Stephen Graham
2017-05-16 05:00:28 UTC
Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Center of
Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.
Chris Manteuffel's thread on "Nationality and accounts of the NW Europe
Campaign" inspired me to pull Riviera to the Rhine off my figurative To
Be Read pile. I've been meaning to read it for perhaps twenty years,
ever since I realized that it finally was in print. It is the last
operational history in the venerable United States Army in World War II
series and one of the final volumes published in the series. Another
volume in the Technical Series, The Medical Department: Medical Service
in the European Theater of Operations, was also published in 1992. The
ultimate volume of the series, The Medical Department: Medical Service
in the War against Japan, was published in 1998, fifty-one years after
the first volume was published. Riviera to the Rhine came out nineteen
years after the preceding volume in the ETO series, The Last Offensive,
was published, and fifteen years after the publication of Casino to the
Alps. No mention as to why Riviera to the Rhine was delayed for twenty
years.
The volume starts with the rationale, planning, and arrangements for
what would become Operation Anvil, the Allied landings in Southern
France on 15 August 1944. As you would hope and expect, the discussion
of this material is thorough and well written. The authors are careful
to discuss what the Allies expected to encounter - a weakened but still
tough opponent - and how this affected considerations on loading
priorities (combat heavy) and initial plans. Instead, the landing forces
found an opponent even weaker than expected, in the midst of
redeploying, and ultimately preparing to evacuate Southern France. This
would lead to a continuing theme for these forces: not enough troops,
insufficient armor at key points, and tenuous logistics, but always
unexpected gains. While there were numerous details I hadn't known
before or didn't remember, the discussion of which US divisions would be
pulled from Italy for the invasion was surprising. Mark Clark's initial
plan included the US 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions, but also the US 1st
Armored Division. Certainly it would seem to make more sense to redeploy
the 1st Armored from Italy than to retain it there. As we know,
ultimately the decision was to use three US infantry divisions,
ultimately choosing the 36th Infantry Division due to its amphibious
experience. There had been discussion of using the 85th Infantry
Division as a follow-up prior to selecting the 36th.
A notable feature of this volume is that the discussion of the campaign
moves beyond the usual focus on military operations to encompass more
detail on logistics than usual in the series' operational histories.
There is also substantial discussion of issues of the use of air power,
engineering, and other supporting services. Naturally, there is also
reasonable attention paid to inter-Allied cooperation and civil affairs,
particularly the transition back to civilian French control.
This drops off once the Anvil forces tie in to SHAEF, though there is
always an underlying thread of logistical issues.
The tie in and the comparative lack of support for the southern flank
provide the theme for the rest of the volume. As has been more common in
recent histories, the conflict between Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers
features strongly. Beginning with dispute over the establishment of
Sixth Army Group, it continues with a struggle over the provision of
additional US troops to the Seventh Army. Logistics provided the
ultimate argument for the switch of Fifteenth Corps from the Third Army
to the Seventh Army. One gains the sense that port capacities provided
the rationale for the reinforcing divisions received by Seventh Army in
October and November: 44th, 100th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, and the
14th Armored Division.
While the Allied forces in Northwest Europe were perennially short of
divisions, the discussion of Sixth Army Group operations in October
through January highlights a set of what-if questions. The French First
Army was always hobbled by the lack of trained replacements, especially
in specialists. While it was able to use FFI as light infantry forces,
finding infantry replacements and building up additional necessary
divisions was hard and slow. Adding the limited number of US divisions
available stretched available forces thin, limiting offensive options
and keeping divisions in line longer than was good for them. Thus the
French were unable to clear the Belfort Gap in October. Limited US
forces were able to keep a favorable attritional battle going in the
Vosges. Yet there was never enough force to breakthrough the defenses,
which may have been possible.
When sufficient forces were available in November, the ensuing attacks
had the potential to be decisive or at least much more influential than
they turned out to be. The seizure of multiple points along the Rhine,
both in the Strasbourg area and also running north from the Swiss border
to the vicinity of Mulhouse held the promise of potentially allowing a
jump of the Rhine in November. The authors are clear in blaming
Eisenhower and Bradley for reorienting Seventh Army north into the Saar
in support of Third Army. Combined with Hitler's illogical attachment to
holding any part of Alsace, this led to the formation of the Colmar
pocket. Naturally this stretched Allied resources further than necessary
and required additional effort in January and February to clear, in
addition to making the Seventh Army more vulnerable to North Wind.
The history concludes after the clearance of the Colmar Pocket in early
February 1945. This set the stage to the invasion of Germany proper
covered in The Last Offensive. I was left with a higher opinion of
Devers, Patch, and de Lattre, and a bit of a lower opinion of Truscott.
Overall, the book is a good addition to the series, likely one of the
best overall of the operational histories. It has the usual large number
of photos and maps. There are none of the larger, fold-out maps common
in earlier volumes; every map is in the text, often as individual,
full-page maps. A couple aren't well done - there is one in particular
that has a direct equivalent in the Lorraine Campaign and the level of
detail is noticeably poorer. It does get harder to refer back to maps to
accompany the narrative, especially if you're reading the PDF version.
Riviera to the Rhine is available as either a hardback or paperback from
multiple sellers, including direct from the US GPO. It's also available
as a free PDF download from
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-10-1/index.html
[I also came to the conclusion that there were just too many First
Armies running around NW Europe in 1944-5: First Canadian, First French,
First German, and First US. Surely there were more integers available.]
Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.
Chris Manteuffel's thread on "Nationality and accounts of the NW Europe
Campaign" inspired me to pull Riviera to the Rhine off my figurative To
Be Read pile. I've been meaning to read it for perhaps twenty years,
ever since I realized that it finally was in print. It is the last
operational history in the venerable United States Army in World War II
series and one of the final volumes published in the series. Another
volume in the Technical Series, The Medical Department: Medical Service
in the European Theater of Operations, was also published in 1992. The
ultimate volume of the series, The Medical Department: Medical Service
in the War against Japan, was published in 1998, fifty-one years after
the first volume was published. Riviera to the Rhine came out nineteen
years after the preceding volume in the ETO series, The Last Offensive,
was published, and fifteen years after the publication of Casino to the
Alps. No mention as to why Riviera to the Rhine was delayed for twenty
years.
The volume starts with the rationale, planning, and arrangements for
what would become Operation Anvil, the Allied landings in Southern
France on 15 August 1944. As you would hope and expect, the discussion
of this material is thorough and well written. The authors are careful
to discuss what the Allies expected to encounter - a weakened but still
tough opponent - and how this affected considerations on loading
priorities (combat heavy) and initial plans. Instead, the landing forces
found an opponent even weaker than expected, in the midst of
redeploying, and ultimately preparing to evacuate Southern France. This
would lead to a continuing theme for these forces: not enough troops,
insufficient armor at key points, and tenuous logistics, but always
unexpected gains. While there were numerous details I hadn't known
before or didn't remember, the discussion of which US divisions would be
pulled from Italy for the invasion was surprising. Mark Clark's initial
plan included the US 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions, but also the US 1st
Armored Division. Certainly it would seem to make more sense to redeploy
the 1st Armored from Italy than to retain it there. As we know,
ultimately the decision was to use three US infantry divisions,
ultimately choosing the 36th Infantry Division due to its amphibious
experience. There had been discussion of using the 85th Infantry
Division as a follow-up prior to selecting the 36th.
A notable feature of this volume is that the discussion of the campaign
moves beyond the usual focus on military operations to encompass more
detail on logistics than usual in the series' operational histories.
There is also substantial discussion of issues of the use of air power,
engineering, and other supporting services. Naturally, there is also
reasonable attention paid to inter-Allied cooperation and civil affairs,
particularly the transition back to civilian French control.
This drops off once the Anvil forces tie in to SHAEF, though there is
always an underlying thread of logistical issues.
The tie in and the comparative lack of support for the southern flank
provide the theme for the rest of the volume. As has been more common in
recent histories, the conflict between Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers
features strongly. Beginning with dispute over the establishment of
Sixth Army Group, it continues with a struggle over the provision of
additional US troops to the Seventh Army. Logistics provided the
ultimate argument for the switch of Fifteenth Corps from the Third Army
to the Seventh Army. One gains the sense that port capacities provided
the rationale for the reinforcing divisions received by Seventh Army in
October and November: 44th, 100th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, and the
14th Armored Division.
While the Allied forces in Northwest Europe were perennially short of
divisions, the discussion of Sixth Army Group operations in October
through January highlights a set of what-if questions. The French First
Army was always hobbled by the lack of trained replacements, especially
in specialists. While it was able to use FFI as light infantry forces,
finding infantry replacements and building up additional necessary
divisions was hard and slow. Adding the limited number of US divisions
available stretched available forces thin, limiting offensive options
and keeping divisions in line longer than was good for them. Thus the
French were unable to clear the Belfort Gap in October. Limited US
forces were able to keep a favorable attritional battle going in the
Vosges. Yet there was never enough force to breakthrough the defenses,
which may have been possible.
When sufficient forces were available in November, the ensuing attacks
had the potential to be decisive or at least much more influential than
they turned out to be. The seizure of multiple points along the Rhine,
both in the Strasbourg area and also running north from the Swiss border
to the vicinity of Mulhouse held the promise of potentially allowing a
jump of the Rhine in November. The authors are clear in blaming
Eisenhower and Bradley for reorienting Seventh Army north into the Saar
in support of Third Army. Combined with Hitler's illogical attachment to
holding any part of Alsace, this led to the formation of the Colmar
pocket. Naturally this stretched Allied resources further than necessary
and required additional effort in January and February to clear, in
addition to making the Seventh Army more vulnerable to North Wind.
The history concludes after the clearance of the Colmar Pocket in early
February 1945. This set the stage to the invasion of Germany proper
covered in The Last Offensive. I was left with a higher opinion of
Devers, Patch, and de Lattre, and a bit of a lower opinion of Truscott.
Overall, the book is a good addition to the series, likely one of the
best overall of the operational histories. It has the usual large number
of photos and maps. There are none of the larger, fold-out maps common
in earlier volumes; every map is in the text, often as individual,
full-page maps. A couple aren't well done - there is one in particular
that has a direct equivalent in the Lorraine Campaign and the level of
detail is noticeably poorer. It does get harder to refer back to maps to
accompany the narrative, especially if you're reading the PDF version.
Riviera to the Rhine is available as either a hardback or paperback from
multiple sellers, including direct from the US GPO. It's also available
as a free PDF download from
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-10-1/index.html
[I also came to the conclusion that there were just too many First
Armies running around NW Europe in 1944-5: First Canadian, First French,
First German, and First US. Surely there were more integers available.]