Morgenthau Plan

Post by Jeff Drew
I have searched the archives and can find no discussion within the
last few years on the U.S. and the implementation of the Morgenthau
plan.

Have you checked if new books have been published since 2004? If not, the
old discussions are perfectly serviceable.

Don Phillipson

2010-10-28 20:07:05 UTC

Post by Jeff Drew
I have searched the archives and can find no discussion within the
last few years on the U.S. and the implementation of the Morgenthau
plan. So, was the Plan ever taken seriously? If so when did it stop being
a
serious policy, and was it the basis of the initial post war
occupation of Germany? Did Roosevelt support the plan until the day
before his death?

We know the Morgenthau Plan (to reduce Germany to an all-agricultural
state, forbidden to have the sort of industries necessary for modern
warfare)
was never implemented. This was the private project of a US politician
(and
semiretired public official) and never proposed to the other Great Powers
that agreed (e.g. at the Yalta Conference, Feb. 1945) to occupy the whole of
Germany after the war. So its status in the mind of Pres. Roosevelt (who
died in April 1945) remains solely notional. (The Nazi Propaganda Ministry
knew the gist of the plan, and may have used this in campaigns to stiffen
German resistance, perhaps to some effect: but no one can judge whether
Morgenthau outweighed in this respect actual German experience on the
Eastern Front.)

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

Rich Rostrom

2010-10-29 07:53:18 UTC

This was the private project of a US politician (and
semiretired public official)

Morgenthau was not a politician - he never held or
ran for elective office - and was not semiretired
in 1944 when he proposed the Plan - he was
Treasury Secretary until July 1945. The plan
was drawn up by him and his staff at Treasury.

and never proposed to the other Great Powers
that agreed (e.g. at the Yalta Conference, Feb. 1945) to occupy the whole of
Germany after the war.

It was officially proposed by Roosevelt to
Churchill at the QUADRANT conference
in Queben in September 1944, and agreed
to by Churchill in a secret memorandum
signed by the two leaders.

So its status in the mind of Pres. Roosevelt (who
died in April 1945) remains solely notional.

Roosevelt liked it well enough to push it
on Churchill.

The Plan was never formally adopted as
Allied policy, and was eventually repudiated,
but it should not be dismissed as "notional".

Tim Hicks

2010-10-29 22:22:40 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom

This was the private project of a US politician (and
semiretired public official)

and never proposed to the other Great Powers
that agreed (e.g. at the Yalta Conference, Feb. 1945) to occupy the whole of
Germany after the war.

It was officially proposed by Roosevelt to
Churchill at the QUADRANT conference
in Queben in September 1944, and agreed
to by Churchill in a secret memorandum
signed by the two leaders.

So its status in the mind of Pres. Roosevelt (who
died in April 1945) remains solely notional.

Roosevelt liked it well enough to push it
on Churchill.
The Plan was never formally adopted as
Allied policy, and was eventually repudiated,
but it should not be dismissed as "notional".

Indeed it should not be dismissed as notional, considering it was
still so alive in 1947, after 2 years of occupation, that former U.S.
president Hoover, in his twilight years working on feeding the world,
wrote in a report commissioned by the government that:

"there is the illusion that the new Germany left after the annexations
can be reduced to a "Pastoral State." It cannot be done unless we
exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it."
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=turn&entity=History.omg1947n087.p0030&id=History.omg1947n087&isize=M

Whatever repudiation there may have been, it was probably more for
show. The Morgenthau plan found it's way into many U.S. policy
instruments, such as the Potsdam conference where the U.S. economic
proposals were the ones accepted by the other powers. Also the U.S.
occupation directive JCS 1067, in place until the summer 1947, was a
direct offspring of the Morgenthau plan. It replaced the occupation
handbook that had been drafted in 1944 but that both Morgenthau and
Roosevelt found far too lenient. This new directive that was drafted
as a consequence of this had at its focus the de-industrialization of
Germany.

It also included some scattered words on democracy, and on ensuring
that starvation would not reach such levels that U.S. troops might be
put into jeopardy from riots and diseases, but the core was: Do
nothing that will help the German economy. We have taken control over
the economy away from the Germans, and you are now to do nothing that
would serve to even maintain the economy at current levels. Let things
slide into chaos for the Germans.

In formal wording what it stated was: "take no steps (a) looking
toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to
maintain or strengthen the German economy"

So essentially, in the most important part of the occupation, the
critical first years, the Morgenthau plan was the acted upon policy.
According to Allan Lightner, Assistant Chief, 1945-47, and Associate
Chief, 1947-48, of the Central European Affairs Division, Department
of State

...those [Morgenthau plan] ideas permeated much of American thinking,
especially in the War Department, right up to the time of Secretary
[James F.] Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech in [September] 1946.
They were reflected in the basic directive for the occupation of
Germany, which was a kind of Bible for all that was done during the
early days of the occupation, the paper known as JSC-1067.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lightner.htm#46

The British Government of late 1946 seems to agree with Lightner, as
does president Harry S. Truman and his Secretary of State James
Byrnes, unless the British government is lying in its private meeting
minutes.:
b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart
speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel
prodn to 5.8 m.
Before this was completed I had seen Byrnes (before Stuttgart
speech) & asked wtr. this meant he wd. overthrow Morgenthau policy. He
said yes - with Truman's authy.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2006/march/policy_germany.htm

And why did U.S. policy eventually start to change away from the
Morgenthau plan? It was discovered that the German economy was vital
to that of the rest of Europe, shutting Germany down meant shutting
Europe down. In July 1947 Time magazine wrote the following.

"Without Ruhr coal, and without the German industrial output which
depends on Ruhr coal, the rest of Europe cannot recover." " Whatever
article we take, we finish up against a blank wall--Germany. It is the
fact that Germany is not there which paralyzes our calculations." "To
help remedy that paralysis, the U.S. last week issued a new directive
to Germany's occupation chief, General Lucius D. Clay, superseding
Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (which had directed the U.S.
commander to take "no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation
of Germany . . ."). The new directive said: "An orderly, prosperous
Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive
Germany.""
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,887417-1,00.html

I wonder which the reason for the post-surrender Morgenthau plan
repudiation was, the above one, or Hoovers cold an clinical analysis
from a few months earlier:
"It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people
out of it."

Luckily probably only several hundred thousand had time to die in this
failed economical experiment before the Americans aborted it, and then
forgot all bout it.
http://www.german-films.de/app/filmarchive/film_view.php?film_id=1992

Cheerio

William Black

2010-10-30 16:16:48 UTC

Post by Tim Hicks
Luckily probably only several hundred thousand had time to die in this
failed economical experiment before the Americans aborted it, and then
forgot all bout it.
http://www.german-films.de/app/filmarchive/film_view.php?film_id=1992

I don't for one minute suppose you haev any evidence that the bad times
in 1946 were a matter of policy.

Your 'puff piece' about a movie described by its makers as ...a gripping
mixture of fact and fiction... isn't proof of anything but a movie.

The 'Pastoralisation of Germany' is about as realistic as British plans
to drop Anthrax.

It was proposed and rejected...

As for famine in Germany, it's what happens when they use U-boats
against the UK...

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

Tim Hicks

2010-10-30 17:30:13 UTC

Post by William Black

I don't for one minute suppose you haev any evidence that the bad times
in 1946 were a matter of policy.
Your 'puff piece' about a movie described by its makers as ...a gripping
mixture of fact and fiction... isn't proof of anything but a movie.
The 'Pastoralisation of Germany' is about as realistic as British plans
to drop Anthrax.
It was proposed and rejected...
As for famine in Germany, it's what happens when they use U-boats
against the UK...

I'm sorry to see that you apparently were distracted by the last
source I provided and therefore ignored all the others. I see no need
waste my time by trying to repeat myself in any case. I provided
sources, you provide statements of opinion with no backing evidence.

The thing about U-boats intrigues me though, are you claiming the
famine in occupied Germany was justified since the Germans chose to
use u-boats during wartime?

As for the movie page, it's a bit disingenuous to talk about the
docudrama itself, why not also cite another part:
"Historians estimate, as best they can, that in Germany alone
several hundred thousand people perished from the effects of the cold
and hunger."

Post by William Black
I don't for one minute suppose you haev any evidence that the bad times
in 1946 were a matter of policy.

I've shown very clearly, with backing links, that Morgenthau was the
policy, if you publicly wish to disregard the evidence of the cited
high-level politicians and civil servants then that is up to you of
course.
It really doesn't take a genius to see that a country that needs large
food imports during normal times will suffer tremendously if you first
take away one quarter of their agricultural land, squeeze together the
former inhabitants into what is left of the country, and then start
taking away big chunks of the remaining industry so they will have
much less to pay for food imports with.

But wait, there are more sources to ignore.

"As part of the JCS 1067 punishment philosophy, U.S. forces were not
supposed to provide ordinary relief. Troops were specifically ordered
not to let American food supplies go to hungry Germans. American
households were instructed not to let their German maids have
leftovers; excess food was to be destroyed or rendered inedible."
http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=599

So, during the Morgenthau time no American food for the starving
Germans, thats what you get for using naughty submarines... but wait,
there's more. It is not enough that the Americans were actively
destroying food. What about the food the Germans themselves were
growing on their fields, inadequate in numbers as these fields may
have been? Col. Stanley Andrews made the following discovery in 1945:
http://web.archive.org/web/20070204000806/www.bluechromis.com/stan/retread.txt

"The whole economy of the American zone in West Germany, that which
had not been destroyed by the bombing and the fighting, had come to a
virtual standstill. Nothing moved or was undertaken by Germans
themselves except by permission of the military. The military
controlled fuel, transportation, food supplies, money -- the works."

"I sought and received an appointment -- one might call it an audience
-- with General Eisenhower's chief of staff, the late Lieutenant
General Walter Bedell "Beetle" Smith. General Smith had the reputation
of being rough but fair. After a few remarks on who I was and where I
had come from, I broached the subject of action on opening factories,
setting up machinery, loosening up transportation, labor, materials,
(binder twine, horseshoes, etc.) and releasing prisoners so that the
harvest could be gotten in promptly. I reported that I had flown over
Southern Germany coming in and it appeared from a rather low altitude
that fields all had been planted and were ripe with a good harvest,
especially wheat, rye, and barley."

"General Smith listened, but in the end said simply: 'Don't get too
worked up and concerned about these Germans, the policy is to make it
hard on these SOBs to get going again.' "

Cherioooooo

William Black

2010-10-31 04:32:53 UTC

Post by Tim Hicks
The thing about U-boats intrigues me though, are you claiming the
famine in occupied Germany was justified since the Germans chose to
use u-boats during wartime?

I'm saying that if you try and use food as a weapon, then food become a
weapon, and weapons sometimes have distressing side effects.

Post by Tim Hicks
"General Smith listened, but in the end said simply: 'Don't get too
worked up and concerned about these Germans, the policy is to make it
hard on these SOBs to get going again.' "

It sounds reasonable to me.

Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

Tim Hicks

2010-10-31 18:16:11 UTC

Post by William Black
I'm saying that if you try and use food as a weapon, then food become a
weapon, and weapons sometimes have distressing side effects.

Refusing to feed a civilian population under military occupation is
not only morally wrong but is also is a crime under the Hague
convention, article 43. Those responsible for the decision and those
"obeying orders" and implementing it are therefore all war-criminals.
Trying to enforce a blockade of a country during wartime is something
else completely, and no German was ever punished for the U-boat
blockade, despite loosing the war and therefore being eligible to be
tried for war-crimes.
If you want to split hairs Admiral Doeniz was indicted on breaching a
naval treaty, but since Admiral Nimiz had admitted that the U.S.
conducted unrestricted submarine warfare the Nuremberg judges didn't
want to be seen as too hypocritical and therefore did not pass
sentence.

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Ah, ze Geeermanz...
I leave without further comment your horrifying implicit argument that
starving people means no more wars. I also see you simplify things by
restricting your argument to Europe, seeing as for example Britain
meanwhile invaded large parts of the rest of the world, e.g. almost
all of Africa. Germany started a war in Europe in 1939 when under the
heels of a national-socialist dictatorship that got into power much
thanks to the miserable situation British and French revenge policies
after the 1914-1918 war had led to, exacerbated by the great
depression in 1932.

Then there is the 1914 - 1918 war, driven by the Austrio-Hungarians,
but for which all main protagonist share the blame, so not only the
Germans. Incidentally the British had a go at starving the German
civilians both during that war and also after the war too.
http://mises.org/daily/4308

And then what? The 1870 war between Germany and France, then led by
Napolen III? I hope not, since this war was definitively declared by
and started by France.
Sweet Napoleon III of France obviously made a mistake then, but things
had gone so well before trying to invade Germany. Under his leadership
France invaded Russia in the Crimean, fought Austria in Italy and used
the U.S distraction of their civil war to occupy Mexico. After the war
in 1870 the American minister in Berlin, Bancroft, wrote very lucidly
to the German foreign ministry:

"The leading statesmen as well as public opinion in America regard
the present war essentially as an act of self-defense on Germany's
part, and the outstanding task is to ensure Germany permanently, by a
better system of frontiers, against new wars of aggression on the part
of her western neighbors, of which the past three centuries have
brought so large a number."
http://www.fredautley.com/roadtowar.htm

Makes at least me think.

William Black

2010-10-31 23:54:42 UTC

Post by William Black
I'm saying that if you try and use food as a weapon, then food become a
weapon, and weapons sometimes have distressing side effects.

Balls.

There was a general food shortage in Europe in 1946/7.

It is not a duty to feed an occupied country if your own is starving.

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

Geoffrey Sinclair

2010-11-01 04:25:16 UTC

Post by William Black
I'm saying that if you try and use food as a weapon, then food become a
weapon, and weapons sometimes have distressing side effects.

Wondered how long this claim would take to come up. Trouble is the
world food situation was bad post WWII, in Germany the Nazis had
done things like convert food into fuel. The allies found the Germans
were the best fed people encountered, the countryside was well off,
the cities were about to starve though.

People did starve to death in post war Japan, see the newspaper
articles. Perhaps you can point out similar information for Germany.

Given the wartime famines in Greece and Holland you have just
announced lots of German soldiers are war criminals, then there
are all those Japanese in China.

The US army in Europe cut rations to its non combat troops by 10%
in 1945, the combat troops followed after the surrender. The US
Quartermaster service was busy warning of food shortages.

Allied civil relief supplies to The European Theatre of Operations, long
tons,
by quarter, excluding liquid fuels,

Q2/44 727 (In other words 6 to 30 June 1944)
Q3/44 157,639
Q4/44 588,968
Q1/45 1,359,657
Q2/45 2,336,556
Q3/45 2,211,080

Total 6,654,627 long tons, in addition a further 6,853,313 long tons was
sent to the Mediterranean in the same time period. Overall the mix was
roughly 50:50 food:coal, with England supplying more coal and the US
more food, all up the US supplied 6,788,765 tons, England 6,098,902 tons
and Canada 620,273 tons.

So over 6 million tons of food sent to Europe by the end of September
1945.

Post by Tim Hicks
Trying to enforce a blockade of a country during wartime is something
else completely, and no German was ever punished for the U-boat
blockade, despite loosing the war and therefore being eligible to be
tried for war-crimes.

In either wars.

By the way in one of the supporting articles the British blockade in WWI
is declared illegal, since it was a distant, not close, blockade, as would
be
the U-boat efforts, so make up your mind about blockades.

Post by Tim Hicks
If you want to split hairs Admiral Doeniz was indicted on breaching a
naval treaty, but since Admiral Nimiz had admitted that the U.S.
conducted unrestricted submarine warfare the Nuremberg judges didn't
want to be seen as too hypocritical and therefore did not pass
sentence.

There were 4 counts at the Nuremburg trials, Doenitz was charged with
the first 3, aggressive war, violation of treaties, war crimes including
treatment of prisoners and workers. Guilty on counts 2 and 3, not guilty
on count 1, 10 years.

Think Laconia order and the workforce building U-boats. Plus some
speeches he gave.

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/NurembergIndictments.html

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Ah, ze Geeermanz...

If previous bad experiences are supposed to prevent war in the
future then war would have stopped centuries ago.

Post by Tim Hicks
I leave without further comment your horrifying implicit argument that
starving people means no more wars.

Actually you commented, "horrifying", need to keep the story straight.

Post by Tim Hicks
I also see you simplify things by
restricting your argument to Europe, seeing as for example Britain
meanwhile invaded large parts of the rest of the world, e.g. almost
all of Africa.

By the way, did those places in Africa, the Pacific and Asia that
became German colonies during things like the Scramble for
Africa apply for German governance, or were they also invaded
during this time period?

Post by Tim Hicks
Germany started a war in Europe in 1939 when under the
heels of a national-socialist dictatorship that got into power much
thanks to the miserable situation British and French revenge policies
after the 1914-1918 war had led to, exacerbated by the great
depression in 1932.

Yes we know there is a group of people trying to externalise the
reasons for the Nazis, rather than deal with the reality it was the
German government and the German people followed it to the
very end.

In case you have not noticed large numbers of those who believed
in Germany as dominant power in Europe worked to undermine
the German government in the 1920's, the stab in the back ideas
for example. They did their best to return to the authoritarian
style of government of pre WWI. That helped Hitler a great deal.

Yet amazingly once again it is non Germans that are responsible
for Germans behaving badly.

Post by Tim Hicks
Then there is the 1914 - 1918 war, driven by the Austrio-Hungarians,
but for which all main protagonist share the blame, so not only the
Germans.

How democratic of you, I trust today you are well aware of your
guilt over the deaths of millions in Africa, things like the coltan wars,
keeping those mobile telephony devices working. Plus all the other
bad things going on at the moment. I trust you are starving yourself
in solidarity with those suffering famine at the moment, in Pakistan,
Ethiopia etc. Furthermore if people cite the starvation as a reason
for later violence you will be there saying it is partly your fault.

Mean time consider Austria-Hungary was told by Germany to push
hard as they would be fully supported. And the German war plan
required the invasion of Belgium.

Oh yes, in your who declared war as method of guilt world, remember
in 1914 Germany declared war on Russia, France and invaded Belgium.

The Germans even bombed one of their own cities to provide a reason
to declare war on France.

Post by Tim Hicks
Incidentally the British had a go at starving the German
civilians both during that war and also after the war too.
http://mises.org/daily/4308

Strangely enough during WWI Britain was down to about 6 weeks of
food reserves at one point thanks to the U-boat blockade. Strangely
enough food was rationed in the UK in WWI and WWII and post
WWII and while the WWII rations improved the overall nutrition of
the population, the post WWII rations sent things backwards.

Strangely enough the WWI armistice terms explicitly made it clear the
blockade would continue until the peace treaty was signed.

Oh yes, since the above article says Germany was in famine why
exactly is the German government blameless when it chose to
continue the war amongst a famine? How about all the food the
Germans tried to take from Russia under the Brest-Litovsk treaty?
What was that going to do to the food situation in the east?

Also if the allied actions and treaties are supposed to be responsible
for the Nazis how about the Germans sending Lenin to Russia and
the harsh treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the way it helped the Soviets?
Since it is clear the articles being used are all on the usual theme, the
communists were worse, they were helped by the non Germans and
the Nazis are some Non German's responsibility.

By the way Wilson proposed the 14 points in January 1918, the best
part of a year later the Germans were to discover parts of the offer
had closed.

http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~jobrien/reference/ob34.html

Note article 13 and of course where is the point about no indemnities?
Since again one of the supporting articles makes the claim the allies
promised no indemnities and annexations.

Post by Tim Hicks
And then what? The 1870 war between Germany and France, then led by
Napolen III? I hope not, since this war was definitively declared by
and started by France.

Actually it was Bismarck, he basically wanted the war and made sure
the French were provoked, so while the Kaiser agreed with the French
Bismarck acted independently.

Post by Tim Hicks
Sweet Napoleon III of France obviously made a mistake then, but things
had gone so well before trying to invade Germany. Under his leadership
France invaded Russia in the Crimean, fought Austria in Italy and used
the U.S distraction of their civil war to occupy Mexico.

Napoleon III 1848 to 1873. German Danish War 1864, Austro
Prussian War 1866. At least be consistent and note the German
wars as well.

Post by Tim Hicks
After the war
in 1870 the American minister in Berlin, Bancroft, wrote very lucidly
"The leading statesmen as well as public opinion in America regard
the present war essentially as an act of self-defense on Germany's
part, and the outstanding task is to ensure Germany permanently, by a
better system of frontiers, against new wars of aggression on the part
of her western neighbors, of which the past three centuries have
brought so large a number."
http://www.fredautley.com/roadtowar.htm

Ah yes, the poor innocent peaceful, Germans, forever being invaded,
always the victim, as a result whenever they form a bad government
or go invading it is someone else's fault. Can the French blame the
Romans and English for their behaviour towards German speaking
areas as well?

If you read the article, you will find the usual suspects blamed.

What I like is Britain and France taking territory in Africa is considered
non peaceful but Germany doing do must be peaceful.

Yet again there is supposed to be a strategy to keep the USSR out of
Eastern Europe.

Post by Tim Hicks
Makes at least me think.

No actually, nothing original, just cruising the net looking for quotes
that fit the world view and repeating them.

The fact the Nazis preferred explosives to fertiliser. The
30% of German farm labour being impressed or slave
labour. The wrecking of European economies, the fact
most countries there lost at least one growing season.
The scorched earth. The bad harvests in the post war period.

In WWII,

The USSR received just under 4,500,000 tons of US food
as a start, it was 25% of all the US shipments to the USSR,
ignoring the aircraft. The commonwealth apparently received
between 4.3 and 5.4 percent of the US food harvest under
lend lease in the 1942-44 time period, plus between 4.3 and
5.6 percent of the "other agricultural produce." In dollar terms
12.2% of lend lease to the commonwealth was food, it is
number three on the dollar table, behind aircraft and vehicles,
it becomes number 2 when you add in other agricultural
produce.

By the way after 1939 Germany never equalled it's
pre war grain harvests, hovering between 84 and 92% in
the 1940-43 time period, down to 78% in 1944. Potatoes
did well for a while, but the figures for 1943 at 75% and
1944 at 80% were not good. Germany was importing an
extra 2,400,000 tons of grain by 1942/43 compared with
the 1938/39 time period. The Nazis created a food shortage
in Germany and "solved" it by taking food from the rest of
Europe and caused shortages there as well, by things like
laying minefields and scorched earth. Then add the diversion
of food stocks into alcohol for fuel and all those people the
Nazis put on starvation rations who had their rations restored
upon liberation.

Also things like taking 100% of the Norwegian fish catch from
sometime in 1944 on, causing malnutrition in Norway as an example.

See the histories on the fourth republic, pre war France imported
around 10% of its food needs. During the war some 3,000,000
acres had gone out of cultivation. With industry largely not working,
most of the new machine tools had been looted, only 20% of the
necessary spare parts for agricultural machinery were available,
then add fuel shortages. German requisitions had seen the horse
population reduced from 2.2 million to 1.5 million. French industry
was back to pre war levels of production in 1947.

The result was the French had to concentrate on keeping only the
most fertile farms in full operation, leading to resentment amongst
those who missed out. Despite the release of some 1.2 million
PoWs held by the Germans there was a major labour shortage.

Transport was a problem as well, inland waterways 40% capacity,
merchant marine 1/3 capacity, 45% of rail track operational,
along with 1 in 6 locos, 1 in 3 wagons and 1 in 2 carriages, 115 out
of 300 major stations destroyed, plus 24 main marshalling yards,
7,500 bridges down (1,500 had been hastily repaired), major road
repairs needed but these could be delayed since there were few
trucks available anyway, and they had fuel problems.

The population of France sank by over 1 million people between
1936 and 1946, to 40.5 million, the average 14 year old in 1945
was 7 to 9 kg lighter and 7 to 11 cm shorter than their 1935
counterparts. Germany had requisitioned a lot of French food
production.

Vichy had done the usual axis economic management, printed
money, there was 5 times the money in circulation in 1944 than
in 1939, 27% inflation in 1944, 63% in 1945.

There was a severe 1944/45 winter and disastrous frosts, French
1945 grain production was 50% of pre war, down 1/3 on even 1944,
the 1946 harvests produced a "precarious balance".

The winter of 1946/7 produced record low temperatures in Europe,
and lingered until April and was followed by widespread drought.
Shortages of bread and refined sugar lead to riots in Verdun and
Le Mans in September 1947. The US population started purchasing
food parcels to send to Europe.

The bad 1946/7 winter reduced the French rail system to a worse
state than in wartime.

It should be remembered it took time to bring land left fallow
back into production, and this time was lengthened by a lack
of manpower and tools, industry needed to supply the right
tools and spare parts. Most irrigation systems had been
neglected as had pest control.

As for local requisitions, the Germans took grain from where ever
it could be obtained, either for Germany or to feed the occupation
troops, in the 1940 to 1944 period 3.8 million tons from France
and in the period 17 July 1941 to 31 March 1944 1.76 million
tons from the USSR to Germany, a further 4.05 million tons from the
USSR to feed German troops and an additional 3.34 million tons
requisitioned for the German civil administration in the USSR which
at least fed locals working for the administration. Apparently the
grains taken from the USSR represented around 10% of the grain
available to the Germans during the time period.

Even Holland and Belgium, which were very food deficient, were
billed 176,000 tons of grains 1940 to 1944.

The 1951 Statistical Abstract of the US has food
production figures from 1866 onwards for some crops, if you want
to look at the long term changes in US production, interestingly 1948
was a high point in terms of yields per acre for many crops, Corn,
Oats, Barley, Buckwheat, Flax, Potatoes, Cotton, Dry Beans,
Soybeans and Tobacco appear to have set new yield records.

So 1948 seems to have been a very good year for many crops
around the globe, the US, Japan, Europe, Asia, Australia as
examples appear to have had their best seasons for some time.

Post by Tim Hicks
From the 1950 Canada Yearbook,

"Wheat - The crop year 1948-49 brought about for the first time in
several years a near balance between world what supplies and
import requirements. Generally excellent crops were harvested in
1948 with world production of both bread grains and coarse grains
reaching considerably higher levels than in 1947. Production also
exceeded the 1935-39 average by a considerable margin with
improved crops being harvested quite generally in both importing
and exporting countries. With this easing of previously existing
tight supply situation, governments of some wheat importing
countries abolished bread rationing while others lowered the
compulsory extraction rate in flour milling and considerably
reduced the amounts of coarse grains which were formally mixed
with bread grains in the manufacture of flour. These two actions
provided larger quantities of milling offals and coarse grains for
live-stock feed, and so promoted the expansion of live-stock
production. The optimism generated by increased available
supplies led to the dissolution of the world allocating agency, the
international food council of the Food and Agricultural Organisation."

So the usual story, forward feedback for a while, with the reverse
applying just post war, when a lack of feed reduced meat, dairy
and egg production just when they were needed to cover the loss
of other foodstuffs.

As to food shortages during the war the UK statistical digest
indicates the losses of food and feeding stuffs at sea were
9 to 12/39 142,400 tons, 1940 728,400 tons, 1941 787,200
tons, 1942 520,800 tons, 1943 370,800 tons, 1944 39,600
tons, 1945 12,100 tons, total 2,601,300 tons. These losses
have to be taken into account after noting world production,
grains and pulses losses come to around 1,232,000 tons,
wheat losses alone are 912,200 tons.

Pre war in South East Asia Burma exported around 3 million tons
of rice, Indo China and Thailand around 1.5 million tons each out
of a total production of around 14.4 million tons. In 1945/6 Burma
could just supply enough rice for its own population and overall
production in South East Asia was 2/3 that of pre war. In 1946/7
production was around 75% of pre war, in 1947/8 it was back to
around the pre war level. Malaya needed 700,000 tons of rice a
year pre war, it received 94,000 tons in 1944 and 12,000 tons in
1945, rice went from $6 to $7,500 between December 1941 and
August 1945.

In Java Japanese economic management dropped the area under
crops from 8 million hectares in 1940 to 5.8 million in 1945 with
yields per hectare down maybe 20 to 30% from pre war.

See Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South East Asia.

However to note Japanese production, see the Japanese
statistical yearbook, in Japanese and English, the first
volume is in 1949 but often covers figures starting in the
19th Century. Units of measurement are fun, a mixture of
metric and old Japanese, crop production is in Koku,
around 1.8 Hectolitres (1 hectolitre is 2.7495 imperial
bushels), fish in Kan, around 3.75 Kg.

Japanese crop production, million Koku and fish catch, million Kan

Year / Rice / Barley / Naked Barley / Oats / Wheat / Fish

1938 / 65.8 / 6.3 / 5.1 / 2.6 / 9.0 / 0.85
1939 / 69.0 / 7.8 / 6.7 / 1.9 / 12.1 / 0.86
1940 / 60.9 / 7.5 / 6.3 / 2.0 / 13.1 / 0.87
1941 / 55.1 / 6.5 / 6.8 / 2.2 / 10.7 / 1.0
1942 / 66.8 / 4.7 / 6.6 / 2.2 / 10.1 / 0.89
1943 / 62.9 / 5.3 / 5.3 / 1.2 / 8.0 / 0.81
1944 / 58.6 / 7.2 / 6.6 / 1.5 / 10.1 / 0.62
1945 / 39.1 / 4.9 / 5.2 / 1.2 / 6.9 / 0.45
1946 / 61.4 / 3.8 / 3.3 / 0.7 / 4.5 / 0.53
1947 / 58.7 / 4.7 / 4.6 / 0.7 / 5.6 / 0.55
1948 / 62.3 / 5.7 / 5.7 / 1.1 / 6.9 / 0.62
1949 / 62.3 / 8.8 / 7.5 / 1.2 / 9.5 / 0.64

Note how rice production held up well except for one very
bad year and that fish production remained well below
the pre war and wartime catches. Apparently the calorie
value index of the fish catch went from 100 in 1933-5 to
39.7 in 1945. Note the halving of wheat output post war
and how much better 1948 was compared with 1947.

In the period mid 1946 to mid 1947 the US shipped some
800,000 tons of food aid to Japan.

It should be noted the Japanese military tried to credit finance
WWII and one of the government's last acts was to pay
the big industrial firms for all outstanding orders, even though
none of them would be delivered, increasing the number of
notes in circulation from around 5 billion yen in 1941 to
around 60 billion yen at the end of 1945. This must be taken
into account when you note the increase in food prices, from
the end of price controls in 1945 to the end of 1947, rice 500
to 20,944 yen, Barley 33 to 1,260 yen, wheat flour 40 to 1,315
yen, Mackerel 75 to 680 yen, food was in short supply in Japan.

During the war the area under crops in Australia went from
23.5 million acres in 1938/9 to 15.9 million acres in 1943/4,
it recovered to 20.4 million acres in 1945/6 and 22.2 million
acres in 1947/8

The 1952 Australian Yearbook has a table of world wheat
production and export/import trade.

World production averaged 5.81 billion bushels 1935 to 1939,
and reached 6.1 billion in 1948. The 1946-47 world production
was 5.6 billion bushels, as was the 1947-48 crop. Unfortunately
the Australian figures switch the basis of a year every so often
to account for the way the southern summer is split over two years.

Wheat production by areas, 1930-34 average, 1935-38 average
and 1948, million bushels

North America (includes Mexico) 1,096.0, 1,086.0, 1,701.1
Europe, 1,156.0, 1,632.0, 1,348.4
USSR 860.4, 1,050.0, unknown
Africa 135.0, 142.0, 154.3
Asia (India to Japan), 1,456.0, 1,442.0, 1,601.9
South America 295.0, 280.0, 224.1
Oceania 193.8, 161.5, 194.0

Average wheat available for export 1934-38 was around 535.8 million
bushels, and net imports came to 516.2 million bushels, in 1946-47
the figures were exports 758.5, imports 748.5, 1947-48 exports
926.8, imports 932.5.

Australia, Argentina and the USSR had bad years in 1946-47
but this was offset by a rise in US wheat exports from an
average of 24.4 million bushels in 1934-38 to 405.7 in
1946-47, then in 1948 the US exported 484.9 million bushels.
So you can see the expansion of world wheat trade was largely
met by a major increase in US crops, able to cope with the
fact the rest of the world reduced wheat exports.

The export table gives the top 5 in 1934-38 as Canada 33% of
world trade, Argentina 23%, Australia 19%, USSR 5%, USA 4%,
with all others accounting for 16%. In 1948 the big 4 (non
US) exporters managed around a 4% increase on their pre
war average exports, the US had increased exports by around
21.5 times, 2150%. The all other countries exports went from
88.3 million bushels average in 1934-38 to 9.6 million 1946-47
and 1.2 million 1947-48.

So where did all the wheat go?, figures are 1934-38 average,
1946-47 and 1947-48 in million bushels, major increases in
imports over pre war, (exporter) means they were nett exporters
of wheat during the relevant time period.

Germany 21.5, 83.0, 136.4
Italy 18.1, 46.8, 81.8
Austria 8.9, 11.9, 22.3
France, 5.4, 16.8, 53.2
Ceylon, 0.9, 14.4, 10.8
Mexico, 0.7, 13.9, 10.9
Spain (exporter), 10.7, 16.4
Japan/Korea (exporter), 36.2, 45.6
India/Pakistan (exporter), 37.6, 48.1
Holland 21.6, 25.5, 27.6

There were significant food shortages in Europe post WWII,
and in much of the rest of the world.

Other countries like China, Brazil and Belgium reduced their wheat
imports, or stayed roughly the same, like the UK and Switzerland.

The all other country's figure for wheat imports is 101.1, 158.7, 191.0,
again a major increase.

Note how much extra wheat ended up in Germany. When Montgomery
put in his food request early in the occupation the wheat asked for was
around the size of the entire UK crop.

The UK delivered around 1,205,000 tons of wheat to Germany
by May 1946. The UK rations dropped in 1945 and in 1946.
Bread was rationed for the first time.

By the way it is easy to cause a famine, all the government
has to do is nothing, as food becomes short people hoard
and the prices go up and the poor start to starve, as more
starve more hoard, as more hoard prices go higher, as
prices go higher more people cannot afford food and starve,
repeat as necessary. Governments have to intervene to
stop this cycle.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

David H Thornley

2010-11-02 01:17:55 UTC

Post by Tim Hicks
all of Africa. Germany started a war in Europe in 1939 when under the
heels of a national-socialist dictatorship that got into power much
thanks to the miserable situation British and French revenge policies
after the 1914-1918 war had led to, exacerbated by the great
depression in 1932.

You know, I have my own startlingly different take on the subject, which
may surprise you.

I believe that Germans are human, just as human as the British and
French.

You, on the other hand, seem to believe that the British and French
were human, and moral actors, and therefore that they have some sort
of responsibility for the Versailles treaty. You also seem to believe
that this is what caused the rise of the Nazis and the start of WWII
in Europe, which is one-sided historical determinism, and relies on
the concept that the Germans were merely reacting to events.

Now, if Germans were the sort of beings that could only respond,
volitionless, to British and French actions, it would follow that
they were not human, not moral actors, and wiping them out would be
just as reasonable as wiping out smallpox.

However, if the Germans did have something to do with the rise
of Hitler, then they are humans and moral actors. While they did
get caught up in a spectacularly wrong series of decisions, they
deserve to live and have a chance to change things.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
***@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

Michele

2010-11-02 15:15:23 UTC

Post by William Black
I'm saying that if you try and use food as a weapon, then food become a
weapon, and weapons sometimes have distressing side effects.

Refusing to feed a civilian population under military occupation is
not only morally wrong but is also is a crime under the Hague
convention, article 43.

You should state which Hague Convention, you know. There were several. The
one that would look applicable, is, of course, Hague IV. So why don't we
read that article?

"Art. 43.
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands
of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

Now, I'd like to draw your attention to these little qualifiers:

"in his power",
"as far as possible",
"unless absolutely prevented".

Interesting, eh. They don't sound like there was some absolute obligation,
irrespective of any other consideration, to do... anything. So the fact that
there were, in those years, famines all over the world, shortages of food in
Europe and other continents, a shortage of merchant shipping to move food to
Europe from, say, South America, shortages of coal, rolling stock and actual
non-destroyed rails to move food across Europe, shortages of fertilizers
because the Nazis had turned the factories into producing ammunition, and a
generally pitiful situation both in the German countryside and the
countryside of all Euopre because of the wars started by the Nazis, all seem
to be considerations that somewhat limit what was

- in the power of the occupant,
- possible,
- and not absolutely prevented.

But is that really relevant? No.

There's more. The article you quote has nothing to do with feeding the
population or taking care of their welfare. It has to do with public order,
safety, and lawfulness. Fortunately, occupied Germany, at least the part
occupied by the Western Allies, did not see outbursts of generalized public
unrest.

Then there's more. It is highly questionable that this Convention applies at
all. I know it will be shocking news for you. But, you see, it applies when
there is a war on, and this section in particular, applies when there is a
hostile state.
Neither applies since May 1945. There was no war; there was no hostile
state.

So I'm afraid this claim of yours is headed in the same direction of
everything else you posted, the wastepaper basket.

pbromaghin

2010-11-04 22:53:58 UTC

Post by Michele
- in the power of the occupant,
- possible,
- and not absolutely prevented.

Relentlessly faultless logic. Kudos to you, sir.

Bill

2013-03-18 01:54:51 UTC

Post by William Black
I'm saying that if you try and use food as a weapon, then food become a
weapon, and weapons sometimes have distressing side effects.

OK, prosecute them.

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Ah, ze Geeermanz...
I leave without further comment your horrifying implicit argument that
starving people means no more wars.

Interestingly, it works...

I also see you simplify things by

Post by Tim Hicks
restricting your argument to Europe, seeing as for example Britain
meanwhile invaded large parts of the rest of the world, e.g. almost
all of Africa.

And a fair bit of Asia, most of North America and plenty of other
places.

However these islands have been remarkably free from famine for
several centuries.

Your thesis that full bellies make whole nations belligerent possibly
has some merit.

Then again, it's probably bollocks...

Post by Tim Hicks
"The leading statesmen as well as public opinion in America regard
the present war essentially as an act of self-defense on Germany's
part, and the outstanding task is to ensure Germany permanently, by a
better system of frontiers, against new wars of aggression on the part
of her western neighbors, of which the past three centuries have
brought so large a number."
http://www.fredautley.com/roadtowar.htm
Makes at least me think.

Freda Utley makes you think?

Silly child.

m***@netMAPSONscape.net

2013-03-18 04:02:26 UTC

Post by Bill

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Ah, ze Geeermanz...
I leave without further comment your horrifying implicit argument that
starving people means no more wars.

Interestingly, it works...

Well, then the Japanese and Germans should have been sitting on top of
Asia and Europe, respectively, and Britain should still have India/Burma.

Or perhaps Germany would never had started WWII, considering what happened after
WWI.

Or whatever other trivial counter-example suffices.

Post by Bill
However these islands have been remarkably free from famine for
several centuries.

Well, Ireland... and the rest of Britain around that time...

Mike

GFH

2010-10-31 19:16:06 UTC

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Germany is still occupied by the U.S Army. If you doubt me, just go
there and look.

GFH

Mario

2010-10-31 20:31:39 UTC

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European
war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous
100 years.

Germany is still occupied by the U.S Army. If you doubt me,
just go there and look.

USA has hundreds of military facilities around the world, most
of them are welcome by local governments.

German government looks to be democratically formed since the
Fifties.

In the Sixties French government asked the American troops to
leave France, and they left.

--
H

Mario

2010-11-01 16:25:27 UTC

Post by Mario

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major
European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the
previous 100 years.

Germany is still occupied by the U.S Army. If you doubt me,
just go there and look.

USA has hundreds of military facilities around the world, most
of them are welcome by local governments.
German government looks to be democratically formed since the
Fifties.
In the Sixties French government asked the American troops to
leave France, and they left.

Addenda:
after 1989 the Soviet Army left East Germany.

--
H

William Black

2010-10-31 23:54:33 UTC

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Germany is still occupied by the U.S Army. If you doubt me, just go
there and look.

And also by the British army.

But, thank goodness, they're coming home soon...

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

Bill

2013-03-18 13:14:35 UTC

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Germany is still occupied by the U.S Army. If you doubt me, just go
there and look.

There a British army there as well.

Goodness knows why...

When did the US Army actively run operations in Germany?

Not, I imagine, since 1989.

m***@netMAPSONscape.net

2013-03-18 15:25:23 UTC

Post by Bill

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Germany is still occupied by the U.S Army. If you doubt me, just go
there and look.

There a British army there as well.

Speaking of which, there are 6 US military bases in the UK.

Post by Bill
Goodness knows why...
When did the US Army actively run operations in Germany?
Not, I imagine, since 1989.

I'd imagine about the mid-50s; running a country is expensive.

Mike

Bill

2013-03-18 18:00:59 UTC

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by Bill

Post by William Black
Please note that the Germans haven't started a major European war in
over 60 years now, which they routinely did for the previous 100 years.

Germany is still occupied by the U.S Army. If you doubt me, just go
there and look.

There a British army there as well.

Speaking of which, there are 6 US military bases in the UK.

Only 6 now.

There used to be dozens...

Louis C

2010-10-31 13:44:12 UTC

Post by Tim Hicks
Indeed it should not be dismissed as notional, considering it was
still so alive in 1947, after 2 years of occupation, that former U.S.
president Hoover, in his twilight years working on feeding the world,
"there is the illusion that the new Germany left after the annexations
can be reduced to a "Pastoral State." It cannot be done unless we
exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it."http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=tur...

This paper discusses the postwar German economy. The idea of reducing
Germany to a - presumably peaceful - "pastoral state" had a lot of
appeal among those who had been on the receiving end of German
aggression (i.e. most of Europe), all the more so as they equated
German aggression with big business, industry, Krupp, etc. Just
because Hoover felt obliged to disprove the concept, however, doesn't
mean it had become accepted policy.
"In addition to the above courses of action [i.e. reparations - LC],
there have been general policies of destruction or limlitation of
possible peaceful productivity under the headings of 'Pastoral State'
and 'war potential.' The original of these policies [was] apparently
expressed on Sept 15, 1944, at Quebec ... This idea ... partially
survived in JCS Order 1067 of April, 1945 for the American Zone. It
was not accepted by the British. ... in the Postdam Declaration [the
concept was replaced by] the 'level of industry', developed by the
agreement of March 26, 1946, and signed by Russia, Britain, France,
and the United States. This agreement was a compromise between the
drastic terms proposed by Russia and France and the more liberal terms
proposed by the other two nations."

That agreement mostly targetted heavy industry, with the aim of
reducing German capacity to a fraction of what it had been prewar.
Clearly, the notion was to keep Germany industrialized, though at a
level deemed sufficient to preclude a resumption of what the Allies
considered the militaristic German tendencies, with the idea being
that there had been a sort of surplus industrial capacity that had
been entirely devoted to warmaking, so said surplus could be
eliminated without significantly affecting the future of Germany.

Hoover's paper debunks that notion: Germany needed more industrial
capacity than the agreement allowed for, if it was to pay for its food
imports. The reason, which he could only guess at but which we now
know because we have decades of scholarship to help us figure things
out, was that prewar Germany had managed to be militaristic by risking
bankruptcy, and its level of industrialization was necessary for a
peaceful, stable economy (as opposed to a militaristic, unstable one).

None of that contains the notion of a deliberate Allied policy to
starve the Germans. Instead, the author notes that "It is indeed a
cynical fact that today we are supplying Germany with oil and nitrogen
at the expense of the American and British taxpayer, at a rate of
70,000,000 dollars per annum, which, except for the 'Level of
Industry' and the Russian refusal of zonal cooperation, Germany could
have produced herself." In other words, the Allies are preventing
Germany from producing fertilizers but are paying for fertilizer
imports to that country out of their own pockets, a fact which is
hardly compatible with a deliberate starvation policy. The author's
point is that lifting some of the restrictions on German industry
would have the same result andnd save money.

The author therefore proceeds to attack the 'level of industry'
concept under which the agreement had been based. His point - which is
quite correct - is that one can't separate peaceful economic potential
from warmaking potential. When he writes that "Germany, under the
'Level of Industry' concept, unless she is to be allowed to starve,
will be a drain on the taxpayers of other nations for years and years
to come", he is clearly not advocating mass starvation (though of
course, taking that quote out of context would make it sound that way,
I'm surprised you passed on that golden opportunity) but the end of
the then current "Light Industry" concept.

Post by Tim Hicks
Whatever repudiation there may have been, it was probably more for
show. The Morgenthau plan found it's way into many U.S. policy
instruments, such as the Potsdam conference where the U.S. economic
proposals were the ones accepted by the other powers.

Not according to your source, see above.

Post by Tim Hicks
Also the U.S.
occupation directive JCS 1067, in place until the summer 1947, was a
direct offspring of the Morgenthau plan.

Not according to your source, see above. It incorporated some of the
features of the Morgenthau Plan, like preventing the German heavy
industry to resume production in potentially warmaking sectors (like
fertilizers - the plants being the same as those used for explosives
production), but the gist of the Morgenthau Plan had been dropped, as
the British would have none of it and the Russians and the French were
doing their own thing in their respective zones.

Post by Tim Hicks
It replaced the occupation
handbook that had been drafted in 1944 but that both Morgenthau and
Roosevelt found far too lenient.

You're now practially copy/pasting the Wikipedia article on the
Morgenthau Plan. Why not acknowledge your source? Truman signed JCS
1067, by the way.

Post by Tim Hicks
In formal wording what it stated was: "take no steps (a) looking
toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to
maintain or strengthen the German economy"

The German economy was in better shape than most European ones, and
its maintenance had been sustained by plundering neighboring countries
during the war. The Allied focus was on restoring the economies of
formerly occupied countries first, and if that meant that the German
economy should suffer as a result, then let it. The resources to
maintain all European economies at pre-war levels were simply not
there, and Germany wasn't prioritized. Given that this was just on the
wake of the war, with millions of people telling terrible tales, I
wonder how that came to be...

Post by Tim Hicks
...those [Morgenthau plan] ideas permeated much of American thinking,
especially in the War Department, right up to the time of Secretary
[James F.] Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech in [September] 1946.
They were reflected in the basic directive for the occupation of
Germany, which was a kind of Bible for all that was done during the
early days of the occupation, the paper known as JSC-1067.http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/lightner.htm#46

Funny how the previous sentences from the same document isn't deemed
worth quoting. They read "On the American side there was the
reluctance of the War Department to support this effort and also
President Roosevelt could not make up his mind what to do with
defeated Germany. As early as the Quebec Conference he had bought
Secretary [Henry J.] Morgenthau's ideas: The Morgenthau Plan -- to do
everything possible to prevent the Germans from regaining the strength
ever again to wage war, by requiring them to exist on an agrarian
economy. Then gradually the President pulled back from that extreme
position"

So the plan was shelved, but no matter, its ideas permeated American
thinking. Note that the Morgenthau Plan never envisioned starving
Germany, by the way.

Post by Tim Hicks
The British Government of late 1946 seems to agree with Lightner, as
does president Harry S. Truman and his Secretary of State James
Byrnes, unless the British government is lying in its private meeting

Cute.

Alternately, Morgenthau Plan and pastoralization were words widely
bandied about in the immediate postwar context and served as shortcut
for the American policy, though the latter was more complex than that.

Post by Tim Hicks
b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart
speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel
prodn to 5.8 m.

So when the Americans let the Soviets and the French have their way,
it's evidence of the Morgenthau Plan? Are you going to claim that the
Soviets and the French were driven by the Morgenthau Plan as well?
Because they weren't.

Post by Tim Hicks
Before this was completed I had seen Byrnes (before Stuttgart
speech) & asked wtr. this meant he wd. overthrow Morgenthau policy. He
said yes - with Truman's authy.http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2006/march/policy_germany...

Your quote is truncated, "this" in "this was completed" doesn't refer
to American support of the Soviet and French cases mentioned in the
previous sentence.

And yes, the Allies progressively realized that they would have to let
the German economy, including its "warlike" heavy industrial
components, restart if they were to have a viable European economy.
Where do we find starvation of Germans here?

Post by Tim Hicks
And why did U.S. policy eventually start to change away from the
Morgenthau plan? It was discovered that the German economy was vital
to that of the rest of Europe, shutting Germany down meant shutting
Europe down.

That, and the alternatives were:
1/ force the Germans into mass starvation (i.e. genocide) - not
politically acceptable
2/ force the end of the German industry and pay to feed the Germans -
not financially acceptable
3/ let the German economy grow back to prewar levels, including the
heavy industry.

Post by Tim Hicks
In July 1947 Time magazine wrote the following.
"Without Ruhr coal, and without the German industrial output which
depends on Ruhr coal, the rest of Europe cannot recover."

Note that everybody agreed about the Ruhr coal, what they hadn't
agreed on was the resumption of a powerful German coal industry.

Post by Tim Hicks
I wonder which the reason for the post-surrender Morgenthau plan
repudiation was,

Reality has a way of asserting itself.

Post by Tim Hicks
the above one, or Hoovers cold an clinical analysis
"It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people
out of it."

Could we please stop parrotting the Wikipedia article?

Post by Tim Hicks
Luckily probably only several hundred thousand had time to die in this
failed economical experiment before the Americans aborted it, and then
forgot all bout it.

There was a worldwide food shortage immediately after the war. Lots of
people were going to die anyway. What the Allied powers did was make
sure as few as possible of these people would be in Allied countries,
which meant lots of Germans would die. That's human nature: not
exactly noble, but considering that Germany had precipitated the whole
war in the first place, and then had starved millions during that war
to feed itself, what would you expect?

LC

Tim Hicks

2010-10-31 21:02:52 UTC

Post by Tim Hicks
"there is the illusion that the new Germany left after the annexations
can be reduced to a "Pastoral State." It cannot be done unless we
exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it."http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=tur...

Just because Hoover felt obliged to disprove the concept, however, doesn't
mean it had become accepted policy.

You are free to your opinions and selective interpretations.
Economists differ with you though. Here it was the say of the Marshal
plan, and the relation of the Morgenthau plan to it.

.... It represented a complete reversal of the preceding Morgenthau
Plan. ... Hoover's third report of 18 March 1947 noted: "There is the
illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be
reduced to a 'pastoral state'. It cannot be done unless we exterminate
or move 25,000,000 people out of it." Hoover well understood that an
agricultural economy would be able to sustain a much smaller
population than an industrialized nation. ..... Less than three months
later, Marshall's landmark speech reversed policy.

http://web.archive.org/web/20080618021831/http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2008/webarticles/080103_marshallplan.html

Let me re-print one of your quotes:
" there have been general policies of destruction or limlitation of
possible peaceful productivity under the headings of 'Pastoral State'
and 'war potential.' The original of these policies [was] apparently
expressed on Sept 15, 1944, at Quebec"

Quebec was when Roosevelt and Churchill signed the pastoralization
memorandum with Morgenthau by the way.

production), but the gist of the Morgenthau Plan had been dropped, as
the British would have none of it and the Russians and the French were
doing their own thing in their respective zones.

That is wild speculation based on misinterpreted data. The British
rightly became strongly against pastoralization since they would be
the ones responsible for carrying it out, they were the ones in
control of the Ruhr, just factories and very few farms. When
starvation started they would be given the biggest blame for the
deaths. However, the war had ruined them financially. They depended on
U.S. cash, so the U.S. was king. Just as Churchill was made to sign
the pastoralization memorandum in return for a huge lend-lease loan,
so too was the later British government forced to bend to the will of
the U.S. since it needed U.S. funds. In their own words.

"b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart
speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel
prodn to 5.8 m. tons. And during Loan talks, cdn't oppose them too
strongly."

So the U.S. sided with Russia and France, not that they really
mattered in any way, and ran the Morgenthau policy straight over the
objecting U.K. who was powerless to forcibly object to the U.S. Note
well, powerless against the U.S., the other two mattered very little.

Post by Tim Hicks
In formal wording what it stated was: "take no steps (a) looking
toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to
maintain or strengthen the German economy"

You are really reaching here, and I think you know it. Take no steps
to maintain the economy. It takes no special resources to maintain an
economy, at least none that have to come from outside. This also
explains why the currency reform could not take place until 1948. The
Germans had to use cigarettes as currency until then. If you look at
the later German recovery the funds that came through the Marshal plan
were negligible, especially compared to the occupation costs. The
Germans pulled themselves up. But to do that they had to take charge
of the economy themselves and get rid of the Americans who prohibited
actions designed even to maintain their economy.

Funny how the previous sentences from the same document isn't deemed
worth quoting. They read "On the American side there was the
reluctance of the War Department to support this effort and also
President Roosevelt could not make up his mind what to do with
defeated Germany. As early as the Quebec Conference he had bought
Secretary [Henry J.] Morgenthau's ideas: The Morgenthau Plan -- to do
everything possible to prevent the Germans from regaining the strength
ever again to wage war, by requiring them to exist on an agrarian
economy. Then gradually the President pulled back from that extreme
position"
So the plan was shelved, but no matter, its ideas permeated American
thinking. Note that the Morgenthau Plan never envisioned starving
Germany, by the way.

Who, except you, says the plan was shelved by Roosevelt? And Funny how
the following sentences from the same document aren't deemed worth
quoting.

You look at the period between the Morgenthau plan and the Marshall
plan, one of which represents a "salted earth" policy, and the other
an industrial
development policy. The question of historians who are always
concerned with pinning things down to precise things inevitably comes
down to: what was the turning point? Was there any particular event or
any absolutely crucial time period in which the change from the
Morgenthau plan to the direction of the Marshall plan was made?
LIGHTNER: I think it was fairly gradual. I think the military had
their directives based, as I said before, very much on the philosophy
of the Morgenthau plan, the basic JCS-l067. ... I guess the turning
point was Secretary Byrnes' speech in Stuttgart in September 1946. By
that time after the experience of running occupied Germany for a year,
the more Draconian policies of JCS-1067 were being interpreted
differently."

By the way, on what basis to you make claims of what the plan
envisioned? Only because the word starvation is not used in the plan?
It was clearly envisioned that shutting down the Ruhr would exile
millions of Germans. Confronted with this problem, Morgenthau replied.
"Sure, it is a terrific problem. Let the Germans solve it! Why the
hell should I worry about what hapens to their people?"

Cute.
Alternately, Morgenthau Plan and pastoralization were words widely
bandied about in the immediate postwar context and served as shortcut
for the American policy, though the latter was more complex than that.

That's a nice "get out of jail free" card you invented there. Cute
theory.

Post by Tim Hicks
b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart
speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel
prodn to 5.8 m.

Who cares what the Russian and French motives were. The French wanted
as weak a Germany as possibly, and possibly also to annex the Ruhr and
Rhineland in order to expand their own export markets and industry.
Russia wanted a weak Germany too, but mostly wanted reparations and
possibly chaos and communism. It doesn't matter, The U.S. could easily
have overruled the French who only got an occupation zone by the
american good graces. The Morgenthau plan didn't matter at all for the
Russian zone, so they don't matter either. The only ones who matter
were the ones who were sitting on the Ruhr, i.e. the British. And the
Americans ran right over them, using their British economic weakness
and dependency on U.S. loans. Lets quote it in full.

"b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart speech.
They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel prodn to 5.8
m. tons. And during Loan talks, cdn't oppose them too strongly."

It was the Americans, and their policy, that mattered. Mentioning the
other 2 is just smoke.

Your quote is truncated, "this" in "this was completed" doesn't refer
to American support of the Soviet and French cases mentioned in the
previous sentence.

Cute. It never was my intention to imply so. I see you fail to grasp
an interesting element here though. They consistently talk about
Morgenthau policy, and pastoralization. These are very strong words,
when a simple "decartelization", "dismantling" or other euphemism
readily could have been used if they were meaning other than the
actual Morgenthau policy. Instead they go to lengths to point out
which policy they are talking abouts so there can be no mistake:
"pastoralising (Morgenthan)"

Louis C

2010-11-01 12:08:07 UTC

Just because Hoover felt obliged to disprove the concept, however, doesn't
mean it had become accepted policy.

You are free to your opinions and selective interpretations.

Thank you for allowing me the freedom of thought. As to how selective
my interpretations are, may I point out that all my quotes have been
about the parts of your sources that *you* had somehow left out?

Post by Tim Hicks
Economists differ with you though.

Economists differ with each other all the time, and the difference
between attacking a concept and that concept having become policy is
about logic, not economics.

Post by Tim Hicks
Here it was the say of the Marshal
plan, and the relation of the Morgenthau plan to it.
.... It represented a complete reversal of the preceding Morgenthau
Plan. ... Hoover's third report of 18 March 1947 noted: "There is the
illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be
reduced to a 'pastoral state'. It cannot be done unless we exterminate
or move 25,000,000 people out of it." Hoover well understood that an
agricultural economy would be able to sustain a much smaller
population than an industrialized nation. ..... Less than three months
later, Marshall's landmark speech reversed policy.
http://web.archive.org/web/20080618021831/http://www.un.org/Pubs/chro...

Again, the Morgenthau plan was never implemented. Note that the
article you quote only mentions Morgenthau outlining his views in a
book. Had it become policy, what need would he have had to write a
book? De-industrialization was the policy that was reversed, there was
never any notion of starving the Germans.

Post by Tim Hicks
" there have been general policies of destruction or limlitation of
possible peaceful productivity under the headings of 'Pastoral State'
and 'war potential.' The original of these policies [was] apparently
expressed on Sept 15, 1944, at Quebec"

Yes, this refers to the general policy - the one implemented after
Postdam and which was no longer Morgenthau - of not letting the
Germans reopen whatever industries were deemed likely to put the
country on a war footing again. Essentially, authorizations to resume
production were withheld, sometimes even in cases of light, not heavy,
industry. The context is very clear if one is to read the whole
source, as opposed to quoting a sentence out of context.

Your point...?

Post by Tim Hicks
Quebec was when Roosevelt and Churchill signed the pastoralization
memorandum with Morgenthau by the way.

Indeed. And since the war hadn't ended yet, other things happened that
made the agreement moot. Britain, under new management, no longer
agreed with the plan while the Soviets and the French would have none
of it. The reality of the occupation zones, which could not be made
individually self-sufficient, meant the Morgenthau plan could never be
implemented. By the time it could have become Allied policy, the
Allies would no longer agree with it.

production), but the gist of the Morgenthau Plan had been dropped, as
the British would have none of it and the Russians and the French were
doing their own thing in their respective zones.

That is wild speculation based on misinterpreted data.

Ah, to use your formule, "Let me re-print one of your
quotes:" (actually, one of my quotes from one of your sources)
Capitals are mine.

BEGIN QUOTE:
This idea of a "Pastoral State" PARTIALLY survived in JCS Order 1067
of April, 1945 for THE AMERICAN ZONE. It WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE
BRITISH."
END QUOTE

So much for wild speculation, where's my misinterpretation here?

Regarding the Soviets and the French, there are numerous quotes to
that effect (also in the Cabinet minutes you had quoted elsewhere in
your post), but let's just read on, two sentences later: "the
Agreement of March, 1946. This agreement was a compromise between the
drastic terms proposed by Russia and France and the more liberal terms
proposed by the other two nations". (said other two nations being
Britain and the USA).

So much again for wild speculation, and feel free to point out to my
misinterpretation of that text.

Post by Tim Hicks
The British
rightly became strongly against pastoralization since they would be
the ones responsible for carrying it out, they were the ones in
control of the Ruhr, just factories and very few farms.

Agreed.

Post by Tim Hicks
When
starvation started they would be given the biggest blame for the
deaths.

Actually, they feared they'd be blamed for it by the communists.

Post by Tim Hicks
so too was the later British government forced to bend to the will of
the U.S. since it needed U.S. funds. In their own words.
"b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart
speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel
prodn to 5.8 m. tons. And during Loan talks, cdn't oppose them too
strongly."

And in their own words, "Next Day, U.S. agreed we cdn't be expected to
go on making contn at £80-100 m. p.a. They forced us to 5.8 m. - but
all experience has shown we were right on APW Cttee in our figure of
11 m."

So the British could make the Americans see the light. The French were
harder, and the Soviets infinitely harder. Most of the discussions
focus on what the Soviets were doing, given their own forcible
reparations policy and control of the less urban areas.

Post by Tim Hicks
So the U.S. sided with Russia and France, not that they really
mattered in any way, and ran the Morgenthau policy straight over the
objecting U.K. who was powerless to forcibly object to the U.S. Note
well, powerless against the U.S., the other two mattered very little.

Again, the policy that was run was the Industry Level policy, which
itself was a much watered-down version of the Morgenthau Plan. Even
that was later found to be impracticable, which is what the
discussions you referred to are about.

Post by Tim Hicks
You are really reaching here, and I think you know it.

Assume I don't. I much prefer discussions based on facts or sources to
attempts at mind-reading. The latter are so often wrong, even my ego
has got bored with it.

Post by Tim Hicks
Take no steps
to maintain the economy. It takes no special resources to maintain an
economy, at least none that have to come from outside.

Maintaining an economy means maintaining a steady flux of imports for
those critical commodities that an economy needs. Germany wasn't self-
supporting, as you reminded us.

Maintaining the economy means reopening factories to build and repair
industrial infrastructure. Maintaining the economy means investing to
"maintain" even the heavy industry to its 1945 (or even early war)
level. The latter wasn't policy until the Allies changed their minds.
The idea was that Germany should start growing food instead of guns.

Maintaining the economy means coal, at a time when the Ruhr coal was
needed by other customers than just the German heavy industry. Think
non-German civilians whose own coal mines had been scorched earthed.

Post by Tim Hicks
This also
explains why the currency reform could not take place until 1948.

There could be no currency reform until enough of the Allies agreed to
merge their occupation zones, and that took until 1948 to be realized.

Post by Tim Hicks
The Germans had to use cigarettes as currency until then.

Yes, a common practice in countries whose economy has broken down. It
was happening in Bosnia in the early 1990s as well. I don't understand
what that has to do with the Morgenthau plan, let alone with mythical
Allied attempts to starve Germany, though.

Post by Tim Hicks
If you look at
the later German recovery the funds that came through the Marshal plan
were negligible, especially compared to the occupation costs. The
Germans pulled themselves up. But to do that they had to take charge
of the economy themselves and get rid of the Americans who prohibited
actions designed even to maintain their economy.

The point of an initial influx of cash is that it be negligible.
Europe rebuilt itself, the Marshall Plan kick-started the whole
process, which was its whole point. There never were any plans that
the US would pay for European recovery indefinitely.

Post by Tim Hicks
Who, except you, says the plan was shelved by Roosevelt?

Your source does: "Then gradually the President pulled back from that
extreme position". Couple it with the other quotes showing the
Americans had to amend their policy to make it acceptable to their
allies.

Post by Tim Hicks
And Funny how
the following sentences from the same document aren't deemed worth
quoting.

They obviously were, since you quoted them. I was just pointing out
how selective you were being.

Post by Tim Hicks
You look at the period between the Morgenthau plan and the Marshall
plan, one of which represents a "salted earth" policy, and the other
an industrial development policy.

There never was a "salted earth" policy, otherwise millions of Germans
would have starved and the country couldn't have been rebuilt. The
whole point of salting the earth where Carthage had stood had been to
prevent it from ever re-emerging as a major power. Germany did.

Post by Tim Hicks
The question of historians who are always
concerned with pinning things down to precise things inevitably comes
down to: what was the turning point?

And as usually happens, historians find that there is seldom one
identifiable turning point. Instead, more and more people came to
realize that the "Industry Level " policy couldn't work and had to be
amended. Coupled with the continual deterioration of relations with
the Soviets and growing fears of the communist threat, and here came
the Marshall Plan.

Post by Tim Hicks
Was there any particular event or
any absolutely crucial time period in which the change from the
Morgenthau plan to the direction of the Marshall plan was made?
LIGHTNER: I think it was fairly gradual.

...and I agree. What I disagree with is your characterization of the
Morgenthau Plan, as well as the notion that it was adopted. What was
adopted was a policy that originated from Morgenthau's ideas, though
it didn't incorporate all of them, by a long stretch. That policy
subsequently evolved as it became increasingly clear it wasn't going
to work.

Post by Tim Hicks
By the way, on what basis to you make claims of what the plan
envisioned? Only because the word starvation is not used in the plan?

Ah, just to remind you: you were the one making claims in this thread.
I've only shown that your claims weren't substantiated. Don't expect
me to prove a negative in the hope it will make your position look
sensible.

Post by Tim Hicks
It was clearly envisioned that shutting down the Ruhr would exile
millions of Germans. Confronted with this problem, Morgenthau replied.
"Sure, it is a terrific problem. Let the Germans solve it! Why the
hell should I worry about what hapens to their people?"

Right. And was the Ruhr, in fact, shut down? As you well know, it
wasn't. Besides, how does Morgenthau's indifference to the problems
faced by Germans having to seek jobs elsewhere amounts to a plan to
starve them out? Again, the idea was to make the Germans move from
industrial cities back to the countryside, an agrarian ideal that was
ironically close to some of Hitler's ideas for his Herrenvolk after
the war. Neither Hitler nor Morgenthau envisioned that this would risk
starvation, the difference was that Hitler wasn't around anymore to
witness the experiment being partly carried out, so he never changed
his mind about it.

Post by Tim Hicks
b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart
speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel
prodn to 5.8 m.

Who cares what the Russian and French motives were.

The quote you provided does. Here it is in full, instead of just the
portion that you like:

"Hampered in B. Zone -
a) by R. refusal to treat G. as economic whole. They have taken
heavily fr. current prodn & will continue up to $10 billions
b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart speech.
They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel prodn to 5.8
m. tons. And during Loan talks, cdn't oppose them too strongly.
c) Fr. policy - detach Ruhr: & decline any agreement w'out prior
consent to that. Now generally realised our policy on that was
correct."

Post by Tim Hicks
The French wanted
as weak a Germany as possibly, and possibly also to annex the Ruhr and
Rhineland in order to expand their own export markets and industry.

Mostly, they agreed 100% with Morgenthau that the Ruhr was the source
of all the troubles with Germany and they wanted it separated from the
rest of the country. Annexing it could have been a bonus, but by 1945
nobody believed it would be done anymore. Things had moved on since
the 1900s, the borders between Germany and France had definitely
crystallized, what the French hoped was to partition Germany, not to
make it French.

Post by Tim Hicks
Russia wanted a weak Germany too, but mostly wanted reparations and
possibly chaos and communism. It doesn't matter, The U.S. could easily
have overruled the French who only got an occupation zone by the
american good graces.

Actually, they couldn't. The whole point of giving the French an
occupation zone meant that it was theirs and the Americans couldn't
take it back. The Americans could put pressure on the French, but the
latter were the only potentially large western army remaining in the
area, with the British and Americans both demobilizing. So the arms-
twisting could go both ways. I'm not claiming that the Americans and
French were on an equal footing, of course, just that your "could
easily have overruled" statement is too cavalier.

Post by Tim Hicks
The Morgenthau plan didn't matter at all for the
Russian zone, so they don't matter either.

It did matter, because the Soviet zone incorporated a lot of the
agricultural land in Germany. Removing it from the equation meant the
already iffy plan became clearly an impossibility.

Post by Tim Hicks
The only ones who matter
were the ones who were sitting on the Ruhr, i.e. the British. And the
Americans ran right over them, using their British economic weakness
and dependency on U.S. loans. Lets quote it in full.

That's the third time you're quoting it, you must really like that
bit. Also, that's not quoting in full. I quoted it in full above.

Post by Tim Hicks
It was the Americans, and their policy, that mattered. Mentioning the
other 2 is just smoke.

Taken from an expert, I see.

Post by Tim Hicks
Cute. It never was my intention to imply so. I see you fail to grasp
an interesting element here though. They consistently talk about
Morgenthau policy, and pastoralization. These are very strong words,
when a simple "decartelization", "dismantling" or other euphemism
readily could have been used if they were meaning other than the
actual Morgenthau policy. Instead they go to lengths to point out
"pastoralising (Morgenthan)"

Decartelization means there will be just as much heavy industry in
Germany, just that instead of a few big konzerne there will be a lot
of smaller ones. Instead of one big Krupp, you'll have Kruppe, Kruppo
and Kruppi all making steel and guns. If you want no weapons, then you
need to remove the entire heavy industry, which means pastoralization.
As that wasn't practical, the Allies settled on something different
eventually, which was educating the Germans not to do it again. It
seems to have worked well enough.

LC

Tim Hicks

2010-11-01 15:23:07 UTC

Post by Louis C

And in their own words, "Next Day, U.S. agreed we cdn't be expected to
go on making contn at £80-100 m. p.a. They forced us to 5.8 m. - but
all experience has shown we were right on APW Cttee in our figure of
11 m."
So the British could make the Americans see the light. The French were
harder, and the Soviets infinitely harder. Most of the discussions
focus on what the Soviets were doing, given their own forcible
reparations policy and control of the less urban areas.

No-one ever claimed the Americans didn't eventually saw the light.
Germany is an industrial economy today isn't it? The question is how
long it took, and how much damage and suffering they caused before
they did let go of the Morgenthau policy.

Lets quote the relevant bit in full shall we, so those too lazy to
click on the link are not deceived by the seeming proximity of the two
quotes you provided.
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2006/march/policy_germany.htm

"At outset, I took the line - let's get in & put the Zone on self-
supportg. basis. Was told this wd. spell disaster for W. Europe.
Looking back, not sure it was right to let this political considn
outweigh the economic arguments. I refer to coal exports fr. Ruhr.
Looking back it's obvious this policy wd. rundown economy of B. Zone.
In Paris, at CFM time, tried to get B. Zone on self-supportg. basis.
Fr. then wdn't play because of c) above. Then announced tht., failing
agreemt. to treat G. as a whole, we shd. be forced to make our Zone
self-supporting. Next Day, U.S. agreed we cdn't be expected to go on
making contn at £80-100 m. p.a. They forced us to 5.8 m. - but all
experience has shown we were right on APW Cttee in our figure of 11
m."

The Americans could be made to see the light, indeed. But to educate
the less astute readers, CFM stands for Council of Foreign Ministers,
and the Americans seeing "the light", to use your phrase, was not at
the Potsdam conference in Germany 1945 but at Paris, more specifically
either at the Paris Peace Conference that took place on July 29 to
October 15, 1946 or at the Conference of the Council of foreign
ministers in Paris, 25 April to 12 July 1946.

In either case this was after well over 1 year of Morgenthau policy
occupation.

William Black

2010-11-01 18:00:37 UTC

On 01/11/10 15:23, Tim Hicks wrote:

The question is how

Post by Tim Hicks
long it took, and how much damage and suffering they caused before
they did let go of the Morgenthau policy.

No time at all.

It was never implemented...

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

m***@netMAPSONscape.net

2010-11-02 03:33:48 UTC

Post by Tim Hicks
Germany is an industrial economy today isn't it? The question is how
long it took, and how much damage and suffering they caused before
they did let go of the Morgenthau policy.

Since the Morgenthau policy was never implemented, the damage would have
been on the order of the Martian Invasion of Germany of the same era.

Mike

Louis C

2010-11-02 11:43:06 UTC

Post by Tim Hicks
"At outset, I took the line - let's get in & put the Zone on self-
supportg. basis. Was told this wd. spell disaster for W. Europe.
Looking back, not sure it was right to let this political considn
outweigh the economic arguments. I refer to coal exports fr. Ruhr.
Looking back it's obvious this policy wd. rundown economy of B. Zone.

So what this means is that the British were asked to let the Ruhr
export coal, as the coal mines were in their area. They could either
"treat Germany as a whole" and share the coal with other regions of
Germany as well as neighboring European countries, or declare their
own zone to be self-sufficient and use the coal themselves - or barter
for food with it, on better terms. The latter course of action would
be good for those Germans in the British zone, because they would get
better terms for their coal, but worse for the other Germans and the
rest of western Europe.

Of course, as the British were by then complaining, letting their zone
export coal freely meant they weren't getting enough in exchange for
their sole resource, and imports of food into their zone had to be
paid for by the British Treasury.

Post by Tim Hicks
In Paris, at CFM time, tried to get B. Zone on self-supportg. basis.
Fr. then wdn't play because of c) above.

So the British again threatened to treat their zone independently, so
that German coal exports would be more expensive and would pay for
food, instead of British monies having to be used. The French would
have none of it because they wanted the Ruhr treated as a special -
and if possible separate - zone.

Post by Tim Hicks
Then announced tht., failing
agreemt. to treat G. as a whole, we shd. be forced to make our Zone
self-supporting.

This is the British supporting to withdraw from the talks. They're the
ones who "announced", not the French. This means "if you don't agree
to our terms, you'll have to pay market prices for the coal".

Post by Tim Hicks
Next Day, U.S. agreed we cdn't be expected to go on
making contn at £80-100 m. p.a. They forced us to 5.8 m. - but all
experience has shown we were right on APW Cttee in our figure of 11
m."

So the next day, the Americans agreed that the current situation - of
German coal not bringing in sufficient cash to pay for food, and of
the British Treasury having to pick up the tab - wasn't satisfactory
and that they had been wrong to force the 5.8 million tons quota on
the British. The British wanted to keep more of the Ruhr coal to
produce more steel, the others wanted the coal directly. There was a
coal shortage as well.

Post by Tim Hicks
The Americans could be made to see the light, indeed.

...which is exactly what the passage you quoted says.

Post by Tim Hicks
But to educate
the less astute readers, CFM stands for Council of Foreign Ministers,
and the Americans seeing "the light", to use your phrase, was not at
the Potsdam conference in Germany 1945 but at Paris, more specifically
either at the Paris Peace Conference that took place on July 29 to
October 15, 1946 or at the Conference of the Council of foreign
ministers in Paris, 25 April to 12 July 1946.

Absolutely. And...?

Post by Tim Hicks
In either case this was after well over 1 year of Morgenthau policy
occupation.

I'm glad you're shifting from Morgenthau Plan to Morgenthau policy,
maybe we can get rid of the Morgenthau altogether in future posts?

Quoted from JCS Order 1067:

"As a member of the Control Council and as zone commander, you will be
guided by the principle that controls upon the German economy may be
imposed to the extent that such controls may be necessary to achieve
the objectives enumerated in paragraph 4 above and also as they may be
essential to protect the safety and meet the needs of the occupying
forces and assure the production and maintenance of goods and services
required to prevent starvation or such disease and unrest as would
endanger these forces. No action will be taken in execution of the
reparations program or otherwise which would tend to support basic
living conditions in Germany or in your zone on a higher level than
that existing in anyone of the neighboring United Nations."

So the orders are to prevent starvation, prevent disease and unrest
from getting out of control (the order implicitly acknowledges that,
in the sanitary and social conditions of postwar Germany, a certain
level of disease and unrest was unavoidable - Europe as a whole had
the same problem), and make sure German living conditions are no
higher than those of Germany's neighbors.

LC

Michele

2010-11-03 15:24:08 UTC

Post by Louis C
Decartelization means there will be just as much heavy industry in
Germany, just that instead of a few big konzerne there will be a lot
of smaller ones. Instead of one big Krupp, you'll have Kruppe, Kruppo
and Kruppi all making steel and guns. If you want no weapons, then you
need to remove the entire heavy industry, which means pastoralization.
As that wasn't practical, the Allies settled on something different
eventually, which was educating the Germans not to do it again. It
seems to have worked well enough.

Yes. What I find ludicrous about these wide-eyed claims about the
intentional starvation of the poor Germans is that it goes hand in hand with
pastoralization. The WWII experience itself shows that when food is scarce,
the farmers have enough to go by, the people starving are the industrial
workers in the cities.

e***@yahoo.com.au

2010-10-31 18:11:03 UTC

Post by Jeff Drew
I have searched the archives and can find no discussion within the
last few years on the U.S. and the implementation of the Morgenthau
plan.
So, was the Plan ever taken seriously?

Yes.

The Morgentau Plan was an American developed plan to reduce the German
population through genocide. The means was through large scale land
reductions, population expulsions and radical deindustrialisation such
that neither would it be possible to grow sufficient food or to paying
for it via traded goods was possible.

Like all 20th and 19th century famines, it would have been man made
and its intent hidden under the jargon of political policy.

Post by Jeff Drew
If so when did it stop being a
serious policy, and was it the basis of the initial post war
occupation of Germany?
Did Roosevelt support the plan until the day
before his death?

Yes, it appears so, and this is probably the basis of the 'he was sick
he talked sick' remark.

Post war large portion of the German population did suffer famine and
starved, mostly people die from the diseases that develop on the way
to starvation as complications of malnutrition. The Allied especially
US occupying authorities prevented foreign aid (eg from the swiss red
cross) or neutral nations from getting through to German children.

Hebert Hoover, the ex US president, did 'out' the Morgentau plans
genocidal (deliberate famine inducing effects) and this pehraps
prevent its adoption. Perhaps due to his Quaker background, perhaps
due to his German background he organised small food packages that
prevented many of the illneess and stunted intellectual development
that can kill and hamper before acutal death by starvation occurs.

Morgentaus plan almost made it to full implementation and it appears
its corrosive spirit did create a moral space that lead to partial
implementation

Geoffrey Sinclair

2010-11-01 04:31:55 UTC

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au

Post by Jeff Drew
I have searched the archives and can find no discussion within the
last few years on the U.S. and the implementation of the Morgenthau
plan.
So, was the Plan ever taken seriously?

Yes.

And No. Given the reality of what happened.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The Morgentau Plan was an American developed plan to reduce the German
population through genocide.

Eunometic is always one to enhance things. Try it was a plan to ensure
Germany did not have the industry for modern war, trouble is it meant
not having the industry for modern living, including food production.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The means was through large scale land reductions,

No.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
population expulsions

Do tell, where were the Germans to go to?

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
and radical deindustrialisation such
that neither would it be possible to grow sufficient food or to paying
for it via traded goods was possible.

In short no, no one wanted to be permanently paying Germany's
food bills.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Like all 20th and 19th century famines, it would have been man made
and its intent hidden under the jargon of political policy.

Actually famines are quite a natural product, how far they run from
around 1800 or so depends on the actions of humans.

Given from around 1800 onwards sea shipments of food became
large enough and communications quick enough.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au

Post by Jeff Drew
If so when did it stop being a
serious policy, and was it the basis of the initial post war
occupation of Germany?
Did Roosevelt support the plan until the day
before his death?

Yes, it appears so,

FDR spent a lot of time being deliberately ambiguous, so he could
keep options open. Hence there are usually signs wither way.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
and this is probably the basis of the 'he was sick he talked sick' remark.

Ah yes, Eunometic the mind reader.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Post war large portion of the German population did suffer famine and
starved, mostly people die from the diseases that develop on the way
to starvation as complications of malnutrition.

Here are the civilian death tolls per thousand people for
east and west Germany, the eastern figures are from the
East German 1955 yearbook.

Year / West / East
1946 / 12.3 / 22.9
1947 / 11.6 / 19.0
1948 / 10.3 / 15.2
1949 / 10.2 / 13.4
1950 / 10.3 / 11.7

In numerical terms this meant the West German death toll was
around 550,000 in 1945 including military deaths, and it declined
to 479,373 in 1948 before beginning to rise

Simply the Eunometic famine and large scale die off is an exaggeration,
though many were killed trying to move to Germany from the east.
Note the break down in the medical system during the immediate post
war period would push death rates up, particularly amongst the new
born, along with people who died post war from wartime wounds.
Cities are disease traps without modern medicine and sanitation.

Then add the medical crisis as the Nazi camps were uncovered.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The Allied especially
US occupying authorities prevented foreign aid (eg from the swiss red
cross) or neutral nations from getting through to German children.

Actually foreign aid made it through, see for example the major
increase in wheat imports.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Hebert Hoover, the ex US president, did 'out' the Morgentau plans
genocidal (deliberate famine inducing effects) and this pehraps
prevent its adoption.

Or to put it another way as the French found to have modern farming
required modern industry to build the farm machinery, pity the damage
and looting the Germans did to French industry and agriculture, and
everyone else's in WWII meant Europe could not feed itself post war.

Morgenthau was removing industry, not killing people.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Perhaps due to his Quaker background, perhaps
due to his German background he organised small food packages that
prevented many of the illneess and stunted intellectual development
that can kill and hamper before acutal death by starvation occurs.

I really like this, the US is supposed to be blocking foreign aid now it
must be allowing it on a large scale to avoid famine.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Morgentaus plan almost made it to full implementation and it appears
its corrosive spirit did create a moral space that lead to partial
implementation

The Soviets were determined to take things from Germany to replace
what had been destroyed or taken to Germany, similar for other
European countries, no Morgenthau required. If nothing else they
wanted what was theirs returned.

However the usual line is to blame Morgenthau if you want fictional
history, if you are really trolling for the believers add genocide.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Louis C

2010-11-01 10:43:19 UTC

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The Morgentau Plan was an American developed plan to reduce the German
population through genocide.

Cite, please.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The means was through large scale land
reductions, population expulsions and radical deindustrialisation such
that neither would it be possible to grow sufficient food or to paying
for it via traded goods was possible.

Actually, the original plan was that Germany would be busy growing
food and would not therefore require heavy industry to pay for
imports. It would become a self-sufficient, pastoral state. That plan
was shown to be unrealistic, so it was shelved.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Like all 20th and 19th century famines, it would have been man made
and its intent hidden under the jargon of political policy.

I can think of plenty of 20th and 19th century famines that weren't
man made, but why let facts get in the way of a snappy line?

So if large portions of the German population starved, the German
population was reduced by a large portion, correct? How come
demography disagrees with you?

Many Germans died out of food deprivation and malnutrition. So did
many non-Germans. Neither, fortunately, were a large proportion of any
population, except that of concentration camps.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Hebert Hoover, the ex US president, did 'out' the Morgentau plans
genocidal (deliberate famine inducing effects) and this pehraps
prevent its adoption.

Do you have a quote showing Hoover believed the Morgenthau plan had a
genocidal intent? I thought not.

Oh, and by the way, in the beginning of the post your claim is that
the Morgenthau plan was in fact implemented with a large proportion of
the Germans subsequently dying of hunger and malnutrition, remember?
Now, barely two paragraphs later, your claim is that Hoover, drawing
on his religious ideals and German background, prevented the adoption
of the Morgenthau plan. So was that plan adopter or not? You really
need to make up your mind about which of these two fantasies you'll be
pushing today.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Morgentaus plan almost made it to full implementation and it appears
its corrosive spirit did create a moral space that lead to partial
implementation

Things like the worldwide shortage of foodstuffs played a part, too.
In 1945, the average British ration was less than the prewar German
had been, and prewar Germany had already been tightening its belt,
being mobilized for rearmament (or against the capitalist-plutocratic-
Jewish plot to prevent it from blossoming, according to another
version). So either the British had collectively decided that they
were overweight and needed to go on a national diet, or maybe, just
maybe, there wasn't enough food to be had. In liberated countries,
there were riots in 1945-46 around availability of food, the
population couldn't understand why things were almost as bad as under
the German occupation despite the fact that the war was over. The
answer of course was that the livestock had been taken away or
slaughtered, agricultural equipment requisitioned and/or destroyed
etc. It took until 1948 before things returned to normal.

LC

Tim Hicks

2010-11-01 15:22:48 UTC

Post by Louis C

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Morgentaus plan almost made it to full implementation and it appears
its corrosive spirit did create a moral space that lead to partial
implementation

Interesting defensive argument. It has some big gaping holes in it
though. You have assiduously avoided defending the American practice
of destroying food. Possibly because there is no way of defending it?

People were hungry all across Europe, in Germany they were eventually
dying by their hundreds of thousands.

And what was the American response: Destroy food to keep it from
starving Germans.

"As part of the JCS 1067 punishment philosophy, U.S. forces were
not
supposed to provide ordinary relief. Troops were specifically ordered
not to let American food supplies go to hungry Germans. American
households were instructed not to let their German maids have
leftovers; excess food was to be destroyed or rendered inedible."
http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=599

So, during the Morgenthau time no food for the starving. Sounds like a
deliberate American made disaster to me, but please go ahead and
continue to try to explain it away as the results of general European
food shortage.

As to the British rationing, pleeease, that has long since been
debunked and is usually only bandied about by apologists. It was only
a means to trick the U.S. into giving the desperate British more cash.

Cite:
It seems that bread was rationed in the UK "not primarily for economic
reasons - in order to save wheat - but for psychological and political
reasons" as part of extensive negotiations between the British
government and the United States on the allocation of North American
wheat and on the terms of US loans and Marshall Aid necessary to
secure the revival of the British economy after the war.
Her conclusion at the end of the article is that bread rationing
helped Britain to "retain its privileged position as the only food
importing country which did not suffer a significant reduction in
calorie consumption."

"Having make the offer to introduce bread rationing in April [1946],
the UK government found it was politically impossible to go back on
it, even though there was, strictly speaking, no real need to
introduce rationing in the UK, as the ration was set at more or less
the same level as previous consumption, and resulted in virtually no
savings."
http://howitreallywas.typepad.com/how_it_really_was/bread_rationing/

Geoffrey Sinclair

2010-11-02 04:32:19 UTC

Post by Louis C

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Morgentaus plan almost made it to full implementation and it appears
its corrosive spirit did create a moral space that lead to partial
implementation

Interesting defensive argument.

No quite accurate, it took years to bring agriculture back to normal,
and that was before we talk about bad seasons. See the various
yearbooks of the time.

Post by Tim Hicks
It has some big gaping holes in it though.

No.

Post by Tim Hicks
You have assiduously avoided defending the American practice
of destroying food. Possibly because there is no way of defending it?

Yes there is, the US determined the Germans would not receive
any food over and above the available rations. The Germans
were certainly feeling hunger and the lack of luxury foods, but
not starving.

Post by Tim Hicks
People were hungry all across Europe, in Germany they were eventually
dying by their hundreds of thousands.

No, as the official death rates show.

Post by Tim Hicks
And what was the American response: Destroy food to keep it from
starving Germans.
"As part of the JCS 1067 punishment philosophy, U.S. forces were
not
supposed to provide ordinary relief. Troops were specifically ordered
not to let American food supplies go to hungry Germans. American
households were instructed not to let their German maids have
leftovers; excess food was to be destroyed or rendered inedible."
http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=599
So, during the Morgenthau time no food for the starving.

I like the way despite the Morgenthau plan not being implemented
the idea is to label the US actions under the name, at least the quote
makes clear the proper directive name. And I like the way the
starving is presented as fact when it was not.

The US determined on a policy to make it very clear to the Germans
they had lost and give an idea of what they had been inflicting on the
rest of Europe. They also had ideas about dismantling war making
abilities.

Oh yes the above article decides the entire US occupation was
designed to punish and deny war making potential. Pity the first
months of the occupation are expanded to include the years of
occupation. The German government was not formed until
7 September 1949.

Next comes the fact the Germans resented the way others had
more food than them, this is pronounced a bad thing, not for
the Germans to note this is what they did to the rest of Europe.
Win hearts and minds by forgive and forget, instantly, or
alternatively tell the bad guys the punishment will be light.

Next we are told apparently the policies to 1952 did little to further
democracy, you know those free and fair elections are really not
that important.

Next comes the way the article does not bother to note when the
non fraternisation orders were ended, the idea is to try and convince
the reader the policy stayed until well after it was revoked, see the
time line below.

The article announces it was the duty of the allies to make sure the
Germans were warm, comfortable and well fed from day 1, apparently
the idea is to presume everything needed was available. No major
displaced persons problems for example. So under these rules the
Red Cross etc. are amongst the biggest criminals in the world, think
how many deaths under their care when the world did not have the
necessary preventative resources.

As for the poverty of the Germans while much of industry was intact
it was geared to weapons and the communications and housing situation
was extremely bad, aggravated by those moving from the east.

Apparently there were no dedicated young Nazis after the war, so
there was no real need for things like new non Nazi text books, the
revulsion over the Nazi crimes, the penalties for being Nazi play no
part, the Nazis washed over the Germans and left them clean. A
sort of instant amnesia, political education does not work for Germans,
it is defeated by their instincts.

Why even the Germans were forming their own new political
parties ahead of authorisation, the Americans made it harder,
not easier.

You know, take the logic back a while, to the Nazi government,
if any German government is supposed to be so ineffective against
the will of the people then it was not the Nazis who lead the
Germans into the atrocities of WWII rather the other way around.

Germany is declared a democracy from 1871 onwards, which is
interesting given the power of the Kaiser to 1918 for example.
Essentially all the axis powers were democracies before the
bad guys came to power and they became democracies after
WWII in spite of the allies.

In other words government is generally bad, private initiative
good, rather following the web sites beliefs.

Post by Tim Hicks
Sounds like a
deliberate American made disaster to me, but please go ahead and
continue to try to explain it away as the results of general European
food shortage.

Perhaps you can tell us all how many American households there were
in Germany in 1946, there must have been millions if their destruction
of left over food caused a major change to the food situation when
the US zone had tens of millions of citizens. As a hint the first
dependents of US servicemen serving in Germany arrived in April
1946 and the transport situation, and the European situation, kept
the numbers low.

Post by Tim Hicks
As to the British rationing, pleeease, that has long since been
debunked and is usually only bandied about by apologists.

Like the cut to ham and bacon ration in 1945, to a wartime low,
along with the edible fats ration? The latter was restored by the
end of 1945, then came the 1946 cuts.

Post by Tim Hicks
It was only
a means to trick the U.S. into giving the desperate British more cash.

No actually, as the article you choose to use shows, the UK knew
wheat supplies were tight, their stocks were considered too high by
some Americans. So they adopted bread rationing.

The point is wheat was in short supply so the UK needed to show it
was making an effort if it was to obtain what it wanted.

Post by Tim Hicks
It seems that bread was rationed in the UK "not primarily for economic
reasons - in order to save wheat - but for psychological and political
reasons" as part of extensive negotiations between the British
government and the United States on the allocation of North American
wheat and on the terms of US loans and Marshall Aid necessary to
secure the revival of the British economy after the war.
Her conclusion at the end of the article is that bread rationing
helped Britain to "retain its privileged position as the only food
importing country which did not suffer a significant reduction in
calorie consumption."

So in other words food was short and bread rationing was needed
to secure normal food supplies. Lots of other countries needed to
get by with less.

Glad you have cleared that up.

Post by Tim Hicks
"Having make the offer to introduce bread rationing in April [1946],
the UK government found it was politically impossible to go back on
it, even though there was, strictly speaking, no real need to
introduce rationing in the UK, as the ration was set at more or less
the same level as previous consumption, and resulted in virtually no
savings."
http://howitreallywas.typepad.com/how_it_really_was/bread_rationing/

Above it states bread rationing was needed to effectively assure food
exporters that in a hungry world the UK was deserving of normal
imports and it was not wasting them. Now it is not supposed to matter.

I like the way the Canadians and Americans reduced their own
consumption of wheat to allow more exports but it is supposed
to be not a sign of shortage. Also pat of the reason for the
introduction of bread rationing is to help the food situation in
Germany.

See also the 5 February 1946 announcement of cuts to UK rations.

http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/homefront/rationing.asp
http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-food/rationing.htm

Australia maintained rationing post war to enable more food to
be exported.

A time line.

On 12th September 1944 SHAEF gives the no fraternization order for
contact with Germans.

On 10th March 1945 prosecution of Germans for attempted fraternization
is discontinued.

On 10th April 1945 the official US attitude to feeding PoWs can be
summarised by the statement, "Definitely I do not intend to go along on
a ration that will cause prisoners to starve to death, or throw them into
our hospitals. Neither do I intend to be a party to a ration which will
make the Germans fat".

On 8th June 1945 SHAEF declares the non fraternization policy does not
apply to small children.

On 22nd June 1945 the non fraternization order is revoked for dealing
with Displaced Persons.

On 11th July 1945 the non fraternization rule is relaxed to allow
conversations
with German adults in public places.

At the end of August 1945 the US Army is still feeding around
1,500,000 displaced persons. Also "60% of the Germans lived on
a diet that would inevitably lead to diseases caused by malnutrition."
Normal consumers were receiving 800 to 1,150 calories a day.
It turned out 1945 was a mild enough year to get just enough food,
the official ration was 1,550 calories a day. Then at the end of the
year large numbers of refugees began moving into western Germany.

On 1st October 1945 the Allied Control Council removes nearly all
restrictions on fraternization, except marriage and billeting.

The first war brides sailed for the US on 4th February 1946.

In March 1946 German food stocks were at 60 days, rations were
cut to 1,180 calories a day and by May and June Army foods were
being used. The final crisis would be in the second quarter of 1947.

On 1st April 1946 the first major construction program in the US
zone begins, timed to start at the beginning of the German fiscal year.

Dependents of US service personnel serving overseas were allowed
to join them starting in the second quarter of 1946. The first arrivals
in Germany are on 16th April.

On 1st January 1947 the US and UK occupation zones merge into Bizonia.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Louis C

2010-11-02 11:25:46 UTC