Hitlers Stop Order May 1940

Are there some new facts, like I found with the NSA declassification
relevant to Sedan 1940?

And what were those? I hadn't heard about that. What would the NSA have
to say on the subject considering that it did not even exist at that time?

Michael

WJHopwood

2014-05-13 04:47:29 UTC

On Monday, May 12, 2014 7:59:05 PM UTC-4, Michael

Are there some new facts, like I found with the
NSA declassification relevant to Sedan 1940?

And what were those? I hadn't heard about that.
What would the NSA have to say on the subject
considering that it did not even exist at that time?

I believe you misunderstood SENECA's reference to
NSA,. Although the NSA did not exist until 1952,
one of its activities under its security function is to
review previously classified documents for possible
declassification in connection with inquiries as a
result of the Freedom of Information Act. Ir is also
sometimes called upon to evaluate whole categories
of classified information going back decades, some
or all of which may pose no present security threat
and can be declassified in the public interest.

Such was the case in the 1970s with regard to MAGIC,
the code-name given to the pre-WWII U.S. breaking of
the Japanese diplomatic code. Thousands of such
messages were declassified and can now be seen in
numerous publications. One such publication is the
8-volume DOJ series titled "The MAGIC Background of
Pearl Harbor."

WJH

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-14 22:19:01 UTC

Are there some new facts, like I found with the NSA declassification
relevant to Sedan 1940?

And what were those? I hadn't heard about that. What would the NSA have
to say on the subject considering that it did not even exist at that time?
Michael

I cited it here at 10. July 2013 under "Re: Sedan 1940"

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

WJHopwood

2014-05-13 05:23:18 UTC

On Monday, May 12, 2014 5:37:28 PM UTC-4,

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I just saw in German TV (n-tv) a documentary on
May 1940. It was said that Hitlers order to stop the
tank forces at Dunkirchen was a big mistake.
To my knowledge it was no mistake... whats the myth?
Are there some new facts...

That story still generates a lot of controversy over why
Hitler gave such an order. The myth seems to be that
Hitler held up the tanks and that they remained stopped.
But that seems to be only half true. From what I have
read it seems that although Hitler did stop the tanks,
he later changed his mind after one of his generals
convinced him to lift the "stop" order. But it was 3 days
before Hitler changed his mind and that gave the British
enough time to get organized and get most of their people
evacuated and on the way back to England.

So, from the German point of view Hitler's first order does
seem to have been a mistake.

WJH

Don Phillipson

2014-05-16 15:50:23 UTC

RAF strategists later believed Goering had a role, viz.
proposed to Hitler that the (exhausted) Wehrmacht be
allowed to rest while the Luftwaffe wiped out the British
pocketed at Dunkirk: and this failed because RAF airfields
(e.g. Manston, Tangmere) were near enough to defend
Dunkirk airspace fairly effectively.

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

WJHopwood

2014-05-16 21:58:18 UTC

On Friday, May 16, 2014 11:50:23 AM UTC-4,

.... It was said that Hitlers order to stop the
tank forces at Dunkirchen was a big mistake.
To my knowledge it was no mistake.... whats
the myth?

.... although Hitler did stop the tanks, he later
changed his mind...that gave the British...time
to get... most of their people evacuated....

RAF strategists later believed Goering...proposed to
Hitler that...the Luftwaffe wiped out the British...and
this failed because RAF airfields...were near enough to
defend Dunkirk airspace....

I had not seen that story but it does make sense. As regard
to the Luftwaffe aspect, another story is that Goering, out of
hubris, used his close personal relationship with Hitler to...
stop the tanks and let the Luftwaffe do the job. As that story
goes, however, bad weather is said to have got in the way and
the Luftwaffe was not able to do so.

As has been pointed out, a number of reasons have circulated
in a continuing effort to determine the reason behind Hitler's
decision to stop the tanks at Dunkirk. My guess is that Hitler
didn't make his decision on the basis of one factor alone but
on a combination of factors as he saw them at the time. We
shall probably never know for sure.

WJH

Haydn

2014-05-13 20:12:23 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I just saw in German TV (n-tv) a documentary on May 1940. It was said
that Hitlers order to stop the tank forces at Dunkirchen was a big mistake.

Karl-Heinz Frieser in Blitzkrieg-Legende (The Blitzkrieg Myth) explains
definitively, thoroughly and in detail why the stop order was a big
mistake, and possibly one of the worst mistakes of WWII.

Haydn

Roman W

2014-05-15 14:38:20 UTC

Post by Haydn
Karl-Heinz Frieser in Blitzkrieg-Legende (The Blitzkrieg Myth)

explains

Post by Haydn
definitively, thoroughly and in detail why the stop order was a big
mistake, and possibly one of the worst mistakes of WWII.

What would have been the difference if Hitler hadn't stopped?

RW

WJHopwood

2014-05-15 17:54:43 UTC

On Tue, 13 May 2014 16:12:23 -0400, Haydn

Post by Haydn
Karl-Heinz Frieser in Blitzkrieg-Legende (The Blitzkrieg Myth)
explains...in detail why the stop order was ...possibly one of the
worst mistakes of WWII.

What would have been the difference if Hitler hadn't stopped?

Hitler's "stop" order was certainly no "mistake" from the Allied
point of view. It was a blessing. There is a very good chance
that the British and their allies on the shore might have been
overwhelmed by the German armor and the small craft rescue
operation unable to function. As it was, the 3 day delay caused
by Hitler's "stop" and "go" orders resulted in enough time for
some 300,000 Allied troops to be evacuated from the beaches
and taken back to England. Had Hitler not ordered the "stop,"
the consequences to the Allies might have changed the course
of the war.

WJH

Haydn

2014-05-15 18:34:30 UTC

Post by Roman W
What would have been the difference if Hitler hadn't stopped?

300,000 Allied troops taken off the board in one sweep.

Including virtually all trained British Army officers and other ranks
(except those in Egypt).

Haydn.

Bill

2014-05-15 19:58:15 UTC

Post by Haydn
Including virtually all trained British Army officers and other ranks
(except those in Egypt).

And India, and the rest of the empire...

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-05-15 15:08:24 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I just saw in German TV (n-tv) a documentary on May 1940. It was said
that Hitlers order to stop the tank forces at Dunkirchen was a big mistake.
It was due to a conflict of power between OKW/OKH and the civilian Hitler.
Hitler prevailed and from then on dominated his generals.

If you look at Guderian's account there were several stop orders, which
he variously managed to get around by "reconnaissance in force" or
a long telephone cable.

In the end Hitler intervened and came down on the side of those who
wanted to stop.

And Hitler was dominating the Generals from pre war, look at the
ousting of Blomberg and Frisch.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
To my knowledge it was no mistake. The tanks could have crushed the pocket
but with considerable losses, specially low in fuel and ammunition. The
forces could be too weak for the next battle with French forces.
So, what was true, whats the myth?

There were quite valid reasons for and against the decision, and it is a
much debated what if. There is also the factor the bigger ports like
Calais were the obvious targets to prevent an evacuation, no one
expected Dunkirk to handle large numbers of people.

You can take your choice, the Panzer forces were strung out, with lots
of tanks needing repairs, the allied forces were quite weak in the area
between the Panzer spearheads and the ports, but where there were
defences the Germans had a hard time overcoming them.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From what we know now any losses the Panzer forces took on the

attack were unlikely to change the outcome of the 1940 campaign.

On the 20th of May the German spearheads made it to the channel
at Abbeville as their future direction was being debated.

On the 21st Rommel did not take Arras and was hit by the small
counter attack. The success of the British attack had three effects,
agreement that the Panzer spearheads would head for the
channel ports, it caused the local commanders to be much more
wary of their flanks and it made the Germans want to take Arras
and its high ground before moving further.

Guderian lost 10th Panzer to reserve while 1st and 2nd Panzer
had units holding the Somme bridgeheads. So when his advance
began on the 22nd towards the channel ports it was weak, the
first objective was Boulogne. Later in the day 10th Panzer was
released, while the German forces reported strong resistance.
The attacks on Boulogne began on the 22nd with the British
official history noting had the Germans arrived 5 hours earlier
things would have been awkward.

British troops were landed at Calais, including a tank regiment
(battalion)

The Panzer forces were reporting tank strength of between 50
and 70%

On the 24th the Germans took St Omer and established
bridgeheads over the Aa canal. Hitler agreed with the stop
order already issued.

Early on the 25th OKH tried to order an advance, which Army
Group A ignored. Boulogne fell.

On the 26th Hitler told the forces to move within artillery range
of Dunkirk, however heavy rains fell on the 26th and 27th
while the Panzer forces were discovering they were not the
ideal forces to take fortified towns when the defenders had
anti tank guns. The British had 2 infantry divisions and part
of a third in the way, the III Corps, there were also French
troops present. Calais fell.

On the 28th Guderian was all for turning the task over to the
infantry.

It should be pointed out that since many of the French troops
evacuated were repatriated a key point is how many of the
British would be captured if an earlier attack had happened.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Are there some new facts, like I found
with the NSA declassification relevant to Sedan 1940?

What you found in the NSA report was a comment on a French book
from 1973 that claimed Ultra was so good in 1940 the French were
made fully aware of the German battle plan before 10 May 1940,
some feat given the Germans did not start to change plans until
after 10 January 1940 and were using land lines.

This great awareness of the plan plus codebreaking skill was of
course not communicated to the British who are on record as
struggling with German codes through 1940.

Then having granted the French the German plan there is a need
for a conspiracy, the French command trying to lose sort of idea.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Haydn

2014-05-16 17:19:12 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You can take your choice, the Panzer forces were strung out, with lots
of tanks needing repairs, the allied forces were quite weak in the area
between the Panzer spearheads and the ports, but where there were
defences the Germans had a hard time overcoming them.

Pages 305 through 312 of the English edition of his book, and based on
German sources, Frieser debunks or demolishes the panzers needing
repairs theory as well as other alleged reasons for the stop order,
including German fretting over possible flank attacks as a psychological
consequence of the Arras tank run.

According to Frieser, German reports (known by Hitler) about the actual
Allied situation were very much unambiguous and showed that one single
panzer regiment, let alone a larger force, would have reached Dunkirk,
without taking exceeding risks anywhere.

Then the author proceeds to bring forth his explanation of the stop
order, that is a short circuit within the German military leadership
(which by that time had problems in dealing with the sheer size of a
victory that greatly surpassed any expectations they might have had
beforehand) and between the latter and Hitler.

Debatable though this tenet may be, like any other, Frieser's
authoritativeness makes it hard to ignore it.

Haydn

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-05-18 18:04:31 UTC

Post by Haydn

The tank strength reports are there, and they were a worry. What we
know now is the damage done to the French was so great the losses
were worth it, a lot were recoverable, and many were effectively not
needed given the military balance after the Dunkirk evacuation
finished.

As of the end of May the Germans reported 516 tank losses, defined
as total losses and those needing more than 5 day's repairs. All up
649 tanks had been lost or were damaged beyond unit repair
capabilities, major repairs were not possible given the transport
situation. As of early June 217 tanks had been issued as replacements,
of these 20 had been issued to the 3 northern most panzer divisions,
3rd, 4th and 9th. Starting strength was 2,582 tanks of which 3rd, 4th
and 9th had 808.

The pause and the replacements meant the German tank strength
was about 80% of 10 May when the attack south began in June.
So that implies at end May around 700 or more tanks badly
damaged or lost plus others needing maintenance. What does
Frieser say the tank losses were and how many were runners
around 24 May? That is the Hitler stop order time.

The Germans were worried that a comparatively small force had
managed to do so much damage at Arras and it made them more
cautious, including the decision to take Arras and the surrounding
high ground. The idea of psychological damage is going too far,
risks had been pointed out, the French were in theory preparing
a bigger attack from the south. Rommel was apparently over
estimating the forces he was facing.

The stop order Hitler approved of was just the last in a number of stop
or slow down orders, as Guderian makes clear.

Post by Haydn
According to Frieser, German reports (known by Hitler) about the actual
Allied situation were very much unambiguous and showed that one single
panzer regiment, let alone a larger force, would have reached Dunkirk,
without taking exceeding risks anywhere.

As of what date? And how does that compare to allied reports of
their forces?

And why the minor port of Dunkirk, as opposed to Calais and Boulogne?

Ostend did not fall until 29 May, so there is the length of coast from
Calais to Ostend.

Post by Haydn
Then the author proceeds to bring forth his explanation of the stop order,
that is a short circuit within the German military leadership (which by
that time had problems in dealing with the sheer size of a victory that
greatly surpassed any expectations they might have had beforehand) and
between the latter and Hitler.

The Germans were well ahead of where they expected to be, hence
the debate when Abbeville was taken about where the spearheads
should go next, the channel, more south or largely stay in place .

Post by Haydn
Debatable though this tenet may be, like any other, Frieser's
authoritativeness makes it hard to ignore it.

Comparison to actual allied dispositions would be much better,
along with what happens if the port is taken and the allies mount
a major attack to retake it, along the idea it is rather desperate
but their only hope. Or simply move further north given the fact
many men were lifted off the beaches. How much fighting does
Frieser assume the allied armies would have done?

Then there are the bridgeheads over the Somme near Amiens
and Abbeville, does Frieser say anything about them? We know
now they could be abandoned without much long term damage to
the German cause, but they wanted them at the time.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-17 16:39:19 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Are there some new facts, like I found
with the NSA declassification relevant to Sedan 1940?

What you found in the NSA report was a comment on a French book
from 1973 that claimed Ultra was so good in 1940 the French were
made fully aware of the German battle plan before 10 May 1940,
some feat given the Germans did not start to change plans until
after 10 January 1940 and were using land lines.
This great awareness of the plan plus codebreaking skill was of
course not communicated to the British who are on record as
struggling with German codes through 1940.

Geoffrey. did you read the book by Bertrand by now or did you make this up?
I wanted to read it but only found it in French. All I know is from
the NSA release. Here again what Deutsch wrote about Bertrand's book:

"Bertrand holds that no general headquarters in history had yet been so
thoroughly informed of enemy moves and intentions as the French
headquarters of Generals Gamelin and Weygand, but he implies that not
much was made of this."
Harold C. Deutsch: The Historical Impact of Revealing The Ultra Secret,
(Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College) Approved for Release
by NSA on 10-26-2006, FOIA Case # 51639

Has someone more details? General Bertrand was the highest French "Ultra"
authority who ever went public. Like Winterbotham, who was the highest
British Ultra authority who ever went public. Both agree that the crucial
events around Sedan 1940 were direct or indirect based on "treason". That
the word may not full fit I explained last year. But the whole issue is
something all historians carefully avoided for 40 years now.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then having granted the French the German plan there is a need
for a conspiracy, the French command trying to lose sort of idea.

Well, that is about what Winterbotham suggested in his ground breaking
book "The Ultra Secret" (1974):

"Despite all the information available, the full appreciation of where
the armoured thrust to come appears to have ignored by the French High
Command, and even when the French tank patrols finally met the German
tanks in the forest of Ardennes, there was still no air reconnaissance,
ordered. It seems almost impossible to believe that General Gamelin,
the French command-in Chief [generalissimo], had so staked his reputation
on his assessment that the Germans could not and would not attack through
the the Ardennes that he refused to change his mind or his strategy. It
is difficult to say more without accusing Gamelin of treason. To the
intelligent onlooker it appeared that he was deliberately allowing the
Germans a quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance in the
North."

That book a lot here read I assume. But nobody remembered this crucial
part about May 1940.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-17 21:13:19 UTC

To the intelligent onlooker it appeared that
[Gamelin] was deliberately allowing the Germans a
quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance
in the North."

To believe that, one must believe that Gamelin was
a conscious traitor to his country. And that his
whole staff were co-conspirators; they had all the
same information and were fully complicit in his
decisions.

_And_ that these men were also military geniuses
who, based on the fragmentary information supplied
from decrypts, completely understood the German plan,
including the theory of armored warfare which it was
based on, and saw (even better than the Germans
themselves) how successful it could be.

All without ever having shown _any_ previous understanding
of armored warfare or disloyalty to France.

Never infer malice when incompetence will suffice.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-19 14:40:09 UTC

To the intelligent onlooker it appeared that
[Gamelin] was deliberately allowing the Germans a
quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance
in the North."

What you cited was by Winterbotham and he used the word "treason".
Like he you seems only able to see it from the British side. I tried
last year a French perspective and included 9th October 1934.
To put it short: A failed German offensive 1940 would cause a several
year war of attrition. France may win, but with possibly 100 times more
deaths than the 100 000 it actually had. Was it really treason by the
French HQ to protect its nation from such a catastrophe?

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-05-19 16:32:42 UTC

To the intelligent onlooker it appeared that
[Gamelin] was deliberately allowing the Germans a
quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance
in the North."

What you cited was by Winterbotham and he used the word "treason".

And of course you follow along without thinking about it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Like he you seems only able to see it from the British side.

As opposed to the French side of losing control of the country,
with manpower conscripted to Germany and the country
systematically looted, complete with food and medicine
shortages as the population is by law second class at best.
Resulting in a steady increase in death rates, which really
hurts in the long term.

Completely reliant on others to remove the Germans.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I tried
last year a French perspective and included 9th October 1934.

You see the "perspective" is a key French minister was murdered
in 1934 and that stopped an alliance with the USSR. Along with
the idea a French invasion of Germany in 1934 or 1935 would end
the danger of WWII, which of course would mean no need for an
alliance with the USSR. Plus apparently convince the Germans to
go the way of peace, not come up with another nationalist
movement more rational than the Nazis but still expansionist, at
least towards the people that recently invaded Germany.

Or to put the conspiracy at yet another level the claim was,

"But the French policy shifted from anti Nazi to anti
communist and may still be there in 1940. That may better explain
Sedan 1940 than Winterbotham's "treason" of Gamelin."

Do not worry, no evidence of a conspiracy is proof of two
conspiracies, the original and the cover up. Plus you now
have multiple choice conspiracies, as one fails move to
the other.

When the French came up with a better military system and
a person named Napoleon ended up in charge, they decisively
defeated opponents like Prussia and Austria. Clearly they did
not actually defeat them, the Prussians and Austrians were
trying to lose. Remember decisive defeats are clear signs a
conspiracy to lose was in play.

How about the fact the French air force was much weaker
than the Luftwaffe in 1940, surely there is plenty of scope to
prove this was a long term conspiracy, not the obvious
problems of designing and then mass producing one of the
more complex machines of the time, aircraft. Nor surely
could it be related to the leap in aircraft performance
in the late 1930's and early 1940's. Must be another all
seeing conspiracy laying the groundwork in a timely manner
for that quick loss once war began.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
To put it short: A failed German offensive 1940 would cause a several
year war of attrition.

It is good to know you believe this, now tell us all why it
should be so and why it would only involve France?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
France may win, but with possibly 100 times more
deaths than the 100 000 it actually had.

By the way WWII French war deaths are put at around 600,000.

10,000,000 dead out of 40,000,000 would be impressive, given
the WWI death toll was under 1.5 million. Almost half the male
population as of 1938 or so.

So if we assume the Germans kill 2 French for every German
killed by the French that means 5,000,000 dead Germans, so
I suppose it would also be treason for the German army
command as well.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Was it really treason by the
French HQ to protect its nation from such a catastrophe?

Good to know you think humans can predict the future with
such incredible accuracy. No possibility for example that in
1941 or 1942 the US and USSR join the war?

Hey, Russia and China are currently expanding, and are nuclear
armed, which really would cause millions of deaths if used.

Don't hesitate, accept they will rule the world, organise for
your country to become a satellite now while you have the
choice between them, China has the better economy and
lots of people who could emigrate and really boost your
economy for example but Russian tends to be easier to
learn for westerners. Start now, all those who would have
been killed in the future war will thank you. How can it be
treason when it will save so many lives?

Lay out your perfect prediction of the future, include some
investment tips as well, that will really convince the doubters.
Winners all round.

Or alternatively learn the future is unpredictable, and the
best actions can turn out badly and the French Command
in 1940 had failed to understand armoured warfare and
the crucial step the Germans had made, speeding up
the command cycle to match the speeds of an army using
internal combustion engines, an advantage the Germans
would keep against their opponents for much of the war.

Add the failure to train and equip troops well enough so
they could handle air attack.

The British had the English channel, the USSR great
strategic depth, France had neither.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-21 17:11:51 UTC

To the intelligent onlooker it appeared that
[Gamelin] was deliberately allowing the Germans a
quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance
in the North."

What you cited was by Winterbotham and he used the word "treason".

And of course you follow along without thinking about it.

After all brought here (for a first time even) that is really an
odd remark.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I tried
last year a French perspective and included 9th October 1934.

No, France had in 1934 talks with Poland about a joint invasion.
The USSR talk was to join this alliance or to secure the Polish
state in case of a PL/F vs D war.

The shoots of 9th Oct. 1934 that ended this policy were later called
by Anthony Eden the first shoots of World War Two.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
To put it short: A failed German offensive 1940 would cause a several
year war of attrition.

It is good to know you believe this, now tell us all why it
should be so and why it would only involve France?

Of course Britain too. Like WWI but with Russia supplying Germany
instead of the two front war.

Imagine the German Ardennen forces were stopped with 30 % losses before
Sedan. Do you really think that would give the allies a good chance to
conquere Germany in 1940? Even in 1939 with the bulk of German forces
bussy in Poland they were unable (or unwilling) to invade the Ruhr.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
France may win, but with possibly 100 times more
deaths than the 100 000 it actually had.

By the way WWII French war deaths are put at around 600,000.

Has someone a breakdown on this number?

For 1940 I heard in the TV doc (that featured Frieser btw) the nummber
of 80000. I assume military deaths. Then in the same doc it was called
"the forgotten 100 000 deaths". I assume this included the civilians.
But I nowhere found French civilian deaths for 1940.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
10,000,000 dead out of 40,000,000 would be impressive, given
the WWI death toll was under 1.5 million. Almost half the male
population as of 1938 or so.
So if we assume the Germans kill 2 French for every German
killed by the French that means 5,000,000 dead Germans, so
I suppose it would also be treason for the German army
command as well.

10 out of 40 Mio would be a death rate of 25 % like Belarus had
or the 17 % Poland had. Thats called genocide and implies the
far majority be civilian deaths. Do you think the Nazis would
hesitate to target civilians in France if they saw it as a
chance to win?

Dont think about a "Hungerplan" like in Belarus. Rather terror
bombing with the explicit focus on civilian deaths. Goering
would have enjoyed it. I dont know how the millions of deaths
in Poland happened. But I`m sure it was not an occupation regime
like in France. And the occupied part of France could have faced
a very different regime compared to what it had in WWI or WWII.
So 10 millions is not unthinkable.

I have a vague memory that some French generals and politician considered
the WWI losses as to much to be worth the victory. Their focus was more on
the crippled than the death. Was there a discussion in France in the 1920s
or 30s about what costs would be worth another war?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Was it really treason by the
French HQ to protect its nation from such a catastrophe?

Good to know you think humans can predict the future with
such incredible accuracy. No possibility for example that in
1941 or 1942 the US and USSR join the war?

No. The US public was very anti war up to Pearl Habor. Even after
it FDR had not much chance to declare war on Germany. Germany
had to declare war on the US. Not even reports of German genocide in
Poland and USSR moved the US public opinion in 1941. Instead some
influential figures like John Foster Dulles suggested to accept
the German land extensions in the east.

The USSR offered cooperation to the West in the 1930s until August
1939. It was always declined. Stalin would have enjoyed to view
the British French German war as long as possible. Probably like
some in the USA.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-05-22 15:18:09 UTC

To the intelligent onlooker it appeared that
[Gamelin] was deliberately allowing the Germans a
quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance
in the North."

What you cited was by Winterbotham and he used the word "treason".

And of course you follow along without thinking about it.

After all brought here (for a first time even) that is really an
odd remark.

No it is an observation based on the mind set displayed.

deleted, text, on the consequences of being conquered versus
trying to lose the war,

"As opposed to the French side of losing control of the country,
with manpower conscripted to Germany and the country
systematically looted, complete with food and medicine
shortages as the population is by law second class at best.
Resulting in a steady increase in death rates, which really
hurts in the long term.

Completely reliant on others to remove the Germans."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I tried
last year a French perspective and included 9th October 1934.

deleted text, to next ">"

"Plus apparently convince the Germans to
go the way of peace, not come up with another nationalist
movement more rational than the Nazis but still expansionist, at
least towards the people that recently invaded Germany.

Or to put the conspiracy at yet another level the claim was,

"But the French policy shifted from anti Nazi to anti
communist and may still be there in 1940. That may better explain
Sedan 1940 than Winterbotham's "treason" of Gamelin."

Do not worry, no evidence of a conspiracy is proof of two
conspiracies, the original and the cover up. Plus you now
have multiple choice conspiracies, as one fails move to
the other.

When the French came up with a better military system and
a person named Napoleon ended up in charge, they decisively
defeated opponents like Prussia and Austria. Clearly they did
not actually defeat them, the Prussians and Austrians were
trying to lose. Remember decisive defeats are clear signs a
conspiracy to lose was in play.

How about the fact the French air force was much weaker
than the Luftwaffe in 1940, surely there is plenty of scope to
prove this was a long term conspiracy, not the obvious
problems of designing and then mass producing one of the
more complex machines of the time, aircraft. Nor surely
could it be related to the leap in aircraft performance
in the late 1930's and early 1940's. Must be another all
seeing conspiracy laying the groundwork in a timely manner
for that quick loss once war began."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
No,

Yes, given your ideas about how it would have prevented WWII,
I kept copies of the messages from the previous attempt to
push the claim.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
France had in 1934 talks with Poland about a joint invasion.

Which clearly went nowhere and in any case were more about
alliances than invasions.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The USSR talk was to join this alliance or to secure the Polish
state in case of a PL/F vs D war.

Which ran into the very real problem of how much the Poles
distrusted the USSR, with good reason.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The shoots of 9th Oct. 1934 that ended this policy were later called
by Anthony Eden the first shoots of World War Two.

Which of course you follow through and build into a conspiracy,
rather than note France had a number of changes of Government
in the 1930's with associated policy shifts.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
To put it short: A failed German offensive 1940 would cause a several
year war of attrition.

It is good to know you believe this, now tell us all why it
should be so and why it would only involve France?

Of course Britain too. Like WWI but with Russia supplying Germany
instead of the two front war.

Except we know WWII front lines moved more than WWI, thanks to
more vehicles and airpower, so either the allies end up in Germany
or the Germans end up conquering France is the most likely
scenario. Not a solid immobile front line like WWI.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Imagine the German Ardennen forces were stopped with 30 % losses before
Sedan.

I realise the conspiracy ideas will be defended, even to the point of
putting lots of the Belgian army in the Ardennes or lots of the French
army. That is what it would take to inflict 30% losses before the
Germans reach the Meuse.

Given the Dutch could not hold out for long and the Belgians, with
most of their army north of the Ardennes, were steadily forced back
the allies had problems all along the line. They were going
backwards before the Sedan position fell.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Do you really think that would give the allies a good chance to
conquere Germany in 1940? Even in 1939 with the bulk of German forces
bussy in Poland they were unable (or unwilling) to invade the Ruhr.

The front in 1939 was narrow, given Belgium, Luxembourg and
Holland were neutral, the French were not mobilised and by the
time they were Poland was clearly going to fall.

As for 1940, I do not expect the allies to end up in Germany short
of something like the Arras attack being expanded greatly and
cutting off significant numbers of troops. Even then the disparity
in air power would make allied mobile operations very hard.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
France may win, but with possibly 100 times more
deaths than the 100 000 it actually had.

By the way WWII French war deaths are put at around 600,000.

Has someone a breakdown on this number?

Air raids were the main cause as far as I know, but the French military
was active for much of the war and the extermination program was
active as well, plus things like hostage execution. About a third of the
deaths were military, an eighth the extermination program.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
For 1940 I heard in the TV doc (that featured Frieser btw) the nummber
of 80000. I assume military deaths. Then in the same doc it was called
"the forgotten 100 000 deaths". I assume this included the civilians.
But I nowhere found French civilian deaths for 1940.

You would need to consult the French to see whether the records of
when the deaths happened have been kept.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
10,000,000 dead out of 40,000,000 would be impressive, given
the WWI death toll was under 1.5 million. Almost half the male
population as of 1938 or so.

No reply here.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So if we assume the Germans kill 2 French for every German
killed by the French that means 5,000,000 dead Germans, so
I suppose it would also be treason for the German army
command as well.

No reply, just a comparison between combat deaths and the
deaths from non combat causes under Nazi administration.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
10 out of 40 Mio would be a death rate of 25 % like Belarus had
or the 17 % Poland had. Thats called genocide and implies the
far majority be civilian deaths. Do you think the Nazis would
hesitate to target civilians in France if they saw it as a
chance to win?

Poland around 34.5 million people, about 4.3 million war deaths
or 12.5%, of these 2.9 million were Jewish people killed in the
extermination program, then add other minorities and even
Polish intellectuals, then add the deaths due to inadequate food
and medicine.

Yes what happened in Poland and other places was Genocide,
the result of being conquered, plus importantly a deliberate
policy of killing people.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Dont think about a "Hungerplan" like in Belarus.

So tell us what the figures are for Belarus, combat versus
extermination program versus starvation deaths. You are the
one telling us the French command deliberately lost in 1940
to avoid casualties, then telling us how much more killing the
Nazis did of captive populations, way above the combat deaths.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rather terror
bombing with the explicit focus on civilian deaths.

And as the air raids throughout the war showed, they were not
good at killing warned civil populations, the Luftwaffe was not
going to create many firestorms and with the army engaged
was not going to do a lot of strategic bombing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Goering
would have enjoyed it. I dont know how the millions of deaths
in Poland happened.

A clue, the Polish military, including those under Soviet Command,
lost a fraction of the people the Nazis killed or allowed to die
through neglect while in charge of Poland.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But I`m sure it was not an occupation regime
like in France.

The Germans generally behaved better the further west they
conquered. The Poles were meant as around third class
citizens, the French second.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the occupied part of France could have faced
a very different regime compared to what it had in WWI or WWII.
So 10 millions is not unthinkable.

Simply put 10 French million deaths from combat either military
or civilian is so wrong it does not even make a bad joke, it
shows a detachment from reality.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I have a vague memory that some French generals and politician considered
the WWI losses as to much to be worth the victory.

Like every other participant, Germany included, the Nazis had
a different mindset. There were no cheering crowds in Berlin in
September 1939.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Their focus was more on
the crippled than the death. Was there a discussion in France in the 1920s
or 30s about what costs would be worth another war?

There would have been, just like in every other country.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Was it really treason by the
French HQ to protect its nation from such a catastrophe?

Good to know you think humans can predict the future with
such incredible accuracy. No possibility for example that in
1941 or 1942 the US and USSR join the war?

No. The US public was very anti war up to Pearl Habor.

Actually if you look at the opinion polls the US public was not
"very anti war", they were becoming aware they were going to
have to fight, Japan's behaviour and its alliance to Germany
pushed this apart from what Germany and Italy were doing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Even after
it FDR had not much chance to declare war on Germany.

FDR made a decision to only formalise the declaration of
war against Japan, he was well aware the Germans had no
obligations to help Japan, given the alliance was if one of
them had attacked, he was also aware the Germans were
making noises about declaring war in the diplomatic traffic.

So he waited, if the Germans declared war that would have
its effect on US public opinion, if they did not the US had only
one front to worry about.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Germany
had to declare war on the US.

See above.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Not even reports of German genocide in
Poland and USSR moved the US public opinion in 1941.

Given the problems of verifying what the Nazis were doing, the
sheer scale of the killing program, and the propaganda in WWI
the allies had real problems in convincing themselves, let alone
their public about what the Nazis were really doing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Instead some
influential figures like John Foster Dulles suggested to accept
the German land extensions in the east.

You see the idea here is to find an American who did not want
to go to war with Germany and announce it therefore applied to
the entire US.

Noted the USN operations in the Atlantic in late 1941?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The USSR offered cooperation to the West in the 1930s until August
1939. It was always declined.

If you mean by "West" Germany until the early Nazi period then you
have the early period where there was co-operation. In the mid 1930's
Stalin had an alliance with Czechoslovakia, the Munich Agreement
forced a reassessment. At the time the USSR was more prepared
to fight than the western allies.

Until the mid 1930's the USSR was more worried about the
real military powers in existence, the British and French, given
the post WWI interventions, plus wanted to defeat Poland.

Simply put in the 1930's there was little chance of an alliance
that had both Poland and the USSR but as the Nazi power
grew Stalin became more interested in alliances, but at the
same time more paranoid about whether Nazi Germany was
a puppet or proxy of the western capitalists who wanted to
destroy the USSR.

So the idea Stalin spent years offering help to France and
Britain is wrong, and the offers that were made need to
be balanced against his worries about Germany being
part of the grand undeclared alliance against the USSR.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Stalin would have enjoyed to view
the British French German war as long as possible. Probably like
some in the USA.

And others in Italy etc., but of course this is supposed to be
support evidence the French High Command in 1940 was
playing to lose.

deleted text, to end of message

Hey, Russia and China are currently expanding, and are nuclear
armed, which really would cause millions of deaths if used.

Don't hesitate, accept they will rule the world, organise for
your country to become a satellite now while you have the
choice between them, China has the better economy and
lots of people who could emigrate and really boost your
economy for example but Russian tends to be easier to
learn for westerners. Start now, all those who would have
been killed in the future war will thank you. How can it be
treason when it will save so many lives?

Lay out your perfect prediction of the future, include some
investment tips as well, that will really convince the doubters.
Winners all round.

Or alternatively learn the future is unpredictable, and the
best actions can turn out badly and the French Command
in 1940 had failed to understand armoured warfare and
the crucial step the Germans had made, speeding up
the command cycle to match the speeds of an army using
internal combustion engines, an advantage the Germans
would keep against their opponents for much of the war.

Add the failure to train and equip troops well enough so
they could handle air attack.

The British had the English channel, the USSR great
strategic depth, France had neither.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-25 18:28:05 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
France had in 1934 talks with Poland about a joint invasion.

Which clearly went nowhere and in any case were more about
alliances than invasions.

Do you have any source for the second part of this sentence?
Is there some book on the F PL RU talks about Germany in 1934?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The shoots of 9th Oct. 1934 that ended this policy were later called
by Anthony Eden the first shoots of World War Two.

Which of course you follow through and build into a conspiracy,
rather than note France had a number of changes of Government
in the 1930's with associated policy shifts.

But according Churchill this shift 1934 was crucial. He called it
"a heavy blow to French foreign policy". Afterwards France policy had
more sympathy for the dictators and went pacifistic to: "at all costs
avoid war" with Germany. After it happened nevertheless, Sedan 1940 was
the best way to cut it short. All still in the mindset Churchill
sketched. A book in 1970 called the assassination "The Turning Point"
regarding WWII. How many books else do you know about this event?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Of course Britain too. Like WWI but with Russia supplying Germany
instead of the two front war.

We know today what happened in WWII. But the French HQ could not. You said
the old men there could not imagine the new tech way.

Btw, was the mobile frontline in WWII only an effect of the faster
vehicles and airpower? In WWII the Allied intelligence was much better
than in WWI. The war in Africa was dominated by intel on both sides.
In the east too. After 1943 the Red Army could create extreme local
superiority at breakthrough points without German prior notice. West
in 1944/45 had total Allied intel supremacy due to Ultra.

Just looking on technical abilities one could argue that airpower
could prevent any successful breakthrough. The aircraft can always
find the tanks and trucks and destroy them. The fighter aircraft can
not protect a tank force 12 hours per day in the same strenght an
attacker on this force will focus within one strike.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
As for 1940, I do not expect the allies to end up in Germany short
of something like the Arras attack being expanded greatly and
cutting off significant numbers of troops. Even then the disparity
in air power would make allied mobile operations very hard.

So, if no war of attrition, what else do you expect then? A better
German offensive in 1941?

Poland around 34.5 million people, about 4.3 million war deaths
or 12.5%,

They had a newer estimate in 2009. Of 34.8 Mio about 5.6 to 5.8 Mio
or 16.1 % to 16.7 % were killed. 240000 were military, 500 000 were
"Civilian deaths due to war related famine and disease."
The far majority, 4.8 to 5 Mio were "Civilian deaths due to military
activity and crimes against humanity", in short Genocide. Wikipedia
has a lot on this under World_War_II_casualties.html#endnote_Poland

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the occupied part of France could have faced
a very different regime compared to what it had in WWI or WWII.
So 10 millions is not unthinkable.

Simply put 10 French million deaths from combat either military
or civilian is so wrong it does not even make a bad joke, it
shows a detachment from reality.

A 1940-44 war of attrition with a German focus to create civilian
deaths in France, how many deaths, civ and mil, could be the worst
expectation? Assume 20% of France got occupied.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Michael Emrys

2014-05-25 20:47:38 UTC

A book in 1970 called the assassination "The Turning Point" regarding
WWII.

Which book? By whom? Anybody can write a book about anything. That
doesn't make it true. So who is this author and what kind of track
record does he have? Are there any corroborating sources at all?

Michael

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-28 16:59:25 UTC

A book in 1970 called the assassination "The Turning Point" regarding
WWII.

This is the part about it I wrote last year under "Sedan 1940":

By that view the crucial point was neither Gamelin nor in 1940 but at the
9th October 1934. Then was "The Turning Point" like Allen Roberts suggested
in his 1970 book. In April 1934 French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou
announced that France "would look after its own security in whatever way
was necessary." What happened then is in diplomatic words described by
Winston Churchill (The Gathering Storm: The Second World War (2010), pp 95f):

Btw, the English Wikipedia had until 8th Sept. 2012 this text in the
"Louis Barthou" article:

It was assumed that Chernozemski hit both victims. But in 1974,
forensic examination found that the bullet that struck Barthou was
not a 7.65 mm caliber bullet and could not have been fired from
Chernozemski's gun[citation needed]. It was an 8 mm bullet, the
same caliber used by the Marseille police, and must have been
fired at Chernozemski by one of the escorts.

Has someone more on this 1974 investigation, some newspaper source? It
was just 4 years after the book but 40 years after the event.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-05-26 17:00:15 UTC

Lots of stuff deleted, the idea a bad loss must be due to the losers
playing to lose requires avoiding so much factual material.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
France had in 1934 talks with Poland about a joint invasion.

Which clearly went nowhere and in any case were more about
alliances than invasions.

Do you have any source for the second part of this sentence?

Any number of histories, by omission, the failure to come up with
any sort of agreement is obvious because nobody has found one.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Is there some book on the F PL RU talks about Germany in 1934?

Given how long they lasted try looking for an academic paper.
And just how much do you think the USSR was involved?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The shoots of 9th Oct. 1934 that ended this policy were later called
by Anthony Eden the first shoots of World War Two.

Which of course you follow through and build into a conspiracy,
rather than note France had a number of changes of Government
in the 1930's with associated policy shifts.

And of course Churchill's judgment must be correct and French
opinion could never be swayed for example if the British government
came up with a friendly policy towards Germany right, even if they
gave the policy a name like, say, appeasement?

It is all the French, and it is a continual policy, surviving all the
changes
in prime ministers and therefore attitudes to foreign policy.

List of French Prime Ministers, from Wiki

Gaston Doumergue 9 February 1934 to 8 November 1934 Radical Party
(Government of National Union)

Pierre-Étienne Flandin 8 November 1934 to 1 June 1935 Democratic Alliance

Fernand Bouisson 1 June 1935 to 7 June 1935 Republican-Socialist Party

Pierre Laval 7 June 1935 to 24 January 1936 Independent (conservative)

Albert Sarraut 24 January 1936 to 4 June 1936 Radical Party

Elections were held on 26 April and 3 May 1936. The Communist party
went from 10 out of 607 seats to 72 out of 610 as part of a general
swing to the leftist parties, overall around a 30 seat gain by the left,
using Wiki's ideas about French Political Parties of the time.

Léon Blum 4 June 1936 to 22 June 1937 French Section of the Workers'
International (Popular Front), at 149 sets this was the new biggest
party in the legislature, the radical party had gone from 160 to 110 seats,
the communists were the third biggest party, up from thirteenth out of
sixteen groupings in the previous legislature.

Camille Chautemps 22 June 1937 to 13 March 1938 Radical Party
(Popular Front)

Léon Blum 2 13 March 1938 to 10 April 1938 French Section of the
Workers' International (Popular Front)

Édouard Daladier10 April 1938 to 21 March 1940 Radical Socialist Party

Noted how many of those Prime Ministers were in theory more
comfortable with left wing politics than right.

But no, the one quote from Churchill must be correct, the conspiracy
demands it, a no war with Germany policy that survives all changes
of government, one that would have been changed to an early war
with Germany had one, sorry, THE ONE, person been alive for a
while longer.

The British government for example negotiating a naval treaty with
Germany in 1935, the appeasement policy, these have no effect on
French policy in conspiracy land.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Of course Britain too. Like WWI but with Russia supplying Germany
instead of the two front war.

We know today what happened in WWII. But the French HQ could not.

However you are quite convinced of what they thought, despite no
evidence, as opposed to the solid evidence from their military
writings and command how they had missed the changes the
Germans were about to use.

You are quite convinced they knew the Sedan attack and far
more importantly the exploitation would end the war in a
short time while being also sure there would be a long war
of attrition and genocide if the Sedan attack was not allowed
to succeed.

Quite a contradiction, either the new mobile war worked or
it totally failed.

You are the one coming up with the idea there could only ever
be one successful thrust into France by the German mobile
forces, all other attacks would be WWI like in terms of ground
gained and casualties, while the Germans conducted genocide
in the areas they did gain control of.

So what was so special about Sedan, the location? The
French troops present? Druids hidden in the Ardennes
calling down curses on the French?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You said
the old men there could not imagine the new tech way.

Yet you are quite convinced they were convinced that Germany
would conduct a genocide in France, with a side line in military
combat, despite no evidence of anyone coming up with that
scenario, then or now.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Btw, was the mobile frontline in WWII only an effect of the faster
vehicles and airpower?

Airpower stopped the WWI ability to rail troops into a combat
zone faster than an attacker could break through, it also meant
more men had to be deployed to make, mend and defend
against aircraft, thereby lessening the number of men available
as infantry. The machines the armies used had similar effects,
though the removal of horses with associated food and care
costs helped balance that.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
In WWII the Allied intelligence was much better
than in WWI.

Yes and no, the allies in WWII used what they had better.

The RN knew the High Seas Fleet was at sea before Jutland,
the officer who decided to tell Jellicoe otherwise showed a
major lack of understanding. Haig preferred the reports one
more push would break the Germans, not the reports that
the Germans were a long way from being beaten. The
intelligence people that disagreed with Haig ended up in
other positions.

See things like Room 40.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The war in Africa was dominated by intel on both sides.

The war in North Africa for most of the period consisted of
almost zero ground combat and not a lot in the air, it was
really only in Tunisia the armies stayed in contact instead
of keeping most of the forces well back from the official
front line. Lack of supplies and men.

You do know Rommel found out about the size of the
November 1941 offensive from the BBC? He had been
fixated on Tobruk, not willing to be distracted by an
obvious spoiling attack. Meantime 8th Army's plan
unraveled as the Germans were not fighting it very
much, the Germans were supposed to strongly react
and attack the key ground the 8th Army had captured,
why those particular parts of the desert were key
grounds was left unexplained.

In the end 8th Army won, one tank reserve to none.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
In the east too. After 1943 the Red Army could create extreme local
superiority at breakthrough points without German prior notice. West
in 1944/45 had total Allied intel supremacy due to Ultra.

Ultra was useful from around 1941 onwards, that is enough
messages could be read to build more accurate pictures,
then comes the understanding not all commanders report
truthfully and plus what they are really meaning to say.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Just looking on technical abilities one could argue that airpower
could prevent any successful breakthrough.

The air force dream, trouble is that is not the case, the army is
required to defeat the enemy army.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The aircraft can always
find the tanks and trucks and destroy them.

Actually that is clearly not the case, take a look at the size of
the Red Air Force versus its effects on the German army.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The fighter aircraft can
not protect a tank force 12 hours per day in the same strenght an
attacker on this force will focus within one strike.

Or alternatively the fighters use radar, or alternatively the
fighters escort bombers forcing the enemy air force into
defending itself.

Strangely enough it is often a numbers, training and doctrine
issue. In 1944 the allies had enough airpower they could
severely limit German mobility, but not stop it.

So, if no war of attrition, what else do you expect then?

What I have been saying, a mobile war, with the French on the
losing end.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A better
German offensive in 1941?

Why? The French army had major doctrine and training
problems, hence why the Sedan breakthrough happened
in the time it did and why the command did not react to
the German attacks in any coherent way.

Poland around 34.5 million people, about 4.3 million war deaths
or 12.5%,

deleted text,

"of these 2.9 million were Jewish people killed in the
extermination program, then add other minorities and even
Polish intellectuals, then add the deaths due to inadequate food
and medicine.

Yes what happened in Poland and other places was Genocide,
the result of being conquered, plus importantly a deliberate
policy of killing people."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They had a newer estimate in 2009. Of 34.8 Mio about 5.6 to 5.8 Mio
or 16.1 % to 16.7 % were killed. 240000 were military, 500 000 were
"Civilian deaths due to war related famine and disease."
The far majority, 4.8 to 5 Mio were "Civilian deaths due to military
activity and crimes against humanity", in short Genocide. Wikipedia
has a lot on this under World_War_II_casualties.html#endnote_Poland

The Wiki article notes the USSR was responsible for around 500,000
deaths, 350,000 during 1940-41. It also gives a range of death
totals, including 500,000 killed by the USSR government before the
end of 1941.

The Poles were right not to trust Stalin.

The totals are important but whatever the final numbers it is clear
Nazi Germany was committed to a policy of genocide and the
USSR was also killing large numbers of people.

Is the idea the British will also kill large numbers of French
citizens?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the occupied part of France could have faced
a very different regime compared to what it had in WWI or WWII.
So 10 millions is not unthinkable.

Simply put 10 French million deaths from combat either military
or civilian is so wrong it does not even make a bad joke, it
shows a detachment from reality.

A 1940-44 war of attrition with a German focus to create civilian
deaths in France, how many deaths, civ and mil, could be the worst
expectation? Assume 20% of France got occupied.

Oh good, a homework assignment from someone who deletes any
reply that does not fit.

Why does the war last until 1944? Why is the only active front
in France? Why does Germany activate a genocide program
in France only? Why do Japan and Italy stay out, enabling
around 3 more British field armies to join the BEF? Plus
all the airpower from the Middle East etc.?

Why does US public opinion and FDR ignore the killings?

Why do you fixate on one or two quotes and backfill ludicrous
conspiracies to fit?

The quotes supplied from Winterbotham and Bertrand are
wrong and can easily be shown to be wrong, the allied
code breaking they require did not exist at the time. They
require the allies to have then lose late war levels of code
breaking and in any case ignore the Germans used couriers
and land lines while in Germany, not radio messages for
the allies to intercept.

The quote from Churchill is also wrong, ignoring the many
changes in French governments and policy, along with the
fact such policy was influenced by more than the French
foreign minister, and more than the French government.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-28 17:00:29 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Noted how many of those Prime Ministers were in theory more
comfortable with left wing politics than right.
But no, the one quote from Churchill must be correct, the conspiracy
demands it, a no war with Germany policy that survives all changes
of government, one that would have been changed to an early war
with Germany had one, sorry, THE ONE, person been alive for a
while longer.

Some historians suggest the assassination of JFK was the crucial
turning point for the Vietnam war. A change at or near the top
can well change the direction of an institution, even a state.
Less controversial most German historians suggest the leave
of Bismarck in 1888 was the crucial turning point for Germany
towards the policy that in the end brought WWI.

(...)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So what was so special about Sedan, the location? The
French troops present? Druids hidden in the Ardennes
calling down curses on the French?

Instead of Sedan one could call it Ardennes breakthrough. But
in German its often called Sedan because
(1) it was the way German forces usually took (like in 1870, 1914),
(2) the crucial Meuse crossing happened at and near Sedan.

We agree that this tank force that went through here was the decisive
part in the invasion of France?

(...)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The war in Africa was dominated by intel on both sides.

The war in North Africa for most of the period consisted of
almost zero ground combat and not a lot in the air, it was
really only in Tunisia the armies stayed in contact instead
of keeping most of the forces well back from the official
front line. Lack of supplies and men.
You do know Rommel found out about the size of the
November 1941 offensive from the BBC? He had been
fixated on Tobruk, not willing to be distracted by an
obvious spoiling attack. Meantime 8th Army's plan
unraveled as the Germans were not fighting it very
much, the Germans were supposed to strongly react
and attack the key ground the 8th Army had captured,
why those particular parts of the desert were key
grounds was left unexplained.
In the end 8th Army won, one tank reserve to none.

Some German historians saw the initial success of Rommel due to
the intel he got by the broken code of the US military attache
in Cairo and his Seebohm Sigint group. Similar they see his defeat
by the loss of this sources and the British apply of Ultra intel,
specialy against his supply.

(...)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the occupied part of France could have faced
a very different regime compared to what it had in WWI or WWII.
So 10 millions is not unthinkable.

Simply put 10 French million deaths from combat either military
or civilian is so wrong it does not even make a bad joke, it
shows a detachment from reality.

A 1940-44 war of attrition with a German focus to create civilian
deaths in France, how many deaths, civ and mil, could be the worst
expectation? Assume 20% of France got occupied.

Oh good, a homework assignment from someone who deletes any
reply that does not fit.

No, I want to understand your line of argument. The above scenario
is something the old men of French HQ must had in mind in April
1940. I think we agree that they feared a repeat of WWI.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
From an only military point of view, what would be the result

such 4 years in your opinion?

Do you think tech of 1940 would no allow death numbers like in WWI
or at least not more?
Do you think by ideology the Nazis would not target civilians in
the west if they saw it as a way to win?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Why does the war last until 1944? Why is the only active front
in France? Why does Germany activate a genocide program
in France only? Why do Japan and Italy stay out, enabling
around 3 more British field armies to join the BEF? Plus
all the airpower from the Middle East etc.?
Why does US public opinion and FDR ignore the killings?

I want to discuss a scenario most likely in the mind of
the old men at French HQ 1940. Not a political what if.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Why do you fixate on one or two quotes and backfill ludicrous
conspiracies to fit?
The quotes supplied from Winterbotham and Bertrand are
wrong and can easily be shown to be wrong, the allied
code breaking they require did not exist at the time.

Thats not true. It was reported here that in the 3 months
after March 1940 several 1000s Ultra messages were read. The
possibility and details of the Ardennes attack was known from
other source (like the Mechelen papers and spies). To confirm
this other data only a fraction of this decrypts were necessary.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They
require the allies to have then lose late war levels of code
breaking and in any case ignore the Germans used couriers
and land lines while in Germany, not radio messages for
the allies to intercept.

Do you have some data on this wire vs radio argument?

Once a radio station was with the Enigma it was to be used. The
possibility of decipherment was not an issue on operational level.
The Enigma was assumed safe and therefore usualy used by radio.
One reason was to have the radio station in confirmed operational
status too.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The quote from Churchill is also wrong, ignoring the many
changes in French governments and policy, along with the
fact such policy was influenced by more than the French
foreign minister, and more than the French government.

Churchill saw it different from you. And he had (at least since
1940) probably access to more information (MI6) around the 1930s
events than we have.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Michael Emrys

2014-05-28 18:12:31 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Do you have some data on this wire vs radio argument?

That was standard German procedure, same as in other nations' armies.
Material sent by courier would not need to be encrypted and decrypted. I
don't know if messages sent by teletype were routinely encrypted, but I
suspect not as long as there was no fear of them being intercepted (as
they might in the case of the cables crossing international borders into
non-German controlled territory).

Michael

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-28 18:52:15 UTC

I don't know if messages sent by teletype were routinely encrypted...

The Germans developed their own, more advanced,
electromechanical cipher system call the
Geheimschreiber ("secret writer") for use with
teletype messages. The Geheimschreiber both
encrypted and transmitted the message, and
also received and decrypted in one step.

The Geheimschreiber was used on teleprinter
circuits that passed through neutral countries,
notably Sweden. (The Swedes broke the Geheimschreiber
and read several hundred thousand messages.)

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Roman W

2014-05-28 20:11:18 UTC

On Wed, 28 May 2014 14:52:15 -0400, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
notably Sweden. (The Swedes broke the Geheimschreiber
and read several hundred thousand messages.)

What did they do with them later?

RW

Michael Emrys

2014-05-28 21:07:47 UTC

(The Swedes broke the Geheimschreiber and read several hundred
thousand messages.)

The Germans don't seem to have had much luck with their communications
security.

:)

Michael

Bill

2014-05-28 21:46:28 UTC

(The Swedes broke the Geheimschreiber and read several hundred
thousand messages.)

The Germans don't seem to have had much luck with their communications
security.

Throughout the war their security and intelligence agencies were
bloody awful.

Both the British and the USSR ran rings around them.

Even after capturing a huge Soviet spy ring that same spy ring managed
to subvert its own captors and ran the operation back at them.

The British managed to capture every single German spy in their
territory.

The Allies managed to run both intelligence gathering AND sabotage
agencies in just about all the occupied countries.

German codes from the very top (the aforementioned Geheimschreiber,
known to the Allies as STURGEON ) down to the lowest level were
broken.

I don't think there's a single area where German intelligence agencies
had a major success that relied on anything but a brute force
approach.

Rich

2014-05-28 22:07:56 UTC

Post by Bill
Throughout the war their security and intelligence agencies were
bloody awful.

Surprisingly, their cryptanalysis capability was nearly as good as
the Allies and scored remarkable successes against pretty much everyone.
Google TICOM Archive for the real story, which is quite different than the
one you usually hear.

German counterintelligence was also brutally and scarcely efficient as
especially the Dutch learned.

OTOH their intelligence analysis was pretty bad, largely because many
of their top intelligence people were badly compromised by their enmity
to the Nazi regime they worked for. However, they also had a remarkable
blind spot - they had an almost childlike belief in the efficacy of
their HUMINT. Luckily for the Allies it was a bigger blind spot than
their own blind spot regarding their SIGINT vulnerabilities.

Cheers!

Bill

2014-05-28 23:03:51 UTC

Post by Rich

Post by Bill
Throughout the war their security and intelligence agencies were
bloody awful.

I thought they made next to no ingress into Allied machine cyphers.

Post by Rich
German counterintelligence was also brutally and scarcely efficient as
especially the Dutch learned.

Compared to who?

They were certainly brutal but I believe that the MI-6 intelligence
gathering networks still operated in the Netherlands despite the SOE
debacle (In which a cousin of mine died)

And it seems that after MI-6 discovered the Dutch networks had been
compromised some stories say that they managed to exploit even that.

Rich

2014-05-29 05:19:26 UTC

Post by Bill
I thought they made next to no ingress into Allied machine cyphers.

True, although M-209 was compromised. However, the Allies made much
more limited use of machine cyphers and depended heavily on hand
cyphers, which were compromised.

Post by Bill
Compared to who?

Who were they more brutal than? Just about anyone. They were pretty damned
efficient operating against HUMINT networks too. Which is one reason why
Allied SIGINT and IMINT capability was so important.

Post by Bill
They were certainly brutal but I believe that the MI-6 intelligence
gathering networks still operated in the Netherlands despite the SOE
debacle (In which a cousin of mine died)

I am not aware that MI6 had much luck either. By December 1941, the
five principal MI6 agents operating in Holland had all been
captured, compromising their network. I do not believe it was
reconstituted.

Post by Bill
And it seems that after MI-6 discovered the Dutch networks had been
compromised some stories say that they managed to exploit even that.

I would be interested to hear more, since that is not the impression I
have gained from Foot or Hinsley?

Bill

2014-05-29 14:39:32 UTC

Post by Rich

Post by Bill
And it seems that after MI-6 discovered the Dutch networks had been
compromised some stories say that they managed to exploit even that.

I would be interested to hear more, since that is not the impression I
have gained from Foot or Hinsley?

The story is that after MI-6, who operated the communications links
for SOE realised that the agents had been compromised because of
missing security checks.

The 'conducting officers' for agents being parachuted into Europe were
also MI-6. These were the last people the agents talked to before
their mission.

It has been suggested that MI-6 used this information and briefed the
last few agents being sent to the Netherlands that, to put it crudely,
D-Day was to be in the Pas-de-Calais region.

Rich

2014-05-30 14:39:41 UTC

Post by Bill
It has been suggested that MI-6 used this information and briefed the
last few agents being sent to the Netherlands that, to put it crudely,
D-Day was to be in the Pas-de-Calais region.

Ah, thanks, okay now I understand what you meant. I think the question
remains as to when the realization occurred and when MI6 started so
callously sacrificing agents in the interest of disinformation...if
they actually did so. It has also been argued that this claim was just
a matter of putting the best face on things. Something like 25
of 27 agents dropped by November 1942, when supposedly Englandspiel
became 'obvious' to MI6 were arrested and one of the last two
committed suicide after being injured in his drop. That 24 more were
dropped after 1 November 1942 was either remarkably callous or more
likely simple stove-piping lack of coordination between offices.

I still think Giskes showed remarkable style for an Abwehr guy...

Roman W

2014-05-29 18:50:17 UTC

Post by Bill

Post by Rich
German counterintelligence was also brutally and scarcely

efficient as

Post by Bill

Post by Rich
especially the Dutch learned.

Compared to who?

Soviet counterintelligence was certainly more efficient - it managed
to relatively quickly wipe out all Polish underground structures
after 1945, something which the Germans did not manage to achieve
throughout the entire war.

RW

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-30 22:57:42 UTC

Post by Rich
OTOH their intelligence analysis was pretty bad, largely because many
of their top intelligence people were badly compromised by their enmity
to the Nazi regime they worked for. However, they also had a remarkable
blind spot - they had an almost childlike belief in the efficacy of
their HUMINT.

A major defect in the German intelligence
apparatus was personal ambition and
corruption. Allied spy controllers (with
the exception of SOE) tended to be skeptical
and more worried about security breaches
than about gaining credit.

Virtually the opposite was true of the Germans;
the controllers talked up their pet agents, and
ignored all danger signs. (The XX Committee
deliberately botched one double-cross case to
make the other ones look better. They gave up
because no matter how badly they ran the agent,
the Germans didn't notice.)

This was in part because the German controllers
had personal interests at stake - promotion,
continued posting in a safe neutral country,
and money. Money provided by the Abwehr for
their supposed agents in Britain passed through
controllers in Spain, who stole much of it. One
controller endangered the XX system by running
several fictitious agents and pocketing their
funds - a form of "ghost payrolling".

I think psychology projection had something to
do with it as well. The Third Reich was a snake
pit of corruption and intrigue; its votaries
probably felt that the same conditions obtained
elsewhere.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Rich

2014-05-28 22:12:22 UTC

Post by Michael Emrys
The Germans don't seem to have had much luck with their communications
security.

Which is odd, given they so compromised Allied communications security.
You would have thought it would make them more aware of the vulnerability
of SIGINT, but for some odd reason it seemed to make them feel even
more secure.

Bill

2014-05-28 23:04:16 UTC

Post by Rich

Post by Michael Emrys
The Germans don't seem to have had much luck with their communications
security.

I don't think they ever compromised the Allied machine cyphers, and
everyone always acknowledged that 'hand' cyphers used by ground troops
were of limited life.

Rich

2014-05-29 01:45:43 UTC

Post by Bill
I don't think they ever compromised the Allied machine cyphers, and
everyone always acknowledged that 'hand' cyphers used by ground troops
were of limited life.

They did not compromise SIGABA or TYPEX (although they may have been able
to if they had captured a rotor set), but those were only used for the
highest level communications and were both deployed in relatively small
numbers, especially when compared to Enigma.

OTOH, M-209, the standard US field cypher machine for all mid-level
traffic, was compromised. More critically, most of the Allied
hand-cypher systems, such as SLIDEX, the RAF and Admiralty cyphers,
were all quickly broken and well-exploited. Since their use was
comparable to the use made of Enigma that is a much fairer comparison.
And the unfortunate truth is they continued to be used long after they were
compromised, perhaps in the most significant case with the Admiralty
Cypher No. 3, the "convoy code".

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-30 17:39:09 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Do you have some data on this wire vs radio argument?

That was standard German procedure, same as in other nations' armies.

I remember from German sources that the (deceptive) First U.S. Army Group
(FUSAG) in southeast England 1943/44 was maped by radio traffic analysis
and direction finding. Not by public radio transmissions or newspaper
sources. If a fake Army Group had radio traffic the none fake must have
it too.

Seems FUSAG was not the only case. From Wikipedia:

Operation Skye was the code name for the radio deception component
of Fortitude North, involving simulated radio traffic between fictional
army units.

Interesting seems this from same page:

The use of Ultra decrypts of machine-encrypted messages between
Abwehr and the German High Command, which quickly indicated the
effectiveness of deception tactics. This is one of the early uses
of a closed-loop deception system. The messages were usually encrypted
by Fish rather than Enigma machines.

Fish is the Lorenz Geheimschreiber, a teletype. Seems inside the German
occupied area Fish was used by radio instead of wire. Was the wire such
often cut by SOE or was it just the availability of the radio station?

I got the wire was used by telephone (that was not good to encrypt then)
and all units that were not important enough to have radio. And all
civilians of course.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-06-01 18:14:05 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Do you have some data on this wire vs radio argument?

That was standard German procedure, same as in other nations' armies.

Hannibal used elephants, so presumably in 1940 the Germans did as
well, they can move through forests including removing inconvenient
trees.

You do understand the idea is to provide evidence the Germans
transmitted at least the key elements of their strategic plan by radio
sometime in the February to April 1940 period, and the allies
cracked the message(s) well before May 10? Not to once again
jump somewhere else and announce someone else did something
that therefore means the Germans must have done what the
conspiracy requires.

The fact the allies were decrypting some German radio traffic in the
early months of 1940 shows some German units were using radios,
mainly during the invasion of Norway. Note the Luftwaffe, with a
bigger need for real time communications, was a big user of radio
and had the lowest radio security of the German armed forces.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Seems FUSAG was not the only case.

The whole point about FUSAG was deception, another part was
Montgomery's headquarters was in Portsmouth but any radio
messages went by land line to a transmitter in Kent.

Now please show how much of the main Overlord strategic plan
was sent in radio messages.

The British Expeditionary Force in France in 1940 actually did have
a total radio ban, and paid a real price for it in May 1940. So there
is an inevitable trade off, between using enough radio to ensure
the units are properly trained versus the information, at least traffic
analysis, this gives the enemy. One of the needs of the allied
deception traffic in 1944 was to mask any real traffic from the
actual assault units based along the south coast of England.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Operation Skye was the code name for the radio deception component
of Fortitude North, involving simulated radio traffic between fictional
army units.
The use of Ultra decrypts of machine-encrypted messages between
Abwehr and the German High Command, which quickly indicated the
effectiveness of deception tactics. This is one of the early uses
of a closed-loop deception system. The messages were usually encrypted
by Fish rather than Enigma machines.
Fish is the Lorenz Geheimschreiber, a teletype. Seems inside the German
occupied area Fish was used by radio instead of wire. Was the wire such
often cut by SOE or was it just the availability of the radio station?
I got the wire was used by telephone (that was not good to encrypt then)
and all units that were not important enough to have radio. And all
civilians of course.

The Germans used a lot of radio in occupied territories, not trusting
the land lines to be secure. Telephone exchanges were effectively
manual, requiring humans to set up the call and long distance calls
could mean several exchanges being involved. Dedicated data lines
were point to point but vulnerable to eavesdropping.

Then add the sabotage acts against the phone system, something
the Germans expected to increase once the invasion began.

Again the example is not in Germany in 1939/40, and again we know
the Germans were using couriers then for the important plans, we know
this from the one that landed in Belgium.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-05-29 17:28:53 UTC

Note minor things like the changes in French governments and
the make up of the legislature are deleted, the conspiracy
requires inconvenient facts to disappear.

Some historians suggest the assassination of JFK was the crucial
turning point for the Vietnam war.

Oh good, we now shift to another time and place and unsubstantiated
claim.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A change at or near the top
can well change the direction of an institution, even a state.

I see, you are sure your wish is true and will for example, assume
another killing of a head of state made a difference to government
policy therefore a killing of a foreign minister made a permanent
change to government policy that survived several prime ministers.

Very good, always it probably happened somewhere sometime
in sort of the same way and so it must have happened here, much
easier to ignore the idea to provide facts to show the effect.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Less controversial most German historians suggest the leave
of Bismarck in 1888 was the crucial turning point for Germany
towards the policy that in the end brought WWI.

And others can note the new Kaiser with his attitudes to the
world played a part as well.

And of course it has to be the fearless leaders leading, not
for conspiracy land is the idea things like demographics and
the attitude of the successful (we should export our success,
even if the other people are ungrateful), see for example
today the rise of nationalism in China and India.

It all has to be those handful of key leaders, never constrained
by others or circumstances.

And these all wise leaders can predict the future so well they
will play to lose major military battles, because they know the
alternative will be much worse.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(...)

Some of the deleted stuff, starting with the French High Command.

However you are quite convinced of what they thought, despite no
evidence, as opposed to the solid evidence from their military
writings and command how they had missed the changes the
Germans were about to use.

You are quite convinced they knew the Sedan attack and far
more importantly the exploitation would end the war in a
short time while being also sure there would be a long war
of attrition and genocide if the Sedan attack was not allowed
to succeed.

Quite a contradiction, either the new mobile war worked or
it totally failed.

You are the one coming up with the idea there could only ever
be one successful thrust into France by the German mobile
forces, all other attacks would be WWI like in terms of ground
gained and casualties, while the Germans conducted genocide
in the areas they did gain control of.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So what was so special about Sedan, the location? The
French troops present? Druids hidden in the Ardennes
calling down curses on the French?

Instead of Sedan one could call it Ardennes breakthrough.

Ah yes, when in trouble retreat to deciding what to call something.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But
in German its often called Sedan because
(1) it was the way German forces usually took (like in 1870, 1914),
(2) the crucial Meuse crossing happened at and near Sedan.
We agree that this tank force that went through here was the decisive
part in the invasion of France?

Do we agree this reply is a sad attempt to ignore the fundamental
contradiction in the great French military conspiracy to lose in 1940?

That the French generals were supposed to know, really KNOW,
the Sedan attack would succeed so well, but at the same time, know,
really KNOW, no other panzer thrust would work, dooming France to
years of attrition warfare and genocide in the parts of France held
by the Germans.

So what was so special about Sedan that a panzer thrust would
work there and ONLY there?

Come on, why? And how did the French command know this?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(...)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The war in Africa was dominated by intel on both sides.

The war in North Africa for most of the period consisted of
almost zero ground combat and not a lot in the air, it was
really only in Tunisia the armies stayed in contact instead
of keeping most of the forces well back from the official
front line. Lack of supplies and men.
You do know Rommel found out about the size of the
November 1941 offensive from the BBC? He had been
fixated on Tobruk, not willing to be distracted by an
obvious spoiling attack. Meantime 8th Army's plan
unraveled as the Germans were not fighting it very
much, the Germans were supposed to strongly react
and attack the key ground the 8th Army had captured,
why those particular parts of the desert were key
grounds was left unexplained.
In the end 8th Army won, one tank reserve to none.

You have been reading the thread about Ultra and how it had its
strengths and weaknesses in the Mediterranean, along with the
counter moves by, especially, the Italians?

You know Rommel arrived in February 1941?

You have noticed Colonel Fellers started reporting in October
1940 but the axis only started telling Rommel about the
messages in December 1941? That the theft of the code by
the Italians was in September 1941?

Hence why Rommel found out about the November attack
from the BBC?

Fellers switched to a new code on 29 June 1942.

And the over extension to Egypt, the expansion of 8th Army, a
new British Army commander who seemed capable of
commanding an army played no part in Rommel's defeat?
Correspondingly it was not flaws and failures on the allied
side that contributed to their defeats?

Do you actually understand things are more complicated than
some key person and message, and having an intercept is not
the same as it being true. For example the pessimism of Feller's
June 1942 reports may have helped Rommel decide to drive for
Alexandria?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(...)

Deleted bits include refuting the idea the air force could always
find and destroy tanks and trucks.

Also not bothering to explain why the genocides in Poland by
both the USSR and Nazi Germany should mean one can be
expected in France.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And the occupied part of France could have faced
a very different regime compared to what it had in WWI or WWII.
So 10 millions is not unthinkable.

Simply put 10 French million deaths from combat either military
or civilian is so wrong it does not even make a bad joke, it
shows a detachment from reality.

A 1940-44 war of attrition with a German focus to create civilian
deaths in France, how many deaths, civ and mil, could be the worst
expectation? Assume 20% of France got occupied.

Oh good, a homework assignment from someone who deletes any
reply that does not fit.

No, I want to understand your line of argument.

Given the failure to actually deal with facts that contradict the claims,
there has been little attempt to understand, much more devoted to
saying it must be so.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above scenario
is something the old men of French HQ must had in mind in April
1940.

Genocide?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I think we agree that they feared a repeat of WWI.

Everyone did.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From an only military point of view, what would be the result
such 4 years in your opinion?

Now try and actually note what you are asking for, over the 4 years

Does Italy remain neutral?
Does Japan remain neutral?
Does the USA remain neutral?
Does the USSR remain neutral?
Do the Balkans remain neutral?
Do the U-boats lose significant effectiveness due to the lack of
French bases and the French fleet being available?

Now understand I really doubt the French would be combat
worthy by the end of 1940 given how badly behind the command
structure was, and how little strategic depth they had and how
quickly the Belgians were out of the war and how far ahead the
Luftwaffe was combat strength and quality wise.

Poland had revealed real shortcomings in the German system
and troop training, these had been significantly improved, and
even in Poland the Germans were much better than the French
command system.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Do you think tech of 1940 would no allow death numbers like in WWI
or at least not more?
Do you think by ideology the Nazis would not target civilians in
the west if they saw it as a way to win?

Do you think you can actually stop trying to tell us you know what
the French high command was thinking, including ideas about
genocides, and making conspiracies to lose?

I want to discuss a scenario most likely in the mind of
the old men at French HQ 1940. Not a political what if.

Sorry, over 4 years lots of things change, the most obvious
if the U-boats are less successful that releases a lot of
resources for other operations and overcomes a major
allied problem in WWII, shipping shortages.

Not to mention no need for major invasion craft programs
as France is still open for allied armies.

Thats not true. It was reported here that in the 3 months
after March 1940 several 1000s Ultra messages were read.

So 3 months is April to June 1940, including the Norwegian
attack, the increase in allied capabilities and the increase in
German radio traffic generally. And by the way several
thousands of messages would need to include those
recovered after the early May blackout, way after it mattered
when it came to the initial German attack plans.

How many were intercepted and how many were decrypted
from the units in Germany say from mid February to early
May 1940?

You announce the German radio traffic surely must have
included the really important messages, the Germans had
radios therefore they must have used them.

By the way how come the allies were surprised by the
invasion of Denmark and Norway, if Ultra was that all
seeing eye?

The Polish cryptographers arrived in France by 20 October
1939, even with them the French effort was smaller than the
British one, including the fact the British had people in France.

The RN captured a naval enigma in late 1939. It helped
cracking of German messages from 28 October 1939 in
mid January 1940. More work meant the French could
read other traffic. It would seem as usual the Luftwaffe
was the easiest to penetrate.

Winterbotham was shown the first British decrypts in April
1940, which of course were low level items from the Luftwaffe.
Then came the problems of setting up a system to use the
information, the first attempt took until July 1940.

The French managed to decrypt around 1,141 messages
during the Norwegian campaign. Ever thought all those
early 1940 decrypts could be mainly from the active front,
not the passive one? The one where the Germans had to
use radios?

German radio traffic from the units in Germany declined in
April 1940, the usual understanding of what traffic analysis
could reveal. On 1 May a procedure changed locked out
allied code breakers from all but Norwegian traffic.

Captures from German ships in Norway helped start to
crack the German naval enigma system.

On 10 January, the same day as Hitler ordered the attack
on the west to take place on the 17th, the Luftwaffe courier
plane landed in Belgium. On the 13th the attack is
delayed to the 20th, on the 16th the attack is delayed to
the spring.

I suppose Ultra was revealing all of this to the allies?
Or does the major boost in allied code breaking occur
after 17 February?

On 17 February Manstein managed to talk to Hitler about
an invasion plan via the Ardennes. On the 20th the order
was issued changing the plan along the lines of Manstein's
suggestions.

So please tell us all, what was the message(s) the allies
decoded, was there some master message laying out
the entire plan, in great detail? Was it only for an army
group? When was this message decrypted? How did it
not go to Britain since in March 1940 there was a full
liaison system complete with exchange of decrypts?

Any possibility the intelligence people are confusing
the 10 January incident? Any chance the intelligence
people are trying to say there was no intelligence failure
to locate the important German attack, it was a command
failure, that is it was someone else to blame?

Noticed the lack of support for the Winterbotham and
Bertrand claims?

By the way the Altmark incident occurred on 16 February,
leading to Hitler deciding to seriously plan to invade Norway,
the commander of the invasion was appointed on 20
February. So is the idea the allies completely missed
the Norway invasion plans but intercepted and decoded
the French plans? After all if the Germans are sending
invasion plans by radio surely it would be all of the plans,
not just the one the conspiracy wants.

How about the order to invade Norway on 2 April? Surely
it would be a good way to test all those radios just before
the invasion?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The
possibility and details of the Ardennes attack was known from
other source (like the Mechelen papers and spies).

I suppose it is not a surprise the capture of part of the
January 1940 invasion plans in early January is proof the
allies had copies of the significantly revised plans from mid
February onwards. So is the idea there was no change to
the Ardennes part of the plan in 1940?

Once again you exaggerate and forget to mention other
reports like the Germans were planning to go through
Switzerland.

How about the report the Germans received in 1944 that
the allied attack was going to be on 6 June in Normandy,
along with large numbers of other claims about when and
where. I suppose we must conclude the Germans knew
exactly when and where since they were told.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
To confirm
this other data only a fraction of this decrypts were necessary.

I am sorry you are simply ignoring reality.

So what were these fraction of decrypts? What did they say?

Do you have some data on this wire vs radio argument?

The lack of enigma messages from the time periods on file in
the archives? Even the very basic one, the lack of allied
intercept stations? Versus later.

The idea Germans have brains? They understood how
much you can learn from traffic analysis.

The repeat of the procedure in 1944, just before that
attack in the Ardennes? The reports by allied people
in both 1940 and throughout the war how much less
traffic came out of units stationed in Germany? With
the possible exception of the Luftwaffe.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Once a radio station was with the Enigma it was to be used.

Once artillery units had guns they were to be used, similarly
I suppose the Panzers were being driven day and night, they
were there to be used.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The
possibility of decipherment was not an issue on operational level.

The operational level would not have the grand strategy plans.

Note the courier aircraft that came down in Belgium, it
would not be needed if things were being sent by radio.
But of course all it seems to "prove" is the pre Manstein
invasion plans were the same as the the one used in May.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The Enigma was assumed safe and therefore usualy used by radio.
One reason was to have the radio station in confirmed operational
status too.

Oh sorry, I forgot, the conspiracy requires the Germans to
transmit by radio even when they could use land lines, and
not just a few test messages, major plans and other important
items.

You require the Germans to lack even the basic understanding
of how much traffic analysis can tell you about the units using
radio. That the more traffic you transmit the more likely the
enemy can read at least some of it.

Churchill saw it different from you. And he had (at least since
1940) probably access to more information (MI6) around the 1930s
events than we have.

Ah yes, of course, Churchill went through MI6 information,
presumably they had a great source in the French
government who was able to confirm THE ONE man
being killed ensured French policy would change and
stay changed through all the changes in Government over
the next 6 years, the changes you decide are completely
irrelevant, since you delete the mention of them.

I know this is silly but why not look at the French Government
policies and the influences on it, including Italy shifting from
anti to pro Germany, the British actions, the depression and
its effects, the changes in Germany's attitudes and capabilities
and so on.

Try and explain with the communists making so many gains
in the elections why French government policy is supposed
to continue to be so against alliances with the USSR.

I realise the Churchill quote is so important you will invent
reasons to ignore what the French government did in
favour of what you wanted it to do, but try, reality is much
more interesting than fiction.

The allies knew when the German attack came it was
likely to be from the North Sea to Luxembourg. The Belgians
and Dutch decided despite all the information available to
avoid overt co-operation with the allies, even with the
evidence of the plans captured on 10 January 1940 and
apparently in conspiracy land, with even more of the
German plans known to the allies. In any case the
opening attacks on 10 May were powerful indications the
original German plans were being used, complete with
Panzer divisions attacking into Holland and Belgium.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-06-01 19:57:54 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So what was so special about Sedan that a panzer thrust would
work there and ONLY there?
Come on, why?

It was then in the public discussion even. Thats why this parliament
commission was launched to investigate the possibility of a breakthrough
at Sedan. How it became a public issue then, I dont know.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And how did the French command know this?

Bertrand brought in Ultra why the F HQ was such extraordinary well informed.
I suspect they had several sources, but Ultra (besides spies) be the most
important. Note that NSA historian Deutsch who reviewed the book of Bertrand
gave no indication that he thought the claim of Bertrand be wrong or an
exaggeration. Deutsch cited from the book of Bertrand several times and
called it more authentic than the 1974 Ultra book of Winterbotham.
Deutsch (1978 ?) in the NSA release of 2006:

In view of the bombshell impact of Winterbotham's
book in the following year, it is astonishing how litde
sensation resulted from the publication in 1973 of
Gustave Bertrand's "Enigma ou la plus grande enigme de
la guerre 1939-1945", Bertrand did not leave very much
for Winterbotham to spill. But the insouciance of most
Britons and Americans about anything appearing in a
language not their own prevented Bertrand from gaining
much attention in their countries.

On the background of the breaking of Enigma,
Bertrand's account is by far the more authentic, though
he does not say much about Ultra after the 1940 disaster
in the West. Winterbotham supplemented this with a
survey, constructed essentially from memory, of what
Ultra did for the British and Americans.
(...)
The number of messages deciphered at Bletchley and
Vignolles before France left the war is given variously
between eight and fifteen thousand.5
Something like one thousand became available during the Norwegian
campaign and five thousand during that in the West.6
In neither case does the course of events seem to have been
much influenced. Winterbotham avers that it was the
decipherment of a Rundstedt signal which persuaded
Lord Gort to head for the coast and commence the
Dunkirk evacuation.7
Bertrand holds that no general
headquarters in history had yet been so thoroughly
informed of enemy moves and intentions as the French
headquarters of Generals Gamelin and Weygand, but he
implies that not much was made of this. (..)

5 The latter figure is from Bertrand, p. 15. Peter Calvocoressi
in a BBC broadcast of 27 January 1977 speaks of 8,440, of which
83 percent are said co have been the work of Bletchley.
6 Ibid.
7 As related by Lord Gort. Wimerbotham, pp. 34-35.
8 As related by Menzies, Bertrand. p. 256.

Harold C. Deutsch: The Historical Impact of Revealing The Ultra Secret,
(Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College) Approved for Release
by NSA on 10-26-2006, FOIA Case # 51639

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 1940-44 war of attrition with a German focus to create civilian
deaths in France, how many deaths, civ and mil, could be the worst
expectation? Assume 20% of France got occupied.

Oh good, a homework assignment from someone who deletes any
reply that does not fit.

No, I want to understand your line of argument.

Given the failure to actually deal with facts that contradict the claims,
there has been little attempt to understand, much more devoted to
saying it must be so.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above scenario
is something the old men of French HQ must had in mind in April
1940.

Genocide?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I think we agree that they feared a repeat of WWI.

Everyone did.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From an only military point of view, what would be the result
such 4 years in your opinion?

Now try and actually note what you are asking for, over the 4 years
Does Italy remain neutral?

(more policy issues deleted)

I asked for about the third time what a French military could fear
as worst outcome. You refused by policy talk again. Let it rest here.
I think they feard millions of deaths, more than in WWI.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The RN captured a naval enigma in late 1939. It helped
cracking of German messages from 28 October 1939 in
mid January 1940.

I do not remember this. Can you tell some more?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
More work meant the French could
read other traffic. It would seem as usual the Luftwaffe
was the easiest to penetrate.
Winterbotham was shown the first British decrypts in April
1940, which of course were low level items from the Luftwaffe.

The British cracked German Navy Enigma from 10/39 to 1/40 but
Winterbotham had no knowledge of this or did not mention it?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Any possibility the intelligence people are confusing
the 10 January incident? Any chance the intelligence
people are trying to say there was no intelligence failure
to locate the important German attack, it was a command
failure, that is it was someone else to blame?
Noticed the lack of support for the Winterbotham and
Bertrand claims?

I noted the lack of attention by (published) historians on this
claims. It seems we here are the first to discuss it in public.
And before I brought it in in 2013 nobody here remembered to read
it. Bertrand was only read by one here (so claimed). But Winterbotham
by most I assume.

Churchill saw it different from you. And he had (at least since
1940) probably access to more information (MI6) around the 1930s
events than we have.

I`m not aware that anyone ever suggested MI6 had a hand in
this assassination 1934. Churchill wrote after the war. Do we
agree that he was one of the best informed man about the 1930s
events that lead to WWII? That he some time inquired about it?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-06-02 15:19:15 UTC

Essentially my previous reply was around 250 lines, under 40
survived into this latest non reply.

Some of the deleted stuff, starting with the French High Command.

However you are quite convinced of what they thought, despite no
evidence, as opposed to the solid evidence from their military
writings and command how they had missed the changes the
Germans were about to use.

You are quite convinced they knew the Sedan attack and far
more importantly the exploitation would end the war in a
short time while being also sure there would be a long war
of attrition and genocide if the Sedan attack was not allowed
to succeed.

Quite a contradiction, either the new mobile war worked or
it totally failed.

You are the one coming up with the idea there could only ever
be one successful thrust into France by the German mobile
forces, all other attacks would be WWI like in terms of ground
gained and casualties, while the Germans conducted genocide
in the areas they did gain control of.

That the French generals were supposed to know, really KNOW,
the Sedan attack would succeed so well, but at the same time, know,
really KNOW, no other panzer thrust would work, dooming France to
years of attrition warfare and genocide in the parts of France held
by the Germans.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So what was so special about Sedan that a panzer thrust would
work there and ONLY there?
Come on, why?

It was then in the public discussion even. Thats why this parliament
commission was launched to investigate the possibility of a breakthrough
at Sedan. How it became a public issue then, I dont know.

So good you decided to delete the paragraph before the one you
kept, it really helps avoid answering.

So try again, why was Sedan so special that the French high command
KNEW a panzer thrust from there would work, but no other one would
work, dooming the fighting to long term attrition?

All you do is change the subject, not answer the question.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And how did the French command know this?

Bertrand brought in Ultra why the F HQ was such extraordinary well informed.

And of course despite all the evidence that the meaning you give
Bertrand is wrong you still start from the idea he must be right and
then back fill reasons to fit.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I suspect they had several sources,

NO, you have to KNOW the sources, not suspect it to accuse people
of treason just to start with.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
but Ultra (besides spies) be the most
important.

Provide the evidence, not the assumptions piled on assumptions.
Winterbotham decided something close to treason for not doing
reconnaissance flights over the Ardennes, ignoring the actual
flights and reports. You decide Winterbotham is right therefore
it must be reconnaissance that is very to most important.

In mid May a German Officer was captured with a complete
German Order of Battle on him for example.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Note that NSA historian Deutsch who reviewed the book of Bertrand
gave no indication that he thought the claim of Bertrand be wrong or an
exaggeration. Deutsch cited from the book of Bertrand several times and
called it more authentic than the 1974 Ultra book of Winterbotham.

Winterbotham's book is well known to contain a number of errors,
not surprising as he was writing from memory and the British were
latecomers to the effort.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
In view of the bombshell impact of Winterbotham's
book in the following year, it is astonishing how litde
sensation resulted from the publication in 1973 of
Gustave Bertrand's "Enigma ou la plus grande enigme de
la guerre 1939-1945", Bertrand did not leave very much
for Winterbotham to spill. But the insouciance of most
Britons and Americans about anything appearing in a
language not their own prevented Bertrand from gaining
much attention in their countries.

So essentially the English speakers are supposed to
monitor foreign language publications, in the Ultra case
not only French but also Polish.

And Winterbotham made it clear there was an all war
attack on the German codes with significant successes,
Bertrand was involved in a lot less.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
On the background of the breaking of Enigma,
Bertrand's account is by far the more authentic, though
he does not say much about Ultra after the 1940 disaster
in the West. Winterbotham supplemented this with a
survey, constructed essentially from memory, of what
Ultra did for the British and Americans.

So Bertrand had the deeper knowledge of pre war
cracking, which has long been understood given the
way the French and Poles had been helping each other,
the British have paid tribute to the Polish efforts, which
were well in advance of the British ones at the time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(...)
The number of messages deciphered at Bletchley and
Vignolles before France left the war is given variously
between eight and fifteen thousand.
5 Something like one thousand became available during
the Norwegian campaign and five thousand during that
in the West.

So at least 2,000 decrypts before early April with others
claiming up to 9,000. So far the Ultra books I have
consulted are closer to the 2,000 mark including April.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
6 In neither case does the course of events seem to have
been much influenced. Winterbotham avers that it was the
decipherment of a Rundstedt signal which persuaded
Lord Gort to head for the coast and commence the
Dunkirk evacuation.

Gort was thinking about evacuating on 19 May, the rear
echelons began to go or be organised to go the next day.
The same day as the Germans reached the coast.

On the 21st the Arras attack occurred.

By the 24th at least partial evacuation was policy, Gort
decided on the 25th and by the 26th officially a full
evacuation and by the end of the day almost 28,000 men
had been returned to England since the evacuations began.

It is not surprising Winterbotham would claim an Ultra
message was the cause, the reality is any such message
was stating the obvious after 21 May.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
7 Bertrand holds that no general
headquarters in history had yet been so thoroughly
informed of enemy moves and intentions as the French
headquarters of Generals Gamelin and Weygand, but he
implies that not much was made of this. (..)

Ah I see, Bertrand is referring to the messages cracked
during the campaign itself, ignoring the black out from 1
May due to changes. He announces the intelligence
people provided a steady stream of reliable decrypts
which the command failed to act on.

You come along and decide Bertrand says the French
had a full or near full copy of the German strategic plan,
well in advance of 10 May and therefore the French were
playing to lose.

You have a remarkable ability to turn a report of a sore
toe into a request for multiple amputations and organ
transplants.

Bertrand ignores the problems in the French command
system, how slow it was, he decides the decrypts were
essentially accurate actionable material, no ambiguities,
no contradictions from say reconnaissance, no messages
shown to be wrong and therefore causing doubt about
other messages. Also there was a well working
intelligence system ready to go to handle the decrypts
and all the other information to turn out highly accurate
intelligence in a quick time frame that kept up with the
pace of the panzer divisions.

Winterbotham makes the point it took the British a
few months to create the system to provide Ultra
to field commanders.

No admission from Bertrand the Luftwaffe was making
it hard to move troops and then engage in a counter attack.

How about the intelligence estimates that stated the
Germans would take much longer to close and then
cross the Meuse?

You do know about all the halt orders issued before the
one endorsed by Hitler? The ones Guderian and others
did their best to ignore. So hey, Bertrand gives a decrypt
saying Guderian has been ordered to halt, we can now
plan an attack knowing where he is going to be for a
while, possibly days. Then Guderian moves, or rather
does not really stop.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
5 The latter figure is from Bertrand, p. 15. Peter Calvocoressi
in a BBC broadcast of 27 January 1977 speaks of 8,440, of which
83 percent are said co have been the work of Bletchley.
6 Ibid.
7 As related by Lord Gort. Wimerbotham, pp. 34-35.
8 As related by Menzies, Bertrand. p. 256.
Harold C. Deutsch: The Historical Impact of Revealing The Ultra Secret,
(Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College) Approved for Release
by NSA on 10-26-2006, FOIA Case # 51639

Oh good, a homework assignment from someone who deletes any
reply that does not fit.

No, I want to understand your line of argument.

Given the failure to actually deal with facts that contradict the claims,
there has been little attempt to understand, much more devoted to
saying it must be so.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above scenario
is something the old men of French HQ must had in mind in April
1940.

Genocide?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I think we agree that they feared a repeat of WWI.

Everyone did.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From an only military point of view, what would be the result
such 4 years in your opinion?

Now try and actually note what you are asking for, over the 4 years
Does Italy remain neutral?

(more policy issues deleted)
I asked for about the third time what a French military could fear
as worst outcome.

Actually I did answer, a war of attrition like WWI, wrecking France
again, one reason why they wanted to move into Belgium as fast
as possible, along with the better defensive lines in the country.

Along with why it was a very unlikely outcome.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You refused by policy talk again.

No I asked someone who wants to change the subject into
what ifs what sort of constraints there were on the scenario
and received the above sort of non reply.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Let it rest here.

In other words you cannot construct the scenario you want
so time to announce once again it is too truthful to be
challenged.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I think they feard millions of deaths, more than in WWI.

I think you have decided the answer and have zero intention
of allowing reality to change things.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The RN captured a naval enigma in late 1939. It helped
cracking of German messages from 28 October 1939 in
mid January 1940.

I do not remember this. Can you tell some more?

It is in the various Ultra books, essentially an early success
that faded, though the physical parts captures were useful,
the German Navy was better at communications security.

The British cracked German Navy Enigma from 10/39 to 1/40 but
Winterbotham had no knowledge of this or did not mention it?

You have once again exaggerated the code breaking, the cracking
in January 1940 was for ONE DAY's traffic, 28 October 1939,
essentially after 3 months delay.

And yes, Winterbotham was writing from memory and the
critics have pointed out a number of times when he is in error
and he did not know everything.

I noted the lack of attention by (published) historians on this
claims. It seems we here are the first to discuss it in public.

Actually there has been discussion of the claims in the past,
and again, you decide to change this, so a lack of support for
your ideas is wished away to no one has discussed this before.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And before I brought it in in 2013 nobody here remembered to read
it.

Can you please post the results of the survey of the readers of
the news group you have obviously done, about who has read what
book? Or alternatively have you decided since no one has posted
messages mentioned reading the books everyone must not have
read them?

You know you are very good at manufacturing conclusions from
zero evidence.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Bertrand was only read by one here (so claimed). But Winterbotham
by most I assume.

Or people read the Ultra books that came out later as those
works were granted access to the records and so could be
regarded as more likely to supply accurate details.

Churchill saw it different from you. And he had (at least since
1940) probably access to more information (MI6) around the 1930s
events than we have.

I`m not aware that anyone ever suggested MI6 had a hand in
this assassination 1934.

I am well aware you will change the subject rather than cope
with reality.

What sources did MI6 have inside the French Government?
To the point of knowing what you claim they knew?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Churchill wrote after the war. Do we
agree that he was one of the best informed man about the 1930s
events that lead to WWII?

Do we agree whatever Churchill knew at the time is not
evidence the quote you like is correct?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That he some time inquired about it?

Prove MI6 had lots of files of accurate information on the internal
workings of the French government. Which is what you are claiming
they had. Prove Churchill went through the MI6 files, which is what
you are claiming he did.

Or stop telling us Churchill must be right because he wrote
something you like and stop inventing "must have" non evidence
as support.

So once again, Bertrand, Winterbotham and Churchill as you
present them are wrong, as has been shown multiple times,
as you keep proving by avoiding the facts.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-06-04 17:07:05 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And how did the French command know this?

Bertrand brought in Ultra why the F HQ was such extraordinary well informed.

And of course despite all the evidence that the meaning you give
Bertrand is wrong you still start from the idea he must be right and
then back fill reasons to fit.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I suspect they had several sources,

NO, you have to KNOW the sources, not suspect it to accuse people
of treason just to start with.

The accusation of treason was by Winterbotham. I explained at length
why I would not have called it that way.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The RN captured a naval enigma in late 1939. It helped
cracking of German messages from 28 October 1939 in
mid January 1940.

I do not remember this. Can you tell some more?

It is in the various Ultra books, essentially an early success
that faded, though the physical parts captures were useful,
the German Navy was better at communications security.

Please give some more details where and how it happened, I checked
some net sources but this capture was unknown. The capture of the
rotors from U-33 was later and the full Enigma with paper from U-110
was in 1941. In the 2006 NSA release Deutsch wrote "a setting for a
message intercepted on 26 October 1939 was not solved until 17 January
1940." But no mention of any Enigma capture.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Noticed the lack of support for the Winterbotham and
Bertrand claims?

I noted the lack of attention by (published) historians on this
claims. It seems we here are the first to discuss it in public.

Actually there has been discussion of the claims in the past,
and again, you decide to change this, so a lack of support for
your ideas is wished away to no one has discussed this before.

What book or paper discussed Winterbothams "treason" claim? Do you mean
our discussion here in 2013?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And before I brought it in in 2013 nobody here remembered to read
it.

On 3rd July 2013 under "Sedan 1940" I asked "was there ever an article
or book that explained it by treason?" Nobody suggested any source. Then
I found that Winterbotham quite plain suggested it. It was in his 1974 book
on the Ultra revelation. By its ground breaking stuff I assume it was one
of the most mentioned books on WWII. I would be surprised if nobody here
had read it. Did you Geoffrey?

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-06-05 16:13:40 UTC

This time the 160 lines of reply have been cut to 13, and some of the
remnants are effectively ignored.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And how did the French command know this?

Bertrand brought in Ultra why the F HQ was such extraordinary well informed.

And of course despite all the evidence that the meaning you give
Bertrand is wrong you still start from the idea he must be right and
then back fill reasons to fit.

I note no reply here, the quotes are too sacred therefore they need
no evidence to back them up.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I suspect they had several sources,

NO, you have to KNOW the sources, not suspect it to accuse people
of treason just to start with.

The accusation of treason was by Winterbotham. I explained at length
why I would not have called it that way.

While casually introducing the idea the French command was trying
to lose, treason anyone?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The RN captured a naval enigma in late 1939. It helped
cracking of German messages from 28 October 1939 in
mid January 1940.

I do not remember this. Can you tell some more?

It is in the various Ultra books, essentially an early success
that faded, though the physical parts captures were useful,
the German Navy was better at communications security.

Please give some more details where and how it happened,

No, it was in one of the Ultra books I consulted. Normally I would
go back and look but simply I feel there is no point given your
writings, the way anything that does not fit the conspiracy is
deleted.

Try actually going back and answering the points I made in the
messages you chose to effectively ignore while framing your
non replies.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I checked
some net sources but this capture was unknown. The capture of the
rotors from U-33 was later and the full Enigma with paper from U-110
was in 1941. In the 2006 NSA release Deutsch wrote "a setting for a
message intercepted on 26 October 1939 was not solved until 17 January
1940." But no mention of any Enigma capture.

And there were some others according to some of the books I
found, including off Norway in 1940. Machines and/or parts of
machines were captured as the Germans expected.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Noticed the lack of support for the Winterbotham and
Bertrand claims?

I noted the lack of attention by (published) historians on this
claims. It seems we here are the first to discuss it in public.

Actually there has been discussion of the claims in the past,
and again, you decide to change this, so a lack of support for
your ideas is wished away to no one has discussed this before.

What book or paper discussed Winterbothams "treason" claim? Do you mean
our discussion here in 2013?

You would need to go back through the newsgroup archives to at
least the 1990's.

Then look at the discussions generated when his book came out,
around 40 years ago. The book came and went as others were
found to be better references.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
And before I brought it in in 2013 nobody here remembered to read
it.

On 3rd July 2013 under "Sedan 1940" I asked "was there ever an article
or book that explained it by treason?" Nobody suggested any source.

You mean people did not bother to mention a single sentence in a book
that can easily be shown to be wrong, that is Winterbotham? And you
decide that must mean no one has read the book.

Winterbotham says no reconnaissance, other references note the allies
did fly reconnaissance and detected movement in the Ardennes but
discounted it as simply part of the general advance.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Then
I found that Winterbotham quite plain suggested it. It was in his 1974 book
on the Ultra revelation. By its ground breaking stuff I assume it was one
of the most mentioned books on WWII.

No, it was put aside because of things like the treason ideas and the
errors in it, later books had access to the archives.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I would be surprised if nobody here
had read it. Did you Geoffrey?

Can you please post the results of the survey of the readers of
the news group you have obviously done, about who has read what
book? Or alternatively have you decided since no one has posted
messages mentioned reading the books everyone must not have
read them?

Once again you assume lots and defy logic while doing so.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-06-08 19:44:58 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The RN captured a naval enigma in late 1939. It helped
cracking of German messages from 28 October 1939 in
mid January 1940.

I do not remember this. Can you tell some more?

It is in the various Ultra books, essentially an early success
that faded, though the physical parts captures were useful,
the German Navy was better at communications security.

Please give some more details where and how it happened,

I agree that it probably had nothing to do with Sedan 1940. But it
may be an important and certainly is a less known event in the
Enigma story. We are here to share interesting information not just
to a single subject. In the past I got a personal request to an
issue I mentioned here in the passing. I gave him full sources
and this historian was quite satisfied because it was news to him.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Noticed the lack of support for the Winterbotham and
Bertrand claims?

I noted the lack of attention by (published) historians on this
claims. It seems we here are the first to discuss it in public.

Actually there has been discussion of the claims in the past,
and again, you decide to change this, so a lack of support for
your ideas is wished away to no one has discussed this before.

What book or paper discussed Winterbothams "treason" claim? Do you mean
our discussion here in 2013?

You would need to go back through the newsgroup archives to at
least the 1990's.

I did now with: Winterbotham treason
I was surprised to found only ours in 2013/14.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then look at the discussions generated when his book came out,
around 40 years ago. The book came and went as others were
found to be better references.

I did a Google web search: Ultra Winterbotham Gamelin treason
What I found was very meager and partly from us here. On such an issue
I would have expected much more. Instead it seems almost unknown.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-06-09 14:40:15 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The RN captured a naval enigma in late 1939. It helped
cracking of German messages from 28 October 1939 in
mid January 1940.

I do not remember this. Can you tell some more?

It is in the various Ultra books, essentially an early success
that faded, though the physical parts captures were useful,
the German Navy was better at communications security.

Please give some more details where and how it happened,

I agree that it probably had nothing to do with Sedan 1940. But it
may be an important and certainly is a less known event in the
Enigma story.

Or alternatively as explained it was a small piece, but I understand
ENIGMA means it must be big for you.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We are here to share interesting information not just
to a single subject.

No, you are here to announce your conspiracy theory is so
wonderful it must be protected from reality at all opportunities.

Hence when people share information showing the conspiracy
is wrong you delete it. You are either preaching or repeating
dogma, not sharing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
In the past I got a personal request to an
issue I mentioned here in the passing. I gave him full sources
and this historian was quite satisfied because it was news to him.

WWII is too big for someone to know everything.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Noticed the lack of support for the Winterbotham and
Bertrand claims?

I noted the lack of attention by (published) historians on this
claims. It seems we here are the first to discuss it in public.

Actually there has been discussion of the claims in the past,
and again, you decide to change this, so a lack of support for
your ideas is wished away to no one has discussed this before.

What book or paper discussed Winterbothams "treason" claim? Do you mean
our discussion here in 2013?

You would need to go back through the newsgroup archives to at
least the 1990's.

I did now with: Winterbotham treason
I was surprised to found only ours in 2013/14.

I would note that Winterbotham's book predates the newsgroups
by a few years.

I would note his idea about French treason was rapidly blown apart
as the allies did do the reconnaissance, and it became clear they
did not realise what was coming through the Ardennes.

However you clearly intend to keep the quote as an irrefutable
truth. Winterbotham must be right, so there must be a conspiracy.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then look at the discussions generated when his book came out,
around 40 years ago. The book came and went as others were
found to be better references.

I did a Google web search: Ultra Winterbotham Gamelin treason
What I found was very meager and partly from us here. On such an issue
I would have expected much more. Instead it seems almost unknown.

Now try this, try thinking, try understanding.

The Gamelin line in Winterbotham is a throw away line that was
rapidly proved wrong, repeat wrong. It was one of the claims in
his book quickly refuted, and people moved on. However
everyone now expects you to simply assume it is right no
matter how wrong it is.

Bothered to go looking for reports on what reconnaissance
told the allies before the Germans crossed the Meuse?

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2014-06-02 18:15:05 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The British cracked German Navy Enigma from 10/39 to 1/40 but
Winterbotham had no knowledge of this or did not mention it?

The Allies broke no Enigma until early 1940.

They read essentially no Kriegsmarine
Enigma until mid-1941, after several
successful operations to capture naval
Enigma material.

This is confirmed in many different
accounts of Bletchley Park and ULTRA.

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Rich Rostrom

2014-05-23 22:52:52 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The US public was very anti war up to Pearl Habor. Even after
it FDR had not much chance to declare war on Germany.

Wrong on both counts.

By mid-1941, the U.S. public (by a wide margin)
supported aiding the Allies even at risk of war,
and going to war if necessary to defeat the Axis.

That going to war was _necessary_ had not been
shown, so the U.S. did not declare war until
attacked.

As to the situation after Pearl Harbor... In a Gallup
poll taken immediately after the U.S. declaration
of war on Japan, a very strong majority agreed that
FDR should also have asked for a declaration of war
against Germany.

--
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GFH

2014-05-24 15:33:25 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The US public was very anti war up to Pearl Habor. Even after
it FDR had not much chance to declare war on Germany.

Wrong on both counts.
By mid-1941, the U.S. public (by a wide margin)
supported aiding the Allies even at risk of war,
and going to war if necessary to defeat the Axis.

My father was a good example. He signed up with the
US Navy in late May or early June. At first he was
rejected because the Navy "did not need more doctors".
But three days later they called back to say that they
had reviewed his file and had noted that he was also a
PhD in physics. They wanted him to join as a line
officer in mine-sweeping. He was in England that fall,
well before December 8, 1941. (BTW, he had a very good
job at Cornell Medical College.)

GFH

WJHopwood

2014-05-25 04:12:05 UTC

On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:52:52 PM UTC-4, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
By mid-1941, the U.S. public (by a wide margin)
supported aiding the Allies even at risk of war...

My father was a good example. He signed up with the
US Navy in late May or early June....

The chronology of dates is interesting. In 1940 many of
us could see the handwriting on rhe wall. Things were
beginning to speed up. The U.S. Army only had 174,000
men on active duty, the other services had comparably
few as well, so by early 1940 the armed forces started a
a drive to enlist recruits and reservists. The "great
depression" was still with us, jobs were scarce, and some
men were glad to join up. The Reserves also grew. (On a
personal note, I joined the Naval Reserve in May of 1940
and was called to active duty in Feb of 1941).
The national guard was activated in 1940. The first
peacetime draft also passed in October of 1940. (More
than 34,000,000 men had registered by the end of the war).
Although those of us in the Reserves were exempt from being
drafted, we had to register with our local draft boards anyway.
On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt informed the
nation that "an unlimited national emergency exists." Then
In August of 1941, FDR and Churchill met at Newfoundland on
the U.S.cruiser "Augusta." They produced a "Most Secret
Agreement" outlining the objectives that Britain and the U.S.
had in common with regard to "hopes for a better future for the
world." So much for those hopes. We all know what happened
on Dec 7, 1941 and thereafter for 4 more years.

WJH

WJHopwood

2014-05-24 21:27:25 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The US public was very anti war up to Pearl Habor. Even after
it FDR had not much chance to declare war on Germany.

Wrong on both counts. By mid-1941, the U.S. public (by a wide
margin) supported aiding the Allies even at risk of war,
and going to war if necessary to defeat the Axis.

True. By mid-1941 the U.S. public had been pretty
well exposed to a constant barrage of bad news from
Europe and a speed-up of "defense" preparations in the
U.S.
Although still professing "neutrality" it was no secret
anywhere (including with the Axis partners) whose side
the U.S. was on as far as the Roosevelt administration was
concerned. Although the anti-war movements, principally
the "America First" group with the support of Charles A.
Lindbergh, and a few others such as Father Coughlin the
firebrand "Radio Priest," made a lot of noise and were a
political minority that had to be reckoned with by FDR, they
did not represent the thinking of most Americans. At the
peak of the anti-war opposition in 1940, FDR was re-elected
for a third term.

That going to war was _necessary_ had not been shown, so the
U.S. did not declare war until attacked.

It was more than that. On the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack
after the U.S. had intercepted and decoded the final part of
the long Japanese diplomatic message of instructions being
sent by Tokyo to Japanese Special Envoy Kurusu, President
Roosevelt is quoted as having said to his aide, Harry Hopkins,
"this means war."
Hopkins suggested that since that appeared to be the case
perhaps the U.S. might better strike first. But FDR is said to have
replied, "We can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful
people."

As to the situation after Pearl Harbor... In a Gallup
poll taken immediately after the U.S. declaration
of war on Japan, a very strong majority agreed that
FDR should also have asked for a declaration of war
against Germany.

I don't recall hearing of a "Gallup Poll" at that time.
Maybe there was one but if so it was hardly necessary.
Everybody knew about the "tri-partite" pact between
Germany, Italy, and Japan. After Pearl Harbor the U.S.
public assumed we were already at war with Germany
and Italy because of that pact. Germany only confirmed
it with a declaration pf war against the U.S. 4 days later.

WJH

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-25 18:10:18 UTC

At the peak of the anti-war opposition in 1940, FDR
was re-elected for a third term.

True. But in his campaign, he stated:

"I have said this before, but I shall say it again and
again and again; your boys are not going to be sent
into any foreign wars."

According to William Safire, FDR was urged to
hedge by adding "except in case of attack".
FDR dismissed this, saying if the U.S. was
attacked it would not be a "foreign war".

Again according to Safire, Willkie had accused
FDR of leading the U.S. into war, and Bronx
Democrat boss Ed Flynn demanded that FDR
explicitly disclaim any such intent.

Had FDR _not_ done so and been re-elected, that
would be one thing. But he did, which suggests
that anti-war sentiment was still dominant in
1940.

Things were changing, to be sure, but the
changes weren't all there yet.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

WJHopwood

2014-05-25 23:54:11 UTC

On Sunday, May 25, 2014 2:10:18 PM UTC-4, Rich

At the peak of the anti-war opposition in 1940, FDR
was re-elected for a third term.

"I have said this before, but I shall say it again and
again and again; your boys are not going to be sent
into any foreign wars."
According to William Safire, FDR was urged to
hedge by adding "except in case of attack".
FDR dismissed this, saying if the U.S. was
attacked it would not be a "foreign war".

FDR dismissed the suggestion because he had
already hedged that remark on numerous
occasions during the campaign by his reference
to the First World War in his remarks which
assured the electorate that the country's young
men would not be sent overseas again to "settle
Europe's troubles." Of course that was campaign
oratory and the country knew it.
i am not saying that pre-was "isolationism"
was non-existent. Just that it was exaggerated,
then and now. The fact was that FDR merely
played lip-service to it and proceeded to support
Britain, France, and later Russia by every conceivable
means short of declaring war, while struggling at
the same time to put up a front of "neutrality" which
fooled nobody.
As for the principal opposition group,
"America First," it didn't get around to officially
organizing until September 4, 1940, and that was
because of the Lend/Lease Act, the "old destroyers
for bases" deal between Britain and the U.S. which
Congress had passed shortly before.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Again according to Safire, Willkie had accused
FDR of leading the U.S. into war. Had FDR
_not_ done so and been re-elected, that
would be one thing. But he did, which suggests
that anti-war sentiment was still dominant in 1940.

You lost me rhere. You seem to be contradicting
your own position. On rhe contrary, FDR was, in fact,
taking actions in support of the Allies which tended to
expose the country to the possibility of war with the
Axis, yet he WAS re-elected. Doesn't that indicate
that the majority of the country was not isolationist?
That the majority of the people DID support FDR's
actions to aid the Allies?.
Despite Willkie's campaign oratory so as
not to offend Republican isolationists, his whole
campaign was centered on criticism of FDR's
unprecedented candicacy for a "third term" and
on FDR's domestic "New Deal" rather than FDR's
aid to the European Allies.
In fact, to jump ahead, after Willkie was
defeated by FDR he agreed, in late 1941 (before
Pearl Harbor) to serve as FDR's special envoy to
Europe to assure the Allies of U.S. support in the
fight against the Axis. He also publicly supported
the "Lend Lease" agreement5 and was highly critical
of the isolationists.

WJH

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-28 01:46:18 UTC

Post by WJHopwood
As for the principal opposition group,
"America First," it didn't get around to officially
organizing until September 4, 1940, and that was
because of the Lend/Lease Act, the "old destroyers
for bases" deal between Britain and the U.S. which
Congress had passed shortly before.

The Lend-Lease Act was passed on March 11, 1041.

The "destroyers-for-bases" deal was made on
2 September 1940.

Thus destroyers-for-bases predated Lend-Lease by
six months, and neither had anything to do with
the founding of America First, which predated both.

You lost me rhere. You seem to be contradicting
your own position.

Only because you seem to have edited out a
key sentence from my posting before reading it
and quoting it.

This is what I actually wrote:

"Again according to Safire, Willkie had accused
FDR of leading the U.S. into war***, and Bronx
Democrat boss Ed Flynn demanded that FDR
explicitly disclaim any such intent***."

[the text you omitted is emphasized]

Had FDR _not_ done so and been re-elected, that
would be one thing."

What FDR might have not done, but actually did,
was "explicitly disclaim any such intent" (of
leading the U.S. into war), as Flynn demanded.

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WJHopwood

2014-05-28 14:38:28 UTC

On Tuesday, May 27, 2014 9:46:18 PM UTC-4, Rich

The Lend-Lease Act was passed on March 11, 1041.

In 1041? WOW! Twenty-five years before the Battle of
Hastings, eh?
But on a more serious note, although Lend Lease was
passed as legislation in 1941, it's subject matter, i.e. aid
to the Allies, had been debated for months before. That
debate and the "Destroyers for Bases" debate were not
entirely unrelated they were two different issues which came
to fruition at different times as I should have noted in my
previous post. Both were highly controversial issues in the
late 1940s and were strongly opposed by the isolationists
who argued unsuccessfully that both violated previous
neutrality legislation, particularly the "cash and carry"
provisions thereof.

Post by Rich Rostrom
The "destroyers-for-bases" deal was made on
2 September 1940.

Yes. Thanks for confirming the "shortly before" September 4th,
dste I said in my prior post.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Thus destroyers-for-bases predated Lend-Lease by
six months, and neither had anything to do with
the founding of America First, which predated both.

On the contrary, both matters had much to do do with
the arguments of America First, and were strongly debated
in the late 40's and early 1941. As historian Stan Cohen
wrote in his book "V for Victory--America's Home Front
During WWII." (1991)
"The America First Group was organized by isolationist
people on Sept. 4th,1940 to counter the growing
involvement of the United States in the European conflict.
One strong catalyst for the committee to organize was the
destroyer-for-bases trade two days before between Britain
and the United States."

You lost me rhere. You seem to be contradicting
your own position.

Only because you seem to have edited out a
key sentence from my posting...
r***, and Bronx Democrat boss Ed Flynn
demanded that FDR explicitly disclaim any such
intent***." [the text you omitted is emphasized]
Had FDR _not_ done so and been re-elected, that
would be one thing." What FDR might have not done,
but actually did, was "explicitly disclaim any such intent"
(of leading the U.S. into war), as Flynn demanded.

I still can't figure out what you are trying to say. Furthermore
what Flynn said is meaningless vis-a-vis FDR's "intent." As I
previously pointed out and you seem to have missed is that
FDR said on numerous occasions that the country's young men
would not be sent overseas again to "settle Europe's troubles."
Maybe you are trying to say you agree with that remark. After
all FDR can't show much more "intent" than that, at least when
he said it.

WJH

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-28 18:41:47 UTC

WJHopwood <***@aol.com> wrote:

Good point about the destroyer-for-bases deal.
I misread the dates.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Had FDR _not_ done so and been re-elected, that
would be one thing." What FDR might have not done,
but actually did, was "explicitly disclaim any such intent"
(of leading the U.S. into war), as Flynn demanded.

I still can't figure out what you are trying to say.

That isolationism was still a considerable
political force in 1940, as seen by FDR
showing such egregious deference to it.

Post by WJHopwood
Furthermore
what Flynn said is meaningless vis-a-vis FDR's "intent."

And that Flynn, a political expert, insisted
on such deference, as necessary to win the
1940 election.

Post by WJHopwood
As I
previously pointed out and you seem to have missed is that
FDR said on numerous occasions that the country's young men
would not be sent overseas again to "settle Europe's troubles."

_I_ was the one who quoted FDR's "again and
again and again" statement, so I don't see
how I missed it.

Post by WJHopwood
Maybe you are trying to say you agree with that remark.

The point of citing the remark is not about
FDR's intent, but that the political climate
at that time induced him to make it.

This is contradictory to your claim that
isolationism versus intervention was not
important in the 1940 election. At that time,
neither candidate dared explicitly support
intervention.

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S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

2014-05-25 18:28:22 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The US public was very anti war up to Pearl Habor. Even after
it FDR had not much chance to declare war on Germany.

Wrong on both counts.
By mid-1941, the U.S. public (by a wide margin)
supported aiding the Allies even at risk of war,
and going to war if necessary to defeat the Axis.
That going to war was _necessary_ had not been
shown, so the U.S. did not declare war until
attacked.
As to the situation after Pearl Harbor... In a Gallup
poll taken immediately after the U.S. declaration
of war on Japan, a very strong majority agreed that
FDR should also have asked for a declaration of war
against Germany.

Wow, I apologize on what I thought about the US public then.
I remember that I heard or read that FDR had no chance to get a
declaration of war against Germany in 1941 or 42. He was eager to get it.
It even was suggested he would have gone to dirty tricks, some false flag
operations with the British to achieve it. Was that all nonsense? Or was
the Senat opinion very different from the public one?

Why did FDR not take the chance of Pearl Harbor to go on Germany too?
That Germany would take on the US days later, was that really such
foreseeable to him? For the Germans at least it was the second sudden shock
within 6 months.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-28 01:57:16 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Wow, I apologize on what I thought about the US public then.
I remember that I heard or read that FDR had no chance to get a
declaration of war against Germany in 1941 or 42.

Until a few months ago, I would have partially
agreed with you - that there was no chance in 1941.
I have felt for a long time that FDR could have
managed a declaration of war against Germany by
mid-1942, but many thought otherwise.

That the U.S. public was _immediately_ ready for
war with Germany right after Pearl Harbor - I didn't
know _that_ until I saw the Gallup poll numbers.

This is why we participate in these forums - to
share information and learn.

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Geoffrey Sinclair

2014-05-18 18:04:12 UTC

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Are there some new facts, like I found
with the NSA declassification relevant to Sedan 1940?

What you found in the NSA report was a comment on a French book
from 1973 that claimed Ultra was so good in 1940 the French were
made fully aware of the German battle plan before 10 May 1940,
some feat given the Germans did not start to change plans until
after 10 January 1940 and were using land lines.
This great awareness of the plan plus codebreaking skill was of
course not communicated to the British who are on record as
struggling with German codes through 1940.

Geoffrey. did you read the book by Bertrand by now or did you make this up?

The British are reporting they certainly had no knowledge of
the German plan, so if the French knew they were not telling.
Plus we have the records of British code breaking abilities
in 1940.

I was actually taking the details from your message from a
while ago now, is the idea most of that message was made up?

I went and looked up my reply to that thread.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I wanted to read it but only found it in French. All I know is from
the NSA release.

Yet you decide to tell us a declassified NSA report backed the
idea the French knew, not a book written in France over 40
years ago the report quoted.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"Bertrand holds that no general headquarters in history had yet been so
thoroughly informed of enemy moves and intentions as the French
headquarters of Generals Gamelin and Weygand, but he implies that not
much was made of this."
Harold C. Deutsch: The Historical Impact of Revealing The Ultra Secret,
(Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College) Approved for Release
by NSA on 10-26-2006, FOIA Case # 51639

And Bertrand is fundamentally wrong, firstly on what the French
knew then and secondly what the allies could learn from Ultra
late in the war.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Has someone more details? General Bertrand was the highest French "Ultra"
authority who ever went public. Like Winterbotham, who was the highest
British Ultra authority who ever went public.

I presume the multi volume British official history on the subject is a
lower
authority than someone writing mainly from memory.

Also people like R V Jones and his memoirs, he makes extensive
use of Ultra material.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Both agree that the crucial
events around Sedan 1940 were direct or indirect based on "treason". That
the word may not full fit I explained last year.

Treason or something similar going on implies the French high
command knew most, kept the British in the dark, and then played
to lose.

And it is not just the events around Sedan, since the French High
Command would have to know in advance the German attack would
succeed as well as it did, some feat given their understanding of
armoured warfare.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But the whole issue is
something all historians carefully avoided for 40 years now.

Or to put it another way people have looked at the evidence and
noted the claims about intelligence at the time knowing so much
are wrong.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then having granted the French the German plan there is a need
for a conspiracy, the French command trying to lose sort of idea.

Well, that is about what Winterbotham suggested in his ground breaking

And of course this is believed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"Despite all the information available, the full appreciation of where
the armoured thrust to come appears to have ignored by the French High
Command, and even when the French tank patrols finally met the German
tanks in the forest of Ardennes, there was still no air reconnaissance,
ordered. It seems almost impossible to believe that General Gamelin,
the French command-in Chief [generalissimo], had so staked his reputation
on his assessment that the Germans could not and would not attack through
the the Ardennes that he refused to change his mind or his strategy. It
is difficult to say more without accusing Gamelin of treason. To the
intelligent onlooker it appeared that he was deliberately allowing the
Germans a quick victory, whilst making some show of resistance in the
North."

Right, forward patrols encounter German tanks, which immediately
confirms multiple Panzer corps are in the area, not the standard
French approach of support tanks being assigned to the formations.
And why are the French reconnaissance units using tanks in a
forest? It was Belgian territory anyway and they were doing patrols.

Next comes the fact the French did order air reconnaissance and did
note large movements, just like all along the front from Luxembourg
north, the terrain the French expected to hinder the Germans also
hindered the reconnaissance.

Next comes the idea the French had what they considered to be a
strong river defence line, and were comfortable the Germans would
have lots of difficulty in breaking it, not least due to problems
deploying artillery. Stukas against untrained infantry was something
for the future.

Finally most of the French mobile forces were committed on the
first day of the attack to move to contact in the more open
territory of Belgium, it would help keep the Germans out of
France, something the French were quite keen on.

So the idea is Gamelin notes some German tanks were seen
in the Ardennes, and is supposed to immediately stop the
move into Belgium and direct the troops to the Ardennes.

There were 3 panzer divisions with the force attacking Holland
and Northern Belgium, so the reports of those tanks are to
be ignored? One went into Holland, the other two drove from
Aachen and then south of Brussels, running into the French
1st Army.

Next on the list of panzer divisions from north to south are
two that attacked near Dinant, running into the French 9th
Army about 40 miles north of Sedan and not in the Ardennes.

Two more panzer divisions came through the Ardennes
and attacked at Montherme, basically the French 2nd Army,
about 15 miles north of Sedan, finally 3 more panzer
divisions attacked at Sedan, also hitting the French 2nd
Army.

So as of 21 May 5 of the 9 panzer divisions in France had
come through the Ardennes, with the 3 that moved through
Sedan the ones that had moved the most and reached
the coast.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That book a lot here read I assume. But nobody remembered this crucial
part about May 1940.

People remember, hence why the conspiracy and treason ideas are
simply wrong.

By the way if Bertrand and his team knew so much about Ultra
why did they never tell the British? You do know the French
team kept in contact with the British during the Vichy period?

Ever though Bertrand is confusing Ultra with the plans recovered
from the German courier plane that landed in Belgium in January
1940? They were a complete set.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2014-05-17 20:59:25 UTC