Bomber Command in Battle of Britain

[Chris Allen]

What did Bomber Command do in the Battle of Britain?

My question is prompted by 2 points.

1) I understand that before the war, some RAF opinion was "bombers would
do it all next time wound". No need then for sailors, soldiers or even
their own fighters. I believe some Yanks shared the same opinion. All
this meant that as the battle began Bomber Command was 3 or 4 times
stronger than Fighter Command.

2) At the start of the battle, Germany attacked British air bases to
reduce their defences against German bombers. Some people claim that
Germany lost the battle because they abandoned this policy too soon. I
know some people dispute this view but the important point is that
attacking enemy airfields proved very important at various times
throughout the war.

These 2 points clearly imply that during the Battle of Britain, Bomber
Command SHOULD have attacked German airfields, yet we hear nothing about
this.

So what did Bomber Command DO in the Battle of Britain?

[Alan Meyer]

On 03/09/2014 02:38 PM, Chris Allen wrote:
...

Post by Chris Allen
2) At the start of the battle, Germany attacked British air bases to
reduce their defences against German bombers. Some people claim that
Germany lost the battle because they abandoned this policy too soon. I
know some people dispute this view but the important point is that
attacking enemy airfields proved very important at various times
throughout the war.
These 2 points clearly imply that during the Battle of Britain, Bomber
Command SHOULD have attacked German airfields, yet we hear nothing about
this.

I'm not competent to answer your primary question of what Bomber Command
did during the Battle of Britain, but I would like to comment on the
points made above.

First off, I agree with the conventional wisdom that says that the
Germans would have done better to continue their attacks on the RAF
rather than shift to an attack on London. However, having said that, I
would still argue that the putative goal of the attack on the RAF,
namely to enable an invasion of Britain, was unattainable.

Germany had neither a navy nor an airlift capability that would have
allowed them to invade Britain. Had they tried, I believe that whatever
forces they landed would have been cutoff and overwhelmed. Churchill
stated in his history of the war that he was actually hoping that the
Germans would try an invasion. He was (justifiably I think) confident
that it would have failed with great losses for the Germans. The events
in Tunisia 2.5 years later might well have been foreshadowed on the
coasts of England.

I can see why it would seem to be a good idea for Bomber Command to
attack German airfields in France, but I think it would only seem to be
that. Quick, surprise raids on German airfields might have worked and
been useful. However I think that a sustained bomber offensive would
have been disastrous. If the British bombers flew unescorted missions,
they would have been blown out of the sky even worse than the Luftwaffe
was over England. If they were escorted, the Spitfires and Hurricanes
would have suffered huge losses. In England, every German pilot that
bailed out was captured and every British pilot was able to fight
another day. Over France, the reverse would have been true, and the
more numerous and experienced Luftwaffe would have exacted a steep penalty.

Ultimately, all the RAF had to do if their losses in the coastal
airfields were too great would be to withdraw another hundred or so
miles, out of range of the German fighters. There they could bide their
time, continue training, conserve their strength in both fighters and
bombers, and unleash all of their strength against any attempted German
invasion.

It would have been an unpopular strategy. It would have meant that the
Luftwaffe could attack southern English targets unopposed in the air,
almost at will. But I believe it would have worked.

Alan

[Paul F Austin]

Post by Alan Meyer
...

Post by Chris Allen
2) At the start of the battle, Germany attacked British air bases to
reduce their defences against German bombers. Some people claim that
Germany lost the battle because they abandoned this policy too soon. I
know some people dispute this view but the important point is that
attacking enemy airfields proved very important at various times
throughout the war.
These 2 points clearly imply that during the Battle of Britain, Bomber
Command SHOULD have attacked German airfields, yet we hear nothing about
this.

I'm not competent to answer your primary question of what Bomber Command
did during the Battle of Britain, but I would like to comment on the
points made above.
First off, I agree with the conventional wisdom that says that the
Germans would have done better to continue their attacks on the RAF
rather than shift to an attack on London. However, having said that, I
would still argue that the putative goal of the attack on the RAF,
namely to enable an invasion of Britain, was unattainable.
Germany had neither a navy nor an airlift capability that would have
allowed them to invade Britain. Had they tried, I believe that whatever
forces they landed would have been cutoff and overwhelmed. Churchill
stated in his history of the war that he was actually hoping that the
Germans would try an invasion. He was (justifiably I think) confident
that it would have failed with great losses for the Germans. The events
in Tunisia 2.5 years later might well have been foreshadowed on the
coasts of England.
I can see why it would seem to be a good idea for Bomber Command to
attack German airfields in France, but I think it would only seem to be
that. Quick, surprise raids on German airfields might have worked and
been useful. However I think that a sustained bomber offensive would
have been disastrous. If the British bombers flew unescorted missions,
they would have been blown out of the sky even worse than the Luftwaffe
was over England. If they were escorted, the Spitfires and Hurricanes
would have suffered huge losses. In England, every German pilot that
bailed out was captured and every British pilot was able to fight
another day. Over France, the reverse would have been true, and the
more numerous and experienced Luftwaffe would have exacted a steep penalty.
Ultimately, all the RAF had to do if their losses in the coastal
airfields were too great would be to withdraw another hundred or so
miles, out of range of the German fighters. There they could bide their
time, continue training, conserve their strength in both fighters and
bombers, and unleash all of their strength against any attempted German
invasion.
It would have been an unpopular strategy. It would have meant that the
Luftwaffe could attack southern English targets unopposed in the air,
almost at will. But I believe it would have worked.

The RAF was a thoroughly Dohettian air force, as was the USAF.
Bomber-preponderant doctrine shaped procurement. An AIr Staff Memorandum
from 1924 called for a force as heavy with bombers as possible and as
light in fighters as "popular opinion and necessity of defending vital
objectives will permit". That doctrine didn't change throughout the
preparations for war and the prosecution of the war from September 1939
onwards.

Political limitations prevented the RAF from engaging any but military
targets until May 1940, when the RAF changed its targeting to
"strategic" economic and transporation assets. During the summer of
1940, when the Battle of Britain was at its peak, RAF priorities
remained with "strategic" targets. As a sop, bombers which were unable
to complete their primary mission were directed to bomb German airfields
on the way home. In September, because of the invasion fright, Bomber
Command was ordered to attack invasion targets.

Even if Bomber Command _had_ been ordered to bomb German airfields in
France as primary targets, the effect would have been minimal, since the
RAF bombers 1. couldn't survive when operating in the daytime and 2.
couldn't find their targets in the night. The Butt Report, after
debriefing bomber crews and examining photographic evidence, was
devastating. From the Butt Report (August 1941) that examined the
bombing results in June and July 1941, 2/3rds of bomber crews claimed to
have hit their primary targets. Of that 2/3, only a third or 11% came
within five miles of the target.

Paul

[Michael Emrys]

Of that 2/3, only a third or 11% came within five miles of the target.

A small correction of your math if I may, Paul. A third of 66% is 22%,
not 11%.

Michael

[Paul F Austin]

Post by Michael Emrys

Of that 2/3, only a third or 11% came within five miles of the target.

A small correction of your math if I may, Paul. A third of 66% is 22%,
not 11%.
Michael

My bad, it was late. I also said the Butt report was published in August
1941, while 1942 was correct.

Paul

[Michele]

Post by Chris Allen
What did Bomber Command do in the Battle of Britain?
My question is prompted by 2 points.
1) I understand that before the war, some RAF opinion was "bombers would
do it all next time wound". No need then for sailors, soldiers or even
their own fighters. I believe some Yanks shared the same opinion. All
this meant that as the battle began Bomber Command was 3 or 4 times
stronger than Fighter Command.
2) At the start of the battle, Germany attacked British air bases to
reduce their defences against German bombers. Some people claim that
Germany lost the battle because they abandoned this policy too soon. I
know some people dispute this view but the important point is that
attacking enemy airfields proved very important at various times
throughout the war.
These 2 points clearly imply that during the Battle of Britain, Bomber
Command SHOULD have attacked German airfields, yet we hear nothing about
this.
So what did Bomber Command DO in the Battle of Britain?

First, those who believe that Germany lost because they stopped bombing
airfields and began bombing London will of course have to be grateful to
Bomber Command.
The Germans were the first ones to bomb the enemy capital, but that might
have remained a one-off event, or just the first in a slow and creeping
series of attacks on cities, were it not for the fact that the RAF did have
retaliation capabilities and Churchill did not hesitate to use them. So
Bomber Command hit Berlin, which prompted a retaliation.
I do not believe that the Germans switched to bombing London for this
reason, but certainly the Bomber Command missions over Berlin did make a
response a political necessity for Hitler.

Second, Bomber Command did little to attack enemy airfields - and with very
good reason.
Note how the Germans were bombing the enemy airfields: in broad daylight and
with heavy fighter escort. If the British had tried the same strategy, they
would have had to divert fighters from their duties. Which were working
pretty well in whittling the Luftwaffe down.
The alternative would have been bombing German airfields at night. Which
Bomber Command did do, occasionally; July to October, 17% of their missions
were against airfields (and another 14% agains German aircraft industries).
The reason why we don't hear much about this is that airfields were a
difficult target to damage _even in daylight_. The British night missions
achieved very little.

But, third, Bomber Command did have targets that they could find and hit in
the framework of that campaign. Even assuming the Germans had won the _air_
Battle of Britain, that would have been useless per se (save in the case of
a British surrender). A _naval_ battle would have had to ensue. And Bomber
Command was hitting, successfully, the German barge flotillas in their
ports. 30% of the Bomber Command sorties July to October were against these
targets, with a surge in September, with 60%. Of the German invasion
flotilla, 12% was damaged or sunk by Bomber Command that month, without
Seelöwe even being launched. We can easily imagine how the German attempt
would have fared if the threat of an invasion had ever increased, with
Bomber Command flying 90-100% of its missions against the ports.

Finally, Coastal Command flew anti-ship patrols, sea mining sorties, and the
occasional bombing of ports, oil terminals, and even airfields too.

Data from Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy.

[GFH]

Post by Chris Allen
2) At the start of the battle, Germany attacked British air bases to
reduce their defences against German bombers. Some people claim that
Germany lost the battle because they abandoned this policy too soon. I
know some people dispute this view but the important point is that
attacking enemy airfields proved very important at various times
throughout the war.

The time of the year was the main reason that the attacks
were shifted from air bases to cities in September. The
weather and the tides in the English Channel would not allow
the Germans to have any possibility of invading England in 1940.

The German plans to invade England were totally inadequate.
The theory that a cross-channel invasion was no different
from crossing a wide river was wrong.

GFH

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Chris Allen
What did Bomber Command do in the Battle of Britain?
My question is prompted by 2 points.
1) I understand that before the war, some RAF opinion was "bombers would
do it all next time wound". No need then for sailors, soldiers or even
their own fighters. I believe some Yanks shared the same opinion.

A lot of airmen thought along those lines, most air forces would have
their true believers. And apart from the increase in aircraft performance
there was the idea it would spare the world the horrors of trench warfare,
and a lot of warfare generally given how accurate and devastating the
bombers were assumed to be.

Post by Chris Allen
All this meant that as the battle began Bomber Command was 3 or 4 times
stronger than Fighter Command.

That is very wrong. Fighter Command had around 870 aircraft in
fighter squadrons in early July 1940, of which around 650 were
serviceable. This grew to 1,000 to 1,100 for most of the battle of
which around 700 to 750 were serviceable. Of course the numbers
include Blenheims and Defiants

Bomber Command had a strength of around 700 aircraft by mid
September, in July an average of 475 aircraft were serviceable,
of which 400 had crews, this grew to an average of around 530
serviceable, 475 with crews, during September. The numbers
include Fairey Battles, an average of 75 of which were
serviceable in September, up from 41 in July.

Bomber Command peaked in late 1944 and into 1945 at
around 2,100 to 2,300 aircraft on strength of the combat units,
of which around 75% were serviceable.

Bombers cost more, required bigger airfields and lots more
crew and mechanics than fighters, the result being it took
more effort to create a bomber force.

British Bomber production by year / medium bomber / light
bomber / total

1935 \ 0 \ 120 \ 120
1936 \ 0 \ 175 \ 175
1937 \ 34 \ 358 \ 392
1938 \ 160 \ 538 \ 698
1939 \ 766 \ 1,080 \ 1846
1940 \ 1,935 \ 1,528 \ 3463

There were 42 heavy bombers built in 1940. Note there were
officially no Blenheim fighters built, they were all conversions,
so they are counted in the bomber production figures.

British fighter production by year.

1935 101
1936 311
1937 444
1938 371
1939 1,357
1940 4,289

Post by Chris Allen
2) At the start of the battle, Germany attacked British air bases to
reduce their defences against German bombers.

Actually at the start of the battle the Luftwaffe attacked a wide variety
of targets, including airfields of Training and Bomber Commands,
this was partly to spread the defences, partly to do with the need for
pre invasion attacks and most to do with the belief small raids could
destroy targets.

As the battle went on the Luftwaffe reduced the targets to mainly
Fighter Command airfields and aircraft factories.

Post by Chris Allen
Some people claim that Germany lost the battle because they abandoned this
policy too soon.

The prime aim of the attacks on London was to draw all available RAF
fighters into massive air battles, that happened, the Luftwaffe lost.

Post by Chris Allen
I know some people dispute this view but the important point is that
attacking enemy airfields proved very important at various times
throughout the war.

Yes, provided it was systematic and the attackers had the offensive
power to knock out the required number of airfields.

Post by Chris Allen
These 2 points clearly imply that during the Battle of Britain, Bomber
Command SHOULD have attacked German airfields, yet we hear nothing about
this.

Raids were run on German airfields, with the day raids usually
unescorted, plus raids on the invasion ports.

The day raids were expected more to tie up German fighters
on defensive activities than cause serious damage,

Post by Chris Allen
So what did Bomber Command DO in the Battle of Britain?

RAF bombing sorties to Western Europe, excluding Germany, in 1940

Month / day / night
Jul / 302 /1 144
Aug / 283 / 352
Sep / 88 / 1,862
Oct / 82 / 455

Luftwaffe bomber sorties against England are put at around 8,000
in September.slightly under half by night.

Lots of the sorties were to the invasion ports where they inflicted
enough casualties to worry the Germans.

Bomber Command bomb tonnage, long tons, dropped by target
category in 1940, including targets in Germany.

month \ transport \ naval targets \ oil \ airfields + aircraft industry \
specific industry \ miscellaneous

Jul \ 225 \ 176 \ 219 \ 488 \ 39 \ 110
Aug \ 147 \ 97 \ 297 \ 445 \ 201 \ 178
Sep \ 241 \ 1399 \ 120 \ 184 \ 172 \ 223
Oct \ 167 \ 623 \ 299 \ 275 \ 187 \ 100

The RAF reports total aircraft battle casualties July to October 1940
inclusive as 1,140 fighters and 367 bombers. Given the mainly
defensive nature of the fighter combat and the size of the bomber
crews Bomber Command lost more men than Fighter Command
during the battle.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich]

Post by Chris Allen
What did Bomber Command do in the Battle of Britain?

Bombed enemy targets as directed by the Air Staff.

Post by Chris Allen
My question is prompted by 2 points.
1) I understand that before the war, some RAF opinion was "bombers would
do it all next time wound". No need then for sailors, soldiers or even
their own fighters. I believe some Yanks shared the same opinion. All
this meant that as the battle began Bomber Command was 3 or 4 times
stronger than Fighter Command.

No, the opinion held almost universally by all air forces was:
"The Bomber will always get through." Slightly different.

Bomber Command strength as of 2 May 1940 was 199 operational to an
establishment of 376 and as of 2 September 1940 was 528 operational
to 592 establishment. Fighter Command for the same dates was
respectively 365/632 and 701/1,102.

Post by Chris Allen
2) At the start of the battle, Germany attacked British air bases to
reduce their defences against German bombers. Some people claim that
Germany lost the battle because they abandoned this policy too soon. I
know some people dispute this view but the important point is that
attacking enemy airfields proved very important at various times
throughout the war.

"Some people" are usually wrong. The Germans didn't have a viable
strategy to defeat the RAF given the forces available.

Post by Chris Allen
These 2 points clearly imply that during the Battle of Britain, Bomber
Command SHOULD have attacked German airfields, yet we hear nothing about
this.

Airfields were not always such a lucrative target, given that if
aircraft were present they were dispersed as were base installations.
Given the lack of bombing accuracy they would have had to attack in
daylight and would have suffered attrition comparable to that the
Germans suffered, for little result.

Post by Chris Allen
So what did Bomber Command DO in the Battle of Britain?

See http://web.archive.org/web/20050510084038/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary_bob.html

Most frequently, they attacked the shipping being collected in ports
for the planned German invasion. Targets that were relatively easy to get
to and target at night.

[Paul F Austin]

Post by Rich

Post by Chris Allen
1) I understand that before the war, some RAF opinion was "bombers would
do it all next time wound". No need then for sailors, soldiers or even
their own fighters. I believe some Yanks shared the same opinion. All
this meant that as the battle began Bomber Command was 3 or 4 times
stronger than Fighter Command.

"The Bomber will always get through." Slightly different.

The RAF, USAAC and the Armee de l'Air were Dohettian, the Luftwaffe, the
Japanese Army Air Service and the Soviet air forces were not.

Both the RAF and USAAC feared their own armies and navies at least as
much as any possible external enemies and spent a great deal of
organizational energy accordingly.

Douhet's doctrine was of course nonsense. "Battle Planes", the
progenitors of the early WWII heavy fighters turned out to be death
traps whenever proper fighters were around. A light sprinkling of bombs
or even prolonged heavy bombardment didn't result in the collapse of
civilian morale.

None the less, because Douhet promised an independent air force with
priority over the armies and navies, for organizational ambition
purposes, his doctrine became the dogma for the RAF and the officers
promoting an independent US Air Force. I'm unfamiliar with the history
of the Armee de l'Air so I can't comment there.

The German, Japanese and Soviet air forces maintained close ties to
their respective armies, with resulting reduced emphasis on "strategic"
bombing of economic assets and the aircraft necessary to attack them.

Paul

[Michele]

Post by Paul F Austin
The RAF, USAAC and the Armee de l'Air were Dohettian, the Luftwaffe, the
Japanese Army Air Service and the Soviet air forces were not.
Both the RAF and USAAC feared their own armies and navies at least as much
as any possible external enemies and spent a great deal of organizational
energy accordingly.
Douhet's doctrine was of course nonsense. "Battle Planes", the progenitors
of the early WWII heavy fighters turned out to be death traps whenever
proper fighters were around. A light sprinkling of bombs or even prolonged
heavy bombardment didn't result in the collapse of civilian morale.

Curiously, a case could be made that the bombardment of cities did
contribute to the collapse of one of the combatants - Douhet's own country.
Naturally it is also true that Italy had enemy ground troops on its
metropolitan territory; but the bombing of Rome did provide a major
contribution.

Note also that Douhet's theory was not tested in its entirety. Nobody
followed up HE and incendiary bombs with gas bombs on cities.

Post by Paul F Austin
The German, Japanese and Soviet air forces maintained close ties to their
respective armies, with resulting reduced emphasis on "strategic" bombing
of economic assets and the aircraft necessary to attack them.

In the case of the Luftwaffe, this is true in theory and in design (by which
I mean both the design of the force and the design of the aircraft equipping
it). It is only partially true in practice; the Luftwaffe did get to be used
as a strategic force, notwithstanding the doctrine and the not entirely
suitable machines.
The threat of city bombing loomed large in the minds of the Czechoslovakian
negotiators. The Luftwaffe contributed to a victory, in that case, that is
the utmost achievement of the strategic victories - a victory without a
fight.
After that there was the surrender of Warsaw. The main reason that led the
mayor to surrender was stopping the destruction and civilian casualties
caused not by ground fighting but by artillery and air bombardment.
After that there was the surrender of Holland. Again, the Germans made it
clear in their negotiations that Dutch cities would suffer from air bombing,
and when the Dutch were not prompt enough, indeed they did not send bombers
to hit the Dutch army positions at the edge of Rotterdam, they sent them
against the center of that city.
After that there was the Battle of Britain, where the Luftwaffe attempted
strategic bombing once again, only, this time, without success.

[Rich]

Post by Paul F Austin
The RAF, USAAC and the Armee de l'Air were Dohettian, the Luftwaffe, the
Japanese Army Air Service and the Soviet air forces were not.

Sorry Paul, I was being tongue in cheek with my Baldwinism - a bit. However, given that
Walter Wever was considered to be "Douhetian" by his contemporaries,
and that he was one of the primary authors of L.Dv.lb Luftkrieqfuhrunq
(Conduct of the Air War), I would be hesitant to describe the Luftwaffe
as unbelievers. In that document, of 280 paragraphs, 158 deal with
offensive air operations and 35 on defensive air operations.

Critically, L.Dv.1b assigned the following priorities:

- To combat the enemy air force, thereby weakening the enemy's armed
forces while at the same time protecting our people and homeland
- To directly support army and naval forces by taking part in operations
and combat on land and on the sea
- To attack the sources of power of the enemy's armed forces (strategic
centers of gravity) and interrupt the flow of supplies to the front interdiction)

However, without prioritizing one over the other. Instead, they were
considered holistically as part of Gesamtkrieg or the overall war.

The Luftwaffe too believed that "the bomber would always get through"
and expected that attempts at interception would be futile. Instead,
they concentrated on eliminating the enemy airpower at the outset, by
attacking them on the ground, which is what we see in Poland, France,
and the USSR.

Japanese air doctrine was similar - the IJAAF strategic mission in
terms of air defense was counter-air - knocking out enemy air forces
on the ground, while the IJNAF mission was supporting the strategic
operations of the fleet. In that sense they were entirely operational,
but given that they made little attempt at developing an air
interception capability, I think they probably adhered to the
Baldwinism.

The Soviets though are an interesting mix. They maintained lip service
to a strategic air force (DA - Long Range Aviation), as well as keeping
a strategic defense force (PVO-Stranny), and a tactical-operational
air force (VVS). So kind of a mixed bag, so whether or not they adhered
to the Baldwinism is unclear. :)

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Paul F Austin
The RAF, USAAC and the Armee de l'Air were Dohettian, the Luftwaffe, the
Japanese Army Air Service and the Soviet air forces were not.

Yes, i.e. correct.

Post by Paul F Austin
Both the RAF and USAAC feared their own armies and navies at least as much
as any possible external enemies and spent a great deal of organizational
energy accordingly.

This makes no sense in either country.
1. The USAAC was part of the US Army i.e. governed by
army commanders. Professional rivalry and political competition
between the US Army and the US Navy long antedated aviation.
2. In Britain, the RN enjoyed top military priority about 1919-36
(as the main defence of an island) and the RAF won top priority
in 1936 (as the main offensive or deterrent force.) The British
Army never had equal priority with the sea and air arms until
about 1942.

No evidence suggests "the RAF and USAAC feared their own
armies and navies . . ."

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Don Phillipson
This makes no sense in either country.
1. The USAAC was part of the US Army i.e. governed by
army commanders. Professional rivalry and political competition
between the US Army and the US Navy long antedated aviation.

The AAC was part of the Army, but was an entirely
new combat branch, which did not feel it had much
in common with the infantry, the artillery, or the
tanks. It was very much in competition with the
other branches of the Army for resources. Also, the
AAC was in _direct_ competition with the Navy for air
resources.

This forecast the famous legendary remark of a USAF
general circa 1960: "The Russians are the _adversary_.
The Navy is the _enemy_."

Post by Don Phillipson
2. In Britain, the RN enjoyed top military priority about 1919-36
(as the main defence of an island) and the RAF won top priority
in 1936 (as the main offensive or deterrent force.) The British
Army never had equal priority with the sea and air arms until
about 1942.

But the RAF had to politic vigorously to _maintain_
its top dog position. Britain didn't have (no country
ever had) enough resources to fulfill the ambitions
of all its service leaders. Even to meet the minimum
requirements was a strain.

The RAF's heavy demands had to be justified every day.

The Army had very large indisputable requirements, and
pressed for more. The RAF could not presume that its
wants would always have priority - and thus spent much
of its institutional influence opposing the Army and RM.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Paul F Austin
The RAF, USAAC and the Armee de l'Air were Dohettian, the Luftwaffe, the
Japanese Army Air Service and the Soviet air forces were not.

Yes, i.e. correct.

No, the Luftwaffe was quite into strategic bombing and the Red Air Force
had a strategic bomber and strategic fighter force, the latter for defence.
The Italians also thought in terms of strategic bombing.

No air force ignored the idea of strategic attack and defence, all had their
army and navy "support" sections, it then becomes a judgment about what
was the overall doctrine.

The USN was limited in aircraft size and so was "tactical", the IJNAF had
long range bombers, it, and the IJAAF, did have strategic bombing ideas.
The fact there was little industry to attack in the Pacific area limited the
amount of strategic bombing the Japanese could do but look at the various
attacks on Chinese cities.

Remembering pre WWII the bombers were over rated and were often
assumed to drop chemical and biological weapons as well as the
standard explosives and incendiaries.

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Paul F Austin
Both the RAF and USAAC feared their own armies and navies at least as
much as any possible external enemies and spent a great deal of
organizational energy accordingly.

This makes no sense in either country.
1. The USAAC was part of the US Army i.e. governed by
army commanders. Professional rivalry and political competition
between the US Army and the US Navy long antedated aviation.

No, there was political competition within the USA/USAAF, given
the limited funds. Then comes the struggle for control, do the
divisional, corps and army commanders control the aircraft or
do the air commanders?

It was interesting to see 1920's discussions of air support, with
the participants using the current force levels, so very few aircraft,
yet were theorising about a major war, which should have meant
many more resources. And they were concerned about who
would have control.

Post by Don Phillipson
2. In Britain, the RN enjoyed top military priority about 1919-36
(as the main defence of an island) and the RAF won top priority
in 1936 (as the main offensive or deterrent force.) The British
Army never had equal priority with the sea and air arms until
about 1942.
No evidence suggests "the RAF and USAAC feared their own
armies and navies . . ."

There is plenty of evidence air force commands could fear the
armies and navies, and vice versa, mainly in peace time. Talk
of air/ground or air/sea operations inevitably had the point of
who would have ultimate control of the units. The armies and
navies wanted the final control, essentially making the relevant
air units part of them.

As we know now a major war meant the army received control of
some aircraft and the RAF formed ground units, including
armoured cars.

In any case British expenditure on rearmament, million pounds,
in 1934, Navy 20.9, RAF 9.4, army 6.9
in 1937, Navy 42.0, RAF 39.3, Army 21.5, ordnance factory 1.5
in 1939, Navy 82.9, RAF 109.9, Army 67.6, ordnance factory 12.7

So around a tripling of expenditure 1934 to 1937, and by 1939
expenditure was around 7 time 1934 levels and the Navy had gone
from around 56% of rearmament expenditure to 30%.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Michael Emrys]

The USN was limited in aircraft size and so was "tactical"...

Mostly true. The USN did have medium and large multi-engined long range
patrol bombers at the outbreak of war with more on the drawing boards or
in development, but at that time there was no thought to employing them
for strategic bombing. They were intended to protect the US and its
possessions from hostile fleets. Primarily they were used for long range
recon and ASW work, although by mid war they were also used at times to
attack enemy installations.

Michael

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Michael Emrys

The USN was limited in aircraft size and so was "tactical"...

Mostly true.

Correct, I should have said size limited when fitted with
undercarriages, able to operate from carriers or ships.

Post by Michael Emrys
The USN did have medium and large multi-engined long range patrol bombers
at the outbreak of war with more on the drawing boards or in development,
but at that time there was no thought to employing them for strategic
bombing.

Outbreak of war is defined as 1939 or 1941?

I was thinking more of the late 1930's before the European war
started. The USN received the first PBY-1 in August 1936 and by
mid 1939 had completed batches of PBY-2, -3 and -4. Maximum
weight about the same as the B-25 and B-26.

The PB2Y Coronado prototype had flown in December 1937 but
production did not commence until November 1940 and only 6
were built before series production really began in May 1942.
Maximum weight greater than the B-17 or B-24.

The PBM Mariner prototype first flight was in February 1939, a
batch of 21 built September 1940 to April 1941, series production
began in April 1942. Maximum weight more than the early B-17
but less than the B-17G.

The Sikorski PBS first flew in August 1937, to the same basic
specification as the PB2Y, prototype only.

The Martin PB2M was ordered in August 1938, first flight in
July 1942, maximum weight more than the B-29.

All the above were flying boats. The PBY could carry 4,000 pounds
of bombs, the PB2Y 12,000 pounds, the PBM 2,000 pounds.

Any others you were thinking of?

There was a gap in PBY production, none built July 1939 to August
1940, except for the XPBY-5A prototype, the PBY amphibian production
began in October 1941.

The USN started to receive B-24s direct from the factory in August
1942, calling them the PB4Y.

Post by Michael Emrys
They were intended to protect the US and its possessions from hostile
fleets. Primarily they were used for long range recon and ASW work,
although by mid war they were also used at times to attack enemy
installations.

Agreed, but again pre war they were not thinking of strategic attacks,
certainly not say bombing Japanese industry.

I sort of wonder whether the final operations against Japan resulted in
the USN surface ships doing more strategic bombardment for the war
than the USN aircraft, which tended to go for tactical targets (ships,
airfields etc.) the surface ships bombarded things like steel works.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Paul F Austin]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Paul F Austin
The RAF, USAAC and the Armee de l'Air were Dohettian, the Luftwaffe,
the Japanese Army Air Service and the Soviet air forces were not.

Yes, i.e. correct.

No, the Luftwaffe was quite into strategic bombing and the Red Air Force
had a strategic bomber and strategic fighter force, the latter for defence.
The Italians also thought in terms of strategic bombing.
No air force ignored the idea of strategic attack and defence, all had their
army and navy "support" sections, it then becomes a judgment about what
was the overall doctrine.

....

This is what RAND had to say about Soviet strategic bombing and air
defense forces: "The practitioners of the Great Patriotic War produced
a great tactical air force, but they devoted no serious attention to
either a strategic bomber force or a strategic air defense. "
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a228306.pdf

The authors attribute some of that to the liquidation of military
theorists during the purges. During the Great Patriotic War, little
diversion from the main effort to defeat Germany was tolerated.

The Soviet Air Defense Force (VPVO) was established organizationally in
1948.

Soviet Long Range Aviation _did_ exist as a Stavka asset as early as
1940 but the focus was "strategic" in the sense of engaging enemy
administrative, political and military targets at long range, not
Douhet's notion of aiming directly at civilian moral and
economic/industrial targets.

Paul

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Paul F Austin

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
No, the Luftwaffe was quite into strategic bombing and the Red Air Force
had a strategic bomber and strategic fighter force, the latter for defence.
The Italians also thought in terms of strategic bombing.
No air force ignored the idea of strategic attack and defence, all had their
army and navy "support" sections, it then becomes a judgment about what
was the overall doctrine.

....
This is what RAND had to say about Soviet strategic bombing and air
defense forces: "The practitioners of the Great Patriotic War produced a
great tactical air force, but they devoted no serious attention to either
a strategic bomber force or a strategic air defense. "
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a228306.pdf
The authors attribute some of that to the liquidation of military
theorists during the purges. During the Great Patriotic War, little
diversion from the main effort to defeat Germany was tolerated.

I do not dispute this, the Red Air Force Doctrine in WWII was in
fact ultra tactical, it concentrated on army support even to the
point of ignoring the Luftwaffe.

Unlike the western air forces which had a general priority of attacking
the Luftwaffe before doing ground support.

The Red Air Force did bomb Berlin in 1941, and that is a result
of pre war doctrine that created the longer ranged, "heavy"
bombers.

Post by Paul F Austin
The Soviet Air Defense Force (VPVO) was established organizationally in
1948.

Yes, but there were the PVO forces pre WWII, essentially the
strategic fighter defences during the war, at least in terms of
command structure, meant to protect targets like Moscow.

Post by Paul F Austin
Soviet Long Range Aviation _did_ exist as a Stavka asset as early as 1940
but the focus was "strategic" in the sense of engaging enemy
administrative, political and military targets at long range, not Douhet's
notion of aiming directly at civilian moral and economic/industrial
targets.

In which case no air force was Douhetian pre WWII, as they assumed
the morale collapse would be a side effect of the highly accurate
and devastating bombing of the key industrial and economic targets,
like electricity generators and also including destruction of enemy
command systems, causing a break down in civil order.

The Red Air Force may have had a different target list but the aim
was similar, air operations independent of ground or naval actions
to damage the enemy infrastructure away from the battle areas,
with the pre war belief it would or at least could be decisive.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
In any case British expenditure on rearmament, million pounds,
in 1934, Navy 20.9, RAF 9.4, army 6.9
in 1937, Navy 42.0, RAF 39.3, Army 21.5, ordnance factory 1.5
in 1939, Navy 82.9, RAF 109.9, Army 67.6, ordnance factory 12.7
So around a tripling of expenditure 1934 to 1937, and by 1939
expenditure was around 7 time 1934 levels and the Navy had gone
from around 56% of rearmament expenditure to 30%.

Very useful figures, but they only tell part
of the story. "Rearmament", to me, sounds like
the budget for procurement of new combat equipment.

It would not include personnel costs, operating
costs, cost of construction of bases, or cost
of maintenance of existing equipment (not a big
item for the RAF, but a huge item for the RN).

Or am I wrong?

Also, I note the fourth column, "ordnance factory".
This would be money invested in facilities for the
production of "ordnance" - but for which end users?

Some items would be used across all three services;
others would be service specific. How that budget
was allocated would be affected by service rivalries.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
In any case British expenditure on rearmament, million pounds,
in 1934, Navy 20.9, RAF 9.4, army 6.9
in 1937, Navy 42.0, RAF 39.3, Army 21.5, ordnance factory 1.5
in 1939, Navy 82.9, RAF 109.9, Army 67.6, ordnance factory 12.7
So around a tripling of expenditure 1934 to 1937, and by 1939
expenditure was around 7 time 1934 levels and the Navy had gone
from around 56% of rearmament expenditure to 30%.

Very useful figures, but they only tell part
of the story. "Rearmament", to me, sounds like
the budget for procurement of new combat equipment.

Quite possibly, the problems in determining the actual budgets
of government departments. It could also be the extra expenditure
above the then "normal" amounts, though the 1934 figures suggest
the source could be confusing terms.

Post by Rich Rostrom
It would not include personnel costs, operating
costs, cost of construction of bases, or cost
of maintenance of existing equipment (not a big
item for the RAF, but a huge item for the RN).

It may have included most of the above, extra personnel, extra
bases certainly fit rearmament.

The RAF kept a lot of older aircraft around it was the only
way to quickly expand. Training on an obsolete aircraft
is not ideal but better than no aircraft to fly.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Or am I wrong?

You may be reasonably correct.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Also, I note the fourth column, "ordnance factory".
This would be money invested in facilities for the
production of "ordnance" - but for which end users?

Given the separation it probably refers to factories likely to
serve all the services, gun and high explosives manufacture
for example.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Some items would be used across all three services;
others would be service specific. How that budget
was allocated would be affected by service rivalries.

The more common the equipment the more economies,
but I have no breakdown, only the monetary amounts.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[news]

Post by Chris Allen
So what did Bomber Command DO in the Battle of Britain?

I used to have an RAF site bookmarked that had a list of all the daily
operations, targets and losses. They have rebuilt the site and I cannot
find it. I checked with a couple Danish sites that have information on
planes that were shot down over Denmark and there were a number of
bombers shot down there during the days of the Battle of Britain.


http://www.flensted.eu.com/194000.shtml

http://www.airmen.dk/




Dave Smith

[WJHopwood]

Long lines
What did Bomber Command do in the Battle of Britain?
My question is prompted by 2 points.
1) I understand that before the war, some RAF opinion was "bombers would
do it all next time wound"....I believe some Yanks shared the same opinion....

What Bomber Command intended to do, what it did, and the repercussions
from it have been controversial for decades and is covered in a new book
released last last month titled "THE BOMBERS AND THE BOMBED: Allied Air
War Over Europe, 1940-1945 By Richard Overy. An interesting review
thereof appears today, March 21, in the New York Times.

The review points out that the book basically builds around the thesis that
although in London a statue of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris now
stands paying tribute to the WWii bomber crews and their Commander with
the words, " The Nation owes them all an immense debt." But when the
statue was unveiled in 1992 there was a large protest and jeers from the
crowd of "Harris was a war criminal." That sentiment, it is revealed, exists
among many to this day with regard to Allied bombing strategy, "a source
of fierce historical debate frequently skewed by myth, misunderstanding,
and moralistic posturing."

For some, goes the contention, bombing of German civilian areas as distinct
from military targets was completely justified as a logical strategy in response
to Nazi cruelty while on the other hand the bombing "is condemned as a
"barbaric assault on innocent civilians, unjustifiable, indiscriminate, and
unnecessary." Hardly considered by those who so believe was the sacrifice of
the bomber crews whose chance of survival was less than the infantryman in
the trenches of WWI. And for every bomber shot down by enemy fire, six were
lost in accidents.

The book's author, Richard Overy, a professor of history at Exeter University in
Britain, contends that what is needed is a "sober, dispassionate, fully sourced,
exploration of what the bombing campaign comprised, how it developed...and
what was achieved." Overy, described by the reviewer as a detailed and
meticulous analyst, has written precisely such a book "which is all the more
powerful for eschewing the hysteria that has colored this subject for too long."

The coverage of the book goes on with much additional detail, including that
both Churchill was an "early and enthusiastic" advocate of wholesale bombing
as a way to defeat Hitler," and that Roosevelt fully supported that belief. However,
the author brings out the fact that although it was the firm Allied belief that
the fact that the German populace might influence the Nazi regime to end the war
because of the bombing did not take into consideration that the British populace
did not have the same reaction when the British underwent the Blitz and the
destruction of Coventry, so why would the Germans have less fortitude?

As Overy points out, although it served the propaganda interests of both sides
to exaggerate the death toll from bombing, he is careful to scale back the wilder
claims. He does point out, however, that the real numbers were "still appalling"
Some 353,000 Germans were killed by Allied bombs, more than half of those
being killed in the last four months of the war. These, he says, were probably
the closest to actual numbers we will get because, as in the Hamburg firestorm,
precise body counts were "reduced to estimating the number of dead by counting
piles of human ash had been reduced to counting the ashes of human burn victims
as a result of the nature among the debris."

For those interested, the NYT review can be seen in its entirety at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/books/review/the-bombers-and-the-bombed-by-richard-overy.html?emc=edit_tnt_20140321&nlid=65401455&tntemail0=y


WJH

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by WJHopwood
What Bomber Command intended to do, what it did, and the repercussions
from it have been controversial for decades and is covered in a new book
released last last month titled "THE BOMBERS AND THE BOMBED: Allied Air
War Over Europe, 1940-1945 By Richard Overy. An interesting review
thereof appears today, March 21, in the New York Times.

As usual there are quite a number of reviews available now.

It would seem there are already two editions with the US
version several chapters smaller than the UK one, which
is called The Bombing War.

That book highlights the failure of Bulgaria to collapse under
air attack, the 9 RAF raids mainly against Marshalling Yards
January to June 1944, dropping under 700 short tons of
bombs, plus the 14 operations the 15th AF only mounted
on Bulgaria, dropping 2,701.1 short tons of bombs,
November 1943 to September 1944.

The 15th AF raids,

Sofia \ 24/11/1943 \ M/Y \ 43.3 \ -
Sofia \ 10/12/1943 \ M/Y \ 76.0 \ -
Sofia \ 20/12/1943 \ M/Y \ 92.8 \ -
Dupnitsa \ 4/01/1944 \ M/Y & City \ 81.0 \ -
Sofia \ 10/01/1944 \ City \ 419.5 \ -
Vrattso \ 24/01/1944 \ M/Y \ 117.0 \ -
Dinstservovene \ 24/01/1944 \ M/Y \ 3.0 \ -
Sofia \ 30/03/1944 \ City \ 235.0 \ 93 tons incendiary
Kneju \ 30/03/1944 \ City \ 12.5 \ -
Lozen \ 30/03/1944 \ City \ 2.8 \ -
Sanokov \ 30/03/1944 \ City \ 2.8 \ -
Dragoman \ 30/03/1944 \ City \ 2.5 \ -
Gana Lakatnik \ 30/03/1944 \ City \ 1.2 \ -
Sofia \ 30/03/1944 \ M/Y \ 754.7 \ 185 tons incendiary
Sofia \ 30/03/1944 \ I/A \ 80.0 \ -
Misc., Bu \ 30/03/1944 \ T/O \ 2.5 \ -
Sofia \ 17/04/1944 \ I/A \ 51.5 \ -
Sofia \ 17/04/1944 \ M/Y \ 412.0 \ -
Karlovo \ 28/06/1944 \ A/F \ 281.5 \ 63.5 tons fragmentation
Lom \ 28/07/1944 \ City \ 2.5 \ -
Misc., Bu \ 17/08/1944 \ T/O \ 2.0 \ -
Lom \ 18/08/1944 \ P/A \ 10.0 \ -
Misc., Bu \ 4/09/1944 \ Hy \ 15.0 \ -
Sofia \ 17/09/1944 \ Evac POWs \ - \ -

Post by WJHopwood
The review points out that the book basically builds around the thesis that
although in London a statue of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris now
stands paying tribute to the WWii bomber crews and their Commander with
the words, " The Nation owes them all an immense debt." But when the
statue was unveiled in 1992 there was a large protest and jeers from the
crowd of "Harris was a war criminal." That sentiment, it is revealed, exists
among many to this day with regard to Allied bombing strategy, "a source
of fierce historical debate frequently skewed by myth, misunderstanding,
and moralistic posturing."

Noble Frankland made the point about history wars in his book
History at War, published in 1998.

He was one of the authors of the Bomber Command official history
and notes at the time it was published it was considered by many
to be too harsh on the Command, and then later it was considered
by many to be too easy.

Post by WJHopwood
For some, goes the contention, bombing of German civilian areas as distinct
from military targets was completely justified as a logical strategy in response
to Nazi cruelty while on the other hand the bombing "is condemned as a
"barbaric assault on innocent civilians, unjustifiable, indiscriminate, and
unnecessary." Hardly considered by those who so believe was the sacrifice of
the bomber crews whose chance of survival was less than the infantryman in
the trenches of WWI.

The survival statistic presumably refers to crews of the Bomber Command
heavy bombers until around mid 1944. US deaths were lower.

Either that or it means casualties, including captured.

Post by WJHopwood
And for every bomber shot down by enemy fire, six were
lost in accidents.

Think about it for the moment, 6 to 1? The 8th Air Force reported around
4,508 B-17 total losses, including 17 expended as Aphrodite drones.

It considers 1,440 lost to enemy fighters, 1,405 to flak, 352 to battle
damage, so 3,197 of which a proportion were not "shot down", but
were written off after landing.

There were 12,730 B-17s of all types built. The 6 to 1 ratio idea
looks even worse for Lancasters.

The USAAF came to the conclusion for every aircraft lost in combat,
another would be lost or written off by the combat units and another
would be lost in training in the US, but that is the figure over all types.

The USAAF reports 14,280 heavy bombers lost December 1941
to August 1945 from all causes, 12,007 of them were overseas and
10,935 are considered the results of combat and accidents, the
rest "dropped to 2nd line".

I really doubt the USAAF lost only about 1,600 heavy bombers
to enemy fire.

Post by WJHopwood
The book's author, Richard Overy, a professor of history at Exeter University in
Britain, contends that what is needed is a "sober, dispassionate, fully sourced,
exploration of what the bombing campaign comprised, how it developed...and
what was achieved." Overy, described by the reviewer as a detailed and
meticulous analyst, has written precisely such a book "which is all the more
powerful for eschewing the hysteria that has colored this subject for too long."
The coverage of the book goes on with much additional detail, including that
both Churchill was an "early and enthusiastic" advocate of wholesale bombing
as a way to defeat Hitler," and that Roosevelt fully supported that
belief.

I presume bombing here is defined as strategic, not the desire for
air superiority.

Post by WJHopwood
However,
the author brings out the fact that although it was the firm Allied belief that
the fact that the German populace might influence the Nazi regime to end the war
because of the bombing did not take into consideration that the British populace
did not have the same reaction when the British underwent the Blitz and the
destruction of Coventry, so why would the Germans have less fortitude?

The main reason being the German revolts at the end of WWI, a
factor that made the Nazis nervous.

Post by WJHopwood
As Overy points out, although it served the propaganda interests of both sides
to exaggerate the death toll from bombing, he is careful to scale back the wilder
claims. He does point out, however, that the real numbers were "still appalling"
Some 353,000 Germans were killed by Allied bombs, more than half of those
being killed in the last four months of the war. These, he says, were probably
the closest to actual numbers we will get because, as in the Hamburg firestorm,
precise body counts were "reduced to estimating the number of dead by counting
piles of human ash had been reduced to counting the ashes of human burn victims
as a result of the nature among the debris."

Interesting, given the figures from the Federal German Republic
Statistical Office at Wiesbaden, for 593,000 deaths which appears
to apply to Germany as defined by the 1937 borders, so it excludes
Austria for example, and it is people killed, including foreign workers
and PoWs.

Martin K. Sorge in the Other Price of Hitler's war claims 410,000
civilians killed and "hundreds of thousands" missing. The 410,000
figure appears to be German civilians killed, then add 23,000 police
and civilians working in the military, 32,000 foreign workers and
PoWs plus 128,000 displaced persons, total 593,000.

The 410,000 figure in Sorge is the East German government estimate.

Post by WJHopwood
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/books/review/the-bombers-and-the-bombed-by-richard-overy.html?emc=edit_tnt_20140321&nlid=65401455&tntemail0=y

Behind a log in screen.

The trouble with the reviews is they are making basic factual
errors, hopefully it is them, not the book.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Chris Allen
So what did Bomber Command DO in the Battle of Britain?

This is the longer answer. For this reply the Battle of Britain
is considered to last from 1 July to 31 October 1940.

Firstly some background, Bomber Command had 5 groups,

Number 1 group had Fairey Battles, they had formed part of the
RAF force in France, had taken heavy losses and were largely being
re-equipped with Vickers Wellingtons., but some were used to
attack channel ports and other targets in occupied Europe, in some
cases using external bomb racks to up the bomb load from 1,000
to 1,500 pounds. Most of these operations took place in September
and October, 150 and 48 sorties despatched respectively.

Number 2 group had Bristol Blenheims, the only type to undertake
daylight operations during the battle. In addition a series of small
trial night operations with Blenheims was run in the second half of
July, 62 sorties despatched, followed by a near two week pause.
Large scale night operations by Blenheims began on 12 August,
with 316 sorties despatched by the end of the month, 786 in
September and 469 in October. So the group was also active
at night.

Number 3 group had Vickers Wellingtons.

Number 4 group had Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys.

Number 5 group had Handley Page Hampdens, the Hampdens
were the only Bomber Command aircraft to drop mines and this
would remain the case until the second half of 1941.

Bomber Command's staff were still adjusting to the increased
tempo of wartime operations, so aircraft that crashed in
England or landed away from their normal base were often
omitted from the raid reports, effectively as if they brought their
bombs back, or else their report was received too late to
make it into the official figures, though it is part of the raid
reports. Together with the assumption any missing aircraft
did not attack a target it means the official figures are a slight
underestimate of bombs dropped.

A small source of difference is the RAF used long tons, 2,240
pounds, converting the bomb load to tons to 1 decimal place
of accuracy. Given the non randomness of the bomb loads
this introduces differences, for example the standard Blenheim
load of 1,000 pounds is 0.45 long tons, usually reported as
0.4 tons. I have a spreadsheet that does the calculation for
me without the rounding and it also helps catch arithmetic
errors. Many of the raid reports have totals written in pencil,
which usually become the official figures. All up the figures I
have come to 6,657.1 long tons of bombs dropped July to
October 1940 inclusive, the official total is 6,612 long tons.

Unfortunately some reports only give a list of targets attacked
by a given aircraft type on a given day or night together
with the bombs dropped, not a list of bombs dropped by
individual target, so most of this reply will deal with what
the RAF wanted to attack, not what was actually attacked.
On the other hand many reports give the bombing altitudes,
showing 10,000 feet was high level and some were bombing
from hundreds, not thousands, of feet high.

There is of course a number of contradictions both within
the raid reports and the raid report versus the official figures,
about how many aircraft attacked, what they attacked and
what bombs they dropped. Many involve late reports but
most will require records from the groups or squadrons to
hopefully resolve.

This was still a time when aircraft unable to locate a target,
even in Germany, brought their bombs back. For some
reasons mines dropped on official bomb raids, for example
in the Dortmund Ems canal, are defined as 1,500 pound
type M bombs. These minelayers were going in at low level
judging by their loss rate.

Day bomber.

These were hampered by a lack of fighter escorts, meaning
raids tended to be in weather bad enough to provide clouds
to hide in, but good enough to see targets, as a result attack
rates were low, only about a quarter of the day bomber sorties
attacked a target. Sorties were despatched on 111 out of the
123 days July to October.

At the start of the battle Bomber Command kept attacking
Germany, even by day, with about half the day bomber
sorties despatched in July, a fifth in August, a 14% in
September and half in October. There was a gap in daylight
operations to Germany, from 9 September to 2 October,
apart from 1 sortie sent on 28 September.

In July and August aircraft losses were about 20% of effective
bomber sorties, 10% in September and under 3% in October.

Of the 550 bomber sorties despatched (NOT attacking) in July
258 were to targets in Germany, including 106 against oil
targets, 50 against aircraft industry, 38 against ships and ports,
32 against airfields with most of the rest of the sorties to rail
marshalling yards or aluminum plants.

The 292 sorties to occupied countries included 210 to airfields
(130 France, 58 Belgium), and 68 against ships and ports
(44 Holland, 12 Denmark, 9 France)

In August 430 day bomber sorties were despatched. Of the 92
sent to Germany 42 were against oil targets, and 49 against
aircraft industry targets, with 1 against a canal.

The 338 sorties to occupied countries were all to airfields,
32 Belgium, 10 Britain (Channel Islands), 79 France, 95
Holland and 86 to "Europe". The latter being sorties where
no definitive target is given, rather an area is specified that
usually is a mixture of Belgium, Holland and/or France.

In September there were 216 day bomber sorties despatched.
The 30 to Germany (on the 1st to the 8th) were 16 aircraft industry,
10 oil, 3 canals and 1 anti ship.

The 186 sorties to occupied countries have 162 anti invasion,
that is sorties against warships, merchant ships and ports. These
comprised 32 to Belgium, 50 "Europe", 44 France and 36
Holland. Another 24 sorties were sent to airfields (4 Belgium,
10 France, 10 Holland). Sorties against airfields essentially
ceased on 8 September, anti invasion sorties began on 9
September.

In October there were again 216 day bomber sorties despatched.
Sorties against German targets resumed on the 3rd, with 107
sorties sent for the month, 54 to oil targets, 25 against ports and
shipping, 15 against marshalling yards, 10 against aluminium
plants and 3 against canals.

The 109 sorties to occupied countries were 72 anti invasion
(12 Belgium, 9 Europe, 35 France, 17 Holland) and 34
against airfields, 31 of which were in France. Note 21 of the
airfield sorties were on the 28th to the 31st.

So daylight operations harassed the Luftwaffe while trying
for longer term results with attacks on aircraft industry and
oil targets, and this strategy was maintained except for a
roughly three week period from 9 September when effort
was concentrated on the invasion fleet with 164 out of 170
sorties despatched sent against ships or ports. The anti
shipping effort then tapered off. It would be revived post
battle with operation Channel Stop.

On 5 August a day reconnaissance patrol was started, using
aircraft based at Lossiemouth, the original navigation
instructions were "Smith's Bank and position 090 Montrose
47 miles thence a course 060 depth 160 miles.", this was
run almost daily with 6 aircraft until the end of October.
Only two attacks were made, 1 on a suspected U-boat
near the British coast, the second against escort vessels
near Utsire Island, which is north of Stavanger in Norway.

Night Bomber.

Unlike the day raids there is no noticeable break in attempts
to bomb targets in Germany, operations were conducted on
113 out of the 123 nights and sorties were sent to Germany
on 112 nights, the only night of operations where no sorties
were sent to Germany was 21 September.

While there are some exceptions the target list in Germany
did not change much over the 4 months.

There were 5,919 bomber sorties sent to Germany in the July to
October period with the main themes being oil targets, 1,902
sorties, Marshalling yards and rail storage sidings, 836 sorties,
shipyards and ports 710 sorties, aircraft industry targets, 634
sorties, electricity industry, 345 sorties, warships 326 sorties,
aluminium industry 249 sorties. There was also the 98 sorties
sent to try and create forest fires in the 6 days 1 to 6 September.

In keeping with the over estimation on bomber effectiveness
sorties sent to individual targets were small, of all the raids on
marshalling yards for example only 4 had 10 or more sorties,
aircraft were sent to the yards in Hamm on 65 nights, total
sorties despatched was 207.

The raids on German aircraft industry targets effectively ceased
on 1 September and only 165 sorties were despatched to oil
targets in September, while attacks on electricity targets began
on 19 August in an attack on Zschornewitz-Golpa and 438 of the
shipping related sorties were in October. Despite these changes
the general overall impression is of a constant set of targets within
a plan to maintain a constant amount of activity against the targets.
It is remarkable how much the target list looks like the one from 1944.

July, of the 1,615 sorties despatched 1,477 were to Germany
and 67 to France, 44% of sorties attacked the primary targets
while another 28% attacked secondary targets. Most of the
sorties to occupied Europe were against airfields.

August, of the 2,067 sorties despatched 1,574 were to
Germany, 299 to France and 72 to Italy, 51% of sorties
attacked the primary targets while another 25% attacked
secondary targets.

Near nightly raids to targets in Belgium, France and Holland
began on 12 August, however they were mainly directed at
airfields with 284 sorties and French oil targets, 93 sorties,
none were against shipping or ports.

September, of the 3,088 sorties despatched 1,221 were
to Germany, 1,170 to France and 597 to Belgium, 73% of
sorties attacked the primary targets while another 14%
attacked secondary targets, showing the effect of more
closer range targets.

Remarkably sorties attacking shipping or ports in occupied
Europe only started on 2 September and that was 12 sorties
to U-boat docks at Lorient, on the 5th 13 sorties were sent to
E-boat docks at Boulogne, plus 3 sorties to attack barges at
Delfzijl in Holland. It was not until 7 September sorties to
Belgium, France and Holland became almost exclusively
against ports and shipping, with a further 1,618 sorties
despatched to the end of the month. Over 100 sorties per
night were sent on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 19th.
It means that of the 1,850 sorties sent to Belgium, France
and Holland in September 1,682 were against invasion
targets and 57 against airfields. Some 21 of the aircraft
despatched to invasion targets were listed as missing, or
around 1.25% compared with an overall night bomber
loss rate of 1.68% for the month. The ports were certainly
well defended.

October, of the 2,118 sorties despatched 1,647 were to
Germany, 285 to France and 94 to Holland, 51% of sorties
attacked the primary targets while another 24% attacked
secondary targets. Of the 440 sorties sent to Belgium,
France and Holland in September 351 were against invasion
targets and 52 against airfields. Sorties against airfields in
occupied countries were mainly done from the 20th onwards.

Essentially throughout the battle Bomber Command maintained
a steady number of night bomber sorties to targets in Germany,
devoting most of the additional effort against targets outside
Germany and the campaign against the invasion fleet proper was
only commenced at the start of the second week in September
and within a week was causing significant shipping losses.

An ongoing minor campaign against the German guns at
Cap Gris Nez used 19 sorties in August, 60 in September
and 9 in October.

There were 26 nights of raids on Berlin, starting on 25 August,
totaling 700 sorties, of these 298 were against electricity targets,
including 5 different generator plants, 59 against gas works and
129 against the government buildings area.

Note at this time during the war Coastal Command was still laying
mines, the following information only covers Bomber Command
which had taken over the longer range work.

Minelaying, 528 sorties despatched on 59 nights July to October,
136 to Denmark, 160 to France, 220 to Germany and 12 to
Norway. By month, 196 in July, 180 in August, 64 in September
and 88 in October.

Until 19 August all sorties were to Denmark or Germany except for
12 to Norway on 6 August. On 22 August the first mines were laid
in French waters, from then to 9 October 140 out of 184 sorties
were to French targets. After 9 October the concentration on
French targets was reduced. The breakdown for October was 38
to France, 39 to Germany and 11 to Denmark. Minelaying aircraft
often carried a pair of 250 pound bombs and attacked various
targets of opportunity, about a third of sorties despatched
dropped bombs.

Leaflets, the regular bombers carried leaflets on raids,
but designated leaflet raids, usually done by aircraft from
the training units (numbers 6 and 7 group), began on
18 July, almost all were to France. All up 94 sorties
despatched. The aircraft also carried bombs at times
and attacked targets of opportunity, about 15% of sorties
dropped bombs, including on the channel islands, so the
RAF was attacking British territory.

Other operations run on a small scale include weather
and photographic reconnaissance, air sea rescue
and the start of intruder operations, in the latter case by
Blenheim bombers.

Geoffrey Sinclair
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