Post by HaydnPost by Geoffrey SinclairThe economics. The loss of Middle East oil would be a major loss
even if the axis could not exploit it.
Memory may fail me on the exact figure but in 1941-42, Middle East oil
should have made up no more than 7 to 8% of the entire Allied oil
resources worldwide. Losing it would not have been good, but the Allies
wouldn't have lost the war on account of that.
From Oil and War by Goralski and Freeburg.
In terms of absolute numbers you are more than correct, in 1942 Iran,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia produced around 265,000 barrels of crude oil
per day, the US alone was producing 3,800,000, Venezuela 404,589.
In refining terms in December 1940 the US was 58.1% of the world's
capacity, the Middle East 5.5%. So the Middle East was a source of
ready to use fuel. It had more refining capacity than Austria, France,
Germany and Italy combined.
However in terms of militarily usable oil the Middle East numbers go
up, in 1945 some 29% of US oil consumption was by the military, the
reason the oil industry was there in the first place was the civilian
economy, and while consumption could be curtailed and much of the
consumption during the war was making weapons etc. there were limits.
In 1940 military consumption was 1% of the 1,400,000 (refined) barrels
per day used in the US, in 1945 it was 29% of the 1,800,000 barrels
per day. It meant essentially civil consumption was down by around
100,000 barrels per day 1940 to 1945, rationing was offset by the
war driven increase in economic activity.
Almost all the oil in the Middle East was available for military use
and secondly it was quite close to the front line, important when the
allies lacked tankers even in 1944.
Post by HaydnThe problem for the Commonwealth - assuming the Axis broke through to the
Suez Canal - would have been broader than just keeping hold of the Iraqi
and Iranian oil wells. Once evicted from Egypt, the line of supply for a
British Middle East front would have suddenly lengthened to faraway Basra
and the Iranian ports, which means a long way.
Sudan, going down the Nile etc.
The reality is "Middle East" oil in 1942 was Iran at about 198,000
barrels per day, Saudi Arabia was only 12,400. So if the Middle
East oil is in axis hands they are in Iran.
Post by HaydnI'm not sure about the conditions of the ground and air transport network
and the port facilities over that area in 1941-42, but I guess they were
far from optimal. If I am correct on that point, it is extremely doubtful
that the Commonwealth alone would have had the colossal resources needed
to improve and expand, and create wherever non-existent, and within a
reasonable time frame, a logistical structure suited to maintain in full
operational state a large army in contact with Rommel and whose logistical
tail would have been a couple thousand miles long all the way to Bandar
Abbas or Bushehr.
Fundamentally short of the USSR surrendering the logistics say the
axis at optimal could push the allies away from the Mediterranean.
After that the distances and transport networks effectively create
a gigantic no man's land. The axis would need to clear the Suez
canal and have the shipping to transport armies and their supplies
through the Red Sea
Post by HaydnI suppose a massive American help would have been required. The
consequences of such a diversion of resources to keep a Middle East front
in existence might have upset the entire Allied schedule. Let alone the
inevitable consequence of Britain surrendering the coalition leadership to
the US in 1942 instead of 1943, when they finally acknowledged that
without American shipping the Commonwealth war effort on a global scale
couldn't simply be sustained anymore (a fact already in effect in 1942).
Fundamentally the British knew in 1940 they needed the US, as
for surrendering the coalition leadership the reality was that
required US forces in the field and better staff work at a high level
in the US. Something the US military learnt at Casablanca.
Thanks to the various fleets becoming British controlled and the
starting position the shipping situation in 1942 was the US needed
the British more, in particular the monster liners, the losses in 1942
and the major increase in US production changed that in 1943. For
the war about 21% of all US troops sent overseas were transported
in British controlled shipping.
With Japan in the war Britain needed US supplies across the board
to keep its current and planned military strength, plus lend lease to
avoid major post war economic problems.
Post by HaydnOf course the option of simply giving up a Middle East front and letting
Rommel and the Italians wander around oilwells in flames and deal with
exasperating Arab bargainers would also have been open. But was that a
politically viable option?
If the axis take Egypt it reverses the supply situation and should enable
an axis force to take places like Palestine, after that comes sand.
The political consequences during the war would be less, it would
mainly be the military consequences, a reputation for being
ineffective (add Singapore) would make the US more wary of
being any sort of junior partner. The doctrines developed in the
desert really helped make the allies more effective.
Geoffrey Sinclair
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