Japanese reaction to the firebombing of Hamburg

[SolomonW]

The firebombing of Hamburg was not the fire such raid but it was the
biggest so far. It killed 42,600 people and caused a million German
refugees.

We have reports about how shocked German officials were over it including
Field Marshal Keitel and Hitler, who reportably stated that further raids
of similar weight would force Germany out of the war.

Do we have any comments of what the Japanese thought of this raid and what
likely effects it would have on them?

[John Szalay]

Post by SolomonW
The firebombing of Hamburg was not the fire such raid but it was the
biggest so far. It killed 42,600 people and caused a million German
refugees.
We have reports about how shocked German officials were over it
including Field Marshal Keitel and Hitler, who reportably stated that
further raids of similar weight would force Germany out of the war.
Do we have any comments of what the Japanese thought of this raid and
what likely effects it would have on them?

Doubt if many Japanese even knew about it..

However, according to the USSBS survey report 14
on the Morale of the Japanese,
Interviews after the war, 63% of those interviewed
considered the high explosives bombs were worse then the
incendiary bombs at 15%.

USSBS report 14 Morale-Division
The Effects of strategic bombing on Japanese morale,

[WJHopwood]

On Saturday, May 10, 2014 11:19:53 AM UTC-4,

Post by SolomonW
The firebombing of Hamburg was not the fire
such raid but it was the biggest so far. It killed
42,600 people and caused a million German
refugees....Do we have any comments of what
the Japanese thought of this raid and what likely
effects it would have on them?

As far as I know, there were no comments made by
the Japanese as a direct result of the Hamburg
bombing, but that should be no surprise. The heavy
civilian casualties resulting from such raids was
well-known to the Japanese inasmuch as Japan itself
had been bombing Chinese cities from the air since
the early 1930s.

Japan was well aware of its own vulnerabilities when it
came to air bombing attacks. Indeed, in 1939, four
years prior the Hamburg firestorm, Admiral Yamamoto
himself is quoted as having made this prescient remark: :
"Japanese cities, being made of wood and paper,
would burn very easily. The (Japanese) Army talks big
but if war came and there were large scale air raids,
there's no telling what would happen." [Quote from the
book "Eagle Against the Sun," R. Spector (1985) Vintage
Books, p.503]

WJH

[SolomonW]

As far as I know, there were no comments made by the Japanese as a direct result of the Hamburg
bombing,

As far as I know this is true, but it is something I find very strange.
Japanese observers were very active in Germany at that time.

The Wikipedia states
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiroshi_%C5%8Cshima#Intercepted_dispatches

Hiroshi Ōshima had such a close relationship with Hitler and Ribbentrop
comparable to that of Winston Churchill with the American war leadership.

but that should be no surprise. The heavy
civilian casualties resulting from such raids was
well-known to the Japanese inasmuch as Japan itself
had been bombing Chinese cities from the air since
the early 1930s.

These Japanese attacks were generally much smaller than Hamburg; the
biggest one by far was the Bombing of Chongqing of which one raid killed
about 5,000 people.

[Alan Meyer]

Post by SolomonW

As far as I know, there were no comments made by the Japanese as a direct result of the Hamburg
bombing,

As far as I know this is true, but it is something I find very strange.
Japanese observers were very active in Germany at that time.

The Japanese system of information dissemination was pretty bad.

Information flowing "up" from observers on the ground was often
embellished both by the observers themselves and by (ir)responsible
intermediaries who wanted to paint a rosy picture to their superiors.
This resulted in some disastrous command decisions. For example attacks
directed towards Henderson field on Guadalcanal were reported as highly
successful with almost all Americans in the path being wiped out. Then
more Japanese units were sent in to finish the job and take the field
only to find that the "wiped out" Americans were still there and
proceeding to wipe out the new Japanese attackers.

I think this irresponsible and broken information system was in response
to a culture of victory that demanded that every man be totally
determined, enthusiastic, and deeply believing in the inevitability of
victory. To express doubts that Japan was winning the war was
reprehensible "defeatism" with negative repercussions against the defeatist.

At the other end, information flowing "down" was heavily censored.
Ordinary soldiers and civilians were told nothing of the defeats. I
seem to recall reading, though I might be misremembering, that the
battle of Midway was described as a Japanese victory to the Japanese public.

Alan

[WJHopwood]

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 12:47:25 PM UTC-4, Alan

On Sun, 11 May 2014 01:20:50 -0400, WJHopwood

As far as I know, there were no comments made by the
Japanese as a direct result of the Hamburg
bombing,

...Japanese...information dissemination was pretty bad.
Information flowing "up" ...was often embellished...I think this...
was in response to a culture of victory....To express doubts
that Japan was winning..was reprehensible "defeatism" .....

That's right. In fact, in his classic book "Hawaii Under the Rising
Sun," (1984) Prof. John J. Stephan (U of Hawaii) who has a PHd
in Japanese history and is fluent in Japanese, wrote an entire
chapter on much the same theme. Titled "Victory Disease,"
Stephan notes in the chapter that in Japan after Pearl Harbor
there was:
"...An upsurge of confidece in the 'invincible' (Japanese)
Army and Navy...spawned extravagent expectations of future
conquests...'Victory disease' infected civilians, and military
personnel alike but its most virulent symptoms showed up
among politicians, journalists, writers, and academics....

I seem to recall reading...that the battle of Midway was
described as a Japanese victory to the Japanese public

It was. As Stephan also wrote:, "according to Radio Tokyo"
the battle of Midway (was) "one of the greatest victories since
Pearl Harbor."

WJH

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by WJHopwood
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 12:47:25 PM UTC-4, Alan

On Sun, 11 May 2014 01:20:50 -0400, WJHopwood

"...An upsurge of confidece in the 'invincible' (Japanese)
Army and Navy...spawned extravagent expectations of future
conquests...'Victory disease' infected civilians, and military
personnel alike but its most virulent symptoms showed up
among politicians, journalists, writers, and academics....

However, by the time of the Hamburg bombing, the Doolittle Raid had shaken
up Japan as a whole, far beyond any actual damage done.

Mike

[WJHopwood]

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 12:25:13 AM UTC-4,

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

Post by WJHopwood
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 12:47:25 PM UTC-4, Alan

On Sun, 11 May 2014 01:20:50 -0400, WJHopwood

"...An upsurge of confidece in the 'invincible' (Japanese)
Army and Navy...spawned extravagent expectations of future
conquests...'Victory disease' infected civilians, and military
personnel alike but its most virulent symptoms showed up
among politicians, journalists, writers, and academics....

However, by the time of the Hamburg bombing, the Doolittle
Raid had shaken up Japan as a whole, far beyond any actual
damage done.

Well, the Hamburg bombing didn't come until more than 15
months after the Doolittle raid so it's not clear how it could
have affected Japanese thinking as a whole by that long after
the event. However, the Doolittle aspect did have an immediate
effect on the Japanrese military, which is covered by Stephan in
"Hawaii Under the Rising Sun."

Stephan's emphasis is on the change in attitude by Japanese
military officials, particularly the Army, as a result of the Doolittle
raid. The only reference he makes to the effect on the civil
population is in these remarks:
"Japan suffered little physical destruction on 18 April. The
press denounced what was portrayed as deliberate attacks on
schools and hospitals. It disparagingly referred to the sortie as
"do little," punning on the name of the commander of the raid
Colonel James Doolittle."

As for the affect of the raid on military thinking, however, Stephan
wrote "...the psychological effects...were serious. Frustration
gripped officers of the Imperial Navy...a humiliation...Yamamoto
reacted with mortification...And yet, the Doolittle raid had one
salutary consequence...it accomplished what what the Combined
Fleet and the Navy General Staff had been unable to do...For the
first time the Army General Staff paid serious attention to the
Pacific in general and Hawaii in particular....The Army General
Staff decided to participate in the Midway operation. Troops
would also be provided for the assault on Attu and Kiska.,,"

WJH

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by WJHopwood
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 12:25:13 AM UTC-4,

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net
However, by the time of the Hamburg bombing, the Doolittle
Raid had shaken up Japan as a whole, far beyond any actual
damage done.

Well, the Hamburg bombing didn't come until more than 15
months after the Doolittle raid so it's not clear how it could
have affected Japanese thinking as a whole by that long after
the event.

It's pretty clear; their myth of invincibility was shattered earlier. This
was the time the homeland had been under attack for 9 centuries.

Post by WJHopwood
effect on the Japanrese military, which is covered by Stephan in
"Hawaii Under the Rising Sun."

It's covered in Toland, Ienaga, Cook & Cook, etc, as well. While elements of
the military would maintain delusions until after the surrender, the
populace harbored no delusions of was worried, and it would get worse
as the war dragged on.

Mike

[WJHopwood]

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 10:41:11 AM UTC-4,
SolomonW wrote: On Sun, 11 May 2014 01:20:50

Post by SolomonW

Post by WJHopwood
As far as I know, there were no comments made
by the Japanese as a direct result of the Hamburg
bombing,

As far as I know this is true, but it is something I find
very strange. Japanese observers were very active in
Germany at that time....Hiroshi <UTF16-012B><UTF16-014B><UTF16-014A>shima had such a
close relationship with Hitler and Ribbentrop
comparable to that of Winston Churchill with the
American war leadership.

I agree. Oshima Hiroshi was the Japanese ambassador
to Nazi Germany and very close to the high-ranking
German officials all the way up to Hitler. He made
frequent reports to Tokyo about the heavy damage to
Germany caused by Allied bombing and most of his
coded communications to and from Tokyo were being
intercepted and the code broken by the U.S. MAGIC
intelligence team.

Although he did report of the bombing of Hamburg, he
told Tokyo that the Allies had exaggerated the damage.
Toward the end of the war when heavy damage was being
inflicted by the Allies on Berlin, Oshima repeatedly
cautioned Tokyo to make preparations for such attacks
but there is no indication in the Tokyo responses to him
that they were listening.

The book "Marching Orders," (1995) by Bruce Lee has a
number of references to the exchange of coded messages
(being intercepted by the U.S.) between Oshima and Tokyo.
However, nowhere in Tokyo's many messages to Oshima
with regard to German bombing damage can I find any
expressions of concern by Tokyo with the probability of
Japan suffering similar consequences.

Another excellent source of information about the
importance to the Allies of the intercepted damage reports
of Ambassador Oshima's the book "Hitler's Japanese
Confidant--Gemeral Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC intelligence
19441-1945." (1993) by history professor Carl Boyd of Old
Dominion University,

WJH