Why couldn't the Soviets shut down the Stukas?

[Rich Rostrom]

T'other day I read an account of a Eastern Front
battle in late 1943. At several points during
this battle, Stukas intervened, destroying
Soviet tanks, bombing and strafing infantry,
and significantly delaying the Soviet victory.

The extent of the Stuka activities surprised me.

The Soviets by this time had lots of capable
fighters, especially at low altitude. And
my understanding is that the Stuka was very
vulnerable to hostile fighters of even moderate
quality. Where the Luftwaffe had air supremacy,
the Stukas were devastating, but in contested
air, they suffered heavily - even in France in
1940 at times.

By late 1943, the air over the Eastern Front
was at the very least contested, if not
dominated by Soviet air power.

So how did the Stuka still operate effectively
there?

[Don Phillipson]

Post by Rich Rostrom
T'other day I read an account of a Eastern Front
battle in late 1943. At several points during
this battle, Stukas intervened, destroying
Soviet tanks, bombing and strafing infantry,
and significantly delaying the Soviet victory.
The extent of the Stuka activities surprised me.
The Soviets by this time had lots of capable
fighters, especially at low altitude. And
my understanding is that the Stuka was very
vulnerable to hostile fighters of even moderate
quality. Where the Luftwaffe had air supremacy,
the Stukas were devastating, but in contested
air, they suffered heavily - even in France in
1940 at times.
By late 1943, the air over the Eastern Front
was at the very least contested, if not
dominated by Soviet air power.
So how did the Stuka still operate effectively
there?

We need to know how Soviet fighter command was
organized, viz. like France in 1940 or like England
in 1940. I suspect the former, viz. that the USSR
had no system of "sector control" with rapid identification
of incoming raids so that fighter squadrons could be
directed to intercept them before they reached their
targets. Heinz Rudel's memoir Stuka Pilot (1958)
says he often flew several missions in a single day
on the Eastern Front -- implying all were at short
range, allowing little time for radar to plot a raid and
direct interception of bombers, even if the Soviets
had such an organization. Only standing patrols
by fighters seem likely to intercept sorties of 100
miles or less, as seem to have been common.

(Some of Rudel's narrative seems implausible,
e.g. chap. 14 on summer 1944. One anecdote says
Field Marshal Schoerner phoned Rudel at 3.30 a.m. to
order Stuka attacks on a formation of 40 tanks that
had broken through German lines. But I doubt that the
CO of Army Group North would personally issue a
tactical order like this. (Besides, Schoerner was not
promoted field marshal until April,1945.))

[c***@gmail.com]

Post by Rich Rostrom
The Soviets by this time had lots of capable
fighters, especially at low altitude.

The Soviets started the Kursk operation with
approximately twice the strength of the Luftwaffe,
in 4 Air Armies, according to my notes from Hardesty,
_Red Phoenix Rising_.

My notes further say that the problem was the training
of the Soviet fighter pilots: they lacked the initiative to
go out and react to opportunities, strictly following
orders and flying exactly where they were told to, and with
the limited GCI the result was sub-optimal, even though their
aircraft were only a bit worse than their counterparts and
they massive quantitative advantages. Though as the battle
continued and their pilots got more experience, they performed
better- the first day was a fiasco but performance improved.

Chris Manteuffel

[Greg Schuler]

Post by Rich Rostrom
T'other day I read an account of a Eastern Front
battle in late 1943. At several points during
this battle, Stukas intervened, destroying
Soviet tanks, bombing and strafing infantry,
and significantly delaying the Soviet victory.
The extent of the Stuka activities surprised me.
The Soviets by this time had lots of capable
fighters, especially at low altitude. And
my understanding is that the Stuka was very
vulnerable to hostile fighters of even moderate
quality. Where the Luftwaffe had air supremacy,
the Stukas were devastating, but in contested
air, they suffered heavily - even in France in
1940 at times.
By late 1943, the air over the Eastern Front
was at the very least contested, if not
dominated by Soviet air power.
So how did the Stuka still operate effectively
there?

Soviet air activities were geared towards offensive
support of the offensive. It may not have been part
of the battle plan to provide fighter sweeps or air
cover for the troops if they were not part of the
main offensive. Additionally, the Soviets were
still in infancy in exerting air power over the
Eastern front in 1943.

Without knowing the specific action, it would have
been very possible for a small force of German
aircraft to gain local superiority and defeat the
ground elements before fighters could have been
vectored to the troubled sector. Coordination
between the ground and air elements was not as
efficient as the German or Western allies at that
point.

[Padraigh ProAmerica]

Clearly there was a qualitative gap, as well as an opertional one.

The Luftwaffe operated near the front lines; pilots often flew 3 or 4
sorties in a day- which is how Maj. Eric Hartmann garnered over 900
sorties and 352 kills in less than 2 years.

Any advatage in materiel quality is negated if your people aren't
properly trained- and that, at least in some phases of the war- was the
Soviet's Achilles heel.

--
"Communism doesn't work because people like to own stuff."--

Frank Zappa--

[AlexMilman]

Post by Padraigh ProAmerica
Clearly there was a qualitative gap, as well as an opertional one.
The Luftwaffe operated near the front lines; pilots often flew 3 or 4
sorties in a day- which is how Maj. Eric Hartmann garnered over 900
sorties and 352 kills in less than 2 years.
Any advatage in materiel quality is negated if your people aren't
properly trained- and that, at least in some phases of the war- was the
Soviet's Achilles heel.

And later Luftwaffe's Achilles heel: using experienced pilots around
the clock did result in some high scores but they were not available
to teach the new pilots. WWII was about massive deployment and not
primadonnas.