materials, and
unfreeze various assets. Konoye wasn't Tojo, and neither was Hitler. To
even make a comparison is to seriously misunderstand both parties.

Mike

[William Clodius]

<snip>
Direct contact with the US? Maybe. Would have been worth a shot. But the
US DID reach out to Japan with the Potsdam Declaration (not to mention
a few other back-door channels.) Rebuffed. Some claim that "mokusatsu"
was misinterpretted, but a) there was no way the US could know this
and b) the Japanese press took the most extreme meaning of the term to
be the intention, and publically broadcast it. And the Japanese never
contacted the US to clarify or begin actual negotiations.
<snip>

In a brief glance at the literature I don't find any translation that
isn't a variant of reject, differing in reasons for the rejection or how
explicit the rejection is:

Let a subject die is an implicit rejection.
Ignore is an implicit rejection.
Contempt for a proposal is rejection.
Not knowing what else to do in response is an rejection.
Disattention or indifference is rejection

Suzuki's use of the word may have been to appease the military, but at
that time they were the ones in true charge of the country, they
insisted on that phrase, and it reflected their rejection of the Potsdam
declaration.

As near as I can tell the upper ranks of the military ensured all
discussion focussed on a peace that maintained kokutai, the "national
essenence", and not on the emperor. The role of the emperor was an
explicit part of kokutai, and some seem to interpret that phrase as
referring only to the emperor, but it had implications beyond that. It
implies a martial spirit was a core part of that essence, reflecting the
control of the Japanese government by the military over most of its
history, and justifying the current control of the government by the
military. It implies concensus as part of the essence, that led either
to stalemate, or the enforcement of desired concensus by torture,
assasination, and threat. It rejects criticism of the military and
government, leading to suppression of he press in an extrem form. It
placed a central role on the Shinto religion, and the emperor as having
divine descent, alienating followers of other religions. It emphasized a
general rejection of Western values, making negotiations difficult.

The place of the emperor in Japanese society was a complex and not fixed
one. There was his role as spirtiual head of Japan, the extreme view of
him as the descendent of a deity, his cerimonial activity in fulfilling
the previous roles, his occaisional ascent to true power, and his role
as head of the imperial family. There was the visual symolism of all the
wealth and trappings the role had acquired. There was the role of the
Imperial house in maintaining the existence of the emperor. There was
the person that embodied the role. If viewed by the true rulers as not
in "touch" with his "true" spiritual role, he could be strongly
encouraged to abdicate, or placed in sequestration so that his role
would be even more symbolic than normal.

Even discussign guarantees for the emperor could get very complex. Would
the guarantees involve the existence of the position, the role of the
position occupied by an emperor in touch with his true role, the role if
he is not in good graces, the person occupying that role, or the
imperial house. Publically discussing that role was also problematic.
While suppressed by the military, there were those in Japan that were
opposed to the existence of the emperor in any significant role, and the
disaster of the war had almost certainly increased the number
disatisfied with the government as a whole and the emperor in
particular. Making it explicit that the fate of millions was at risk to
serve the interests of one man could bring that dissent into the open.
It would also bring criticism from extreme fractions in the US.

More important from the allies point of view is that it would encourage
the Japanese to bring up other topics of negotiation that were
unacceptable. If the person of the emperor were to be guaranteed, then
why not the prime minister, the army minister, or the army chief of
staff? If the role of the emperor would be guaranteed in the government,
then why not the central role of the military in the government? If the
role of the emperor were to be guaranteed, then why not the central role
of Shintoism, and militarism?

[Rich Rostrom]

...the upper ranks of the military ensured all
discussion focussed on a peace that maintained
kokutai, the "national essenence", and not on the
emperor ... a martial spirit was a core part of that
essence ... and justifying the current control of
the government by the military.

I think a key point here was that the military die-hards
wanted to maintain the existing Japanese military as an
institution in Japan - a dominant institution. That
continuation would preserve their own personal positions
in the national elite, and of course their authority.

They also viewed Japan's military power as an essential
part of its national sovereignty. If Japan was left
militarily powerless, that would be like castration.

And the Allies wanted to disband the Japanese military.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm

DL posts here details of seven particular Japanese initiatives
to open negotiations (e.g. seeking the USSR as a mediator)
but his summary of the Potsdam Declaration (eccentrically
called here the Potsdam Proclamation) omits the warning
threatening "prompt and utter destruction" by an (undescribed)
new weapon if the terms were not accepted. DL also omits
later debate about "mokusatsu" (which may be translated as
either = ignore or = consider later.) He mentions Alperowitz
and Bernstein but omits Paul Fussell (author of Thank God
for the Atomic Bomb.)

DL further suggests:
"The reason for the emphasis on military solutions, as opposed
to diplomatic efforts, may lie in the emotionalism and the desire
for revenge that accompanies war." I.e. he does not mention
casualties (either (a) current casualties in all theatres, or (b)
estimated US casualties if the USA invaded Japan), which
are documented as a prime consideration in Washington,
and he does not mention the atom bomb as a "warning to
Russia" (a favourite of some commentators.)

[Mario]

[DL...] mentions Alperowitz
and Bernstein but omits Paul Fussell (author of Thank God
for the Atomic Bomb.)

In fact there is no Fussell in his bibliography page
http://www.doug-long.com/bibliog.htm

The site looks to be out of date, most recent book listed there
is dated 2005.


Unfortunately I cannot find an address to let DL know about
this thread.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Mario
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
http://www.doug-long.com/hirosh2.htm

To me the article comes across as it was up to the rest of
the world to come up with peace terms acceptable to the
Japanese. The allies had spelled out their aims in the 1941
Atlantic Charter which covered allowing the Japanese to
choose their own form of government, then in the 1943
Cairo declaration, then in the Potsdam Declaration which
covered the Japanese military and included,

"12.The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn
from Japan as soon as these objectives have been
accomplished and there has been established in accordance
with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a
peacefully inclined and responsible government."

Why was there no Japanese declaration that they would
fight until the end unless the allies offered the following
terms regarding the Emperor as part of that new
government? The reality was the Japanese government
could not issue this sort of declaration, let alone come up
with an agreed set of conditions to offer the allies. Where
are the Japanese internal discussions on what changes to
the Emperor's powers could be considered acceptable?
So far it seems the actual answer was no change allowed.

There were a number of possibilities when it came to
deciding what to do about the Emperor.

Firstly would the Emperor retain the status of a living god
or simply become the human at the head of the religion.

Then comes the secular power, four outcomes,
1) Existing Emperor under existing constitution.
2) Existing Emperor under new constitution.
3) New Emperor under existing constitution.
4) New Emperor under new constitution

The Meiji constitution devoted the first 17 articles on the
powers of the Tenno, (Emperor). Must be male, is
sacred and inviolable, sanctions laws, can open, close
and prorogue both houses of parliament, can issue
ordnances (which the legislature has to approve),
organise the government, including salaries,
appointments and dismissals, the size and organisation
of the military, along with the usual powers to declare
war, make peace and grant pardons.

The Teikoku Gikai, the legislature, has two houses,
the upper house is composed of members of the Imperial
Family and nobility appointed by the Emperor. Sessions
last 3 months unless an Imperial order extends them. Laws
are required to pass both houses and be signed by the
Emperor before they can come into use.

The Emperor's finances also have special consideration,
under another two articles in the constitution. Imperial
House Law changes do not require the legislature. Any
amendments to the constitution must be submitted to
the legislature by the Emperor.

There are 86 articles in the constitution, the Emperor or
Imperial House is mentioned in 27, including the
emergency powers if the legislature is not in session
and cannot be called into session.

So is the idea Hirohito stays on the throne with all powers
intact, or he can abdicate in favour of his son who still has
all the powers? The first would be the Japanese peace
factions' ideal, the second probably acceptable, though
what they would do with a living ex Emperor is another
matter.

If the constitution is to be changed, which at least would
be to eliminate the rule about serving officers serving as
military ministers, just how much does the role of the
Emperor change? How long is going to be allowed for
the constitutional debate, including presumably laying
out the changes for the Japanese public to approve.

The post war constitution has the first seven articles
devoted to the Emperor, they firmly make the point
the Emperor rules with the will of the people and is
subject to the legislature. The upper house is now
elected. And so on.

In effect the US occupied Japan and made significant
changes to public opinion then a new constitution was
presented for approval. Is the idea the 1945 military
would assume the occupation would be benevolent
and not used by the anti monarchist US to remove
another royal house? Noted the number of royal houses
lost after WWI? Like all three central powers?

Now is the idea the allies should have explicitly said they
would accept a Japanese Monarchy, over and above what
was in the Atlantic Charter and other declarations? And that
would have been enough for the peace faction to engineer
the peace vote before the bombs were used? No need to
mention what powers the Monarchy would have?

Remember the big 6 were deadlocked at 3 for and 3
against peace for most of 1945 including after the bombs
and Soviet declaration of war. Only the Emperor did
something different, against the usual convention he
personally spoke and made his decision for peace known
at the meeting. Even then Admiral Suzuki wanted the
condition of Japanese polity would continue, that is no
change to the current system.

The article uses extracts from the Japanese diplomatic
messages to the USSR, what is missing is the texts that
show the lack of Japanese proposals and the fact it was
a foreign minister initiative, not a government one.

The allies were very sure the Japanese military was the
government and the pre war diplomacy had given Japan
a credibility issue.

I note the declaration the allies offering concessions would
not strengthen the Japanese military's willingness to fight
on, none of the idea the invasion of Japan was going to be
so destructive that the allies were willing to back down from
unconditional surrender, fight harder and even more
concessions can be won. Which was the actual Japanese
military strategy at the time.

Also the note about US policy being driven by emotionalism
and revenge, so opponents of the articles ideas are given a
label. Yet apparently the Japanese are rational, just waiting
for the correct form of words and able to then deliver the
historical surrender but unable to supply those words themselves.

None of for example the refusals to issue ammunition without
authorisations at Pearl Harbour , the transition from peace to
war, and its opposite, continuing war until the peace actually
happened, the force of habit.

By the way the Japanese trying to stop the war were not
doves, in that they had always opposed war, the doves label
is a nice way for the author to reward "correct behaviour".

Regarding the points about why the Japanese acted, it talks
about the doves running out of time, ignoring the big prop
the military had, the cost of the invasion of Japan proper, had
been kicked out. The allies could deliver a totally destroyed
Japan for trivial cost to them. The allied reply noting the
Japanese could choose their government did not come
through until 19 August and the message began by stating
the allied authorities would be the supreme powers in
Japan until a new Japanese government was formed.

The Emperor's recorded surrender speech was broadcast
on the 15th. Also note most Japanese had never head his
voice and many had trouble understanding his court dialect
version of Japanese. By the 19th there was a Japanese
delegation in Manila.

Fundamentally when people talk about Japan retaining the
Emperor that could have been done by reversion to the
Shogunate system, a figurehead shut away from real power.
What is rarely discussed is if Japan wanted to keep an
Emperor what rights and duties should that person hold, and
how far the Japanese government and military ideas about
this were from the allied ones and how long it would take,
and so how many lives, to come up with the agreement.

Then add once the allies had occupied Japan they had a
great ability to go back on the agreement, at least in part.
There was a major trust issue at the time, most Japanese
regarded western occupation of Japan the way most
westerners would regard North Korean occupation of
their countries today.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The allies were very sure the Japanese military was the
government and the pre war diplomacy had given Japan
a credibility issue.

Yes. Even during the period the military didn't dictate who
the PM (and various ministers) would be, the army ignored
dictates and treaties negotiated in good faith by the Tokyo
government, and with impunity.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
By the way the Japanese trying to stop the war were not
doves, in that they had always opposed war, the doves label
is a nice way for the author to reward "correct behaviour".

They were a mixed bag; undoubtedly, some of them were opposed
to the war from the beginning, as they saw no chance for a
Japanese victory. Others were opposed to the war in China
from the beginning (though these were sometimes extreme right-
wingers), seeing it as a drain on Japan's effort to
industrialize and develop Manchuria, and others became "doves"
when the tide of the Pacific War turned so decidedly against
Japan.

Mike

[John Dallman]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Why was there no Japanese declaration that they would
fight until the end unless the allies offered the following
terms regarding the Emperor as part of that new
government?

Because the concept of defeat was wholly unacceptable: anyone who
mentioned it publicly risked assassination by the Army.

John