No Allied advance after the second battle of El Alamein

[SolomonW]

After the Second Battle of El Alamein the allied forces broke through the
Axis line and forced them all the way back to Tunisia.

What if they had not advanced, we would still have the Allied Torch
landings in North-West Africa. From there the Allies could have moved East
to Tunsia and bypassed the German army in the rest of North Africa.

[John Dallman]

Post by SolomonW
After the Second Battle of El Alamein the allied forces broke
through the Axis line and forced them all the way back to Tunisia.
What if they had not advanced, we would still have the Allied Torch
landings in North-West Africa. From there the Allies could have
moved East to Tunsia and bypassed the German army in the rest of
North Africa.

Why would they not advance? The Axis forces retreated, to avoid being
encircled and destroyed. If you allow an enemy to retreat without pursuit,
he can re-organise and come back at you.

The point was to clear the Axis powers out of North Africa.

John

[The Horny Goat]

Post by John Dallman
Why would they not advance? The Axis forces retreated, to avoid being
encircled and destroyed. If you allow an enemy to retreat without pursuit,
he can re-organise and come back at you.

Given Rommel had repeatedly done just that (not saying the British
didn't advance when they could! please don't report me as saying
that...)

Post by John Dallman
The point was to clear the Axis powers out of North Africa.

Indeed - if the point is to destroy the enemy and the enemy retreats
then not advancing makes achieving your purpose impossible.
Theoretically I suppose the Torch forces could advance all the way to
El Alamein but that's not how you win a war!

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by SolomonW
After the Second Battle of El Alamein the allied forces broke through the
Axis line and forced them all the way back to Tunisia.
What if they had not advanced, we would still have the Allied Torch
landings in North-West Africa. From there the Allies could have moved East
to Tunsia and bypassed the German army in the rest of North Africa.

Historically, the Torch forces were unable to move east fast enough to
occupy Tunisia and prevent the Axis reinforcements into Tunis.

And when they did encounter significant German/Italian forces, the
Kasserine demonstrated that they were not yet sufficiently prepared to
defeat those forces. The problems with training, leadership, and
logistics took some time to work out.

A stalemate in the east in Libya with the British Eighth Army would only
have enabled the Axis to divert even more resources to opposing any
Allied forces attempting to move east into Tunisia from the west.

Eventually the Allies would have prevailed but without 2nd El Alemein,
the outcome would have been certainly delayed, perhaps as late as August
or September.

[Haydn]

Post by Bill Shatzer
A stalemate in the east in Libya with the British Eighth Army would only
have enabled the Axis to divert even more resources to opposing any
Allied forces attempting to move east into Tunisia from the west.

It would have been impossible to supply two main fronts (Alamein and
Tunisia) thousand miles apart from one another.

In 1942-early '43 Italy could, and did, ship a maximum of about 100,000
tons of material per month to Africa, the Balkans and the Aegean Sea.
That was the utmost port capacity and available tonnage allowed. Out of
those 100,000 tons, 30,000 were earmarked for the Balkans and the
Aegean. The forces in Africa had to make do with 60,000 tons per month
(the wartime average was actually 64,000 tons).

60-64,000 tons was the monthly amount of supplies required (discounting
all Rommel claims to the contrary) to keep his army battleworthy until
Alamein. The same amount was acknowledged by Von Arnim, the overall
commander in Tunisia, as "barely sufficient" for his two armies. Split
that amount in two and neither Arnim nor Rommel, at the opposite ends of
a thousand miles line, can live and work.

After Alamein, Rommel could retreat all the way into Tunisia relatively
well supplied because his army had shrunk to a mere battlegroup and he
was drawing nearer and nearer Tripoli, the supply terminus. It would
have been simply out of the question to keep adequately supplied two
large and widely separated forces simultaneously. Even had Rommel
trounced the British at Alamein, he would have had to withdraw in the
wake of the Allied landings in North Africa.

By the way, the ceiling put by port and transport bottlenecks on the
amount of supplies that could be delivered to Rommel's army on a monthly
basis meant that the army could not gather significantly more firepower
and staying power than that it would have on the eve of Alamein. At
most, it might have received some "tactical surprise" units such as a
Tiger tank battalion and Nebelwerfer rocket artillery, which indeed
Hitler promised to Rommel. While those weapons could have made the
British going rougher, it's hard to believe they might have won the
battle for Rommel.

Haydn

[Michael Emrys]

Post by SolomonW
What if they had not advanced, we would still have the Allied Torch
landings in North-West Africa. From there the Allies could have moved East
to Tunsia and bypassed the German army in the rest of North Africa.

I don't think it would work the way you are describing. The Germans and
Italians would still move strong forces into Tunisia that would take
months to overcome. Meanwhile the Afrika Korps is still on the loose
somewhere between Tripoli and el Alamein and no doubt causing trouble.
Finally, the 8th. Army would not be available to conquer Tunisia. So
from where I sit, it looks like your plan would mean the war in North
Africa would last up to another six months or so with the war overall
probably doing the same.

Michael

[Haydn]

Post by Michael Emrys
So
from where I sit, it looks like your plan would mean the war in North
Africa would last up to another six months or so with the war overall
probably doing the same.

The war might have lasted longer if

1) Rommel's Kasserine offensive plan (early, Rommel's own version) had
succeeded - unlikely, or

2) according to Rommel's proposed course of action, Tunisia had been
held by a bridgehead force just for as long as it would take the
Panzerarmee Afrika veterans to be shipped back to Italy, where they
would then rest and reorganize. *And* Hitler had given green light to
substantially beef up the German garrisons in Southern Italy and on the
islands.

Any chances this scenario could come true were however ruled out by the
Axis management of the Tunisian campaign. Initially the decision was
taken to commit to Tunisia a major force to hold the area as long as
possible, with no thoughts of repatriating Rommel's men and then
evacuating the bridgehead.

Then in early 1943, after Rommel's failure at Kasserine, the German
policy changed dramatically and they decided to relinquish the doomed
Tunisian front by gradually whittling supplies and reinforcements away.

This may sound odd but the evidence of the German supplies shipped to
Tunisia speaks for itself. In April 1943 the amount of supplies shipped
to Tunisia was one third smaller than in March. The average 15,000+ tons
of fuel for German motor use was also reduced by a third, dropping to
10,000. Ammunition and foodstuffs for German units were nearly halved.
In March, 77,193 tons of material had left Italian ports bound for
Tunisia. In April, only 48,703 tons did.

Only a half of the Tiger tank battalion earmarked for Tunisia landed in
North Africa, the other half being kept in Sicily - as early as March.
Ditto with the Hermann Goering Division. Along with those rumps, over
the end of March-early May period the Germans only sent to Tunisia the
999th Infantry Division, a brigade size discipline unit made of
court-martialled soldiers they had little use for, in the company of a
few hundred French pro-Nazi volunteers in the 754th Infantry Regiment.
The Wehrmacht's "unsold stock".

In the meantime the same amount of supplies and reinforcements as over
the previous months would be shipped to the Italian units within the 5th
Panzerarmee, but clearly they couldn't take on the vastly reinforced
Allies on their own as the Germans were shutting up shop.

Haydn

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Haydn
2) according to Rommel's proposed course of action, Tunisia had been
held by a bridgehead force just for as long as it would take the
Panzerarmee Afrika veterans to be shipped back to Italy...

If DAK troops were to be evacuated from Africa,
why not evacuate them from Tobruk, Darna, and
Benghazi? This also implies that DAK troops were
so special that it was worth sacrificing other
troops to extract them. Even Rommel would not
make such a claim explicitly.

Post by Haydn
Then in early 1943, after Rommel's failure at Kasserine, the German
policy changed dramatically and they decided to relinquish the doomed
Tunisian front by gradually whittling supplies and reinforcements away.

Is there any record of such a decision being made?

The decision would have been made by Hitler, and
officially set down in the records of OKW; also in
the memoirs and diaries of his military staff, such
as Keitel.

It seems rather peculiar to send an army level force
to Tunisia (5th Panzer Army), then decide the theater
was lost, and continue to supply it at well over half
of its "full" level. And to _reinforce_ it.

Post by Haydn
This may sound odd but the evidence of the German supplies shipped to
Tunisia speaks for itself. In April 1943 the amount of supplies shipped
to Tunisia was one third smaller than in March.

By April 1943, the Allies were pressing into southern
Tunisia, so wouldn't that constrict Axis supply? Malta

Post by Haydn
The average 15,000+ tons of fuel for German motor
use was also reduced by a third, dropping to 10,000.

That seems like a _lot_ of fuel.

Post by Haydn
Ammunition and foodstuffs for German units were nearly halved.
In March, 77,193 tons of material had left Italian ports bound for
Tunisia. In April, only 48,703 tons did.
In the meantime the same amount of supplies and reinforcements as over
the previous months would be shipped to the Italian units within the 5th
Panzerarmee, but clearly they couldn't take on the vastly reinforced
Allies on their own as the Germans were shutting up shop.

One would think that since all the shipping was handled
by the Italians that they would notice this discrepancy
and react. Or was it that the Italians prioritized supplies
to their own troops?

This quote would indicate that the Germans wanted to
ship more than they did.

United States Army in World War II
Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative In the West
by
George F. Howe

Chapter XXXIV The End in Tunisia
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-MTO-NWA/USA-MTO-NWA-34.html


"Perhaps the present positions could be held with
several battalions," Kesselring said to General
Ambrosio, "but the present rate of transportation is
too slow to bring the necessary reinforcements in
time." He suggested the diversion to Tunisia of small
ships then being used to convoy matériel to Sardinia,
and in Hitler's name again proposed the temporary
employment of a convoy of ships of the Italian Navy to
carry up to one division from the backlog of German
troops awaiting shipment to Tunisia. He repeatedly
urged the use of Italian destroyers even for carrying
supplies, since everything was needed at once--fuel,
munitions, and men.
=======

This was on 27-28 April, and it certainly does not
sound like the Germans had given up on Tunisia.

[Haydn]

Post by Rich Rostrom
If DAK troops were to be evacuated from Africa,
why not evacuate them from Tobruk, Darna, and
Benghazi?

Who or what would have delayed 8th Army's advance on Tripoli then?
Assuming DAK could be evacuated from those minor ports soon to be within
RAF's tactical range and not well defended.

Post by Rich Rostrom
This also implies that DAK troops were
so special that it was worth sacrificing other
troops to extract them. Even Rommel would not
make such a claim explicitly.

After Alamein, Rommel consistently disregarded or fooled all Italian
urges to stop somewhere along the way back to Tripoli and make a
determined stand. All sources concur on his gloomy pessimism on the
outcome of the campaign and his intention not to fight on, but to
extricate his troops from the African trap before it was too late. Once
in Tunisia and facing a (for the time being) stabilized situation, his
morale picked up - for a while.

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Haydn
Then in early 1943, after Rommel's failure at Kasserine, the German
policy changed dramatically and they decided to relinquish the doomed
Tunisian front by gradually whittling supplies and reinforcements away.

Is there any record of such a decision being made?

No, there isn't any. It's an educated guess. There was strife and
dissension at Hitler's headquarters through 1943 about how to continue
the war and not everything happened in broad daylight and in written
form. You correctly point out where Kesselring stood regarding the
Tunisian theater, but Kesselring was operating at a lower command and
decision-making level, and that was his own opinion and viewpoint, not
necessarily that of Hitler or OKW. When Sicily was invaded, Hitler
ordered that the island be held at all costs and even to build up more
strength for more counterattacks. Yet on July 13th OKW (meaning Jodl)
imparted secret orders going in the opposite direction - prepare for a
well timed evacuation not only of Sicily but the whole Southern Italy.

Post by Rich Rostrom
It seems rather peculiar to send an army level force
to Tunisia (5th Panzer Army), then decide the theater
was lost, and continue to supply it at well over half
of its "full" level. And to _reinforce_ it.

It is peculiar indeed. And not the only peculiar thing. About the end of
February, von Arnim apparently stated that his stocks would have allowed
his army group to operate until July 1st, 1943, "even without any
further resupplying".

On March 15th, Hitler said that the army group would need a monthly
minimum of 140,000 tons of supplies, a totally farfetched figure since
both Axis armies in Tunisia, unless they received massive
reinforcements, could demonstrably live and fight with an average 60,000
tons of supplies per month. A few days later, Arnim readjusted his
February assessment and set the deadline at the end of May. Yet nothing
had happened in the course of the operational war that could justify the
second thought - despite growing and painful losses, the Italian Navy
was keeping up its job of keeping the front supplied as before.

In other words, it may be Hitler had been persuaded to give up Tunisia
without much further fighting and the Germans were manoeuvering to lay
the blame for the defeat on Italy's supposed inability to keep the front
supplied, a tune the Germans loved to sing.

Post by Rich Rostrom
One would think that since all the shipping was handled
by the Italians that they would notice this discrepancy
and react.

They could do little to prevent the Germans from having their way, and
at any rate they were just trying to pull out of the war without getting
hurt too much in doing so. In March 1943 a secret, behind-close-doors
meeting between Italian big corporation CEOs and Fascist Party figures
took place during which the former basically said a way out of the war
must be found and quickly, if possible by means of an agreement with the
FDR Administration and keeping the British out of the deal for God's
sake, and the latter didn't say a word. A private word was said by
Mussolini shortly thereafter, when speaking to the Fascist Party
secretary he said "it's time to shut up shop, don't you think".

Or was it that the Italians prioritized supplies

Post by Rich Rostrom
to their own troops?

No, to the contrary and despite all complaints lodged by the Germans,
supplies were prioritized to German combat units. In Tunisia there was
also a large civilian population (Arabs, French and Italians) to feed,
larger than the 900,000 in Libya.

Post by Rich Rostrom
This quote would indicate that the Germans wanted to
ship more than they did.

The quote indicates that Kesselring the staunch optimist may have wanted
to ship more than they did, but Kesselring was not at the helm of the
Wehrmacht and Germany's war. Besides, it's hard to believe Kesselring
was not aware of the constrictions the Italian Navy was operating under.
And that they may not have been bursting with enthusiasm at the idea of
having even more ships sunk for the sake of extending the lifetime of
the Tunisian bridgehead by a few weeks.

Haydn

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Haydn

Post by Rich Rostrom
If DAK troops were to be evacuated from Africa,
why not evacuate them from Tobruk, Darna, and Benghazi?

Who or what would have delayed 8th Army's advance on Tripoli then?
Assuming DAK could be evacuated from those minor ports soon to be within
RAF's tactical range and not well defended.

After the retreat from Cyrenaica, Tripoli and Tunis
were "within RAF's tactical range."

Post by Haydn

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Haydn
Then in early 1943, after Rommel's failure at Kasserine, the German
policy changed dramatically and they decided to relinquish the doomed
Tunisian front by gradually whittling supplies and reinforcements away.

Is there any record of such a decision being made?

No, there isn't any. It's an educated guess.

Then it should not be asserted as a fact. Since no
German is on record stating that policy, and in
_known_ fact, the German commander of the theater
had a completely opposite policy, and German
reinforcements and supplies continued at a very
substantial level (vastly exceeding reinforcements
and roughly equaling supplies to Italian forces),
it seems like a very dubious inference.

Post by Haydn
When Sicily was invaded, Hitler ordered that the
island be held at all costs and even to build up
more strength for more counterattacks. Yet on July
13th OKW (meaning Jodl) imparted secret orders going
in the opposite direction - prepare for a well timed
evacuation not only of Sicily but the whole Southern Italy.

Prepare for - not execute. As there were already rumors
of Italian defection, such preparations were quite
sensible.

Post by Haydn
In other words, it may be Hitler had been persuaded to give up Tunisia
without much further fighting and the Germans were manoeuvering to lay
the blame for the defeat on Italy's supposed inability to keep the front
supplied, a tune the Germans loved to sing.

This is rampant conspiracy theory. There is no
evidence that the Germans intentionally "shut down"
Tunisia, except the decline in supplies, which is
parallel to the decline in Italian supplies, and
is much more easily explained by losses of shipping
and more effective Allied interdiction.

The assertion is that the Germans sent tens of thousands
of troops, many of them expensively equipped panzer troops,
and tens of thousands of tonnes of supplies, including
critically needed motor fuel, to Tunisia _after_ deciding
(secretly) that the battle was lost, merely to have an
excuse to blame Italy.

One would think that OKW was already more interested in what
postwar historians might say than in fighting the war.

[Haydn]

Post by Rich Rostrom
It seems rather peculiar to send an army level force
to Tunisia (5th Panzer Army), then decide the theater
was lost, and continue to supply it at well over half
of its "full" level. And to _reinforce_ it.

As to the reinforcements, as I wrote, from the end of March to the end
of the campaign they were sort of symbolic. For the show, no real
substance. A serious effort to extend the viability of the Tunisian
bridgehead would have required a change in the overall German war
strategy and policy they were entirely unwilling to take into consideration.

Haydn

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Haydn
This may sound odd but the evidence of the German supplies shipped to
Tunisia speaks for itself. In April 1943 the amount of supplies shipped to
Tunisia was one third smaller than in March. The average 15,000+ tons of
fuel for German motor use was also reduced by a third, dropping to 10,000.
Ammunition and foodstuffs for German units were nearly halved. In March,
77,193 tons of material had left Italian ports bound for Tunisia. In
April, only 48,703 tons did.

Cargo lost en route, November 1942, to May 1943 as a percentage
of shipped to North Africa,

18.5, 31.7, 21.3, 22.8, 35.7, 41.2, 76.7

Losing so much of the shipped supplies must have had an impact on
cargo capacity as well as the willingness to actually ship the supplies.

Fuel arrivals, long tons in Tunisia, November 1942 to May 1943.

11,947, 14,838, 25,580, 14,798, 16,634, 10,052, 623.

(Libya, 21,731 tons in November, 2,058 in December, 24 in January)

All up Tunisia received by sea, stores (tons): 115,875 Italian Army,
2,787 Italian Navy, 4,054 Italian Air Force, 183,806 German.

Personnel arriving in Tunisia by sea,

13,302, 19,503, 17,567, 10,366, 8,891, 2,617, 0

All up Tunisia received by sea, personnel: 15,973 Italian Army,
6,710 Italian Navy, 229 Italian Air Force, 49,344 Germans

The US Army history says German cargo arriving by sea, probably in
short tons, (excluding vehicles and guns) was

32,374, 22,613, 31,662, 28,013, 21,616, 18,690, 2,163

by air

3,688, 5,593, 4,664, 4,953, 7,651, 4,327, 510

German personnel arriving by air,

15,273, 18,162, 14,257, 12,893, 11,756, 8,388, 292

If you add the air transport then the fall off in supplies and men
does not decrease as much.

German personnel arriving by sea November 1942 onward were
49,464 out of 72,246 recorded arrivals.

Note of the 1,929,995 tons of cargo recorded as arriving in
North Africa June 1940 to January 1943 254,621 was for
civilian use, 554,885 for the Germans, 84,046 for the Italian
Navy and 942,698 for the Italian Army.

The average freight cargo on the Libyan run was around 4,100
tons, that on the Tunisia run 750 tons.

Post by Haydn
Only a half of the Tiger tank battalion earmarked for Tunisia landed in
North Africa, the other half being kept in Sicily - as early as March.

The shipping losses are a good reason.

Post by Haydn
Ditto with the Hermann Goering Division. Along with those rumps, over the
end of March-early May period the Germans only sent to Tunisia the 999th
Infantry Division, a brigade size discipline unit made of court-martialled
soldiers they had little use for, in the company of a few hundred French
pro-Nazi volunteers in the 754th Infantry Regiment. The Wehrmacht's
"unsold stock".
In the meantime the same amount of supplies and reinforcements as over the
previous months would be shipped to the Italian units within the 5th
Panzerarmee, but clearly they couldn't take on the vastly reinforced
Allies on their own as the Germans were shutting up shop.

What were the vast reinforcements arriving say from February 1943 on?

As I am unsure about the definition of tons in the US history I can only
note tonnages arriving in Tunisia by sea November 1942 to May 1943
for are reported as

34,339, 60,619, 70,193, 60,038, 49,631, 28,623, 3,359

To repeat the US Army history says German cargo arriving by sea,
probably in short tons, (excluding vehicles and guns) was

32,374, 22,613, 31,662, 28,013, 21,616, 18,690, 2,163

That would leave, assuming "tons" is the same, arrivals for the
Italian forces in the order of,

1,965, 38,006, 38,531, 32,025, 28,015, 9,922, 1,196.

So more supplies for the Italian forces December 1942 to March
1943, then a major falling off to less than German tonnages.

To repeat, personnel arriving in Tunisia by sea,

13,302, 19,503, 17,567, 10,366, 8,891, 2,617, 0

Germans arriving by sea are said to be,

1,377, 12,621, 16,617, 7,828, 8,383, 2,508, 0

Again Italian arrivals drop away before German, then add the
air transported totals.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.