Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.dePost by Emmanuel GustinHis name was Pierre Taittinger (later a famous producer of champagne),
and he indeed wrote the report of a French parliamentary committee that
had visited the front. That report highlighted the weakness of the defenses
in the Sedan region. He was not alone in this: General Corap, commander
of the 9th Army north of Sedan, sent frequent requests for
reinforcements. But general Huntziger of the 2nd Army, who probably felt
that Taittinger's criticism targeted him, denied that his front was too
weak. Huntziger nevertheless had his men constructing a lot of
fortifications in his sector.
I don't know what you think the "present explanation" is. Actually nobody
seriously thought, in 1940 or later, that an Army could not get through the
Ardennes: The geography with its rolling plateau and deeply cut rivers is
All accounts I ever read said the French HQ thought a major attack through
the Ardennes would be impossible.
Major attack, one that could drive deep into France was considered
hard enough to be rated impossible in most assessments. Starting
with outdated assessments of what modern forces could do. Apart
from the choke points in the Ardennes the tree cover makes it hard
to deploy formations for attacks. The ability of road transport to
supply an army was an unknown and underestimated. The Germans
were fortunate to be able to live off the land and have few major battles
between the Meuse and the Atlantic.
Then add the way the Meuse formed a good defensive line.
To overcome these obstacles the Germans substituted air power
for the artillery they had trouble deploying in the terrain. No one had
understood the effect of modern airpower on troops not trained to
deal with it and short of anti aircraft weaponry. The effects of the
air attacks were psychological as well as physical.
One the river defences were breached then it was a case of
traffic management.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.dePost by Emmanuel Gustindifficult, but not impassible, and the region had seen significant fighting
in earlier wars. The French command did believe that their bank of the
Meuse, which is higher than the other, was a good natural defensive
position that could be held by the second-line forces of the 2nd and 9th
armies. At least for a while, and against the expected (at most)
secondary attack. In this they may have been right, but they were wrong
in not expecting a major attack in this sector.
However, conventional military thinking never assumed that the enemy
could not breach a defensive line at all: The attacker has, after all, the
advantage of being able to concentrate his forces. The real expectation
in a passive sector like this was that the defenders would delay an
enemy advance as long as they could, then retreat fighting while
the HQ sentreinforcements to stabilize the line and counter-attack.
It was expected that the enemy advance would be only as fast as the
infantry could march and supplies could be brought in, so there would
be time. The real problem was that the Meuse was crossed by a strong
mobile combined-arms force that was willing to take the risk of a fast
advance with open flanks: The French HQ did send reinforcements,
but too little, too late, and to the wrong place.
The crucial point at the Ardennes operation was to get early knowledge
of the German force concentration and to attack this forces on the
crowded streets.
That could be applied to all the WWII attacks, armies are road and
rail bound for the most part.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deTo destroy them there or at least to slow them down.
They were in a perfect trap. The dense mass of tanks, cars, fuel- and
ammunition trucks with no way to left the road was a perfect bomber target.
The perfect trap included lots of tree cover, which made attacking the
Germans that much harder.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deEven fighter a/c could do that job, maybe even better. But the French HQ
did neither ground nor air recon.
Firstly the allies did to reconnaissance, both in the air and on the
ground, the latter by both the French and Belgians, the Ardennes
move was assessed in the same way as the attacks on Holland
and Belgium, the Germans were moving to contact with the allied
forces. The fact there were lots of trucks in the Ardennes is much
more significant in hindsight given the number of trucks we now
know the Germans had.
Next comes the fact the allied fighters were outnumbered and
fighting to keep control of French airspace, mainly their airfields,
plus cover the allied advance to contact in Belgium. The fighter
doctrine of the time reserved them for air combat. The next
point is the Germans were well aware of the need to provide
air cover over the Ardennes and did so, the results of allied
air attacks in the area over the next few days would make
that clear. Finally the lack of allied airpower meant they really
could not interdict the area in any effective way. Not enough
bomber strength and doctrine to inflict heavy damage plus the
Germans had good AA defences, and the allies also lacked
the fighter strength to keep bombers from being intercepted.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deThere is the possibility and some evidence that the French HQ already
know of the crucial German attack and wanted to let it happen.
In short the answer is no. And with conspiracy theories the lack of
evidence ends up as proof of two conspiracies, the original and
the cover up.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deIn 1973
General Gustave Bertrand wrote his book "Enigma". Bertrand was the chief
of what we today would call the French "Ultra" organisation who broke and
read the Enigma for the French HQ. His book was more detailed and accurate
than Winterbotham's - but much less known because it was in French.
So the idea is Bertrand access to the archives in 1973? And he
claims they were reading German Enigma traffic in early 1940?
Without telling the British it seems.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de"Bertrand holds that no general headquarters in history had yet been so
thoroughly informed of enemy moves and intentions as the French
headquarters of Generals Gamelin and Weygand, but he implies that not
much was made of this."
Harold C. Deutsch: The Historical Impact of Revealing The Ultra Secret,
(Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College) Approved for Release
by NSA on 10-26-2006, FOIA Case # 51639
So we have the intelligence people saying they did their job but
it was ignored.
Do the books mention the various reports the Germans would come
through Switzerland for example?
As of 10 January 1940 the German plans supported by Hitler assumed
a secondary attack through the Ardennes to support the flank of the
main attack through Belgium. On that day the courier plane with
significant parts of the plan landed in Belgium.
So that forced a rethink with Manstein's plan being used instead.
So the idea seems to be the allies found out about the plan about
as soon as the Germans, given exactly four months between 10
January and 10 May. Less the time for the German high command
to formulate the new plan and issue the orders.
So we turn to the idea Ultra was all seeing and knowing. We are
supposed to believe the Germans sent enough of the plan via
radio signals early enough for the allies to have a good idea of'
the plan.
Firstly what were the Germans doing using radio when they were
all still in Germany with plenty of land line communications? Next
why were they using radio for such high level plans? Finally we
know from the records allied penetration of German codes before
May 1940 was at fragment level thanks to the allies still having
significant gaps in their understanding, small resources and few
German signals to work with.
Ever thought the use of courier aircraft would be a solid clue
major, bulky, plans like the May 1940 offensive might just be
hand delivered?
In any case as wartime experience showed Ultra was a useful
aid, it was not all seeing and knowing and weakest at the
strategic level.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deWhat Bertrand wrote implies that Gamelin had prior knowledge of the intended
Ardennes breakthrough. But Gamelin ordered no recon efforts.
No reconnaissance efforts yet we have Winterbotham stating there
were French patrols in the Ardennes.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deWhat that
meant was straight out written by the "British Bertrand" Group Captain
(Colonel) Frederick William Winterbotham. He was one of the best
intelligence informed British, just after Churchill and Menzies. From the
"Despite all the information available, the full appreciation of where
the armoured thrust to come appears to have ignored by the French High
Command, and even when the French tank patrols finally met the German
tanks in the forest of Ardennes, there was still no air reconnaissance,
ordered. It seems almost impossible to believe that General Gamelin,
the French command-in Chief [generalissimo], had so staked his reputation
on his assessment that the Germans could not and would not attack through
the the Ardennes that he refused to change his mind or his strategy. It
is difficult to say more without accusing Gamelin of treason. To the
intelligent onlooker it appeared that he was deliberately allowing the
Germans a quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance in the
North."
Now with this words he actually accused Gamelin of treason.
Or alternatively of essentially being unable to cope with the Germans
doing something he did not plan for.
I gather the idea is Gamelin was fully up to date with the new doctrine
of mechanised warfare, the concept of the Panzer corps, with the
units operating to punch deep into the enemy rear rather than using
the tanks as infantry support? Can you show his writings on this?
Also other allied writings that thought in terms of the sort of plan
the Germans used in 1940 from before the actual attack.
Alternatively the Germans had come up with a new way of using
forces, including faster decision times, that opened up new
possibilities.
Winterbotham's book was the first written about Ultra, without the
benefit of many documents, and as a result has been shown to
contain significant errors. The above claim is one of them.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deBut Gamelin
was responsible for France and France may have faced something
worse than a German victory. Had he stopped the Ardennes attack
Germany would not been
beaten but going on a war of attrition. Very much like in WW I and with the
same result for France: A victory with millions of death and even more
crippled. Gamelin's handling avoided that bigger diaster for France.
So Gamelin is an all knowing General, sure the German thrust through
the Ardennes would work but also sure any other Ardennes style attack,
using the Panzer forces to strike deep, would always fail, leaving the
situation like WWI. So he understands 1940 airpower could really
help break a line, and 1940 mobile formations could drive much deeper
than WWI formations before the attack could be contained, but was
sure that could only happen if the Germans attacked through the
Ardennes.
Want to explain this form of military genius?
How about Gamelin, say before the end of 1941, saying he was
trying to lose? How about him saying he wanted the French out
of the war or fighting with Germany?
How about him holding office in the Vichy Government?
How about him recording support for the Vichy Government?
How about him simply walking free under the Vichy Government?
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deThe 85000 French deaths in 1940 were like the losses of one typical
offensive in WW I.
So one typical offensive in 1940 had the death toll of about one
typical offensive in WWI, is that the idea?
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deThe Nazis and the German military saw them self openly as an anti
communist force and behaved like.
You mean the Nazi Soviet pact?
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deThose murdered during the German occupation
were mainly Jews and Reds. Not in high regard by the French military either.
If Hitler promised something to Gamelin (I doubt it happened) he kept his
promise.
I do like the way an agreement is suggested and then discounted.
How about an agreement with Hitler and Gamelin for Hitler to lose
WWII with a minimum of French casualties? If one agreement is
possible so are others. Was Hitler a French or Soviet agent?
Note the word Socialist in the party name, zero evidence of such
agencies which makes them perfect conspiracy theory fodder.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deBy that view the crucial point was neither Gamelin nor in 1940 but at the
9th October 1934.
So now we reach back and try and fit any event into the conspiracy.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deThen was "The Turning Point" like Allen Roberts suggested
in his 1970 book. In April 1934 French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou
announced that France "would look after its own security in whatever way
was necessary." What happened then is in diplomatic words described by
"In her search for allies against the new Germany that had been allowed
to grow up, it was natural that France should turn her eyes to Russia
and try to re-create the balance of power which had existed before the
war. But in October a tragedy occurred.
...
[The Assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia]
...
General Georges and M. Barthou stepped out of the carriage streaming
with blood. The General was too weak to move, but soon received medical
aid. The minister wandered off into the crowd. It was twenty minutes
before he was attended to. He was made to walk upstairs to the Prefect's
office before he could be given medical care; the doctor then applied
the tourniquet below [word "below" in italics] the wound. He had already
lost much blood; he was seventy-two. and he died in a few hours. This was
a heavy blow to French foreign policy, which under him was beginning
to take a coherent form. He was succeeded as Foreign Secretary by
Pierre Laval.
...
He [Laval] believed that France must at all costs avoid war, and he
hoped to secure this by arrangements with the Dictators of Italy and
Germany, against whose systems he entertained no prejudice."
So the idea is Laval remained Foreign Minister from 1934 to 1940?
The French gave up any attempt to form agreements with the USSR?
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deChurchill and others suggested Barthou was not mortally wounded like
Alexander in the car but later killed by "medical treatment".
Or the wound was not considered that serious at the time, that the
treatment was correct depending on what the actual wound was,
that the minister compromised treatment chances by "wandering
off".
I do like the idea one man is such a key, even if it was years before
the actual events.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deHe was
wounded in his right upper arm and after he was weakened by blood loss
he got a bandage at his lower arm to intensify bleeding.
Or people who were not there at the time have made an incorrect
report on the wound.
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deIn 1934/35
France could invade Germany and get rid of the Nazi movement and the
danger of WW II.
Actually the threat of WWII could not be removed simply by removing
the Nazis, given the history of Europe. Furthermore is the idea the
French would arrest all the Nazis then allow German politics to resume
as normal, and of course the Germans would all thank the French, they
would not resent the invasion and put together non Nazi plans for a
later war with France?
Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.deBut the French policy shifted from anti Nazi to anti
communist and may still be there in 1940. That may better explain Sedan
1940 than Winterbotham's "treason" of Gamelin.
I gather this French policy survived the various changes in government,
and had the ability to force the army to deploy and behave like it did in
1940.
Alternatively the allied military was still thinking in terms of WWI, were
well behind the German practice of modern mobile warfare, including
the use of airpower, plus were well behind German strength in the air
resulting in a comprehensive defeat.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.