Italian Airfields

[Chris Allen]

What was the main reason for Western Allies to land in Italy early 1943?

I saw a film recently (on Youtube) about Churchill's behaviour during
the war. It was a dramatic re-creation rather than scholarly
discussion. There was a scene where Bits and Yanks discussed future
strategy. The meeting occurred soon after Torch landings, i.e. Dec 42
or Jan 43. "What to do after defeating the Axis in Africa?"

The Yanks clearly wanted to land in northern France "straight away" and
the Brits said "that's too early". The film did not give reasons for
either case. Its main "theme" was personality of Churchill.

Never the less it set me thinking about what went through the minds of
these senior commanders. I can clearly see that trying to land in
France before May 45 was a foolish. (Knowledge of what actually happened
is a great help.) But that was 16 month away, what to do in the meantime.

Many things happened but two of them are particularly relevant to this
question. One of them was heavy bombing of Germany in an attempt to
reduce, or even destroy their capacity to make war (fair enough). The
other was to land in southern Italy and advance north.

My question. Why Italy?

I've seen / read several comments claiming that this was to assist the
main war effort else where, by drawing German forces away from France
and Russia. Some of this commentary claims this was not well executed,
even hint it was a waste of time and resources. That may or may not be so.

However I can see another purpose that is not mentioned any where that I
have seen or read.

AIRFIELDS

Good airfields in Italy, especially northern Italy, would give allied
bombers better access to SW Germany.
Did they do this?
If so why do we not hear more about it?
Was it an after thought for the Allies?
Was it less effective?

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Chris Allen
What was the main reason for Western Allies to land in Italy early 1943?
. . .
I've seen / read several comments claiming that this was to assist the
main war effort else where, by drawing German forces away from France and
Russia. Some of this commentary claims this was not well executed, even
hint it was a waste of time and resources. That may or may not be so.
However I can see another purpose that is not mentioned any where that I
have seen or read.
AIRFIELDS
Good airfields in Italy, especially northern Italy, would give allied
bombers better access to SW Germany.
Did they do this?

Yes indeed: see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foggia_Airfield_Complex
HQ of the US 15th Air Force. The salient point is that the USAAC
was trained for daylight bombing and only discovered in the first 8th
Air Force raids (winter 1942-43) it could not survive over German
airspace withought fighter defence, and many German targets were
beyond P-47 range: but bombers and escorts could reach those
targets from Italy (and German fighter forces were anyway concentrated
between the North Sea/Channel and central Germany: far fewer
fighters were based in southern Germany or Italy.)

Churchill had a personal theory about the "soft underbelly" of
Europe, i.e. favoured an army advance towards Munich or Vienna
from the Mediterranean: but he (like Allied commanders)
underestimated how far Italian mountain terrain favours defence
rather than attack, so ground combat there lasted more than
two years (cf. 11 months in NW Europe from D-Day to VE Day.)

So Churchill could form an alliance with (some, selected) USAAC
bomber strategists, which British army planners accepted the
Italian campaign as an affordable price to delay the invasion of
France until 1944 (which the British judged essential for preparations,
e.g. landing craft, Mulberry harbours etc.)

[Diogenes]

On Fri, 04 Jul 2014 19:32:15 -0400, "Don Phillipson"

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Chris Allen
What was the main reason for Western Allies to land in Italy early 1943?
. . .
I've seen / read several comments claiming that this was to assist the
main war effort else where, by drawing German forces away from France and
Russia. Some of this commentary claims this was not well executed, even
hint it was a waste of time and resources. That may or may not be so.
However I can see another purpose that is not mentioned any where that I
have seen or read.
AIRFIELDS
Good airfields in Italy, especially northern Italy, would give allied
bombers better access to SW Germany.
Did they do this?

Yes indeed: see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foggia_Airfield_Complex
HQ of the US 15th Air Force. The salient point is that the USAAC
was trained for daylight bombing and only discovered in the first 8th
Air Force raids (winter 1942-43) it could not survive over German
airspace withought fighter defence, and many German targets were
beyond P-47 range: but bombers and escorts could reach those
targets from Italy (and German fighter forces were anyway concentrated
between the North Sea/Channel and central Germany: far fewer
fighters were based in southern Germany or Italy.)
Churchill had a personal theory about the "soft underbelly" of
Europe, i.e. favoured an army advance towards Munich or Vienna
from the Mediterranean: but he (like Allied commanders)
underestimated how far Italian mountain terrain favours defence
rather than attack, so ground combat there lasted more than
two years (cf. 11 months in NW Europe from D-Day to VE Day.)

An American general (can't remember which one) later said of Italy:
"Beyond every river stood a mountain, and behind that mountain lay
another river."

Post by Don Phillipson
So Churchill could form an alliance with (some, selected) USAAC
bomber strategists, which British army planners accepted the
Italian campaign as an affordable price to delay the invasion of
France until 1944 (which the British judged essential for preparations,
e.g. landing craft, Mulberry harbours etc.)

----
Diogenes

The wars are long, the peace is frail
The madmen come again . . . .

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Chris Allen
What was the main reason for Western Allies to land in Italy early 1943?
I saw a film recently (on Youtube) about Churchill's behaviour during the
war. It was a dramatic re-creation rather than scholarly discussion.
There was a scene where Bits and Yanks discussed future strategy. The
meeting occurred soon after Torch landings, i.e. Dec 42 or Jan 43. "What
to do after defeating the Axis in Africa?"
The Yanks clearly wanted to land in northern France "straight away" and
the Brits said "that's too early". The film did not give reasons for
either case. Its main "theme" was personality of Churchill.

It sounds like they were concentrating on the Casablanca conference
which officially started in 14 January 1943.

The conference did debate what to do next, and the majority American
idea was to go for France, the majority British idea was further
operations in the Mediterranean.

A major factor in what could be done was whether the allies could
take Tunisia quickly, and even in January 1943 it was highly
probable the allies could not win early enough to ship the troops
and supplies to England to set up for an invasion of France. Hence
any further allied operations in 1943 would have to be in the
Mediterranean.

Post by Chris Allen
Never the less it set me thinking about what went through the minds of
these senior commanders. I can clearly see that trying to land in France
before May 45 was a foolish. (Knowledge of what actually happened is a
great help.) But that was 16 month away, what to do in the meantime.

One of the problems in historical drama can be simplification of the
subject, including setting up two opposed sides instead of a mixture
of strong and milder views. Another is since we now know the outcome
we also know many of the things that concerned the real life people at
the time turned out to be less important than they thought. The script
can make the participants look bad as they "worry over nothing" as
we now think we know, or the reverse, dismiss things we now know
as important.

In reality the allies were constrained by the lack of trained troops
and airpower, the lack of shipping, both merchant and invasion, the
Battle of the Atlantic had yet to reach its crisis (and many of the ships
released from invasion duties helped turn the tide in the Atlantic).

The US advocates of the French invasion discovered the gap between
their idea of staff work and the British, which made their ideas appear
much less thought out, something that would be fixed at later
conferences.

Post by Chris Allen
Many things happened but two of them are particularly relevant to this
question. One of them was heavy bombing of Germany in an attempt to
reduce, or even destroy their capacity to make war (fair enough). The
other was to land in southern Italy and advance north.
My question. Why Italy?

In actual fact at Casablanca the decision was to invade Sicily, not
Italy, that came later. As some US commanders feared just as
invading North Africa pushed an invasion of Sicily so an invasion
of Sicily pushed an invasion of Italy. The sort of mission creep they
were trying to avoid, in this theatre anyway.

In the coming months the US army would discover how much
more training it needed, as demonstrated at Kasserine Pass. The
allies had only done one amphibious assault in Europe, against
lightly defended beaches and largely isolated defenders, many
valuable lessons would be learnt from Sicily, Salerno and Anzio.

The Mediterranean theatre worked well as a training ground for
allied tactics and commanders, to be decisive (however you
want to define that term), the allies needed to keep putting in
more resources (key one - invasion shipping), which they simply
did not have until the invasion of France reached breakout phase,
and the French ports were working, and by that stage France was
clearly the better option.

Post by Chris Allen
I've seen / read several comments claiming that this was to assist the
main war effort else where, by drawing German forces away from France and
Russia. Some of this commentary claims this was not well executed, even
hint it was a waste of time and resources. That may or may not be so.

1) Clear the Mediterranean enough to allow allied convoys through
it, a significant saving from sending ships around Africa. To the end
of the war the allies felt constrained by the amount of available
shipping.

2) Continue the attack, defeat more axis forces and increase allied
combat experience. In mid 1943 the Luftwaffe braced for two big
battles, at Kursk and in the Mediterranean, and took significant
losses in both.

3) At least draw some axis combat power away from the Eastern Front.

Later the invasion of Italy would add a further justification of knocking
Italy out of the war, there were still plenty of Italian troops being used
for occupation services and Italian factories turning out weapons. Also
added was the capture of airfields to enable bomber operations of
targets out of the range of British based bombers.

Post by Chris Allen
However I can see another purpose that is not mentioned any where that I
have seen or read.
AIRFIELDS
Good airfields in Italy, especially northern Italy, would give allied
bombers better access to SW Germany.
Did they do this?

Look up the Foggia complex of airfields in southern Italy, the
USAAF 15th Air Force and the RAF 205 group. No one
expected quick capture of airbases in Northern Italy and in
any case the heavy bombers needed a big supply line,
something the Foggia area had.

Post by Chris Allen
If so why do we not hear more about it?

The 15th Air Force receives much less publicity than the 8th
Air Force in Britain, even more so for 205 group versus
Bomber Command. In terms of the numbers the air war out
of Britain was much bigger, and more controversial.

Post by Chris Allen
Was it an after thought for the Allies?

No.

Post by Chris Allen
Was it less effective?

The bases in Southern Italy were used to attack Austria and the
Balkans, in particular the Ploesti oil fields, the largest source of
natural crude oil available to the Axis in Europe. There were
also attacks on Southern Germany.

The attacks on Ploesti were quite effective, like the oil campaign
in general, attacks on other targets had similar effects as raids
mounted from Britain.

Essentially capturing southern Italy was worth the effort, for
all the reasons listed above, and just as the capture of Rome
was quickly made old by the invasion of France, the whole
Mediterranean theatre, particularly in the US, tends to receive
much less attention, often labeled as the secondary theatre.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Michael Emrys]

...the Battle of the Atlantic had yet to reach its crisis (and many
of the ships released from invasion duties helped turn the tide in
the Atlantic).

Could you enlarge on this a bit please, Geoffrey? My understanding is
that the ships that were important in subduing the U-boat menace were
small ships, DD and smaller. What ships were being held for a potential
invasion of France were released instead for duty in the Atlantic
against U-boats but not for the invasion of Sicily?

Michael

[GFH]

Post by Michael Emrys

...the Battle of the Atlantic had yet to reach its crisis (and many
of the ships released from invasion duties helped turn the tide in
the Atlantic).

Could you enlarge on this a bit please, Geoffrey? My understanding is
that the ships that were important in subduing the U-boat menace were
small ships, DD and smaller. What ships were being held for a potential
invasion of France were released instead for duty in the Atlantic
against U-boats but not for the invasion of Sicily?

When considering why 1944 was chosen for an invasion
of northern France, one must include the lack of large
landing craft -- specifically LSTs. My father was at
Oran. He said that marines invaded from 'whale boats'.

GFH

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

...the Battle of the Atlantic had yet to reach its crisis (and many
of the ships released from invasion duties helped turn the tide in
the Atlantic).

Could you enlarge on this a bit please, Geoffrey? My understanding is that
the ships that were important in subduing the U-boat menace were small
ships, DD and smaller. What ships were being held for a potential invasion
of France were released instead for duty in the Atlantic against U-boats
but not for the invasion of Sicily?

Starting with the escort carriers, look where HMS Avenger was lost,
plus escorts.

The allies expected significant U-boat opposition to the invasion of
French North Africa, plus of course the extra escorts troop convoys
normally had. So there were a lot of allied anti submarine assets
around North Africa for the invasion and the period shortly after.
The Germans did direct all U-boats in the Azores/Mediterranean
area plus any in the Atlantic that had enough fuel to make it to
North Africa. Doenitz was not happy given the strength of the
defences and gradually managed to cut the numbers and
increase the patrol areas into the Atlantic, returning as quickly as
possible to the main convoy routes.

When the troops were ashore and the African supply convoy
system was in place the allies could redeploy assets. It gave
them a "sudden" increase in strength available in the Atlantic
area.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Chris Allen
What was the main reason for Western Allies to land in Italy early 1943?

In actual fact at Casablanca the decision was to invade Sicily, not
Italy, that came later. As some US commanders feared just as
invading North Africa pushed an invasion of Sicily so an invasion
of Sicily pushed an invasion of Italy. The sort of mission creep they
were trying to avoid, in this theatre anyway.

The US landings in Morocco/Algeria were the first seaborne
invasion attempted by US troops -- against such peculiar
resistance (Vichy French forces, no Germans or Italians) that
(I guess) the commanders decided not much was to be learned
from this case.

By contrast, Sicily seemed a reasonable next attempt: not
too far across the sea, with integrated plans of all arms
(sea, air, ground, paratroops etc.) and therefore was organized
and attempted. It was (1) strategically successful, with (2)
plenty of tactical errors that could be analysed so as to
avoid them next time.

FYI Operation Husky (the Sicily invasion) was the climax of
the War Studies curriculum at the RAF College Cranwell
in the 1950s. The main reason is probably that it was
fully comprehensive (all arms, both British and US) but not
uniquely large (like D-Day) and successful (unlike Salerno and
Anzio.) A minor reason may have been Air Marshal Tedder's
role (as US Supremo Eisenhower's British deputy commander.)

[GFH]

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Chris Allen
What was the main reason for Western Allies to land in Italy early 1943?

In actual fact at Casablanca the decision was to invade Sicily, not
Italy, that came later. As some US commanders feared just as
invading North Africa pushed an invasion of Sicily so an invasion
of Sicily pushed an invasion of Italy. The sort of mission creep they
were trying to avoid, in this theatre anyway.

The US landings in Morocco/Algeria were the first seaborne
invasion attempted by US troops -- against such peculiar
resistance (Vichy French forces, no Germans or Italians) that
(I guess) the commanders decided not much was to be learned
from this case.
By contrast, Sicily seemed a reasonable next attempt: not
too far across the sea, with integrated plans of all arms
(sea, air, ground, paratroops etc.) and therefore was organized
and attempted. It was (1) strategically successful, with (2)
plenty of tactical errors that could be analysed so as to
avoid them next time.
FYI Operation Husky (the Sicily invasion) was the climax of
the War Studies curriculum at the RAF College Cranwell
in the 1950s. The main reason is probably that it was
fully comprehensive (all arms, both British and US) but not
uniquely large (like D-Day) and successful (unlike Salerno and
Anzio.) A minor reason may have been Air Marshal Tedder's
role (as US Supremo Eisenhower's British deputy commander.)

Reciting my father's (mine sweepers) information --
he was in all of the Med. invasions:

North Africa: Totally amateur, but the hope that
the North African French would not fight was fulfilled.

Sicily: Much better, but lacking a lot of specialized
invasion equipment.

Salerno: Very short distance. More like a river
crossing.

Anzio: A major shift in location by water. Lacked
sorely needed LSTs, which were being husbanded for
the upcoming invasion of northern France. The Germans
introduced new magnetic mines -- a lot of equipment
lost, which could not be requisitioned before southern
France. (He 'requisitioned' German equipment abandoned
to the French in North Africa.)

Southern France: Went like clockwork. He was awarded
the Legion of Merit (V) for pinpointing the location
of the (16 inch?) cannon removed French battleships
and installed (well camouflaged) where they covered
the invasion beach. How? He had his mine sweepers
goad the Germans into shooting at them. The mine
sweepers then triangulated the flashes of the cannon
shots. Yes, if a mine sweeper was hit, it would be
totally annihilated, but hitting one was very unlikely
and did not happen. Without GPS to locate each
mine sweeper, each one had to report three or more
bearings (2+ to locate the mine sweeper; one for the
flash). His command mine sweeper also did this and
did all of the location calculations for the other
mine sweepers and plotted the resulting intersecting
lines over the German cannon. Bombers took them out.
The bombers had been trying to do this for weeks, but
they did not know the exact locations of the well
camouflaged cannon. No 'Guns of Navarone' action.

GFH

[Haydn]

Post by GFH
North Africa: Totally amateur, but the hope that
the North African French would not fight was fulfilled.

The French, who still had down there a number of excellent infantry,
artillery and tank units (albeit with obsolete material), a considerable
air force and a traditionally proud navy, when ordered to fight and not
taken by surprise did fight, sometimes to the last round and with good
effect.

Around Casablanca and Port Lyautey it was the Americans - pinned and
taking mounting casualties - who had to hope that the ceasefire and
armistice would be signed and become effective as soon as possible, to
cut losses. The Oran assault was a disaster, and one can but imagine
what would have happened had there been a German panzer or panzer
grenadier division near any one of those locales.

Haydn

[GFH]

Post by Haydn

Post by GFH
North Africa: Totally amateur, but the hope that
the North African French would not fight was fulfilled.

The French, who still had down there a number of excellent infantry,
artillery and tank units (albeit with obsolete material), a considerable
air force and a traditionally proud navy, when ordered to fight and not
taken by surprise did fight, sometimes to the last round and with good
effect.
Around Casablanca and Port Lyautey it was the Americans - pinned and
taking mounting casualties - who had to hope that the ceasefire and
armistice would be signed and become effective as soon as possible, to
cut losses. The Oran assault was a disaster, and one can but imagine
what would have happened had there been a German panzer or panzer
grenadier division near any one of those locales.

My father was at Oran.

GFH

[Haydn]

Post by GFH
My father was at Oran.

Oran includes the assault landing inside the port, which was a dismal
failure, and the more successful landings west and east of Oran. Two
days of battle (light here, tough there, token resistance in some cases)
cost the 1st Armored Division 191 dead, 105 wounded and 9 missing; 1st
Infantry Division, 85 dead, 105 wounded, 7 missing.

The French lost probably 165 KIA and an unknown number of wounded.

Such losses may seem negligible compared with the total of about 15,000
men put ashore by nightfall on D-Day, but they are instead pretty high
in that context. 1st Inf. Div.'s losses may well have been higher than
on the first day of the Sicily invasion.

Haydn

[Haydn]

Post by Don Phillipson
By contrast, Sicily seemed a reasonable next attempt: not
too far across the sea, with integrated plans of all arms
(sea, air, ground, paratroops etc.) and therefore was organized
and attempted. It was (1) strategically successful

Considering that the overall attacking strength : defending strength
ratio was like cracking a nut with a sledgehammer, no wonder it was
strategically successful. In fact it was failure-proof and Montgomery's
revised plan streamlined it even further.

The only point still open to debate is how well or ill the Allies would
have managed a failed landing in any one of the landing areas, which was
not an absolutely impossible outcome as the Gela beachhead story
demonstrates. Aside from the blow on morale, the re-embarked and
disorganized troops should have been shifted to other, viable beachheads
in the course of the operations. The strain on Allied organizational and
logistical capabilities would have been massive.

Haydn

[c***@gmail.com]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
1) Clear the Mediterranean enough to allow allied convoys through
it, a significant saving from sending ships around Africa. To the end
of the war the allies felt constrained by the amount of available
shipping.

The Italian campaign was a net loss of shipping capacity, according to my
notes from H.P. Willmott, _Great Crusade._ He claims that merely supplying
the Italian people (exclusive of UN combat forces) took more shipping tonnage
than was used by the entire Philippine Islands campaign, for example.

Now, did the Allies realize how needy the Italian people would be? Probably
not; they certainly seem to have underestimated the demands of the
civil population for every other area they liberated.

On balance, as I recall (I didn't take notes on this) he felt that the Italian
campaign after the fall of Rome was probably a mistake: sure, they tied down
a number of German elite units (the Italian campaign had the highest ratio of
German elite units to generic infantry divisions for any theater) but the
overall number of forces was still small enough that it was probably better,
he felt, to focus more on the NW Europe front.

As for the soft underbelly of Europe, Willmott further claimed that 8th
Army plans for driving across the Alps and to Vienna called for 25 divisions-
more combat-ready divisions than the entire UK army had over the entire world,
roughly a quarter of the total US Army combat power (about a third of what the
US Army put into France), a significant diversion of combat force for a
relatively minor gain. While the drive to Rome/the Winter Line might have been
worthwhile, ultimately there was no path leading anywhere that was worth
the investment in combat power.

Chris Manteuffel

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by c***@gmail.com

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
1) Clear the Mediterranean enough to allow allied convoys through
it, a significant saving from sending ships around Africa. To the end
of the war the allies felt constrained by the amount of available
shipping.

The Italian campaign was a net loss of shipping capacity, according to my
notes from H.P. Willmott, _Great Crusade._ He claims that merely supplying
the Italian people (exclusive of UN combat forces) took more shipping tonnage
than was used by the entire Philippine Islands campaign, for example.

According to the British merchant ship budget drawn up in January
1945 for the first half of 1945 they wanted 60,000 deadweight tons
(DWT) of shipping continuously used for the Italian part of "National
Government Import Programs for Liberated Areas"

French North Africa, North France and Belgium were 200,000 DWT each,
South France 70,000.

As for military in the Pacific, the South West Pacific area budget was
proposed to be 900,000 DWT, the central Pacific 1,500,000 DWT.

On 22 November 1944 MacArthur was notified the President had
become involved in the discussions on the world wide shipping shortage,
since MacArthur was reported as holding some 476 ships, which if they
were all Liberties would be over 5 million DWT. Not all of that was
being used in the Philippines but the sheer distances of the Pacific war
used a lot of merchant shipping.

Various reports have the estimated saving of opening the Mediterranean
as 1 to 2 million tons, without stating whether that was Deadweight or
Gross, the US Maritime Commission built around 56.3 million DWT of
shipping in WWII or 39.9 million GRT.

Apart from India and easier access to Middle East Oil there was the
Persian Gulf supply line to the USSR.

By the looks of it civil relief shipments for the entire Mediterranean
Theatre was around 2.3 million long tons July 1943 to December 1944,
so around 130,000 tons a month but it was building, another 4.6 million
long tons was shipped January to September 1945, or 500,000 tons
per month. These figures exclude liquid fuels and lubricants (POL).

The US Army says it landed 14.8 million long tons in the ETO June
1944 to April 1945, again excluding POL, or around 1.35 million tons
a month, starting at 291,000 tons in June 1944, reaching 2,040,000
in March 1945. An estimate of British tonnage would be between
a third (in 1945) and a half (in mid 1944) the US figure.

Civil relief shipments to the ETO are put at 750,000 long tons in
1944 and 5,900,000 long tons for the first 9 months of 1945.

To give the best comparison I can to the US Army figures above
to end March 1945 civil relief supplies in the Mediterranean
Theatre were 3.7 million long tons, in the European Theater they
were 2.1 million long tons.

About half of all the relief shipments sent to Europe was coal,
most of that was from England, the other half was food, most of
that was from the US plus some from Canada.

So civil relief certainly took a lot of shipping which would reduce the
savings of the shorter voyage from the US or UK to the Middle East
or India. Based on the above figures Willmott is exaggerating the
merchant ship/civil relief "cost" of invading Italy but is drawing
attention to the fact there was a real price to pay.

Post by c***@gmail.com
Now, did the Allies realize how needy the Italian people would be? Probably
not; they certainly seem to have underestimated the demands of the
civil population for every other area they liberated.

Yes and no, my reading between the lines of the logistics histories
indicate the allies did well at early relief, but massively underestimated
the time it would take to put local economies back into shape and
therefore able to generate civilian supplies locally. I recall the allies
assigned some men and equipment to help in at least the harvest
in Italy at times, or understood that is what they had to do if they
wanted reasonable gathering of harvests.

The allies were hoping to purchase things like food locally, it was
thought that would help stimulate recovery, but any food purchases
tended to be flash points in a food scarce continent.

Post by c***@gmail.com
On balance, as I recall (I didn't take notes on this) he felt that the Italian
campaign after the fall of Rome was probably a mistake: sure, they tied down
a number of German elite units (the Italian campaign had the highest ratio of
German elite units to generic infantry divisions for any theater) but the
overall number of forces was still small enough that it was probably better,
he felt, to focus more on the NW Europe front.

Given many people start with the whole campaign was a mistake, and
plenty of others get off at the first winter Willmott is one of the more
generous critics.

A big what if starts with the allied break out in mid 1944 being more
successful in trapping German combat troops, before that comes
the same thing in Sicily.

Post by c***@gmail.com
As for the soft underbelly of Europe, Willmott further claimed that 8th
Army plans for driving across the Alps and to Vienna called for 25 divisions-
more combat-ready divisions than the entire UK army had over the entire world,
roughly a quarter of the total US Army combat power (about a third of what the
US Army put into France), a significant diversion of combat force for a
relatively minor gain. While the drive to Rome/the Winter Line might have been
worthwhile, ultimately there was no path leading anywhere that was worth
the investment in combat power.

There are all sorts of branch points with what ifs, at the very least
the allied invasions of Sicily and Italy enabled the easy taking of
Sardinia and Corsica thereby making the logistically useful
invasion of Southern France safer. Would such an invasion have
taken place if the allies had stayed in North Africa? Sicily? Would
it still happen but delayed, if so by how much? How would a
passive stance in the Mediterranean go with having the air
power needed to invade Southern France from North Africa?

Essentially Italy makes most sense if the allies can have the invasion
shipping, every time the Germans make a stand an army appears
on a beach behind them. That should maximise the chances of
trapping Germans and minimise the time taken to reach the Alps.
After that there are no good military options apart from redeployment
of most of the now experienced forces. Which leaves only the political
of being able to move into the Balkans instead of Stalin. I have
little doubt had the allies made the Alps in 1944 there would have
been some attempts to find a way through, which would most
likely have gone nowhere until pressure from other areas forced
a German withdrawal. Note though the lack of action on the
French/Italian border from around September 1944 to the end
of the war.

Next come the islands in the eastern Mediterranean, given how
sensitive Hitler was to them in 1943/44, if it forces the Germans
to fight where the allies should have the numbers in the air and
at sea it would be profitable, if the Germans simply pull back to
the mainland shut the operations down. Of course such actions
if successful would probably lead to an invasion of Greece rather
than the historical landings following the withdrawing Germans,
the usual sort of mission creep. An invasion of Greece is also
unlikely to do much militarily.

Having just wished into existence significantly more allied
resources (or alternatively taking most of the Pacific's
specialist invasion shipping) the alternative is whether the
Mediterranean forces could have been used more "profitably"
elsewhere.

Not in France until late 1944 when Antwerp, the southern
French ports and the rail system were working.

Moving them to India does not seem like a major gain,
unless the newly provided invasion shipping goes with them.
Burma rice, Malaya tin and rubber would be useful but if the
Pacific Theatre speeds up does that mean an invasion of
Japan in mid 1945, before the atomic bomb is proved?

By the way the US did move some Mediterranean air units to
France and others to India.

So it would seem the most "profitable" thing to do with the
forces in the Mediterranean in 1943 was to invade Italy, then
to mid 1944, until the invasion shipping was released from
Normandy, comes attacking the Germans in Italy (would
things be considered good enough if the Germans had
been largely trapped south of Rome?). After that what
other theatre could have used the forces, that is had the
supplies and plans to enable the transferred forces to fight
in addition to the forces those theatres historically had?

It cost much more merchant shipping to maintain a
soldier in the Pacific, Eisenhower's did not lack troops
in France compared with lack of supplies, plus there
was a large US Army in the US waiting to be deployed,
those armoured divisions were not of much use in the
Pacific.

A better Italian campaign from an allied perspective
needs to start much earlier, more shipping being built
sooner and so on, giving options to the allies, after that
comes for example taking a successful gamble to invade
Tunisia (or near it) in November 1942, then comes
invading Sicily to trap the forces there, or at least
blockade the straits of Messina and so on.

As noted before operations to the end of 1943 were
profitable for the allies, both in terms of losses inflicted
and experience and territory gained, from then on the
fighting has less to justify itself as worthwhile, and the
justification above, it was the most profitable (or lowest
loss making) use of the forces the allies had available
given their supply constraints does not give a great
feeling of value. Then add the well known mistakes
the allies made.

Just as had been predicted, once you start fighting in
an area it is hard to stop unless you have totally won or lost.
Apart from the emotional reasons the cost of moving and
supplying forces tends to support continued fighting where
they are, not in some other place.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich Rostrom]

60,000 deadweight tons (DWT) of shipping
continuously used for the Italian part of "National
Government Import Programs for Liberated Areas"
French North Africa, North France and Belgium were
200,000 DWT each, South France 70,000.
As for military in the Pacific, the South West
Pacific area budget was proposed to be 900,000 DWT,
the central Pacific 1,500,000 DWT...

<snip extremely informative discussion of Allied
shipping allocation and usage>

I don't think this can be evaluated purely in "tons
of shipping". What's needed is to find the tonnage
delivered to various points, and the distance that
tonnage had to travel, and also the tonnage and speed
of available Allied freighters. That is, ton-miles
used, and ton-miles available.

For instance, Lend-Lease materiel delivered to the
USSR via Iran. The voyage through the Med is short
than the voyage around Africa. How much shorter
(bearing in mind that the Mediterranean route has
to pass down the Red Sea and around Arabia)?

How many tons were delivered by that route? Thus, how
many ton-miles saved?

How much war materiel was shipped to or from India?

Shipments _to_ US/UK forces in the Middle East would
be trivial after the end of the North African campaign
in May 1943. But what about shipments of oil _from_
the Middle East? There were pipelines from the oil
fields to the Med; use of them would be an additional
saving.

Shipments to and from Australia via the Indian Ocean
also figure into it.

I guess the balance comes down to this.

Suppose the US/UK decide that after the African
campaign, they will take Sardinia and Corsica to
enable the invasion of southern France, but will
not invade Sicily or mainland Italy.

The Mediterranean remains closed to Allied shipping,
so shipments to and from iran, the Middle East, India,
and Australia require more ton-miles to deliver.

_But_ the Allies do not have to supply an army group
fighting in Italy, nor provide relief for Italian
civilians (except in Sardinia), saving all the
ton-miles used in those activities.

Which number is greater?

BTW, I wonder where did Allied relief for Italy go?
How much to Sicily, how much to Sardinia, how much to
the mainland? I'd guess that Sardinia didn't need or
get much.

[Mario]

Post by Rich Rostrom

60,000 deadweight tons (DWT) of shipping
continuously used for the Italian part of "National
Government Import Programs for Liberated Areas"
French North Africa, North France and Belgium were
200,000 DWT each, South France 70,000.
As for military in the Pacific, the South West
Pacific area budget was proposed to be 900,000 DWT,
the central Pacific 1,500,000 DWT...

<snip extremely informative discussion of Allied
shipping allocation and usage>
I don't think this can be evaluated purely in "tons
of shipping". What's needed is to find the tonnage
delivered to various points, and the distance that
tonnage had to travel, and also the tonnage and speed
of available Allied freighters. That is, ton-miles
used, and ton-miles available.
For instance, Lend-Lease materiel delivered to the
USSR via Iran. The voyage through the Med is short
than the voyage around Africa. How much shorter
(bearing in mind that the Mediterranean route has
to pass down the Red Sea and around Arabia)?
How many tons were delivered by that route? Thus, how
many ton-miles saved?
How much war materiel was shipped to or from India?
Shipments _to_ US/UK forces in the Middle East would
be trivial after the end of the North African campaign
in May 1943. But what about shipments of oil _from_
the Middle East? There were pipelines from the oil
fields to the Med; use of them would be an additional
saving.
Shipments to and from Australia via the Indian Ocean
also figure into it.
I guess the balance comes down to this.
Suppose the US/UK decide that after the African
campaign, they will take Sardinia and Corsica to
enable the invasion of southern France, but will
not invade Sicily or mainland Italy.
The Mediterranean remains closed to Allied shipping,
so shipments to and from iran, the Middle East, India,
and Australia require more ton-miles to deliver.

So why invade Northafrica if Med sea remains closed?

At least Sicily must be under allied control.

Post by Rich Rostrom
_But_ the Allies do not have to supply an army group
fighting in Italy, nor provide relief for Italian
civilians (except in Sardinia), saving all the
ton-miles used in those activities.
Which number is greater?
BTW, I wonder where did Allied relief for Italy go?
How much to Sicily, how much to Sardinia, how much to
the mainland? I'd guess that Sardinia didn't need or
get much.

Gross estimation, I haven't searched for census data (last
Italian census was in 1936, then one in 1951 with a 10%
increase):
Sardinia 1.2 M
Sicily 3.8 M
Calabria 1.55 M
Basilicata 0.47 M
Puglia 2.9 M
Campania 4.1 M

Total about 13 Million people, ~10% of them in Sardinia.

If Allied forced could also occupy central Italy:
Abruzzo & Molise 1.2 M
Lazio 3.8 M
Tuscany 2.7 M
Umbria 0.6 M
Marche 1.05 M

8.5 million people more.

Food production, I have no 1940's data but Sicily produces much
more wheat than Sardinia.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom

60,000 deadweight tons (DWT) of shipping
continuously used for the Italian part of "National
Government Import Programs for Liberated Areas"
French North Africa, North France and Belgium were
200,000 DWT each, South France 70,000.
As for military in the Pacific, the South West
Pacific area budget was proposed to be 900,000 DWT,
the central Pacific 1,500,000 DWT...

<snip extremely informative discussion of Allied
shipping allocation and usage>
I don't think this can be evaluated purely in "tons
of shipping". What's needed is to find the tonnage
delivered to various points, and the distance that
tonnage had to travel, and also the tonnage and speed
of available Allied freighters. That is, ton-miles
used, and ton-miles available.

You could do that, the alternative is as presented, the amount
of shipping on operation on the given trade route, which is
expected to deliver the desired amount of cargo.

The figures I have indicate tonnages delivered for the
relevant theatres, they are actually quarterly in the histories.

One important note is the world's merchant fleet existed
because there was trade to carry, while civil needs for
imports and surpluses requiring export could be reduced
during the war they were still substantial.

Also I cannot find a figure for how much of the Italian
merchant fleet made it to allied ports in September 1943.

Post by Rich Rostrom
For instance, Lend-Lease materiel delivered to the
USSR via Iran. The voyage through the Med is short
than the voyage around Africa. How much shorter
(bearing in mind that the Mediterranean route has
to pass down the Red Sea and around Arabia)?

According to the US in 1943 from New York to the near
east via the Cape of Good Hope and back again took
210 days. Via the Mediterranean in 1944 it was 109
days. About 10 days at each end was the planned
time allowed for loading and then unloading. So the
voyage time was around 190 days via the Cape and
90 days via the Mediterranean.

New York to the Mediterranean theatre was 78 days
in 1943.

San Francisco to the Southwest Pacific was 115 days,
actually faster than to the South Pacific which took 134
days. Distance mattered but so did port facilities and
the willingness/ability to clear and return ships.

Charleston to India was 185 days in 1943.

Post by Rich Rostrom
How many tons were delivered by that route? Thus, how
many ton-miles saved?

The shipping schedule, US to Persian Gulf, set at the
Casablanca conference was for 126 sailings in the
first 6 months of 1943, actual was 75 full and 15 partial
ship loads, 553,000 tons.

After starting in November 1941 shipments to the USSR
via the Persian Gulf to end June 1943 were 1,272,000
long tons, this took 168 sailings plus minor parts of the
cargo of another 74 sailings.

The last ship with material for the USSR via the Persian
Gulf left the US in January 1945 (the Black Sea route
was being opened), a few ships to May 12th carried part
cargoes.

All up 373 full sailings, 2.9 million long tons of cargo,
end 1941 to early 1945.

The Black Sea route adds 76 ships 672,000 long tons
of cargo, final sailings were in August 1945.

So say at most 2.2 million long tons were able to use
the Mediterranean, mainly in 1944.

Post by Rich Rostrom
How much war materiel was shipped to or from India?

Unknown, the US army shipped 6.4 million measurement
tons (40 cubic feet of cargo space, versus 100 cubic feet
for a register ton)

This is out of 126.8 million measurement tons shipped
from the US to overseas destinations including Alaska.

The British military would have shipped more to India but
note a key part of pre and early war planning was building
up war industries in the area which did happen, with Italy
looking hostile the Mediterranean route was assumed to
be closed in the early part of the war at least.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Shipments _to_ US/UK forces in the Middle East would
be trivial after the end of the North African campaign
in May 1943. But what about shipments of oil _from_
the Middle East? There were pipelines from the oil
fields to the Med; use of them would be an additional
saving.

Middle East oil tended to go to the Middle East, India
and Australia, the US and Caribbean supplying Europe.

By destination in May 1944 the allied tanker fleet in
Gross Register Tons, ships over 1,600 GRT, was
distributed as follows,

2.2 million with the navies,
1.7 million under repair, refit etc.,
3.3 million supplying England, Iceland and the USSR,
1.4 million Western Mediterranean, Azores and West Africa,
2 million Pacific including the Vladivostok run,
2 million US and Canadian Eastern Seaboard,
2 million other Western Hemisphere,
1.8 million "Indian Ocean", including Libya, East and South
Africa, India, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand,
total 16.9 million

Apparently the tanker fleet in the Indian Ocean stayed
around 1.7 to 1.8 million tons for most of the war.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Shipments to and from Australia via the Indian Ocean
also figure into it.

There were no major movements of troops or equipment
from the second half of 1943 onwards. Civil cargo as
planned for the first 6 months of 1944 saw the UK shipping
around 600,000 tons of such cargo to the Middle East, India,
Ceylon, New Zealand and Australia. All up the UK was
going to ship 982,000 tons of essential civil supplies in the
6 months to Africa, the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas.
The US was going to ship 2.4 million tons (0.9 of that to
Australia and New Zealand, 0.2 to North Africa, 0.4 to
South Africa)

Another 2.7 million tons of civil supplies was going to be
moved between Africa, the Middle East, Australia and New
Zealand from local production. And another 0.2 million
tons would be imported into the above areas from South
America.

So to meet the areas civil needs required planning to move
about 12.5 million tons of cargo in 1944 of that around 1.2
million of the UK and 1.4 million from the US would probably
benefit from having the Mediterranean open, then comes
any return cargo.

The US military loads to India seem to have had plenty of empty
ships on the return voyage, though this is in part due to the
military wanting them back immediately and cross trade
voyages could add weeks to round trip times.

The UK import plan for 1944 wanted around 2.6 million tons
from "East of Suez" and had actually imported 1.5 million to
end June (versus over 6 million tons from North America)

Post by Rich Rostrom
I guess the balance comes down to this.
Suppose the US/UK decide that after the African
campaign, they will take Sardinia and Corsica to
enable the invasion of southern France, but will
not invade Sicily or mainland Italy.
The Mediterranean remains closed to Allied shipping,
so shipments to and from iran, the Middle East, India,
and Australia require more ton-miles to deliver.

You can add the allied forces in North West Africa,
they would be supplied from the US/UK, rather than
the Middle East.

Post by Rich Rostrom
_But_ the Allies do not have to supply an army group
fighting in Italy, nor provide relief for Italian
civilians (except in Sardinia), saving all the
ton-miles used in those activities.

How much of an air force is left to guard Africa, also
navy and army? Removing the Italian fleet from axis
control makes things a lot easier, otherwise what is
to stop the axis mounting at least raids on allied Africa?

Taking Sicily opened up the shipping lanes, taking
southern Italy, Sardinia and Corsica made them much
safer, also allied aircraft in the newly taken areas could
attack important targets, including the beaches of southern
France while being able to also attack any axis attempt
to retake the territories. What important targets could
allied forces in North Africa hit? How much infrastructure
would be needed to maintain credible forces that make
any axis attack from Sicily etc. too expensive?

Post by Rich Rostrom
Which number is greater?

To answer that question you need to for example decide
how to account for the 15th Air Force, (an addition to the
what if is that it is unlikely Britain could have found room
for the 8th and 15th Air Force)

The US army reports it shipped 27.7 million measurement
tons to the Mediterranean Theatre, Central Africa and
the Middle East, which would include the Air Force, which
reports it shipped 3.9 million measurement tons to the
Mediterranean by water

So 11 million GRT of cargo with about 1.6 million for the
air force. Maybe 8 million long tons of cargo, the British
would ship comparable amounts. Then add the civil
relief to the newly liberated areas. In crude terms say
around 6 million tons of supplies in 1944 for the allied
military, say another million tons for the Italian civilians.

Apart from opening the Mediterranean there are the gains
of making North Africa safe, removing the Italian forces
from the axis side and opening up Austria, Southern France
and the Balkans to air attack. And Southern France to
invasion.

Think you now have a "simple" equation? The British
Merchant Shipping History says the allies shipped
around 2.1 million tons of civil relief supplies to the
Middle East in 1942 from the UK and US but part of
the cargo was for the military. It also indicates about
half the cargo was at no or little cost to overall shipping
capacity, as it was shipped in the available spare space
present in military cargo sailings.

Remember Full and Down? The ideal of hitting the weight
limit at the same time as hitting the cargo volume limit?
That usually required a mixture of cargo.

Or putting it another way crating vehicles could in theory
increase the number carried in a given ship by around 6
times, at a very real cost in time and effort and facilities at
both ends to crate and uncrate the vehicles. What the above
equation ignores is vehicles were light and you could always
pack cargo in and around them. (Crating tanks does not
save much space).

So in the savings column goes the shipping on Middle East
etc. civil relief, and the fact the use of spare capacity in
military sailings would have continued into 1943 and beyond.

It would appear in military capacity the allies paid a price to
keep fighting in Italy greater than the merchant ship capacity
saved by opening up the Mediterranean. Throw in the civil
cargo movements and things change.

So if we hand wave things to say a cost of 7 million tons
a year of extra civil and military shipments to Italy, less
whatever you allocate to formations like the 15th Air Force,
in 1944 you are going to halve the time it takes to move
around 2.6 million tons of civil cargo to the Middle East
and beyond (US to Australia and New Zealand assumed
via Pacific) about 1.8 million tons of Lend Lease to the
USSR plus the military shipments to India (US army
maybe 0.7 million tons, I would expect the British to
match that), plus further exports to Australia and New
Zealand. So 2.6+1.8+1.4 is 5.8 million tons, "savings"
as each ship should in theory do 2 voyages instead of
1 is about 11.5 minus 7, so 4.5 million tons.

Another figure to throw in is the planned number of sailings
from the UK and US in the first half of 1944 as part of the
military program were 210 to India versus 443 to the
Mediterranean implying a ratio of about 2 to 1, so if
the Mediterranean was sent 6 million tons, India was sent
approaching 3 million or double the 1.4 million used above.
Note the cargo would include Lend Lease material.

And now is about the time to mention all the times the UK
Merchant Shipping history makes it clear calculations of
cargo capacity are complex and many of the figures needed
to do calculations on efficiencies were not recorded.

How much shipping was saved? I am confident more
than was used to maintain the fighting in Italy, even before
we talk about deducting tonnages for the 15th AF etc. I
wonder it was around 4 or more million though. Half of
that brings us nearer to the upper estimates of 1 to 2
million tons often mentioned, but of course the shipping
routes open would drive an increase in cargo movements,
that is material being moved that would have been ignored
had less shipping capacity been available. The more
cargo shipped the more "savings".

The US shipped about 870,000 tons of grains to India in
1945, previously grains had been mainly from Australia,
though of course harvests fluctuated.

Post by Rich Rostrom
BTW, I wonder where did Allied relief for Italy go?
How much to Sicily, how much to Sardinia, how much to
the mainland? I'd guess that Sardinia didn't need or
get much.

It would be mostly population dependent but it would vary
according to the local economy, including how much
damage had been taken, Naples was not a very livable
city at the end of 1943. The figures I have are only at
theatre level, you would need to look at histories of allied
management of liberated areas.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So if we hand wave things to say a cost of 7 million tons
a year of extra civil and military shipments to Italy, less
whatever you allocate to formations like the 15th Air Force,
in 1944 you are going to halve the time it takes to move
around 2.6 million tons of civil cargo to the Middle East
and beyond (US to Australia and New Zealand assumed
via Pacific) about 1.8 million tons of Lend Lease to the
USSR plus the military shipments to India (US army
maybe 0.7 million tons, I would expect the British to
match that), plus further exports to Australia and New
Zealand. So 2.6+1.8+1.4 is 5.8 million tons, "savings"
as each ship should in theory do 2 voyages instead of
1 is about 11.5 minus 7, so 4.5 million tons.

(snip)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
How much shipping was saved? I am confident more
than was used to maintain the fighting in Italy, even before
we talk about deducting tonnages for the 15th AF etc. I
wonder it was around 4 or more million though

as that assumes each ship did only 1 trip per year when
in fact opening up the Mediterranean increased the number
of round trips from the US to the Indian Ocean Area from
around 1.5 to 3, and even better from England, so the same
shipping could move over twice the cargo. If you use the
4.5 million tons of cargo savings then

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Half of
that brings us nearer to the upper estimates of 1 to 2
million tons often mentioned, but of course the shipping
routes open would drive an increase in cargo movements,
that is material being moved that would have been ignored
had less shipping capacity been available. The more
cargo shipped the more "savings".

Regarding the above, delete key did a special offer, hundreds of
characters deleted for the price of one keystroke, proof reading
then failed to notice.

Hopefully I now have the factors correct, but time to try
things another way.

Assuming 4 round trips per year to the Mediterranean and
100% efficiency, it would have cost the allies around 1.75
million tons of merchant shipping to support operations in
the theatre and civil relief in Italy, Sardinia etc. being generous
with the civil aid allocation to those areas. Operations include
anti submarine operations and air defence of allied territory
as well as the offensive actions in Italy, Austria, the Balkans
and France.

In the no invasion out of Africa option there are still allied
troops, aircraft and ships operating in the eastern and western
Mediterranean. While the garrisons in French North Africa
could be supplied direct from the US and UK what about those
in say Libya and points east? Would the allies run special
Mediterranean convoys for them from the US/UK, or send
their supplies around the cape? Most probably a mixture
depending on the strength of axis forces present. Essentially
if you want to save on merchant shipping by running convoys
through the Mediterranean the allies need active air and naval
operations to suppress the axis air and naval units, which in
turn requires a level of supplies for the theatre to enable these
offensive operations and adequate defences of the supply
routes and dumps. Remembering the Germans were
operating on interior lines and could move units to the
theatre quicker than the allies.

Meantime instead of using 2/3 of 5.8 million tons of shipping
(3.8 million) for Indian Ocean etc. cargo, in 1944 it drops to
1/3 or 1.9 million using the Mediterranean. If in fact military
cargo to India was the higher figure of half the historical
Mediterranean figure instead of a quarter, the tonnage "East
of Suez", climbs to 7.4 million, requiring around 5 million tons
of shipping via the Cape of Good hope and 2.5 million via the
Mediterranean.

So 2 to 2.5 million tons of merchant shipping, if the North Africa
only garrison requires as much shipping as the historical theatre
and no convoys transit the Suez Canal then this is pure "savings",
reduce the "savings" for each ship not needed in the reduced
Mediterranean theatre and for each ship using the Suez Canal,
less any increase in losses in the Mediterranean.

For an idea of garrison supply.

The maximum load carried by a B-25 was around 16,000 pounds,
8 short tons, assuming consumption of 5 tons of fuel, bombs
and ammunition per sortie then 100 sorties is 500 tons of supplies,
plus the usual food, spare parts, airfield maintenance etc.

It is likely the allies would have needed some heavy bombers, their
maximum load was around 30,000 pounds.

Based on the June to September 1944 combat SHAEF calculated the
daily supply requirements as 541 tons per divisional slice in normal
combat, 426 tons if regrouping or negotiating natural obstacles and 462
tons in a rapid advance. Of the 541 tons the division itself consumed
223 tons and the rest by corps and army overheads. This calculation
apparently ignores air units.

The RN official history notes the allies lost 80 merchant ships of
around 400,000 tons to enemy action in the Mediterranean June to
December 1943.

The 1 to 2 million tons of shipping saved by opening up the
Mediterranean seems to be about the best sort of measurement
we can do short of detailed figures of all civil and military imports
and exports and even then we have to estimate the requirements
of the hypothetical North African garrison. With the final point the
savings depend on how much East of Suez traffic there is and
that in turn was influenced by the time it takes to complete the
voyage.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Bill Shatzer]

I am surprised that no one has mentioned the second volume of Rick
Adtinson's Liberation Trilogy - "The Day of Battle" - which contains a
lengthy and excellent discussion of the various political, strategic,
logistic, and military considerations which went into the decision to
follow up Sicily with an invasion of the Italian mainland.

The entire three volumes of the Liberation Trilogy is highly
recommended. The best history of the Allied campaigns in
Africa/Mediterrean/Western Europe I've come across in many years.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by Bill Shatzer
The entire three volumes of the Liberation Trilogy is highly
recommended. The best history of the Allied campaigns in
Africa/Mediterrean/Western Europe I've come across in many years.

I too would recommend the series; they make good reading. One word of
caution though: Bill calls it a history of the _Allied_ campaigns. I
would suggest that that is not strictly the case. Atkinson makes it
clear that it is a history of the _American_ campaigns. The roles played
by the various other Allies are for the most part only cursorily
covered, and then only to the extent that they impacted the US role and
experience. I do not find anything illegitimate in that as long as we
are clear about it. To have covered the entire spectrum of the Allied
armies, their strategies to the same level of detail that he gives the
US forces would have taken at least three times as much space as the
already massive publications. He set out to write a history of the US
Army in the MTO/ETO and that is what he has done.

Michael

[Haydn]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by Bill Shatzer
The entire three volumes of the Liberation Trilogy is highly
recommended. The best history of the Allied campaigns in
Africa/Mediterrean/Western Europe I've come across in many years.

I too would recommend the series; they make good reading. One word of
caution though:.............Atkinson makes it
clear that it is a history of the _American_ campaigns. ..............
He set out to write a history of the US
Army in the MTO/ETO and that is what he has done.

Atkinson's information rests heavily on US memoirs, official histories,
campaign histories and unit histories, many of which dating back to the
late 40s or early/mid 50s and never substantially updated or revised since.

Obviously, had he taken in also what the other Allies did, and the
German and Italian side of the hill, the series would have easily
multiplied by several times its current size. I don't mean that as a
criticism levelled at the author. However the information state of the
art seems to me more or less the same as could be found in a 1955 book.
It's no breakthrough work, just a highly readable industrious one-sided
compilation of one-sided old sources.

Haydn

[Rich Rostrom]

"Geoffrey Sinclair" <***@froggy.com.au> wrote:

Many excellent points!

You mentioned in passing something I overlooked:

There was _essential_ civil freight moving to/from
"east of Suez" as well as war shipping, and that
activity also required additional shipping due to
the Med being closed.

That is perhaps as big a factor as the requirements
for Italian relief.

Other points: I don't think NW Africa ever drew
significant supply from the Middle East, except
possible fuel.

By the time of the Italian surrender, Italy's
merchant fleet was almost entirely lost. Many
ships were lost to Italy due to being out of the
Med when war was declared. Some of those had
already fallen into Allied hands, I'd bet.

Of the ships remaining in the Med, a lot (most?)
were sunk on convoy runs to Africa or Greece.
What was left was not a significant addition to
Allied shipping (in my estimate).

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom
There was _essential_ civil freight moving to/from
"east of Suez" as well as war shipping, and that
activity also required additional shipping due to
the Med being closed.
That is perhaps as big a factor as the requirements
for Italian relief.

If you look at the figures the civil traffic was bigger than the
civil relief for the Mediterranean Theatre and Italy seems
to have been a minority of such supplies.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Other points: I don't think NW Africa ever drew
significant supply from the Middle East, except
possible fuel.

Agreed and even then NW Africa seems to have had
its fuel supplied from the Americas. As noted Libya
was about as far west as the Indian Ocean tankers
would go.

Post by Rich Rostrom
By the time of the Italian surrender, Italy's
merchant fleet was almost entirely lost. Many
ships were lost to Italy due to being out of the
Med when war was declared. Some of those had
already fallen into Allied hands, I'd bet.

Many took shelter in American ports, the US ended
up in control of many but generally handed them over
to other users.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Of the ships remaining in the Med, a lot (most?)
were sunk on convoy runs to Africa or Greece.
What was left was not a significant addition to
Allied shipping (in my estimate).

The British merchant ship history says in terms of
ships of 1,600 tons or larger in 1939 Italy had 571
ships of 3,107,000 GRT or 3,816,000 DWT.

War losses are put at around 2,600,000 GRT including
coasters. About 1/3 of the merchant fleet was outside
the Mediterranean when Italy declared war, as a result
180,000 tons was scuttled to prevent capture, then in
February and April 1941 some 200,000 GRT was
scuttled in the Red Sea and a further 500,000+ GRT was
seized in North and South America in December 1941.

Apart from the scuttled/captured ships all other cause
losses to end September 1943 are put at 1.9 million GRT,
mostly in the Mediterranean.

Given new construction and captures it seems about
1,250,000 tons of shipping was under Italian control
in September 1943, but a lot to around half was under
or awaiting repair.

Gaining a quarter of it would have been a nice bonus.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=93416

For a discussion on the topic.

I do not have a good figure on how much ended up
in allied control.

Lloyds says 5 Italian ships of 12,248 GRT were lost
in allied service, all in 1943 plus a 4,200 GRT ship
captured, again in 1943.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Alan Meyer]

Post by Chris Allen
What was the main reason for Western Allies to land in Italy early 1943?

...

Churchill believed:

1. The western Allies were not strong enough to invade France in 1943.

There weren't enough troops, ships, tanks, supplies, aircraft, etc.

I think most historians believe that he was right and the American
generals who thought the invasion of Italy was a useless distraction had
to agree that an invasion of France would be at least very risky in 1943
if not downright suicidal.

2. It was unconscionable to do nothing while the Soviets did all of the
fighting.

From a moral point of view this seems right. But even from a hard
nosed geopolitical point of view it may have been right. If Stalin
believed he was fighting solely on his own, wouldn't it give him more
incentive to make a separate peace?

3. Taking the largest German ally off the board in Europe seemed like a
big win.

The Italians weren't nearly as effective as Hitler must have hoped they
would be, but they did furnish troops and supplies. Moving 44 million
people from the Axis to the Allied camp sounded like a great idea.

4. Germany was vulnerable in its "soft underbelly".

From Italy, Churchill hoped to launch attacks into Yugoslavia and
Greece. These would both hurt the Germans and free a pair of hard
fighting allies who would rejoin the Allied cause.

It might even induce Turkey to enter the war.


My reading of the history is that Churchill was right about numbers 1
and 2 and wrong about 3 and 4.