German produced port damage

Post by William Clodius
In evaluating Operation Dragoon advocates often focus on the usefulness
of Marseilles for the allied effort, while the critics often imply that
its capture at that time and moment was unimportant. In thinking about
it the usefullness of its capture as par of Dragoon depends on the
expected time scale for its capture, its condition when captured, and
the number of allied casualties to be expected as part of its capture,
if its capture were delayed until after the German mobile units would be
ordered to evacuate southern France in the later stages of the breakout
and pursuit.

Unless the allies close the passes to northern Italy that remains a viable
withdrawal route, look where Dragoon came ashore versus the border
and the main ports.

Post by William Clodius
1. Among the reasons Marseilles was captured so quickly after the
Dragoon landings were that land defenses had been neglected, the
civilian population was not evacuated, and troops were able to isolate
and attack Marseilles quickly so there was little time to improvise
defenses. If they liberation had been attempted by post-COBRA
exploitation troops would the defenses had been better?

While Marseilles was an important port there were a number of French
Mediterranean ports, which helped spread the risk of port damage.

A fundamental reason the Germans did not defend south France
was the risk of the forces being cut off from Germany by the allied
armies exploiting from Normandy. Forces coming from north
France would certainly take longer, and then comes whether they
presented the same threat of isolating the German forces.

Essentially the Germans did not fight for southern France, they
concentrated on saving as many troops as possible. Keeping
any allied forces coming from Normandy occupied for a long
time would be a big win for the Germans, it kept them away
from Germany at the end of stretched supply lines.

POL = Petrols (Gasoline), Oils, Lubricants

First Dragoon landings 15 August, Toulon and Marseilles in allied
hands on 28 August, so around 2 weeks.

"On 17th August the first train is run in the south of France, unlike the
north the rail operations quickly move to phase II, civilian operation
with military supervision." The first train run in Normandy was on
11 July and it took until October before French train crews were used.

"On 28th August Toulon, Marseilles and Port-de-Bouc are captured, the
latter is a satellite of Marseilles with significant POL capacity. This is
4 weeks earlier than planned for Marseilles and 1 week earlier for Toulon."

On 3rd September "The first basin in Marseilles harbour is declared free
of mines, cargo discharge can start into DUKWs and lighters"

On 15th September. "The port of Marseilles is opened for liberty ships
to discharge directly onto shore, by the end of the month it will have
handled 146,297 long tons of cargo, Port-de-Bouc is also opened
handling 36,839 long tons of cargo and 331,600 barrels of bulk POL
by the end of September. To handle the supplies the army opens up
the never used WWI US Army depot at Mirimas, 20 miles from Marseilles."

Cherbourg first tanker on 25 July, liberty ship, 9 August.

On 22nd September "Some of the merchant ships waiting off northern
France are sent to Marseilles."

At the end of October "In Marseilles there has been congestion
caused by a backlog in clearing cargo from the port area even
though the railway running north can now handle 12,000 tons/day.
The supply bottleneck in the south for the remainder of the war
are the railways, they do not have the capacity to clear the cargo
from a fully working Marseilles, so once Antwerp opens ships will
be unloaded in the north where possible. "

"During November the re-equipment of truck companies begins
by normally sending the unit to Marseille where some 1,800
semi trailers and 690 truck/tractors were sent due to the limited
port capacity in Northern France. Apart from the trucks 3
divisions originally scheduled to land in the north are diverted
to the southern ports ."

Post by William Clodius
2. Brest is often noted as not being repaired during the war at least
partly because of the extent of its damage, but several other ports that
were repaired read as if they were extensivley damaged. In what ways was
Brest more extensively damaged than Marseillees, Naples, or Cherbourgh?

Not a lot compared with Naples and Cherbourg. Brest was not repaired,
and other Brittany and Atlantic ports left in German hands simply as,

1) Antwerp.

2) The allies reached their planned D+365 line at around D+90,
which opened up the channel ports as well as leaving Brittany
well to the rear. Brest was really the momentum of the original
pre landings plan.

Post by William Clodius
3. If the Germans had more time would they have been able to do
significantly more damge to the port of Marseilles?

Yes. Note some northern ports were captured less damaged
than Cherbourg, for example,

30 August Rouen is captured but the Germans hold the Seine
estuary. Originally meant as a British port, opened as a US
port on 15 October, it has 15 liberty and 26 coaster berths,
mainly intended as a bulk POL port.

The allies arrived at Le Havre on 2 September, it was meant
to be a British port, on 2 October it opened as a US port, using
DUKW, first ship docked on 9 October, first liberty ships ordered
there on 13 October. First US tanker on 31 October.

On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945.

Post by William Clodius
4. WIth better defenses could battle damage to non-port specific
infrastructure, i.e., housing, transport, and services, make Marseilles
unusable?

Some yes, systematic demolitions and mining would do more.

It seems the French southern coast was far enough away that the
Germans did not invest nearly as much effort in wrecking the ports
there. Though they did do rail demolitions, helped by allied air
power.

Note Cherbourg was mainly a passenger port, it was number 22 on the
ranking of French Ports, cargo capacity at 900 tons/day pre war and it
was expected to open 3 days after capture.

" On 27th June Cherbourg Harbour is taken. The damage to the harbour is
about expectations, the minesweeping is considered the major holdup. In
the advance to take the harbour much building material is captured and
used to repair the harbour. In addition the fuel storage is taken intact,
500,000 barrels of storage is almost immediately ready for use. The tanks
are underground a mile from Cherbourg. The Logistics history ranks the
captured storage alongside Antwerp and Remagen, at 21 million US
gallons of storage.

The 4th Major Port (Transport corps) is
assigned to run Cherbourg, displacing from the Mersey ports. Much of the
unit's equipment is sent to Utah beach and has to be searched for, causing
"considerable delay". The major problem for the operation of the ports is
civilians had been used to operate the cranes in England, there is a major
shortage of qualified crane operators in the unit."

"On 30th June Minesweeping operations begin at Cherbourg,
the most troublesome mines are those sitting on the sea floor, it will take
3.5 months to complete the minesweeping. Salvage operations also
commence, including turning sunken ships into new piers. In addition the
rail track in the port area is doubled, the marshalling yard capacity
quintupled and the rail storage area increased by over 1,100%."

"On 16th July Cherbourg is opened, a DUKW lands a load of signal corps
wire on a beach inside the harbour. The beach has been prepared with
holes made in the beach wall, concrete roads to the area and hardstands."

On 25th July the first POL tanker arrives at Cherbourg, 4 weeks after
capture, it begins unloading the next day.

On 9th August the first liberty ship berths at Cherbourg are operational.

"Early in September the plan for Cherbourg is for a cargo capacity of
28,300 tons a day, berths for 28 liberty ships, 14 LSTs, 75 barges, 13
coasters, 2 train ferries and 1 tanker. One of the last set of berths
brought into service are the "alongside berths" where cargo could be
directly transferred to trucks or rail cars."

"On 29th September salvage operations are completed at Cherbourg. The
commander of the 4th Port operating Cherbourg is relieved of his command
without prejudice over the performance of the port. The new commander
asks for more PoWs with an infantry battalion to guard them, 12 port
companies, a port trained engineer company, 1,310 rail cars per day,
(which would require 8 to 9,000 rail cars assigned to the task), plus
additional cargo handling equipment, like nets and slings. The port should
then be able to work 44 ships at a time at 500 tons per day per ship, plus
another 2,000 tons per day via LSTs and car ferries."

US Army cargo landed by month by port, excluding vehicles and bulk
POL in long tons, June 1944 to April 1945, table is date, Omaha, Utah,
Cherbourg, Minor Normandy Ports including Granville, Brittany ports,
Total for all ports, including second half of table.

Jun 182199 / 109134 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 291,333
Jul 356219 / 193154 / 32658 / 40291 / 0 / 621,322
Aug 348820/ 187955 / 266644 / 125353 / 9499 / 1,112,771
Sep / 243564 / 150158 / 314431 / 100126 / 75198 / 1,210,290
Oct / 120786 / 72728 / 365603 / 58816 / 77735 / 1,309,184
Nov / 13411 / 12885 / 433301 / 48707 / 64078 / 1,402,080
Dec / 0 / 0 / 250112 / 50749 / 27327 / 1,555,819
Jan / 0 / 0 / 262423 / 47773 / 0 / 1,501,269
Feb / 0 / 0 / 286591 / 41836 / 0 / 1,735,502
Mar / 0 / 0 / 261492 / 39691 / 0 / 2,039,778
Apr / 0 / 0 / 181043 / 47542 / 0 / 2,025,142

US Army cargo landed by month by port, excluding vehicles and bulk
POL in long tons, June 1944 to April 1945, table is date, Le Havre,
Rouen, Antwerp, Ghent, South France

Aug / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 174500
Sep / 0 / 0 / 0 / 0 / 326813
Oct / 61731 / 26891 / 0 / 0 / 524894
Nov / 148654 / 127569 / 5873 / 0 / 547602
Dec / 166038 / 132433 / 427592 / 0 / 501568
Jan / 198768 / 157709 / 433094 / 15742 / 385760
Feb / 195332 / 173016 / 473463 / 69698 / 495566
Mar / 192593 / 268174 / 558066 / 172259 / 547503
Apr / 165438 / 240708 / 628227 / 277553 / 484631

US Army Cargo landed 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 excluding bulk
POL and vehicles in Long Tons / personnel landed

South France 4,123,794 / 905,512
Cherbourg 2,697,341 / 95,923 (67,022 in September 1944)
Antwerp 2,658,000 / 333 ("little momentum" before mid December 1944)
Omaha 1,264,990 / 801,000
Le Havre 1,168,171 / 1,014,036
Rouen 1,164,511 / 82,199 (Mainly a POL port)
Utah 726,014 / 801,005
Ghent 614,861 / 6
Minor Ports in Normandy 600,884 / 788
Brittany Ports 253,837 / 1378

Total 15,272,412 long tons, 3,702,180 personnel. Utah and Omaha also
handled 287,500 vehicles.

Port-En-Bouc (A satellite of Marseilles) 162,245 tons bulk POL in March
1945.

If you believe the supply people capturing the southern French ports
made a real difference, they landed around a quarter of the troops
and US army cargo. In addition in the September to December 1944
period they helped overcome the major problem of working port
capacity to unload troops and supplies into France.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2016-06-16 13:16:18 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945.

Ghent isn't a port AFAIK; it's about 50 km inland.
It's about 25 km by canal from the Scheldt Estuary,
but I doubt that the canal was used by ocean-going
ships.

Also it was definitely in the British zone.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Geoffrey Sinclair

2016-06-16 16:06:17 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945.

Ghent isn't a port AFAIK; it's about 50 km inland.
It's about 25 km by canal from the Scheldt Estuary,
but I doubt that the canal was used by ocean-going
ships.

It was ranked at the number 2 or 3 port in Belgium. The
allies had over 500,000 GRT of coasters supporting the
invasion.

You did notice the 614,816 tons of US army supplies
the port handled?

Logistical Support of the Armies, volume II, p395.

"The port of Ghent, which had been
captured by British forces in September,
was not brought into use until late in
January, An inland port, Ghent had
access to the sea by means of the twenty mile
Terneuzen Canal and the mouth
of the Schelde. Like Antwerp, therefore,
its use was denied until the enemy was
cleared from Walcheren and the Beveland
Peninsula in November. Ghent
ranked as the second port of Belgium,
and before the war had been counted
among the ten busiest ports in western
Europe. An extensive canal system connected
it with Bruges, Ostend, Antwerp,
and Liège. Damage to the port was
not extensive. The main obstacles to
rapid restoration were several destroyed
bridges over the canal, damaged lock
gates, sunken vessels, and the fact that
some cranes had been removed. The harbor
was also badly silted and had to be
dredged to accommodate deep-draft vessels.

British forces started repairing the
port in December.

Ghent had not figured seriously in
early COMZ port planning. In mid-
January, however, U.S. and British officials
agreed on a plan for its joint use,
the main thought being that it would
serve as a standby to Antwerp in case
operations at the latter were interrupted.
The arrangements were very similar to
those made for Antwerp. A port executive
committee was appointed to decide
on allocations of space, the joint use
of certain facilities, and so on. Initially
the port's capacity was divided to allow
a discharge of 5,000 tons per day for
the British and 7,500 tons for the Americans.
The 17th Port, then operating the
Bristol Channel ports, was assigned the
mission of working the U.S. sector.
Ghent had been used almost exclusively
by barges, coasters, and small
freighters, and there was doubt at first
as to whether ocean-going ships could be
accommodated. The first ship to enter
on 23 January was a Liberty, however,
whose 57-foot beam barely cleared the
Terneuzen locks, and the port thereafter
handled both Liberties and coasters
regularly. Some ships had to be lightened
by discharge to barges at Terneuzen, at
the entrance to the canal, before they
could proceed to the port. Ghent unloaded
only about 2,500 tons per day in
the first month of operations, but it more
than doubled that record in March, and
discharged an average of 9,300 tons in
the final month before V-E Day."

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2016-06-17 23:26:45 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You did notice the 614,816 tons of US army supplies
the port handled?

No... thanks for the info.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Ghent unloaded only about 2,500 tons per day in the
first month of operations, but it more than doubled
that record in March, and discharged an average of
9,300 tons in the final month before V-E Day."

This seems to indicate that Ghent was used only in
the last stages of the ETO.

It does invite another question. Ghent lies south
and west of Antwerp. If the Allies wanted to keep
supply chains running parallel, rather than
crossing over...

Then ports from north to south would support troops
from north to south. I.e. something like

Antwerp -----> 21st AG, 12th AG/US 9th Army, 1st Army
Ghent -------> 12th AG/US 1st Army
Le Havre ----> 12th AG/US 3rd Army
Rouen -------> 12th AG/US 3rd Army
Marseilles --> 9th AG

But both Antwerp and Ghent were used by both countries...

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Geoffrey Sinclair

2016-06-19 16:04:36 UTC

This seems to indicate that Ghent was used only in
the last stages of the ETO.

So presumably you totally missed this from my original post,

"On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945."

Post by Rich Rostrom
It does invite another question. Ghent lies south
and west of Antwerp. If the Allies wanted to keep
supply chains running parallel, rather than
crossing over...

It is not like there was a solid mass of barges, trains and
trucks from the ports. The big early planning idea was
British ports and US ports, no mixing.

Also note ports had different capacities for passengers,
dry and liquid cargo, then add what size ships they could
service and how many.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Then ports from north to south would support troops
from north to south. I.e. something like
Antwerp -----> 21st AG, 12th AG/US 9th Army, 1st Army
Ghent -------> 12th AG/US 1st Army
Le Havre ----> 12th AG/US 3rd Army
Rouen -------> 12th AG/US 3rd Army
Marseilles --> 9th AG

6th Army Group.

Post by Rich Rostrom
But both Antwerp and Ghent were used by both countries...

Yes, because of the evolving situation, in particular how
far ahead they were of the projected schedule that
underpinned the ideas about ports. Along with the scale
of V weapon attacks on Antwerp which meant the allies
decided to only unload anti aircraft ammunition for the
local defences there.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2016-06-20 19:29:45 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
This seems to indicate that Ghent was used only in
the last stages of the ETO.

So presumably you totally missed this from my original post,
"On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945."

I should have written "mainly used"; the
numbers showed about much higher landings in the
last two months, compared to 2,500 tons/day
earlier - or was this just U.S. landings
at Ghent?

And "fully cleared on the 11th [of September]"
cover Ghent itself, but the canals ran north
into the Breskens pocket, which wasn't cleared
until the beginning of November.

So... 2,500 tons/day under British control
in November 44-Jan 45, then 2,500/5,000/9,300
tons/day in Feb/Mar/Apr 45?

Thus 300,000 tons in Nov-Feb, then 430,000 in
Mar/Apr.

300,000 is a lot, of course. But there does
seem to be backloading.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Geoffrey Sinclair

2016-06-21 13:18:52 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
This seems to indicate that Ghent was used only in
the last stages of the ETO.

So presumably you totally missed this from my original post,
"On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945."

I should have written "mainly used"; the
numbers showed about much higher landings in the
last two months, compared to 2,500 tons/day
earlier - or was this just U.S. landings
at Ghent?

It is only the US landings, essentially Ghent was meant to be a
British port but that changed to shared.

Post by Rich Rostrom
And "fully cleared on the 11th [of September]"
cover Ghent itself, but the canals ran north
into the Breskens pocket, which wasn't cleared
until the beginning of November.

I was pointing out you missed the second half of my sentence,
I understand like Antwerp the approaches had to be cleared
before the port could be used.

Post by Rich Rostrom
So... 2,500 tons/day under British control
in November 44-Jan 45, then 2,500/5,000/9,300
tons/day in Feb/Mar/Apr 45?

Where does November come from given the port opening
for US supplies has been given as January at least twice?

If you are going to quote figures back at me please leave the
originals in, saves me having to go though the previous posts
to find the context.

The quote from Logistical Support of the Armies, volume II, p395.

"Ghent unloaded
only about 2,500 tons per day in
the first month of operations, but it more
than doubled that record in March, and
discharged an average of 9,300 tons in
the final month before V-E Day."

Never under British control, the US and Britain set up
parallel systems in the ports they shared, as noted this
sharing was against the pre invasion plans.

Note averages, how about a steadily ascending amount
unloaded per day, such that the average for the month is
unloaded say about mid month?

Post by Rich Rostrom
Thus 300,000 tons in Nov-Feb, then 430,000 in
Mar/Apr.
300,000 is a lot, of course. But there does
seem to be backloading.

You of course did notice the actual totals by month by port
I posted in my original message on this topic?

Ghent opened on 23 January
Using the quote we have
Jan/Feb 2,500 tons x 31 days (23 Jan-22 Feb) = 77,500
March 5,000+ x 31 = 155,000+
April 9,300 x 30 = 279,000

Ghent actual monthly cargo tonnage,
Jan 15,742
Feb 69,698
Mar 172,259
Apr 277,553

It was a near universal rule, ports would open slowly, but
would still unload more than could be cleared from the
docks area, it took weeks to have everything going
smoothly, so the unloaded cargo would be promptly
moved to inland depots.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2016-06-21 17:34:22 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
This seems to indicate that Ghent was used only in
the last stages of the ETO.

So presumably you totally missed this from my original post,
"On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945."

So... 2,500 tons/day under British control
in November 44-Jan 45, then 2,500/5,000/9,300
tons/day in Feb/Mar/Apr 45?

Where does November come from given the port opening
for US supplies has been given as January at least twice?

When I noted that Ghent was used "in the last
stages of the war", you immediately reminded
me that Ghent was "fully cleared on the 11th
[of September 1944]..." This seemed to imply that
Ghent was used earlier. Antwerp was used in
November 1944, so I thought Ghent would have
been too. But "not used as a US port until
January 1945", therefore by the British.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You of course did notice the actual totals by month by port
I posted in my original message on this topic?

I guess not.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Ghent actual monthly cargo tonnage,
Jan 15,742
Feb 69,698
Mar 172,259
Apr 277,553

So Ghent was used pretty much "only in the
last stages of the war." When you seemed to
disagree with that, I began maundering about
trying to guess what was correct instead.
I'm sorry for wasting your time, and I thank
you again for all this information. I had
never thought of Ghent being a port at all.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Mario

2016-06-18 13:19:16 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on
the 11th, not used as a US port until January 1945.

Ghent isn't a port AFAIK; it's about 50 km inland.
It's about 25 km by canal from the Scheldt Estuary,
but I doubt that the canal was used by ocean-going
ships.

It was ranked at the number 2 or 3 port in Belgium. The
allies had over 500,000 GRT of coasters supporting the
invasion.

Ostend was a good port then?

Rouen too was an inland city on the Seine river.

--
oiram

Geoffrey Sinclair

2016-06-19 16:05:19 UTC

Post by Mario

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on
the 11th, not used as a US port until January 1945.

Ghent isn't a port AFAIK; it's about 50 km inland.
It's about 25 km by canal from the Scheldt Estuary,
but I doubt that the canal was used by ocean-going
ships.

It was ranked at the number 2 or 3 port in Belgium. The
allies had over 500,000 GRT of coasters supporting the
invasion.

Ostend was a good port then?

Using the pre war atlas,

Ostend, Passenger Port, population around 49,000
Ghent, at Junction of Shelde and Lys rivers, population 169,000

Note Cherbourg was also mainly a passenger port.

Do not forget the port is one thing, then comes the transport
links to the port.

Post by Mario
Rouen too was an inland city on the Seine river.

Yes, Rouen, port, on Seine, population 123,000.

Using the US supply histories,

On 12 September, Le
Havre is captured, it has 4 tanker berths. While the port is rated as badly
damaged the POL offloading and storage facilities are relatively
undamaged, tankers can discharge into the shore storage which has a 10
inch pipeline to Port Jerome on the Seine or into smaller tankers for them
to take the fuel to Rouen.

On 20th September the first tanker discharges at Ostend.

On 25th September rail from the South has reached Lyon, offering 3,000
tons/day. The first allied ships enter Ostend Harbour. The report of the
survey group sent to Brest confirms the port is useless and it would take
75 days before even limited unloading of troops and cargo would be
possible.

During October the minimum requirements for MT80 fuel east
of the Seine rises to 5,900 tons (1,616,600 gallons) a day. Supply
is 600 tons from Ostend, 1,600 tons by truck and 800 tons by rail
from Normandy, the rest from the pipeline at Coubert. The
autodrome at Linas with 15 miles of paved road, a few miles from
Coubert, is turned into the biggest decanting point on the continent.
Coubert will be mainly used for rail shipments.

On 5th October. US
and UK officials meet at Brussels to review the port situation, assuming
Antwerp will not open until 15th November, in a 4 day meeting they
conclude only 4 ports channel should be developed, Boulogne, Dieppe
and Ostend for 21st Army Group, with the US sharing POL facilities at
Ostend with Calais for the US, it provide LST berths for landing vehicles.

On 15th October Rouen is opened as a US Army
port, it has 15 liberty and 26 coaster berths, mainly intended
as a bulk POL port.

By mid October rail capacity from the Mediterranean ports is
at 12,000 tons/day. Of the 12 to 15.5 million jerrycans in stock
in May some 3.5 million are now missing, many have been
abandoned, others used to build pathways through mud, chairs
and "hundreds of other uses". A drive to make them on the
continent is started and children encouraged to find them. The
US design (yes it was called a merrican) , with a spout, has been
found inadequate. Commonwealth POL supplies are good enough
that 500 tons/day can be sent from Ostend to 12th Army Group, this
will increase to 1,000 tons/day later in October. Ostend proves to be
weather effected, with discharges dependent on the state of the
weather, COMZ refuses to authorise a second tanker berth at
Cherbourg and extra offloading lines at the existing berth. US forces
arrive at Le Havre to repair the POL discharge and storage facilities.

During November Fuel is finally being discharged at Le
Havre, Petite Couronne (near Rouen) and Ostend as well as
Cherbourg, and plans are made to set up a 210,000 gallon
storage tank for each army. Large POL dumps
are created at Verdun for 3rd Army and Liege for the 1st and
9th armies. Verdun draws its supplies from Cherbourg, Liege
uses Ghent, Antwerp and Ostend. The stabilising of POL supply
means jerricans are turned around more rapidly, easing the
shortage. Note there was a 60 day time gap between the
official activation of the Verdun and Liege dumps and when
they were actually able to support the armies properly.

On 8th November Rouen is working so well that
all coasters bar those carrying coal are ordered to use the port, enabling
the closing of the small Normandy ports. If needed the port can take
lightened liberty ships.

At the end of November despite all the efforts there are still
2,500,000 missing jerricans. With the opening of Antwerp the fuel
situation is finally completely under control. Antwerp is used to
land fuel for 1st and 9th armies and ADSEC, using bulk rail cars
to move the fuel, excess to the Liege dumps, similar for Ostend
where the fuel is pumped to Ghent, then bulk rail to Liege. Fuel
landed at Cherbourg was mainly sent to ADSEC or 3 rd Army,
via the pipeline to Coubert then usually bulk rail to the forward
area. Part of the fuel was drawn off at Chartres and Linas for
the units around the Seine and in Normandy for units there and
in Brittany. The fuel landed at Le Havre was mainly used by
the units along the channel coast, the Channel and Oise base
sections. Avgas was via Antwerp and Cherbourg, the latter
having an avgas pipeline to Chartres.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2016-06-20 20:08:36 UTC

"Geoffrey Sinclair" <***@froggy.com.au> wrote:

A lot of very interesting stuff - "merri-cans"?
Who knew?

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

William Clodius

2016-06-16 17:18:59 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On 6 September Ghent is partially cleared, fully cleared on the 11th,
not used as a US port until January 1945.

Ghent calls itself the third largest port in Belgium. The canal is 13.5
m in depth and it describes itself as taking seagoing vessels. It
probably can't handle the largest ocean going ships, but the same was
true of several of the chanel ports. As to being in the British zone,
so was Antwerp and the US was assigned use of half of its capacity.
Ports in the British zone were overall closer to the front west of the
Ardennes, and were often larger, so a few ports liberated by British
troops were assigned to the US, even those that remained in the British
zone.

Rich Rostrom

2016-06-16 13:17:07 UTC

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
It seems the French southern coast was far enough away that the
Germans did not invest nearly as much effort in wrecking the ports
there. Though they did do rail demolitions, helped by allied air
power.

IIRC, the Allied air forces didn't attack the
railroads in southern France. The air effort
was intended to isolate the German forces in
Normandy from reinforcement and supply. Also
to hinder the withdrawal or transfer of German
forces in the Pas-de-Calais (and the bombing of
communications in that area would contribute to
the Allied deception plan).

Eisenhower wrote in _Crusade In Europe_ that
because of this, the railroads from Marseilles
to northeastern France were less damaged than
those from Normandy.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Geoffrey Sinclair

2016-06-16 16:06:48 UTC

The plans were to isolate Normandy, from all directions.
That hurt some of the rail lines running north south. Then
comes the Dragoon support aids. The Germans
destroying bridges and track were the big contributor.

Bomber Command damaged the rail lines at Lyons as a
side effect of a raid, it attacked the Dijon rail yards in July
and August.

The 15th air force bombed the rail bridges at Avignon
and Tarascon, Arles-sur-Rhone and the Var River in July.
Along with the marshalling yards of Aramon, Arles, Avingnon
East, Bellgarde, Beziers, Marseilles, Miramas, Montpellier,
and Nimes.

The rail bridge list for August was Avignon (twice), Avignon/South,
Crest, Givors, Grenoble/Isere, Le Pouzin, Orange, Pont St. Esprit,
St. Pierre D'Albigny, St. Rambert, St. Vallier, Tarascon, Valence.
Marshalling yards at Portes les Valance and Miramas were also
attacked.

I have not checked the 8th Air Force operations.

Add the tactical air force strikes.

Clearly not all were on the main line but equally clearly they
created damage on lines the allies wanted post Dragoon.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Eisenhower wrote in _Crusade In Europe_ that
because of this, the railroads from Marseilles
to northeastern France were less damaged than
those from Normandy.

He is correct, but it is relative.

Post by Rich Rostrom
From Normandy,

On 30th August. The rail line reaches Paris,
railheads at Dreux (1st Army) and Chartres (3rd Army). The line open to
Paris is very important, it means the allies have crossed the railway desert
the allied airforces are largely responsible for.

On 2nd September The
first hospital train Cherbourg to Paris is run, to give an
idea of the state of the railways the journey takes 80 hours,
or around walking pace.

On 27th September The Red
Ball moves into the second phase, trying to use rail from Paris
to the front, the trucks to cross the "railway desert".

Post by Rich Rostrom
From South France,

Mid September the rail lines from the Mediterranean coast are to Bourg,
220 miles inland, 1,500 tons/day since the locomotives could not cross
some of the repaired bridges.

On 4th October the southern rail capacity is nearing 8,350 tons/day
enabling trucks to go back to short haul services, as a result the "Flaming
Bomb Express" truck service is terminated 4 days later.

By mid October rail capacity from the Mediterranean ports is
at 12,000 tons/day

By the end of 1944. In South France some 4,000
miles of track were in service, with the usual problems with congestion and
weather. All up some 3,500 miles of single and 5,000 miles of double
track were in service, around a third of the French rail system.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Rich Rostrom

2016-06-17 23:27:10 UTC

On 27th September The Red Ball moves into the second
phase, trying to use rail from Paris to the front,
the trucks to cross the "railway desert".

Now that's a very intriguing little factoid.

It makes sense, but I had never heard of (or
even imagined) any such arrangement.

Interesting notes on bombing of southern rail lines.
As you say, relative to the effort in Normandy, it
was less, but only relatively.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

William Clodius

2016-06-16 17:18:32 UTC

<snip>
Essentially the Germans did not fight for southern France, they
concentrated on saving as many troops as possible. Keeping
any allied forces coming from Normandy occupied for a long
time would be a big win for the Germans, it kept them away
from Germany at the end of stretched supply lines.

Except that they focussed on saving the mobile and support troops and
not the static formations. The two static divisions were assigned the
defense of Marseille and Toulon, essentially one division each. Toulon
had less time to prepare defenses, but forced out the civillian
population. Marseille's defenders failed to expell the civialns and
found its defenses compromised by their presence. The speed of the
French advance left both divisions little time to improve defenses, and
damage the ports. So part of what I am askiing, is whether capture from
Normandy would have left the static divisions time to make the situation
more like that of the ports in Britany or Bordeaux, not worth taking
given the strong defense? Also whether it would have allowed the mobile
divisions more time to further damage the rail system?

Geoffrey Sinclair

2016-06-17 14:56:19 UTC