US vs USSR - military strength circa 1945

[[e-mail]]

Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

[William Black]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

How does the US Navy bring its superior naval power to bear on the USSR?

[[e-mail]]

How does the US Navy bring its superior naval power to bear on the USSR? >

It doesn't, but that's not what I was talking about. I was just
comparing the overall strengths of the two forces, not how they would
fare in a conflict with one another, though that is an interesting
spinoff conversation I suppose.

[William Black]

Post by ***@aol.com

How does the US Navy bring its superior naval power to bear on the USSR?>

It doesn't, but that's not what I was talking about. I was just
comparing the overall strengths of the two forces, not how they would
fare in a conflict with one another, though that is an interesting
spinoff conversation I suppose.

The two armies had radically different ways to solve the same problem.

That the US Army eventually adopted the USSR's way of doing things seems
to indicate that the USSR had a tactical edge.

They may have had a qualitative edge as well.

The IS III tank was far superior (as a weapon) to anything the US had.

The US had a technological edge in the level of issue of things like
radios and a vast superiority in 'soft vehicles'.

All these aspects are force multipliers of some kind.

Actual numbers don't matter that much.

[a***@hotmail.com]

Post by William Black

Post by ***@aol.com

How does the US Navy bring its superior naval power to bear on the USSR?>

It doesn't, but that's not what I was talking about. I was just
comparing the overall strengths of the two forces, not how they would
fare in a conflict with one another, though that is an interesting
spinoff conversation I suppose.

The two armies had radically different ways to solve the same problem.
That the US Army eventually adopted the USSR's way of doing things seems
to indicate that the USSR had a tactical edge.

Would this 'way' include almost total disregard to the losses and
treating soldiers as a dirt? :-)

Post by William Black
They may have had a qualitative edge as well.
The IS III tank was far superior (as a weapon) to anything the US had.

Well, this was a 'breakthrough tank' with a good ability to act
against the fortifications but not necessarily good for tank-to-tank
engagement and, even by the Soviet doctrine, the heavy tanks became
obsolete few years after WWII.

OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Not sure about comparable advantages and disadvantages of the front-
line aviation but the long-range strategic bombers had been
practically absent on the Soviet side in 44-45.

Post by William Black
The US had a technological edge in the level of issue of things like
radios and a vast superiority in 'soft vehicles'.

To a degree that these vechicles represented most of the non-railroad
transport used by the Soviet Army. AFAIK, by 44 domestic production of
the radio sets in the SU was on a satisfactory level (still, some US-
produced field radios had been in use).

Post by William Black
All these aspects are force multipliers of some kind.
Actual numbers don't matter that much.

Sure. US dependency of the supplies from the SU - 0. Soviet dependency
(in 44-45) on the supplies from the US - noticeable, to put it mildly.

[William Black]

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

[Phil McGregor]

On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited
by the availability of US M3 Halftracks for the infantry ... Soviet
Halftracks, such as they were, were not available in the numbers
needed nor were they of the same standard of cross country mobility as
the M3.

Phil

[William Black]

Post by Phil McGregor
On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited
by the availability of US M3 Halftracks for the infantry ...

There is no doubt that the equipment supplied by the USA to the USSR was
more reliable than the locally produced stuff, but is that factor big
enough to be a major factor in battle?

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by William Black
There is no doubt that the equipment supplied by the USA to the USSR was
more reliable than the locally produced stuff, but is that factor big
enough to be a major factor in battle?

Oh yes. In the case of the M4 vs
the T-34 - if the unit motor marches
say 100 miles cross-country, a
lot more M4s than T-34s would
complete the trip.

Addressing the initial question:

The U.S. had a larger and more capable air force.

The U.S. had a much larger and far more capable navy.

The USSR had a larger army, with more men, tanks,
and artillery.

However, military strength consists of not only
ready forces for use at the moment, but the
ability to supply and sustain those forces in
battle, and here the U.S. had a very substantial
advantage.

The U.S. had more industry, and none of it had
been destroyed. The USSR had had much of
its industry and infrastructure destroyed; and
much of the wartime replacements during the
war were hasty construction that were wasteful
to operate and not built to last.

The U.S. had ample food supplies. The U.S.
had far more oil. The USSR, due to its territorial
losses and heavy casualties, had to strip its
civilian economy of manpower to form its
enormous army. Whole sectors of the Soviet
economy shut down "for the duration" - these
needs being made up with Lend-Lease supplies
or by doing without. Maintenance was neglected.

One result of these factors is that the U.S. supported
not only its own forces (lavishly) but also to a
substantial degree equipped and supplied the forces of
other countries, including China, Free France, Britain,
and the USSR. while the USSR was substantially
dependent on aid from others.

A posting in this group some years discussed the
magnitude of Lend-Lease (and British) aid to the
USSR. The posting noted that this aid included
1/3 of all explosives and over half of all aviation
fuel, nearly all new locomotives, and the bulk of
new rolling stock, and most of the motor vehicles
used by the Soviet army. This was in addition to
tens of thousands of aircraft and tanks supplied,
food, clothing, raw metals, industrial machinery.

This aid was winding down when the war ended;
but in any case should not be counted as part
of intrinsic Soviet military strength.

I think, adding it all up, that the U.S. was
stronger.

The OP specifically said he was not asking
who would win a war between the two nations.

However: if the world had been invaded by space
aliens with WW II weapons, such that the U.S.
and USSR each had to fight them separately,
I think the U.S. would have shown stronger.

[[e-mail]]

The U.S. had a larger and more capable air force. >

First of all, thanks for all the great information contained in your
post. But, is it really true that the U.S. had a "larger" and "more
capable" air force. The US seems to have significant superiority in
long range bombers, but not so sure about fighters and attack
aircraft, both in quality and quantity. The Yak-3 would seem to be a
decent match for the P-51, and the IL-2 was reknowned as an attack
aircraft.

[Louis C]

Post by ***@aol.com
But, is it really true that the U.S. had a "larger" and "more
capable" air force.

In terms of size, both had very large air forces, though the US had
the larger one. I have in mind a figure of some 67,000 aircraft owned
by the USAAF, not counting those owned by the USN and USMC. The
Soviets had a little under 50,000, total, of which around 20,000 were
combat aircraft (I've seen different figures, ranging from 17,000 to
about 25,000). The RAF also had some 50,000 planes total, of which
9,000 or so were combat.

The average American plane was heavier: heavy bombers and fighters,
whereas the Soviets focused on a tactical force with lightweight
planes.

Post by ***@aol.com
The US seems to have significant superiority in
long range bombers, but not so sure about fighters and attack
aircraft, both in quality and quantity. The Yak-3 would seem to be a
decent match for the P-51, and the IL-2 was reknowned as an attack
aircraft.

The Il-2 was also renowned as the aircraft type with the greatest
amount of losses in WWII, IIRC. Absent friendly air superiority, and
against competent AA (which the Germans had, but which the Allies had,
too) they wouldn't last all that long.
The Yak-3 would definitely be better than a P-51 or P-47 in a dogfight
at low altitude, but it would be powerless to intercept a strategic
bombing raid, let alone fight it out with those same US aircraft types
at these altitudes if it managed to make it that high.

The USAAF was also the more modern force, with better intelligence,
communications, ground control interceptions, radar, etc. It would
find fighting the Soviets heavy going, but there's little doubt it
would end up on top. Note that the Soviets depended on lend-lease for
most of their high-octane avgas, so in a theoretical east vs west
confrontation, the performance of their air force would degrade after
stocks of high-octane fuel had been exhausted and replaced by domestic
production.


The US had the more modern army, the Soviets had the larger army. Both
armied wielded considerable firepower. I'd give the Soviets the nod
for having the better army & army group commanders, though it's not
clear that they'd be able to leverage that advantage in a
confrontation against western armies.


LC

[Phil McGregor]

Post by Louis C
Note that the Soviets depended on lend-lease for
most of their high-octane avgas, so in a theoretical east vs west
confrontation, the performance of their air force would degrade after
stocks of high-octane fuel had been exhausted and replaced by domestic
production.

ISTR that the US shipped at least one full plant capable of producing
higher octane petrol than the Soviets could do with home grown
refinery tech, but I have no idea of its operational status at the end
of the war or when it was shipped.

Phil

[n***@hotmail.com]

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by Louis C
Note that the Soviets depended on lend-lease for
most of their high-octane avgas, so in a theoretical east vs west
confrontation, the performance of their air force would degrade after
stocks of high-octane fuel had been exhausted and replaced by domestic
production.

ISTR that the US shipped at least one full plant capable of producing
higher octane petrol than the Soviets could do with home grown
refinery tech, but I have no idea of its operational status at the end
of the war or when it was shipped.
Phil

I vaguely recall something like what Phil suggests, but can't pin it
down either.

And to refocus the whole discussion, I'm tempted to say again what
I've said before: Lend-Lease to the USSR from 1943 to mid-1945 made it
possible for them to fight a modern war in the first place; absent
Lend-Lease the Soviets wouldn't be figthing a modern war more slowly,
they wouldn't have been fighting a modern war at all. (Which is not
the equivalent of declaring an ultimate Nazi victory and a 1000-Year
Reich, btw, so don't anybody start ;-) .)

I think William Black's comment about the political dimension of a US-
Soviet War--i.e. the US and other Western powers were shot through
with Soviet sympathizers and agents--is extremely relevant to any such
discussion also.

Narr

[William Black]

Post by Louis C
The US had the more modern army, the Soviets had the larger army. Both
armied wielded considerable firepower. I'd give the Soviets the nod
for having the better army& army group commanders, though it's not
clear that they'd be able to leverage that advantage in a
confrontation against western armies.

They'd certainly have a strategic intelligence advantage.

Both the British and the Americans were riddled with Communist spies.

[Michael Kuettner]

Post by William Black

Post by Louis C
The US had the more modern army, the Soviets had the larger army. Both
armied wielded considerable firepower. I'd give the Soviets the nod
for having the better army& army group commanders, though it's not
clear that they'd be able to leverage that advantage in a
confrontation against western armies.

They'd certainly have a strategic intelligence advantage.
Both the British and the Americans were riddled with Communist spies.

True. But the USA started "Operation Gehlen" (the later BND) very soon
after the war.
They were aware that they had no intelligence sources in the Soviet sectors
except for the old agents of the Heeresnachrichtendienst.
Gehlen's old contacts continued to deliver up until the 70ies, it is said.
Although noone knows how good the intelligence was or how highly placed
the agents were (that's still classified).

Cheers,

Michael Kuettner

[William Black]

Post by Michael Kuettner

Post by William Black

Post by Louis C
The US had the more modern army, the Soviets had the larger army. Both
armied wielded considerable firepower. I'd give the Soviets the nod
for having the better army& army group commanders, though it's not
clear that they'd be able to leverage that advantage in a
confrontation against western armies.

They'd certainly have a strategic intelligence advantage.
Both the British and the Americans were riddled with Communist spies.

True. But the USA started "Operation Gehlen" (the later BND) very soon
after the war.

The US funded Gehlen Bureau was riddled with Soviet spies from the start
and was less than useless.

[Rich]

Post by William Black
The US funded Gehlen Bureau was riddled with Soviet spies from the start
and was less than useless.

That would make have negligible effect in 1945 and 1946, while the
Soviet penetration of the State Department had little effect on the
War or Navy Department. In any case it would have been minor compared
to VENONA.

Cheers!

[William Black]

Post by Rich

Post by William Black
The US funded Gehlen Bureau was riddled with Soviet spies from the start
and was less than useless.

That would make have negligible effect in 1945 and 1946,

It does if you're doing what Gehlen and his mates were doing, which was
putting poor saps over the wire into the East.

Anyone who came back was a Soviet agent before he went in, but his
paymasters, the USA, didn't know that...

Now translate that into a war situation and you get what the British did
to the Germans throughout WWII.

while the

Post by Rich
Soviet penetration of the State Department had little effect on the
War or Navy Department. In any case it would have been minor compared
to VENONA.

VENONA betrayed a few highly placed agents.

Gehlen ran just about the only aggressive intelligence operation putting
men into the East.

If they thought it was any good they'd have been as fooled as the
Germans in WWII were.

[Rich]

Post by William Black
It does if you're doing what Gehlen and his mates were doing, which was
putting poor saps over the wire into the East.

Gehlen's new organization did not begin operations until December
1946. How is it supposed to put anyone, poor saps or otherwise, "over
the wire", which, BTW, was nonexistent at that time, in 1945 or 1946,
which was the point I addressed?

Post by William Black
Anyone who came back was a Soviet agent before he went in, but his
paymasters, the USA, didn't know that...

Actually, that has never been that clearcut. The American-sponsored
Gehlen Organization was heavily supported by the OSS/CIA while it
seems that the War Department and then DOD depended much more on
cryptography and aerial reconnaissance and never really fully trusted
Gehlen's output.

Post by William Black
Now translate that into a war situation and you get what the British did
to the Germans throughout WWII.

How? In 1945 and 1946?

Post by William Black
VENONA betrayed a few highly placed agents.

Um, no, it was a cryptographic entry into GRU and the NKVD, just as
the double-agents later placed into Gehlen's organization were entries
into the Western Allies intelligence apparatus.

Post by William Black
Gehlen ran just about the only aggressive intelligence operation putting
men into the East.

Very nice if the only source of intelligence is HUMINT...

Post by William Black
If they thought it was any good they'd have been as fooled as the
Germans in WWII were.

They? Sorry, but that sentence and reasoning appears to be completely
circular.

Cheers!

[Michael Kuettner]

Post by Rich

Post by William Black
It does if you're doing what Gehlen and his mates were doing, which was
putting poor saps over the wire into the East.

Gehlen's new organization did not begin operations until December
1946. How is it supposed to put anyone, poor saps or otherwise, "over
the wire", which, BTW, was nonexistent at that time, in 1945 or 1946,
which was the point I addressed?

Post by William Black
Anyone who came back was a Soviet agent before he went in, but his
paymasters, the USA, didn't know that...

Actually, that has never been that clearcut. The American-sponsored
Gehlen Organization was heavily supported by the OSS/CIA while it
seems that the War Department and then DOD depended much more on
cryptography and aerial reconnaissance and never really fully trusted
Gehlen's output.

Post by William Black
Now translate that into a war situation and you get what the British did
to the Germans throughout WWII.

How? In 1945 and 1946?

Post by William Black
VENONA betrayed a few highly placed agents.

Um, no, it was a cryptographic entry into GRU and the NKVD, just as
the double-agents later placed into Gehlen's organization were entries
into the Western Allies intelligence apparatus.

Post by William Black
Gehlen ran just about the only aggressive intelligence operation putting
men into the East.

Very nice if the only source of intelligence is HUMINT...

Post by William Black
If they thought it was any good they'd have been as fooled as the
Germans in WWII were.

They? Sorry, but that sentence and reasoning appears to be completely
circular.

Just a couple of points :

(a) I've mentioned Gehlen as an example that the USA knew early on that they
had no reliable intelligence from Stalin's empire. Gehlen is just an example
that
they tried to do something about that fact. Whether OG was effective or not
is beside the point.
(b) Gehlen didn't put men over the wire; he tried to re-activate the rest of
the HND - network which lay dormant after the fall of Germany.
That was his sale-argument for the USA.
I don't believe that he ever had any high-ranking sources, btw.

Cheers,

Michael Kuettner

[William Black]

Post by Rich

Post by William Black
VENONA betrayed a few highly placed agents.

Um, no, it was a cryptographic entry into GRU and the NKVD,

Only into the agent running part of their operations.

I'm not aware of any breakthroughs into Soviet signals at any time
except for VENONA.

You'd think that if there were any they'd be telling us about them by
now, it's over 60 years ago....

[[e-mail]]

Post by Louis C
The Yak-3 would definitely be better than a P-51 or P-47 in a dogfight
at low altitude, but it would be powerless to intercept a strategic
bombing raid, let alone fight it out with those same US aircraft types
at these altitudes if it managed to make it that high.

Thanks for the info. above and pardon my ignorance on the matter, but
why is it that an aircraft like the Yak-3 would perform well at low
altitude but not as well at higher altitude? The reverse scenario is
also of interest....P-51 performing well at high altitude but not as
well at lower altitudes.

[Space Captain Kurt Kosmic]

Post by ***@aol.com
Thanks for the info. above and pardon my ignorance on the matter, but
why is it that an aircraft like the Yak-3 would perform well at low
altitude but not as well at higher altitude? The reverse scenario is
also of interest....P-51 performing well at high altitude but not as
well at lower altitudes.

Aerodynamic and engine performance vary at different altitudes (mostly
I believe due a change in air density). Thus, it was possible to
'tune' an aircraft to perform best at a particular altitude.

This link http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/sl-wade.html examines
the performance differences of late war RAF aircraft, and notes for
example, that the "the Spitfire [mk XIV is], 30 mph slower than the
Mustang III at sea level, but 10 mph faster at 30,000ft"

[Alan Meyer]

Post by Louis C
...
The Il-2 was also renowned as the aircraft type with the greatest
amount of losses in WWII, IIRC. Absent friendly air superiority, and
against competent AA (which the Germans had, but which the Allies had,
too) they wouldn't last all that long.

...

I would have thought the Fairey Battle and Ju-87 would have shared the
title of highest percentage losses. Although losses were high, as an
armored airplane, I expect that the Il-2 was the best of the ground
attack planes in terms of survivability of battle damage.

No ground attack planes would have lasted long against the U.S. and
British air defenses in the west. Fast fighter bombers would have had
the best chance because they could leave at high speed, but even they
wouldn't have lasted long and would not have been as effective in ground
attack as the Il-2.

I think the heavy Il-2 losses were due to factors other than the
survivability of the aircraft. Until 1944, the Soviet use of the planes
was very ineffective. They had terrible coordination between fighter
and ground attack units. Il-2s often arrived at rendezvous points to
find no friendly fighters and then proceeded to fight their way into the
targets anyway. Intelligence on enemy air strength and locations was
poor. Targeting was poor - often sending missions against targets that
couldn't be found, or were not what was thought when the mission was
planned. Pilots were sent into combat with insufficient training and
experience, even in flying much less in combat techniques.

In general, the Soviets too often pursued what the Brits called the
"bash on regardless" strategy. Where American, British and German units
would be more likely to stand down after a failure and think things out,
the Russians would be more likely to keep on keeping on, following
orders from the rear by commanders who were more accountable for
following their own orders than for adapting their tactics to actual
conditions at the front.

This is not to say that Soviet officers couldn't figure out what was
going wrong and how to make it right. They could. But the rigidly top
down authoritarian command structure hampered them.

Alan

[Michele]

Post by Alan Meyer

Post by Louis C
...
The Il-2 was also renowned as the aircraft type with the greatest
amount of losses in WWII, IIRC. Absent friendly air superiority, and
against competent AA (which the Germans had, but which the Allies had,
too) they wouldn't last all that long.

...
I would have thought the Fairey Battle and Ju-87 would have shared the
title of highest percentage losses.

Greatest amount <> greatest percentage. The Soviets produced tens of
thousands of the Shturmoviks, for the simple reason that they kept being
shot down in the thousands.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Alan Meyer
I would have thought the Fairey Battle and Ju-87 would have shared the
title of highest percentage losses.

But we can easily see major differences:
-- the Fairey Battle was built in hundreds and was withdrawn from
combat service in 1940 (as unsurviveable;)
-- the Ju 87 was built in thousands and remained in front-line
service until 1944.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Don Phillipson
-- the Fairey Battle was built in hundreds and was withdrawn from
combat service in 1940 (as unsurviveable;)
-- the Ju 87 was built in thousands and remained in front-line
service until 1944.

The Battle was designed as a light bomber not a dive bomber. For
tactical use it had to attack at low level. The last Battle to be
delivered was in January 1941 and it was due for replacement by twin
engined aircraft. Most of the Battle losses in France were actually due
to ground fire.

The Ju87 in service in 1944 was very different from that of 1939 with
an improved air frame and a different engine. It was just as vulnerable
to fighters as the Battle but the Soviets did not have air superiority
for most of the war and by 1942 most were used in night missions.

There were 10 Battle squadrons sent to France in 1940 and total
production was 2,419 with the survivors being used for trainers, target
tugs and test beds. The Battle was withdrawn from service in 1949.

source Bombers by Gunson



Ken Young

[Phil McGregor]

On Sat, 06 Nov 2010 12:50:50 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by Phil McGregor
On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited
by the availability of US M3 Halftracks for the infantry ...

There is no doubt that the equipment supplied by the USA to the USSR was
more reliable than the locally produced stuff, but is that factor big
enough to be a major factor in battle?

Well, the Soviets certainly thought so ... otherwise they would have
had more exploitation units using their own production of inferior
(numerically and operationally) half tracks, I guess.

Note: The Soviet Guards Mech units were going up against a German army
that, like the Red Army, was only 15% motorised/mechanised ... not
against a western allied (US/UK) army that was 100%
motorised/mechanised.

That would have reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's
"breakthrough" units considerably as well.

In battle such things *are* generally regarded as significant.

Amateurs study tactics, dilettantes study strategy ... professionals
study logistics!

Phil McGregor

[a***@hotmail.com]

Post by William Black

Post by Phil McGregor
On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited

There were 10 (AFAIK) tanks units of a corps strenght with a "Guards"
title. Some of them had and some did not have lend-lease (SU and
Brittish) tanks. The 'Guards' status, in general (in tanks, airforce
and infantry), had been awarded not based on an available eqiupment
but due to the outstanding performance. As a part of the 'benefits'
corps _could_ (but not necessarily would) get more of the lend lease
equipment with a result that it could became better suited for
'exploitation' than for a 'breakthrough'. In the case of the domestic
equipment the Guards would routinely have the 1st pick of the stock
(ending up with the better quality tanks). Not sure that this would
make difference in the case of the infantry units and some of the air
force Guards had been all-female flying wood and canvas bi-plans.

Post by William Black

Post by Phil McGregor
by the availability of US M3 Halftracks for the infantry ...

AFAIK, the most popular truck was Studebaker (2 thirds of all Soviet
Army military trucks) and infantry was using mostly them (outside
immediate fighting area) or had been moving on the tanks (and on foot
as well).

Post by William Black
There is no doubt that the equipment supplied by the USA to the USSR was
more reliable than the locally produced stuff, but is that factor big
enough to be a major factor in battle?

You have to define 'battle': pursuing enemy and fast marches using
highways were happening mostly _after_ the battle itself. For the
'breakthrough' the Soviets seemingly preferred their own heavier
tanks. IIRC, A gun on IS-2 was explicitly chosen with a view on
ability to destroy German fortifications. These tanks were suppossed
to be powerful and with a short expected life span.

'Exploitation' vechicles had to be fast and reliable.

[Phil McGregor]

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited

There were 10 (AFAIK) tanks units of a corps strenght with a "Guards"

No. NO. NO!!!

I mentioned Guards *MECHANISED* Corps.

NOT Guards TANK Corps.

Guards MECHANISED Corps had infantry in Half tracks in large (or
relatively large) numbers, Guard TANK Corps were almost pure tank
units AFAIR.

Guards TANK Corps were *breakthrough* units.

Guards MECHANISED Corps *exploited* said breakthroughs, which the
aforementioned Guards TANK Corps were incapable of doing by
themselves.

There were, from memory, only around five or six (but a limited number
regardless of the actual number) Guards MECHANISED Corps, and the
number was directly related to the amount of M3 Halftracks supplied to
the SU by the USA as noted in my original post.

<Interesting but irrelevant material snipped>

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
by the availability of US M3 Halftracks for the infantry ...

AFAIK, the most popular truck was Studebaker (2 thirds of all Soviet
Army military trucks) and infantry was using mostly them (outside
immediate fighting area) or had been moving on the tanks (and on foot
as well).

Um.

Er.

So?

I have no idea what the relevance of the above statement might be.

As far as I can see it has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to do
with the TO&E ("Table of Organisation & Equipment") of a Guards
MECHANISED Corps, which was provided with M3 Halftracks in
(relatively) large numbers for the infantry in their Mechanised
Brigades.

Phil

[a***@hotmail.com]

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited

There were 10 (AFAIK) tanks units of a corps strenght with a "Guards"

No. NO. NO!!!
I mentioned Guards *MECHANISED* Corps.

I brought an issue of the _tank_ Guards armed with the Shermans prior
to William's switching to the subject of a single 'exploitation
unit' (which is almost totally irrelevant as an answer to what I was
talking about) and prior to you contributing to this non-answer with
the Halifax tracks which have even less relevance to what I was
talking about so whatever 'irrelevance' is there, it is not mine.

However, I'll deal with the issue of a mechanized corps below.

Post by Phil McGregor
NOT Guards TANK Corps.
Guards MECHANISED Corps had infantry in Half tracks in large (or
relatively large) numbers, Guard TANK Corps were almost pure tank
units AFAIR.
Guards TANK Corps were *breakthrough* units.

ANY tank corps was a breakthrough unit.

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards MECHANISED Corps *exploited* said breakthroughs,

ANY mechanized corps was an exploiting unit.

Post by Phil McGregor
which the
aforementioned Guards TANK Corps were incapable of doing by
themselves.
There were, from memory, only around five or six (but a limited number
regardless of the actual number) Guards MECHANISED Corps, and the
number was directly related to the amount of M3 Halftracks supplied to
the SU by the USA as noted in my original post.
<Interesting but irrelevant material snipped>

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
by the availability of US M3 Halftracks for the infantry ...

AFAIK, the most popular truck was Studebaker (2 thirds of all Soviet
Army military trucks) and infantry was using mostly them (outside
immediate fighting area) or had been moving on the tanks (and on foot
as well).

Um.
Er.
So?
I have no idea what the relevance of the above statement might be.

Isn't rather obvious? Ah well, never mind....

Post by Phil McGregor
As far as I can see it has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to do
with the TO&E ("Table of Organisation & Equipment") of a Guards
MECHANISED Corps, which was provided with M3 Halftracks in
(relatively) large numbers for the infantry in their Mechanised
Brigades.

I'm afraid that you are somewhat mistaken about the nature of the
Soviet mechanized units and meaning of the term 'Guards'.

To start with, mechanized units of brigade and then corps strenght had
been created in the early 30's and did not have any Halifax halftracks
by the reasons quite obvious. 29 mechanized corps of various strenght
and readiness were in existence in June 1941 (each inculded up to 6
motorized rifle regiments and a motorcycle regiment). Most of these
units had been destroyed early in the war (many during the Battle in
Belorussia) well before a single Halifax <whatever> could arrive. So,
the 1st important thing is that creation of the mechanized units did
not depend on the imported halftracks.

'The Guards' was a honorific title awarded for a successful
performance which had little to do with the equipment or a military
branch (something I already tried to explain but relevance of which
you refused to recognize). While mechanized corps were, indeed,
'exploitation' units, only some of them became Guards and talking
about the 'Guards corp' as of something structurally or tactically
different from the non-Guards of the same type does not make sense.


Structure of a mechanized corps authorized in 1942 included: 3
mechanized brigades, 1 tank brigade, anti-tank regiment and support
units. Tank corps included 3 tank and 1 mechanized brigade (not almost
purely tank units as you are saying, later they had added regiments of
the heavy, medium and light self-propelled guns, which are not exactly
'tanks' either). In 1944 a mechanized corps (similarly to a tank
corps) had been strenghtened with 3 regiments of the assault guns and
other units.

Number of the mechanized corps units of 1942 composition formed during
WWII is 13, so it is not exactly 'few'. 1st,3rd, and 9th Guards
Mechanized Corps (3 out of 9 Guards) were equipped with Sherman so
there was more than a single 'exploitation' unit as William stated.

It would be helpful if you can provide specific numbers of the Halifax
halftracks used in the specific Soviet units (and other vechicles used
to carry infantry in these units).

[Phil McGregor]

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited

There were 10 (AFAIK) tanks units of a corps strenght with a "Guards"

No. NO. NO!!!
I mentioned Guards *MECHANISED* Corps.

I brought an issue of the _tank_ Guards armed with the Shermans prior
to William's switching to the subject of a single 'exploitation
unit' (which is almost totally irrelevant as an answer to what I was
talking about) and prior to you contributing to this non-answer with
the Halifax tracks which have even less relevance to what I was
talking about so whatever 'irrelevance' is there, it is not mine.

Since you were specifically replying to my comment per the
attributions, then what you said was irrelevant *to what *I* said*,
above "justification" notwithstanding.

Whatever the *other* guy may have done is irrelevant ... unless you
*meant* to reply to *his* post, which you singularly failed to do per
the attributions.

It is important to keep such things clear.

Post by a***@hotmail.com
However, I'll deal with the issue of a mechanized corps below.

Post by Phil McGregor
NOT Guards TANK Corps.
Guards MECHANISED Corps had infantry in Half tracks in large (or
relatively large) numbers, Guard TANK Corps were almost pure tank
units AFAIR.
Guards TANK Corps were *breakthrough* units.

ANY tank corps was a breakthrough unit.

Theory vs. practise.

Guards Tank Corps were used as the spearheads for almost all late war
operations.

Tank Corps supported them, but they were not the spearheads for the
most part, unless they were spearheading breakthroughs in secondary
areas made possible by the disruption of the German army by the major
breakthroughs caused by the aforementioned Guard Tank Corps.

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards MECHANISED Corps *exploited* said breakthroughs,

ANY mechanized corps was an exploiting unit.

Indeed. See above.

According to ...

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000040.html

The USSR had, *in May 1945* ...

9 Guards Mechanized Corps
4-6 Mechanized Corps

Which is the point I made. The GMCs were equipped with M3 Halftracks,
which were available in limited numbers. As I said.

12 Guards Tank Corps
12-17 Tank Corps

(Note: There is some confusion about which ones were active during the
war or after the war, it is hinted, and it seems tey *formed* more TCs
and MCs than the above numbers suggest, but that these numbers are
probably reasonably accurate for 1944-45 Orbat

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com
AFAIK, the most popular truck was Studebaker (2 thirds of all Soviet
Army military trucks) and infantry was using mostly them (outside
immediate fighting area) or had been moving on the tanks (and on foot
as well).

Um.
Er.
So?
I have no idea what the relevance of the above statement might be.

Isn't rather obvious? Ah well, never mind....

Post by Phil McGregor
As far as I can see it has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to do
with the TO&E ("Table of Organisation & Equipment") of a Guards
MECHANISED Corps, which was provided with M3 Halftracks in
(relatively) large numbers for the infantry in their Mechanised
Brigades.

I'm afraid that you are somewhat mistaken about the nature of the
Soviet mechanized units and meaning of the term 'Guards'.

Since I make no comment about the nature of Mechanised Corps, Guards
or otherwise, beyoned the fact that GMCs were heavily equipped with M3
Haltracks and used as prime exploitation units in 1944-45, the above
statement shows that you haven't actually read what I actually said.

Post by a***@hotmail.com
'The Guards' was a honorific title awarded for a successful
performance which had little to do with the equipment or a military
branch (something I already tried to explain but relevance of which
you refused to recognize). While mechanized corps were, indeed,
'exploitation' units, only some of them became Guards and talking
about the 'Guards corp' as of something structurally or tactically
different from the non-Guards of the same type does not make sense.

So you say, all evidence to the contrary.

Guards units were better equipped and supplied than standard units,
that was one of the bennies of being declared a "Guards" unit.

And GMCs were equipped with M3 Halftracks for their Motor Rifle
Battalions, rather than merely trucks or the few, inferior, Soviet
made halftracks.

Check out their TO&Es.

Post by a***@hotmail.com
It would be helpful if you can provide specific numbers of the Halifax
halftracks used in the specific Soviet units (and other vechicles used
to carry infantry in these units).

AFAICT a GMC had exactly *zero* Halifax Halftracks. Since, AFAICT,
there was no such thing as a "Halifax" Halftrack. Lend Lease
Halftracks supplied to the USSR were largely M3E2s, sometimes referred
to as M5s.

The best data I can find online indicates that the total M3/M5
Infantry Halftracks allocated to a GMC's three Mechanised Battalions
was on the order of 96, presumably 32 per Company.

So, around 900 for the nine GMCs. Out of around 1800 supplied during
the course of the war. Allowing for lossed, presumably moderately
heavy ones in an exploitation unit, the 1800 supplied indicates why
only the 9 GMCs were so equipped.

Again, as far as I can tell from online sources, the Mechanised Corps
and Tank Corps had Motorised Battalions mostly in US supplied trucks
or of Desantniki (Tank Riders). US trucks were more more cross country
capable than Soviet trucks but less so than US half tracks

So, as I said, 9 GMCs were so equipped because of limitations in the
number of infantry halftracks supplied, and these were the primary
exploitation units.

Phil

[Phil McGregor]

On Wed, 10 Nov 2010 11:16:29 -0500, Phil McGregor

Post by Phil McGregor
The best data I can find online indicates that the total M3/M5
Infantry Halftracks allocated to a GMC's three Mechanised Battalions
was on the order of 96, presumably 32 per Company.

Oops. That should be 32 per *Battalion*.

Phil

[a***@hotmail.com]

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
On Fri, 05 Nov 2010 16:08:06 -0400, William Black

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Yeah, but I seem to remember reading some years ago that the absolute
number of "exploitation" units (Guards Mechanised AFAIUI) was limited

There were 10 (AFAIK) tanks units of a corps strenght with a "Guards"

No. NO. NO!!!
I mentioned Guards *MECHANISED* Corps.

I brought an issue of the _tank_ Guards armed with the Shermans prior
to William's switching to the subject of a single 'exploitation
unit' (which is almost totally irrelevant as an answer to what I was
talking about) and prior to you contributing to this non-answer with
the Halifax tracks which have even less relevance to what I was
talking about so whatever 'irrelevance' is there, it is not mine.

Since you were specifically replying to my comment per the
attributions, then what you said was irrelevant *to what *I* said*,
above "justification" notwithstanding.
Whatever the *other* guy may have done is irrelevant ... unless you
*meant* to reply to *his* post, which you singularly failed to do per
the attributions.
It is important to keep such things clear.

Post by a***@hotmail.com
However, I'll deal with the issue of a mechanized corps below.

Post by Phil McGregor
NOT Guards TANK Corps.
Guards MECHANISED Corps had infantry in Half tracks in large (or
relatively large) numbers, Guard TANK Corps were almost pure tank
units AFAIR.
Guards TANK Corps were *breakthrough* units.

ANY tank corps was a breakthrough unit.

Theory vs. practise.

Definition.

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards Tank Corps were used as the spearheads for almost all late war
operations.
Tank Corps supported them, but they were not the spearheads for the
most part, unless they were spearheading breakthroughs in secondary
areas made possible by the disruption of the German army by the major
breakthroughs caused by the aforementioned Guard Tank Corps.

What you are saying is totally irrelevant to the subject. Tank corps
was, by the Soviet definition, 'a breakthrough unit'. Your
interpretation is neither here nor there even if it has its own
merits.

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards MECHANISED Corps *exploited* said breakthroughs,

ANY mechanized corps was an exploiting unit.

Indeed. See above.

You still did not get it.

Post by Phil McGregor
According to ...
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000040.html
The USSR had, *in May 1945* ...
9 Guards Mechanized Corps

Correct

Post by Phil McGregor
4-6 Mechanized Corps

Detailed list of the mechanized units is easily available on the web
with the eliminated units being clearly marked. Result is more than
4-6.

Post by Phil McGregor
Which is the point I made.
The GMCs were equipped with M3 Halftracks,
which were available in limited numbers. As I said.
12 Guards Tank Corps
12-17 Tank Corps
(Note: There is some confusion about which ones were active during the
war or after the war, it is hinted, and it seems tey *formed* more TCs
and MCs than the above numbers suggest, but that these numbers are
probably reasonably accurate for 1944-45 Orbat

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com
AFAIK, the most popular truck was Studebaker (2 thirds of all Soviet
Army military trucks) and infantry was using mostly them (outside
immediate fighting area) or had been moving on the tanks (and on foot
as well).

Um.
Er.
So?
I have no idea what the relevance of the above statement might be.

Isn't rather obvious? Ah well, never mind....

Post by Phil McGregor
As far as I can see it has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to do
with the TO&E ("Table of Organisation & Equipment") of a Guards
MECHANISED Corps, which was provided with M3 Halftracks in
(relatively) large numbers for the infantry in their Mechanised
Brigades.

I'm afraid that you are somewhat mistaken about the nature of the
Soviet mechanized units and meaning of the term 'Guards'.

Since I make no comment about the nature of Mechanised Corps, Guards
or otherwise, beyoned the fact that GMCs were heavily equipped with M3
Haltracks and used as prime exploitation units in 1944-45, the above
statement shows that you haven't actually read what I actually said.

Post by a***@hotmail.com
'The Guards' was a honorific title awarded for a successful
performance which had little to do with the equipment or a military
branch (something I already tried to explain but relevance of which
you refused to recognize). While mechanized corps were, indeed,
'exploitation' units, only some of them became Guards and talking
about the 'Guards corp' as of something structurally or tactically
different from the non-Guards of the same type does not make sense.

So you say, all evidence to the contrary.

You did not produce any evidence so far.

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards units were better equipped and supplied than standard units,

I said so few posts ago but this does not automatically mean that all
of them had US-produced halftracks

Post by Phil McGregor
that was one of the bennies of being declared a "Guards" unit.
And GMCs were equipped with M3 Halftracks for their Motor Rifle
Battalions, rather than merely trucks or the few, inferior, Soviet
made halftracks.

Valid references, please: I'm quite open-minded on this subject but so
far you are just repeating yourself without any serious proof.

Post by Phil McGregor
Check out their TO&Es.

Post by a***@hotmail.com
It would be helpful if you can provide specific numbers of the Halifax
halftracks used in the specific Soviet units (and other vechicles used
to carry infantry in these units).

AFAICT a GMC had exactly *zero* Halifax Halftracks. Since, AFAICT,
there was no such thing as a "Halifax" Halftrack. Lend Lease
Halftracks supplied to the USSR were largely M3E2s, sometimes referred
to as M5s.
The best data I can find online

Link, please.

Post by Phil McGregor
indicates that the total M3/M5
Infantry Halftracks allocated to a GMC's three Mechanised Battalions
was on the order of 96, presumably 32 per Company.
So, around 900 for the nine GMCs.
Out of around 1800 supplied during
the course of the war. Allowing for lossed, presumably moderately
heavy ones in an exploitation unit, the 1800 supplied indicates why
only the 9 GMCs were so equipped.

Sorry, but you are clearly confused: there were 3 Motorized rifle
batallions per mechanized brigade. MC had 3 mechanized brigades, which
means 9 batallions. Plus, tank brigade had 1 motorized machine gun
batallion. Which means that, following your computations, the Soviets
could equipp only 3 GMC's providing ALL <whatever> would be
distributed to them AND providing only half of the supplied numbers
would be lost.

http://www.worldlingo.com/ma/enwiki/en/Mechanized_corps_(Soviet)#List_of_Soviet_Mechanized_Corps

.What I'm trying to understand is the following (and hopefully, you
can clarify this point): are you saying that the only way to a
mechanized unit to make into the Guards was availability of the
imported halftracks? Simple "yes/no" would suffice.

Post by Phil McGregor
Again, as far as I can tell from online sources, the Mechanised Corps
and Tank Corps had Motorised Battalions

Brigades, if you don't mind. Mechanized corps had 3 mechanized
brigades + 1 tank brigade (plus self-propelled guns) and tank corps
had 3 tank brigades and 1 mechanized brigade (plus self-propelled
guns).

Post by Phil McGregor
mostly in US supplied trucks

At least 2 third of the trucks of any type used by the Soviets
(starting from mid-42 if not earlier) were of American production so
this is more or less granted.

Post by Phil McGregor
or of Desantniki (Tank Riders). US trucks were more more cross country
capable than Soviet trucks but less so than US half tracks

What this has to do with anything is a little bit beyond me.


"In 1943 (the GMC were already in existence, AFAIK) '420 [M5] were
delivered to the Soviet Union, probably in 1943.
There, the M5, mainly supplied to the Russian southern Fronts, served
successfully as artillery prime mover (though the rubber tracks lost
some performance on soft ground), as command vehicle and in the
reconnaissance units of the Red Amy"
http://www.o5m6.de/m5.html

Nothing about them being distributed exclusively to the Mechanized
Guards or being deployed in the central fornts. As I said in the
earlier post,

"About 800 M2 and M9 halftracks were sent to the Soviet Union. "
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M2_Half_Track_Car

While you can easily find references to the Guards Tank and Mechanized
units equipped with the Shermans (for example,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Guards_Mechanized_Corps_(Soviet_Union),
I have yet to find any support to what you are saying. Just out of a
totally sincere curiuosity, what is is source of your data and ideas?

[Phil McGregor]

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards TANK Corps were *breakthrough* units.

ANY tank corps was a breakthrough unit.

Theory vs. practise.

Definition.

Theory vs. Practise.

See. I can repeat things, too.

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards Tank Corps were used as the spearheads for almost all late war
operations.
Tank Corps supported them, but they were not the spearheads for the
most part, unless they were spearheading breakthroughs in secondary
areas made possible by the disruption of the German army by the major
breakthroughs caused by the aforementioned Guard Tank Corps.

What you are saying is totally irrelevant to the subject.

No. It may be relevant to what *you* are rabbiting on about, but *I*
have not been so rabbiting.

Ergo, it is irrelevant to the issue *I* raised.

Ergo, it is irrelevant.

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
According to ...
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000040.html
The USSR had, *in May 1945* ...
9 Guards Mechanized Corps

Correct

Post by Phil McGregor
4-6 Mechanized Corps

Detailed list of the mechanized units is easily available on the web
with the eliminated units being clearly marked. Result is more than
4-6.

The detailed list on the dupuy institute website cited above shows *IN
MAY 1945* that the Red Army had ...

9 GMC
4-6 MC

... which is what *I* said.

It also notes that more were raised over the course of the war, but
that reclassification, losses, nominal units that never existed in
practical terms and etc. meant that *BY MAY 1945* there were ...

9 GMC
4-6 MC

If you want to argue about peanuts while I am referring to oranges,
fine. Just argue with yourself, as it seems obvious that it has
nothing to do with anything *I* have said.

Note: I have provided an actual citation to support my statement,
*you* have provided the vague "easily available on the web" comment
and NO citation used by people who know that the information is NOT
easily available or, worse, that the information *actually* available
is either a) not from a source as reliable as the one they are
claiming to counter or b) doesn't actually say what they claim it says
or c) both.

Please provide an actual cite from a source with the historical cred
that the Dupuy institute does.

Note that the one cite you *do* provide, doesn't actually support what
you say and, on a close reading, actually supports *me* ... see ...

www.worldlingo.com/ma/enwiki/en/Mechanized_corps_(Soviet)#List_of_Soviet_Mechanized_Corps

Which means that (c), above, is correct.

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com
It would be helpful if you can provide specific numbers of the Halifax
halftracks used in the specific Soviet units (and other vechicles used
to carry infantry in these units).

AFAICT a GMC had exactly *zero* Halifax Halftracks. Since, AFAICT,
there was no such thing as a "Halifax" Halftrack. Lend Lease
Halftracks supplied to the USSR were largely M3E2s, sometimes referred
to as M5s.
The best data I can find online

Link, please.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M3_Half-track

No mention of "Halifax" Half Tracks.

None.

Clear mention of M3E2/M5 as Lend Lease provision.

Since it seems obvious that your citations don't actually support
anything you have said that is relevant to anything I have actually
said, as opposed to what you have repeatedly misunderstood, and since
your cites patently support what I have said, I await a cite from you
that shows how many Halifax Halftracks equipped a Mechanised Corps.

With baited breath.

Phil

[a***@hotmail.com]

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards TANK Corps were *breakthrough* units.

ANY tank corps was a breakthrough unit.

Theory vs. practise.

Definition.

Theory vs. Practise.
See. I can repeat things, too.

But your repetition is pointless. If we are talking about the Soviet
military, we have to use their terminology and not one invented by
you.

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
Guards Tank Corps were used as the spearheads for almost all late war
operations.
Tank Corps supported them, but they were not the spearheads for the
most part, unless they were spearheading breakthroughs in secondary
areas made possible by the disruption of the German army by the major
breakthroughs caused by the aforementioned Guard Tank Corps.

What you are saying is totally irrelevant to the subject.

No. It may be relevant to what *you* are rabbiting on about, but *I*
have not been so rabbiting.

Unlike you, I'm not 'rabbiting' about anything. If you want to
continue conversatrion, do it in a polite way.

Post by Phil McGregor
Ergo, it is irrelevant to the issue *I* raised.
Ergo, it is irrelevant.

If you want to come with your own terminology, it is up to you.
However, this terminology is of no interest to me as long as it
differs from the official.

This lives you with 2 options: (a) operate within the official
terminology or (b) keep talking to yourself.

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
According to ...
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000040.html
The USSR had, *in May 1945* ...
9 Guards Mechanized Corps

Correct

Post by Phil McGregor
4-6 Mechanized Corps

Detailed list of the mechanized units is easily available on the web
with the eliminated units being clearly marked. Result is more than
4-6.

The detailed list on the dupuy institute website cited above shows *IN
MAY 1945* that the Red Army had ...
9 GMC
4-6 MC

Precise link, please. Not to dupuy website in general but to the place
from which you are quoting. Actually, this is not really important
because number of the GMC's kills your pet theory.

Post by Phil McGregor
... which is what *I* said.
It also notes that more were raised over the course of the war, but
that reclassification, losses, nominal units that never existed in
practical terms and etc. meant that *BY MAY 1945* there were ...
9 GMC
4-6 MC
If you want to argue about peanuts while I am referring to oranges,
fine. Just argue with yourself, as it seems obvious that it has
nothing to do with anything *I* have said.
Note: I have provided an actual citation to support my statement,
*you* have provided the vague "easily available on the web" comment

Fine:

"1st Tank Corps
2nd Tank Corps
3rd Tank Corps - see 9th Guards Tank Corps
4th Tank Corps - March 42-Feb 43 - converted to 5th Guards Tank Corps
5th Tank Corps - formed April 1942. Equipped largely with British-
built Valentine tanks, 5 TC was badly handly in the early stages of
the 1943 Smolensk operation, being mauled both from the air and from
the ground. However the deflection of German units necessitated by the
sacrifice of 5 TC meant that Spas Demensk fell on 13 August 1943.[1]
6th Tank Corps - see 11th Guards Tank Corps
7th Tank Corps
8th Tank Corps
9th Tank Corps - the 9th Tank Division can trace its history back to
12 May 1942 when the 9th Tank Corps was formed in the Moscow Military
District.[2] It took part in the Battle of Kursk, then across Ukraine
with the Central, Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian Fronts. It ended
the war in Berlin. As part of the occupation forces, it was assigned
to the 1st Guards Tank Army (also 1st Guards Mechanized Army). In
1957, it was reorganized into a Heavy Tank Division and re-designated
the 13th Heavy Tank Division. This lasted until 1965, when it was
returned back to its original 9th Tank Division designation. This it
retained until its withdrawal from the GDR in 1991 when it was
disbanded. Its divisional headquarters was at Riesa.
10th - 12th Tank Corps
13th Tank Corps - "The 13th Mechanized Corps is an oddball in the
Soviet Army. 13th Tank Corps had been so shot up that most of its tank
brigades were removed in September-October 1942, and when Mechanized
Brigades were substituted at the beginning of November, it should have
been redesignated as a Mechanized Corps with a new number, as had
happened to other tank corps in similar situations. Instead, the corps
retained the number '13' and even the Soviet sources get confused on
what to call it: a tank corps or a mechanized corps. It had the
subordinate units of a mechanized corps when it went into battle in
late November and December 1942. It fought as a mechanized corps with
57th, 51st and 2nd Guards Armies during December in the mobile battles
against German panzers south of Stalingrad, and in recognition of its
actions there on 9 January 1943 the 13th Mechanized Corps was
redesignated as the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps."[3]
14th Tank Corps
15th Tank Corps
16th Tank Corps - was part of 2nd Tank Army on formation. Became 12th
Guards Tank Corps
17th Tank Corps - became 4th Guards Tank Corps after Operation Little
Saturn.
18th Tank Corps
19th Tank Corps
20th Tank Corps - The 20th Tank Division can trace its history back to
12 December 1942 when the 20th Tank Corps was formed in the Moscow
Defense Zone. It took part in the counter-offensives in the winter of
1942/43 and the summer 1943 offensives in the southern Ukraine. After
taking part in the offensives in 1944 and early 1945, is was in Stavke
Reserves when the war ended. It was allocated to the Northern Group of
Forces by Directive No. 11096, where it remained through the Cold War.
In later 1945, it was reorganized into the 20th Tank Division. Between
1949 and 1955, it was known as the 7th Tank Division, although as a
cadre unit. IN 1955, it was restored to full strength and renamed the
20th Tank Division. It would remain in southern Poland until 1991 when
it was disbanded.
21st - 24th Tank Corps (see also http://stalingrad.ic.ru/s22tcorp.html
for 22nd Tank Corps)
25th Tank Corps - formed June 1942 in the Moscow Defence Zone
26th Tank Corps
27th Tank Corps - formed in the Moscow Defense Zone. The 27th was
never committed to combat, but instead on 8 September 1942 it was
reorganized into the 1st Mechanized Corps.
28th Tank Corps
29th - 31st Tank Corps[4]
1st Guards Tank Corps
2nd Guards Tank Corps
3rd Guards Tank Corps
4th Guards Tank Corps - now 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division
5th - 8th Guards Tank Corps
9th Guards Tank Corps - 3rd Tank Corps was formed at Tula in the
Moscow Military District. It took part in the winter counter-
offensives in 1942/1943, the Battle of Kursk, then across Ukraine and
then the summer offensive in 1944, Operation Bagration, with the
Central, Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian Fronts. On 20 November 1944
it was awarded 'Guards' status ad re-designated the 9th Guards Tank
Corps.
10th Guards Tank Corps: ex 30th Tank Corps. Now 10th Guards Uralsko-
Lvovskaya Tank Division.
11th Guards Tank Corps - The 11th Guards Tank Division can trace its
history back to 10 April 1942 when the 6th Tank Corps was formed in
the Moscow Defense Zone.[5] It took part in the Battle of Kursk, then
across Ukraine with the Central, Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian
Fronts. On 23 October 1943, it was awarded 'Guards' status and
redesignated the 11th Guards Tank Corps. It ended the war in the
Berlin area. As part of the occupation forces, it was assigned to the
1st Guards Tank Army (also 1st Guards Mechanized Army). For the
occupation period and post-war era, it was mainly uneventful until
1968 when it took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1992 it
was withdrawn from Germany and landed in Slonim the newly independent
Belarus. It would eventually be reorganized into the 11th Guards
Mechanized Brigade. Division Headquarters was at Dresden in the 1980s.
12th Guards Tank Corps - former 16th Tank Corps. 16 TC was formed on 1
June 1942 in the Moscow Defense Zone. It took part in the counter-
attacks against the Germans advancing on Stalingrad in the later
summer of 1942, the winter counter-offensives of 1942/43, the Battle
of Kursk in July (as part of the Central Front), then across Ukraine
with the Central, Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian Fronts. In the
summer of 1944, it was with the 2nd Tank Army, and took part in the
offensives, reaching the outskirts of Warsaw. On 20 November 1944, it
was awarded 'Guards' status and re-designated the 12th Guards Tank
Corps. The Corps took part in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin Operations,
ending the war in the Berlin area. As part of the occupation forces,
it was assigned to the 2nd Guards Tank Army (also 2nd Guards
Mechanized Army). In later 1945, it was reorganized into the 12th
Guards Tank Division. During the occupation period and post-war era,
its assignments remain unclear. Initially it was assigned to the 2nd
Guards Mechanized Army, but then transferred to the 4th Guards
Mechanized Army, which became the 20th Guards Combined-Arms Army in
1957. It eventually became part of the 3rd Shock Army - actually 3rd
Red Banner Army - and still with 3rd Red Banner Army, disbanded circa
1990."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tank_corps_(Soviet_Union)

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com
Link, please.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M3_Half-track
No mention of "Halifax" Half Tracks.

Well, aren't we being a little bit dishonest?

Uncut post:

"

Post by Phil McGregor
The best data I can find online

Link, please.

Post by Phil McGregor
indicates that the total M3/M5
Infantry Halftracks allocated to a GMC's three Mechanised Battalions
was on the order of 96, presumably 32 per Company.

"

Now, please show me where exactly in the site you are referencing to,
is there anything about distribution of the halftracks by the Soviet
mechanized batalions?


Not to mention that any site with a minimal credibility would show
that there were not 3 but 9 mechanized batallions (plus mechanized
machine-gun batalion) per Soviet mechanized corps.

Post by Phil McGregor
None.
Clear mention of M3E2/M5 as Lend Lease provision.

Did I say at any point that there was no import of the halftracks? On
a contrary, I brought some numbers related to this import. Judging by
the fact that you conveniently dropped my references to the numbers of
halftracks supplied by Lend Lease and their deployment and, even more
important, my comments on your bogus 'computations' (I wonder if you
intentionally lowered number of the mechanized batalions per corps
from 9 to 3 or was it an honest misreading), you have no factual
support for your claim about the GMC's equipment. Yes, the halftracks
had been imported *just as trucks, tanks, airplanes, etc.) but I did
not see any indication that they were sent exclusively to the GMC's
and that infantry of all (or any number) GMC's had been operating from
these halftracks.

I'll make it easy for you. Structure of the Soviet MC is well-
documented and easily available on the web (for example,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanized_corps_(Soviet_Union):

"Total[3]:

246 Armored Fighting Vehicles (183 T-34, 21 SU-76, 21 ISU-122, 21
ISU-152)
16,438 personnel
3 Tank Regiments and 3 Tank Battalions
9 Motorized Rifle Battalions and 1 Motorized Submachine Gun Battalion
3 Motorized Artillery Battalions
"
Find similar _regulation_ data on the GMC totals (with a precise
reference).

[Phil McGregor]

<rrelevant rabbiting on about stuff raised by other posters deleted>

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
According to ...
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000040.html
The USSR had, *in May 1945* ...
9 Guards Mechanized Corps

Correct

Post by Phil McGregor
4-6 Mechanized Corps

Detailed list of the mechanized units is easily available on the web
with the eliminated units being clearly marked. Result is more than
4-6.

The detailed list on the dupuy institute website cited above shows *IN
MAY 1945* that the Red Army had ...
9 GMC
4-6 MC

Precise link, please. Not to dupuy website in general but to the place
from which you are quoting. Actually, this is not really important
because number of the GMC's kills your pet theory.

Hmm.

YOU cited the dupuy institute ... indirectly, as it was, in fact, the
*source* for the actual web page you did cite (a fact clearly noted on
said site! More evidence you don't actually read anything!), which, as
I noted, actually did not support your claims, and, in fact, supported
mine.

More evidence that you have not read what you have used, and, indeed,
more support for the obvious fact that you haven't read (or grasped) a
single thing that I have actually said.

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor
... which is what *I* said.
It also notes that more were raised over the course of the war, but
that reclassification, losses, nominal units that never existed in
practical terms and etc. meant that *BY MAY 1945* there were ...
9 GMC
4-6 MC
If you want to argue about peanuts while I am referring to oranges,
fine. Just argue with yourself, as it seems obvious that it has
nothing to do with anything *I* have said.
Note: I have provided an actual citation to support my statement,
*you* have provided the vague "easily available on the web" comment

<Irrelevanices snipped>

<sigh>

You *still* haveb't read anything ... or still haven't grasped
anything.

The list you cite is the same list as from the Dupuy Institute
website, as it was from the last website you linked to, and you
haven't read the actual text ABOVE the list where the AUTHOR of the
list CLEARLY states that the Red Army had ...

9 GMC
4 MC

... BY MAY 1945.

It hasn't changed anywhere.

You still don't seem to grasp that the others listed ...

* were of nominal existence only
* were changed titles of pre-existing units (i.e. they didn't add to
the actual numbers of units)
* were raised after May 1945
* were destroyed and never reformed

Post by a***@hotmail.com
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tank_corps_(Soviet_Union)

Please do actually read the source for your sources, and then read ALL
of it.

Post by a***@hotmail.com

Post by Phil McGregor

Post by a***@hotmail.com
Link, please.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M3_Half-track
No mention of "Halifax" Half Tracks.

Well, aren't we being a little bit dishonest?

Post by Phil McGregor
The best data I can find online

Link, please.

So, you asked for a link to the existence of the M3/M5 in Soviet
service, which I provided, what is your problem?

We await cites that show the number of "Halifax Half Tracks" sent to
the Soviet Union (or anywhere else).

Phil

[[e-mail]]

As a followup to this, you often hear that Roosevelt "gave away"
Eastern Europe to the Soviets. That would lead one to believe that
Roosevelt and the US had the power and leverage to dictate the terms.
However, the bulk of the fighting occurred on the Eastern Front (about
80% of German casualties?) and as has been discussed and demonstrated
in this thread, while deficient in some ways the Soviet Armed Forces
were still quite formidable. So how much power did Roosevelt truly
wield in these negotiations? With that said, it's unfortunate the
Soviets retained control of Poland, since they assisted the Germans in
the Polish invasion.

[Bay Man]

Post by ***@aol.com
As a followup to this, you often hear that Roosevelt "gave away"
Eastern Europe to the Soviets. That would lead one to believe that
Roosevelt and the US had the power and leverage to dictate the terms.
However, the bulk of the fighting occurred on the Eastern Front (about
80% of German casualties?) and as has been discussed and demonstrated
in this thread, while deficient in some ways the Soviet Armed Forces
were still quite formidable. So how much power did Roosevelt truly
wield in these negotiations? With that said, it's unfortunate the
Soviets retained control of Poland, since they assisted the Germans in
the Polish invasion.

The Soviets had the upper hand. Stalin knew that. The Soviets were also
working on an A bomb and knew full well of the UK-US bomb, although they
thought the Soviets knew nothing. Towards the end of WW2 Roosevelt and
Churchill went behind each other's back's to Stalin.

The USA wanted the Soviets to attack the Japanese in Manchuria, which they
did. The US knew the day of attack and dropped an A bomb just before.

Churchill did not want the USSR having massive control or influence in
eastern Europe. The USA stated they would pull out of Europe within a year.
The UK could see the power of the Soviets who had taken lots of territory.
They had influence in others like Romania who volunteered to be in the
Communist block.

Polish units in the British Army were fighting in Italy and France fighting
for freedom while the Germans were raping Warsaw. The USSR looked on from
across the river and let it happen and the British sent bombers and supply
aircraft mainly manned by Poles to assist (my friends father amongst them).
The Soviets would not allow British planes to land on Soviet held territory
as the Poles acted unilaterally - that was their excuse.

The Poles were expecting more and stated so to Churchill. Churchill wanted
Poland to be independent. Poland was the sticking point with the USSR. The
Poles rose independently of the Soviets in Warsaw, which did not go well
with the Soviets.

The USA gave away nothing as they never had anything to begin with. The
Soviets were there in the ground with a modern, well equipped, formidable
fighting force. Western propaganda states that the USSR only won because of
a winter and being large. No so.

The USA was in no position to lock horns with the Soviets.

[Rich]

Post by Phil McGregor
YOU cited the dupuy institute ... indirectly, as it was, in fact, the
*source* for the actual web page you did cite (a fact clearly noted on
said site! More evidence you don't actually read anything!), which, as
I noted, actually did not support your claims, and, in fact, supported
mine.

Nice to see that some of that info is still being used.

Post by Phil McGregor
So, you asked for a link to the existence of the M3/M5 in Soviet
service, which I provided, what is your problem?

I'm afraid that isn't quite correct though. A total of 920 carriers
were shipped to the Soviet Union under US Lend-Lease. 402 were M2
series halftracks, 2 were M3 series, and 420 were M5 series. The
remaining 96 were full-track T16 universal carriers. In addition,
3,340 M3A1 wheeled scout cars were shipped. Oddly enough, some believe
that 1,200 M2, M3, and M9, and 3,034 M3A1 were shipped, but that is
incorrect.

Most of the T16 (and the 2,008 carriers from Canada and Britain) and
M3A1 appear to have been allocated to the motorcycle regiments at
front and army-level and to the motorcycle battalions of the tank and
mechanized corps. The halftracks OTOH were mostly requested by the
RKKA Artillery Directorate to use as prime movers (the 5,941 Zis-42
halftracks the Soviets produced were for the same purpose as were the
200 Zis-22 produced 1938-1940) and only 118 of the 824 were allocated
to other uses.

The actual difference between the "Mechanized" Brigades in the
Mechanized Corps and the "Motorized" Brigade in the Tank Corps has
caused endless confusion over the years. Essentially the Mechanized
Brigade included a Tank Regiment, whereas the Motorized Brigade was
purely infantry and supporting weapons, but in both cases the vast
majority were transported by trucks. By late 1944 when the bulk of the
M3A1 and the 118 halftracks not claimed by the artillery had arrived
it is possible that some may have found their way to the Mechanized
Brigades, but it is unlikely that many could have been so equipped.

Post by Phil McGregor
We await cites that show the number of "Halifax Half Tracks" sent to
the Soviet Union (or anywhere else).

Okay, I'll bite...just WTF is a "Halifax Half Track" supposed to be?
The answer certainly wasn't in the Wiki article he referenced.

Cheers!

[Phil McGregor]

Post by Rich

Post by Phil McGregor
YOU cited the dupuy institute ... indirectly, as it was, in fact, the
*source* for the actual web page you did cite (a fact clearly noted on
said site! More evidence you don't actually read anything!), which, as
I noted, actually did not support your claims, and, in fact, supported
mine.

Nice to see that some of that info is still being used.

Handy, too!

I did have a book or books that had some TO&E data, if incomplete, but
it's in storage somewhere as I have moved house after 50 odd years
and, while it will resurface one day, ghu knows when.

IIRC it was on the order of a footnote or throwaway line. Perhaps one
of Glantz's books ...

Post by Rich

Post by Phil McGregor
So, you asked for a link to the existence of the M3/M5 in Soviet
service, which I provided, what is your problem?

I'm afraid that isn't quite correct though.

And, indeed, you are entirely correct.

I was referring mainly to the infantry carriers, not those used as
artillery tractors or as SP artillery as I understand it, which is
what most of the rest were used for, afaiui.

Post by Rich
The actual difference between the "Mechanized" Brigades in the
Mechanized Corps and the "Motorized" Brigade in the Tank Corps has
caused endless confusion over the years ...

<much interesting info snipped>

That's what I have been able to glean from the OOBs and TO&Es of the
Nafziger collection.

I suspect that they went to the GMCs that had mainly US tanks as well,
and possibly only to one of the three Mechanised Rifle Brigades in
each, but that's merely somewhat informed speculation.

Certainly the three (?) US equipped ones would make sense.

Post by Rich

Post by Phil McGregor
We await cites that show the number of "Halifax Half Tracks" sent to
the Soviet Union (or anywhere else).

Okay, I'll bite...just WTF is a "Halifax Half Track" supposed to be?
The answer certainly wasn't in the Wiki article he referenced.

I have no idea.

And we are awaiting the creator of the term to let the rest of us
know!

Phil

[a***@hotmail.com]

Post by William Black

Post by a***@hotmail.com
OTOH, AFAIK the Soviet tanks were not very good when it came to moving
by the paved roads (one of the reasons why the Guards units often had
been equipped with the Shermans).

Only a single 'exploitation' unit was equipped with Shermans.

Total number of the Shermans supplied to the SU was over 4K. Units in
which deployed: 2nd tank army, 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, 2nd Guards
Tank Army, 6 Guards tank army. Hardly a single 'exploitation UNIT'.


http://www.172shermans.com/markings_Soviet.htm shows

[Shawn Wilson]

Post by William Black
The IS III tank was far superior (as a weapon) to anything the US had.

No, it wasn't. It was merely heavier. As a weapon the best tank in
WWII was the Sherman.

[John Anderton]

On Sun, 07 Nov 2010 14:02:10 -0500, Shawn Wilson

Post by Shawn Wilson
No, it wasn't. It was merely heavier. As a weapon the best tank in
WWII was the Sherman.

The only way I can think that the Sherman could be thought of as
better than, say, the Panther or Comet is if significant emphasis is
placed on the sheer number of Shermans available or if length of
service is deemed important.(Or all Panthers are dismissed as
"unreliable" because early models had problems)

The Sherman, like the Panzer IV and T-34, was an extremely good early
war design that got improved as the war went on but by 1945 better
designs were being fielded.

Cheers,

John

[Shawn Wilson]

Post by William Black

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

How does the US Navy bring its superior naval power to bear on the USSR?

Conquer the Far East regions, for one. All those airplanes and
Marines will come in pretty handy for that.

[John Anderton]

On Sun, 07 Nov 2010 14:08:57 -0500, Shawn Wilson

Post by Shawn Wilson
Conquer the Far East regions, for one. All those airplanes and
Marines will come in pretty handy for that.

If by "Far East regions" you mean Manchuria then I think the six US
Marine divisions might find the 90 Soviet divisions (equivalent to
~45 US divisions) located there in August 1945 something of a
challenge.
..
..
..
..
..
..
Especially in the deserts.


Cheers,

John

[Stephen Graham]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

This is a largely meaningless question. It really depends on what you
want the military forces to do. In stark terms, neither is likely strong
enough to conquer the other's home areas. But people's evaluations are
likely to be colored by nationalistic feelings.

In quantitative terms, the Soviet Union has a much larger ground force
in terms of combat units. The US has a much larger navy. The air forces
are approximately the same size in terms of number of aircraft, but are
configured for different missions.

Quality is a completely separate debate and doesn't really have an
answer. There's a thriving argument about the overall quality of the US
Army, see Rick Atkinson's Liberation Trilogy and several other works in
the past few decades. There are similar arguments for the air force and
the Navy. Meanwhile, there's not that much in English about the Soviet
armed forces. But see Glantz's _Stumbling Colossus_, _Colossus Reborn_
and the third volume if it ever comes out.

But reading this and other questions leads me to believe that you don't
really have a good grasp of the size and nature of the US military in
World War Two and would benefit from reading more books on the subject.

[e***@yahoo.com.au]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

I would say Soviet by a long shot.

Depends when you believe WW2 started:

Polish invasion of parts of Czechoslovakia.
German invasion of Poland
Soviet Invasion of Poland
British and French declarations of war on Germany.
Perl harbour Attack.

However it should be noted that Soviet Army and Airforce Strength at
the outset of Barbarossa was higher than US strength at Perl Harbour.

The Soviets had nearly 1800 T-34 tanks at the outset of Barbarossa and
1200 KV-1 in the West (another 50% in the East). The German Wehrmacht
had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the
invasion. This yields a balance of immediately-available tanks of
about 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. The best Soviet tank, the T-34, was
the most modern in the world, and the KV series the best armored.

The US struggled with providing Lee Grants after Perl Harbour.

At the Outset of the German invasion of Poland there was not such
thing as the P-40's let alone P-38 Lightinging or P-47. Nothing like
the vastly superior Me 109.

At the Outseltof Barbarossa the Soviets did have 981 MiG 3 and about
425 Yak-1 ( the latter admitedly with some parts missing)

Of course as a maritime power the USN would appear to be well ahead.

[Michele]

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Polish invasion of parts of Czechoslovakia.

That's really funny! The yielding of Cieszyn to Poland was part of the
package that delivered the Sudeten to Germany.
Now, at Munich the Czechoslovakians were certainly strong-armed, but it was
a diplomatically agreed solution, with no declarations of war by anybody,
and no bloodshed - apart, of course, in the Sudeten, mostly _before_ the
agreement, where the local Nazis did their best to stir up trouble.

Yet somehow, while you'd consider assessing world war II as started by this
non-war situation, you define it by the change of ownership at Cieszyn, and
somehow forget the change of ownership of the Sudeten.
Curious.

BTW, it's highly questionable that the Polish flag would have been unfurled
over Cieszyn, _if not_ because the German flag was being unfurled in the
Sudeten. So, if one really has to take the peculiar position that a war
started with a non-war, one might as well talk about the "German invasion of
parts of Czechoslovakia".

But if one is of the convinction that a war starts with a non-war, then what
about the German invasion of Austria. Isn't that good enough?

[e***@yahoo.com.au]

Post by Michele

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Polish invasion of parts of Czechoslovakia.

That's really funny! The yielding of Cieszyn to Poland was part of the
package that delivered the Sudeten to Germany.

A quick chronilogy of facts shows that you claim of a 'package' is
simply nonsense that needs to be corrected.

The first and MAIN thing to note is that Poland invaded the Tschen
region of Czechoslovakia was that it was BEFORE Hitler sent German
troops to occcupy the Ethnically German Sudeten Region of the
Czechoslovak State Construct.

Hitler was NEGOTIATING for this at Munich remember. He did not move
untill he had a treaty. It should be seen as an undoing of a portion
of the Treaty of Versailes. No one gave the Sudens the choice where
they wanted to be. Remember Wilson "14 point plan" which promised
"Self Determination" but turned out to be nothing but propaganda.

1 Hitler wanted to restore the 3 million Sudeten Germans between the
German border and Czech regions of Czehoslovakia (population 5 million
Czechs plus 2.5 million Slovaks who DIDN'T want to be part of it
either) to the German Reich. The Sudetens, previsously part of the
Austrian Empire and previous to that the Bavarian State didn't want to
be there despite attempting democratic resolutions to their grievences
not least of which was dismissal of 50,000 the German speakers from
the Railways (ostenseibly for linquistic reasons), the shooting of 60
UNARMED peachfull demonstraters by Czech police during political
rallies associated with local council elections, the vastly
disproportionate placing of Czech pulbic servants over the top of
ethnic Germans in Ethnic german regions, the seizure of land in the
Sudenland as part of 'land reforms' that then redistributed the land
to Czechs and the building of ethnic Czech schools and busnisses
within the Sudenland to service the new settlers. It was seen as a
policy of exclusion and assimilation.

Point is there were tensions, point is that the sudenland was made
part of Czecholoslovakia because France wanted to dismember Germany
irrespective of the wealfare of its people. Rather ungenerous since
after Frances defeat during the Franco Prussian war she was allowed to
keep her empire. Point is that the confederalist Swiss style
democracy which was prmised in the 14 points was denied to the Sudens
and they were instead gerrymandered into powelessness in the
czecholovak "Democracy"

Post by Michele
Now, at Munich the Czechoslovakians were certainly strong-armed, but it was
a diplomatically agreed solution, with no declarations of war by anybody,
and no bloodshed - apart, of course, in the Sudeten, mostly _before_ the
agreement, where the local Nazis did their best to stir up trouble.

What is not true is the claim that it was "Nazis Stirring up trouble"
the trouble was there before there were nazis and it would have been
there without them at all.

The Sudens should not have been part of Czecholovakia, nor should the
Slovaks, if they were part of it as a sort of buffer state then it
should have been a conferated state that gave the sudens self
determination (and the Slovaks) and even without this the Czech should
have respectfull of the Sudens and not used their superior numbers to
disenfranchise, assimilate and sideline economically a minority.

Note, Czech Prime minister Eduard Benns in 1932 (before Hitler came to
power threatned to expell all 3 million Sudetens if Austria and
germany formed a single state! Latter in 1945 he ethnically cleansed
the Sudetens of their 1000 year homeland killing tens of thousands to
the point that rivers were said to have discoloured.

Post by Michele
Yet somehow, while you'd consider assessing world war II as started by this
non-war situation, you define it by the change of ownership at Cieszyn, and
somehow forget the change of ownership of the Sudeten.
Curious.

It was an Polish INVASION.

You can't compare the two. The Sudetens were not in anyway czech.

Post by Michele
BTW, it's highly questionable that the Polish flag would have been unfurled
over Cieszyn, _if not_ because the German flag was being unfurled in the
Sudeten. So, if one really has to take the peculiar position that a war
started with a non-war, one might as well talk about the "German invasion of
parts of Czechoslovakia".

Poland invaded in what was a land grabbing exercise because it could
take advantage of mommentary Czech weakeness due to its preoccupation
with Czechoslovak tensions over the Sudeten issue. Yes Virgina the
Poles had nasty arrogant nationalist as well.

Germany occupied the Sudetenland because the Sudetens wanted out
having been repeatedly mistreated.

[Louis C]

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
A quick chronilogy of facts shows that you claim of a 'package' is
simply nonsense that needs to be corrected.

Not nonsense at all. Poland and Germany had a deal, the annexation of
Teschin by Poland was a separate process - Poland issued its own
ultimatum "independently" and the Czechs yielded to it
"independently", in a process technically separate from Munich - but
couldn't have taken place outside of Munich. Polish support of the
Reich also played a part at Munich, here.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The first and MAIN thing to note is that Poland invaded the Tschen
region of Czechoslovakia was that it was BEFORE Hitler sent German
troops to occcupy the Ethnically German Sudeten Region of the
Czechoslovak State Construct.

Strangely enough, the Poles didn't trust Hitler to keep his promise to
let them have the place as per their agreement. Distrustful fellow,
these Poles... I mean, not trusting the Fuehrer's word? What a stupid
notion!

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Hitler was NEGOTIATING for this at Munich remember. He did not move
untill he had a treaty.

Given that Hitler issued an ultimatum which the western powers bent
over backward to accomodate, this should be "he got a treaty before he
would move". In none of the histories I've read that mentioned Munich
(which is a fair number), do I remember the notion of Hitler actually
waiting for a treaty before he'd move.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
No one gave the Sudens the choice where they wanted to be.

That's right, and that goes for 1938, too. Hitler had promised he'd
hold a plebiscite but he somehow forgot all about it, preferring
outright annexation instead.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
1 Hitler wanted to restore the 3 million Sudeten Germans between the
German border and Czech regions of Czehoslovakia (population 5 million
Czechs plus 2.5 million Slovaks who DIDN'T want to be part of it
either) to the German Reich.

The Sudeten hadn't been part of the "German Reich", so Hitler could
hardly "restore" them, could he?

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The Sudetens, previsously part of the
Austrian Empire and previous to that the Bavarian State didn't want to
be there despite attempting democratic resolutions to their grievences

They certainly hadn't wanted to initially, by 1938 things had become
less clear until Heinlein and his goons started agitating at Hitler's
orders.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Point is there were tensions, point is that the sudenland was made
part of Czecholoslovakia because France wanted to dismember Germany
irrespective of the wealfare of its people.

Ah, those French! What will they be up to next? I mean, attempting to
dismember Germany by dealing with an area - the Sudetes - which had
never been part of Germany! No wonder they lost the war, if they
couldn't get their geography straight...

Not to mention the fact that they did not, in fact, dismember Germany.
Last time I checked, Germany was still a single country following the
Versailles Treaty, the French dismemberment had even left it the most
populated and most industrialized country in Europe. Clearly, the
French should have hired some German consultants to do that particular
job: Germany definitely proved better at dismembering other countries.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Rather ungenerous since
after Frances defeat during the Franco Prussian war she was allowed to
keep her empire.

I think you need to check what the French empire consisted of in 1871,
and you forgot some of the tings France was not allowed to keep, like
a border province and a sizeable amount of gold.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
What is not true is the claim that it was "Nazis Stirring up trouble"
the trouble was there before there were nazis and it would have been
there without them at all.

So you need to look up "to stir up" in a dictionary. Just because
there had been resentment before doesn't mean the Nazis didn't whip it
up to something more serious. Heinlein had specific instructions not
to arrive at an agreement with Czech negotiators. That's been part of
the public record since 1945, when German archives were seized.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
The Sudens should not have been part of Czecholovakia, nor should the
Slovaks, if they were part of it as a sort of buffer state then it
should have been a conferated state that gave the sudens self
determination (and the Slovaks) and even without this the Czech should
have respectfull of the Sudens and not used their superior numbers to
disenfranchise, assimilate and sideline economically a minority.

I think you're going to need some better example to make the case for
the "disenfranchise" and "sideline economically", as well as
explaining how assimilating is bad. Note that assimilation involves
some measure of cooperation from its targets. The Germans went to
great lengths to assimilate Elsass-Lothringen, both in 1871-1914 and
in 1940-45, they'd even been fairly successful at the end of the first
period (1914), and no-one seems to have considered that a war crime.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
It was an Polish INVASION.

No, Czechoslovakia "voluntarily yielded" the place. Just like it
"voluntarily yielded" the Sudetes.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
You can't compare the two. The Sudetens were not in anyway czech.

Says you. Given the reliability of your claims so far, I'm afraid your
credibility might not be all that high.


LC

[Carey]

Louis C wrote:
....

Post by Louis C
Last time I checked, Germany was still a single country following the
Versailles Treaty, the French dismemberment had even left it the most
populated and most industrialized country in Europe.

So I have generally believed. Tooze's "Wages of Destruction" however
reveals a Germany with a relatively low per capita income averaged from
1924-1935 (pg. 136-37). The modern estimate he cites gives Germany an
economy just equal to Britain's only due to its larger population.

Tooze goes into the vagaries affecting German economic performance of
the period - but provides no comparative study (understandably since it
is not the topic of his book which is already 800 pages).

How does one square "most industrialized country in Europe" with a per
capita GDP well below that of Britain, France, the Benelux countries,
etc.? Is it due to particularly poor economic performance during the
period?

More generally, how does Germany's history of industrialization compare
with the rest of Western Europe? Tooze's portrayal of an (apparently)
relatively backward Germany in WWII seems somewhat counterintuitive.

[Louis C]

Post by Carey

Post by Louis C
Last time I checked, Germany was still a single country following the
Versailles Treaty, the French dismemberment had even left it the most
populated and most industrialized country in Europe.

So I have generally believed. Tooze's "Wages of Destruction" however
reveals a Germany with a relatively low per capita income averaged from
1924-1935 (pg. 136-37). The modern estimate he cites gives Germany an
economy just equal to Britain's only due to its larger population.

Today, the economies of Britain, France and Italy are in the same
range. At the time, Britain was richer than France by a fair margin,
with France in turn having an equivalent superiority over Italy. Just
because Germany was as rich as Britain overall doesn't mean it wasn't
richer than France - so much for French dismemberment.

Further note that I wrote most industrialized, and not richest, on
purpose. Given its vulnerability to blockade, the true measure of
Germany's warmaking capability was its industry, which was second to
none in Europe at the time of the Versailles treaty.

I have read Tooze, and I don't remember my notions of who was the
richest and most industrialized being challenged on reading his book,
though there's always the possibility that I'd missed something, of
course.

Post by Carey
Tooze goes into the vagaries affecting German economic performance of
the period - but provides no comparative study (understandably since it
is not the topic of his book which is already 800 pages).

Try "The Economics of WWII" by Mark Harrison (ed) for comparative
statistical data. For more specific figures, look for the League of
Nations statistical digests, which are available for free download as
a series of pdf files. You can track the various sectors you may be
interested in, like steel, coal, vehicles and the like.

Post by Carey
How does one square "most industrialized country in Europe" with a per
capita GDP well below that of Britain, France, the Benelux countries,
etc.?

Per capita GDP isn't the same as industry. German per capita income
had been very high before 1914, and one of the reasons why it was
comparatively low in the 1930s was Hitler's rearmament policy. The
Soviet Union had a very low per capita income, and a lot of industrial
capacity by the late 1930s. Said capacity had been built by keeping
income low: less butters, more lathes and more guns.

Post by Carey
More generally, how does Germany's history of industrialization compare
with the rest of Western Europe?

That's something that would be difficult to answer within the scope of
a newsgroup post.

Very briefly, the first country to industrialize was Britain, followed
closely by France. The French then lagged behind, being busier
fighting each other through the first half of the 19th century. By
1871, France and Prussia were fairly evenly matched, but then Germany
took off and overtook everyone else industrially. Britain retained its
lead in per capita income thanks to other sources of income: financial
assets, shipping, insurance, etc.

By the 1930s, Germany was relatively backward compared to Britain - in
terms of GDP per capita, certainly not industry - but not to the rest
of Europe. It was above all backward compared to the common perception
of a "military-industrial" juggernaut which Tooze had set out to
correct.


LC

[careysub]

Post by Louis C

Post by Carey

Post by Louis C
Last time I checked, Germany was still a single country following the
Versailles Treaty, the French dismemberment had even left it the most
populated and most industrialized country in Europe.

So I have generally believed. Tooze's "Wages of Destruction" however
reveals a Germany with a relatively low per capita income averaged from
1924-1935 (pg. 136-37). The modern estimate he cites gives Germany an
economy just equal to Britain's only due to its larger population.

Today, the economies of Britain, France and Italy are in the same
range. At the time, Britain was richer than France by a fair margin,
with France in turn having an equivalent superiority over Italy. Just
because Germany was as rich as Britain overall doesn't mean it wasn't
richer than France - so much for French dismemberment.
Further note that I wrote most industrialized, and not richest, on
purpose. Given its vulnerability to blockade, the true measure of
Germany's warmaking capability was its industry, which was second to
none in Europe at the time of the Versailles treaty.
I have read Tooze, and I don't remember my notions of who was the
richest and most industrialized being challenged on reading his book,
though there's always the possibility that I'd missed something, of
course.

The disconnect I am having is that with the onset of the industrial
revolution, per capita income and degree of industrialization are
closely linked. A more industrial society will have a proportionately
larger industrial sector (virtually by definition) and a boost to its
agricultural sector also - a bigger economy for a given population
gives a higher per capita income. So it is surprising that a country
described as having an industry 'second to none' has a markedly lower
per capita income than most of north western Europe.

(Note I avoid using the term "richest" entirely due to its imprecision
- per capita income has a well defined technical meaning.)

I think this is why the "industrial steamroller of Germany" myth
existed in the first place, that Tooze aimed to explode. He did, but
on perusing the book an explanation for how this illusion existed or
why Germany did not match up to its reputation is not evident to me (I
have not read the whole thing yet, BTW).

Various possible explanations: Germany has "two economies" (to lesser
extent than China today or the USSR at the time) a large poor peasant
population and a separate industrial economy; or due to the
disruptions of WWI and those of the inter-war period, Germany's
industrial economic development fell behind, or else was still only
partially utilized at the onset of WWII; and so on.

Post by Louis C

Post by Carey
Tooze goes into the vagaries affecting German economic performance of
the period - but provides no comparative study (understandably since it
is not the topic of his book which is already 800 pages).

Try "The Economics of WWII" by Mark Harrison (ed) for comparative
statistical data. For more specific figures, look for the League of
Nations statistical digests, which are available for free download as
a series of pdf files. You can track the various sectors you may be
interested in, like steel, coal, vehicles and the like.

Thanks, this sounds useful for raw material for analysis, but this
issue must have been addressed elsewhere by people who already did the
analysis.

Part of the problem is I am asking about the comparative industrial/
economic histories, not just the state of the economies during the
war, or at some specific date prior to it.

If a general economic history of Western Europe covering from some
time in the 19th century to WWII exists then this would be exactly
what I am looking for.

Post by Louis C

Post by Carey
How does one square "most industrialized country in Europe" with a per
capita GDP well below that of Britain, France, the Benelux countries,
etc.?

Per capita GDP isn't the same as industry. German per capita income
had been very high before 1914, and one of the reasons why it was
comparatively low in the 1930s was Hitler's rearmament policy.

Per capita income (taken literally - personal income) and per capita
GDP are different things yet again. GDP definitely includes armament
production as well -it is the aggregate value of everything produced.

Post by Louis C
The
Soviet Union had a very low per capita income, and a lot of industrial
capacity by the late 1930s. Said capacity had been built by keeping
income low: less butters, more lathes and more guns.

This is the "two economies" situation - a comparatively small
industrial economy set among a poor peasant nation.

Post by Louis C

Post by Carey
More generally, how does Germany's history of industrialization compare
with the rest of Western Europe?

That's something that would be difficult to answer within the scope of
a newsgroup post.
Very briefly, the first country to industrialize was Britain, followed
closely by France. The French then lagged behind, being busier
fighting each other through the first half of the 19th century. By
1871, France and Prussia were fairly evenly matched, but then Germany
took off and overtook everyone else industrially. Britain retained its
lead in per capita income thanks to other sources of income: financial
assets, shipping, insurance, etc.

Yes this I can see.

Post by Louis C
By the 1930s, Germany was relatively backward compared to Britain - in
terms of GDP per capita, certainly not industry - but not to the rest
of Europe.

According to the chart I cited from Tooze it shows Germany's per
capita GDP being behind France, Benelux, Switzerland, Denmark, etc.
also.

[Michael Kuettner]

"careysub" schrieb :
<snip>

Post by careysub
The disconnect I am having is that with the onset of the industrial
revolution, per capita income and degree of industrialization are
closely linked.

Yes, a few get rich and the mass of workers is near starvation.
Remember "Manchester Liberalism" ?
"per capita income" is tricky ...

Post by careysub
A more industrial society will have a proportionately
larger industrial sector (virtually by definition) and a boost to its
agricultural sector also -

Except when the agricultural sector falls away or is disrupted
(Versailles).

Post by careysub
a bigger economy for a given population
gives a higher per capita income.

The population wasn't given. Add some millions of people who had
lost everything after Versailles and the ethnical cleansing afterwards.

Post by careysub
So it is surprising that a country
described as having an industry 'second to none' has a markedly lower
per capita income than most of north western Europe.

Northwestern Europe hadn't lost WWI.

Post by careysub
(Note I avoid using the term "richest" entirely due to its imprecision
- per capita income has a well defined technical meaning.)
I think this is why the "industrial steamroller of Germany" myth
existed in the first place, that Tooze aimed to explode. He did, but
on perusing the book an explanation for how this illusion existed or
why Germany did not match up to its reputation is not evident to me (I
have not read the whole thing yet, BTW).
Various possible explanations: Germany has "two economies" (to lesser
extent than China today or the USSR at the time) a large poor peasant
population and a separate industrial economy; or due to the
disruptions of WWI and those of the inter-war period, Germany's
industrial economic development fell behind, or else was still only
partially utilized at the onset of WWII; and so on.

No. Simple explanation : Germany managed to integrate the "displaced
persons" but that took time. Then came "Black Friday", which wasn't exactly
helpful. So they took another hit. But : They managed to come up again.
And then came the unholy coalition of the Zentrumsparteien with the Nazis.

<snip>

Cheers,

Michael Kuettner

[Chris]

Post by careysub
Various possible explanations: Germany has "two economies" (to lesser
extent than China today or the USSR at the time) a large poor peasant
population and a separate industrial economy; or due to the
disruptions of WWI and those of the inter-war period, Germany's
industrial economic development fell behind, or else was still only
partially utilized at the onset of WWII; and so on.

As I understand it (caveat: once again there is an something of an
expert in the conversation: Dr. Louis Capdeboscq has been thanked by
Professor Harrison for helping him- see Chapter 7 of _A World At Total
War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1947_) the
first one is generally correct. In particular, the backwardness of the
German agricultural sector: Tooze and Werner Abelshauser (author of
the chapter on the Germany Economy in Harrison's edited _The Economics
of World War Two_) both agree that the German problem was largely that
their farmers generally had land plots that were far too small.
Because of that, there was little incentive to mechanize or improve
the land in such a way that less manpower-intensive methods might be
adopted.

Tooze goes from there to explain why Germany didn't have as many women
in their industrial workforce: the majority of the farm workers during
the war (at least until forced labor became the norm) were women. If
you count agricultural and industrial workers, Germany actually
employed a larger percentage of their working age women at the start
of their war than Britain did at its peak. He also discusses plans
that the Nazi government implemented to try and fix the small-holding
problem- largely through the eviction of the locals in occupied areas
and moving German settlers in, and how that conflicted in about three
different ways with other plans the Nazis had for the resources of
occupied Europe.

Chris Manteuffel

[a***@hotmail.com]

Post by Chris

Post by careysub
Various possible explanations: Germany has "two economies" (to lesser
extent than China today or the USSR at the time) a large poor peasant
population and a separate industrial economy; or due to the
disruptions of WWI and those of the inter-war period, Germany's
industrial economic development fell behind, or else was still only
partially utilized at the onset of WWII; and so on.

As I understand it (caveat: once again there is an something of an
expert in the conversation: Dr. Louis Capdeboscq has been thanked by
Professor Harrison for helping him- see Chapter 7 of _A World At Total
War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1947_) the
first one is generally correct. In particular, the backwardness of the
German agricultural sector: Tooze and Werner Abelshauser (author of
the chapter on the Germany Economy in Harrison's edited _The Economics
of World War Two_) both agree that the German problem was largely that
their farmers generally had land plots that were far too small.
Because of that, there was little incentive to mechanize or improve
the land in such a way that less manpower-intensive methods might be
adopted.
Tooze goes from there to explain why Germany didn't have as many women
in their industrial workforce: the majority of the farm workers during
the war (at least until forced labor became the norm) were women. If
you count agricultural and industrial workers, Germany actually
employed a larger percentage of their working age women at the start
of their war than Britain did at its peak. He also discusses plans
that the Nazi government implemented to try and fix the small-holding
problem- largely through the eviction of the locals in occupied areas
and moving German settlers in, and how that conflicted in about three
different ways with other plans the Nazis had for the resources of
occupied Europe.

Women who had nothing to do with the farming had not been MOBILIZED in
the work force either as a part of a domestic policy and this policy
did not change too much during the war. I'm not sure if there was, at
any time, a dedicated attempt to mobilize women into the industry (as
opposite to the secretary type of work). Comparison with the GB is not
necessarily relevant because comparison is with the SU (if I
understood initial post correctly). In the SU the women had been
mobilized en mass into the industrial workforce while also being the
major (and sometimes the only) workers in the collective farms. Both
Germany and the SU had enough of the urban female population (Germany
probably had a higher percentage) as a potential resource of the
industrial workers but the Nazies never used this resource.

"Industrialization" and mobilization of the resources (outside those
related to the farming) was, according to Speer, quite low even in
1941 and as for the later period he acknowledged that he lost his
fight with the opposition (gaulaiters and SS) and failed to re-orient
Germany toward the truly industrial style of production (a lot of
resources had been allocated to the 'regional interests').

[Louis C]

Post by Chris
As I understand it (caveat: once again there is an something of an
expert in the conversation: Dr. Louis C has been thanked by
Professor Harrison for helping him- see Chapter 7 of _A World At Total
War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1947_)

He kindly thanked me for correcting his draft figures on the total
French manpower mobilized. There was very little effort involved on my
part, so don't assume I hold any sort of expert status just because my
name happened to find its way to a footnote.
True enough, though how much of an impact it had on the German economy
as a whole is debatable.

Post by Chris
Because of that, there was little incentive to mechanize or improve
the land in such a way that less manpower-intensive methods might be
adopted.

Note that manpower isn't always the bottleneck. The British did a very
good job of managing their wartime agriculture by juggling between
productions that gave the most calories per worker, though at times
getting the most calories per acre was more interesting. British
agricultural management was helped by the availability of food
imports. With a virtually unlimited and - especially after lend-lease
- free supply of foodstuffs & fertilizers available, the British could
optimize their own agriculture so as to save manpower and shipping.
The Germans didn't have access to the same amount and flexibility of
imports, so while there's no question that their agriculture could
have been made more modern, I'm not sure how much more modern it
realistically could have been made before running into other problems,
like the availability of fuel, lubricants, spare parts and other
paraphernalia.

Post by Chris
Tooze goes from there to explain why Germany didn't have as many women
in their industrial workforce: the majority of the farm workers during
the war (at least until forced labor became the norm) were women.

True enough, but as you noted, German women were more mobilized as a
whole than in other countries, save the Soviet Union. A worker is a
worker is a worker, does it really matter from the point of view of
the war effort that the Germans preferred to keep their women working
farms rather than being Welda the Welder to match Rosie the Riveter?

Geoffrey Sinclair posted some interesting stuff on that topic, arguing
that the Germans counted as part of their workforce people that
weren't counted as such in other countries, though.


LC

[Louis C]

Post by careysub
The disconnect I am having is that with the onset of the industrial
revolution, per capita income and degree of industrialization are
closely linked.

If that were so, then GDP per capita would be higher in China than in,
say, Switzerland or Luxembourg. Or Saudi Arabia. Or the USA for that
matter.

Industrialized economies generally boosted higher per capita incomes
than the agricultural economies they had evolved from. But it's
neither a straight line, nor a universal rule.

Post by careysub
A more industrial society will have a proportionately
larger industrial sector (virtually by definition) and a boost to its
agricultural sector also - a bigger economy for a given population
gives a higher per capita income.

Yes and no.

Britain pretty much sacrificed its agricultural sector in order to
industrialize. Many other industrial countries, including Germany,
France, and Japan were trying to get industry while protecting their
peasantry at the same time.

Post by careysub
So it is surprising that a country
described as having an industry 'second to none' has a markedly lower
per capita income than most of north western Europe.

Check the post-WWII Soviet Union for another case of such. Or today's
China.

Post by careysub
or due to the
disruptions of WWI and those of the inter-war period, Germany's
industrial economic development fell behind, or else was still only
partially utilized at the onset of WWII; and so on.

German industrial capacity was anything but underused after 1933, but
it was increasingly devoted to producing armament, with consequent
effects on per capita income.

Post by careysub
If a general economic history of Western Europe covering from some
time in the 19th century to WWII exists then this would be exactly
what I am looking for.

Something like that probably exists, though it will certainly be
general, so you won't find the sort of data you're looking for.
Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of Great Powers" might be a possible start.

Post by careysub

Post by Louis C
By the 1930s, Germany was relatively backward compared to Britain - in
terms of GDP per capita, certainly not industry - but not to the rest
of Europe.

According to the chart I cited from Tooze it shows Germany's per
capita GDP being behind France, Benelux, Switzerland, Denmark, etc.
also.

They're not actually per capita GDP, as the discussion in the pages
around that chart (I assume you mean the one on p.136) shows. The
German per capita income was dragged down by its agricultural sector,
essentially Germany was Britain with a Third World country (an
anachronism, I know) strapped to it. That dragged the German average
down, but still represented an asset for the purpose of fighting a
global war.

Also, German per capita income was arrived at by calculations based on
purchasing power parity, which per definition excludes rearmament (the
average household consumes very few tanks). German standards of living
were low compared to those in other European countries, largely
because by 1938 the country was practically running a war economy.
That doesn't make it a weak economy, just like the Cold War Soviet
Union had a stronger economy than Britain, despite having a much
inferior per capita income.


LC

[Bay Man]

Post by Louis C
Britain pretty much sacrificed its agricultural sector in order to
industrialize.

Not so. Even today only 7.5% of the UK land mass is settled. It was all
economics. It was cheaper to own land elsewhere and import food using cheap
to run steamships - the UK had the world's largest merchant fleet. The UK
has always suffered from the land being in the hands of the few - and still
does, as we have never had a revolution, as France did. Approx 0.3% of the
population own 70% of the land - mainly by parasite aristocrats.

Post by Louis C
From the 1800s cereals and timber was imported from Canada and the USA. Iron

ships were developed because they ran out of wood at home. The UK was a net
food importer pre-WW2. When war broke out, the US said it was supporting the
UKs war effort, when in fact it was not, as the trade was there for decades.
It was normal trade.

Post by Louis C
They're not actually per capita GDP, as the discussion in the pages
around that chart (I assume you mean the one on p.136) shows. The
German per capita income was dragged down by its agricultural sector,
essentially Germany was Britain with a Third World country (an
anachronism, I know) strapped to it. That dragged the German average
down, but still represented an asset for the purpose of fighting a
global war.

That is what Tooze says they did not possess. They could not sustain any war
with any major power. As Tooze highlights, Germany was wild and gambled.
Some paid off, like invading France. He puts that down to Allied
incompetence rather than anything brilliant the Germans did. Others did not
pay off, like the invasion of the USSR.

[Rich Rostrom]

For more specific figures, look for the League of Nations statistical
digests, which are available for free download as a series of pdf files.

Cool.

But where does one get them?

Link _please_, pretty please?

[Rich]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Cool.
But where does one get them?
Link _please_, pretty please?

http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/league/stat.html

Cheers!

[Louis C]

Post by Rich Rostrom

For more specific figures, look for the League of Nations statistical
digests, which are available for free download as a series of pdf files.

Cool.
But where does one get them?
Link _please_, pretty please?

Young people are lazy, nowadays.

Using the keywords "League of Nations statistical digest" (just as I'd
suggested), it took me less than 5 minutes with only a couple of
deadends before I found the right link.

http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/stat.html

Enjoy.


LC

[David H Thornley]

Post by Louis C
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/stat.html

Ooh, shiny! (And bookmarked, thanks.)

At a quick glance at some figures for industrialization in the 20s
(like electricity and steel) show German leadership, except for some
ridiculously high values from someplace in Amerique du Nord.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Carey
How does one square "most industrialized country in Europe" with a
per capita GDP well below that of Britain, France, the Benelux
countries, etc.? Is it due to particularly poor economic performance
during the period?

The hyper inflation meant that the economics in Germany were disrupted.
Farmers for example hung onto produce to feed themselves rather than
selling it. There was also a lot of barter and neither of these would
make it into GDP figures. Add to that, that a lot of the
industrialisation was in the weapons industry and that production in the
Ruhr was disrupted during the French occupation you can see that GDP is
likely to be depressed.

You can add to that the effects of repatriations, the Gold Standard and
political infighting. When the UK was forced off the Gold Standard in
IIRC 1931 it produced a currency devaluation that increased exports.
France resumed the standard at a rate that was about half the pre WW1
one again resulting in a devalued currency and incidently was also
hoarding gold.

Finally there is a difference between having industrial capacity and
using it.

Ken Young

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Louis C
They certainly hadn't wanted to initially, by 1938 things had become
less clear until Heinlein and his goons started agitating at Hitler's
orders.

H_e_nlein, not H_ei_nlein.

The Nazi stooge Konrad Henlein was no
relation to the distinguished American
science-fiction writer Robert Heinlein.

The similarity in names may have caused
Heinlein trouble in 1938, when he ran for
California state assemblyman. He was
defeated in the Democrat primary. He
wrote later that the prominence of the
scoundrel H_e_nlein in the news at
that time may have caused some voters
to vote against H_ei_nlein by mistake.

[Rich Rostrom]

The Sudetens, previously part of the Austrian Empire

True.

and previous to that the Bavarian State...

NOT true.

The Sudetenland was never part of Bavaria.

See this map which shows the divisions
of the "Holy Roman Empire" in 919 to 1125.

Loading Image...

The southwestern and northwestern boundaries
of the "Duchy of Bohemia" are almost identical
to the boundaries of today's Czech Republic.

The only exception is Egerland, a small district
at the very western end of Bohemia.

The Duchy of Bohemia later became the
Kingdom of Bohemia, passed to the House
of Hapsburg, and was incorporated in the
Austrian Empire when the Holy Roman Empire
was abolished.

To the extent that Austria and Bohemia were
considered part of "Germany", the Sudetens
were in "Germany" until 1918. But the 1918
division of the Austrian lands followed the
traditional political boundaries, which did not
reflect the ethnic divisions.

[Michele]

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au

Post by Michele

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Polish invasion of parts of Czechoslovakia.

That's really funny! The yielding of Cieszyn to Poland was part of the
package that delivered the Sudeten to Germany.

A quick chronilogy of facts shows that you claim of a 'package' is
simply nonsense that needs to be corrected.
The first and MAIN thing to note is that Poland invaded the Tschen
region of Czechoslovakia was that it was BEFORE Hitler sent German
troops to occcupy the Ethnically German Sudeten Region of the
Czechoslovak State Construct.

Your terminology gives you away. You need to be more careful if you don't
want to spill your political beans here.

1. Teschen is a German name, a Austro-Hungarian relic. The place was called
Cieszyn both by Poles and Czechoslovakians.
2. Calling Czechoslovakia a "construct", with obvious derogatory intentions,
is pitiful. It was no more a construct than Switzerland, or, for that
matter, Germany, which was much a younger construct than Switzerland. Sure,
Czechoslovakia had several linguistic minorities within it, so what? That
did not make it less feasible, in theory, than Switzerland, or for that
matter the German Reich of 1914 or of 1872.
3. Calling the Sudeten "ethnically German" conveys the impression that there
was nobody else but Germans there. Which is of course wrong, just like the
Sudeten Germans were a minority in Czechoslovakia, there was a Czech
minority in the Sudeten. Fact is that there was no way to trace a border in
Europe without leaving a minority on one side, or the other, or often both.

As to the substance, you are right as to the sequence of dates as to the
deployment of troops - which is nothing else than a little sleight of hand
on your part. Sure the Polish troops arrived earlier. What counts is when
the decisions were taken for these annexations. And the decision as to the
Sudeten came first, even if by a matter of just one day.
So as to the substance, your claim above is, unsurprisingly, wrong.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Hitler was NEGOTIATING for this at Munich remember. He did not move
untill he had a treaty.

Yeah sure. "Negotiation" that obviously included an element of threat of the
use of force. Which is exactly the same that happened between Warsaw and
Prague. The Poles sent an ultimatum; the Czechoslovakians accepted it. And
only a neo-nazi would believe that the Czechs would have given up Cieszyn if
they had not been dealt the Munich blow just hours before; likewise, the
Poles moved exactly because Munich had just taken place.

As to the claim that the Polish move about Cieszyn had nothing to do with
Munich, I suggest you to read the actual text of the document. You'll find
the predictable references to the issue with Polish and Hungarian borders.
Cieszyn would have remained Czechoslovakian, without Munich.

I'll snip the usual lament about self-determination of the peoples. That's
all fine and high-sounding, but it's a tad undermined by the fact that the
Nazis thought it applied to Germans only, while everybody else would do what
they were told to, in particular in the East, where the Germans would invade
here and there, dispossess the owners, grab Lebensraum and exploit the land
for themselves.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au

Post by Michele
Now, at Munich the Czechoslovakians were certainly strong-armed, but it was
a diplomatically agreed solution, with no declarations of war by anybody,
and no bloodshed - apart, of course, in the Sudeten, mostly _before_ the
agreement, where the local Nazis did their best to stir up trouble.

What is not true is the claim that it was "Nazis Stirring up trouble"
the trouble was there before there were nazis and it would have been
there without them at all.

Of course there would be trouble anyway; a manageable amount. The Nazis were
not interested, in the immediate, to cause trouble in Alsace-Lorraine or
South Tyrol - and trouble there was contained. The Nazis were interested in
stirring up trouble in the Sudeten and then in Danzig - and guess what,
trouble happened. I suppose it is a coincidence for you, no, actually two
coincidences, right?

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
Note, Czech Prime minister Eduard Benns in 1932 (before Hitler came to
power threatned to expell all 3 million Sudetens if Austria and
germany formed a single state! Latter in 1945 he ethnically cleansed
the Sudetens of their 1000 year homeland killing tens of thousands to
the point that rivers were said to have discoloured.

Oh, my heart bleeds for those poor Germans who discovered, in 1945, that
what they had done unto others could be done unto them too.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au

Post by Michele
Yet somehow, while you'd consider assessing world war II as started by this
non-war situation, you define it by the change of ownership at Cieszyn, and
somehow forget the change of ownership of the Sudeten.
Curious.

It was an Polish INVASION.

Well, exactly as much as the German entry in the Sudeten was an invasion. In
both cases, the government involved ordered its troops to withdraw, after
accepting harsh conditions dictated by the newcomers.
I'd normally reserve the term "invasion" to when the government in place,
you know, fights back, but if you want, we can call moving in without
opposition an invasion too. In that case, it applies in both places, the
Sudeten and Cieszyn.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au
You can't compare the two. The Sudetens were not in anyway czech.

Of course I can compare the two. I've just done it. The nationality of part
of the population (because as we know there were Czechs in the Sudeten) is
neither here nor there. But if it helps you to feel better about the
annexation of Cieszyn to Poland, I'll let you know there was a Polish
minority there, just like there was a German minority in the Sudeten.

Post by e***@yahoo.com.au

Post by Michele
BTW, it's highly questionable that the Polish flag would have been unfurled
over Cieszyn, _if not_ because the German flag was being unfurled in the
Sudeten. So, if one really has to take the peculiar position that a war
started with a non-war, one might as well talk about the "German invasion of
parts of Czechoslovakia".

Poland invaded in what was a land grabbing exercise because it could
take advantage of mommentary Czech weakeness due to its preoccupation
with Czechoslovak tensions over the Sudeten issue. Yes Virgina the
Poles had nasty arrogant nationalist as well.

The "preoccupation with Czechoslovakian tensions over the Sudeten issue"
means the fact that they had just been forced to deliver the Sudeten to
Germany, right? After all it had happened the day before. You may try to
make it sound as happening at roughly the same time by mere chance, but it
was not roughly at the same time, it was in a matter of hours, and only a
moron would buy that line.

I don't know who Virgina is, but I do know the Poles had more than their
share of nationalists, and some were nasty and arrogant. Yet they had been
claiming the Cieszyn region since 1919, and had not moved a battalion about
it, until the day that the Czechoslovakians were amputated by the Germans in
Munich. The day before. A coincidence, right?

[TeoZ]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

Depends on what needs done.

If you want a quick war between the US and its allies in Europe and the USSR
the second Berlin falls I would say USSR wins control of Europe. If you want
a long drawn out war of Rome VS Carthage type then the US would win for the
simple fact that the USSR starts as a shambled mess still relying on
imported food, explosives, rail and wheeled transport compared to the US
which is untouched at full production with a strategic airforce and navy
that can hit the USSR as needed without the enemy doing the same. the USSR
would have lost for the same reason Germany did, they could not hit the US
directly.

Russia had its military concentrated on a single large front mechanized land
war with an airforce designed for tactical fighting at low altitudes and no
real navy to speak of. The only restrictions for the armored forces of USSR
was to be able to cross rivers on makeshift bridges. After those years of
war against the Germans, USSR was pretty much the better Army. On the bad
side you have an airforce with little long range hitting power, little high
altitude experience fighting large bomber formations (that would raise hell
with production facilities and transportation). Also I think US navy
airpower could hit wha't left of the oil producing regions inside of the
USSR which would have hurt. From my understanding the US was still the king
of oil production even compared to USSR, and can import materials from all
over the world using its navy to protect trade which the USSR could not.

The US built its military up for a two front war of power projection.
Everything we needed had to get there by ship in both theaters of war. Quite
a few people were in the navy, and the airforce had to do double duty of
bombing over long distances with four engine bombers and doing tactical
fighting once the army was onshore with single engine fighters and fighter
bombers. So the navy and airforce soaked up tons of people, and resources
that could be diverted at some point back to the army as needed with
retraining.

[Michele]

"TeoZ" <***@neo.rr.com> ha scritto nel messaggio news:k8MAo.317276$***@en-nntp-09.dc1.easynews.com...


the USSR

Post by TeoZ
would have lost for the same reason Germany did, they could not hit the US
directly.

Germany lost because it could not hit the USA?
By october 1942, the USA had not yet fielded one soldier against Germany.
The Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR had barely begun to have some effects at
the speartip end of things on the Eastern front. The German submarines had
been hitting the USA directly, sinking hundreds of thousands of tons per
month just off the US coast.
And yet, by that date, Germany had lost the war against the USSR. Blau had
failed; Stalingrad was in the making; Germany had lost the initiative and
would never regain it.
The US industries, outside the reach of Germany, surely sped up the outcome.
But by that date, it was unavoidable. Germany could no longer win in the
East, and without that victory, it could only lose.


Also I think US navy

Post by TeoZ
airpower could hit wha't left of the oil producing regions inside of the
USSR which would have hurt.

Uh? You mean puny carrier-based bombers designed to sink ships take off from
the Persian Gulf and flatten Baku? You are aware that Iran is a battlefield
at this point, probably spilling over in Iraq, and that the Soviet divisions
there easily outnumber the British and US personnel there?

[TeoZ]

Post by William Black
the USSR

Post by TeoZ
would have lost for the same reason Germany did, they could not hit the
US directly.

Germany lost because it could not hit the USA?
By october 1942, the USA had not yet fielded one soldier against Germany.
The Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR had barely begun to have some effects
at the speartip end of things on the Eastern front. The German submarines
had been hitting the USA directly, sinking hundreds of thousands of tons
per month just off the US coast.
And yet, by that date, Germany had lost the war against the USSR. Blau had
failed; Stalingrad was in the making; Germany had lost the initiative and
would never regain it.
The US industries, outside the reach of Germany, surely sped up the
outcome. But by that date, it was unavoidable. Germany could no longer win
in the East, and without that victory, it could only lose.
Also I think US navy

Post by TeoZ
airpower could hit wha't left of the oil producing regions inside of the
USSR which would have hurt.

Uh? You mean puny carrier-based bombers designed to sink ships take off
from the Persian Gulf and flatten Baku? You are aware that Iran is a
battlefield at this point, probably spilling over in Iraq, and that the
Soviet divisions there easily outnumber the British and US personnel
there?

We are talking in 1945 here, and nobody said the USA could not hit first. So
if the US wanted to start a war taking out the USSR oil field is a
possibility, and that would weaken the USSR pretty well considering the US
was still supplying the USSR with strategic material at that point. US navy
airpower was not puny in 1945, neither was the army airforce.

The point I was making about Germany is that it could never get boots on the
ground in the US, same thing with USSR. If Germany was connected by land to
the UK, the UK would have been crushed, but as it was they could never be
defeated. In total war (which I assumed this was about) the USSR would
eventually be defeated by the US, if we started much later then 1945 when
the USSR had time to recover and rebuild then that's another story. Germany
loosing to the USSR has nothing to do with a direct US vs. USSR battle in
1945 (other then an army running out of troops and still relying on support
from a country it will now have to fight).

[Michele]

Post by TeoZ

Post by William Black
the USSR

Post by TeoZ
would have lost for the same reason Germany did, they could not hit the
US directly.

Germany lost because it could not hit the USA?
By october 1942, the USA had not yet fielded one soldier against Germany.
The Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR had barely begun to have some effects
at the speartip end of things on the Eastern front. The German submarines
had been hitting the USA directly, sinking hundreds of thousands of tons
per month just off the US coast.
And yet, by that date, Germany had lost the war against the USSR. Blau
had failed; Stalingrad was in the making; Germany had lost the initiative
and would never regain it.
The US industries, outside the reach of Germany, surely sped up the
outcome. But by that date, it was unavoidable. Germany could no longer
win in the East, and without that victory, it could only lose.
Also I think US navy

Post by TeoZ
airpower could hit wha't left of the oil producing regions inside of the
USSR which would have hurt.

Uh? You mean puny carrier-based bombers designed to sink ships take off
from the Persian Gulf and flatten Baku? You are aware that Iran is a
battlefield at this point, probably spilling over in Iraq, and that the
Soviet divisions there easily outnumber the British and US personnel
there?

We are talking in 1945 here, and nobody said the USA could not hit first.
So if the US wanted to start a war taking out the USSR oil field is a
possibility, and that would weaken the USSR pretty well considering the US
was still supplying the USSR with strategic material at that point. US
navy airpower was not puny in 1945, neither was the army airforce.

US navy bombers were puny. Look at 4-engined bombers for something suitable
to hit oilfields. They don't take off from carriers. I'd also check the
range, while you are at it.
Throwing in the USAAF of course changes the equation, but you mentioned
carrier-based bombers above, and that's what I objected to.

That said, I'd add that
a) Permanently shutting off one extensive oilfield - i.e., Ploesti - by air
power alone proved to be quite difficult, even when using 4-engined bombers
aplenty. here we're talking about Baku and Grozny, plus reduced output from
Majkop, plus many minor sites all across the USSR, plus, well, Ploesti
itself.
b) Given the balance of forces in Northern Iran, if the USA strike first
against the USSR, the USSR will not be stopped by niceties about the exact
status of Iraq, and the US bombers will need to add the Iraqi oilfields to
the list of targets, in a short while.

Post by TeoZ
The point I was making about Germany is that it could never get boots on
the ground in the US, same thing with USSR.

Sure. And the point I made was that having the US industries far away did
help the Allies, but it was not what defeated Germany.

[Rich]

Post by Michele
US navy bombers were puny. Look at 4-engined bombers for something suitable
to hit oilfields. They don't take off from carriers. I'd also check the
range, while you are at it.
Throwing in the USAAF of course changes the equation, but you mentioned
carrier-based bombers above, and that's what I objected to.

Hello Michele,

At the risk of being pedantic (who me? :) ) TIDALWAVE and the other
Ploesti missions were not directed at oil fields, they were directed
at oil refineries. And, for that, 4-engined bombers, at least with
that mission profile and numbers, were no more suitable. OTOH, given
that by mid 1945 the average strength of USN fast carrier task forces
included 3,346 fighters, 1,233 bombers, and 1,241 torpedo bombers that
were also excellent level and glide bombers and were backed by another
954 fighters and 581 bombers and torpedo bombers on escort carriers,
its a little unreasonable to say they were "puny" compared to the
capbility of 176 4-engine bombers. :)

Post by Michele
That said, I'd add that
a) Permanently shutting off one extensive oilfield - i.e., Ploesti - by air
power alone proved to be quite difficult, even when using 4-engined bombers
aplenty. here we're talking about Baku and Grozny, plus reduced output from
Majkop, plus many minor sites all across the USSR, plus, well, Ploesti
itself.
b) Given the balance of forces in Northern Iran, if the USA strike first
against the USSR, the USSR will not be stopped by niceties about the exact
status of Iraq, and the US bombers will need to add the Iraqi oilfields to
the list of targets, in a short while.

Indeed, oil fields simply aren't a very good target. To add to that,
the geography makes a naval carrier force attack fairly problematic
for either Ploesti of the Soviet Caucasian targets. Unless the Turks
allow the USN access to the Black Sea. :)

Post by Michele
Sure. And the point I made was that having the US industries far away did
help the Allies, but it was not what defeated Germany.

True, but it didn't hurt and the point remains that the Soviet Air
Forces were grossly overmatched. The USAAF reached its absolute peak
of aircraft strength 1 July 1944 with 79,908 first and second-line
combat, transport, trainer, and liaison aircraft. But its peak of
combat aircraft was reached 1 May 1945 when 43,248 first and second
line combat aircraft were operational including:

First Line
1,565 VHB
8,733 HB
2,987 MB
2,512 LB
15,611 FTR
1,941 REC

Now add in:

Carrier Aviation
4,300 FTR
3,055 LB

Land-based Naval Aviation (Pacific Theater Only)
436 FTR
101 LB
339 MB/HB (patrol bombers)

As best I can make out the Soviet Air Forces, including PVO, LRA,
Frontal Aviation, and Aviation on inactive Fronts and Military
Districts included about 11,000-12,000 fighters, 4,000-5,000 bombers,
4,500-5,500 close support, perhaps 500-1,000 night bombers (mostly
obsolescent types), and about 500 reconnaissance aircraft.

As best I can make out the combined USAAF/USN/USMC frontline aircraft
assets operational fighter types ***or*** bomber types about equals
the ***total*** frontline Soviet air strength. There were about 20,000
American fighters and just over 19,000 American bombers to face
perhaps 12,000 Soviet fighters and 10,500 bombers. Add in the
capability of the American command and control and early warning
systems and I think it might be a bit dicey for the Soviets?

Cheers!

[Michele]

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
US navy bombers were puny. Look at 4-engined bombers for something suitable
to hit oilfields. They don't take off from carriers. I'd also check the
range, while you are at it.
Throwing in the USAAF of course changes the equation, but you mentioned
carrier-based bombers above, and that's what I objected to.

Hello Michele,
At the risk of being pedantic (who me? :) ) TIDALWAVE and the other
Ploesti missions were not directed at oil fields, they were directed
at oil refineries. And, for that, 4-engined bombers, at least with
that mission profile and numbers, were no more suitable. OTOH, given
that by mid 1945 the average strength of USN fast carrier task forces
included 3,346 fighters, 1,233 bombers, and 1,241 torpedo bombers that
were also excellent level and glide bombers and were backed by another
954 fighters and 581 bombers and torpedo bombers on escort carriers,
its a little unreasonable to say they were "puny" compared to the
capbility of 176 4-engine bombers. :)

First, of course when we talk about hitting oilfields we are not talking
about hit the deposits underground. We are talking about damaging the
infrastructures. Sorry if I assumed that that would naturally go without
saying.

Second, we're not comparing a couple thousands of naval one-engined puny
bombers to two hundred 4-engined bombers. By the end of the war, the US (and
the British - somehow, if we hypothesize a USA-USSR war, I don't see the UK
staying out or being allowed to stay out) had 4-engined bombers in the
thousands, too.

Third, for all its sound and fury, Tidal Wave was an entirely unsuccessful
operation. Oil refineries are harder targets than they sound.

And finally, if you really want to insist in this line of reasoning, it's
time to throw a few figures around. I'll begin: a B-17 could carry 2,700 kgs
of bombs over 2,000 miles. The SB2C could carry 900 kgs over 1,200 miles.
That's nearly twice the range and three times the payload. Over the same
range, the B-17's payload would be four times.
The SB2C was fine for hunting enemy warships; its payload was puny for
inflicting damage on immense ground installations.

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
That said, I'd add that
a) Permanently shutting off one extensive oilfield - i.e., Ploesti - by air
power alone proved to be quite difficult, even when using 4-engined bombers
aplenty. here we're talking about Baku and Grozny, plus reduced output from
Majkop, plus many minor sites all across the USSR, plus, well, Ploesti
itself.
b) Given the balance of forces in Northern Iran, if the USA strike first
against the USSR, the USSR will not be stopped by niceties about the exact
status of Iraq, and the US bombers will need to add the Iraqi oilfields to
the list of targets, in a short while.

Indeed, oil fields simply aren't a very good target. To add to that,
the geography makes a naval carrier force attack fairly problematic
for either Ploesti of the Soviet Caucasian targets. Unless the Turks
allow the USN access to the Black Sea. :)

Yes. Since we're talking about figures and ranges, let me add that to reach
Baku from the Kuwaiti shores, that's something like 750 miles -one way. From
the gulf of Iskenderun, that's some 850 miles, one way and as the crow flies
(i.ew., violating Turkish neutrality).

I snip the data you posted as to total aircraft strengths. All interesting
and relevant, but it wasn't what made me object to the theory that
carrier-based attacks could significantly influence Soviet oil production.

[Rich]

Post by Michele
First, of course when we talk about hitting oilfields we are not talking
about hit the deposits underground. We are talking about damaging the
infrastructures. Sorry if I assumed that that would naturally go without
saying.

But an "oilfield" is part of an oil infrastructure, just as are "oil
refineries", and "oil storage tanks", and "oil pipelines", and "oil
tankers", but they are all different parts of that infrastructure all
more or less vulnerable to different forms of attack. You may have
assumed that the crowd here understood all that and that you were
really saying "oil refinery" when you said "oil field", but frankly
I'm not so sure that is a safe assumption on your part considering
some of the things I have seen posted lately by those who will go
unnamed... ;)

Post by Michele
Second, we're not comparing a couple thousands of naval one-engined puny
bombers to two hundred 4-engined bombers. By the end of the war, the US (and
the British - somehow, if we hypothesize a USA-USSR war, I don't see the UK
staying out or being allowed to stay out) had 4-engined bombers in the
thousands, too.

We aren't? But I just did. :) The point is that a fast carrier task
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

Post by Michele
Third, for all its sound and fury, Tidal Wave was an entirely unsuccessful
operation. Oil refineries are harder targets than they sound.

Er, yes, exactly? As were many of the other level bombing missions by
heavy bombers directed at the natural and synthetic oil refining
capabilities of Germany. Accurate targeting was part of the problem.

Post by Michele
And finally, if you really want to insist in this line of reasoning, it's
time to throw a few figures around.

I'm "insisting" on a line of reasoning? I suggest you take a breath,
read again, and not try to put words into my mouth.

Post by Michele
Yes. Since we're talking about figures and ranges, let me add that to reach
Baku from the Kuwaiti shores, that's something like 750 miles -one way. From
the gulf of Iskenderun, that's some 850 miles, one way and as the crow flies
(i.ew., violating Turkish neutrality).

Er, exactly?

Post by Michele
I snip the data you posted as to total aircraft strengths. All interesting
and relevant, but it wasn't what made me object to the theory that
carrier-based attacks could significantly influence Soviet oil production.

Oh, I understood that and those figures were actually for the OP who
was questioning the relative strengths of the Soviet and American air
forces. In any case the point I was making that "puny" is a relative
matter.

Cheers!

[Michele]

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
Second, we're not comparing a couple thousands of naval one-engined puny
bombers to two hundred 4-engined bombers. By the end of the war, the US (and
the British - somehow, if we hypothesize a USA-USSR war, I don't see the UK
staying out or being allowed to stay out) had 4-engined bombers in the
thousands, too.

We aren't? But I just did. :)

Then you made a mistake. We were talking about US capabilities in 1945. In
1943, the USA did not muster more than 2 hundred heavy bombers for Tidal
Wave, but that doesn't compare with what the USAAF could muster in 1945 for
an anti-oil operation.

The point is that a fast carrier task

Post by Rich
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load delivered
by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It will make
limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the repair squads
will deal with it in a short order.
Additionally, in order to achieve meaningful accuracy, that bomber will have
to fly low - i.e., where the Soviet fighters are best and where AA fire is a
factor.

Conversely, a heavy bomber, part of a heavy strike, will certainly not be as
accurate, but its, let's say, 3,600-kg bomb load will cause widespread
damage. Maybe 3/4 of it don't hit accurately; that still leaves the same
tonnage as the attack bomber falling onto significant targets, another
quarter not hitting anything, and the rest causing collateral minor damage
that, albeit minor, will make the life of the repair personnel more
interesting.
Additionally, all of that can be delivered from high altitude, where AA is
much less of a factor and where the Soviet fighters are at a marked
disadvantage against high-altitude escort fighters.

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
Third, for all its sound and fury, Tidal Wave was an entirely
unsuccessful
operation. Oil refineries are harder targets than they sound.

Er, yes, exactly?

Exactly, and this doesn't support your naval strike operation. If it was so
difficult for that tonnage, it will be exponentially more difficult for a
puny tonnage.

As were many of the other level bombing missions by

Post by Rich
heavy bombers directed at the natural and synthetic oil refining
capabilities of Germany. Accurate targeting was part of the problem.

Sure, and part of the targeting problem was caused by the fact that heavy
bombers were either operating at night, or in daylight but at high altitude
and, often, in bad visibility. The Allies could have sent light bombers
against those targets, light bombers flying low and slow, and they would
have hit with marvelous accuracy - if they had survived the FlAK and the
fighters. The fact that the Allies did not decide to do so should tell you a
lot about the chances of a light bomber force that makes that choice.

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
And finally, if you really want to insist in this line of reasoning, it's
time to throw a few figures around.

I'm "insisting" on a line of reasoning? I suggest you take a breath,
read again, and not try to put words into my mouth.

I acknowledge you can't be bothered to do some research for those figures.

[Michael Kuettner]

<snip>

Post by Rich
The point is that a fast carrier task

Post by Rich
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load delivered
by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It will make
limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the repair
squads will deal with it in a short order.

No, that's wrong. An oil refinery is a highly complex and highly volatile
thing. If the bomb hits, secondary explosions will do an incredible amount
of damage.
Cracking crude (or raw ?) oil to get the desired end products involves
heating - meaning that much of the stuff is in gaseous form. Dropping
a 900-kg bomb load in there will have serious consequences.
It's like throwing a hand-grenade into a distillery while it's running.

The better question would be : "Would the US be able to take out the
oil refineries ?"
Without refineries the Russians would sit on a lake of crude oil which
would be useless.

<snip>

Cheers,

Michael Kuettner

[Michele]

Post by Michael Kuettner
<snip>

Post by Rich
The point is that a fast carrier task

Post by Rich
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load
delivered by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It
will make limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the
repair squads will deal with it in a short order.

No, that's wrong. An oil refinery is a highly complex and highly volatile
thing. If the bomb hits, secondary explosions will do an incredible amount
of damage.

No. Read something about the bombing of Ploesti. Damage was done, and it was
never the end of the world. There were several refineries, with surplus
capacity, extensive wartime safety measures, plenty of manpower to man the
fire teams and repair teams, etc.

You might start with this:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/true.htm

Note that Tidal Wave, in the rosy expectations of the planners, should have
knocked out for good Ploesti. Indeed it reduced by 40% the total refinery
output - for a few weeks. At the cost of some 28% losses to the low-flying
attackers, even though the place was not as thickly protected as later.

The Allies discovered, through hard experience, that the only way to keep
refineries out of order was to bomb them again. And again. And again.

Dropping

Post by Michael Kuettner
a 900-kg bomb load in there will have serious consequences.

No. Read the article above. Besides, nobody has still shown that a naval
bomber, taking off from a carrier anywhere but the very Easternmost Black
Sea, can carry 900 kgs of bombs to Baku.

[Michael Kuettner]

Post by Michele

Post by Michael Kuettner
<snip>

Post by Rich
The point is that a fast carrier task

Post by Rich
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load
delivered by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It
will make limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the
repair squads will deal with it in a short order.

--------------------------------------------------^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Just for emphasis ...

Post by Michele

Post by Michael Kuettner
No, that's wrong. An oil refinery is a highly complex and highly volatile
thing. If the bomb hits, secondary explosions will do an incredible amount
of damage.

No. Read something about the bombing of Ploesti. Damage was done, and it
was never the end of the world. There were several refineries, with
surplus capacity, extensive wartime safety measures, plenty of manpower to
man the fire teams and repair teams, etc.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/true.htm

Thanks for making my point for me.
(a) Ploesti used only 60 percent of its capacity :
Meaning 40 percent of the refineries weren't running.
I _explicitly_ mentioned the volatile state of gaseous oil in the part
you snipped. If the plant isn't running, the damage will be small.
(b) Plosti recovered in a few weeks, as stated in the link.
That's a little different than "short order".
(c) The link also explicitly states navigation errors and following
confusion over the target.
(d) The raid was in 1943; we were talking about 1945

Now see below.

Post by Michele
Note that Tidal Wave, in the rosy expectations of the planners, should
have knocked out for good Ploesti. Indeed it reduced by 40% the total
refinery output - for a few weeks. At the cost of some 28% losses to the
low-flying attackers, even though the place was not as thickly protected
as later.
The Allies discovered, through hard experience, that the only way to keep
refineries out of order was to bomb them again. And again. And again.
Dropping

Post by Michael Kuettner
a 900-kg bomb load in there will have serious consequences.

No. Read the article above. Besides, nobody has still shown that a naval
bomber, taking off from a carrier anywhere but the very Easternmost Black
Sea, can carry 900 kgs of bombs to Baku.

My point was that hitting a refinery _while it is running_ is not trivial.
The secondary explosions etc will knock it out.
Ploesti was running at 60 percent. Meaning : A refinery not online will be
easy to fix. A refinery online is fucked. Add the numbers in your link.
42 percent of the cracking capacity was lost - although 40 percent of
the plants were not running at the time of the attack.
And it took several weeks to bring it online again, but only because 40
percent of Ploesti were idle.

I'm not arguing about the militarian aspects; that's why I stated that the
better question would be whether the USA could manage such a strike in 1945.
I don't know the answer; your link suggests the opposite.

Cheers,

Michael Kuettner

[Michele]

Post by Michael Kuettner

Post by Michele

Post by Michael Kuettner
<snip>

Post by Rich
The point is that a fast carrier task

Post by Rich
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load
delivered by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately.
It will make limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and
the repair squads will deal with it in a short order.

--------------------------------------------------^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Just for emphasis ...

Post by Michele

Post by Michael Kuettner
No, that's wrong. An oil refinery is a highly complex and highly volatile
thing. If the bomb hits, secondary explosions will do an incredible amount
of damage.

No. Read something about the bombing of Ploesti. Damage was done, and it
was never the end of the world. There were several refineries, with
surplus capacity, extensive wartime safety measures, plenty of manpower
to man the fire teams and repair teams, etc.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/true.htm

Thanks for making my point for me.
Meaning 40 percent of the refineries weren't running.
I _explicitly_ mentioned the volatile state of gaseous oil in the part
you snipped. If the plant isn't running, the damage will be small.
(b) Plosti recovered in a few weeks, as stated in the link.
That's a little different than "short order".
(c) The link also explicitly states navigation errors and following
confusion over the target.
(d) The raid was in 1943; we were talking about 1945

You should read the whole article.
Sure Tidal Wave was small and beset by mistakes; likewise the defense force
was small and unprepared. Likewise, in 1943 the Romanians weren't ready to
deploy extensive manpower into repair work - and neither did they need to do
that with round-the-clock work, since they had excess capability in the
refineries.
But working round the clock, in three turns, with extensive manpower being
thrown at the problems, was exactly the way in which the Soviet oil
industries were used to work, since 1942. And they had plenty of experienced
personnel, they had been repairing their own pre-emptive sabotages as well
as the German sabotages in Majkop. They knew the drill.

Later, in 1944, the Allies kept coming back over Ploesti, without committing
the same mistakes of Tidal Wave, in ever increasing numbers and very often;
but the defenses also got better and the result remained the same; some
damage done and the plants never shut down for good.

It took Soviet tanks on the oilfields to shut them down.

Post by Michael Kuettner
My point was that hitting a refinery _while it is running_ is not trivial.
The secondary explosions etc will knock it out.
Ploesti was running at 60 percent. Meaning : A refinery not online will be
easy to fix. A refinery online is fucked. Add the numbers in your link.
42 percent of the cracking capacity was lost - although 40 percent of
the plants were not running at the time of the attack.
And it took several weeks to bring it online again, but only because 40
percent of Ploesti were idle.

Exactly; meaning that they weren't in any hurry. Evidently this has escaped
you. In any case, the results were the same in 1944; some damage done; some
damage repaired. The output inched to the 0% figure, ever so slowly, but
never reached it before the Soviets had ground troops there.

[Michael Kuettner]

<snip>

Post by Michele
You should read the whole article.

Oh, I did. It was interestting, but beside the point I made.

Post by Michele
Sure Tidal Wave was small and beset by mistakes; likewise the defense
force was small and unprepared. Likewise, in 1943 the Romanians weren't
ready to deploy extensive manpower into repair work - and neither did they
need to do that with round-the-clock work, since they had excess
capability in the refineries.

Exactly. In the idle ones.

<snip>

Post by Michele
It took Soviet tanks on the oilfields to shut them down.

I have no quarrels with that.

Post by Michele

Post by Michael Kuettner
My point was that hitting a refinery _while it is running_ is not trivial.
The secondary explosions etc will knock it out.

See ? That was my only objection.
Whether the USA could manage a strike to take out the Russian refineries
in 1945 is a topic I feel not qualified enough to talk about.

Post by Michele

Post by Michael Kuettner
Ploesti was running at 60 percent. Meaning : A refinery not online will be
easy to fix. A refinery online is fucked. Add the numbers in your link.
42 percent of the cracking capacity was lost - although 40 percent of
the plants were not running at the time of the attack.
And it took several weeks to bring it online again, but only because 40
percent of Ploesti were idle.

Exactly; meaning that they weren't in any hurry.

No, meaning that not all plants were running. If you hit a dormant plant,
you do some damage, but since no volatile materials are in the plant,
the damage will be rather small.

Post by Michele
Evidently this has escaped you.

No. See above.

Post by Michele
In any case, the results were the same in 1944; some damage done; some
damage repaired. The output inched to the 0% figure, ever so slowly, but
never reached it before the Soviets had ground troops there.

No argument from me here.
I'm not arguing about the efficiency of airstrikes, just that I'd like to be
as far
away as possible from a running refinery which is hit by bombs. Preferably
in the next country, I guess ;-)

Cheers,

Michael Kuettner

[TeoZ]

Post by Michael Kuettner
<snip>

Post by Rich
The point is that a fast carrier task

Post by Rich
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load
delivered by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It
will make limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the
repair squads will deal with it in a short order.

No, that's wrong. An oil refinery is a highly complex and highly volatile
thing. If the bomb hits, secondary explosions will do an incredible amount
of damage.
Cracking crude (or raw ?) oil to get the desired end products involves
heating - meaning that much of the stuff is in gaseous form. Dropping
a 900-kg bomb load in there will have serious consequences.
It's like throwing a hand-grenade into a distillery while it's running.
The better question would be : "Would the US be able to take out the
oil refineries ?"
Without refineries the Russians would sit on a lake of crude oil which
would be useless.
<snip>
Cheers,
Michael Kuettner

I would think a few hundred fighters firing .50 caliber tracers would make a
hell of a mess to the piping and distillation columns while the dive/level
bombers with fragmentation and incendiary bombs would hit large targets like
storage tanks and distribution points. Air based strikes could happen over
and over again as needed.

You don't have to take out the refineries completely, just shut down
distribution and create bottlenecks that keep production low. Most
refineries are spread out quite a bit so you need to hit a decent sized
area.

As somebody stated here that the US had shipped a complete refinery to the
USSR for high octane aviation fuel production it would seem bombing that
would cause many problems with respect to spare parts needed to keep it
running not being available. This alone would degrade the USSR airforces
because of the lack of high quality fuel.

Baku is a tiny little area on the very tip of the USSR, how many rail lines
ran to it? How easy would it be to hit that long rail line to keep oil/gas
from moving? How many tankers could be sunk by an airstrike to keep oil from
moving over the water?

Full scale mechanized wars need tons of fuel, the US had the USSR beat on
production in 1945, and could hit the USSR's oil production as needed
without warning because of the location. I can't see the USSR putting up any
more flak and fighters then the Germans did over their production facilities
during the war and that didn't stop the US from bombing as it pleased. Its
not like the US bombers would have to be over USSR territory for very long
either during raids.

[Michele]

Post by TeoZ

Post by Michael Kuettner
<snip>

Post by Rich
The point is that a fast carrier task

Post by Rich
force had quite a bit of flexibility and, at least in the case of the
USN one, quite a bit of strength, so the appelation of "puny", while
perhaps applicable in the microcosm, isn't strictly true in a macro
sense. For one thing, against an "oil refinery" the ability of an
attack bomber to accurately strike targets is something of an
advantage.

It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load
delivered by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It
will make limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the
repair squads will deal with it in a short order.

No, that's wrong. An oil refinery is a highly complex and highly volatile
thing. If the bomb hits, secondary explosions will do an incredible amount
of damage.
Cracking crude (or raw ?) oil to get the desired end products involves
heating - meaning that much of the stuff is in gaseous form. Dropping
a 900-kg bomb load in there will have serious consequences.
It's like throwing a hand-grenade into a distillery while it's running.
The better question would be : "Would the US be able to take out the
oil refineries ?"
Without refineries the Russians would sit on a lake of crude oil which
would be useless.
<snip>
Cheers,
Michael Kuettner

I would think a few hundred fighters firing .50 caliber tracers

Would never reach Baku. Check where that is. Then check the naval fighters'
range.

Apart from that, no, they would not do a lot of damage. Think. Did the land
based air forces of the Allies send fighters to shoot German refineries up?
No.

Post by TeoZ
Baku is a tiny little area on the very tip of the USSR,

You don't know where it is. Check that.

[TeoZ]

Post by Michele

Post by TeoZ
I would think a few hundred fighters firing .50 caliber tracers

Would never reach Baku. Check where that is. Then check the naval
fighters' range.

It depends who holds Norther Iran (airfields to refuel) and if the fleet can
get into the black sea to begin with.

Post by Michele
Apart from that, no, they would not do a lot of damage. Think. Did the
land based air forces of the Allies send fighters to shoot German
refineries up? No.

Bombs are better for hitting oil tanks and large pipelines (only thing you
can hit at any real altitude), still distillation colums riddled with
bullits will make a mess of them if you were at low level. It was not untill
late in the war the allies had fighters with enough range to get into
Germany. Piston aircraft have longer range at altitude, so dropping to
ground level will lower their total range. Later in the war when the US had
air bases on continetal Europe fighter planes did attack ground targets of
opportunity and did pretty much slow down rail traffic and daytime truck
traffic.

Post by Michele

Post by TeoZ
Baku is a tiny little area on the very tip of the USSR,

Baku is a small spec sticking out into the Caspian Sea. If there is naval
power in the black sea you can interdict railway traffic from Baku into the
USSR, tanker traffic would be a problem in the Caspian Sea since you can't
get to them. Its not like you have to fly through half of russia to give
them warning of an attack (like you did when attacking refineries in
Germany/Europe), and there are only so many roads and railways from Baku
going into the USSR because of the mountain ranges.

Post by Michele
You don't know where it is. Check that.

[Michele]

Post by TeoZ

Post by Michele

Post by TeoZ
I would think a few hundred fighters firing .50 caliber tracers

Would never reach Baku. Check where that is. Then check the naval
fighters' range.

It depends who holds Norther Iran (airfields to refuel)

We know who's holding Northern Iran, the Red Army, and we can also make an
educated guess as to who's holding Southern Iran and maybe Iraq, given the
ratios as to land forces in the region, the Red Army.

and if the fleet can

Post by TeoZ
get into the black sea to begin with.

That means dragging the Turks into the war, to begin with, not necessarily a
wise course of action.

Post by TeoZ

Post by Michele
Apart from that, no, they would not do a lot of damage. Think. Did the
land based air forces of the Allies send fighters to shoot German
refineries up? No.

Bombs are better for hitting oil tanks and large pipelines (only thing you
can hit at any real altitude), still distillation colums riddled with
bullits will make a mess of them if you were at low level.

Which is where AA is effective and Soviet fighters stand a chance.

It was not untill

Post by TeoZ
late in the war the allies had fighters with enough range to get into
Germany. Piston aircraft have longer range at altitude, so dropping to
ground level will lower their total range. Later in the war when the US
had air bases on continetal Europe fighter planes did attack ground
targets of opportunity and did pretty much slow down rail traffic and
daytime truck traffic.

And even then they did not send fighters to shoot up refineries.

Post by TeoZ

Post by Michele

Post by TeoZ
Baku is a tiny little area on the very tip of the USSR,

Baku is a small spec sticking out into the Caspian Sea. If there is naval
power in the black sea

Big if.

you can interdict railway traffic from Baku into the

Post by TeoZ
USSR,

So you are now giving that carrier based force the task of targeting Soviet
rail communications, too? Why don't you make yourself a favor and read
something about the gigantic efforts by the land-bases Allied air forces to
achieve that result as to the German rail communications. They did break
those down - eventually, making use of bomb tonnages the USN can only dream
of.



tanker traffic would be a problem in the Caspian Sea since you can't

Post by TeoZ
get to them.

So it's not "on the very tip" of anything, right? And, in fact, the Soviets
did use the Caspian. Only, they did not necessarily need tankers. They also
used small tugboats, towing floating tanks. Each individually is a very
vulnerable target, just there are a tad too many.

Its not like you have to fly through half of russia to give

Post by TeoZ
them warning of an attack (like you did when attacking refineries in
Germany/Europe),

You know, Tidal Wave did not fly over half of Europe, and the Romanians did
not have anything even remotely like the British radar network. Yet the
warning was enough to down nearly 30% of that force, with a half-prepared
defense.


and there are only so many roads and railways from Baku

Post by TeoZ
going into the USSR because of the mountain ranges.

Fine. Let's say this naval outfit, having strong-armed the Turks and exposed
them to Soviet retaliation, also divides its strength between bombing the
refineries in Baku and the main rail line. This leaves the Caspian route
open, but let's say these naval bombers do curtail Baku's production.
Now they only have to deal with Kuibyshev's output ("the second Baku"),
Grozny, Majkop (only a small production there), minor wells in several other
parts of the Soviet Union, Ploesti, other minor wells in Soviet-occupied
Europe, and the fact that the Red Army has either already occupied Iraq or
is going to.

I'm not saying that the Western Allies can't give the Soviets some trouble
with air attacks against their oil production, if they really have to. I'm
just saying that the USN contribution here can be extremely marginal at
best, and that the real work will have to be done by the heavyweights, the
USAAF and the RAF.

[Michele]

Well,

I have mentioned a couple of sources, and they have been either ignored or
misconstrued.

The data concerning the B-17's payload/range has been challenged. Yet I have
asked, repeatedly, for some analysis as to the mission profile, payload,
range, and take-off point for the naval bombers (and fighters). No analysis
was forthcoming, save for the highly unlikely idea that a carrier group
could force the Bosporus, violating Montreux, pushing Turkey into an
unsustainable position, and with Soviet land troops a few hours of tank
drive away from the Northern shore of those straits.

Since the big advantage of light dive/glide bombers over the heavy bombers
was accuracy, I mentioned the issue of low altitude, AA, and fighter
opposition. I was told that the naval dive bombers could, after all, release
from 12,000 feet. In other words, that while the heavy bombers could
compensate their low accuracy with their high tonnage, the naval dive
bombers would have both low tonnage and low accuracy.

All of that, because I used the word "puny" as to the naval bombers'
payload, in comparison with the land-based heavy bombers' payload. Now, I
understand there are those who feel emotional about the USN airpower. So,
let me rephrase. I'll look at the maximum possible payload of both the
Helldiver and the Fortress. Now, I know they'd never use that maximum
payload against distant targets, and very likely not even against very close
ones, because they'd still be highly vulnerable to enemy fighters.
So, these maximum payload figures are theoretical figures. But let's take
those values as an indication of overall payload capability, including
underwing hardpoints.
The Helldiver's maximum payload is 1,400 kgs.
The B-17's is 7,800 kgs.
Now, both the Lancaster and the B-29 could carry a maximum payload higher
than the B-17's, while I doubt that any naval bomber could carry more than
the Helldiver. I won't check that, though, I'm tired of doing the other
guys' homeworks.

I rest my case. If you don't want to call 1/6th "puny", then don't.

[Rich]

So Michele, just what did I say to put your knickers in such a twist?
Does correcting your "oil fields" remark warrant such vituperation?

Post by Michele
Then you made a mistake. We were talking about US capabilities in 1945. In
1943, the USA did not muster more than 2 hundred heavy bombers for Tidal
Wave, but that doesn't compare with what the USAAF could muster in 1945 for
an anti-oil operation.

Curiously though, even with that US capability, the attacks on oil
refinery (O/R) targets by the USAAF in 1944 and 1945 remained fairly
small in terms of the number of aircraft employed. For example, on 31
December 1944 the attacks on the three refineries at Hamburg (Grass-
Rhen, Rhenania, and Wilhelms) involved 237 aircraft, while on the same
strike 101 aircraft hit the Misberg plant in Hanover. More aircraft
meant that more targets could be attacked, not that more could be hit
or taken out by directing more aircraft to them - they simply weren't
a very good weapon to strike point targets with in a single mass
attack. OTOH, the carriers ability to organize large-scale, accurate
strikes on point targets was quite good. For example, 527 sorties
directed against Yamato.

Post by Michele
It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load delivered
by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It will make
limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the repair squads
will deal with it in a short order.
Additionally, in order to achieve meaningful accuracy, that bomber will have
to fly low - i.e., where the Soviet fighters are best and where AA fire is a
factor.

Actually, neither were really a good trade-off, since industrial
targets of all type proved very resiliant. Nonetheless, a large
measure for that was the relative inaccuracy of the heavy bombers. It
wasn't the number of bombs, in fact it was found on most industrial
targets that large numbers of smaller bombs were relatively useless.
So four 750-lb GP delivered by a B-17 would be less effective
potentially than a single 1,000-lb GP delivered, more accurately, by
an SB2C dive-bombing or a TBM glide-bombing.

Nor, would they neccessarily be that low...dive, glide, and level
bombing approaches were all around 15,000 feet, dropping to 12,000 in
the final. Nor would they be unescorted, a nice advantage of naval
strike packages...they come with escorts.

Post by Michele
Conversely, a heavy bomber, part of a heavy strike, will certainly not be as
accurate, but its, let's say, 3,600-kg bomb load will cause widespread
damage. Maybe 3/4 of it don't hit accurately; that still leaves the same
tonnage as the attack bomber falling onto significant targets, another
quarter not hitting anything, and the rest causing collateral minor damage
that, albeit minor, will make the life of the repair personnel more
interesting.

You might want to examine
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=3334&CISOBOX=1&REC=1
before you make those assumptions. I am also curious how far yu think
that a B-17 or B-24 will get with neraly an 8,000 pound bomb load?

Post by Michele
Additionally, all of that can be delivered from high altitude, where AA is
much less of a factor and where the Soviet fighters are at a marked
disadvantage against high-altitude escort fighters.

For a 17, yes, about 21,000 feet, lower for a B-24. The Hellcat though
was also quite a good medium and low altitude fighter IIRC?

Post by Michele
Exactly, and this doesn't support your naval strike operation. If it was so
difficult for that tonnage, it will be exponentially more difficult for a
puny tonnage.

"My" naval strike operation? Really? The whole notion, as I already
said, is ***silly*** and the only point I have contradicted you on was
the "oil refinery" and "puny" bit. As a theoretical exericse against a
point target like the seven refineries at Ploesti a naval strike
package is an interesting theoretical notion, but that's about it. It
simply isn't ***practical***.

Post by Michele
Sure, and part of the targeting problem was caused by the fact that heavy
bombers were either operating at night, or in daylight but at high altitude
and, often, in bad visibility. The Allies could have sent light bombers
against those targets, light bombers flying low and slow, and they would
have hit with marvelous accuracy - if they had survived the FlAK and the
fighters. The fact that the Allies did not decide to do so should tell you a
lot about the chances of a light bomber force that makes that choice.

Er, yeah, or they could have used medium or light bombers in the role
they did use them in, which was primarily level bombing at medium
altitudes of about 15,000 to 20,000 feet. Or a Hi-Lo attack profile
possibly. Or dive or level bombing by attack bombers, which is
something that AFAIK Allied medium and light bombers for the most part
could not do? Mosquitoes are a possibility...but, again, like the
naval air strike notion it isn't practical for other reasons. What
made the heavy bomber the only practical way to do it was the
combination of range, size, and relative dispersal of the targets,
which made it neccessary to conduct repeated attacks, serially against
the targets to keep them out of action.

Post by Michele
I acknowledge you can't be bothered to do some research for those figures.

Really? So where did the odd bomb loads and ranges for the B-17 you
gave come from? I find Joe Baugher's figures of 1,300 miles with a
6,000 pound load and 1,850 miles with a 4,000 pound load more
trustworthy and coherent than those from some random websites and
Wikipedia.

BTW, if you would actually like to read something about TIDALWAVE you
might consider http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090522-039.pdf
it's a bit more detailed than the magazine article you suggested
Michael Kuettner read.

[Michele]

"Rich" <***@msn.com> ha scritto nel messaggio news:e33a5366-18a1-4196-a238-***@g4g2000prj.googlegroups.com...

Pointless personal remarks snipped.

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
Then you made a mistake. We were talking about US capabilities in 1945. In
1943, the USA did not muster more than 2 hundred heavy bombers for Tidal
Wave, but that doesn't compare with what the USAAF could muster in 1945 for
an anti-oil operation.

Curiously though, even with that US capability, the attacks on oil
refinery (O/R) targets by the USAAF in 1944 and 1945 remained fairly
small in terms of the number of aircraft employed. For example, on 31
December 1944 the attacks on the three refineries at Hamburg (Grass-
Rhen, Rhenania, and Wilhelms) involved 237 aircraft, while on the same
strike 101 aircraft hit the Misberg plant in Hanover. More aircraft
meant that more targets could be attacked, not that more could be hit
or taken out by directing more aircraft to them - they simply weren't
a very good weapon to strike point targets with in a single mass
attack. OTOH, the carriers ability to organize large-scale, accurate
strikes on point targets was quite good. For example, 527 sorties
directed against Yamato.

Yes, and? We've been talking about Baku for the sake of simplicity, but of
course there were Grozny, Kuibyshev ("the second Baku"), Majkop (with very
reduced output), countless minor wells and plants and refineries across the
USSR, Ploesti itself, plus other minor wells in Soviet-occupied Europe,
plus, if the ratio of forces on the ground are any indication, the oil sites
in Iraq.
It's not as if the vaunted ability of the naval forces to focus on one
target mean anything. The targets are more than one.
Come to think of it, there is a suitable oil target for the USN: Sakhalin.
At least that's right on the sea coast, and in the vicinity of where the
carriers already are. If the USN does get that source dealt with, that's
more than enough.
As a side note, I find it curious that you can think of a complex of oil
refineries as a "point target".

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
It's a trade-off, and a bad one at that. Sure a 900-kg bomb load delivered
by a single-engine bomber can be delivered more accurately. It will make
limited damage to a limited part of an immense target, and the repair squads
will deal with it in a short order.
Additionally, in order to achieve meaningful accuracy, that bomber will have
to fly low - i.e., where the Soviet fighters are best and where AA fire is a
factor.

Actually, neither were really a good trade-off, since industrial
targets of all type proved very resiliant. Nonetheless, a large
measure for that was the relative inaccuracy of the heavy bombers. It
wasn't the number of bombs, in fact it was found on most industrial
targets that large numbers of smaller bombs were relatively useless.
So four 750-lb GP delivered by a B-17 would be less effective
potentially than a single 1,000-lb GP delivered, more accurately, by
an SB2C dive-bombing or a TBM glide-bombing.

Please note
a) the overall effect of area bombing. The heavy bombers were inaccurate at
hitting a specific industrial target, yes. Then again, they burned the area
down. They cut the utilities, water, power, gas, sewage that allowed the
factory to work. They destroyed the ancillary plants, services, suppliers.
They damaged the roads, rails, public transportation means that both the
workers and the supplies used to reach the factory and the finished product
used to leave it. And they killed the workers, or otherwise made them not
show up at work. The Goehle-Werke factory in Dresden was not hit, yet it
suffered a manpower reduction of 50%. The Ica-Werke was hit and and it
suffered a 70% manpower shortage. The Zeiss-Ernemann, slightly damaged, 80%.
b) the fact that if big bombs are better, then by definition heavy bombers
are better. Because they can carry, by definition, more and heavier bombs.
Sure they will not deliver them as accurately, but if they deliver just one
out of a number, they're even with the naval bomber as to the one on-target
bomb, and additionally they spread out secondary damage with the rest of the
load.

Post by Rich
Nor, would they neccessarily be that low...dive, glide, and level
bombing approaches were all around 15,000 feet, dropping to 12,000 in
the final.

No. Dive bombers could release even at a low level such as 2,000 feet, or
even less. That was about the standard release altitude for the Stuka, and
it's what makes a dive bomber deadly accurate. The procedure for USN dive
bombers also was to drop down to 2,000 feet if they wanted to hit a ship.

So you're telling me that the main ingredient of accuracy, low-altitude
release, is forfeited?

Nor would they be unescorted, a nice advantage of naval

Post by Rich
strike packages...they come with escorts.

Well, what makes you think, exactly, that _daylight_ heavy bomber strikes
weren't escorted in 1945?

And now that I mentioned daylight, of course the heavy bombers could strike
a target at night. And in clouds. They wouldn't hit it accurately, but they
could always area bomb it.
While the naval force would be restricted to daylight hours in good weather.

One of the Ploesti defenses that turned out to be quite effective was very
simple: smoke generators. This, against bombers that had ground radar to
assist in targeting. I can imagine those naval bombers dropping their small
loadouts over a big cloud of smoke extending over many square kilometers.
Accuracy, yeah right.

Post by Rich

Post by Michele
Conversely, a heavy bomber, part of a heavy strike, will certainly not be as
accurate, but its, let's say, 3,600-kg bomb load will cause widespread
damage. Maybe 3/4 of it don't hit accurately; that still leaves the same
tonnage as the attack bomber falling onto significant targets, another
quarter not hitting anything, and the rest causing collateral minor damage
that, albeit minor, will make the life of the repair personnel more
interesting.

You might want to examine
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=3334&CISOBOX=1&REC=1
before you make those assumptions.

I'm quite knowledgeable about the USSBS accuracy data. I'm well aware that,
for instance, only 13% of the bombs unloaded, both in daylight and at night
by the RAF, on three representative oil plants in Germany, fell within the
plants. That doesn't take into account that all the bombs falling outside
did not necessarily fail to hit anything significant, as briefly mentioned
above with reference to area bombing.

I am also curious how far yu think

Post by Rich
that a B-17 or B-24 will get with neraly an 8,000 pound bomb load?

You know, I'm also curious about how far you think the naval bombers can fly
with one single 450-lb bomb, not to mention a 1,000-lb one. I've repeatedly
asked where do the bombers take off from and how far they have to fly, to
reach, say, Baku or Grozny or Kuybishev. I'm still waiting.

[Rich]

Post by Michele
Pointless personal remarks snipped.

Pointless personal remarks? Are you serious? Or just that purposely
antagonistic for no reason at all? How do you get "pointless personal
remarks from "So Michele, just what did I say to put your knickers in
such a twist? Does correcting your "oil fields" remark warrant such
vituperation?" I don't know why you're being so oddly
pugnacious...bordering on being deliberately rude...and I'm starting
not to care.

Post by Michele
Yes, and? We've been talking about Baku for the sake of simplicity, but of
course there were Grozny, Kuibyshev ("the second Baku"), Majkop (with very
reduced output), countless minor wells and plants and refineries across the
USSR, Ploesti itself, plus other minor wells in Soviet-occupied Europe,
plus, if the ratio of forces on the ground are any indication, the oil sites
in Iraq.

Yes, you have. I haven't. You may have decided to confuse me with
someone else you are having an argument with over those points, but it
isn't me. For the ***third time*** the notion is silly and at best a
theoretical exercise. My only argument was your characterization of
"oil fields" as the target and the USN naval strike forces as "puny".
I suggest ***again*** that you take a breath and figure out who you
actually are intending to have that argument with since it ***isn't
me***.

Post by Michele
It's not as if the vaunted ability of the naval forces to focus on one
target mean anything. The targets are more than one.

Given that I indicated that Ploesti consisted of seven refinery
targets I think you might have realized that I know that. In fact
there were twelve considered by the USAAF as profitable targets in the
immediate vicinity. BTW, "oilfields" were "not considered a profitable
target"...page 5 of the reference you apparently didn't decide to look
at.

Post by Michele
Come to think of it, there is a suitable oil target for the USN: Sakhalin.
At least that's right on the sea coast, and in the vicinity of where the
carriers already are. If the USN does get that source dealt with, that's
more than enough.

True enough.

Post by Michele
As a side note, I find it curious that you can think of a complex of oil
refineries as a "point target".

Because they are? The individual refinery complexes, the twelve in and
near Ploesti and the other eight in Romania, are fairly small, well
defined, industrial targets. "Point targets" for want of a better
term. For example, the bolier rooms and cracking plant at Columbia
Vega "presented a very compact target" (page 8 of the reference you
couldn't be bothered to look at).

Post by Michele
Please note

Sure, happy to.

Post by Michele
Sure they will not deliver them as accurately, but if they deliver just one
out of a number, they're even with the naval bomber as to the one on-target
bomb, and additionally they spread out secondary damage with the rest of the
load.

So then if the average heavy bomber strike on a refinery is 200
aircraft and each carries four 750-lb GP and has a 13% accuracy then
104 bombs may have some effect. Or if 200 naval strike aircraft each
drop one 1,000-lb GP and have a 50% accuracy? The cummulative
attritional effect of repetitive raids was neccessary because of the
inherent inaccuracy of the level bomber...but it would have been
interesting to see what effect a more accurate attack capability might
have had. But it all remains a theoretical exercise revolving around a
***silly*** scenario.

Post by Michele
No. Dive bombers could release even at a low level such as 2,000 feet, or
even less. That was about the standard release altitude for the Stuka, and
it's what makes a dive bomber deadly accurate. The procedure for USN dive
bombers also was to drop down to 2,000 feet if they wanted to hit a ship.

You do realize that to ***dive*** to 2,000 feet the bombers ***have***
to approach at a higher altitude?

Post by Michele
So you're telling me that the main ingredient of accuracy, low-altitude
release, is forfeited?

No, what gave you that idea?

Post by Michele
Well, what makes you think, exactly, that _daylight_ heavy bomber strikes
weren't escorted in 1945?

Are you going to just continuously revert to a strawman? Where did I
ever say that the heavy bomber strike were unescorted? ***You***
raised the issue of unescorted bombers at low-levels being attacked by
Soviet aircraft. I responded. Where is your problem with that?

Post by Michele
And now that I mentioned daylight, of course the heavy bombers could strike
a target at night. And in clouds. They wouldn't hit it accurately, but they
could always area bomb it.

Sure.

Post by Michele
While the naval force would be restricted to daylight hours in good weather.

Actually, by the end of the war the TBMs were developing an airborne
radar capability and night operations were becoming more frequent, but
yes that is quite true, blind bombing wouldn't be a capability then.

Post by Michele
Accuracy, yeah right.

Yeah...and had the same effect on the heavy bombers in practice.

Post by Michele
I'm quite knowledgeable about the USSBS accuracy data. I'm well aware that,

Actually that was the Eight Air Force assessment of their own accuracy
in 1943...I sent the 1944 reference, but it hasn't posted yet. So glad
you can't be bothered to even look at it either.

Post by Michele
You know, I'm also curious about how far you think the naval bombers can fly
with one single 450-lb bomb, not to mention a 1,000-lb one. I've repeatedly
asked where do the bombers take off from and how far they have to fly, to
reach, say, Baku or Grozny or Kuybishev. I'm still waiting.

Why pray tell should I when I already have told you ***twice*** that I
don't have a dog in that fight? But by all means if it makes you happy
just keep on erecting and knocking down those strawmen. Whatever
floats your boat and all that. But it is a good way to dodge the
simple question posed to you.

BTW, 450-lb bomb? How? It ain't in the inventory AFAIK?

[Rich]

You might want to examinehttp://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CIS...
before you make those assumptions.

Sorry, I gave the earlier edition.
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=3339&filename=3346.pdf
is more applicable.

[mike]

Post by Rich
Really? So where did the odd bomb loads and ranges for the B-17 you
gave come from? I find Joe Baugher's figures of 1,300 miles with a
6,000 pound load and 1,850 miles with a 4,000 pound load more
trustworthy and coherent than those from some random websites and
Wikipedia.

With any aircraft, such values can be more variable than you
might expect.

By the book, Max Take off of a B-17G was around 62,000
pounds, but MTO pilots sometimes went over 70,000
if they had long runways.

With Tokyo tanks, 2780 gallons, about 9 tons if filled.
Fuel burn was around 205 gph at cruise at max load @25k
Thats around 1900 miles.

That leaves 8000 pounds for crew, guns, and ammo carried, plus
bombs, 16,000 if you want to push overload.

So expecting fighters, more ammo would be hauled along, cutting
into the bombload.

Late in the War, when the Luftwaffe wasn't the threat, Waist
gunners were left behind, with the Radio Operator to man if
needed, and cheek and radio guns not installed, allowing
more bombload.

4000 could be reasonable average bombload without
overloading the B-17 at all at long range, but more could
have been carried, at cost to the defense.

To complicate things, flying lower saves on gas, and no
O2 to be carried. Max range would be at 2450 miles
with that 8-16,000 pounds for payload.

**
mike
**

[Rich Rostrom]

a B-17 could carry 2,700 kgs of bombs over 2,000 miles.

???

ISTM this overstates the B-17's capacity.

Its range with that bomb load was more like
1,300 miles. per my references.

[David H Thornley]

Post by Rich Rostrom

a B-17 could carry 2,700 kgs of bombs over 2,000 miles.

Its range with that bomb load was more like
1,300 miles. per my references.

Which is about how far an SB2C could carry 900 kg.

This means that a B-17 could carry about three times
the bombload, but, with all due respect for the Norden
bombsight, not delivered as accurately.

The difficulty, of course, is getting carrier aircraft
to important points in the largely land-locked USSR.
The USN could hit any point close enough to the open
sea pretty hard, but there's not that much handy.

Of course, the carrier aircraft could have been staged
to European land airfields, had that been necessary.

[Michele]

Post by David H Thornley
Of course, the carrier aircraft could have been staged
to European land airfields, had that been necessary.

Necessary for them to reach Baku? Deploying them in any non-Soviet-occupied
part of Europe places them _farther_ from Baku than aboard their carriers.
Things don't change if they want to bomb Ploesti, I think; of course they
might gain a few kms, in comparison with a carrier in the Egean, if they
deploy in Northern Greece, but considered the Red Army units in the Balkans
I wouldn't do that.

While I'm at it, I checked the range of the Corsair and the Hellcat. From
Iraklio (Crete), the Helldiver can - barely - reach Ploesti, but these two
fighters can't escort it all the way. It seems that basing on land only
makes the chances dimmer.

[Mark Sieving]

Post by Michele
While I'm at it, I checked the range of the Corsair and the Hellcat. From
Iraklio (Crete), the Helldiver can - barely - reach Ploesti, but these two
fighters can't escort it all the way. It seems that basing on land only
makes the chances dimmer.

The datasheet at http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/sb2c-5.pdf
gives the SB2C-5 Helldiver a 345 nautical mile combat radius with a
1,000 lb bomb and 100 gallons external fuel. That's around the range
that the 5th Fleet attacked from in the Philippine Sea, where a good
portion of the attacking aircraft had to ditch from lack of fuel. So
a Helldiver would have to be in the northern Aegean to reach Ploesti.

Post by Michele
From Crete, it could only reach Ploesti if it simply flew directly

there, turned around and flew back, with no bomb load or combat.
There's no way that carrier based aircraft could reach Baku or
anywhere else on the Caspian.

[Michele]

Post by Rich Rostrom

a B-17 could carry 2,700 kgs of bombs over 2,000 miles.

???
ISTM this overstates the B-17's capacity.
Its range with that bomb load was more like
1,300 miles. per my references.

http://www.warbirdalley.com/b17.htm
http://www.aviation-history.com/boeing/b17.html
http://b17us.com/
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-17

I also have printed sources stating more or less the same in kms/kgs or lbs.
Now, of course the B-17 often carried just 1,800 kgs of bombs, but then
again I considered the very maximum bombload of the SB2C, which would
normally carry just 450 kgs. It's still in the 4:1 proportion range.

[SolomonW]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

There is no parity because the war would not be conventual. The Soviets
could do little to the US, although it might be able for a time to
devastate Western Europe, which was already devastated and the US by 1946
would have plenty of nuclear bombs. They would use them too.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR?

The only rational answer is: "It depends where they are." Relative
military strength depends (in part) on how forces are deployed with
respect to current operations.

E.g. in 1939:
1. Allied air forces (RAF and Armee de l'Air) outnumbered the Luftwaffe.
2. Allied armies (mainly French) outnumbered the Wehrmacht.
3. Allied navies vastly outnumbered the Kriegsmarine.
But in practice Germany won the Battle of France in 1940 and KM
submarines caused catastrophic losses at sea 1939-43. This was
because German forces were deployed more effectively for their
offensive mission: they had local superiority in the places that
mattered. The result was not simply dictated by total "strength."

[Phil McGregor]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR? I
suppose the US would have an advantage primarily because of the atomic
bomb. Otherwise, in terms of conventional forces, other than perhaps
Naval power, where the US seems to have a significant advantage, there
seems to be parity in many respects between the two forces.

The real problem is not the strength of the armies in terms of raw
numbers ... but, as the saying goes, "Amateurs studytactics,
Professionals study logistics"

Who had the best logistics?

Or, perhaps, who had the most *robust* logistics.

The western allies were certainly in the running for "best" ... and
the Russians were certainly in the running for "most vulnerable:.

Just a couple of things.

The Soviets relied, despite their postwar denials, to a huge extent on
US and Allied Lend Lease supplies both directly and indirectly, and
these had been progressively cut from some time in late 1944, so they
were behind the 8-ball there ...

The Soviet forces advances into non-Soviet Europe was supplied over
three patched together and badly damaged rail lines ... only three ...
with all sorts of potential bottlenecks that could easily be exploited
by the Allied air forces.

(NB: Said Allied air forces closed down all significant rail movement
within a couple of hiundred miles of Normandy for D-Day, and kept it
shut down. By 1945 no German train was able to travel, on average,
more than 20 klicks without running into an obstacle created by the
allied Transport campaign that prevented further progress ... and that
only at night)

The Soviets may have, theoretically, had a bigger army and, equally
theoretically, better tanks, but if they cannot feed their soldiers to
at least a minimal degree and if they cannot fuel the bulk of their
motorised and mechanised forces, then it is an immobile army and one
the allies will be able to handle much more easily than it might at
first appear on the face of it.

(NB: "Much more easily" is a very definitely *relative* term).

In reverse, the Russians have no ability to damage allied logistics in
(probably) any significant way, and certainly not on the level of
devastation the allies could infict on the Russian logistics net/

So, ultimately, the Russians probably could not take, and certainly
could not hold, Western Europe ... Eastern Europe would be a
battleground where the Allies would have a considerable edge ... and,
short of the use of A Bombs against targets in Mother Russia, it would
be difficult for the allies to invade successfully short of a collapse
of Russian Morale and/or outbreak of a civil war or anti-communist
uprising ...

Some other logistic related things to consider ... the Brits were
having manpower problems from late 1944, and were having to
cannibalise existing non-divisional units to keep many of their
divisions up to strength. The US was having similar manpower problems,
but this was because of arguably suboptimal training and replacement
policies rather than lack of manpower.

The Russians, however, were barrel scraping ... Stalin's profligate
waste of warm bodies was coming home to roost. By 1944 they were
conscripting 17 year olds (1941-late 44, 18 year olds only) and in
early 1945, due to the massive losses taken in the final battles for
Germany and Berlin, they were conscripting 16 year olds.

Since the Russian "way of war" was to expend warm bodies more than
materiel (less and and less over the course of the war, sure, but
still profligate waste by western standards even at the end) and the
western one was the reverse, this is interesting from a logistics POV
as the Allies have the industrial capacity to do that in 1945 and
onwards and the Russians don't have either the industrial capacity nor
do they have the manpower.

Just some considerations to think about.

Phil McGregor

[Shawn Wilson]

Post by ***@aol.com
Who was stronger militarily at the close of WWII -- the US or USSR?

No, question- US. And that is withOUT counting the Bomb.