Just how crazy was Japan?

[Rich Rostrom]

This is my question:

Supposing (for the sake of argument) that

WW II in Europe ended in German defeat
before December 1941.

and

The Pacific crisis of 1941 proceeded about
historically, so that by late 1941 Japan
would have to choose between ending its war
in China or running out of fuel oil.

Then in December 1941, if Japan attacks the
U.S. and Britain as historically, Japan
would be at war with those two powers when
they have no other adversaries, plus resurgent
France would challenge Japan over Indochina,
plus the USSR would be free to deploy most of
its strength to the Far East.

Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Supposing (for the sake of argument) that
WW II in Europe ended in German defeat
before December 1941.

...

Post by Rich Rostrom
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

It might depend on when in 1941. If Germany looked like it was going to lose
in June, then Japan would have had to adjust. If there was somehing unexpected
that happen in, say, October, they might have decided they could take the
chance to seize defensive perimeter they dreamed of, before Britain and France
could recover.

Mike

[Dave Smith]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Rich Rostrom
Supposing (for the sake of argument) that
WW II in Europe ended in German defeat
before December 1941.

...

Post by Rich Rostrom
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

It might depend on when in 1941. If Germany looked like it was going to lose
in June, then Japan would have had to adjust. If there was somehing unexpected
that happen in, say, October, they might have decided they could take the
chance to seize defensive perimeter they dreamed of, before Britain and France
could recover.

If if if..... Germany most certainly did not look like it was losing in
1941. They had repeatedly violated the terms of Versailles by annexing
Austria, then the Sudatenland, the rest of Czechoslovakia, the Poland,
which earned then a declaration of war with France and Britain, along
with the rest of the British Empire, but they managed to take over most
of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. Britain held off an
invasion by maintaining air supremacy in the Battle of Britain, but
Germany went east. The bulldozed through eastern Europe and well into
Russia.

I don't know how anyone can reasonably speculate that there was a
possibility that Germany might lose at that point.


Britain and its allies were tied up in Europe and had only minimal
resources to deal with anything in southeast Asia. The US was not
directly involved in the war in Europe.

[Rich Rostrom]

If if if... Germany most certainly did not look like
it was losing in 1941...

Not historically, obviously.

I don't know how anyone can reasonably speculate that there was a
possibility that Germany might lose at that point.

Not at that point, historically... But there were
other possibilities.

For instance, the attack on France could have failed.
(Bear in mind that anything less than immediate
decisive victory is a strategic failure for Germany.)

Quite a few historians have suggested that if the
Germans had stuck with their original plan, the
campaign would have bogged down in a WW-I-like
stalemate, which most Germans would expect to end in
exhaustion and collapse (including most of the Army
leaders). This would establish the conditions for an
internal coup against Hitler and a negotiated end to
the war.

Or Stalin might have accepted the evidence of imminent
German attack in 1941. If the Red Army had been on
full alert, the Axis attack would have met much
stronger resistance, while Soviet losses would be much
smaller. By September, BARBAROSSA would be an obvious
strategic failure, and (again) the conditions would be
set for a coup and negotiated peace.

Either of these scenarios could lead to the premise of
my question: would Japan attack Britain and the U.S.
with no allies?

In any case, I wrote "for the sake of argument" about
the premise. Please don't argue with the premise.

[Don Phillipson]

. . . campaign would have bogged down in a WW-I-like
stalemate, which most Germans would expect to end in
exhaustion and collapse (including most of the Army
leaders). This would establish the conditions for an
internal coup against Hitler and a negotiated end to
the war.

Problems here:
1. Casablanca Declaration for "unconditional surrender."
Whether or not because of Stalin, no evidence suggests
London or Washington would accept anything less.
2. By August 1944 sober Germans could expect only
either defeat or "exhaustion and collapse" -- yet the
only "internal coup against Hitler" failed within 24 hours
(July 1944.)

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Don Phillipson

. . . campaign would have bogged down in a WW-I-like
stalemate, which most Germans would expect to end in
exhaustion and collapse (including most of the Army
leaders). This would establish the conditions for an
internal coup against Hitler and a negotiated end to
the war.

1. Casablanca Declaration for "unconditional surrender."

The Casablanca Declaration came in 1943, under very
different conditions. IIRC, there is evidence that it
was FDR's idea, and that Churchill neither wanted or
expected it.

Post by Don Phillipson
2. By August 1944 sober Germans could expect only
either defeat or "exhaustion and collapse" -- yet the
only "internal coup against Hitler" failed within 24 hours
(July 1944.)

Again, very different situation. 1940-1941 saw an
unbroken string of dazzling German victories, some
of them wholly unexpected. This streak elevated
Hitler to near-godlike status in Germany; even many
of those who disliked him were baffled and demoralized.
In addition, the streak boosted German self-confidence
almost as much. It became much easier for Germans to
believe that the course of the war could again shift in
their favor, and to refuse to accept the inevitability
of defeat.

The defeats that started in late 1942 gradually broke
down these attitudes, but even in mid-1944 Germans
were far from accepting defeat.

In addition, the "unconditional surrender" demand,
combined with the rhetoric of Morgenthau, Vansittart,
and other Germanophobes, plus the presence of the USSR
in the Allied coalition, caused many Germans to think
that surrender would not spare Germany from destruction.

In 1940-1941, the possibility that Germany could end
the war on moderate terms was a lot more realistic
than in 1944.

Finally, the longer a group is committed to a difficult
task, the more sacrifices made and hardship endured, the
harder it is to give up. Note how, in many wars, a
significant number of soldiers on the losing side fight
on when defeat is all but complete. In 1944, Germany
was in far deeper than in 1940-1941.

[Les]

On Monday, May 23, 2016 at 9:31:43 PM UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:

(stuff deleted)

Post by Rich Rostrom
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

(rest of post deleted)

I assume that Italy has either capitulated, or decided to remain
neutral.

I believe Japan would go to war regardless. Even if we have the
collapse of Germany in 1941, France and the UK would be devoting
most of their attention and the best portion of their forces to
the occupation and probable de-Nazification in Europe. While
they are in position to maintain if not boost their forces in
the Far East, they have good reason to keep their attention in
Europe.

Also, Japan's leadership was effectively in thrall to the IJA's
veto. The IJA was not willing to accept any deal that would
result in them yielding territory, and the IJN was not willing
to state that it could not beat the Allies in any long term war,
despite the fact it was fully aware of it.

[Rich Rostrom]

Even if we have the collapse of Germany in 1941,
France and the UK would be devoting most of their
attention and the best portion of their forces to
the occupation and probable de-Nazification in
Europe.

1) German defeat does not necessarily mean German
_surrender_. If the Nazis go down, and post-Nazi
Germany withdraws from France, the Low Countries,
Scandinavia, and Poland, that could be good enough
even for Churchill.

2) "the best portion of their forces"? Britain had
millions of men under arms (counting the Indian Army).
It wouldn't take a million men to occupy Germany, nor
would it consume any ammunition. Nor would it need
_any_ of the Royal Navy or Royal Air Force.

Some Soviet forces might be employed, but as 1945
showed historically, the USSR could occupy half of
Germany and still deploy overwhelming force against
Japan.

And the U.S. would not be involved at all.

[Les]

On Tuesday, May 24, 2016 at 4:03:24 PM UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:

(stuff deleted)

Post by Rich Rostrom
1) German defeat does not necessarily mean German
_surrender_. If the Nazis go down, and post-Nazi
Germany withdraws from France, the Low Countries,
Scandinavia, and Poland, that could be good enough
even for Churchill.

This assumes the Allies are willing to trust the Germans.
This is the same nation that has broke almost every
treaty, except perhaps for the Non-Aggression Pact
with the USSR.

Yes, they are suddenly under new leadership, and supposedly
that leadership is going to purge itself of Naziism which
has infected every level of German society. Oh yes, and
this is the same *military* leadership that has proven
itself trustworthy by assassinating its recognized leader.

At the very least, they are going to maintain a large force
dedicated to containing Germany, and this is going to include
the liberated area of Poland, which will also want protection
from the USSR.

Post by Rich Rostrom
2) "the best portion of their forces"? Britain had
millions of men under arms (counting the Indian Army).
It wouldn't take a million men to occupy Germany, nor
would it consume any ammunition. Nor would it need
_any_ of the Royal Navy or Royal Air Force.

That depends on the type of peace achieved, and even with
occupation, they will want a defense with the ever-arming
USSR, and yes, they will need a standing army complete with
aircraft.

They could divert the Navy, and Singapore had the means to
base at least a portion of it, which can serve to blunt the
IJN offensive. Still, this isn't going to deter the Japanese
from attacking, because their leadership was either convinced
of innate Japanese superiority, or more afraid of internal
political turmoil than national defeat.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Some Soviet forces might be employed,

This assumes the USSR wants a war against Japan, when it might
not be formally allied with the UK/France. Stalin was not a
naturally trusting sort, and may view a Japanese war against
the UK and France as a good opportunity to stay neutral, or
gain whatever he could when the Allies' attention is focused
elsewhere.

Post by Rich Rostrom
but as 1945
showed historically, the USSR could occupy half of
Germany and still deploy overwhelming force against
Japan.

After Germany's defeat, Stalin did not have the immediate
worry of a war on the west. Here, we have a Germany that
is either contained or defeated, half a Poland that wants
the other half, and a UK/France alliance that does not
exactly trust the Soviets, and probably does not trust
the Germans much either.

Post by Rich Rostrom
And the U.S. would not be involved at all.

(rest of post deleted)

True, but its build up was slow, particularly under a
peacetime mentality. That was why their Rainbow
Five plan effectively abandoned the Philippines as a
defensive stronghold. They didn't have the means to maintain
an effective defense at that range, even with an established
garrison.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Les
(stuff deleted)

Post by Rich Rostrom
1) German defeat does not necessarily mean German
_surrender_. If the Nazis go down, and post-Nazi
Germany withdraws from France, the Low Countries,
Scandinavia, and Poland, that could be good enough
even for Churchill.

This assumes the Allies are willing to trust the Germans.
This is the same nation that has broke almost every
treaty, except perhaps for the Non-Aggression Pact
with the USSR.

Britain in 1940-41 is in no position to insist on
unconditional surrender by Germany. Britain can
continue to expend billions of pounds and thousands
of lives to seek such a victory - with no assurance
of ever getting it, and a definite possibility of
German victory. Or Britain could accept a deal which

Removes the criminal regime responsible for the war.
(Many people suspect a "Prussianist cabal" behind
the Nazis, but they have no proof or even real evidence.)

Liberates about 70M people from German occupation.

Restores Britain's most important ally against future
German aggression.

Under which conditions is Britain in greater danger?

Continuing to fight, without allies, against a German
state that is stronger in everything but sea power?

Facing _possible_ future German aggression in alliance
with France and all the minor powers attacked by Germany?

Post by Les
Still, this isn't going to deter the Japanese from
attacking, because their leadership was either
convinced of innate Japanese superiority, or more
afraid of internal political turmoil than national defeat.

Forget all the rest. This is your opinion -
Japan would not ever be deterred from attacking
the British and Dutch colonies.

Post by Les
This assumes the USSR wants a war against Japan, when it might
not be formally allied with the UK/France...

Stalin was an opportunist, and not reluctant to
attack the friendless (i.e. Finland).

Post by Les
After Germany's defeat, Stalin did not have the immediate
worry of a war on the west.

He thought he might. He did not trust the Western
Allies in 1945.

[Les]

On Saturday, May 28, 2016 at 2:10:47 PM UTC-3, Rich Rostrom wrote:

(stuff deleted)

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Les

Post by Rich Rostrom
1) German defeat does not necessarily mean German
_surrender_. If the Nazis go down, and post-Nazi
Germany withdraws from France, the Low Countries,
Scandinavia, and Poland, that could be good enough
even for Churchill.

Note the assumption here: France has not fallen.

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Les
This assumes the Allies are willing to trust the Germans.
This is the same nation that has broke almost every
treaty, except perhaps for the Non-Aggression Pact
with the USSR.

Britain in 1940-41 is in no position to insist on
unconditional surrender by Germany.

No, and they are even in less of a mindset to trust
Germany, even if they do deal it a great enough
setback to make it come to terms.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Britain can
continue to expend billions of pounds and thousands
of lives to seek such a victory - with no assurance
of ever getting it, and a definite possibility of
German victory.

Your initial argument is that the war in Europe ends in a
German defeat. Also, your argument indicated that this
defeat occurs before France falls.

Consequently, the UK doesn't have its back to the ropes.
Quite the contrary, the UK and France have the means to
dictate terms.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Or Britain could accept a deal which
Removes the criminal regime responsible for the war.

They don't know that. Just because the Nazis were a
different kind of militarist than the Prussians does
not mean that a German military government can be trusted.

Post by Rich Rostrom
(Many people suspect a "Prussianist cabal" behind
the Nazis, but they have no proof or even real evidence.)

Well, the Nazis were avid militarists, which was one
of the reasons the "Prussionist cabal" supported Hitler
in the first place. Much like the USSR, few outside the
regime had any accurate idea who was really calling the
shots.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Liberates about 70M people from German occupation.

...Until Germany recovers from whatever setback they
encountered and tries again. The only real way to ensure
that doesn't happen again is to have sizable forces
already in place to stop them.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Restores Britain's most important ally against future
German aggression.

France is still not conquered in this ATL, as you stated
above. They *might* be willing to accept German withdrawals,
but they are going to reform their armed forces, and more
than likely demand a UK presence to bolster their ground
forces as well for the short term.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Under which conditions is Britain in greater danger?

When they abandon yet another chance to defeat Germany
run by militarists. Britain got in "greater danger"
because it constantly avoided a fight as Germany
got stronger.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Continuing to fight, without allies,

France is still in the fight in this ATL, as per your
specification above. Also, you specified a German
defeat.

Post by Rich Rostrom
against a German
state that is stronger in everything but sea power?

...and by your earlier definition has been defeated?
Either the essentials of Germany's forces are isolated
and soon in danger of collapse, or the nation is (due
to a result

Post by Rich Rostrom
Facing _possible_ future German aggression in alliance
with France and all the minor powers attacked by Germany?

They *might* choose this option, and to guard against
another German invasion the Allies will establish a
large force (British, French, Belgian, etc.) in place
to oppose it.

That still means France and the UK are going to devote
most of their attention in the European theater.

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Les
Still, this isn't going to deter the Japanese from
attacking, because their leadership was either
convinced of innate Japanese superiority, or more
afraid of internal political turmoil than national defeat.

Forget all the rest. This is your opinion -

Based on accounts of the meetings between the IJA, IJN,
Japanese business leaders, and the Emperor, mainly related
by John Toland's "Rising Sun."

Post by Rich Rostrom
Japan would not ever be deterred from attacking
the British and Dutch colonies.

Based on what I've read of Japanese politics prior to and
during WW2. The IJN refused to admit to either the Prime
Minister or the Emperor that they would lose a war against
the USN, instead settling on a non-response "if we go to
war we should do it soon" type statement.

The IJA stated that the Allies would capitulate in the face
of Japanese superiority, and this was *after* they were
twice beaten by the Soviets.

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Les
This assumes the USSR wants a war against Japan, when it might
not be formally allied with the UK/France...

Stalin was an opportunist, and not reluctant to
attack the friendless (i.e. Finland).

(rest of post deleted)

He also invaded Poland, allied with the UK and France,
because he was allied with Germany and he correctly
saw the Allies being unable to directly aid Poland.

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Les

Post by Rich Rostrom
Continuing to fight, without allies,

France is still in the fight in this ATL, as per your
specification above. Also, you specified a German
defeat.

I confess I was wondering how the original poster managed to engineer
a German defeat before 1941 with a POD ("point of divergence for those
not used to counterfactuals) after the panzers reach Abbeville (which
produced the pocket that led to Dunkirk).

Because unless you're talking about a successful Arras counterattack
that broke the German front and pocketed most of the German armor
(which I would consider about as likely as a successful German
invasion of Scotland) that's about the only way Germany gets defeated
in 1940.

After that event the best case scenario I can see for the French is
losing a war of attrition.

[The Horny Goat]

On Sat, 28 May 2016 13:10:45 -0400, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Les
This assumes the USSR wants a war against Japan, when it might
not be formally allied with the UK/France...

Stalin was an opportunist, and not reluctant to
attack the friendless (i.e. Finland).

Post by Les
After Germany's defeat, Stalin did not have the immediate
worry of a war on the west.

He thought he might. He did not trust the Western
Allies in 1945.

Having wargamed the historical May 1945 situation I would say that a
US/UK v Soviet war fought in 1945 would depend a lot on the Allied
political will at least as much as anything else.

In a purely military sense an initial Soviet attack would make
advances but would be in serious trouble once the Allied air forces
seriously got into action. We are talking both about long range
bombing and anti-armor air attacks here which the Allies were doing
extremely effectively against the Germans by 1945 once near total air
supremacy had been achieved.

A stalemate would be VERY bad for the Red Army since Soviet losses
against Germany had been far higher than those of the Western Allies
and as such would be likely to "crack" earlier than those of the west.
Furthermore a stalemate means more deployable atomic bombs. So if
you're talking sheer destructive power alone then it's an Allied win
albeit at a huge human cost and with Soviet industry largely destroyed
by bombing at the end of it. I just don't see Churchill and Truman
having the stomach for the sort of "butcher's bill" we are describing
here and I say that with the full knowledge of the German and Japanese
casualties due to the air campaign.

Now plain and simply such a conflict would NOT be fought strictly on
military terms as there was huge war weariness in the west and as soon
as Germany was defeated there was a huge desire for the blessings of
peace even though Japan was not yet defeated. The ultimate example of
this is the mindset of the 1945 British General Election though in my
opinion Churchill's sheer bullheadedness that summer was Labour's best
tool in the election!

To steal a line from JFK's inaugural "Let every nation know, whether
it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to
assure the survival and the success of liberty. " It is one thing to
say that from a podium, quite another to say it when the bodies are
piling up at WW1 levels and beyond.

Thus politically unless Stalin were to behave with epic stupidity to
bring about such a war (which given his career to 1945 seems
completely out of character) that would unite the British and American
peoples I just don't see it happening.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Supposing (for the sake of argument) that
WW II in Europe ended in German defeat
before December 1941.
and
The Pacific crisis of 1941 proceeded about
historically, so that by late 1941 Japan
would have to choose between ending its war
in China or running out of fuel oil.

Not late in 1941, but end July when the occupation of southern
Indo China triggered the extensive trade embargos. About a
month after Barbarossa.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Then in December 1941, if Japan attacks the
U.S. and Britain as historically, Japan
would be at war with those two powers when
they have no other adversaries, plus resurgent
France would challenge Japan over Indochina,
plus the USSR would be free to deploy most of
its strength to the Far East.
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

As others have noted the later the German collapse the
more likely Japan is to go to war. Like for example
the German army falls to pieces in December 1941.

The Red Army successfully counter attacking into Poland
and Romania in July 1941 would be about the other end
of the possible axis in Europe collapse.

The later the collapse the less allied power is in the
Pacific.

While France would have real trouble finding troops and
aircraft for Asia the fleet was relatively intact, the British
were fully mobilised, and would be able to divert air and
naval power quite easily. No convoys in the Atlantic would
free a lot of shipping.

Do not forget many of the troops in Malaya were being
rotated out to more important areas after they were partially
trained, replaced by new recruits, the earlier a collapse of
the axis in Europe the more Malaya becomes a front line.

Essentially my reading is if anything the Japanese would
ignore the US if they were going to war after the axis in
Europe were defeated or looked like they were about to
be defeated. Try to take the key resources, mainly oil
but also rubber, tin and food and rely on the IJA being
truly impossible to out fight to allow a negotiated peace.
Grab Singapore and look how far back it is for the
allies, not to mention probably forcing the building of a
lot more amphibious shipping, causing more delays to
any counter attacks.

The ten IJN carriers operating out of Singapore would be
a real problem for the RN and French.

Yet the decision making in Japan had moved well beyond
careful calculation of the odds, or more rather had moved to
whether the odds of winning an expanded war were better
than the risk of a very destructive civil war if there was a back
down. Remember the amount of fighting in the 19th century
after Japan opened up.

So in short like any what if, the collapse of the axis might
cause a major collapse in the Japanese expansionist
movement, or it might make them go to war against fewer
opponents, or it might make them simply enter the war as
per historical on the assumption it was now or never or
even the mobilised allies would take the opportunity to
"settle" with Japan anyway, given Japan was an axis ally.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[The Horny Goat]

On Tue, 24 May 2016 11:34:06 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair"

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Rich Rostrom
Then in December 1941, if Japan attacks the
U.S. and Britain as historically, Japan
would be at war with those two powers when
they have no other adversaries, plus resurgent
France would challenge Japan over Indochina,
plus the USSR would be free to deploy most of
its strength to the Far East.
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

As others have noted the later the German collapse the
more likely Japan is to go to war. Like for example
the German army falls to pieces in December 1941.

That would depend entirely on what 'falling to pieces' means.

If you're talking about a new line somewhere between 50km west of
Smolensk or 50km east of Smolensk maybe - but bear in mind the
Japanese fleet was in position ready to strike on 5 December 1941 -
the point of furthest German advance and beginning of the Soviet
counter-attack.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The Red Army successfully counter attacking into Poland
and Romania in July 1941 would be about the other end
of the possible axis in Europe collapse.

Short of a successful coup against Hitler I don't see that happening.
About the only way you get a Soviet attack into Romania at that time
would be if Romania DOESN"T join the Axis and Stalin attacks them
anyhow.

If Russia were to attack German occupied Poland anytime it would have
been during the Battle for France when the German garrison in Poland
was 12-13 divisions rather than June-July 1941 when the German sector
had 100+ German divisions.

However my personal opinion is that the Red Army was far less prepared
for war in July 1940 than 1941 and it is arguable whether the Red Army
was prepared for war in June/July 1941 at all.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The later the collapse the less allied power is in the
Pacific.
While France would have real trouble finding troops and
aircraft for Asia the fleet was relatively intact, the British
were fully mobilised, and would be able to divert air and
naval power quite easily. No convoys in the Atlantic would
free a lot of shipping.
Do not forget many of the troops in Malaya were being
rotated out to more important areas after they were partially
trained, replaced by new recruits, the earlier a collapse of
the axis in Europe the more Malaya becomes a front line.
Essentially my reading is if anything the Japanese would
ignore the US if they were going to war after the axis in
Europe were defeated or looked like they were about to
be defeated. Try to take the key resources, mainly oil
but also rubber, tin and food and rely on the IJA being
truly impossible to out fight to allow a negotiated peace.
Grab Singapore and look how far back it is for the
allies, not to mention probably forcing the building of a
lot more amphibious shipping, causing more delays to
any counter attacks.
The ten IJN carriers operating out of Singapore would be
a real problem for the RN and French.
Yet the decision making in Japan had moved well beyond
careful calculation of the odds, or more rather had moved to
whether the odds of winning an expanded war were better
than the risk of a very destructive civil war if there was a back
down. Remember the amount of fighting in the 19th century
after Japan opened up.
So in short like any what if, the collapse of the axis might
cause a major collapse in the Japanese expansionist
movement, or it might make them go to war against fewer
opponents, or it might make them simply enter the war as
per historical on the assumption it was now or never or
even the mobilised allies would take the opportunity to
"settle" with Japan anyway, given Japan was an axis ally.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by The Horny Goat
On Tue, 24 May 2016 11:34:06 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair"

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Rich Rostrom
Then in December 1941, if Japan attacks the
U.S. and Britain as historically, Japan
would be at war with those two powers when
they have no other adversaries, plus resurgent
France would challenge Japan over Indochina,
plus the USSR would be free to deploy most of
its strength to the Far East.
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

As others have noted the later the German collapse the
more likely Japan is to go to war. Like for example
the German army falls to pieces in December 1941.

That would depend entirely on what 'falling to pieces' means.

Quite, given the rather heroic assumptions about how Germany
goes from a position of strength in January to defeated in/by
December. So fall to pieces would be something like 1918,
or the Communist idea of the army rebelling instead of attacking
the worker's paradise.

Essentially if we are given Germany is to be defeated in 1941
we have the problem of what that means, it requires a major
change in either German actions or a major upgrade to the
USSR.

Post by The Horny Goat
If you're talking about a new line somewhere between 50km west of
Smolensk or 50km east of Smolensk maybe - but bear in mind the
Japanese fleet was in position ready to strike on 5 December 1941 -
the point of furthest German advance and beginning of the Soviet
counter-attack.

Germany is supposed to be defeated, that means the German
armies are at best in Germany or more likely being disbanded
and the victors are having to supply a probably substantial keep
the peace force into 1942.

Post by The Horny Goat

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The Red Army successfully counter attacking into Poland
and Romania in July 1941 would be about the other end
of the possible axis in Europe collapse.

Short of a successful coup against Hitler I don't see that happening.
About the only way you get a Soviet attack into Romania at that time
would be if Romania DOESN"T join the Axis and Stalin attacks them
anyhow.

I agree, please note the response is to a very ahistorical what if,
debating the mechanism of such a shift is in the realms of what
do you like. I was after putting a time to any defeat.

Post by The Horny Goat
If Russia were to attack German occupied Poland anytime it would have
been during the Battle for France when the German garrison in Poland
was 12-13 divisions rather than June-July 1941 when the German sector
had 100+ German divisions.

Quite, it assumes for example Stalin knows how bad the French army
was going to perform and does the calculations correctly while
concealing the build up from the Germans, thereby making major
gains so quickly the attack on France is fatally compromised. With
the final defeat in 1941 but the fact of that defeat is coming well known
in 1940, indeed before Japan formally allied itself with Germany.

Post by The Horny Goat
However my personal opinion is that the Red Army was far less prepared
for war in July 1940 than 1941 and it is arguable whether the Red Army
was prepared for war in June/July 1941 at all.

In short as noted the requirement for a German defeat in 1941 is
a major upgrade of its opponents or it falling to pieces of its own
accord.

My only point of mentioning the ideas was to note the date of such
an unlikely event will likely make a difference to Japanese actions.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Dave Smith]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Supposing (for the sake of argument) that
WW II in Europe ended in German defeat
before December 1941.

Wow..... talk about hypothetical. Japan was fighting China at the time
and dealing diplomatically with the US and the Allies. Other than the
cancellation of the plan to invade Britain after failing to gain air
supremacy, Germany had proved itself pretty well unstoppable.


....... snip.....

Post by Rich Rostrom
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

You are talking about a lot of variables that are so contrary to the way
things turned out historically. The US was a minor player at that point
in the war. They had managed to stay out of the conflict in Europe and
were using economic embargoes to support their diplomatic demands.

[William Clodius]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Supposing (for the sake of argument) that
WW II in Europe ended in German defeat
before December 1941.
and
The Pacific crisis of 1941 proceeded about
historically, so that by late 1941 Japan
would have to choose between ending its war
in China or running out of fuel oil.
Then in December 1941, if Japan attacks the
U.S. and Britain as historically, Japan
would be at war with those two powers when
they have no other adversaries, plus resurgent
France would challenge Japan over Indochina,
plus the USSR would be free to deploy most of
its strength to the Far East.
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

As with almost any proposed alternative history the proposed starting
point of the change is so drastic "German defeat before December 1941"
that many other significant events would have also had to occur and they
would almost certainly also influence Japan's decision.

Was Germany defeated because the sickle cut failed completely?
=> France could more easily defend indochina so it would be difficult
for Japan to have a starting base for operations against DEI.

Was the sickle cut a partial success so France is still weak?

DId Germany get any bases on the west coast of France or did the
submarine threat remain well contained so the fleet has been free to
move?

DId Italy join the war on Germany's side or has North Africa and the
eastern Mediterranean been quiet?

If so has Britain been transfering troops to Malaya, or less reliant on
the Indian divisions in Malay as source of cadres for expanding other
divisions?

Have Holland and Britain been less dependent on the US and less willing
to back the US against Japan?

Did the Soviet Union cut off supplies early, because of poor German
payments?

Did the Soviet Union decide to defend Poland rather than participate in
its dismemberment?

Has the Soviet Union significantly strengthened its forces near
Manchuria?

Has the Soviet Union shown more military competancy than they showwed in
FInland?

[Alan Meyer]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Supposing (for the sake of argument) that
WW II in Europe ended in German defeat
before December 1941.
and
The Pacific crisis of 1941 proceeded about
historically, so that by late 1941 Japan
would have to choose between ending its war
in China or running out of fuel oil.
Then in December 1941, if Japan attacks the
U.S. and Britain as historically, Japan
would be at war with those two powers when
they have no other adversaries, plus resurgent
France would challenge Japan over Indochina,
plus the USSR would be free to deploy most of
its strength to the Far East.
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

There's a very interesting book that bears heavily on this question:

_Japan 1941, Countdown to Infamy_ by Eri Hotta.

Most of my ideas about this question come from what I learned from that
book, though Ms. Hotta might have different answers from mine to the
specific question.

I think the Japanese leadership was very, very, very crazy - not in the
medical sense but in the political sense. The Army and to a lesser but
still great extent the Navy, was dominated by belief in the honor and
glory of war and the honor and glory of Imperial Japan. There were
reasonable men in the government and the armed forces, but they felt
themselves to be under tremendous social pressure (and sometimes fear of
assassination) to conceal their doubts and act as if they were gung ho
for war.

However, they were not complete idiots. A commission of experts that
they created in 1940-41 to study the prospects for war with the U.S.
concluded that Japan could not win. Furthermore, they weren't even
winning in China in anything like the way that they had expected to, and
they had been shocked by the beating they took from the USSR in the
Nomonhan Incident.

The excuse they had for going to war was that Germany was winning and it
was now or never. They believed that if Germany were checked and
Britain, France, and the USSR, never mind the United States, were free
to fight in the Pacific, the war would be very tough or impossible.

So my answer to the question "Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?" is - Probably not.

I will concede however that they badly misjudged the possible outcome of
defeat. I don't think they ever envisioned even in the worst possible
case that their cities would be flattened, their navy rusting at the
bottom of the sea, and their army forced to lay down arms in
unconditional surrender. So there is a possibility that they might have
gone to war anyway. But if I had to guess, my best guess is that they
would not.

Alan

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Alan Meyer

Post by Rich Rostrom
Would Japan be crazy enough to go to war
anyway?

_Japan 1941, Countdown to Infamy_ by Eri Hotta.
Most of my ideas about this question come from what I learned from that
book, though Ms. Hotta might have different answers from mine to the
specific question.
I think the Japanese leadership was very, very, very crazy - not in the
medical sense but in the political sense. The Army and to a lesser but

The Japanese political ladership (until Tojo) wasn't crazy; they were anti-
war. It took a great deal and a decade of political manuevering on the
part of the military to get a pro-war PM.

Mike

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
The Japanese political ladership (until Tojo) wasn't
crazy; they were anti- war.

ITYM "anti-war _with the U.S._" Japan was at war
with China long before Tojo became PM.

Or were the PMs before him also opposed to that war,
but powerless to prevent the Army from conducting it?

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
The Japanese political ladership (until Tojo) wasn't
crazy; they were anti- war.

ITYM "anti-war _with the U.S._" Japan was at war
with China long before Tojo became PM.
Or were the PMs before him also opposed to that war,
but powerless to prevent the Army from conducting it?

Well, Inukai was assassinated in 1932 for opposing the seizure of
Manchuria (they also planned to assassinate Charlie Chaplin
that day), Tanaka was forced (by Hirohito) to resign as PM in
1928; he was going to court-martial the officers responsible for
assassinationg Zhang Zuolin, but the military refused to allow him
to do so. Takashi was assassinated in 1921 for merely trying to
alleviate some of the Japanese iron rule in Korea, Hamaguchi would
die of complications from an assassination attempt he 'survived'
in 1930, Okada was originally thought killed in the 2/26/36 Incident,
which was an outright coup attempt, so I'm inclined to think
"powerless" doesn't begin to describe it.

Not to imply that they were all wonderful people (they were, after all
politicians) but they were practical men and could see the waste of
large-scale foreign intervention. Sometimes war is opposed for quite
practical reasons.

Mike