The Double Cross system

[Michael Emrys]

I trust everyone here is reasonably familiar with the story of the XX
Committee and its work during the war. But one part of the story I don't
have yet, and that is what happened to the spies after the war who
collaborated with British intelligence. Were they then released to
resume normal lives? Were they provided with any assistance: placement;
new identities; financial aid; etc.? Or were they just handed their hats
at the door to the prison and told to be on their way?

Michael

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Michael Emrys
But one part of the story I don't
have yet, and that is what happened to the spies after the war who
collaborated with British intelligence. Were they then released to
resume normal lives?

Yes.

Post by Michael Emrys
Were they provided with any assistance: placement;

Some were.

Post by Michael Emrys
new identities...

None of them really needed that.

Post by Michael Emrys
financial aid...

A little.

Post by Michael Emrys
etc.? Or were they just handed their hats
at the door to the prison...

They weren't prisoners. Some of the XX "agents"
were actually imprisoned, but those were not
collaborators with MI5 - they were impersonated
on the radio or by mail.

Most of the XX agents were willing collaborators
who volunteered their cooperation, and weren't
German nationals anyway.

When the war was over they went back to their
normal lives.

[Michael Emrys]

Most of the XX agents were willing collaborators who volunteered
their cooperation, and weren't German nationals anyway.

I thought that the alternative to collaboration was to be executed for
espionage and that several (eight?) were.

But thanks for your reply, which was helpful.

Michael

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Michael Emrys
I thought that the alternative to collaboration was to be executed for
espionage and that several (eight?) were.

Many of the XX agents were non-Germans recruited
by the Abwehr, who had intended from the first to
go over to the British. The Abwehr seems to have
been remarkably credulous about their agents.

Masterman noted that the British deliberately
"bungled" one double-agent's work, to see when
the Germans caught on - but they never did,
despite many obvious planted clues.

Agents who were immediate volunteers for XX
included:

GARBO (Juan Pujol)
BRUTUS (Roman Garby-Czerniawski)
ZIGZAG (Eddie Chapman)
TRICYCLE (Dusko Popov)

Also (IIRC)

TREASURE
FATHER
FREAK
BALLOON


TATE was imprisoned and impersonated; MUTT and JEFF
were of dubious loyalty. SNOW, despite contact with
MI-5 pre-war, was always mistrusted; he was shut down
and imprisoned. He was released at the end of the war,
and allegedly received occasional small payments from
MI5 until his death.

[Alan Meyer]

On 08/04/2013 12:39 PM, Rich Rostrom wrote:
...

Post by Rich Rostrom
Agents who were immediate volunteers for XX
GARBO (Juan Pujol)
BRUTUS (Roman Garby-Czerniawski)
ZIGZAG (Eddie Chapman)
TRICYCLE (Dusko Popov)

...

There's a very interesting book about Eddie Chapman, _Agent Zigzag: a
true story of Nazi espionage, love and betrayal_ by Ben Macintyre.

According to Macintyre, Chapman was a complex, talented man whose
loyalties to Britain, Germany, friends, lovers, foes, even himself, were
complicated and shifting. He seems to have been the sort of man who was
in love with whatever woman he was with, and was similarly a good
comrade to each of his handlers, be they British or German. He seemed
very much the sort of fellow who could have come out of a John LeCarre
novel.

He had been in prison in England before the war and was rescued from a
British prison in the Channel islands by a German spymaster who saw him
as a good candidate for a double agent. His feelings about the British
authorities were certainly not favorable to them. The Germans trained
him for a considerable period of time and eventually parachuted him into
the UK. He wound up back in Germany, then again back in the UK, in a
hair raising series of escapades.

The British authorities had complicated and mixed feelings about him.
Some of Chapman's handlers saw him, or at least treated him, as a fine
fellow (as did most of the Germans.) Some saw him as a criminal who was
only out for himself and who should be returned to prison to serve out
his original sentence at the end of the war.

Ultimately, he did far more for the British than for the Germans, but it
would be very difficult to pin down his precise motivations.

I recommend Macintyre's book.

Alan

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Alan Meyer
There's a very interesting book about Eddie Chapman, _Agent Zigzag: a
true story of Nazi espionage, love and betrayal_ by Ben Macintyre.
According to Macintyre, Chapman was a complex, talented man whose
loyalties to Britain, Germany, friends, lovers, foes, even himself, were
complicated and shifting.
... His feelings about the British authorities were
certainly not favorable to them. The Germans
trained him for a considerable period of time and
eventually parachuted him into the UK.

Where he immediately surrendered to the nearest constable.

Masterman in his report on the XX system had nothing
to say against Chapman, except that he had to be shut
down because he "started 'to talk'". (That was the
way Masterman wrote it, with "to talk" in quotes; I'n
not sure what that meant.)

He wrote that Chapman offered to undertake the
assassination of Hitler as a one-man job. THe
offer was declined. Masterman added that this may
have been a mistake, "as ZIGZAG was an enterprising
and practical criminal."

[Roger Bell_West]

Post by Rich Rostrom
He wrote that Chapman offered to undertake the
assassination of Hitler as a one-man job. THe
offer was declined. Masterman added that this may
have been a mistake, "as ZIGZAG was an enterprising
and practical criminal."

When was this?

(I understand that as the war went on the opinion of British high
command shifted in favour of leaving Hitler in place, doing his damage
within the German command structures, rather than risking his
replacement by someone who could effectively fight and prolong a
losing war.)

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Roger Bell_West
I understand that as the war went on the opinion of British high
command shifted in favour of leaving Hitler in place...

This is a common legend, but there is absolutely
no evidence for it that I know of.

Ewen Montagu (author of _The Man Who Never Was_)
was as deep in Allied secrets as anyone. He was
cleared for both ULTRA and Double-Cross. In his
memoir he wrote that the most encouraging moment
of the war was on 20 July 1944, when the report
of Hitler's assassination was picked up - and the
most disappointing moment was when the report of
Hitler's survival was received.

If the Allies did not want Hitler dead, why did
they send hundreds of B-17s to bomb central Berlin?
My father was lead bombardier for his squadron on
two of those missions, and his aiming point was
the Fuhrerbunker complex.

While a different leader might have been more
effective in directing the German war effort,
one thing was clear - Germany could never
surrender while Hitler lived. And it was also
clear that a lot of Germans wanted to end the
war on any terms at all.

[Mario]

Post by Roger Bell_West

Post by Rich Rostrom
He wrote that Chapman offered to undertake the
assassination of Hitler as a one-man job. THe
offer was declined. Masterman added that this may
have been a mistake, "as ZIGZAG was an enterprising
and practical criminal."

When was this?
(I understand that as the war went on the opinion of British
high command shifted in favour of leaving Hitler in place,
doing his damage within the German command structures, rather
than risking his replacement by someone who could effectively
fight and prolong a losing war.)

Doenitz didn't prolong the war, though.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Mario
Doenitz didn't prolong the war, though.

Hard to say whether that counts for much. By the time Doenitz took over,
there wasn't much left to fight a war with.

Michael

[Mario]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Mario
Doenitz didn't prolong the war, though.

Hard to say whether that counts for much. By the time Doenitz
took over, there wasn't much left to fight a war with.

Of course.

Still he didn't even try to resist to the last man like Hitler
always ordered and wanted.

IOW, he was Nazi, but not as Nazi as Hitler himself.

Had Hitler disappeared before, anybody who had replaced him
(Goering?) had been less psychotically Nazi than him.

[Alan Meyer]

On 08/12/2013 09:15 AM, Roger Bell_West wrote:
...

Post by Roger Bell_West
(I understand that as the war went on the opinion of British high
command shifted in favour of leaving Hitler in place, doing his damage
within the German command structures, rather than risking his
replacement by someone who could effectively fight and prolong a
losing war.)

I know that I have read this also, but it was a long time ago and I
can't recall the source. Supposedly a meeting took place among high
level political and military intelligence people. I think it was in
1944 but don't remember the date. It had to be after the Allies were
assured of winning the war, but that was probably true any time from
1943 onward.

Two objections were raised to killing Hitler. One was the one mentioned
above. But an equally if not more important reason was the belief that
it was very important to ensure that Hitler be decisively defeated and
not assassinated in order to avoid yet another "we were never defeated,
we were betrayed and stabbed in the back" movement in Germany. They
wanted to rub the German peoples' collective noses in the stink created
by Nazism in order to be sure that this would never happen again.

Personally, I think that was a good reason. Both Germany and Japan had
many die hard fanatics who believed in the racist and nationalist
ideologies of the fascist regimes. They needed to be *completely*
discredited - as they were by the unconditional defeat of both countries.

Abraham Lincoln expressed similar sentiments when people complained to
him about Sherman's march through Georgia. He wanted the people of the
South to know that they had definitely and totally lost the war.

Alan

[Rich Rostrom]

... Supposedly a meeting took place among high
level political and military intelligence people...
Two objections were raised to killing Hitler...

Almost certainly fictional.

Germany ... needed to be *completely* discredited -
as they were by the unconditional defeat...

Taken to an extreme, this would have the Allies
reject a German surrender so they could kill
more and devastate more. Which would cost thousands
of Allied lives in combat, plus the fate of PoWs
and other prisoners in Germany.

I don't think so. The Allies rejected any sort
of conditional peace, but they didn't want any
more fighting than necessary.

(There is a relevant anecdote from _Crusade in
Europe_. In early August 1945, Eisenhower was
on his visit to Moscow. He was at a banquet
when the Japanese surrender was announced. He
was sitting with "old Marshal Budenny", who
seemed less happy than the others present, and
asked why. Wasn't it good that the war was over?

Oh, yes," Budenny said. "But we should have gone
on until we had killed a lot more of those
insolent Japanese."

Eisenhower privately noted to himself the
indifference this showed to the lives of Soviet
soldiers who would have died in that fighting.

I doubt if Eisenhower would have had a different
feeling about a German surrender.

And I think that pretty much all the Allied
leaders believed that Germany could be permanently
neutered by appropriate occupation policies, as
long as these policies were not constrained by
surrender conditions.)

[GFH]

Post by Rich Rostrom

... Supposedly a meeting took place among high
level political and military intelligence people...
Two objections were raised to killing Hitler...

Almost certainly fictional.

Germany ... needed to be *completely* discredited -
as they were by the unconditional defeat...

Taken to an extreme, this would have the Allies
reject a German surrender so they could kill
more and devastate more. Which would cost thousands
of Allied lives in combat, plus the fate of PoWs
and other prisoners in Germany.
I don't think so. The Allies rejected any sort
of conditional peace, but they didn't want any
more fighting than necessary.
(There is a relevant anecdote from _Crusade in
Europe_. In early August 1945, Eisenhower was
on his visit to Moscow. He was at a banquet
when the Japanese surrender was announced. He
was sitting with "old Marshal Budenny", who
seemed less happy than the others present, and
asked why. Wasn't it good that the war was over?
Oh, yes," Budenny said. "But we should have gone
on until we had killed a lot more of those
insolent Japanese."
Eisenhower privately noted to himself the
indifference this showed to the lives of Soviet
soldiers who would have died in that fighting.
I doubt if Eisenhower would have had a different
feeling about a German surrender.
And I think that pretty much all the Allied
leaders believed that Germany could be permanently
neutered by appropriate occupation policies, as
long as these policies were not constrained by
surrender conditions.)

IMHO, the death of Hitler would not have changed
anything. Not one allied leader (FDR,WSC, Stalin)
would have agreed to negotiations at this stage of
the war.

GFH

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by GFH

Post by Rich Rostrom
I don't think so. The Allies rejected any sort
of conditional peace, but they didn't want any
more fighting than necessary.

IMHO, the death of Hitler would not have changed
anything. Not one allied leader (FDR,WSC, Stalin)
would have agreed to negotiations at this stage of
the war.

Much more likely, with Hitler's death, they would have accepted an
"unconditional" surrender of the Japanese sort -- a couple guarantees
wrapped around the word "unconditional". Nothing negotiated, but
not a real unconditional surrender, either.

Mike

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

IMHO, the death of Hitler would not have changed anything.
Not one allied leader (FDR, WSC, Stalin) would have agreed to
negotiations at this stage of the war.

Much more likely, with Hitler's death, they would have
accepted an "unconditional" surrender of the Japanese sort...

More likely, the Allies would have refused any
negotiations, while the Germans would get rid
of the leading Nazis and then surrender.

It is extremely unlikely that the Allies
(especially Stalin, who had much more to say
regarding Germany than Japan) would have
agreed to any conditions, tacit or otherwise.

[m***@netMAPSONscape.net]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by m***@netMAPSONscape.net

IMHO, the death of Hitler would not have changed anything.
Not one allied leader (FDR, WSC, Stalin) would have agreed to
negotiations at this stage of the war.

Much more likely, with Hitler's death, they would have
accepted an "unconditional" surrender of the Japanese sort...

More likely, the Allies would have refused any
negotiations, while the Germans would get rid
of the leading Nazis and then surrender.
It is extremely unlikely that the Allies
(especially Stalin, who had much more to say
regarding Germany than Japan) would have
agreed to any conditions, tacit or otherwise.

Um, yeah, kind of what the US did with Japan, right?

Mike

[Michael Emrys]

...while the Germans would get rid
of the leading Nazis and then surrender.

Aside from simply grabbing and shooting them, they wouldn't have had
much time to do that. And it might not have been possible to grab all of
them. Some of the leading Nazis still had considerable forces loyal to
them. I think the Allies were so intent on putting as many of them on
trial as they could that they might not have gone for that at all.

Michael

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Michael Emrys

...while the Germans would get rid
of the leading Nazis and then surrender.

Aside from simply grabbing and shooting them, they wouldn't have had
much time to do that.

The context is the success of "Operation FLASH"
in March 1943, so I don't see what you mean by
"not much time".

Post by Michael Emrys
And it might not have been possible to grab all of them.

It doesn't have to be all at once, or immediately.

In any case I was responding to the general case.

Post by Michael Emrys
Some of the leading Nazis still had considerable
forces loyal to them.

Neither the SS nor the Luftwaffe Field Divisions
were organized or positioned to control the Heer.

Himmler would change that if he was in charge, but
without that he can't be in charge.

Goering becomes Chancellor, but his credibility is
very week by 1943 and after; if he asserts himself
in ways the Heer doesn't like, the Schwarze Kapelle
will have no difficulty finding support for a coup;
not that there will be great difficulty anyway.

Also, the rivalry between Goering and Himmler would
cripple both.

Post by Michael Emrys
I think the Allies were so intent on putting as many of them on
trial as they could that they might not have gone for that at all.

Who are "they"?

In any case - by 1943, there were few Germans outside
the Nazi leadership who didn't want to end the war ASAP.
Even most Nazis were looking for a way out, and many
thought they could wiggle out of consequences. Even
Goering expected that in 1945.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Rich Rostrom
The context is the success of "Operation FLASH"
in March 1943, so I don't see what you mean by
"not much time".

Ah. I was thinking in terms of the last four or five months of the war.

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Michael Emrys
I think the Allies were so intent on putting as many of them on
trial as they could that they might not have gone for that at all.

Who are "they"?

The Allies.

Michael

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Michael Emrys
I think the Allies were so intent on putting as many of them on
trial as they could that they might not have gone for that at all.

Who are "they"?

The Allies.

"I think the Allies were so intent on putting as many
of them on trial as [the Allies] could that [the
Allies] might not have gone for that at all."

OK, who is "them"?

The Allies were intent on destroying the Nazi regime
and "Prussianism", but they don't seem to have been
been that concerned about trials for anyone but the
most prominent and most flagrant criminals.

Only a fraction of the Germans complicit in war crimes
and crimes against humanity were ever tried; and many
of them were left to be tried by post-war German courts,
and got off.

And what is "that"? (The last one.)

If the Germans surrender without conditions, what is
there for the Allies not to go for?

[Alan Meyer]

Post by Rich Rostrom

... Supposedly a meeting took place among high
level political and military intelligence people...
Two objections were raised to killing Hitler...

Almost certainly fictional.

I wish I could remember the source for this. Is it possibly fictional?
Sure. Writers get things wrong sometimes and readers like me add
another level of possible misremembrance and/or misinterpretation. But
"almost certainly fictional"? I don't know where the "almost certainty"
would come from.

Post by Rich Rostrom

Germany ... needed to be *completely* discredited -
as they were by the unconditional defeat...

Taken to an extreme, this would have the Allies
reject a German surrender so they could kill
more and devastate more. Which would cost thousands
of Allied lives in combat, plus the fate of PoWs
and other prisoners in Germany.
I don't think so. The Allies rejected any sort
of conditional peace, but they didn't want any
more fighting than necessary.

Agreed. I don't think this was taken to an extreme or intended to be
so. I'm almost certain, or I would even say "quite certain" (and I
would be happy to discuss the grounds for that "quite certainty" if
requested) that an unconditional surrender would indeed have been
accepted by the western allies. There may have been quibbling by Stalin
over what it meant and who got what.

Nevertheless, if the war were to go on, I believe it would have been to
the benefit of everyone, including the German people, if Hitler and the
Nazi regime could be clearly seen to be the authors of the fiasco (as
indeed they were) rather than have Hitler die a martyr in some Allied
attack - with all the consequent conspiracy theories about which Jews
and communists were responsible. If Hitler's death would have caused a
German surrender, then I think it likely that everyone in the Western
alliance would have supported pulling the trigger if the opportunity
arose. If it would not and the Germans fought on, it would be better if
Hitler were in charge for both of the reasons mentioned (his
incompetence as a military leader and the political importance of
demonstrating the total disaster of his political leadership.)
...

Post by Rich Rostrom
And I think that pretty much all the Allied
leaders believed that Germany could be permanently
neutered by appropriate occupation policies, as
long as these policies were not constrained by
surrender conditions.)

That's an interesting question. Churchill speaks of the dangers of
German revanchism in his history of the war (again, it's possible that
I'm misremembering or misinterpreting - I don't have a citation and it's
been many years since I read the books.) Americans may have been
feeling very secure and self-confident, but British and Russians, not to
mention French, Poles, and many others, had felt the power of Germany
twice in a quarter century and were not so complacent about the
possibility of a third round.

Finally, someone might ask, Why, if there was a decision not to
assassinate Hitler, was there so much bombing in Berlin? Couldn't
Hitler have been killed in the bombing?

I don't know the answer to that one. My guess is that, if the meeting
did indeed take place, and I'm prepared to at least suppose that it did,
it was stimulated by specific questions raised by the intelligence
agencies and resulted in answers to them that said "We're not interested
in pursuing assassination attempts and don't see them as fruitful." I
don't see why it would have resulted in special instructions to the RAF
or USAAF to avoid killing Hitler. Even if there were a danger of
killing him in a bomb attack (which I doubt), I don't think it would
have been practical to give instructions to thousands of aircrew to not
kill him. No one would have been able to explain and justify that to
men who were risking their lives.

Alan

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Alan Meyer
That's an interesting question. Churchill speaks of the dangers of
German revanchism in his history of the war (again, it's possible that
I'm misremembering or misinterpreting - I don't have a citation and it's
been many years since I read the books.) Americans may have been
feeling very secure and self-confident, but British and Russians, not to
mention French, Poles, and many others, had felt the power of Germany
twice in a quarter century and were not so complacent about the
possibility of a third round.

Even before the 'unconditional surrender' doctrine (and I'm going by
memory here but ...) in mid 1941 Churchill and FDR had decided that
there was no victory that did not include Allied troops on German
soil. That based on the experience of November 1918 there was no way
they would allow Germans to claim they had not been defeated in WW2.

(When even a convinced pacifist like Ebert told a review of German
troops in Berlin in December 1918 that they had not been defeated you
can assume this attitude was widespread in German society)

At the first inter-allied meetings following 22 June 1941 Stalin
readily accepted this principle (though the evidence is clear that
discussions were held between Germany and Russia at various times
during 1941-43 and cession of territory was on the table).

As I say - the doctrine of unconditional surrender came later - but
there was never any allied intention of seeking a peace which involved
German troops on foreign territory.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by The Horny Goat
(When even a convinced pacifist like Ebert told a review of German
troops in Berlin in December 1918 that they had not been defeated you
can assume this attitude was widespread in German society)

According F/UK/US intelligence reports the moral of the German Army
in Oct. / Nov. 1918 was rather low. They saw the war as lost and were
willing to surrender. The majority of the German society were under
hunger and may have felt the same. But the press was still victorious
and therefore the sudden German request for ceasefire was a surprise
for most.

This crucial speech of Ebert had another background. It was the initiation
of the Dolchstoss (stab in the back) legend. First, Ebert was no
pacifist but a very nationalist in full support for a victory.
Second, the content of his speech came direct from the military.

In the 1990s a copy of a letter by the (later General) von Schleicher
to Ebert surfaced. That time von Schleicher was chief of the interior
division of the Reichswehr intelligence. The letter requested such a
speech. The choice of words left no doubt that Ebert was an agent
of the Reichswehr and von Schleicher his personal handler. It seems
the whole Ebert government was just a plan "B" of OHL in case of
a military defeat. It worked well.
You see, sometimes history is rather simple if you get the right dots.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Roman W]

Post by Alan Meyer
Abraham Lincoln expressed similar sentiments when people complained to
him about Sherman's march through Georgia. He wanted the people of the
South to know that they had definitely and totally lost the war.

Didn't work, that.

RW

[MANITOBIAN]

On Friday, August 2, 2013 9:47:57 AM UTC-5, Michael Emrys wrote:
the story of the XX Committee

There is another book:
DOUBLE CROSS (the true story of the D - Day spies)
by BEN MACINTYRE

Published 2012.