FDR to Nimitz: Seize Antwerp

Post by Paul Sturrock
What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign --
ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean
abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
the Central Pacific).

Why would he do that? This is tantamount to reversing the decision on
where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says Normandy
is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to
bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in
Britain available.

This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.
No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would
play out as they did. You should review operational planning and
expected timings for the conquest of France. In particular, look at Map
III in Cross-Channel Attack:
Loading Image...

Note the D+90 line, which corresponds to September 6th.

In the meantime, this is a decision to do nothing beyond local
operations in the Pacific Theater during 1944. You are stripping
virtually the entire amphibious fleet from the Pacific. No Marianas
operations, no Philippine operations, just local operations in the New
Guinea area.

Post by Paul Sturrock
At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
this time.

Only four - the US 17th Airborne Division had just arrived in theater
and was not available for operations. In addition, the British 6th
Airborne Division is still rebuilding from Normandy. Components were in
line on the Continent until early September. On the other hand, the 52nd
Infantry Division is available for air transport.

And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrier
availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions for
the initial drop.

Paul Sturrock

2017-01-13 18:12:10 UTC

Why would he do that?

Because Germany was the greatest threat (as he acknowledged) and Japan
could be defeated by the submarine fleet alone. Of course, he never would have
done it, but he could have as commander-in-chief.

Post by Stephen Graham
This is tantamount to reversing the decision on
where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says Normandy
is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to
bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in
Britain available.

Did anyone in the ETO think we had more than enough manpower to defeat
Germany? Were they ever so confident prior to and after the Normandy
landings that they didn't desire additional forces, even before the bloodbath on
the beaches, the hedgerows and at Caen?

Post by Stephen Graham
This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.

Agreed. Total hindsight on my part. But while I think it's amazing what the
Allies accomplished in such a short time, it seems to me they never took full
advantage of their incomparable amphibious and airborne capabilities. And
I believe the Allies had their eyes on Antwerp prior to the Normandy landings.

Post by Stephen Graham
No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would
play out as they did.

But no matter how things played out or were projected to play out, wouldn't
a surprise landing in the Scheldt and the earlier capture of Antwerp help the
Allies in France? I would think a powerful assault so close to the Ruhr,
placing hundreds of thousands of Germans between two Allied hosts, with
Antwerp to keep follow-on forces supplied would be advantageous.

Post by Stephen Graham
You should review operational planning and
expected timings for the conquest of France. In particular, look at Map
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-XChannel/maps/
USA-E-XChannel-IV.jpg
Note the D+90 line, which corresponds to September 6th.

Yes, they did not expect a total collapse of the Germans. All the more
reason to plan a surprise landing in their rear.

Post by Stephen Graham
In the meantime, this is a decision to do nothing beyond local
operations in the Pacific Theater during 1944. You are stripping
virtually the entire amphibious fleet from the Pacific. No Marianas
operations, no Philippine operations, just local operations in the New
Guinea area.

Yes, that's right. Put the Japanese on hold until the far more dangerous
threat is ended, then returning to finish the job after our submarines fatally
weaken them.

Post by Paul Sturrock
At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
this time.

Thanks for the info, sir.

Post by Stephen Graham
And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrier
availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions for
the initial drop.

Weren't there complaints about the troop carriers making only one drop
that day instead of two, seeing as the drop zones were so close to Britain?

Stephen Graham

2017-01-13 19:21:04 UTC

Post by Paul Sturrock
What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands

campaign --

Post by Paul Sturrock
ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would

mean

Post by Paul Sturrock
abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
the Central Pacific).

Why would he do that?

Because Germany was the greatest threat (as he acknowledged) and Japan
could be defeated by the submarine fleet alone. Of course, he never would have
done it, but he could have as commander-in-chief.

Actually, no, FDR did not have the authority to unilaterally change
world-wide Allied strategy. At a minimum, the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
Churchill, and Curtin would have had to agree.

It was also not apparent that Japan could be defeated solely by the
submarine fleet. For instance, that did nothing about the deployed
forces on the Asian mainland. At a minimum, you're condemning thousands
of civilians to death each day that the war in Asia stretches on.

There's also the issue of the waste of resources and time that such a
redeployment would take. It took months of effort and tens of thousands
of tons of shipping to get troops into the Central Pacific in the first
place. Your scenario tosses all that out the window. It also puts a
significant amount of force out of action for the two months or so it
takes to transfer from the Central Pacific to the Atlantic.

Post by Stephen Graham
This is tantamount to reversing the decision on
where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says

Normandy

Post by Stephen Graham
is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to
bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in
Britain available.

Until late September at the earliest, the Allies always had more troops
in the ETO than they could use effectively in Northwest Europe. That's
how, for instance, they were able to relieve the 82nd and 101st US
Airborne Divisions in July. I'd have to go back through and check dates,
but I believe there were always a minimum of three divisions available
in Britain for deployment. That's above and beyond the airborne.

Post by Stephen Graham
This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.

They always had their eye on Antwerp. It's just that the operational
evaluation was that the cost of a direct invasion was simply too high.
The Germans were expecting an amphibious thrust into the Low Countries
or the Pas de Calais. One of the issues is that a direct thrust on
Antwerp implies that the Germans will be motivated to thoroughly
demolish the port.

Post by Paul Sturrock
No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would

Post by Stephen Graham
play out as they did.

If it just results in an Anzio situation, there's no real point in doing
so, and more hazards.

Post by Paul Sturrock
Yes, they did not expect a total collapse of the Germans. All the more
reason to plan a surprise landing in their rear.

You should take a look at the number of airborne operations planned and
then scrubbed because of progress. Airborne operations are a lot easier
to plan and stage than a major amphibious operation, especially if
you're transferring forces from the Pacific.

Post by Stephen Graham
And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrier
availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions

for

Post by Stephen Graham
the initial drop.

Weren't there complaints about the troop carriers making only one drop
that day instead of two, seeing as the drop zones were so close to Britain?

They did two drops on the first day of Market Garden. It was the later
days that the pace slowed, largely because of crew fatigue and hazards
of operating at night.

Rich Rostrom

2017-01-14 16:07:21 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
There's also the issue of the waste of resources and time that such a
redeployment would take. It took months of effort and tens of thousands
of tons of shipping to get troops into the Central Pacific in the first
place. Your scenario tosses all that out the window. It also puts a
significant amount of force out of action for the two months or so it
takes to transfer from the Central Pacific to the Atlantic.

Two months or so? That's wildly, absurdly optimistic.

One can't take an enormous military force from _here_
and plop it over _there_ and expect it to function the
same. Before this huge fleet could be deployed in the
ETO, there would have to be at least a year of intense
preparations, including the establishment of very
extensive base facilities in British ports, and supply
chains back to the US.

Which makes the idea of doing this _secretly_ utterly
fantastic.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Stephen Graham

2017-01-14 16:32:30 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom

Two months or so? That's wildly, absurdly optimistic.

I freely admit that I was simply accounting for transit time. There are
any number of issues not accounted for. Other things not mentioned
include reconditioning troops after being on ship for a couple of
months, the lack of US Marine replacements in the ETO, additional supply
complications, etc.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Which makes the idea of doing this _secretly_ utterly
fantastic.

The bigger point is really that there are forces already available in
theater or adjacent that could meet the operational requirements, if
there was any need to. If nothing else, there are the Dragoon forces
coming out of the MTO.

Don Phillipson

2017-01-17 18:13:45 UTC

What if FDR . . . ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt
estuary?

Actually, no, FDR did not have the authority to unilaterally change
world-wide Allied strategy. At a minimum, the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
Churchill, and Curtin would have had to agree.

Not least, Nimitz was theatre commander for the Central Pacific just
as Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander of all allied forces
in Europe. Transferring Nimitz would also require either terminating
his supreme command status or else making him a unique
exception to Eisenhower as SACEUR.

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

Geoffrey Sinclair

2017-01-15 16:57:59 UTC

This would mean Nimitz was operating to a very different timetable
to Eisenhower.

The final plan Overlord had a 30 day pause for logistic reasons at the
D+90 line, the Seine, since it was expected that only 12 US divisions
could be supported at the river at D+90 and a 12 division assault would
be the first assault across the river. These plans had been made late,
"even dangerously so from a logistical point of view".

Post by Paul Sturrock
Nimitz is ordered to move his forces, as secretly as possible, to the North
Sea or English Channel by early August at the latest, and rapidly conduct
an amphibious assault on the Scheldt estuary in concert with U.S. and
British airborne divisions.
No one in the ETO is told about the upcoming assault, and the Normandy
landings and campaign take place as scheduled. Airborne units in Britain
are ordered to prepare for a big operation to take place around the projected
date of the Scheldt estuary landings. Only a handful of officers in the
airborne and troop carrier units are told about the real target, and not until a
week or two before Nimitz' forces arrive.
The fleet will not make landfall -- unless it can be done secretly -- until
it reaches the Scheldt estuary. Something akin to Task Group 50.17, with
its 24 oilers, 3 hospital ships and numerous escorts will accompany the
invasion fleet.

So a fleet train and assault fleet plus the carrier forces all trying to fit
into the southern North Sea.

Note the port capacity and internal transport systems of Britain
were highly stressed in the summer of 1944, trying to import enough
to support the local economy and military while exporting two army
groups with full air support to France and keeping them supplied.

Adding the USN carrier fleet alone would cause major problems.
Fuel in bulk, the need to set up replacement aircraft pools and so on.

Post by Paul Sturrock
The fleet has two routes that avoid the Panama Canal (in order to maintain
the element of surprise): Either rounding the Horn, with its awful
conditions, or cruising far to the south in the Indian Ocean on a westerly
course, passing beneath the Cape of Good Hope into the Atlantic. It takes
38 days at 15 knots to go from Pearl Harbor to Antwerp via the Horn, and 47
days via the Indian Ocean.

Now effectively double that for the support ships and understand all ships
would need resupply of food etc. for the crews in the Atlantic, plus fuel.
before any operations could start. Think about how fit the troops would
be after months at sea.

Simply put the deployments would be noticed, starting with the negative
that the axis had lost track of them.

Post by Paul Sturrock
The Antwerp invasion fleet departs Pearl Harbor on June 5, 1944, the same
date on which the invasion fleet for Saipan set out.
At Nimitz' disposal are the same forces used at Saipan and the Battle of the
Philippine Sea, including the V Amphibious Corps and the Fifth Fleet. As
best as I can determine, the following forces took part in the Saipan and
7 fleet carriers, 8 light carriers, 7 escort carriers
956 carrier-based aircraft

According to Max Hastings for Overlord the allied air forces in
Britain had some 9,901 fighters and bombers. Then add the
transports and Coastal Command.

Post by Paul Sturrock
15 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers 58 destroyers

IJN end May 1944, including under repair, 3 fleet, 7 light fleet, 4 escort
carriers, 9 battleships,14 heavy and 16 light cruisers, 44 modern
destroyers.

June to December 1944 the IJN added 4 carriers, counting Shinano.

The allied positions in the Pacific, even in New Guinea, were effectively
isolated garrisons that were vulnerable to interdiction. The removal of
the 5th fleet means the IJN have naval superiority. The allies halt or even
start to go backwards.

The size of the suitable airstrip locations meant the land based air
forces at any given garrison could be overwhelmed by the enemy
carrier fleet turning up. That started to change as the fighting
neared Asia.

The USAAF strength, including reserves and second line combat
types, deployed from Alaska through the Pacific to Burma came
to 6,421 end May 1944, the European theater, read Britain, held
10,637, the Mediterranean held 4,828.

Pacific Ocean areas 824 aircraft, Solomons and New Guinea
(Far East Air Forces) 3,403, China/Burma/India 1,776, Alaska
256. Plus 162 aircraft of the 20th Air Force in India. Note these
figures include 901 transports, 51 trainers and 369 communications
aircraft.

If you use the Max Hastings figures the nominal 7,834 front line
USAAF combat types present in Britain in May 1944 gave a
US combat strength of 5,061. Note Hastings's 9,901 allied combat
aircraft strength meant an effective strength of 7,774, or 78%.

To put it another way about half the USAAF aircraft strength in
Britain in May/June 1944 was first line in a combat unit and
able to fly.

The Far East Air Forces end May 1944 had 2,456 first line combat
types from Guadalcanal to Darwin. Then add the allied air forces.

Post by Paul Sturrock
37 troop transports, 11 cargo ships, 5 LSDs, 47 LSTs, 10 APDs
185 DUKWs, 300-415 LVTs.
2 reinforced Marine divisions
1 reinforced Army infantry division
Note: one additional reinforced Marine division and one additional
reinforced Army division were used for the Tinian assault

As of end May 1944 the US military still had 44 divisions still in the
US, including 1 Marine, end August it was down to 32 divisions,
including 2 Marine.

The US units in the Pacific were set up to handle attacking dug in
infantry on isolated battlefields, not a continent with panzer armies
available for counter attacks.

All up the US had deployed 23 divisions in the Pacific to end May.

Post by Paul Sturrock
About 250,000 men were in the Seabees at war's end; perhaps
50,000-100,000 could be allocated in mid-1944 for the rehabilitation
and operation of Antwerp's port facilities after its seizure. Perhaps
nearby Rotterdam will also be captured and require the Seabees'
expertise.

The port capacity to land the troops to capture, hold and repair the
ports was actually a problem in France. Also given how badly wrecked
many of the northern French ports the allies captured unless Antwerp is
taken with days the prize will be lost.

Post by Paul Sturrock
At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
this time.

The divisions used in Normandy were to an extent still refitting, the
reality is the air transport lift could not handle 5 divisions. Hence the
multiple lifts for Market-Garden, which was a nominal 3 division
assault, similar for Overlord.

The US 17th Airborne division officially arrived in Britain in August.

Post by Paul Sturrock
England and its airfields are nearby to provide additional air support;
London is 200 miles from Antwerp.

Essentially the 5th fleet was limited to a strike radius of 200 miles and
did not have the sea room to operate in the North Sea. Draw an arc
say 150 miles from Antwerp and see how much ocean there is.

Post by Paul Sturrock
The Battle of the Scheldt provides us with detailed information on German
defenses in the estuary, which should give us some idea of how an
enormous amphibious/airborne assault would fare.

Weeks of heavy bomber air strikes on Walcheren, the need to clear
the various river defences. The lack of suitable beaches for a
multi division assault. For around 40 miles north of Scheldt estuary,
to the Hook of Holland, you are effectively assaulting islands with only
a small number of bridges connecting them to other islands or the
mainland, and you start the best part of 50 miles from Antwerp, even
coming ashore around Zeebrugge and Ostend leaves you 50 miles
to go.

Post by Paul Sturrock
Antwerp is only 134 miles from Dortmund in the eastern Ruhr. Once
Antwerp is captured and open to cargo ships, the Ruhr becomes
vulnerable to envelopment, which would spell the end for Germany.

Essentially once Antwerp was open alongside the other Atlantic
and Mediterranean ports the allies could finally funnel in all the forces
they had plus supply them. Then comes actually shipping the forces.

To end September 1944 the US deployed 32 divisions in France,
that is after the southern landings, out of the peak of 61 divisions.
It took until the end of January 1945 for the last of the US army
divisions to leave Britain (2 infantry, 1 armoured).

The only thing the Pacific could supply to the European theatre
that would really make a difference was assault shipping, either
to speed up/increase the size or build up in Normandy or to enable
the southern landings to happen earlier and/or bigger.

Moving land forces from one side of the world to the other makes
little sense when plenty of other forces were available in the US.
Moving the main USN fleet from the Pacific hands the initiative
back to the IJN. Trying to take the Marianas 6 months after the
historical invasions would mean more and better trained Japanese
defenders.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Stephen Graham

2017-01-16 00:03:24 UTC