"Mediterranean strategy"

Post by Alan Meyer
According to some sources (Andrew Roberts was one if I remember
correctly) some top German generals proposed a Mediterranean strategy to
Hitler.

I think it was Grossadmiral Raeder who was the main proponent in favor
of a Mediterranean strategy.

I agree.

But there were other factors that should be kept in mind. Hitler did
actually entertain the idea of a Mediterranean strategy to drive Britain
out of the war, but the strategy hinged on being able to bring Spain and
Vichy France in as active allies. Spain so that Gibraltar could be
assaulted and captured. France so that bases in French North Africa
would be available. The French fleet would also be nice to have.

This diplomatic effort floundered due to the conflicting demands of
those two parties. In addition to material demands by Franco in order
for his country to survive a blockade let alone engage in military
operations, he demanded much of the territory that the French held in
North Africa, specifically in Morocco. This, Vichy flatly refused.

At that point, Hitler lost interest in the whole project and turned his
eyes east. From then on, his primary concern in Africa was to ensure
that his Italian ally did not get ejected.

Post by Alan Meyer
1. Would the Germans have easily overrun Egypt and the Suez Canal if
they had not invaded the USSR?

Depends on whether they could maintain the logistical support for the
necessary forces. Those forces needn't be huge; another armored and a
couple more motorized infantry divisions along with the Italian forces
already in the theater would have been sufficient if they could have
been kept fully supplied and up to strength. A major air commitment all
over the central and eastern Med would have been necessary too, but
supplying them would have been somewhat simpler as at least half of them
could be flying from European bases (counting island bases like
Sardinia, Sicily, and Crete as part of Europe).

Post by Alan Meyer
2. Would they have been able to go as far as the oil fields in Iraq or
Saudi Arabia? To actually take some of the oil? Or at least to disrupt
oil supplies to the UK?

Again I agree with you. Thrusting as far as Iraq and Iran would likely
have been beyond their logistical capability. For reasons discussed in
this group last year, even if they had captured the oilfields, it is
extremely unlikely that they could have returned them to full
production, let alone be able to ship useful quantities of petroleum
products where they would be needed.

Post by Alan Meyer
3. Would the loss of Egypt and the canal been of great harm to the UK,
or would it have made relatively little difference in the course of the
war (assuming of course that Russia was eventually invaded. If Russia
were not invaded the entire course of events would certainly be
dramatically different.)

As long as merchant convoys are unable to transit the Mediterranean
unmolested, possession of the canal is largely irrelevant.

Post by Alan Meyer
4. Assuming the British could not successfully defend the canal, could
they at least have made a successful retreat down the Red Sea or
wherever? Or would the Eighth Army and the Mediterranean fleet have had
to surrender to the Germans?

The plan was to retreat down the Red Sea. I doubt that the Axis could
have applied enough force to prevent that...but then I would have been
doubtful that they could capture Tobruk in a day. Disasters happen and
luck always plays a part.

Post by Alan Meyer
5. Given his wartime goals, was Hitler right to make only minor efforts
in Africa, or were the generals right in recommending a major effort there?

A really major effort in the Med in 1941 *might* have seriously
inconvenienced Britain and led to the collapse of the Churchill
government. This in turn might have led to an armistice and a temporary
cessation of hostilities. But that is rather a long shot. But it also
gives the USSR an additional year to prepare for war, so that if Germany
attacks in 1942 they are apt to have a much harder go of it. In short,
absent a string of even greater blunders on the part of the Allies than
was actually the case, I see Germany as doomed to lose the war. The only
question is whether sooner or later.

Post by Alan Meyer
6. Would conquering the Med have made it easier or harder for Germany to
attack the USSR later, say in 1942?

See above.

Bay Man

2013-03-05 15:18:39 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
2. Would they have been able to go as far as the oil fields in Iraq
or Saudi Arabia? To actually take some of the oil? Or at least to
disrupt oil supplies to the UK?

Michael, If Germany had taken Egypt and moved into Iraq, they would not be
fighting the USSR, only remnants of the British. They would have the time to
set up oil transportation. OK the Brits could maybe raid from India by long
range bombers and maybe some naval raids.

Post by Michael Emrys
As long as merchant convoys are unable to transit the Mediterranean
unmolested, possession of the canal is largely irrelevant.

The canal was vital if Germany wanted Japan to join the war.

Post by Michael Emrys
But it also gives the USSR an additional year to prepare for war, so
that if Germany attacks in 1942 they are apt to have a much harder go
of it.

The USSR would be flooded with T-34 tanks by 1942/43. If the Soviets had
them in all units by June 1941, and on the western borders, the Germans
would not have got to Moscow by Dec 1941.

Michael Emrys

2013-03-05 20:56:02 UTC

Post by Bay Man
Michael, If Germany had taken Egypt and moved into Iraq, they would not
be fighting the USSR, only remnants of the British. They would have the
time to set up oil transportation.

And how pray tell would they be able to do that? There was no rail link
between Iraq and Syria to move oil to tankers waiting on the coast. And
you'd better believe that the pipeline would have been demolished. We
had this discussion already last year.

Post by Bay Man
The canal was vital if Germany wanted Japan to join the war.

Why? Japan had its own reasons for going to war that had absolutely
nothing to do with possession of the canal. Proof of which is that they
in fact went to war although Britain retained possession for the entire
war. Or had that fact escaped your notice?

Michael

Bay Man

2013-03-06 21:23:34 UTC

Post by Bay Man
Michael, If Germany had taken Egypt and moved into Iraq, they would not
be fighting the USSR, only remnants of the British. They would have the
time to set up oil transportation.

And how pray tell would they be able to do that?

They would put in the transportation and facilities. They would have the
time to do it. The Japs built a railway in Burma.

Post by Bay Man
The canal was vital if Germany wanted Japan to join the war.

Why? Japan had its own reasons for going to war that had absolutely
nothing to do with possession of the canal.

The prime reason was the USSR, who they thought would capitulate and link
up with the Germans. That would not be the case as the USSR was out of the
war, as Stalin was happy to see the western powers carve each other up. The
canal would make it easier to link up. The Japanese could only attack the
Brits not the USA.

Michael Emrys

2013-03-06 21:51:54 UTC

Post by Bay Man
They would put in the transportation and facilities.

Made from fairy dust no doubt? We went over this last year in case you
have forgotten.

Post by Bay Man
They would have the time to do it. The Japs built a railway in Burma.

Good grief.

Post by Bay Man
The prime reason was the USSR, who they thought would capitulate and
link up with the Germans.

The USSR would capitulate and link up with the Germans?

Post by Bay Man
The Japanese could only attack the Brits not the USA.

That was not their plan, and for fairly rational reasons.

Michael

Bay Man

2013-03-06 23:52:27 UTC

Post by Bay Man
They would put in the transportation and facilities.

Made from fairy dust no doubt?

No by metal rails, roads, port facilities, etc. The Germans did know how to
do these things.

Michael Emrys

2013-03-07 14:28:13 UTC

The Germans did know how to do these things.

Of course they *knew*. It was not exactly an industrial secret. But
between *knowing* how to do a thing and actually having the *capacity*
to do it a very large gap can open up. So it was here. The Germans knew
how to do a lot of things they never quite got around to simply because
there was too much on their plate.

Michael

Bay Man

2013-03-07 15:22:18 UTC

The Germans did know how to do these things.

Of course they *knew*. It was not exactly an industrial secret. But
between *knowing* how to do a thing and actually having the *capacity* to
do it a very large gap can open up. So it was here. The Germans knew how
to do a lot of things they never quite got around to simply because there
was too much on their plate.

If they pushed the Brist out of NA and the Middle East and not fighting the
Soviets, they would not be distracted and could put in the infrastructure.
They could them attack whoever, at their leisure.

Michael Emrys

2013-03-07 16:07:43 UTC

Post by Bay Man
If they pushed the Brist out of NA and the Middle East and not fighting
the Soviets, they would not be distracted and could put in the
infrastructure. They could them attack whoever, at their leisure.

Except that--oops!--Stalin attacks in 1942 while your pants are down. How
inconsiderate of him!

Michael

Alan Meyer

2013-03-15 20:08:17 UTC

Post by Bay Man
They would put in the transportation and facilities.

Made from fairy dust no doubt?

No by metal rails, roads, port facilities, etc. The Germans did know
how to do these things.

I think it's feasible but difficult, and especially so under wartime
conditions. It's something like a thousand miles as the crow flies from
Haifa to Basrah. At around 200 tons of rails, ties, spike, bolts, tie
plates, etc. per mile, that's 200 tons of material per mile. Add in
food, water, tents, etc. for the men, fuel and water for the machines,
plus cement, bridging equipment and materials, etc. Then there are
trucks locomotives, freight cars, etc. I imagine we're talking about, a
minimum of 300,000 tons for the whole job. At 5,000 tons per freighter,
that's 60 shiploads of supplies - feasible, but a big undertaking. Then
they'd have to have a way to defend that 1,000 mile railway through
potentially hostile territory against saboteurs and air attacks. And if
they managed to get all of the way to Basrah, they'd find everything
blown to bits by the British and have a big engineering challenge ahead,
while fighting against Brits who are now probably closer to their
sources of supply in the Mideast and India than the Germans are to
theirs in Europe.

I would think it's definitely possible, but whether it's practical is
another matter. If there is any sandy desert or mountains in the way,
everything gets MUCH harder.

I think the Germans would ask themselves this question: If we put all of
these resources into doing this (taking them from elsewhere) and
invested the year or two it would take, would it win the war for us? If
not, it's a waste. I think the answer they would come up with is that
it's not a war winning plan.

See http://tacnet.missouri.org/history/railroads/rrcosts.html for some
interesting statistics on the cost of railways in the U.S.

The Horny Goat

2013-03-10 14:28:03 UTC

On Wed, 06 Mar 2013 16:23:34 -0500, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The prime reason was the USSR, who they thought would capitulate and link
up with the Germans. That would not be the case as the USSR was out of the
war, as Stalin was happy to see the western powers carve each other up. The
canal would make it easier to link up. The Japanese could only attack the
Brits not the USA.

What are you suggesting? That this would induce Stalin to join the
Axis as a full partner?

I can see this would have been a good deal from the German point of
view (at least in the short term) but there's no way Hitler would ever
induce the Red Army to turn southwards.

Bay Man

2013-03-10 18:04:10 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
On Wed, 06 Mar 2013 16:23:34 -0500, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The prime reason was the USSR, who they thought would capitulate
and link up with the Germans. That would not be the case as the USSR
was out of the war, as Stalin was happy to see the western powers
carve each other up. The canal would make it easier to link up. The
Japanese could only attack the Brits not the USA.

What are you suggesting? That this would induce Stalin to join the
Axis as a full partner?

No. The USSR fully out. The Japs ignore the US and attack only Brits and
Dutch (and maybe French) in the Far East. The Germans and Japs could meet
up, by-passing British controlled India. They may fight for Persia against
the Brits. But the UK would be engaged withe Japs in the Far East, maybe
making matters easier in the Middle East.

The USSR had a peace pact with the USSR, so they will not be a threat while
Germany secures the Middle East and links with Japan. Then they can focus on
the USSR or the comming air war with then Brits.

Michael Emrys

2013-03-10 19:23:55 UTC

The Germans and Japs could meet up, by-passing British controlled India.

Bypass India? What is this, one of your more exorbitant flights of
fancy? British-controlled India had a rather substantial military
establishment. Witness the failed attempt by Japan to invade that
country from Burma.

Michael

Bay Man

2013-03-10 21:33:54 UTC

The Germans and Japs could meet up, by-passing British controlled India.

Bypass India?

Japan had a large navy and the Italian navy was not bad. Combined they make
a sea bridge.

m***@aol.com

2013-03-11 00:56:18 UTC

The Germans and Japs could meet up, by-passing British controlled India.

Bypass India?

Japan had a large navy

The UK's was bigger.

Post by Bay Man
and the Italian navy was not bad. Combined they make
a sea bridge.

Well, no, not unless they can permanently defeat the British in Indian waters.

They didn't have much luck defended their supply lines against the US, which
attacked thousands of miles from sheltered bases, so it's hard to see
them being more successful running the British gauntlet.

Mike

Michael Emrys

2013-03-11 13:26:11 UTC

Post by m***@aol.com
Well, no, not unless they can permanently defeat the British in Indian waters.
They didn't have much luck defended their supply lines against the US, which
attacked thousands of miles from sheltered bases, so it's hard to see
them being more successful running the British gauntlet.

Well, to be fair, the Far East Fleet was pretty much the poor cousin
throughout most of the war. It was reinforced from time to time by units
from the Mediterranean Fleet and the Home Fleet, but also it gave up
units to the Med and other theaters. If the RN had been driven out of
the Med and the Japanese had made a major effort in the Indian Ocean,
presumably whatever was left of the Med fleet would have gone there.
Like all really big what-ifs, impossible to say with certainty how
things would have gone, but the IJN would have had to fight to stay in
the IO. Merely bypassing India is the least likely of all the scenarios.

Michael

Mario

2013-03-11 18:20:59 UTC

The Germans and Japs could meet up, by-passing British
controlled India.

Bypass India?

Japan had a large navy and the Italian navy was not bad.
Combined they make a sea bridge.

Italian Navy was not so bad, for WW1 standards.

WRT WW2, they were behind on air arm, night fight, long range
operations, radio detection, etc.

And short of fuel.

--
H

Haydn

2013-03-16 14:30:42 UTC

Post by Bay Man
Japan had a large navy and the Italian navy was not bad. Combined they
make a sea bridge.

Since its inception in 1861 the Italian Navy had been logically designed
as a Mediterranean instrument of war. Exception, the submarine fleet,
part of which prior to WWII was created with a view to operating in the
oceans.

Also as a consequence of that, the average WWII Italian warship had an
operational range between refueling stops which was between two thirds
and one half of the average British warship's range, cruising speed
being equal.

For instance, Italian ships steaming out of Italian manland ports could
not sail past Crete, to the east, and past the Baleares Islands to the
west. Ships sailing out of Massawa, East Africa, could only reach Suez
on suicidal, no-return trips, which indeed was what the surviving
Italian East Africa destroyers flotilla attempted in 1941.

That placed severe limits on any Italian surface activity outside
Central Mediterranean and Red Sea. Such limits were accepted pre-war
since the French-British naval superiority until France's downfall in
1940 made it impossible to even dream of operating so far away from
home. And on account of those restrictions, as things stood wartime no
joining up with the Japanese fleet anywhere would ever have been possible.

Before and during the war the Navy made plans for what it was known as
the Breakout Fleet - a longer operational range oceanic fleet built
around a core of fast and powerful battleships based in Massawa and the
port of Kismayu, Somalia, about 300 kms north of the border on Kenya,
largely upgraded and expanded into a major naval base. A fleet to "break
out" of the Mediterranean and Red Sea straits into the Indian Ocean, to
supposedly shake hands with the Japanese somewhere between Aden and India.

The plan made strategic sense but needless to say, the money, the time
and the opportunity to turn the ports into big naval bases and to turn
out the Breakout Fleet were never available.

Haydn

The Horny Goat

2013-03-11 00:54:56 UTC

On Sun, 10 Mar 2013 14:04:10 -0400, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The prime reason was the USSR, who they thought would capitulate
and link up with the Germans. That would not be the case as the USSR
was out of the war, as Stalin was happy to see the western powers
carve each other up. The canal would make it easier to link up. The
Japanese could only attack the Brits not the USA.

What are you suggesting? That this would induce Stalin to join the
Axis as a full partner?

I'm not sure how such a bypass could take place since German naval
capacity was not such as to have a significant Indian Ocean capability
which is presumably where any such link-up would occur. (I >am< aware
that a Japanese naval squadron sortied in the Red Sea during WW1 so
it's not totally cuckoo - just mostly so - and I am also well aware
whose side the Japanese were on in WW1!)

But if the Germans and Japanese are actively collaborating either on
land or at sea, India belongs to Japan whenever they want it. I
personally think such an event is a fantasy not even Tojo dreamed of.

And even if the US isolationist forces WERE in complete control of
Congress, if FDR would put economic embargoes in place due to Japanese
moves on the Chinese, what would he do if British, French and Dutch
possessions were attacked?

Post by Bay Man
The USSR had a peace pact with the USSR, so they will not be a threat while
Germany secures the Middle East and links with Japan. Then they can focus on
the USSR or the comming air war with then Brits.

I understand that's a typo but one could semi-seriously argue that
given what Stalin did to the Red Army leadership 1935-38 that the USSR
did NOT have a peace pact with the USSR and that had the Soviet Union
been defeated in 1941 the aforementioned purge would have been a big
part of why with terrible results for all of us.

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-11 15:33:40 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
But if the Germans and Japanese are actively collaborating either on
land or at sea, India belongs to Japan whenever they want it. I
personally think such an event is a fantasy not even Tojo dreamed of.

The Japanese did in fact dream of India
being included in the Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Post by The Horny Goat
And even if the US isolationist forces WERE in complete control of
Congress, if FDR would put economic embargoes in place due to Japanese
moves on the Chinese, what would he do if British, French and Dutch
possessions were attacked?

Nothing. There would be very little support
for going to war over a battle between rival
imperialists on the other side of the world.

However, it's unlikely that Congress could
be much different; 80% of the members would
be the same, barring some near-revolutionary
upheaval.

OTOH a different President was possible, and
that's a 100% replacement. An isolationist
President changes everything.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Stephen Graham

2013-03-11 21:15:26 UTC

Nothing. There would be very little support
for going to war over a battle between rival
imperialists on the other side of the world.

There's no possible way that the Japanese would bypass Southeast Asia to
launch an attack on the Middle East. They have too much at stake
economically and ideologically in the area. A Japanese attack on
Southeast Asia was likely to provoke a US response ever under a
putatively isolationist government. US economic interests in Malaya and
the NEI were too strong to be ignored, in addition to the direct threat
to US territory in the Philippines.

Michele

2013-03-12 13:27:13 UTC

The Japanese did in fact dream of India
being included in the Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Nothing. There would be very little support
for going to war over a battle between rival
imperialists on the other side of the world.

I beg to disagree. The final straw on the camel's back were not the Japanese
operations in China but the Japanese takeover of French Indochina - an
imperial possession of a European colonial power. _That_ is when the USA
really cut Japan's fuel supplies. And note that the French in Indochina were
Vichy French and were not fighting back.

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-12 14:31:57 UTC

Post by Michele

Post by Rich Rostrom
Nothing. There would be very little support
for going to war over a battle between rival
imperialists on the other side of the world.

OK - the U.S. might stop oil exports to Japan.

But the U.S. would not go to war unless attacked,
or _possibly_ in support of European democracies
invaded by Germany.

The American people would not support, and
Congress would not declare, a war to maintain
British/Dutch/French rule over colonies
instead of Japanese control. There was no
clear moral justification. European colonial
was just as undemocratic as Japanese rule.

A better case could be made for intervention
on behalf of China. But Japan had invaded
China several years earlier, and the U.S.
had not intervened.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Mario

2013-03-12 17:42:18 UTC

Post by Michele

Post by Rich Rostrom
Nothing. There would be very little support
for going to war over a battle between rival
imperialists on the other side of the world.

I beg to disagree. The final straw on the camel's back were
not the Japanese operations in China but the Japanese
takeover of French Indochina - an imperial possession of a
European colonial power. _That_ is when the USA really cut
Japan's fuel supplies.

OK - the U.S. might stop oil exports to Japan.
But the U.S. would not go to war unless attacked,
or _possibly_ in support of European democracies
invaded by Germany.
The American people would not support, and
Congress would not declare, a war to maintain
British/Dutch/French rule over colonies
instead of Japanese control. There was no
clear moral justification. European colonial
was just as undemocratic as Japanese rule.

And apart moral issues of no relevance, colonial rule restricted
US trade.
;-)

Post by Rich Rostrom
A better case could be made for intervention
on behalf of China. But Japan had invaded
China several years earlier, and the U.S.
had not intervened.

Yes but one can bear a punch or two in his face, without
reaction, not more.

--
H

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-12 21:31:31 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
A better case could be made for intervention
on behalf of China. But Japan had invaded
China several years earlier, and the U.S.
had not intervened.

Yes but one can bear a punch or two in his face, without
reaction, not more.

The massive invasion of China and ongoing
atrocities were a whole string of punches;
and there were many others:

1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia

1938 German seizure of Austria

1939 German invasion of Poland

1939 Italian occupation of Albania

1939 Soviet invasion of Finland

1940 German invasion of Denmark and Norway

1940 German invasion of France, Belgium, and Netherlands

1940 Italian invasion of Greece

1941 German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece

After all these "punches", the U.S. agreed
to sell arms to the attacked countries, and
eventually to provide aid to them - but did
not go to war.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Mark Sieving

2013-03-12 21:45:01 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
The American people would not support, and
Congress would not declare, a war to maintain
British/Dutch/French rule over colonies
instead of Japanese control.

Congress is one thing, and still tended towards
isolationism, but the American people had come
around to the idea that Japan should be stopped.
Gallup polls before Peal Harbor showed a
substantial majority in favor of limiting Japan,
even if it meant war.

Interviewing Date 10/24-29/41

Survey #251-K Question #9

Should the United States take steps now
to prevent Japan from becoming more powerful,
even if this means risking a war with Japan?

Yes................................ 64%

No................................ 25

No opinion......................... 11

http://ibiblio.org/pha/Gallup/Gallup%201941.htm

A majority of those polled about a week before
Pearl Harbor said that the US would be at war
with Japan in the near future, though I doubt
many realized how near that future would be.

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-14 16:07:59 UTC

Post by Mark Sieving
Should the United States take steps now
to prevent Japan from becoming more powerful,
even if this means risking a war with Japan?

I'm well aware of the relevant poll figures.

However, the willingness of Americans to
_risk_ war with Japan is not the same as
willingness to _choose_ war with Japan.

Americans would not, voluntarily, start
shooting (and being shot at).

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Michael Emrys

2013-03-12 16:01:17 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
And even if the US isolationist forces WERE in complete control of

Post by The Horny Goat
Congress, if FDR would put economic embargoes in place due to Japanese
moves on the Chinese, what would he do if British, French and Dutch
possessions were attacked?

Nothing.

Not quite nothing, I don't believe. Morison reports that when it became
known that a Japanese fleet was on its way to Malaya, FDR was so
concerned that the US would be bypassed that he ordered such measures as
the arming of yachts and putting them in the path of the fleet so as to
provoke a shooting incident with the US flag.

As it happened, the IJN already had plans for including the US in its
war, so the yacht (which could not be prepared in time anyway) was
unnecessary.

Michael

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-12 21:20:45 UTC

...what would FDR do if British, French and Dutch

Post by The Horny Goat
possessions were attacked?

Nothing.

For FDR to pull this off:

First, the U.S. has to know when the Japanese are going to attack.

Second, the Navy has to deploy a ship in time.

Third, the Japanese have to attack it. If Japan has
decided _not_ to engage the U.S., then Japanese forces
would be ordered not to fire. Or, if the vessel is
small enough, the Japanese could board and capture it,
or damage it by collision. If the vessel fires first,
the Japanese sink it immediately, which makes it a
suicide assignment.

Fourth, Congress has to treat the incident as a _casus
belli_. Congress did not so react to the torpedoing of
KEARNY and REUBEN JAMES, and it is far from certain
Congress would do so here. FDR's action in
deliberately placing a U.S. ship in harm's way to
involve the U.S. in a war among foreigners would be
savagely attacked.

(The same issue could have arisen with KEARNY and
REUBEN JAMES, but their situation was different. They
were deployed with the full knowledge of Congress, for
the purpose of excluding the war from "American"
waters. And FDR did not try to use them as a _casus
belli_.)

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Michael Emrys

2013-03-12 23:44:12 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
First, the U.S. has to know when the Japanese are going to attack.

Apparently this was known in at least an approximate way. I.e., that the
Japanese were on the move in the South China Sea.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Second, the Navy has to deploy a ship in time.
Third, the Japanese have to attack it. If Japan has
decided_not_ to engage the U.S., then Japanese forces
would be ordered not to fire. Or, if the vessel is
small enough, the Japanese could board and capture it,
or damage it by collision. If the vessel fires first,
the Japanese sink it immediately, which makes it a
suicide assignment.
Fourth, Congress has to treat the incident as a _casus
belli_. Congress did not so react to the torpedoing of
KEARNY and REUBEN JAMES, and it is far from certain
Congress would do so here. FDR's action in
deliberately placing a U.S. ship in harm's way to
involve the U.S. in a war among foreigners would be
savagely attacked.

I don't disagree. In fact, I was rather surprised to read of the
attempt, stillborn as it was. Still, the point was, FDR was willing to
roll the dice. He wasn't willing to do nothing.

Michael

Alan Meyer

2013-03-16 20:56:04 UTC

... Morison reports that when it became
known that a Japanese fleet was on its way to Malaya, FDR was so
concerned that the US would be bypassed that he ordered such measures as
the arming of yachts and putting them in the path of the fleet so as to
provoke a shooting incident with the US flag.
As it happened, the IJN already had plans for including the US in its
war, so the yacht (which could not be prepared in time anyway) was
unnecessary.

For the reasons given by Rich Rostrom and even yourself in your reply to
his reply, it seems to me that this is very far fetched.

Do you recall, or can you find, what evidence Morison based this on?

Sometimes rumors like this turn out to be pure fabrications. Other
times, speculative talk is imagined to be actual decisions. I don't
doubt that Roosevelt discussed all manner of wild ideas with all manner
of advisers - with some of those ideas originating with him and some
with the advisers. It's easy for someone, years after the event, to
misremember or misconstrue what was essentially speculative "what-if"
talk as some sort of proposal or even decision.

Meetings are often like that. I remember being in a room with three
others discussing what to do about a particular business problem. We
agreed on a plan. Six months later I overheard two others arguing about
which of the two of them came up with the winning idea. In my own
memory, I thought it was actually mine :) Looking back however, I have
no idea who said what first. Maybe it was the fourth guy.

Alan

The Horny Goat

2013-03-13 14:35:31 UTC

On Mon, 11 Mar 2013 11:33:40 -0400, Rich Rostrom

Nothing. There would be very little support
for going to war over a battle between rival
imperialists on the other side of the world.
However, it's unlikely that Congress could
be much different; 80% of the members would
be the same, barring some near-revolutionary
upheaval.
OTOH a different President was possible, and
that's a 100% replacement. An isolationist
President changes everything.

You really think FDR and Congress would do more for China (i.e.
economic sanctions) than Britain???

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-14 16:04:05 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
You really think FDR and Congress would do more for China (i.e.
economic sanctions) than Britain???

More for China than for British colonial rule.

A lot of Americans viewed the latter as
morally illegitimate - among them President
Roosevet. They did not support immediate
action to _end_ colonial rule, but they
would not support action to protect it,
even against attack by a power the U.S.
disliked, if such action went much beyond
diplomatic noises.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Michael Emrys

2013-03-10 18:06:49 UTC

...there's no way Hitler would ever
induce the Red Army to turn southwards.

I think he even tried that without success. IIRC, he suggested to Stalin
that he take Iran and India, but Stalin wouldn't bite.

Michael

Mario

2013-03-06 17:53:31 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
According to some sources (Andrew Roberts was one if I
remember correctly) some top German generals proposed a
Mediterranean strategy to Hitler.

I think it was Grossadmiral Raeder who was the main proponent
in favor of a Mediterranean strategy.

I agree.
But there were other factors that should be kept in mind.
Hitler did actually entertain the idea of a Mediterranean
strategy to drive Britain out of the war, but the strategy
hinged on being able to bring Spain and Vichy France in as
active allies. Spain so that Gibraltar could be assaulted and
captured. France so that bases in French North Africa would be
available. The French fleet would also be nice to have.
This diplomatic effort floundered due to the conflicting
demands of those two parties. In addition to material demands
by Franco in order for his country to survive a blockade let
alone engage in military operations, he demanded much of the
territory that the French held in North Africa, specifically
in Morocco. This, Vichy flatly refused.
At that point, Hitler lost interest in the whole project and
turned his eyes east. From then on, his primary concern in
Africa was to ensure that his Italian ally did not get
ejected.

Post by Alan Meyer
1. Would the Germans have easily overrun Egypt and the Suez
Canal if they had not invaded the USSR?

Depends on whether they could maintain the logistical support
for the necessary forces. Those forces needn't be huge;
another armored and a couple more motorized infantry divisions
along with the Italian forces already in the theater would
have been sufficient if they could have been kept fully
supplied and up to strength. A major air commitment all over
the central and eastern Med would have been necessary too, but
supplying them would have been somewhat simpler as at least
half of them could be flying from European bases (counting
island bases like Sardinia, Sicily, and Crete as part of
Europe).

Italy entered war on June 10th 1940, only then the Mediterranean
Sea became a war theatre.

Had the Axis been a real military alliance (which was not) the
Italian forces in Libya had been reinforced by German armoured
and motorized troops, and especially by a German air force.

Instead of the slow advance in OTL the Axis could push harder
and faster.

Alexandria would be lost and the Med. fleet retreats in the Red
Sea.
Eastern Mediterranean is safe for the Axis. Malta would be lost
too.

Now what the Axis would do?

Try to go to Syria?

What about Sudan? to connect with Italian East Africa
(Ethiopia). That would push the British out of Red Sea.

Post by Alan Meyer
2. Would they have been able to go as far as the oil fields
in Iraq or
Saudi Arabia? To actually take some of the oil? Or at least
to disrupt oil supplies to the UK?

Again I agree with you. Thrusting as far as Iraq and Iran
would likely have been beyond their logistical capability. For
reasons discussed in this group last year, even if they had
captured the oilfields, it is extremely unlikely that they
could have returned them to full production, let alone be able
to ship useful quantities of petroleum products where they
would be needed.

Post by Alan Meyer
3. Would the loss of Egypt and the canal been of great harm
to the UK, or would it have made relatively little difference
in the course of the
war (assuming of course that Russia was eventually invaded.
If Russia were not invaded the entire course of events would
certainly be dramatically different.)

As long as merchant convoys are unable to transit the
Mediterranean unmolested, possession of the canal is largely
irrelevant.

The British could only operate in Western Mediterranean, the
rest is safe for the Axis.
Balkans are safer, Yugoslavia and Greece have to submit to Axis
will.
Turkey could be "less neutral".

Post by Alan Meyer
4. Assuming the British could not successfully defend the
canal, could they at least have made a successful retreat
down the Red Sea or
wherever? Or would the Eighth Army and the Mediterranean
fleet have had to surrender to the Germans?

The plan was to retreat down the Red Sea. I doubt that the
Axis could have applied enough force to prevent that...but
then I would have been doubtful that they could capture Tobruk
in a day. Disasters happen and luck always plays a part.

Post by Alan Meyer
5. Given his wartime goals, was Hitler right to make only
minor efforts in Africa, or were the generals right in
recommending a major effort there?

A really major effort in the Med in 1941 *might* have
seriously inconvenienced Britain and led to the collapse of
the Churchill government. This in turn might have led to an
armistice and a temporary cessation of hostilities. But that
is rather a long shot. But it also gives the USSR an
additional year to prepare for war, so that if Germany attacks
in 1942 they are apt to have a much harder go of it. In short,
absent a string of even greater blunders on the part of the
Allies than was actually the case, I see Germany as doomed to
lose the war. The only question is whether sooner or later.

Post by Alan Meyer
6. Would conquering the Med have made it easier or harder for
Germany to attack the USSR later, say in 1942?

See above.

Harder because they had less logistic material available (used
in Africa)
Easier if the Brits sign an armistice.

--
H

Michael Emrys

2013-03-06 19:07:56 UTC

Post by Mario
Had the Axis been a real military alliance (which was not) the
Italian forces in Libya had been reinforced by German armoured
and motorized troops, and especially by a German air force.

As a footnote: In November 1940 Hitler offered Mussolini two armored
divisions. Mussolini declined, he wanted to defeat the British on his
own. After the 10th. Army was thrown out of Egypt and Cyrenaica and
essentially destroyed, the offer was renewed and this time accepted.

Michael

Stephen Graham

2013-03-06 19:11:04 UTC

Bear in mind that an alliance doesn't necessarily mean commitment of
forces in all theaters. Germany wasn't particularly enthused about the
use of Italian troops in the Soviet Union. More germanely, while the US
and Britain were heavily committed to joint operations, it didn't apply
everywhere. For instance, US forces had very little presence in Greece
in 1944-5 and really had limited involvement in longer-term operations
in Yugoslavia.

Post by Mario
What about Sudan? to connect with Italian East Africa
(Ethiopia). That would push the British out of Red Sea.

Depends on who is running the theater. If it's the Italians, it seems to
me that the impetus will be to reclaim Italian East Africa.

Post by Mario
Turkey could be "less neutral".

The Turkish hatred of Italy would make that really difficult.

Mario

2013-03-06 21:47:23 UTC

Post by Mario
Had the Axis been a real military alliance (which was not)
the Italian forces in Libya had been reinforced by German
armoured and motorized troops, and especially by a German air
force.

Bear in mind that an alliance doesn't necessarily mean
commitment of forces in all theaters.

Yes but UK+USA+SU had a single goal: Berlin.

Axis had different and divergent goals: Drang nach Osten for
Hitler, Mare Nostrum for Mussolini...

Post by Stephen Graham
Germany wasn't particularly enthused about the use of Italian
troops in the Soviet Union.

In 1941, maybe. Less so in 1942.

Post by Stephen Graham
More germanely, while the US and Britain were
heavily committed to joint operations, it didn't apply
everywhere. For instance, US forces had very little presence
in Greece in 1944-5 and really had limited involvement in
longer-term operations in Yugoslavia.

I suppose that Balkans were an old obsession of Churchill.

Post by Mario
What about Sudan? to connect with Italian East Africa
(Ethiopia). That would push the British out of Red Sea.

Depends on who is running the theater. If it's the Italians,
it seems to me that the impetus will be to reclaim Italian
East Africa.

Post by Mario
Turkey could be "less neutral".

The Turkish hatred of Italy would make that really difficult.

Hm, that war in 1911... maybe some compensation in Iraq would
convince them...

--
H

Michael Emrys

2013-03-06 21:57:14 UTC

Post by Mario
Yes but UK+USA+SU had a single goal: Berlin.

....+Rome+Tokyo...

Michael

Stephen Graham

2013-03-07 00:00:48 UTC

Post by Mario
Turkey could be "less neutral".

The Turkish hatred of Italy would make that really difficult.

Hm, that war in 1911... maybe some compensation in Iraq would
convince them...

Italian operations in Anatolia during the Turkish War for Independence
apparently contributed more than the Italo-Turkish War.

Don Phillipson

2013-03-08 14:23:08 UTC

Post by Mario
Had the Axis been a real military alliance (which was not)
the Italian forces in Libya had been reinforced by German
armoured and motorized troops, and especially by a German air
force.

Bear in mind that an alliance doesn't necessarily mean
commitment of forces in all theaters.

Yes but UK+USA+SU had a single goal: Berlin.

Chronology matters. When Italy entered the war (1940) and
when Italy solicited German help (1941, Africa and Greece)
the USSR was allied with Germany and the USA was
nominally neutral.

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

The Horny Goat

2013-03-10 14:28:32 UTC

Post by Mario
Italy entered war on June 10th 1940, only then the Mediterranean
Sea became a war theatre.
Had the Axis been a real military alliance (which was not) the
Italian forces in Libya had been reinforced by German armoured
and motorized troops, and especially by a German air force.

Well let's face it, if the Italians had REALLY been prepared for war
they would have done a paradrop on Malta the day they declared war -
which was shortly after Dunkirk when Royal Navy resistance could
reasonably be expected to be weaker than usual in that part of the
Med.

Post by Mario
Instead of the slow advance in OTL the Axis could push harder
and faster.
Alexandria would be lost and the Med. fleet retreats in the Red
Sea.
Eastern Mediterranean is safe for the Axis. Malta would be lost
too.
Now what the Axis would do?

Not necessarily so - any reasonably intelligence defence uses the
Qattara Depression to create a narrow path for any invading army - not
impassable but would require a WW1-type battle to push through.

There's no way that particular 20 miles stretch is being captured on
the fly against a competent defence.

Post by Michael Emrys
Again I agree with you. Thrusting as far as Iraq and Iran
would likely have been beyond their logistical capability. For
reasons discussed in this group last year, even if they had
captured the oilfields, it is extremely unlikely that they
could have returned them to full production, let alone be able
to ship useful quantities of petroleum products where they
would be needed.

Anyone who thinks reaching that far without the active cooperation of
the Turks (i.e. from a logistical base in Libya or Egypt) is dreaming.
That's a much further distance than from Normandy to Berlin and we all
know about the problems the Allies had logistically in 1944-45. And
THAT was with 3 years of planning!

Post by Mario
The British could only operate in Western Mediterranean, the
rest is safe for the Axis.
Balkans are safer, Yugoslavia and Greece have to submit to Axis
will. Turkey could be "less neutral".

Less neutral as in Sweden or as in Finland? That's a huge difference.

I think you can pretty much assume that under no conditions will both
Greece and Turkey join the Axis.

Post by Michael Emrys
A really major effort in the Med in 1941 *might* have
seriously inconvenienced Britain and led to the collapse of
the Churchill government. This in turn might have led to an
armistice and a temporary cessation of hostilities. But that
is rather a long shot. But it also gives the USSR an
additional year to prepare for war, so that if Germany attacks
in 1942 they are apt to have a much harder go of it. In short,
absent a string of even greater blunders on the part of the
Allies than was actually the case, I see Germany as doomed to
lose the war. The only question is whether sooner or later.

A political overthrow would be about the only thing that might have
ended the war on German terms in 1940-41.

There seems little doubt that German troops could have landed in the
UK in the fall of 1940 - the length of the English coastline (and I
say English advisedly - no one expected a German landing in Scotland,
Northern Ireland or Wales!) is simply too long for the Royal Navy to
protect it all. The catch is there is no way sufficient German troops
could be landed in a single wave with their supplies to conquer the
UK. And once German troops are in England, the Royal Navy's task is
much easier since at that point you KNOW where German shipping is
going.

In my personal opinion, such an invasion could have been stopped by
the Royal Navy's destroyers alone (i.e. excluding CL/CA/BB's) but no
question the Royal Navy would have done everything possible to prevent
reinforcement of such a landing and no navy existing in the world in
1940 (including the USN and IJN) could have stopped them - and forget
about the Luftwaffe - their 1940 anti-shipping ability was minimal.

So with respect, unless the goal was to topple the Churchill
government (which I'd rate as a low odds probability even with Rommel
in Suez) this scenario would have zero chance of ending the war on
German terms.

Bay Man

2013-03-10 18:04:33 UTC

RN resistance was not weak in the Med at the time. During the BofB a large
fleet was in Gib. Did the Italians have paras? To form and rain such unit
with many 1000s of men take lots of time.

Post by The Horny Goat
There seems little doubt that German troops could have landed in the
UK in the fall of 1940

They had NO chance at all. An invasion attempt would have been a blood bath
for German troops. This forum is full of threads on that.

The Horny Goat

2013-03-11 00:55:17 UTC

On Sun, 10 Mar 2013 14:04:33 -0400, "Bay Man"

Post by The Horny Goat
There seems little doubt that German troops could have landed in the
UK in the fall of 1940

They had NO chance at all. An invasion attempt would have been a blood bath
for German troops. This forum is full of threads on that.

You are confusing "landing" and "landing in good order and having a
serious shot at conquering England". It's the difference between night
and day.

With the length of the English coast, there's no question a landing
could have been made. On the other hand there's equally no question
the Germans knew what the second step would have been. I suggest you
look up the meaning of "himmelsfarbkommando" if you are in doubt on
the point.

(Hint: it means "an operation going to heaven" which was as concise a
definition of Operation Sealion as any I've heard)

Michele

2013-03-11 15:02:56 UTC

"The Horny Goat" <***@home.ca> ha scritto nel messaggio news:***@4ax.com...
suggest you

Post by The Horny Goat
look up the meaning of "himmelsfarbkommando" if you are in doubt on
the point.
(Hint: it means "an operation going to heaven" which was as concise a
definition of Operation Sealion as any I've heard)

Himmelfahrtskommando.
Farb = color. Fahrt = ride, journey, drive.

Rich

2013-03-11 22:00:11 UTC

Post by Michele
Himmelfahrtskommando.
Farb = color. Fahrt = ride, journey, drive.

Thank you Michele...I nearly split a seam when I read Horney Goat's post,
but was unable to reply to it at the time. :) That unintended oops on
his part is truly funny and much more entertaining than Bayman's howlers.

The Horny Goat

2013-03-13 14:34:24 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
suggest you

Himmelfahrtskommando.
Farb = color. Fahrt = ride, journey, drive.

Oops - you're right. Glad you understood what I meant even if I
fumbled the execution.

My "translation" is still as good a summary of Sealion as any I've
seen.

Mario

2013-03-10 19:23:07 UTC

Post by Mario
Italy entered war on June 10th 1940, only then the
Mediterranean Sea became a war theatre.
Had the Axis been a real military alliance (which was not) the
Italian forces in Libya had been reinforced by German armoured
and motorized troops, and especially by a German air force.

Well let's face it, if the Italians had REALLY been prepared
for war they would have done a paradrop on Malta the day they
declared war - which was shortly after Dunkirk when Royal Navy
resistance could reasonably be expected to be weaker than
usual in that part of the Med.

Yes, right. Mussolini entered war only because he saw France
defeated. He knew Italy wasn't ready for a real European war.
There was no real plan. There was no real military coordination
with Germany.
"Parallel war": two countries at war against the same enemies
(but with different goals)

Everybody (even with limited hindsight) could conceive a better
joint Axis plan to fight against the British forces in the
Mediterranean theater, with proper forces (f.ex. less men but
better material on the Egypt front).

Post by Mario
Instead of the slow advance in OTL the Axis could push harder
and faster.
Alexandria would be lost and the Med. fleet retreats in the
Red Sea.
Eastern Mediterranean is safe for the Axis. Malta would be
lost too.
Now what the Axis would do?

Not necessarily so - any reasonably intelligence defence uses
the Qattara Depression to create a narrow path for any
invading army - not
impassable but would require a WW1-type battle to push
through.
There's no way that particular 20 miles stretch is being
captured on the fly against a competent defence.

Of course.
In this ATL there is an almost WW1-type battle (El Alamein no.
0 :-) ) and the Axis wins because they had planned and prepared
it better than in OTL the Italians alone did.
Better air force, better armour, antitank defence etc.

Less neutral as in Sweden or as in Finland? That's a huge
difference.
I think you can pretty much assume that under no conditions
will both Greece and Turkey join the Axis.

Sweden was neutral but noticeably pro-Axis in the beginning
(surrounded!) and noticeably pro-Allies towards the ending of
WW2.

Finland was allied with Germany and then allied with Soviet
Union.

If the Axis takes Egypt, where Greece and Turkey imports come
from?

--
H

k***@cix.compulink.co.uk

2013-03-11 19:58:59 UTC

Post by Mario
He knew Italy wasn't ready for a real European war.
There was no real plan. T

When Italy declared war roughly 1/3 of Italian merchant shipping was in
foreign ports and captured or interned. IIRC the CiC in Africa had
advised against attacking the British and had to be forced into going
ahead.

Rommel's early success in the Desert War was in part down to British
forces being overextended chasing the Italians. That and the diversion
of troops to Greece.

Ken Young

PatrikH

2013-03-12 03:39:39 UTC

Less neutral as in Sweden or as in Finland? That's a huge
difference.
I think you can pretty much assume that under no conditions
will both Greece and Turkey join the Axis. Sweden was neutral
but noticeably pro-Axis in the beginning (surrounded!) and
noticeably pro-Allies towards the ending of WW2.

This is one of my pet peeves. Sweden during WW2 was noticeably
pro-allied (and pro Finland). There was a large amount of
voluntary pro-allied breaches of neutrality (the leaked report
of Gotland's encounter with Bismark, shared intelligence
including Swedish decrypts of the German diplomatic code
detailing the attack on the USSR, key allied aircrew returned
from interment and shared parts/knowledge from V1/V2 tests that
ended up in Sweden). The government knew that the threats to
Swedish independence was Germany and the USSR.

That the trade with Germany continued throughout the war and
concessions where made where caused by the already mention fact
that Sweden was almost entirely surrounded by hostile forces
until the German surrender. In a sense trade with Germany was
essential to Sweden resisting German occupation.

/Patrik

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-10 20:00:31 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
Not necessarily so - any reasonably intelligence defence uses the
Qattara Depression to create a narrow path for any invading army - not
impassable but would require a WW1-type battle to push through.

That's not clear.

The obvious counterexample is Alam Halfa;
the Allied defense line ran from the sea
to the Qattara Depression, but the southern
half was little more than outposts, patrols,
and minefields, and offered minimal resistance
to Rommel's attack on August 30-31.

Rommel pressed forward rapidly east and
north, until he came up against the
positions at Alam Halfa, 35 km behind
the front.

Also, First Alamein was largely a "mobile"
battle, too.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Michael Emrys

2013-03-11 01:07:41 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
The obvious counterexample is Alam Halfa;
the Allied defense line ran from the sea
to the Qattara Depression, but the southern
half was little more than outposts, patrols,
and minefields, and offered minimal resistance
to Rommel's attack on August 30-31.

There was a reason for that.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Rommel pressed forward rapidly east and
north...

Well, maybe not quite so rapidly. Rommel had been tricked into thinking
that the ground in that area was conducive to rapid mechanized advance.
It wasn't. A lot of it was soft sand. Driving through it not only slowed
the advance, it radically increased fuel consumption, something Panzer
Army Afrika was short of anyway.

It was a fairly clever use of terrain by the 8th. Army to take some of
the starch out of Rommel's punch before he even reached the main Allied
defense zone.

Michael

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-11 15:25:18 UTC

Post by Michael Emrys
There was a reason for that.

Yes - this was not a WW I-type defense
or offense.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Rommel pressed forward rapidly east and
north...

Well, maybe not quite so rapidly.

The DAK attacked 30-31 August, and came up
against the Alam Halfa position on 1 September,
having advanced over 35 km.

I would call that a rapid advance compared
to any "WW I" type battle.

By contrast, the Allied attack in Second
El Alamein took over 10 days to advance
less than 10 kilometers.

BTW - the Alam Halfa position faced south
and southwest. The area to the south and
and east was held only by patrols.

So was there really a "bottleneck"?

There seems to have been sufficient room
for a flanking maneuver like Gazala.

At least, the Allied forces did not try
to set up fixed defenses extending all
the way south to the Depression.

(Why not? It's about 60 km, and Bir Hakeim
at the southern end of the Gazala Line was
about the same distance or a little more
from the sea.)

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

The Horny Goat

2013-03-13 14:32:23 UTC

On Mon, 11 Mar 2013 11:25:18 -0400, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
There seems to have been sufficient room
for a flanking maneuver like Gazala.
At least, the Allied forces did not try
to set up fixed defenses extending all
the way south to the Depression.
(Why not? It's about 60 km, and Bir Hakeim
at the southern end of the Gazala Line was
about the same distance or a little more
from the sea.)

I don't know but I'd guess Monty had a reasonable idea of the balance
of forces and figured he didn't need to.

Some folks have the idea that some way some how Rommel could have kept
2000 tanks fueled and in action which would have been quite a feat
even with no Royal Navy attempts to prevent resupply with all his
fuel, ammunition etc coming from Tobruk rather than several hundred km
back as was actually the case.

By Second Alamein something more than 50% of his supplies were being
spent getting fuel, food, ammo etc to the front as opposed to
actually doing anything with his troops once their supplies got to
them. Monty had the same problem in Jan/Feb 1943 when trying to
operate west of Tripoli on route to Tunisia.

It's logistics though I've read your postings long enough to know you
don't need a lecture on the subject.

Don Phillipson

2013-03-04 19:23:58 UTC

. . .

1. Would the Germans have easily overrun Egypt and the Suez Canal if they
had not invaded the USSR?

As AM reminded us, Hitler had no strategic objectives in N.Africa
and the Levant (getting involved mainly to bail out ally Italy.) His
objectives were to control all Europe and prevent outsiders interering
with that control. Africa was marginal in all respects.

So of course some of the 200 divisions German launches in
Barbarossa could probably have captured Egypt: but Hitler did
not lose sight of his main objective, Moscow, and sent his
resources there.

2. Would they have been able to go as far as the oil fields in Iraq or
Saudi Arabia? To actually take some of the oil? Or at least to disrupt
oil supplies to the UK?

So far as Hitler was a strategist, his successes (i.e. models for
future policy) were Blitzkriegen, as in Poland and France -- not
years-long campaigns where strategic supplies might govern the
outcome. (Arabian oil was not discovered until after WW2. Persian
and Mosul oil was highly developed generations earlier.)
. . .

5. Given his wartime goals, was Hitler right to make only minor efforts in
Africa, or were the generals right in recommending a major effort there?

Hitler was right. Occupying Egypt could not win Hitler's war. If
victorious,
Germany would gain nothing towards primary German objectives,
but defeat in Africa would damage Germany's prestige and self-
confidence. Because there was so little to gain, Africa was a
defensive war (despite the paradox that Rommel was much of
the time on the tactical offensive.)

6. Would conquering the Med have made it easier or harder for Germany to
attack the USSR later, say in 1942?

You misunderstand. Germany never "conquered the Med." German
sea power in the Mediterranean was far behind Italian and British
sea power (just as the Afrika Korps began as a minor adjunct to
Italian armies in Africa.). The Luftwaffe was initially master of the
air, but never deployed in the Mediterranean systematically, as
the RAF did (e.g. never attempted to control shipping, hunt for
RN submarines etc.)

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

Alan Meyer

2013-03-04 20:10:37 UTC

...

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Alan Meyer
6. Would conquering the Med have made it easier or harder for Germany to
attack the USSR later, say in 1942?

Right. I only meant by "conquering the Med" what could have happened if
the Germans had concentrated on the Med instead of invading the Soviet
Union.

Had they taken Egypt, including Alexandria and Port Said, I would think
that the Eastern Med would have effectively become a fascist lake with
the Luftwaffe acting, as you put it, more systematically. Britain's
power in the Western Med via Gibraltar might have continued. But with
German air and torpedo boat bases on both sides of the sea from Libya
east, not to mention the Italian Navy, the Royal Navy would have been
much reduced in its ability to project sea power across the Mediterranean.

Alan

The Horny Goat

2013-03-10 04:48:44 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
Had they taken Egypt, including Alexandria and Port Said, I would think
that the Eastern Med would have effectively become a fascist lake with
the Luftwaffe acting, as you put it, more systematically. Britain's
power in the Western Med via Gibraltar might have continued. But with
German air and torpedo boat bases on both sides of the sea from Libya
east, not to mention the Italian Navy, the Royal Navy would have been
much reduced in its ability to project sea power across the Mediterranean.

Short of convincing Turkey to join the Axis and sending a Panzer corps
south through the Levant and Palestine how do you think this happens?

Is it not clear that Rommel's war was primarily about inadequate
logistics? Given his re-supply was based on Italy's ability to play
chicken with the Royal Navy isn't that obvious? The port facilities at
Tobruk and Bengazi were quite capable of supplying the Afrika Korps
(or PanzerArmee Afrika if you prefer) - and there's a very good reason
why Rommel's supplies mostly came from much further back than that.

Pretty much the ONLY way to get land supply for German forces in the
Middle East was via Turkey and that simply wasn't on.

Besides - given Mein Kampf and other speeches and writing isn't it
quite clear that Hitler's whole life was one long march to 22 June
1941?

Michael Emrys

2013-03-10 18:07:28 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
Pretty much the ONLY way to get land supply for German forces in the
Middle East was via Turkey and that simply wasn't on.

If they can capture Alexandria and get it up and running (including the
Delta rail net), their logistical problems farther east and south are
greatly eased. But getting Alexandria is nowhere near a sure thing, even
if the Axis does everything right.

Michael

Alan Meyer

2013-03-15 20:26:01 UTC

Short of convincing Turkey to join the Axis and sending a Panzer corps
south through the Levant and Palestine how do you think this happens?
Is it not clear that Rommel's war was primarily about inadequate
logistics? Given his re-supply was based on Italy's ability to play
chicken with the Royal Navy isn't that obvious? The port facilities at
Tobruk and Bengazi were quite capable of supplying the Afrika Korps
(or PanzerArmee Afrika if you prefer) - and there's a very good reason
why Rommel's supplies mostly came from much further back than that.
Pretty much the ONLY way to get land supply for German forces in the
Middle East was via Turkey and that simply wasn't on.

I think the had more than enough resources to take full control of the
central Mediterranean and allow their convoys to reach Africa. Their
problem wasn't that they couldn't do it but that they chose to attack
the USSR instead.

The Germans massed 4,389 aircraft on the Soviet borders in 1941 (see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa#German_preparations)

The premise of this thread is that they Germans don't launch Barbarossa
but attack in the Med instead.

If even 1/4 of the air forces sent to Russia were sent to southern Italy
and Sicily instead, surely they could have taken Malta. If you don't
believe that, then up the number to 1/3 or 1/2. With German airbases on
all of the central Mediterranean islands (Sardinia, Sicily, Malta,
Lampedusa, Pantelleria) every spot on the route from Italy to North
Africa would be <50 miles, <15 minutes flying time, from a German
airbase. How could the Royal Navy hope to operate anywhere nearby? In
the actual event, the RN didn't seriously try to operate in that area
until after the fall of Tunisia. With the fall of Malta and a Luftwaffe
presence that was 5-10 times greater than the actual 1941 presence, I
don't see how the RAF could have operated either.

Post by The Horny Goat
Besides - given Mein Kampf and other speeches and writing isn't it
quite clear that Hitler's whole life was one long march to 22 June
1941?

Exactly! That's the reason the Germans didn't take the Med. It wasn't
that they couldn't do it, it was that they had more important fish to fry.

Alan

Bill

2013-03-15 20:47:37 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
I think the had more than enough resources to take full control of the
central Mediterranean and allow their convoys to reach Africa. Their
problem wasn't that they couldn't do it but that they chose to attack
the USSR instead.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa#German_preparations)
The premise of this thread is that they Germans don't launch Barbarossa
but attack in the Med instead.

Fairly obviously they'd overwhelm the Eastern Med, but with huge
losses.

Also fairly obviously, the USSR would probably attack them within a
year.

Crete is a fairly good example of how bad it would be for the Germans.

Malta would be worse.

Haydn

2013-03-16 14:30:08 UTC

Post by Bill
Fairly obviously they'd overwhelm the Eastern Med, but with huge
losses.

Axis losses, both partners and all departments, expanded to large size
only in Tunisia, when the entire bridgehead was squashed.

Prior to that their losses had been relatively mild and there's no
reason to believe a larger German effort would have produced a much
scarier butcher's bill.

Post by Bill
Crete is a fairly good example of how bad it would be for the Germans.

It was bad, but the island was ultimately captured at the not too
staggering price of a badly mauled division and - and that was worse,
admittedly - severe losses in airlift assets. Had the British performed
better that they did, the invasion would have failed.

Post by Bill
Malta would be worse.

That was also the opinion, and has always been ever since, of the
Italian Navy mainstream. Maybe they were and are right. Historically
Malta was barely kept supplied as a military base through 1942 via a few
shipping convoys the shreds of which just made it panting to the
island's docks after large scale battles.

In fact the situation of the civilian population's livelihood was so
desperate that Dobbie was sacked by Churchill as he had begun to
seriously entertain thoughts of surrender. A few weeks later Gort, who
as replacement of Dobbie started off in high spirits, also came to the
same glum conclusion, and only Alamein and Torch prevented Malta's
capitulation.

It just stands to reason that more Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean
airspace would have completely obliterated the Malta convoys and starved
Malta into surrender.

Haydn

Alan Meyer

2013-03-16 16:47:34 UTC

Post by Bill
Crete is a fairly good example of how bad it would be for the Germans.

Yes. We forget that Crete was a German victory and not as Pyrrhic as we
sometimes think. The number of dead British and Germans was about the
same but total British losses including prisoners were _much_ higher
than German.

"In the fighting for Crete, the Allies suffered around 4,000 killed,
1,900 wounded, and 17,000 captured. The campaign also cost the Royal
Navy 9 ships sunk and 18 damaged. German losses totaled 4,041
dead/missing, 2,640 wounded, 17 captured, and 370 aircraft destroyed"

See:
http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/worldwarii/p/World-War-Ii-Battle-Of-Crete.htm

Post by Bill
Malta would be worse.

That was also the opinion, and has always been ever since, of the
Italian Navy mainstream. Maybe they were and are right. Historically
Malta was barely kept supplied as a military base through 1942 via a few
shipping convoys the shreds of which just made it panting to the
island's docks after large scale battles.
In fact the situation of the civilian population's livelihood was so
desperate that Dobbie was sacked by Churchill as he had begun to
seriously entertain thoughts of surrender. A few weeks later Gort, who
as replacement of Dobbie started off in high spirits, also came to the
same glum conclusion, and only Alamein and Torch prevented Malta's
capitulation.
It just stands to reason that more Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean
airspace would have completely obliterated the Malta convoys and starved
Malta into surrender.

That sounds very plausible to me. There might not have needed to be an
invasion at all, but if there was, I would expect that the Germans would
have learned many lessons from Crete. In addition, Malta is a tiny
fraction of the size of Crete, was closer to German bases, was further
from British bases, and was much less able to be supported by the Royal
Navy or RAF. It was saved by the extraordinary valor of the seamen
running in supplies and the air and ground forces fighting there but
also, as much as anything else I think, by Hitler's psychological trauma
from the Crete invasion.

I have to agree with Haydn that Malta would have fallen.

Alan

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-16 19:43:36 UTC

Post by Haydn
Axis losses, both partners and all departments, expanded to large size
only in Tunisia, when the entire bridgehead was squashed.
Prior to that their losses had been relatively mild and there's no
reason to believe a larger German effort would have produced a much
scarier butcher's bill.

Axis casualties in Africa

COMPASS ----- 118,000
CRUSADER ---- 38,000
1st Alamein - 10,000
Alam Halfa -- 3,000
2nd Alamein - 30,000
=====================
199,000

This is in addition to the casualties in all
the other battles and sieges.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Padraigh ProAmerica

2013-03-04 20:52:07 UTC

Raeder and Gen. Jodl were the main proponents for the Med strategy.

The key was Malta. IF the Germans could take Malta, then it would have
been a whol new ballgame.

The problem was that the Germans never really developed an effective
amphibious capability, and their parachute corps had been effectively
neutralized after the Crete debacle.

In brief: if the Germans seize Malta, the British sea route to Egypt is
neutralized, while German supply routes to Africa hjave better security.

Take Egypt and the Suez canal from England, and it's a new, frightening
scenario.

--
"When the facts change, I change my opinion. What do you do, sir?."--

John Maynard Keynes

Michele

2013-03-05 14:20:05 UTC

Post by Padraigh ProAmerica
Raeder and Gen. Jodl were the main proponents for the Med strategy.
The key was Malta. IF the Germans could take Malta, then it would have
been a whol new ballgame.
The problem was that the Germans never really developed an effective
amphibious capability, and their parachute corps had been effectively
neutralized after the Crete debacle.
In brief: if the Germans seize Malta, the British sea route to Egypt is
neutralized, while German supply routes to Africa hjave better security.

The supply routes from Italy to North Africa were Italian supply routes, not
German.

The "British sea route to Egypt" was actually not really used by the
British. Egypt was supplied around the Cape, all the way around Africa. The
convoys in the Med were intended to resupply Malta, not to ship stuff all
across the Med.

That said, yes, if Malta is in Axis hands, the Axis supplies cross the Med
more safely.

No recipe for victory, that, of course, given that the main logistical
problems remained:

- limited port handling capabilities in North Africa,
- no rail line from Tripoli to the front line,
- not enough stuff to send anyway.

Bay Man

2013-03-05 15:17:47 UTC

Post by Don Phillipson
So of course some of the 200 divisions German launches in
Barbarossa could probably have captured Egypt: but Hitler did
not lose sight of his main objective, Moscow, and sent his
resources there.

Hitler's main objective was to counter the coming air-war. Hence moving in
for Soviet resources to manufacture aircraft.

Post by Don Phillipson
So far as Hitler was a strategist, his successes (i.e. models for
future policy) were Blitzkriegen, as in Poland and France -- not
years-long campaigns where strategic supplies might govern the
outcome. (Arabian oil was not discovered until after WW2.

Saudi Arabia oil was discovered by the US in 1938. The UK did not explore
that region as Iran and Iraq produced enough oil. a few Italian aircraft
bombed the Saudi fields.

Good point about the draw-out war.

Post by Don Phillipson

Post by Alan Meyer
5. Given his wartime goals, was Hitler right to make only minor
efforts in Africa, or were the generals right in recommending a
major effort there?

Hitler was right. Occupying Egypt could not win Hitler's war.

If a massive air-war was not coming his way concentrating on NA may have
made sense. Circling the Med and having the canal would ensure complete
control and protection of Nazi Europe. But he was facing the Brits with
supply problems and the Soviets with better prospects of supply across land
they controlled. He also viewed the Soviets as a lesser army than the Brits
to engage.

Michael Emrys

2013-03-05 20:56:42 UTC

Circling the Med and having the canal would ensure complete control and
protection of Nazi Europe.

Not for long. If Britain stays in the war, then once the USA gets its
armed forces built up, the Allies are going to invade somewhere wherever
a weak spot in German defenses can be discerned. The larger the German
empire expanded, the more their forces would be stretched to defend it
and the more weak spots would appear.

Michael

Bay Man

2013-03-06 21:24:01 UTC

Circling the Med and having the canal would ensure complete control and
protection of Nazi Europe.

Not for long. If Britain stays in the war, then once the USA gets its
armed forces built up, the Allies are going to invade somewhere wherever a
weak spot in German defenses can be discerned. The larger the German
empire expanded, the more their forces would be stretched to defend it and
the more weak spots would appear.

Any Allied built would be countered. The only successful way would be to
invade across the Channel and the Med is a Axis lake.

Michael Emrys

2013-03-06 21:56:51 UTC

Post by Bay Man
Any Allied built would be countered.

How? Germany lacked the industrial capacity of any of the major Allies,
let alone all of them put together.

Michael

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-08 02:20:40 UTC

Post by Michael Emrys
How? Germany lacked the industrial capacity of any of the major Allies,
let alone all of them put together.

Germany was the world's #2 steel producer
in 1939, after the United States.

U.S. ----- 52.8M tons/year
Germany -- 29.6M
USSR ----- 20.7M
UK ------- 15.1M
France --- 9.4M

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Michael Emrys

2013-03-08 14:23:44 UTC

Post by Michael Emrys
How? Germany lacked the industrial capacity of any of the major Allies,
let alone all of them put together.

Germany was the world's #2 steel producer
in 1939, after the United States.
U.S. ----- 52.8M tons/year
Germany -- 29.6M
USSR ----- 20.7M
UK ------- 15.1M
France --- 9.4M

Thank you for the useful numbers. I realize that steel production is
usually the #1 criterion for industrial capacity, and for good reason,
but I had something else in mind and over the course of the entire war
and not just in 1939. The UK alone produced more ships, more aircraft,
and I believe even more armored vehicles than Germany. And Germany was
out-produced by the USSR in at least two of those categories, as well as
vastly out-produced by the USA in all three.

Michael

Bay Man

2013-03-08 16:51:23 UTC

Post by Michael Emrys
How? Germany lacked the industrial capacity of any of the major
Allies, let alone all of them put together.

Germany was the world's #2 steel producer
in 1939, after the United States.
U.S. ----- 52.8M tons/year
Germany -- 29.6M
USSR ----- 20.7M
UK ------- 15.1M
France --- 9.4M

Thank you for the useful numbers. I realize that steel production is
usually the #1 criterion for industrial capacity, and for good reason,
but I had something else in mind and over the course of the entire war
and not just in 1939. The UK alone produced more ships, more aircraft,
and I believe even more armored vehicles than Germany. And Germany was
out-produced by the USSR in at least two of those categories, as well
as vastly out-produced by the USA in all three.
Michael

Germany actually upped steel production to about 36m tons at one point, but
in 1943 the RAF limited that to approx after Speer upped steel production to
28m, that they had to cut back ammunition production. Speer said the RAF was
hitting all the right targets. Even if steel was being produced getting it
to the factories could be problematic due to the RAF smashing rail
infrastructure. This also meant the vital coals could not be delivered to
the right places.

Rich

2013-03-08 21:02:07 UTC

Post by Rich Rostrom
Germany was the world's #2 steel producer
in 1939, after the United States.
Germany -- 29.6M

Thank you for the useful numbers.

The numbers may be useful, but they are also certainly incorrect. :)

According to Martin Fritz, German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore 1939-1945, the
figures by year for German ingot steel production (domestic plus import) in
millions of tons was:

1935 11.9
1936 16.5
1937 19.8
1938 22.7
1939 23.7
1940 21.5
1941 32.1
1942 31.9
1943 34.5
1944 28.4

The drop from 1943 to 1944 was not through some mysterious intervention
by the RAF, it was inevitable given steel and iron ore imports plummeted
in 1944. Hi-grade Swedish ore imports for example more than halved, from
5.6-million to just 2.6-million tons. The only reason the Germans were able
to maintain the level of production they did was because of the large ore stocks they had on hand.

Bay Man

2013-03-10 14:29:32 UTC

Post by Rich

Post by Rich Rostrom
Germany was the world's #2 steel producer
in 1939, after the United States.
Germany -- 29.6M

Thank you for the useful numbers.

'fraid it was Richie Boy. They were bombing steel mills and rail lines and
all that. Also even if steel is produced in high volume, it was getting it
to the dispersed factories over Germany, over a fractured rail network.

Richie Boy you need to do some Toozing:
page 597:
Speer: "the RAF were hitting the right targets"

page 598:
"After more than doubling in 1942, ammunition production in 1943 increased
by only 20%"

"the shortage of components brought Luftwaffe production to an abrupt halt"

"the disruption in the Ruhr manifested itself across the German economy in a
so-called "Zulieferungskrise (sub-component crisis"

"this affected not only heavy industry directly, but the entire armaments
complex"

"Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks"

Rich

2013-03-10 18:03:46 UTC

Post by Rich
The drop from 1943 to 1944 was not through some mysterious intervention
by the RAF,

"After more than doubling in 1942, ammunition production in 1943 increased

I'm sorry, but are you truly so stupid that you honestly believe that a drop
in steel production in 1944 resulted in a drop in ammunition production in
1943? Are you truly so dense that you are incapable of logically following
a train of cause and effect?

The Combined Bomber Offensive did have an effect on German munitions
production of all types. However, it did not involve time travel.

Bay Man

2013-03-10 19:24:37 UTC

Post by Rich

Post by Rich
The drop from 1943 to 1944 was not through some mysterious
intervention
by the RAF,

"After more than doubling in 1942, ammunition production in 1943 increased

I'm sorry, but are you truly so stupid that you honestly believe that
a drop in steel production in 1944 resulted in a drop in ammunition
production in 1943? Are you truly so dense that you are incapable of
logically following a train of cause and effect?
The Combined Bomber Offensive did have an effect on German munitions
production of all types. However, it did not involve time travel.

You counter Tooze not me. I believe Tooze.

Rich

2013-03-11 00:52:25 UTC

You counter Tooze not me. I believe Tooze.

And I don't believe that Tooze believes in time travel any more than I do.
What I do believe is that you have discovered an almost infinte number of
ways to misinterpret Tooze and his assessment. However, if you want to
continue to make the incredibly stupid argument that events occuring
in 1944 caused something to happen in 1943, then by all means do so,
but please do it at a site that deals in fantasy rather than history.

The Horny Goat

2013-03-11 13:24:33 UTC

Post by Rich

You counter Tooze not me. I believe Tooze.

I dunno Rich, I'd spend my time on The Guns of the South which is both
an entertaining read and historically plausible once you suspend
disbelief to allow the time travel incident that sets up the story in
the first place. It's at least entertaining which the mis-reading of
Tooze above - well isn't.

Neither is what I'd call good history so if the history is sketchy I'd
prefer to be at least entertained. (I just finished Beevor's
Stalingrad which is both historical and entertaining)

Rich

2013-03-11 21:57:27 UTC

Post by The Horny Goat
prefer to be at least entertained. (I just finished Beevor's
Stalingrad which is both historical and entertaining)

Beevor may be entertaining....if you like unoriginal, derivitive pap
without a semblance of a pretence at new scholarship. He is the Quentin
Tarantino of the military history world. If you carefully peruse his
"D-Day" in fact you will find many of his footnotes are classics of
circular referencing - he often cites Hastings' D-Day and when you
go to Sir Max's work to find where ***he*** got it from you find...
nothing. His Stalingrad is little more than a rewrite of Craig,
including all the errors and adding some of his own.

Alan Meyer

2013-03-10 04:48:09 UTC

Circling the Med and having the canal would ensure complete control and
protection of Nazi Europe.

It turned out to be even worse in practice than this theory would
suggest, because of Hitler's habit of throwing good resources after bad
and defending indefensible areas, with 230,000 prisoners lost in Tunisia.

All of the ships and planes used to reinforce Tunisia in 1943 should
have been used to bring the troops out. Maybe if there were more German
forces in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, etc. all ordered to stay put
and hang on, the losses to Germany would have been even worse.

Alan

Stephen Graham

2013-03-05 00:42:30 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
Hitler wasn't interested. I don't know exactly why but I would guess it
was because 1) He had no particular ambitions to conquer Africa or the
Middle East, at least not at that time, and 2) He had very strong
ambitions to conquer "lebensraum" to the east of Germany. That
lebensraum was the primary goal of the war. The invasions of
Scandinavia, France, and then North Africa were made necessary by the
course of events, but Poland and the USSR were always the main objectives.

From the fascist perspective, war was its own reason; the point was to
be at war with someone and the precise reason didn't matter so much.
That being said, there had been a major opponent for the NSDAP since day
one and that was the communists. And one might as well go after the big
target from the start: the Soviet Union.

In World War One, the Germans had two main problems: a two-front war and
a lack of resources, particularly food. Since the British and the French
would mind their own business, getting them out of the way before the
main event made sense. Note that if it weren't for the Italians, if the
British were limited to the Mediterranean and the UK, they wouldn't be
an issue for a couple of years.

Food and resources were more of an immediate problem. Essentially there
was a running clock on these and Germany was always close to the edge of
disaster. Taking the West in 1940 dealt with the food issues for that
year and early 1941. But something still needed to be done in 1941
before hunger would strike the German population the next winter
(1941-2). Taking the Ukraine was that thing.

Additionally, fascist regimes tended to need what might be termed
momentum: appreciable progress towards some large and perceptible goal.
Futzing around with the British in the Mediterranean with a couple of
divisions really isn't that. A year's delay in the big project may lead
to internal problems.

Post by Alan Meyer
1. Would the Germans have easily overrun Egypt and the Suez Canal if
they had not invaded the USSR?

It's arguable that the Axis armies stopped at El Alamein for two
reasons: 1) the Allied army; and 2) they reached the end of their supply
tether. The latter argues that taking Egypt may have been too far.

Post by Alan Meyer
2. Would they have been able to go as far as the oil fields in Iraq or
Saudi Arabia? To actually take some of the oil? Or at least to disrupt
oil supplies to the UK?

That's even farther from the supply bases - the likelihood of getting an
usable port is pretty low. And even if the flow of oil from the Middle
East is stopped, is that really going to make that much difference? More
oil from the Americas is possible, if expensive.

Fighting in the desert is arguably doing the British a favor: they can
constructively engage Axis forces with comparatively little force while
building up for the big operations. Losing would be a prestige hit and
create long-term issues. But Torch is still quite possible.

Depends on the precise sequence of events. The Med fleet may be in real
trouble if there's a threat that they can't make it through the Suez canal.

Post by Alan Meyer
5. Given his wartime goals, was Hitler right to make only minor efforts
in Africa, or were the generals right in recommending a major effort there?

Hitler put too much effort into the Mediterranean.

Post by Alan Meyer
6. Would conquering the Med have made it easier or harder for Germany to
attack the USSR later, say in 1942?

Harder. All of Germany's opponents would have more time to build up.

Alan Meyer

2013-03-05 14:18:29 UTC

On 03/04/2013 07:42 PM, Stephen Graham wrote:
...

Post by Stephen Graham
From the fascist perspective, war was its own reason; the point was to
be at war with someone and the precise reason didn't matter so much.
That being said, there had been a major opponent for the NSDAP since day
one and that was the communists. And one might as well go after the big
target from the start: the Soviet Union.

... <other enlightening observations elided> ...

I have come to believe that the term "fascist" has many meanings.
Franco was an avowed fascist who seemed to know better than to get
involved in any war. Salazar in Portugal tried to hang on to Portuguese
Africa, but had no other warlike inclinations (though admittedly,
neither Spain nor Portugal were in any position to have warlike
aspirations.) Some of the governments in South America could arguably
be called "fascist" without being imperialist in the way that Germany,
Japan and Italy were. Pinochet in 1970 Chile could easily be called a
fascist and so too the Colonels in 1967 Greece. But in both cases, the
motivations of the leaders had everything to do with internal politics
and economics and very little if anything to do with territorial issues.
I think we have to look at the leaders, the military, and the
historical conditions in each country.

In Hitler it seems to me that we have a special case. Ian Kershaw
argued that there was no Nazism without Hitler, that the whole movement
was based on his leadership and personality. He thought that Nazism had
no real ideology except racism, no real economic policy, no real
political system, as for example the Soviet Union had, even though the
USSR was also run by a dictator.

I believe that there certainly would have been no Holocaust without
Hitler. I can imagine that a right wing government without Hitler would
have pushed for a return to pre-WWI borders, and might even have tried
for Anschluss (though I am not convinced they would) but I seriously
doubt that they would have attacked France or the USSR and I think they
would never have invaded Scandinavia, Yugoslavia, or Greece.

As with Napoleon or Alexander the Great, we really seem to be dealing
with a unique personality in Hitler, a man whose combination of ability
and mania influenced his world far more than any politician could.

And for Hitler, I agree that war was its own reason. I think he
believed that all of history was a race war interrupted by periods of
uneasy peace. I think he believed that war would only end with the
victory of one race over all of the others. He may not have been 100%
convinced that the "master race" would conquer the world, but I think he
was committed to trying.

Alan

Bay Man

2013-03-05 19:08:58 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
...

... <other enlightening observations elided> ...
I have come to believe that the term "fascist" has many meanings.

Fascism was the original corporate control of the government. "Fascist" and
"Totalitarian" - the difference is slight,. Fascism as a word has its roots
in Benito Mussolini's fascisti.

In Hitler's Germany, the camps we know about were run quite open as labour
pools for German corporations. Hitler's Germany was a totalitarian state.
The only other states commonly mentioned in the same breath are Stalin's
Russia and Khmer Rouge Cambodia - Communist countries, where corporation did
not exist.

You could say the west has form of fascism today as the corporation get
their way, especially banks.

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-05 20:50:26 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
I have come to believe that the term "fascist" has many meanings.
Franco was an avowed fascist...

Franco was not a fascist, though he incorporated
fascist elements into his regime.

Franco was a reactionary conservative. Fascism is
a radical ideology, with a drive for dramatic acts,
major social changes, military adventures. It is in
some ways as neophilic as Communism. Note that the
"Futurist" art school of the 1920s was affiliated
with fascism.

Fascism had enough in common with the reactionary
right wing to form alliances with them in many
countries, but they are not not the same.

Post by Alan Meyer
Some of the governments in South America could
arguably be called "fascist" without being
imperialist in the way that Germany, Japan and Italy
were.

True, not all fascists launched wars of aggression.
Peron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil had fascist
tendencies, but no interest in conquest.

Post by Alan Meyer
Pinochet in 1970 Chile could easily be called a fascist...

"Easily"? No maximum leader, no political party,
no "consolidation of the nation" into the State.
Pinochet was right-wing authoritarian - but
fascism is a political movement. PInochet's
regime was a _military_ dictatorship, established
in response to a perceived crisis in public order.
It had no raison d'etre except that crisis.

Fascism has a complete social and economic program
to enact, and seeks permanent political power.

Post by Alan Meyer
and so too the Colonels in 1967 Greece.

Same here.

Post by Alan Meyer
As with Napoleon or Alexander the Great, we really seem to be dealing
with a unique personality in Hitler, a man whose combination of ability
and mania influenced his world far more than any politician could.

But he _was_ a politician. ITYM "than any _normal_ politician".

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Stephen Graham

2013-03-06 00:27:54 UTC

I have come to believe that the term "fascist" has many meanings. Franco
was an avowed fascist who seemed to know better than to get involved in
any war. Salazar in Portugal tried to hang on to Portuguese Africa, but
had no other warlike inclinations (though admittedly, neither Spain nor
Portugal were in any position to have warlike aspirations.) Some of the
governments in South America could arguably be called "fascist" without
being imperialist in the way that Germany, Japan and Italy were.
Pinochet in 1970 Chile could easily be called a fascist and so too the
Colonels in 1967 Greece. But in both cases, the motivations of the
leaders had everything to do with internal politics and economics and
very little if anything to do with territorial issues. I think we have
to look at the leaders, the military, and the historical conditions in
each country.

I agree with Rich Rostrom that all these cases are more authoritarian
dictatorships than fascist. Peron comes closest but there are a number
of differences that distinguish Argentina from Germany and Italy.

Those two states are the prime examples of fascism in power. Among their
other similarities is the attempt to gain territory through war and an
idealization of warfare as part of the honing of a new man.

See, for example, the discussion of this in Robert Paxton's _The Anatomy
of Fascism_.

Bay Man

2013-03-05 15:16:05 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
6. Would conquering the Med have made it easier or harder for
Germany to attack the USSR later, say in 1942?

Harder. All of Germany's opponents would have more time to build up.

That is true, but Germany could attack the USSR on many fronts and mainly in
the South were many of the riches were. Assuming Hilter got Middle Eastern
oil, the Soviet oil fields may not be so important. Ores and food was.

Haydn

2013-03-05 16:42:32 UTC

Post by Alan Meyer
1. Would the Germans have easily overrun Egypt and the Suez Canal if
they had not invaded the USSR?

In mid-1942, Britain - with 15.7% of her field forces, and the best ones
at that, deployed in North Africa, supported by a sizeable portion of
the Royal Navy, one third of the RAF and Commonwealth air forces, and
massive American supply - was having a hard time in the theater against
1.3% of the Wehrmacht and 10.3% of the Italian Army.

We'll never know, but if the mid-1942 situation snapshot is any
indication, it seems practically certain that a heavier German effort
would have produced the loss of Egypt.

As for logistics, while the constraints under which the Axis operated
have been thoroughly explored, I'd like to read more about how the
Allies could have kept up and operational a Middle East front using the
puny Iranian and Iraqi ports - a long way from Palestine - as shipping
terminals.

And taking how long to marshal the whole American logistical might,
since I doubt badly overstretched Britain might have done that on her own.

Post by Alan Meyer
2. Would they have been able to go as far as the oil fields in Iraq or
Saudi Arabia? To actually take some of the oil? Or at least to disrupt
oil supplies to the UK?

Even just sketchy, purely hypothetical Axis plans on a continuation of
the offensive across Suez Canal and into Palestine have never been found
so far, and that may not be a mere gap in the records. Maybe they in
fact did not intend to pursue 8th Army over the Canal and into the
Middle East (perhaps waiting for the Churchill government to topple in
the wake of the disaster, and the possibility of armistice negotiations
to open up again as in 1940).

Actually, the only vague hints at "what to do next" after the conquest
of Egypt point to the south - Sudan, Red Sea, then East Africa - rather
than the east. There were loose, occasional talks between Italians and
Germans on the subject, the latter tentatively envisioning a paradrop
onto Aden to quickly seal off the Red Sea as Italian forces would march
upriver along the Nile valley mopping up whatever pockets of British
resistance left.

Haydn

Michael Emrys

2013-03-05 21:04:11 UTC

Post by Haydn
In mid-1942, Britain - with 15.7% of her field forces, and the best ones
at that, deployed in North Africa, supported by a sizeable portion of
the Royal Navy, one third of the RAF and Commonwealth air forces, and
massive American supply - was having a hard time in the theater against
1.3% of the Wehrmacht and 10.3% of the Italian Army.
We'll never know, but if the mid-1942 situation snapshot is any
indication, it seems practically certain that a heavier German effort
would have produced the loss of Egypt.

But is it? By all rights the Gazala battle should have gone to the
Brits. That it didn't was largely due to the lousy command arrangements
in 8th. Army. The commanders of 30th. and 13th. Corps did not get along
and cooperation between them was almost non-existent. For this and other
reasons, 8th. Army never really came together to deliver a decisive
riposte to Rommel's daring but highly vulnerable turning of the southern
flank. The battle was 8th. Army's to win or lose, and they lost
it...badly. Once Auchinleck personally took command, the Axis was unable
to get past him.

Michael

Bill Shatzer

2013-03-06 00:12:40 UTC

Haydn wrote:

- snip -

Post by Haydn
As for logistics, while the constraints under which the Axis operated
have been thoroughly explored, I'd like to read more about how the
Allies could have kept up and operational a Middle East front using the
puny Iranian and Iraqi ports - a long way from Palestine - as shipping
terminals.

I've seen estimates that as much as 70% of the Lend Lease supplies for
the Soviet Union went through the so-called "Persian Corridor". Which
would seem more than enough volume to support and supply significant
British and Commonwealth forces in the Middle East if it came to that.

Of course it would have required a similar investment in upgrading port
facilities and improving the transportation infrastructure to benefit a
hypothetical Middle Eastern front as actually occurred to move supplies
to the Soviet Union. But it seems do-able.

Haydn

2013-03-06 17:52:45 UTC

Post by Bill Shatzer
I've seen estimates that as much as 70% of the Lend Lease supplies for
the Soviet Union went through the so-called "Persian Corridor". Which
would seem more than enough volume to support and supply significant
British and Commonwealth forces in the Middle East if it came to that.

Bandar Abbas to Suez, overland route as the crow flies, should be about
1,600 miles, rough estimate. For a comparison, Tripoli, Libya, to Cairo,
Egypt is 1082 miles.

The Allies couldn't use camels for transport, and that ushers us in to
the transportation infrastructure problem.

The road network between Iran and Palestine... I guess there were no
motorways cutting across the desert for truck convoys to avoid a long
detour via Iraq and Syria / Transjordan (so the actual route would be
quite longer than 1,600 miles). And perhaps the road system in place
across those mandated territories would have needed major improvements.

An adequate road system should thus have been built, along with vast
port facilities upgrading works.

Post by Bill Shatzer
Of course it would have required a similar investment in upgrading port
facilities and improving the transportation infrastructure to benefit a
hypothetical Middle Eastern front as actually occurred to move supplies
to the Soviet Union. But it seems do-able.

How long did it take to build that system up through Iran, for a steady
flow of supplies to be regularly moved to the USSR? Just asking.

Haydn

Michael Emrys

2013-03-06 19:15:33 UTC

Post by Haydn
An adequate road system should thus have been built, along with vast
port facilities upgrading works.

I suspect that a railroad would have been the first choice. In that era
it would have been the only efficient way to move the quantity of
matériel needed by an army. Part of the huge logistical bottleneck that
the Axis faced in North Africa was the lack of a rail line from Tripoli
east.

Michael

The Horny Goat

2013-03-10 14:28:58 UTC

Post by Michael Emrys
I suspect that a railroad would have been the first choice. In that era
it would have been the only efficient way to move the quantity of
matériel needed by an army. Part of the huge logistical bottleneck that
the Axis faced in North Africa was the lack of a rail line from Tripoli
east.

Which is interesting since the British had a rail line running from
the Libyan border to Cairo and Alexandria which despite Rommel holding
what must be 100-150 km of it at various times, I've never seen any
evidence that the Germans attempted to make use of it in any way.

Bay Man

2013-03-10 18:05:00 UTC

Post by Michael Emrys
I suspect that a railroad would have been the first choice. In that
era it would have been the only efficient way to move the quantity of
matériel needed by an army. Part of the huge logistical bottleneck
that the Axis faced in North Africa was the lack of a rail line from
Tripoli east.

British evacuated rail trucks and was the Italian/German gauge different?

Michael Emrys

2013-03-10 18:07:48 UTC

...the British had a rail line running from
the Libyan border to Cairo and Alexandria...

By the time of the Gazala battles, it had been extended all the way to
the Tobruk perimeter, I believe.

Michael

Rich Rostrom

2013-03-06 21:43:10 UTC

Post by Bill Shatzer
I've seen estimates that as much as 70% of the Lend Lease supplies for
the Soviet Union went through the so-called "Persian Corridor".

1) My understanding is that about half of Lend-Lease
tonnage (but no munitions) went through Vladivostok.

2) Much of the tonnage to the USSR via Iran was shipped
in U.S. supplied freighters, which wouldn't be available
to Britain in 1941.

3) Much of it was delivered in 1943-1945, after Italy
surrendered and the Mediterranean was open to Allied
shipping.

So this isn't really evidence that Britain could support
a larger war effort in the Middle East.

Post by Bill Shatzer
Of course it would have required a similar investment in upgrading port
facilities and improving the transportation infrastructure...

which was done, largely at American expense, starting
in 1942. There was already a rail connection from Abadan
to the USSR - none from the Gulf to the Med, except
through Turkey.

--
The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

Bay Man

2013-03-07 00:03:07 UTC

Post by Bill Shatzer
I've seen estimates that as much as 70% of the Lend Lease supplies for
the Soviet Union went through the so-called "Persian Corridor".

1) My understanding is that about half of Lend-Lease
tonnage (but no munitions) went through Vladivostok.
2) Much of the tonnage to the USSR via Iran was shipped
in U.S. supplied freighters, which wouldn't be available
to Britain in 1941.
3) Much of it was delivered in 1943-1945, after Italy
surrendered and the Mediterranean was open to Allied
shipping.
So this isn't really evidence that Britain could support
a larger war effort in the Middle East.

Post by Bill Shatzer
Of course it would have required a similar investment in upgrading port
facilities and improving the transportation infrastructure...

which was done, largely at American expense, starting
in 1942. There was already a rail connection from Abadan
to the USSR - none from the Gulf to the Med, except
through Turkey.

The Brits built a pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Palestine in 41 or 42. It is
still used today although cut off at Israel. If the Brits can do this so
can the Germans.

Haydn

2013-03-05 19:10:15 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
From the fascist perspective, war was its own reason; the point was to
be at war with someone and the precise reason didn't matter so much.

This is taking the Fascist "philosophy" at face value, and an
oversimplified face value. That might be the stuff many stirring
speeches or books were made of, but dictatorship policy makers were not
so intoxicated by their own ideology as to plunge their countries into
any war for the mere sake of waging war. Opportunism, political
calculations and objective, and even legitimate if seen from their
standpoint, strategic goals played at least as important a role in going
to war as ideology.

As an aside: from a Marxist perspective, war is the inevitable product
(ultimate stage, as Lenin put it) of imperialism, in turn an inevitable
product of any forms of capitalistic political system, including of
course democracy. And judging by the sheer number of wars and military
operations the US has initiated since its inception in 1776, one might
conclude Marx and Lenin were spot-on...

Post by Stephen Graham
Hitler put too much effort into the Mediterranean.

Britain did, too. And by doing so she lost the Far East for good, and
eventually the Empire.

Haydn

Stephen Graham

2013-03-06 01:02:28 UTC

Post by Stephen Graham
From the fascist perspective, war was its own reason; the point was to
be at war with someone and the precise reason didn't matter so much.

It's not really giving particular credence to the philosophy. It's an
observation of behavior. There was a need for action to maintain control
of the situation. In both cases, military action was given special
emphasis, both in terms of philosophy and in practice. So jumping into
war was a logical next step.

Post by Haydn
As an aside: from a Marxist perspective

Marxist analysis can be very useful; fascism isn't one of those areas,
particularly if we consider the analysis of the period. It's pretty
evident that the parties involved allowed their preconceptions to blind
themselves to the course of events.

Post by Stephen Graham
Hitler put too much effort into the Mediterranean.

Britain did, too. And by doing so she lost the Far East for good, and
eventually the Empire.

Well, I think the Empire was going regardless of World War Two. The rest
was misanalysis of threats.

Bay Man

2013-03-05 15:18:14 UTC