The published magic decrypts come in 5 volumes, with,
respectively 417, 1,172, 1,322, 1,214 and 104 messages,
counting any parts A and B as 1 message, so around
4,300 messages. The books number each volume's
messages from 1 onwards, so below IV.367 is volume IV
message 367.
Post by WJHopwoodPost by Rich RostromPost by WJHopwoodAccordingly it seemed apparent to some
(including yourself) that I had made a claim
that the names of spies had been mentioned
in the Magic intercepts, whereas I have
consistently said just the opposite.
You have asserted many times that the content
of MAGIC decrypts justified the mass internment
of Japanese-Americans.
What I said is that intelligence obtained from Magic
was ONE of the reasons for the evacuation decision
I didn't say it was the sole reason. On a number
of occasions the Magic intercepts revealed that
Japan was using resident Japanese and PJAs
borne in the U.S., the latter being referred to as
("our second generations) for espionage.
Please specify number. Volume I.119 from Tokyo talks
about using second people generation carefully.
Then comes the series of replies to the request for
numbers of first and second generation Japanese at
various parts of the continental US.
Then comes the statement in No. I.174, "We shall maintain
connection with our second generations who are at present in
the (U.S.) Army, to keep us informed of various developments
in the Army. We also have connections with our second
generations working in airplane plants for intelligence purposes. "
We shall, not we are.
I.175 says second generation Japanese will do something but
that section of the economic section is missing. The people in
the army are mentioned again, this time from Seattle versus
I.174 being from Los Angeles. A first generation person is
being used to set up meetings with the Labor unions and a
second generation person to collect intelligences about
"anti-participation organizations and the anti-Jewish movement"
So I gather "a number" is 2? Or does I.119 push it to 3?, II.393
eligible?
III.379 from San Francisco to Mexico City talks about how most
Japanese are settled and includes statements like they are
"anxious to remain here even though there is a break in Japanese
American relations"
The embassy is undertaking encouragement work to counter this.
Post by WJHopwoodYou can't
deny that they admitted that loud and clear. It's
just plain silly to pretend they didn'r mean what
they said. Just "blowing smoke." as you put it.
Actually going and reading the messages makes it rather clear
the people referred to are maybe going to be used (1.119), are
going to be used in I.175, and I.176 though now you need to show
they were passing classified information instead of simply
answering questions about what they were doing, what they knew
or their opinions, like for example those people mentioned in II.219.
Post by WJHopwoodIncidentally, you are mistaken to use the
phrase "mass internment" as you do above.
Internment was not "evacuation" nor was it
conducted "en masse."
Everyone going is not en masse?
Post by WJHopwoodir was a stand-alone procedure separately
administered by the Dept. of Justice, not the War
Relocarion Aurthority, It applied only to enemy
aliens who had received individual hearings
before enemy alien review boards.
Yet all those Japanese failed and few others joined them.
Post by WJHopwoodPost by Rich RostromIt was pointed out that not one of the
Japanese-Americans interned in 1942 was
ever convicted or even charged with espionage
on the basis of MAGIC sigint, even after
the war when the MAGIC operation was
disclosed to the public.
So what? That means nothing.
No evidence is rather nothing.
Post by WJHopwoodAfter the war
only bare-bones info about Magic became
public knowledge. The intelligence professionals
wanted to keep it that way inasmuch as many
of the same sources and methods were still i
n use during the cold war as well as for years
thereafter.
Right, you are so sure about the conclusion the evidence
does not need to be presented.
Meantime, back at the electronic copy of the messages,
There are lots of messages discussing intelligence without
stating the source, the following are some highlights, fell free
to add other relevant messages. Like all the other messages
you imply exist talking about ethnic Japanese spies in the US.
The rest of this post is simply copies or paraphrases of
magic messages.
I.37, Shanghai, 16 April 1941, discovering US fuel shipments to China
No. I.75
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 327.
INTELLIGENCE:
Though I do not know which ones, I have discovered that the United States is
reading some of our codes.
As for how I got the intelligence, I will inform you by courier or another
safe way.
No. I.114
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) February 5, 1941
TO: Washington (Koshi) # 056.
In connection with New York to Tokyo message # 763, [b] the business men
(including Sumitomo's representatives) and representatives of newspapers
were invited to call here. One of my men discussed the following points with
them:
(1) To have the various representatives of business firms engage in
collecting intelligence material.
(2) To have all such representatives abroad (in the United States) cable
their opinions and manipulations in so far as they are related to politics,
through diplomatic channels so as to maintain secrecy.
We were able to obtain their agreement to cooperate with us in this respect,
so please proceed with this program.
We have the perfect understanding and agreement of the Army and Navy in this
connection. They promise to give us whatever aid they can.
[a] See I, 112. "With the appointment of Ambassador Nomura we wish to
formulate a definite plan for our propaganda and information gathering work
by seeking cooperation of Japanese bank and business officials in the U.S."
[b] Refers to above message and lists 18 Japanese organs in New York as
potential sources of information.
I.115, New York to Tokyo, 11 December 1940, extract, "The set-up of the
press attaché should be concentrated on the task of assembling information
and of widening the intelligence net and its personnel. Especial effort
should be made to establish personal contacts with the members of the press
and persons influential in American politics and business. The intelligence
net should be so organized as to be able to function, even if there should
be a severance of diplomatic and commercial relations between Japan and the
U.S."
I.118, Tokyo to Washington, 30 January 1941, de emphasise propaganda,
increase intelligence.
I.119, Tokyo to Washington, 30 January 1941, on intelligence gathering, an
extract,
"(3) Make a survey of all persons or organizations which either openly or
secretly oppose participation in the war.
(4) Make investigations of all anti-Semitism, communism, movements of
Negroes, and labor movements.
(5) Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than
Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union
members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations described in
the preceding paragraph would undoubtedly bear the best results.
These men, moreover, should have access to governmental establishments,
(laboratories?), governmental organizations of various characters,
factories, and transportation facilities.
(6) Utilization of our "Second Generations" and our resident nationals. (In
view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, our people in the
U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and the utmost caution
must be exercised).
(7) In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our intelligence set-up
will be moved to Mexico, making that country the nerve center of our
intelligence net. Therefore, will you bear in mind and in anticipation of
such an eventuality, set up facilities for a U.S.-Mexico international
intelligence route. This net which will cover Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and
Peru will also be centered in Mexico.
(8) We shall cooperate with the German and Italian intelligence organs in
the U.S. This phase has been discussed with the Germans and Italians in
Tokyo, and it has been approved. "
I.129, Tokyo to Mexico 5 February 1941, circular, information orgainisation,
point 3 is keep contact with German and Italian "organs", point 4, "To
organize Japanese residents, including newspaper men and business firms for
the purpose of gathering information. Care should be taken not to give cause
for suspicion of espionage activities."
I.137, Washington to Mexico, 15 February 1941, "Advise by official
communication, by air, in the same manner as last year, as to military
counter espionage."
I.140, Tokyo to Rome, 15 February 1941, increase in counter espionage
efforts
I.162, Tokyo to Washington, 1 April 1941, extract, "In the event of war we
think that the Labor Unions will become a major political factor in
hindering unity in the United States. In the future arrange to get in touch
with the leaders of labor unions, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party,
and other anti-ROOSEVELT movements. At the same time, I would like to have
you study the possibility of using such a person as (IKU ?) O OYAMA [a]."
[a] A self-exiled Japanese Socialist now in residence at Northwestern
University in Evanston, Illinois.
I.166, Vancouver to Tokyo, 28 April 1941, "This office is at present
employing a spy (an Irishman with Communist Party affiliations) and is
having him collect information of this nature."
I.167 to 171, Request from Tokyo and replies in April 1941 about numbers of
first and second generation Japanese present in San Francisco, New York,
Portland, Vancouver
I.174, Los Angeles to Tokyo, 9 May 1941, regarding establishing intelligence
networks,
"We are doing everything in our power to establish outside contacts in
connection with our efforts to gather intelligence material. In this regard,
we have decided to make use of white persons and Negroes, through Japanese
persons whom we can't trust completely. (It not only would be very difficult
to hire U.S. (military ?) experts for this work at the present time, but the
expenses would be exceedingly high.) We shall, furthermore, maintain close
connections with the Japanese Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the
newspapers.
With regard to airplane manufacturing plants and other military
establishments in other parts, we plan to establish very close relations
with various organizations and in strict secrecy have them keep these
military establishments under close surveillance. Through such means, we
hope to be able to obtain accurate and detailed intelligence reports. We
have already established contacts with absolutely reliable Japanese in the
San Pedro and San Diego area, who will keep a close watch on all shipments
of airplanes and other war materials, and report the amounts and
destinations of such shipments. The same steps have been taken with regard
to traffic across the U.S.-Mexico border.
We shall maintain connection with our second generations who are at present
in the (U.S.) Army, to keep us informed of various developments in the Army.
We also have connections with our second generations working in airplane
plants for intelligence purposes.
With regard to the Navy, we are cooperating with our Naval Attaché's office,
and are submitting reports as accurately and as speedily as possible.
We are having Nakazawa investigate and summarize information gathered
through first hand and newspaper reports, with regard to military movements,
labor disputes, communistic activities and other similar matters. With
regard to anti-Jewish movements, we are having investigations made by both
prominent Americans and Japanese who are connected with the movie industry
which is centered in this area. We have already established connections with
very influential Negroes to keep us informed with regard to the Negro
movement. "
I.175, Seattle to Tokyo, 11 May 1941,regaring intelligence collecting,
2. Economic Contacts.
We are using foreign company employees, as well as employees in our own
companies here, for the collection of intelligences having to do with
economics along the lines of the construction of ships, the number of
airplanes produced and their various types, the production of copper, zinc
and aluminum, the yield of tin for cans, and lumber. We are now exerting our
best efforts toward the acquisition of such intelligences through competent
Americans. From an American, whom we contacted recently, we have received a
private report on machinists of German origin who are Communists and members
of the labor organizations in the Bremerton Naval Yard and Boeing airplane
factory. Second generation Japanese ----- ----- -----.
3. Military Contacts.
We are securing intelligences concerning the concentration of warships
within the Bremerton Naval Yard, information with regard to mercantile
shipping and airplane manufacturer, movements of military forces, as well as
that which concerns troop maneuvers.
With this as a basis, men are sent out into the field who will contact Lt.
Comdr. OKADA, and such intelligences will be wired to you in accordance with
past practice. KANEKO is in charge of this. Recently we have on two
occasions made investigations on the spot of various military establishments
and concentration points in various areas. For the future we have made
arrangements to collect intelligences from second generation Japanese
draftees on matters dealing with the troops, as well as troop speech and
behavior. ----- ----- -----.
4. Contacts With Labor Unions.
The local labor unions A.F. of L. and C.I.O. have considerable influence.
The (Socialist ?) Party maintains an office here (its political sphere of
influence extends over twelve zones.) The C.I.O., especially, has been very
active here. We have had a first generation Japanese, who is a member of the
labor movement and a committee chairman, contact the organizer, and we have
received a report, though it is but a resume, on the use of American members
of the (Socialist ?) Party. ----- OKAMARU is in charge of this.
5. In order to contact Americans of foreign extraction and foreigners, in
addition to third parties, for the collection of intelligences with regard
to anti-participation organizations and the anti-Jewish movement, we are
making use of a second generation Japanese lawyer.
No. I.196
FROM: Honolulu (Okuda) March 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 036.
On the 28th, the local Federal Grand Jury indicted 71 persons who owned
fishing boats, (the majority of whom were Japanese), under Article 88 on
charges of conspiracy. The presidents of three fishing companies operated by
Japanese were also indicted.
The U.S. law reads that captains of all fishing boats over 5 tons must be
U.S. citizens. It is specifically charged that first generation Japanese
have forged bills of sale and made second generation Japanese as nominal
owners of these vessels. It is charged that in this transaction conspiracy
was involved.
This is a similar incident to that which recently arose in Los Angeles, and
developments are being watched with considerable anxiety.
Relayed to Washington. Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle.
I.202 Tokyo to Washington, 28 February 1941, report on Currie mission to
China, including a Chinese spy report.
No. I.213
FROM: Tokyo April 1, 1941
TO: Hongkong # 75.
After working out a plan to have some Chinese at your disposal, to mingle
directly or indirectly through local contacts (for instance, To, etc.) with
Chinese residents in Manila for the purpose of obtaining intelligence
regarding the extent of their participation in the defense program (or the
Islands), which may be useful to us in our future plans, please take
necessary steps, on my responsibility, if the reply [a] to my message # 103
[a] to Manila warrants it.
[a] See I, 214.
No. I.214
FROM: Tokyo April 1, 1941
TO: Manila # 103.
(Secret.)
Regarding your # 129 [a].
After referring to this Minister's message to Hongkong # 75 [b], please
check up on the extent of participation by the Chinese residents in the
Philippines' defense plan and wire same to Hongkong. Also depending on
conditions there, please consider extending our activities along the lines
of my message # 75 [b].
[a]Not available.
[b] See I, 213.
No. I.230
FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador) April 25, 1941
TO: Washington (Japanese Ambassador) No number.
Action Tokyo as # 301.
Intelligence report (23rd).
According to what the informant heard from BIDERU [a].
(1) Every American official in Europe is said to have recently informed his
government of the immediate need of some sort of naval aid to Britain and it
appears that steps are about to be taken toward realizing this end.
A-123
(2) According to SUTAINHARUTO's [b] report, the U.S.S.R. has warned Turkey
to resist Germany's attack, on the threat that the U.S.S.R. herself will
walk into Turkey in self defense.
Relayed to Washington.
[a] Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the governments of
Norway, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium.
[b] Laurence A. Steinhardt, U.S. Ambassador to U.S.S.R.
No. I.231
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) March 8, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro # 41.
In view of the fact that there are those whom we suspect of working as
intelligence agents for their homelands among the British and American
(especially English) firms who are acting as agents for our shipping
companies in Latin America, this office, after consultation with the home
offices of the related shipping companies, has drawn up the following
regulations:
1. We shall use, wherever possible, Japanese companies abroad as agencies.
2. In the event that this is impossible, we shall use foreign companies
other than English and American (companies operated by Germans or other
nationals) as agencies.
3. In the event that it is essential that we continue to use English and
American agencies, we will exercise careful surveillance over their
activities, and we have decided that we shall endeavor to use them in
gathering intelligences.
With this as a basis, I want you to pay careful attention to their
activities wherever located, and should anything to our disadvantage
develop, inform me on each occasion of all the circumstances and give me
your opinions as to counter-policies that we should carry out in each case.
II.186, Washington to Tokyo, 28 July 1941, US using powers of Espionage act
when asset freezing
II.248, Tokyo to Manila, 1 JUly 1941, check reported USN increase in
espionage and ounter espionage.
II.250 Davao to Tokyo, 18 July 1941, "According to a spy, it seems, in view
of the rapid turnover of Americans having charge of stevedores who are being
used in customs duty, as well as by us here for observation of American
submarines entering port, that investigation and collection of intelligence
regarding Japanese vessels and Japanese persons in this area is being
carried out by British and American authorities"
No. I.257
FROM: Berlin April 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 407.
Intelligence wires emanating from our offices in the Near East and Egypt to
our offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before
transmitting their contents to the German and Italian authorities. This
procedure is advisable in order that there be no danger of giving the German
and Italian authorities clues in decoding our codes. Therefore, in
intelligences of this type emanating from that area, the "I" code and the
"SO" code should be discontinued, using only the more efficient "O" code. In
communicating other secret matters
I would like to have you use the "TSU" code and other appropriate codes.
Please follow this procedure.
Relayed to Italy and Turkey.
Trans. 4-16-41
No. I. 258
FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)
TO: Berlin
April 16, 1941
# 329.
Secret.
Re your # 407 [a].
We suspect that the several codes I, SO and OITE are being cryptanalyzed by
foreign powers and today we have none too many code books to spare.
Therefore, when it is necessary to send a message, and at the same time
insure its secrecy, please dispatch them by machine or by TSU code. In case
revelation of the contents are made to foreign powers, take care to
paraphrase them from beginning to end. I want you to use OITE for messages
of relatively slight importance.
Relay to Italy and Turkey.
[a] See I, 257. Berlin tells Tokyo that intelligence wires emanating from
Japanese offices in the Near East and Egypt to offices in Germany and Italy
should be appropriately paraphrased before transmitting their contents to
the Germans and Italians in order to avoid giving them clues in decoding
Japanese codes. Berlin recommends use of certain codes in this connection.
No. I.397
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Bangkok April 24, 1941
# 222.
Strictly secret outside the department.
To be handled in Government code.
Re my # 167 [a].
According to an unimpeachable report, as a result of a secret investigation
recently carried on by the Netherlands Ministry in Bangkok, it was found
that a native employee of this ministry had possession of keys to all the
safes and was in contact with the Japanese Military Attaché. A British
Attaché in Bangkok has made a telegraphic report of these facts so, for the
time being, please stop the schemes we had afoot.
[a] Tokyo tells Bangkok telegraphic clerk IT O will leave Tokyo on the 5th
in order to transmit intelligence received directly.
No. I.403
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) January 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 5.
Post by WJHopwoodFrom the 4th we plan to begin general intelligence work. Has there been any
change in wave length? Please let me know immediately.
II.219, Washington to Tokyo, 19 May 1941 on intelligence gathering,
"5. A summary of the present state of the policy is as follows:
We are making personal contacts on every hand. However, at this place and in
New York we are continuing the existing formal contacts and gathering secret
information. In addition, to this, the officer in charge of intelligence has
contacts with:
(A) J, and W, who are in close touch with the President and his wife.
The President is cultivating power through the "relief workers" and the "W.
P. A." and other agencies. In addition to this, since his third term anyone
who opposes him becomes the target of his attacks and his dictatorial
tendencies are becoming more marked, therefore it is natural that we should
pay special attention to those in close touch with him.
One or two items regarding Roosevelt's position: Evidence was brought out in
the Senate to the effect that the former Ambassador to England, Kennedy, had
not paid his 1932 income tax, but the President maintained silence.
According to other secret information, Wilkie had a secret understanding
with Roosevelt and attacked him in his public speeches more than was
necessary as a Presidential candidate and enjoyed scandalizing public
opinion, however, had he by any chance become President he would have become
a mere puppet of Roosevelt. Again, ----- told Terazaki that originally he
was an isolationist, but that now in view of the opposition he was keeping
silent. Six months from now if he said he were an isolationist he would not
be able to go about in safety.
(B) W of the State Department.
When Terazaki was a student at Brown University he became well acquainted
with W.
(C) G of the Senate.
When Terazaki was in Brown University he was greatly helped by this G.
(D) The relationship of the "America First Committee" to Lindberg and W.
Every time Lindberg makes a speech the German newspapers approve and
American newspaper reporters in Germany write it up and American newspapers
make a big thing of it so that the impression is conveyed that Lindberg is
an agent of Germany. Because of this, Lindberg and the Committee are very
perplexed and according to W, Lindberg has been cautioned by the German
Embassy. Since then he has been in touch with W.
(E) D, an Irish American.
D told our intelligence officer that a Jewish American Justice of the
Supreme Court, Frankfurter, was packing the key posts of the government with
Jewish Americans. But that American antipathy toward Jews is increasing to
such an extent that eventually anti-Jewish influence would prevail.
(F) Persons with religious affiliations. (1) Catholic. (2) Protestant. (3)
Undecided.
The Catholics are the ones who are concerned in the present negotiations.
(G) The Brown University Club.
This meets regularly once a month and at other times at which times he
(Terazaki) is present. "
No. II. 262
FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 480.
Intelligence of primary order.
1. Two destroyers sailed on the fourth. All the war ships at anchor have
sailed. There are, however, several small destroyers in the neighborhood of
Corregidor [a]. (This was observed by the crews of the Koden Maru and the
Kaischu Maru.)
2. About six hundred American soldiers have arrived in Manila on the
Coolidge. (This was learned from the crew of the Coolidge.)
________________________________________
[a] An island in Cavite Province at the entrance of Manila Bay.
II.289, Hollywood to Washington, 10 June 1941, dealing with supporting the
chauffeur of Tachibana who was a "Japanese Naval Language Official who has
been held on charges of espionage"
No. II.353
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) June 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 109.
(3 part message complete.)
Secret outside the Department.
1. This Silver Shirt movement was founded in 1934 as a juridical person
under Delaware law. It is anti communistic and anti Jewish, and has
representatives in every state, all led by Chief PELLEY, and at one time had
30 or 40 thousand regular members.
Lecture societies were organized and they distributed their weekly
mouthpiece and books and pamphlets written by PELLEY and THORKELSON, who,
until last year, was a republican congressman from Montana. Their line of
propaganda is as follows:
The administrative and juridical branches of the ROOSEVELT administration
are shot through with international Judaism and communism and is coming
under the influence of the British royalty, which is under the thumb of
these elements. America must be defended from them. America's foreign policy
must be to save the human race from the enslaving grasp of the international
Jews. As for the Orient, the United States must not interfere. As for
Europe, the United States must not interfere. She must look after herself.
The Silver Shirts organization is being investigated by the DIES committee
as a 5th column activity (volume 6 of this committee's report) and cannot
act openly. Last year, either under legal pressure or of its own accord, it
dissolved and began an underground movement. However, its weekly mouthpiece
and other publications are being shipped from Indianapolis and distributed
all over the country. It seems that this is being accomplished through huge
special contributions. (According to the DIES investigation, those
contributors alone who have been so far discovered, for a year and a half,
beginning in 1937, had contributed $66,000.)
2. Well, I had INAGAKI confer with IWASAKI, who said that on April 20th he
had first received an offer from PELLEY, at whose suggestion he sent a
letter the last of April to Lt. Col. SUGITA, of the Headquarters of the
General Staff (who will tell you all about it) asking if the Japanese
government would not help out with the Plans; and that again he had asked
JIRO KOGA of the Society of Brethren Overseas to contact the German
Ambassador in Tokyo in case Japan could not grant this help.
Since then I understand that PELLEY has asked time and again if we had a
reply, but I fear this plan could hardly succeed in America under the
present conditions. I think it would be dangerous for us to have anything to
do with this. IWASAKI lost faith in the guy because of his past failures but
the fellow is a very earnest and studious man. He concentrates on the Jewish
problem, and is possessed with Pelleyism. Already he has, it seems,
furnished the Chief of Staff with pertinent information, and, remembering
the KOJIMA affair in Los Angeles, I think we should make use of him after
fully instructing him. I want to give him
$500 with which to settle his accounts and enough money to travel second
class in Japan for about three months; so please wire back at once.
I am shipping the Silver Shirts printed matter.
No. II.356
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 468.
(Part 1 of 3.)
1. Approximately 25 % of the total population of the United States is Negro.
In the north, centering around New York and Chicago, there is a movement to
equalize the status of these people. They are being educated along general
sociological lines, and gradually their political position is being
equalized. In last year's presidential election, one Congressman, two state
Senators, 50 members of state Legislatures, and two Justices were elected
from among the Negro population. But still the political strength of the
Negro organization can be used much to our advantage, so long as the bread
and butter of the Negro depend so utterly upon the white man. Taking
advantage of their economic unrest, we might use them to slacken the
progress of the United States' plans for national defense and economy as
well as for sabotage. However, I must point out the following facts: With
the exception of a few pioneers, the Negroes are not organized into a strong
racial group, conscious of the fact that it consists of an oppressed people.
There are certain progressive organizations working toward the equalization
of the Negro, such as the Negro Congress, the Negro Alliance (both Leftist),
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It is to
be noted, however, that the largest Negro organizations are financed by the
Jews. I do not see much that we might do aside from cooperating with these
organizations in elevating the status of the Negro, from which we could
expect very great results. Another thing is that the movement to equalize
the Negro was originally fostered ideologically and financially by the
Communist Party, and among Negro
(Part 2 of 3.)
(Message # 257 from New York to the Foreign Minister.)
To be kept secret within the Department.
2. Since the close of last year, I have been using a Negro literary critic
named [a] and have had him open a news service for Negro newspapers.
The Negro press is so poor that it has no news service of its own, and as I
have told you in various messages, [a] has been getting relatively
good results, and because of the advantage we have in using men like this in
our political and subversive activities, the effect of propaganda upon the
Negroes is naturally limited.
3. HIKIDA is in most intimate contact with Negro groups and Negro leaders. I
am going to have him continue to work along that line and have him foster
the organization of Negroes of great ability, thus advancing our own
purposes. Concerning the advantage of using Negroes in procuring
intelligences, since I have not yet used Negro spies directly, I am unable
to judge. However, as an experiment I am now instructing Mr. [a], an
official of the New York branch of the National Youth Administration, and a
graduate of [a], to be a spy.
____________________________________
[a] DOD comment: Names withheld.
II.357, follow on from 356, extract, "In the arsenals at Philadelphia and
Brooklyn there are also a few unskilled Negro laborers, so I would say that
in the future there will be considerable profit in our getting Negroes to
gather military intelligences for us."
II.384, from Tokyo to Mexico, 2 June 1941, extract,
"3. Please also plan to use RAFAEL MUNAS for purposes of interception.
4. Concerning propaganda and enlightenment, in case the United States joins
the war, we will endeavor to use our nationals there to our best possible
advantage and we will do our very best to use Rightist and Leftist Labor
organizations and promote their anti American revolutionary influence.
Please use your best efforts to achieve this."
No. II. 385
FROM: Mexico City (Sato) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 206.
I wish to send JOSE LLERGO.
This man is thirty years old, youthful and energetic, and is already an
influential reporter. His elder brother is the editor of the weekly
periodical HOY. Although it seems to me that by and large Mexican newspapers
are following the tendency of yielding to pressure from the United States,
nevertheless HOY has steadily maintained unbiased editorials. I believe that
through this man we can greatly influence the press of this country and that
it would be much to our advantage to use him in the future.
I would like to send him by the next plane, so will you please remit his
traveling expenses?
No. II. 386
FROM: Mexico July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 280.
Re my # 206 [a].
1. On the 18th, PAPESU came to call on me to bid me farewell. On this
occasion, he brought a man by the name of ISAKU DEIYASU (Isaac Diaz ?) (he
is also a reporter on the OI (?), and is said to be PAPESU's best friend).
Since touring Europe, Diaz also has become very desirous of traveling to
Japan. So, seizing upon PAPESU's visit to Japan, he has decided to go there
too, at his own expense.
Some time ago, I had members of my staff make investigations into the
characters of these men. This was the first time, however, that I met and
talked with Diaz, and was happy to find that both men were exceedingly
pleasant.
They are both underlings of Maximino Camacho and are well qualified for
future utilization by us. I was firmly convinced that it would be to our
interest to have both men travel to Japan. I, therefore, told Diaz that
because there was no time to advise my home government of his coming, I
could not say definitely whether he could be given any financial assistance
or not. However, I would do my best for him, I said; and told him to go to
Japan on the assumption that he would have to pay his own way, (in part, at
least).
Because of these circumstances, I would appreciate your giving consideration
to allowing Diaz the same sort of treatment as has been extended to PAPESU.
________________________________________
[a] June 14, II, 385. Consul General Sato at Mexico City states his desire
to send Jose Llergo, outstanding Mexican news reporter and brother of the
Editor of Hoy, weekly periodical. Believes that the Mexican press can be
greatly influenced through him.
II.393, Mexico to Tokyo, 2 JUly 1941, extract, "In Mexicali and vicinity
American influence is predominant (All officials from the Governor down are
puppets of the United States). Although there are many Japanese inhabitants
there, since not one of them belongs to the intelligentsia, if intelligence
work is to be carried on, it is absolutely necessary that both funds and the
personnel be reorganized at the branch."
II.400 to 403, Mexico to Tokyo, 4 July 1941, setting up intelligence and
espionage communications from US to Mexico, including using the local
"espionage net".
Part 3 is "When I was in Washington, the official in charge of this matter,
after establishing Washington and New York areas in the espionage net, made
the statement that he would like to wait for a little while before making a
tour for contact purposes. Since that time until today, the question stands
as it did then. Furthermore, in regard to Los Angeles, when Minister
YAMAGATA's party recently passed through there, he was told that they had no
acquaintanceship with such things as intelligence nets, and for that reason
they had made no special plans. Since then, all of these offices, on the
instructions of the home office -- gradually are bringing their
plans to a head for - -----. At the present time, as far as civilian
agents are concerned it will be impossible to make (it ?) more concrete."
II.411, Tokyo to Washington, 10 July 1941, noting German and Italian
consulates in Mexico were closed, requiring Japanese replacement
intelligence activities, including "3. Various officials in the United
States and Mexico will work out all the details of their own espionage nets,
correlate them, and develop a concrete plan for making contacts and
exchanges on the border."
II.424 Mexico City to Tokyo, 10 JUly 1941, the US and Britain are spying on
shipments to Japan.
II.497, Tokyo to Berlin, 24 June 1941, report of Japanese consul in Capetown
about British ship movements.
II.690, Hsinking to Tokyo, increase in counter espionage in Manchukuo.
II.692, Hsinking to Tientsin, report of conference including intelligence
and counter espionage in the area.
No. II. 697
FROM: Tokyo August 4, 1941
TO: Shanghai # 782.
According to intelligences received by the Mitsui branch office in
Soerabaja, it is understood that they are planning to transship East Indian
rubber at Shanghai, exporting it from there to Vladivostok. Furthermore,
according to a military wire from Shanghai, the Soviet is buying petroleum
from agents of British and American firms in your city, and it is thought
that they may try to transport it to Vladivostok. Please investigate and
report the truth of the matter.
II.872, Rome to Washington, spy report, about a report received by the
Vatican about China.
II.878, Pieping to Tokyo, 26 May 1941, spy report on China.
II.881, London to Tokyo, 2 June 1941, "On the 28th day, I had a spy of mine,
who is a bosom friend of Ambassador BIDDLE, converse with him and under my
instructions, as always, to make certain leading statements on the Far
Eastern question in order to draw BIDDLE out", followed by a report on what
Biddle said.
No. II.892
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) August 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 160.
1. The of the Silver ver Pacific Line left San Francisco the 15th
for ¬ - carrying some 14 or 15 aviators and bomber
technicians bound for Chungking, as well as, a cargo consisting of military
material and large caliber guns. The Klipfo to , scheduled to leave this
port about the middle of September, is taking on a large quantity of
military equipment and in addition 20 aviators and bomber technicians bound
for Chungking are scheduled to board her before she leaves.
2. According to intelligences emanating from the local the Burma
road being British, American and Chinese jointly are planning on
the construction of a trans¬portation route between Calcutta and Chungking.
This transportation route (part of it will be a military road) will pass
through Darjeeling, Lhasa in Tibet, Seitei [a] in the province of Seiko and
the city of Seito having its terminus in Chungking. East of Kotei the road
is planned to be a military automobile road.
3. Material to be used in the construction of such an involved engineering
undertaking is at the present time being assembled and prepared. TO CHIN EN
[a] for this purpose is going to on the Matsonia scheduled to leave
the 2nd. Boarding a clipper at that place ¬ - he is
scheduled to leave for home on the clipper flying from San Francisco on the
6th.
______________________________________
[a] Kana spelling.
No. II.928
FROM: Tokyo June 2, 1941
TO: Shanghai # 475.
Re your # 852 [a].
For your own offices intelligence and enlightenment expenses for this fiscal
year, we have appropriated 620,000 yen, for your special agents we have
appropriated 540,000 yen (of which 600,000 yen are for JK's special
activities and which we are sending direct to Shanghai) (sic) making a total
of 1,160,000 yen. You know that nowadays we have to economize all we can and
it was only after considering how important intelligence work in your city
is that we arrived at such a high figure, so, in any case, we want you to
spend this money as wisely as possible. Please get the details from
Secretary YOSHIOKA.
________________________________________
[a] Not available.
II.1060A, Rio de Janerio to Santigao, enemy spy warning.
II.1099, Batavia to Tokyo, 18 July 1941, spy report on airfields.
II.1100, Batavia to Tokyo, 18 July 1941, spy report on allied officers
present.
No. II.1101
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 667.
According to intelligences (Chinese report) the British commander in chief
of the Far East forces, Brooke Popham, and U.S. Naval aviation officer,
Normer, are in this area at present. It is further reported that one officer
each from the Australian Army and Navy came to Soerabaja several days ago
and will remain here as instructors in military affairs.
No. II.1146
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 2, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 366.
Secret within the department.
Re my # 340 [a].
We have appropriated 4,400 Baht [b] from the secret intelligence funds and
are sending it to you for the purchase of the Bangkok Chronicle. Please
handle this matter as stated in the last part of caption message and wire
the result.
________________________________________
[a] Available, See II, 1145.
[c] Siamese coin, normally $ .4424.
No. III.227
FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 625.
(extract) Special intelligence # 330 from New York states that an A. P.
dispatch declares that the Japanese American negotiations warrant a
pessimistic outlook and that the KONOYE Cabinet will face a crisis in about
two weeks
III.286, Seattle to Tokyo, 16 August 1941, spy report about HMS Warspite.
III.308, San Franciso to Tokyo, 18 September 1941, spy report about HMS
Warspite.
No. III.313
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 16, 1941
TO: Seattle #2187 (Circular).
Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement
of warships as follows.
1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and basing of
warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the event of
priority intelligence, report such on each oc¬casion.
a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or scouting
force.
b. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at
one time.
c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United
States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class of ).
2. Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once.
III.325, Manila to Tokyo, 12 August 1941, "(1) At the time a non
commissioned officer of the American Navy told me confidentially that the
ship mentioned in my #414 (b) (8?) (b) was the Warspite and I took this to
be reliable infor¬mation. This British ship, however, had its name painted
over. Some spies who viewed the ship when it docked report that it was
something like a 7,000 ton vessel", plus a spy report about wounded
soldiers.
No. III.333
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 30, 1941
TO: Manila # 277.
According to intelligences obtained by naval authorities, the Houston was
observed on the 20th or there about to pass through the harbor entrance but
since that time they have not been able to learn where it went. Please
investigate the waters in and around Manila for some trace of this warship
and then make your report.
No. III.340
FROM: Manila August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 559.
(Primary Intelligence)
1. Warships at anchor in this harbor on the 30th:
(1) In Manila, 3 destroyers of the Bell class; 6 submarines (submarines left
port on the 27th but have returned). Furthermore, the tanker Trinity came to
this port on the 27th and dropped anchor here (please refer to Part 2 of my
# 543 (a)).
(2) One destroyer (undergoing repairs) Corundusu.
2. A large portion of the submarines, according to intelligences, which have
come to me, are now in the Ringaon area.
3. 500 American soldiers arrived here on the Cleveland the 29th.
Furthermore, on the same day the Migak entered this harbor. (Though details
of this ship could not be ascertained, it is understood that she is loaded
to capacity with military equipment.
________________________________________
(a) See III, 339 regarding boats in harbor at Manila.
(b) Lingayan on the west coast of the Island of Luzon.
III.350, Manila to Tokyo, 3 October 1941, request to confirm spy report.
No. III.369
FROM: Washington August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 677.
Re your (Circular) 1718 (a).
1. Special secret funds for propaganda and intelligence: $17,424.99
2. Special secret funds in the name of the councillor: $20,556.25.
3. Subtracting one half of the $95,500 for the purchase of the adjacent land
from the $70,000 from San Francisco received in December, 1940, leaves
$22,250
4. Secret funds in San Francisco (?) from February, 1939: $5,000
5. Amount on deposit in San Francisco July, 1941, $47,000
6. Amount on deposit in New York at the same time, $54,606.47
Further we plan to pay for the grading and building expense out of paragraph
3.
No. III.379
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) August 16, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 164.
(Part 1 of 2.) (a)
(Message to Tokyo # 171.)
My opinions on suggested steps having to do with the Japanese resident under
my jurisdiction are as follows:
1. First generation Japanese who are farmers, first generation Japanese who
have established themselves to a considerable degree, second generation
Japanese who are registered for military service, their parents, and second
generation Japanese who have never returned to Japan have expressed
themselves as being anxious to remain here even though there is a break in
Japanese American relations. There seem to be no indications of unrest, even
when such persons as those mentioned above heard that Japanese ships on
regular schedule were no longer going to operate to the West Coast. Though
other first generation Japanese and second-¬generation Japanese who are not
likely to be registered for military service are maintaining a calm on the
surface, there are many who actually are wavering in their intentions. We
are, therefore, undertaking the encouragement of these Japanese through our
subsidized newspapers and Japanese organizations.
2. We will evacuate all persons at the present time engaged in branches of
banks and com¬panies with home offices in Japan, and those who as a result
of the freezing legislation are doing nothing more than completing
unfinished business. It is imagined that Japanese residents here who have
become attached to the land will be dealt quite a blow when such an
evacuation takes place. Therefore, we are doing all that we can to make this
blow as easy as possible on them.
III.410 Washington to Tokyo, 6 September 1941, I would like to have TERASAKI
go on an official mission to Chicago in order to make secret contacts with
members of the "America First" Committee residing in that city. Please send
authorization. At that time, I would like to have him make a study on the
spot of the matter concerning OYAMA mentioned in your # 154 (a).
Furthermore, TERASAKI was not able to make an official tour to Los Angeles
and San Francisco in line with your # 349 (b) because he went south to
Mexico. At this time should you permit him to stop off at San Francisco,
Seattle, and Los Angeles, it would be exceedingly convenient from the
standpoint of the work at hand.
(a) Not available.
(b) Discusses plan for TERASAKI's visit to Mexico to confer with Japanese
Minister there for the development of plans pertaining to the establishment
of an espionage net; the focal point of this net to be Mexico City carrying
out activities in the United States as well as South America. See III, 410A.
III.419, New York to Tokyo, 12 September 1941, puching espionage work,
noting "1. Proposed Reorganization. Our policy has been that in order to set
up an effective organization we must:
(a) Immediately dismiss all persons of little value and those who are no
longer required.
(b) Transfer to the Cultural Institute the most effective persons or groups
in our employ (the Culture on Wheels Library and the group handling the
distribution of films) to the Cultural Institute.
(c) To divert the most capable persons in our employ being used in the
dissemination of propaganda into intelligence collecting and espionage
activities.
Though we hold these three points to be our principal objectives, since our
decisions were reached on this matter, the freezing legislation went into
effect. Consequently, with the change in the situation, we have found it
necessary to dismiss such persons as we have classified under (b) above in
the same category as those in (a) because it is now apparent that we cannot
realize our aims under (b). In view of the expectation of increasing
financial difficulty due to the scarcity of funds available for distribution
to civilian personnel, this applies also to those in espionage and
activities. We are now doing our best to make temporary reductions in
expense funds and salaries."
III.472, 10 October 1941, Washington to Tokyo, Major Yano to go to Mexico
city "in order to make preliminary arrangements concerning anti American
espionage" and code book transfer.
III.499, 20 September 1941, Panama to Tokyo, spy budget including for Panama
Canal watchers ($70) and Kyowa company ($100).
III.626, 15 October 1941, Mexico City to Tokyo, pointing out the limits of
monitoring the US from outside and stresses the need to increase
intelligence gathering resources inside the US.
III.643, 22 August 1941, Santiago to Buenos Aires, report of conference by
"HIDENARI TERASAKI, 2nd Secretary of Emb. Washington. He is head of
espionage in the U.S." It is about setting up an intelligence network in
Latin American, and includes "We propose the establishment of spies within
the United States. From these we shall obtain secret intelligences."
III.739, Tokyo to Nanking and Shanghai, spy report from Rangoon on
conference/activity between British and Chinese.
III.741, Tokyo to Nanking Shanghai and Peking, spy report from Rangoon on
supplies to China.
No. III.793
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 8, 1941
TO: Singapore # 307.
Departmental secret.
Strictly secret.
Re your # 599 (a).
The amount of money which we anticipate sending you during the coming year
is roughly 600,000 yen. We are not specifying how it is to be sent. After
you have figured the approximate monthly allotment, please make your report
to us by return wire.
Furthermore, please bear in mind that the above quoted figures does not
include travel expenses or any other extraordinary expense monies.
Expense fund 200,000 yen
Salaries 50,400 yen
Subsidy fund 20,000 yen
Fund for dissemination of intelligences 300,000 yen
Secret fund 6,000 yen
Entertainment fund 1,200 yen
Grand
Total ----------------------------------------------------------------------
577,600 yen
________________________________________
(a) Not available.
III.861, Bangkok to Tokyo suggesting new spy networks if Malaya is going to
be attacked.
III.932, Rome to Tokyo, 18 August 1941, spy report on possible Hitler
Mussolini meeting.
III.1038, 1 October 1945 (probably should be 1941), Canton to Tokyo, amongst
other things noting anti Japanese espionage organisations.
III.1040, Shanghai to "Net", 20 Augst 1941, HQ spy report.
III.1050, Canton to Shanghai, Bangkok, spy report on new Chinese currency.
III.1065 Hong Kong to Tokyo, spy report about possible $200 million loan to
China.
No. III.1289
FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo M # 158.
On 29 August, the Singora (a) consulate received a wire from the Foreign
Office ordering student secretary SHIMIZU JUICHI transferred to Chiengmai.
Please send us a reply wire at once to aid us in giving him instructions.
In view of the importance of collecting intelligence on British Malaya and
Southern Siam, and student secretary GOTO's linguistic ability, I think we
should either supply Singora in addition with one officer who speaks
English, or else we should send this officer to Chiengmai in place of
SHIMIZU.
________________________________________
(a) Possibly Songkla.
No. III.1306
FROM: Tokyo September 29, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 615.
Strictly confidential.
Re my # 614 (a).
In order to collect military intelligence in your intelligence department at
this time, Major (or Lt. Comdr.) Fujiwara and Lieutenant (of Sub Lieutenant)
Yamaguchi of the General Staff Office, are being sent there as honorary non
career clerks under the assumed names of Koichi Yamashita and Hajime Yamada.
They will have the status of general non career clerks. Please have your
Ambassador and Director of the intelligence department recognize this.
________________________________________
(a) See III, 1307.
No. IV.116
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1099.
1. Duties are to be limited to only the most pressing matters. Other
non-urgent duties, such as auditing of accounts, will be dropped.
Accordingly, I desire to have one or two secretaries, two foreign service
attaches, and one clerk ordered back to Japan. (There are family
considerations involved in the case of Foreign Service Attaches Fujiyama and
Inagawa. If possible we would like to have these two returned to Japan.)
2. The intelligence staff will not be returned (to Japan). Instead, we plan
to arrange for their transfer to South America; (Secretary Terazaki and
Clerk Yamamoto).
3. All overseas students and so-called student attaches will be returned to
Japan or transferred elsewhere. (Attaches Ando, Honjo, Nishibori, Arita,
Matsui and six 2nd class clerks.)
4. Employees engaged locally will be dismissed as the occasion may demand.
5. Those returning to Japan would go in one of the evacuee ships. Those
transferring to South America, or elsewhere, would leave immediately for
their posts.
No. IV.259
FROM: Seattle December 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 184.
Urgent intelligence.
1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out
of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.
2. The Saratoga sailed the same day.
IV.299 to 306 Philippines to Tokyo, October/November 1941, US Ship
movements. Other messages cover the ground forces present.
IV.321, Manilka to Tokyo, 15 November 1941, intelligence report from a
Japanese resident in Cebu.
IV.340, Hsinking to Peking, Nanking and Shanghai 28 November 1941, military
intelligence including a spy report.
No. IV.453
FROM: Tokyo December 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 882.
Departmental secret.
Message # 748 [a] from Peking to the Foreign Minister.
According to a spy report, the head of the American Marine group here, while
at a send off party given by a certain foreign friend of his on the 18th,
revealed that all the American Marines are leaving very soon. However, a few
who are versed in airplanes cannot return home. They will probably go via
Manchu (sic) or to Vladivostok as advance troops to lay the ground for the
establishment of an American air base there.
________________________________________
[a] See IV, 454.
Trans. 12 5 41
No. IV.454
FROM: Peking November 27, 1941
TO: Net Circular # 606.
Peking to Tokyo # 748.
Reports of reliability B.
According to secret information on the 18th a corporal of the Marine Corps
stationed here let slip the information that the American Marines were to be
evacuated from here in the near future, excepting a few who, because of
their knowledge of aviation, were not to return home but were to go to
Vladivostok by way of Manchuokuo and form the nucleus of an American
aviation unit to be stationed there.
IV.529, 20 October 1941, Manila to Tokyo, amongst the various reports is the
note the US stepping up vigilance against espionage.
IV.661, 662, Lima to Tokyo, 8 December 1941, includes spy report on
government attitudes/actions.
IV.735, 18 October 1941, Bucharest to Tokyo, on sending to Tokyo some Polish
people currently being used for espionage and code breaking by the Japanese
against the USSR, they have Manchukuo passports.
IV.784, Tokyo to Hsinking, 6 November 1941, report from Budapest including
reports from Hungarian government spies.
IV.1033 Hsingking to Tokyo, 6 December 1941, what are the current
instructions for counter espionage?
No. IV.1094
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1253.
To be handled in Government code. Departmental secret.
The activities of ROO CHOO Sill, backed up by the CHI GOO RAI and the ROO
HOO (an intelligence society and a publication), is working hard in our
behalf to stamp out anti-Japanism. Several incidents have occurred lately
and his opponents are rather belligerent. Consequently, Governmental
surveillance over ROO is rather close. From April to September of this year
we afforded ROO a subsidy for the ROO HOO and a fund for collecting
intelligence, amounting to from 2,000 to 3,000 guilders. ROO is so familiar
with the Chinese and natives here that in case of emergency he can do much
to help us. That is why I have employed him so far. He is ready at our
direction to start the distribution of pamphlets designed to win over as
many of his consanguinaries and the natives as possible. I think that we
should continue to avail ourselves of his services. He has a family of
eight. Therefore, I think we should let him have 3,000 guilders for
operating expenses; 15,000 guilders for living expenses, and 12,000 guilders
as a subsidy for the ROO HOO as of from October 1st to the end of the year.
Will you please, therefore, arrange to appropriate and remit that amount,
namely 30,000 guilders.
IV.1123, Bangkok to Tokyo, 29 October 1941, reporting on radio intelligence
activity against the British and asking for more resources.
IV.1147, Bangkok to Tokyo, 10 November 1941, report on Thai attitudes,
including noting rewards being offered by the Thai police for exposing
foreign espionage agents.
IV.1163, Bangkok to Tokyo, 20 November, spy report.
IV.1166, Bangkok to Tokyo, 22 November, spy report.
V.7, Washington to Tokyo, 24 July 1941, noting "2. At this time, when the
Imperial Navy is sending home all of its Resident Personnel and most of its
Resident Supervisory Personnel because of suspicions of espionage and the
great decrease in purchasing functions, the Army could not keep on sending
in additional personnel without running a great risk of rousing the
suspicions of American officials, especially those of the Army and Navy, and
eventually of having the activities of our per¬sonnel severely restricted.
Therefore, I think it would be more advisable to keep the number of our
personnel resident in America down to the minimum and to utilize this
personnel to fill out and strengthen our intelligence network."
"3. The personnel I should like to have remain in the United States to the
end are:
The Attaché, Col. IWAKURO,
2 Aides (These in Washington)
1 Technical Resident Official,
1 Technical Resident Supervisor and Col. SHINJO.
(These in New York.)
I have in previous wires stated my views on the matter of appointing those
of the above who do not enjoy diplomatic privileges to the position of Local
Aides. Until this is done, it will be next to impossible to ensure their
personal security."
V.49, Rome to "Circular: Bucharest, Moscow", 20 June 1941, spy report on
German Supreme HQ location.
V.54, Bangkok to Tokyo, 3 May, spy report.
No. V.56
FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) May 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Autumn (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.)) # 861.
Intelligence from Japanese Agents who have infiltrated Victoria Point (at
the southeast tip of Burma).
1. About 200 GURKHA and Indian troops are stationed there, and they have
some light tanks.
2. Central part. There are two emergency airfields, but no warplanes are in
evidence. Furthermore, there are no hangers, and planes land but
infrequently.
3. In the bay there are some small ships, two of them being gunboats; also
there are two destroyer squadrons on patrol.
4. It is rumored that 1000 Chinese troops are stationed at Moulmein.
V.64, Mexico to Tokyo, 1 May 1941, about 50 Germans sailing on a Japanese
ship, one of whom is named as a spy.
Volume V "Additional Messages Found in 1977." Tokyo to Stockholm, 12
November 1941, regarding clearing up the status with Polish authorities of a
Polish officer now doing vital work with the Kwantung Army.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email