D-Day: Fighter-Bombers over OMAHA Beach

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

It was often here the issue about the lack of any fighter-bombers
during early D-Day at Omaha Beach. After the Private Rayen movie it is
an obvious question. The suggested answers range from suspected low
visibility to institutional barriers (Navy vs USAAF) were mainly
speculations.

There is a whole book about the problems that caused the bloody beach:

Lewis, Adrian R.: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory,
University of North Carolina Press (2001)

It is mainly about the history of Allied amphibious planning. It is
interesting in its condensed report about the problems that raised at
Omaha and how it got solved. Regarding air support the book was a
disappointment. About the heavies:

"The bombers flying above the clouds at an altitude of 11,000 feet
used radar to determine their bomb release time, and because of the
proximity to friendly troops, they added an extra margin of safety
to their calculations."

I often heard that and I think its a myth. I assume there was never the
intention to bomb the beaches and create the field of craters promised
to the troops. Such a field would have serious hampered the later
disembarkment of the heavy equipment. I wonder why nobody ever mentioned
this problem.

That the heavy bombers by H2X airborne radar were of no much use against
small and medium size beach fortifications seems rather obvious. The
author is right that no other doctrine of their use was established then.
But that should be a point of his critic. There were technical means
available to use them another way. Ploesti showed they could be used at
low altitude in high precision attacks.

Further, the RAF and the USAAF had by 1944 highly accurate radio controlled
blind bombing systems. So there was a chance to develop something. But in
a German book I found the medium bombers had some success against the large
fortifications by visual aiming from medium altitude. That was something
the heavies were able too. But all in all it seems the heavies were not of
much importance at the beaches anyway.


I understand the main killer at Omaha were German MGs from small
fortifications. Thats a target for fighter-bombers or tanks. The tanks
at early D-Day mainly failed by bad weather. The winds were beyond
prediction and well beyond operational limit. That some got to the
beaches at all was a small wonder. The German guns there were 7.65 cm
and larger. This were perfect tank killers and I suspect they had AT
ammunition intended against ships too. So I have some doubts whether
the tanks had much chances without prior elimination of this guns.

This guns were a good target for fighter-bombers too. Instead Lewis wrote:

"Naval gunfire from destroyers proved to be the only reliable part of the
Joint Fire Plan since the Army Air ForceÆs strategic bombers missed the
target area and the tactical air force was too poorly trained in close
air support to assist."

I doubt that attacking the beaches in front of the first wave would be
"close air support" at all. This term is used for situations were friendly
and enemy force are close by and not easy to distinguish or the target not
easy to find or to see from air. That was not the situation at the beach.

Visibility was an issue. But for the ships, not the air. According a map
in Lewis book the destroyers were 3000 yards from the beach. I assume he
meant the beach line at low tide when the first wave was to arrive. At
high tide it was 275 m or 300 yards further. The targets where still
some 100 m or more further inland. So it seems they intended to hit
targets of about 1 m size (about the height of an artillery bunker free
opening) at 3 km range.

That was possible in clear air. But in the morning mist and various smoke
sources they had to see through 3 km bad air. No way this ever had a chance
to work. Some blame it on the loss of the radio equipment of the first wave.
They not just lost the radios but the officers trained on it too. But the
main work of the destroyers had to be completed before the first wave
landing ships even came in range of the German guns.

Hours later some destroyers came "close" to 1 km to the beach. But even
then not all targets were visible. They fired in the approximate directions
in hope for hits. A German book mentioned a cruiser "Ajax" (I assume British,
the one of Graf Spee fame?) as the most successful in taking out several
German guns. The fire of the Ajax was directed by an airplane!

The USAAF had a lot of P-47 fighter-bombers at D-Day. They had up to 500 kg
bomb load. In summer 1944 they were about the first to drop napalm bombs.
More important I think was the MG armament. The 8 MG of 12.7 mm size with
a capacity of 3400 rounds had a good chance to take out German pillboxes
and bunkers. It could "melt" small pillboxes and disable guns or destroy
MGs just by a few hits. Not to mention what happens to the German crew if
some rounds enter trough the opening and ricochet inside the bunker.


The issue of visibility is simple. From above you look through some 10s m of
mist and smoke. From the ships you have to look through several km. So
where were the P-47 at D-Day? They were over Omaha beach and looked down
as the first wave approached the shore:

General John W. Vogt: Let me talk about the isolation of the Normandy
beachhead. I happened to be involved in that operation. I was a squadron
commander of P-47 "Thunderbolts" at the time of the Normandy operation,
which, as I recall, was June 6, 1944.

We were briefed the night before on the general outline of the opera-
tion. We knew that the transports had already set sail and were on their
way across the channel, that there would be early shore bombardment, and
that we would try to put the troops ashore. We went out in squadron
formations that day in order to get the total coverage that was required
for the full period. My squadron was briefed along the following lines:

"We don't know what the enemy air reaction is going to be to all of this.
The Germans may be over the beachhead in great numbers, so our number one
job is to insure that we have air superiority over the beach." I was given
the altitude block of 5,000 to 15,000 feet, right over Omaha Beach at
daybreak. We had to take off before daybreak to arrive over the beachhead
on time.

There was one twist: if no air opposition appeared, then we had to be
prepared to do the secondary mission, which was to interdict the area in
which the total operation was taking place and to prevent the movement of
German reinforcements into the area. That meant we had to have the
airplanes loaded with bombs, even while we were doing the first portion of
the mission, which was the air superiority portion. The instructions of
course were, "jettison your ordnance if you get into a battle with Focke-
Wulf 190s."

We orbited over the beach for about two hours, and no German air appeared.
Then we went to the secondary portion of the mission, which was the
interdiction.
(...)
So we spent that morning, the remainder of our mission time, methodically
hitting the bridges over which we believed the Germans would ultimately
have to come.

Smart: Excuse me one minute. Would you give us the time line for this
mission? Was this on the day of the invasion?

Vogt: Yes, it was the morning of June 6. As I say, I arrived over the
beachhead at slightly before daybreak. We just orbited there, watching
the initial bombardment, the heavy cruisers laying the fire support in,
and of course witnessed the movements of the small vessels bringing the
troops ashore. No German air forces appeared. (...)

Partridge, Earle E.: Air interdiction in World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam. USAF, Washington (1986). pp. 23ff


I'm not aware of any other account about the P-47 over Omaha. Lewis did
not mention it and neither any of the many TV docus about D-Day. Even
Smart above did not trust his ears as he heard it and inquired. Obviously
he immediately understood the implications but did not shared his thoughts.

I still can only assume why this blunder in the planning of D-Day happened.
It seems to me most likely what someone here mentioned some time ago. That
all beach operations were left to the Navy as their sole operation. The
Navy did the best they could but had no fighter-bombers in Europe. The
single point failure was the decision to leave all to the Navy and avoid
a combined operation with the USAAF. It must be an early and high level
decision. Seems its too buried under the mountain of papers and books
about D-Day that even a specialized historian like Lewis is no longer
able to find it.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich]

(snip)The suggested answers range from suspected low
visibility to institutional barriers (Navy vs USAAF) were mainly
speculations.

They are not "speculations". The weather conditions on D-Day are
well recorded.
Which unfortunately is deeply flawed itself.

It is mainly about the history of Allied amphibious planning.

Actually it is mainly about Lewis's belief about how a flawed US
Navy/Army doctrine for amphibious assault affected the planning
for D-Day.

I often heard that and I think its a myth. I assume there was never the
intention to bomb the beaches and create the field of craters promised
to the troops. Such a field would have serious hampered the later
disembarkment of the heavy equipment. I wonder why nobody ever mentioned
this problem.

Why, given the D-Day air plan is available in any number of original
sources, as are the actual operations and results, would you ever
think its a "myth"?

What is a "myth" is the idea the air plan ever included a "promise"
of craters. That was a misreading by some of the ground forces
embarked prior to the assault.

Ploesti showed they could be used at
low altitude in high precision attacks.

Ploesti also showed what could be expected in terms of attrition to
the heavy bomber units engaged in low-level bombing. It is likely
somewhat significant no such attempt was made to so use heavy
bombers after Ploesti.

Further, the RAF and the USAAF had by 1944 highly accurate radio controlled
blind bombing systems. So there was a chance to develop something.

No, they did not have such systems by 6 June 1944. They had H2X and GEE-H.
They were not "highly accurate".

a German book I found the medium bombers had some success against the large
fortifications by visual aiming from medium altitude. That was something
the heavies were able too. But all in all it seems the heavies were not of
much importance at the beaches anyway.

What "German book" is that? Ninth Air Force medium bombers had the best
success of D-Day, effectively bombing on UTAH Beach. However, their effect
was accidental, given the defenses effected were not where the landing was
supposed to occur - it was providence rather than planning or precision.

I understand the main killer at Omaha were German MGs from small
fortifications. Thats a target for fighter-bombers or tanks. The tanks
at early D-Day mainly failed by bad weather. The winds were beyond
prediction and well beyond operational limit. That some got to the
beaches at all was a small wonder. The German guns there were 7.65 cm
and larger. This were perfect tank killers and I suspect they had AT
ammunition intended against ships too. So I have some doubts whether
the tanks had much chances without prior elimination of this guns.

Um, mortars and artillery were at least as important as MGs on all of the
beaches in terms of casualties.

Unfortunately, the beach defenses were neither a decent target for either
fighter bombers or naval gunfire. The bombs carried were too ineffective
versus the construction of most of the defenses and the accuracy of the
fighter-bombers wasn't sufficient. Direct fire from the sea was limited
by the vessels ability to distinguish targets and the construction of the
German gun positions, which were virtually impervious to attack from the
sea.

BTW, I know of no German 7.65 cm guns in the Normandy defenses? There were
8.8cm, 7.62cm, 7.5cm, 5cm, 4.7cm. and 3.7cm guns.

I doubt that attacking the beaches in front of the first wave would be
"close air support" at all. This term is used for situations were friendly
and enemy force are close by and not easy to distinguish or the target not
easy to find or to see from air. That was not the situation at the beach.

It also was not a capability in existence with the Allied Tactical Air Forces
committed to the invasion. A limited capacity for true CAS existed with the
Mediterranean air forces and in the Pacific, but those lessons learned in
other theaters had not been transferred and had to be learned afresh.

Visibility was an issue. But for the ships, not the air. According a map
in Lewis book the destroyers were 3000 yards from the beach. I assume he
meant the beach line at low tide when the first wave was to arrive. At
high tide it was 275 m or 300 yards further. The targets where still
some 100 m or more further inland. So it seems they intended to hit
targets of about 1 m size (about the height of an artillery bunker free
opening) at 3 km range.

The pre-assault bombardment by the destroyers was executed at c. 5,000-
6,000 yards range for 35 minutes. Later, during the critical period, some
of the destroyers were firing at targets at 1,300 yards range.

The first were at area targets. The second were at identified targets,
some discovered by the ships themselves, some designated by observing
where the tanks on the beach were firing, and a very few designated by
the few functional NFST teams ashore.

The fire of the Ajax was directed by an airplane!

HMS Ajax fired on the coastal battery at Longues-sur-Mer. All of the
heavy bombardment ships were provided with air spotting to direct
fire on the pre-planned targets.

The USAAF had a lot of P-47 fighter-bombers at D-Day. They had up to 500 kg
bomb load. In summer 1944 they were about the first to drop napalm bombs.
More important I think was the MG armament. The 8 MG of 12.7 mm size with
a capacity of 3400 rounds had a good chance to take out German pillboxes
and bunkers. It could "melt" small pillboxes and disable guns or destroy
MGs just by a few hits. Not to mention what happens to the German crew if
some rounds enter trough the opening and ricochet inside the bunker.

My fathers platoon of four quad-.50 caliber MG spent quite a bit of time at Rehlingen trying to silence a German pillbox of 1938-39 vintage in December
1944 without much success. They were stationary. It was stationary. They
knew where it was. They expended thousands of rounds on it. It didn't work

Why will a P-47 do better?

The issue of visibility is simple. From above you look through some 10s m of
mist and smoke. From the ships you have to look through several km. So
where were the P-47 at D-Day? They were over Omaha beach and looked down

Conditions on D-Day were 9/10 clouds at 11,000 feet with intermittent clouds
below that.

I'm not aware of any other account about the P-47 over Omaha. Lewis did
not mention it and neither any of the many TV docus about D-Day. Even
Smart above did not trust his ears as he heard it and inquired. Obviously
he immediately understood the implications but did not shared his thoughts.

Effectiveness of Third Phase tactical air operations in the European Theater,
5 May 1944 -- 8 May 1945 covers the planning and execution in outline.

Ninth Air Force invasion activities, April thru June 1944 covers more details.

I still can only assume why this blunder in the planning of D-Day happened.

Because there were other priorities considered as over-arching and there
was a considerable lack of real experience in opposed amphibious assault as
well as in effective close air support doctrine.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Rich

wrote: (snip)The suggested answers range from suspected low
visibility to institutional barriers (Navy vs USAAF) were mainly
speculations.

They are not "speculations". The weather conditions on D-Day are
well recorded.

Some years ago here the question of fighter-bombers was countered
with the argument of low visibility. Now I found Vogt from above 5000 ft
saw the initial bombardment and "witnessed the movements of the small
vessels bringing the troops ashore." And from your reply I understand
that several spotter planes directed the naval fire. That clearly
suggestes that visibility was not an issue against figher-bomber use.

Post by Rich
What is a "myth" is the idea the air plan ever included a "promise"
of craters. That was a misreading by some of the ground forces
embarked prior to the assault.

The poor guys were delivered to the butching plate by a misreading?
For them it was a big difference whether they could jump from crater
to crater or had 300 m of plain surface without any hiding until
the MG pillboxes. I dont know for what scenario the assault forces
were trained for. In the event we know they would have needed smoke
mortars more than anything. But they had none.

Without planed craters and no planed smoke, could it be that all of
the German gun fortifications were expected to be dealt by the Navy
and the MGs by tanks?

Post by Rich
Unfortunately, the beach defenses were neither a decent target for either
fighter bombers or naval gunfire. The bombs carried were too ineffective
versus the construction of most of the defenses and the accuracy of the
fighter-bombers wasn't sufficient.

Rich, I know you did research on the topic. Are the above two sentences
your assumption or was there realy a study then? I have some vague memories
that Allied intel got plans of some bunkers and build replicas to test
weapons. But were the bunkers of Omaha ever tested or evaluated as P-47
targets?

Post by Rich

I still can only assume why this blunder in the planning of D-Day happened.

Because there were other priorities considered as over-arching and there
was a considerable lack of real experience in opposed amphibious assault as
well as in effective close air support doctrine.

After such a failure its always true to claim a lack of experience. But
in this case the lack of fighter-bombers is a too obvious issue. It came
up here several times and was always wiped away. It was here never
accepted as a planing failure. Even in your reply I got the impression
you (like Lewis) did not consider it as planing failure.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich]

Sorry for the long lines, but...

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Some years ago here the question of fighter-bombers was countered
with the argument of low visibility. Now I found Vogt from above 5000 ft
saw the initial bombardment and "witnessed the movements of the small
vessels bringing the troops ashore." And from your reply I understand
that several spotter planes directed the naval fire. That clearly
suggestes that visibility was not an issue against figher-bomber use.

Sorry, but I cannot be responsible for ill-considered arguments from
some years ago unless I was involved in them. As it is, we know very
well what the conditions on D-Day were. Specifically over OMAHA it was
a 9-10ths could deck at 11,000 feet with scattered clouds at lower
altitudes.

And, just because Vogt could "see" does not define the conditions for
executing fighter bomber attacks with sufficient accuracy. VIII
Fighter Command dive-bombing pioneers developed the practices used
starting in 1943. The P-47 was generally flown at 12,000 feet to a
push-over point into a 60 degree dive, pulling out at 4,000 feet.
The dive had to be carefully controlled, due to the lack of speed
breaks and the high dive acceleration characteristics of the P-47.
At 7,000 feet the pilot would "pull his nose through the target" to
set up the final alignment after his push-over at 12,000 feet. A
ccuracy from a well-experienced pilot was expected as 100 yards.

Vogt's fighter-bomber squadron - one each operated in rotation over
OMAHA and UTAH - was assigned the air alert mission over the beach
at 5,000-15,000 feet.

Do you see the first problems arising?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The poor guys were delivered to the butching plate by a misreading?

That's simply misreading on your part. Cratering was never intended
and should have been understood at all levels, since the emphasis was
getting the forces off the beach and ready fro the anticipated German
armored counterattack. Cratering would only have made it harder to do
so.

Worse by far was the decision by the ground commanders to overload the
assault troops with more gear than they needed. It was the slowness and
lack of agility rather than a lack of cover that was deadly.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Without planed craters and no planed smoke, could it be that all of
the German gun fortifications were expected to be dealt by the Navy
and the MGs by tanks?

Principally by tanks, but also with flamethrowers, mortars, and bazookas
in fire and maneuver by the infantry. The defenses simply were not that
exposed to direct fire from the sea. Most were in defilade or required
pinpoint targeting if exposed and, since they were generally on the
military slope the tendency was for overs by flat trajectory pieces to
miss by miles and unders impacted the bluffs.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rich, I know you did research on the topic. Are the above two sentences
your assumption or was there realy a study then? I have some vague memories
that Allied intel got plans of some bunkers and build replicas to test
weapons. But were the bunkers of Omaha ever tested or evaluated as P-47
targets?

Extensive tests were done by Ordnance against field and fixed
fortifications typical of beach defenses...in 1945. The results aren't encouraging.
A direct hit on most of the bunkers used by the Germans
would have had zero measurable effect unless an AP bomb
in the 1,000-lb range were used.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
After such a failure its always true to claim a lack of experience. But
in this case the lack of fighter-bombers is a too obvious issue. It came
up here several times and was always wiped away. It was here never
accepted as a planing failure. Even in your reply I got the impression
you (like Lewis) did not consider it as planing failure.

Lack of experience against a defended beach wasn't a claim, it was a fact.

Betio and Kwajalein were the two previous and each was considerably
different. However, the "lack of fighter-bombers" was nothing like. They
were there after all, but they simply didn't have the capability to have
an effect for technical reasons as well as lack of experience. So where is
the "planing failure"? And there were plenty of them, but you haven't identified them.

[Rich]

n Sunday, June 28, 2015 at 5:32:54 PM UTC-4, Rich wrote:

Sorry for the long lines, but...

Post by Rich
Vogt's fighter-bomber squadron - one each operated in rotation over
OMAHA and UTAH - was assigned the air alert mission over the beach
at 5,000-15,000 feet.

Some more details on this. The VIII Fighter Command first began addressing fighter-bomber operations in 1943,
after its initial attempts in July-August 1942 were derailed by the transfer of the units to XII Fighter Command
and the demands of escort. It wasn't until as late as summer 1943 it seems before the techniques were addressed
again. Up to that time, "fighter-bombers" flew with the bomber formations and salvoed when the lead bomber did.
As you can imagine, they weren't very accurate. However, developing accuracy also caused problems. They had no
bombing sight, so relied on trial and error to see how to use the standard reflector gun sight. They also did
not have any units with dive bombing experience, so raided the few pilots available that had rotated from the
ME after flying P-40's. The result was exactly three pilots who ran tests using the P-47 as a dive bomber and then
began disseminating the training, first to the 353d Fighter Group and then others. By 6 June it was common practice,
but was apparently mainly used against airfields.

The technique developed is also directly relevant to your question. They found that for best accuracy, the approach would
be from 12,000 feet.Verbatim, the technique was to "climb to about 12,000 feet, approach the target straight and level.
Fly close enough to the target so that it will pass out of sight under the Wing at about the position of the guns. After
the target has passed from view under the wing for approximately ten seconds,roll into a 90 degree turn and
point the nose slightly under the target. (It is very essential that the pilot learn how to turn the ship and trim it
up so that the ship will be in a straight dive and not skidding.) Then align the vertical line of the sight through
the target.By this time an average pilot will be down to about 7,000feet so he should begin to pull the nose of the ship
through the target. After the target has passed from view for about the count of two seconds, pull the bomb release.
Then reef the ship up and turn over on your side and see where it hits. Make a mental note, "over or short". Now the
next time attempt to use the same altitude and same distance away from the target (thus the same dive). Then try
to achieve the opposite from the first results.From then on, after the pilot has a general idea of what the basic
mechanics are, he can become very proficient at higher altitude" varying angles of dives."

Note that while they practiced shallow 30 degree dives from 6,000 feet with release at 2,500 feet, the dive from
10,000-12,000 feet at 60 to 70 degrees with drop at 4,000 to 5,000 feet was considered the most accurate.

The problem was on D-Day the visual approach would have had to have been under 10,000 feet, reducing accuracy.

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rich, I know you did research on the topic. Are the above two sentences
your assumption or was there realy a study then? I have some vague memories
that Allied intel got plans of some bunkers and build replicas to test
weapons. But were the bunkers of Omaha ever tested or evaluated as P-47
targets?

Extensive tests were done by Ordnance against field and fixed
fortifications typical of beach defenses...in 1945. The results aren't

The second part of this is that actual experimental results of the accuracy and ballistic effects was not completed
until summer 1945 and published for dissemination in September 1945 as Volume III of "Terminal Ballistics". Notably,
it superseded the information published in Volume I Part 2, which appears to have been based upon "rules of thumb"
as developed in the field.

First, with respect to accuracy, it was found that to strike a target 10 yards by 10 yards with release at 5,000 feet
required 25-250 bombs to achieve a 50% chance and 80-800 bombs for a 90% chance. It was further noted that the
first figure assumed "good accuracy", but the latter figure was probably "more realistic" under operational conditions.
So one P-47, one bomb, probably in the best circumstances was a 1-2% chance of a hit, while under "operational conditions"
was perhaps a 0.1-0.2% chance.

The third part is the relative ineffectiveness of bombs versus concrete. The initial problem was if the fuze did not
actuate correctly, or if any delay was used, there was a strong possibility of "rebounding"; the bomb would bounce off
before exploding, yielding zero effect. General purpose (GP) light case, high capacity type bombs could also shatter,
resulting in a low order detonation and again zero effect on the target. AP or SAP didn't have that problem, but it was
considered their low explosive yield negated the advantage...basically if it missed the target and hit the open there
was little possibility of significant collateral effect.

Worse, even if the GP bomb was correctly fuzed, didn't rebound, and didn't shatter, its effect was minimal. The
100-lb bombs that were the majority carried on D-Day could destroy wire entanglements and possibly set off a
few mines, but its effect against concrete was minimal; it could be expected to perforate 1 foot, "blow through" 2 1/4
feet, and cause scabbing of the interior up to 3 1/4 feet. The 1,000-lb GP (the largest reasonably carried by the P-47)
did 2 1/4, 4 3/4, and 6 3/4 respectively. Unfortunately, most of the standard along the Atlantic Wall - "B" - was
6 2/3 feet.

Nor were the results against field fortifications much better. Well-built trenches provided good protection against
blast and fragments, so again a direct hit was required. Earth-covered positions also generally provided sufficient
protection against all except direct hits.

So what was the solution? Direct hits by large caliber weapons...like tank or SP guns.

[Rich]

You may also find some of your questions answered here:

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=cmh

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Rich
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=cmh

It is

Bechthold, Michael (1999) ""The Development of an Unbeatable Combination":
US Close Air Support in Normandy," Canadian Military History: Vol. 8:
Iss. 1, Article 2.

an interesting read. Thank you Rich!

The main surprise I found this:

...the Americans sent their equivalent Air Support
Parties ashore with each of the Regimental
Combat Teams. However, the role of these parties
was to be extremely limited. The ASPs were
prohibited from using their VHF radios to contact
aircraft overhead unless they received prior
authorization to do so. The restrictions on
communications were so severe that the ASPs
were not even permitted to signal aircraft that
were attacking friendly troops or attacking the
wrong target.

The rationalization behind these
orders is not immediately understandable but
historian W.A. Jacobs postulates that the Air
Force did not want their forward attack control
to develop into target control, and thus erode the
doctrine which espoused a centralized system of
air support.

This are unbelievable orders but must be true. It screwed the whole
concept of close air support. What wonders most is that historians
had no direct explanation. Neither from written records nor interviews
or oral history. What Jacobs assumed may be the only explanation for
that blunder.



An immediate request mission was required
as "soon as possible" (SAP) and action on the
request took priority over other activities.
...
On average it took 88 minutes from the time a
request was submitted until the ground unit
received notification on the status of the request.
Aircraft did not actually reach the target until an
average of nearly four hours after the request was
made.

With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was much more
a burden than Luftwaffe.



When an armoured column found its way blocked, its
ability to proceed depended on the timely
intervention of air power which more often than
not would mask rather than destroy an enemy
position allowing the ground forces to either
bypass, or close and destroy the position.

What means "mask"? To take away visibility or attention? Force them
to take cover?
Sounds like something much needed at Omaha beach.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
an interesting read. Thank you Rich!

You're welcome. :)
Why was it a surprise? I already told you most of that. :)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This are unbelievable orders but must be true. It screwed the whole
concept of close air support.

It is difficult to screw up a concept they had so little interest in.
As I said, after the African experience CAS went to the bottom of the
priority list for air forces tasking. And that was the bottom of the
list for the ***tactical tasking*** which was also second fiddle to
the ***strategic tasking***.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was much more
a burden than Luftwaffe.

They had one ***squadron*** tasked on rotation as on call fighter-
bombers throughout the day for ***each beach***, i.e. 16 aircraft.
The rest of the hundreds of P-47 were on air superiority and
interdiction missions.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What means "mask"? To take away visibility or attention? Force them
to take cover?

A "natural or artificial cover that provides concealment". In this
sense, yes, the aircraft obscured the enemy's view of the ground
forces.

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Rich
It is difficult to screw up a concept they had so little interest in.
As I said, after the African experience CAS went to the bottom of the
priority list for air forces tasking. And that was the bottom of the
list for the ***tactical tasking*** which was also second fiddle to
the ***strategic tasking***.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was much more
a burden than Luftwaffe.

They had one ***squadron*** tasked on rotation as on call fighter-
bombers throughout the day for ***each beach***, i.e. 16 aircraft.
The rest of the hundreds of P-47 were on air superiority and
interdiction missions.

This surprises me since a former employee of ours who was a D-Day vet
(military policeman with the Sherbrooke Regiment on D-Day - as a
Canadian you know what beach he was on) who told me that in the first
six weeks of the landing his unit was strafed both by USAAF and RAF
fighters but that it was September till he saw his first German
aircraft (other than as wreckage of course).

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by The Horny Goat
This surprises me since a former employee of ours
who was a D-Day vet ... told me that in the first
six weeks of the landing his unit was strafed both
by USAAF and RAF fighters but that it was September
till he saw his first German aircraft...

Where's the contradiction?

The RAF and USAAF wanted to direct their forces to
air combat. At the start of the campaign, they
assigned nearly all to that function. But it soon
became apparent that there was no significant air
opposition over Normandy. So the fighters were
sent out to strafe. Lots of fighters roaming around
Normandy, looking for targets; some of them strafed
anything that moved.

Meanwhile the Luftwaffe in France had been destroyed.

The ratio of Allied to German aircraft over the
battle area was probably around 100-1.

Under those conditions, Allied troops were more
likely to be strafed by Allied aircraft than by
Germans.

[The Horny Goat]

On Fri, 03 Jul 2015 14:21:15 -0400, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by The Horny Goat
This surprises me since a former employee of ours
who was a D-Day vet ... told me that in the first
six weeks of the landing his unit was strafed both
by USAAF and RAF fighters but that it was September
till he saw his first German aircraft...

Where's the contradiction?
The RAF and USAAF wanted to direct their forces to
air combat. At the start of the campaign, they
assigned nearly all to that function. But it soon
became apparent that there was no significant air
opposition over Normandy. So the fighters were
sent out to strafe. Lots of fighters roaming around
Normandy, looking for targets; some of them strafed
anything that moved.
Meanwhile the Luftwaffe in France had been destroyed.
The ratio of Allied to German aircraft over the
battle area was probably around 100-1.
Under those conditions, Allied troops were more
likely to be strafed by Allied aircraft than by
Germans.

True - but few Allied troops were strafed by BOTH USAAF and RAF!

In any case this surely puts the lie to those who claim nationality of
troops could be distinguished from 5000 feet - after all, the
Canadians wore the same color khaki as the British army and I very
much doubt either air force would knowingly strafe (at a much lower
altitude than 5000 feet!) Allied troops. I would be astonished if
aircraft from 500 feet could distinguish Canadians vs Brits but either
way the color could be clearly distinguished from Feldgrau even if the
national markings on vehicles weren't visible.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Rich
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=cmh

It is
Iss. 1, Article 2.
...the Americans sent their equivalent Air Support
Parties ashore with each of the Regimental
Combat Teams. However, the role of these parties
was to be extremely limited. The ASPs were
prohibited from using their VHF radios to contact
aircraft overhead unless they received prior
authorization to do so. The restrictions on
communications were so severe that the ASPs
were not even permitted to signal aircraft that
were attacking friendly troops or attacking the
wrong target.
The rationalization behind these
orders is not immediately understandable but
historian W.A. Jacobs postulates that the Air
Force did not want their forward attack control
to develop into target control, and thus erode the
doctrine which espoused a centralized system of
air support.
This are unbelievable orders but must be true. It screwed the whole
concept of close air support. What wonders most is that historians
had no direct explanation. Neither from written records nor interviews
or oral history. What Jacobs assumed may be the only explanation for
that blunder.

Actually they enforced the whole concept of close air support.
Rather than order, counter order, disorder.

Want to be a fighter commander with several ground controllers
trying to talk to you? Each presumably trying to tell you what to
do? Plus any Germans deciding to join in? Formation of 8 aircraft
heading NNE at 5,000 feet near St Lo, come in please I have
some targets for you. Gimlet leader I have a target, please
respond if you are near St Lo? Relic Green cancel orders to
bomb near hill 124, head for Dives river crossing co-ordinates.....
Relic Green ignore diversion. Relic Green ignore ignore diversion
we are under attack.

There are some basic requirements, like authentication codes
on both sides and an understanding of the situation.

The Air Support parties, 15 of them, initially attached to regiments
and above, later to divisions and above, had a ground to ground
radio to send requests, initially via the offshore command ships,
and a ground to air set to control any allocated fighters, to help
the aircraft hit the correct target. So the people on the ground
were doing target control of the resources allocated to them,
including telling the aircraft they were hitting the target.

They were not doing target priorities, with the real risk them
deciding their priority was the important one and calling any
aircraft within range. Note late in 1944 a 9th AF controller
managed to talk to a fighter about a target he really wanted
to be hit only to be told the fighter was over Italy.

On the night of the 17th/18th the 9th AF command in France
assumed control of fighter bombers, but of course like before,
within priorities set down in England. However this coupled
with the fact many fighter bombers were now based in France
reduced delays and increased aircraft patrol times. The
fighters were something like 100 to 150 miles closer to their
targets on take off, or the best part of an hour at economic cruise,
than add return time. P-47D cruise with a pair of 150 gallon
external tanks was around 209 mph at 10,000 feet.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
An immediate request mission was required
as "soon as possible" (SAP) and action on the
request took priority over other activities.
...
On average it took 88 minutes from the time a
request was submitted until the ground unit
received notification on the status of the request.
Aircraft did not actually reach the target until an
average of nearly four hours after the request was
made.
With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was much more
a burden than Luftwaffe.

No. What we have is someone not looking at what was going on,
or reading, to repeat

P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

The allies expected a very strong reaction from the Luftwaffe and were
well aware losses of loaded ships would hurt. The vast majority of allied
fighters were allocated to air superiority. And it worked. In most cases
the air superiority fighters were told to look for a target of opportunity
at
the end of their patrol. That left, in the 9th Air Force, some P-47 for
patrol/fighter bomber, patrol until a given time, drop bombs on a
prearranged or opportunity target then return or else hit a target given
to them in the air or before take off.

And it does look like 1 Air Support Party went ashore on Omaha on
D-Day. Again remember where the allies planned to be at the start
of D+1.

How quick do you think WWII communications were, manually code
a request, send it, decode it, evaluate the situation, issue orders to
the fighters and the requester so the relevant forces know what is
going on?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
When an armoured column found its way blocked, its
ability to proceed depended on the timely
intervention of air power which more often than
not would mask rather than destroy an enemy
position allowing the ground forces to either
bypass, or close and destroy the position.
What means "mask"? To take away visibility or attention? Force them
to take cover?

Yes or at least divide their fire between the air and ground.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Sounds like something much needed at Omaha beach.

Really, how many armoured columns were trying to leave the beach?
How many concrete and steel bunkers did the US armoured columns
meet after Cobra and before the German border?

Allied ground support doctrine was based on the North African
experience, diluted by the fact it was theory for most of the units in
England, and often, more in the US case, further diluted by being
new units. The doctrine had evolved when there were fewer allied
and more axis aircraft and as such had to make real decisions
about priorities. In mid 1944 in fact the allies had such a superiority
they could go to something much like what the armies wanted pre
war, air umbrellas, strikes on short notice. This was understood
as June 1944 went on and the Luftwaffe response was seen to be
weak. So by the time Cobra occurred tanks had been fitted with
radios capable of communicating with aircraft and the US was
willing to assign continuous cover to front line forces. They were
willing to operate in small formations at low level while carrying bombs.

By being prepared to continually send missions it meant as one
used its ammunition another was close by to replace it. The article
actually shows it was not so much the communication times
improved but there were more aircraft formations available so
requests that previously had to become part of the Soon As
Possible system were being done routinely, the aircraft were
already close enough. Then add experience allowing diversions
of other missions.

So as of early June 1944,

The allied ground support doctrine assumed strong air opposition
and so fewer available fighter bombers who would need to operate
in larger formations for safety and/or be provided with escorts.

The doctrine was more about interdiction, the closer the strike came
to the front line the more pre planning and co-ordination it wanted.
Troops in artillery range tend to be very hard targets, no man's land
is often smaller than the possible bombing error distances.

The doctrine was further hampered by inexperience, the need for
communications to be relayed through ships offshore and the
distance from the airfields to the front line. As for the D-Day
beaches the assumption was the navy would handle much of
the fire support in the short time the troops would take to clear
the defences. By the way how much situation awareness do you
think an Air Support Party landed on Omaha would have on D-Day?

As the campaign went on the allies became more confident they
could do what pre war the air forces had considered so extravagant
as to be impossible. An air umbrella and the ability of small, bomb
laden formations to operate safely (at least from hostile fighters) in
the battle zone at low altitude. This was the big breakthrough in terms
of response times, what previously required a special or urgent request
was being handed as part of the routine operations as air formations
turned up regularly. Communications remained about as slow as ever
though improved by shorter ranges and the removal of the need to go
through the ships. Shorter ranges also improved aircraft availability.

Then add the experience of all involved. The ground forces now had
an air support system like the Forward Observers for artillery and with
more comparable times of arrival. Add the understanding forces that
had broken through the enemy lines really benefitted from having
aircraft overhead, to scout and replace the often outranged friendly
artillery. Plus mobile warfare gives the best chances for aircraft to
intervene effectively. It is not like the allies met many prepared
defences between the beaches and Germany.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Rich
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=cmh

It is
Iss. 1, Article 2.
...the Americans sent their equivalent Air Support
Parties ashore with each of the Regimental
Combat Teams. However, the role of these parties
was to be extremely limited. The ASPs were
prohibited from using their VHF radios to contact
aircraft overhead unless they received prior
authorization to do so. The restrictions on
communications were so severe that the ASPs
were not even permitted to signal aircraft that
were attacking friendly troops or attacking the
wrong target.
The rationalization behind these
orders is not immediately understandable but
historian W.A. Jacobs postulates that the Air
Force did not want their forward attack control
to develop into target control, and thus erode the
doctrine which espoused a centralized system of
air support.
This are unbelievable orders but must be true. It screwed the whole
concept of close air support. What wonders most is that historians
had no direct explanation. Neither from written records nor interviews
or oral history. What Jacobs assumed may be the only explanation for
that blunder.

Actually they enforced the whole concept of close air support.
Rather than order, counter order, disorder.
Want to be a fighter commander with several ground controllers
trying to talk to you? Each presumably trying to tell you what to
do? Plus any Germans deciding to join in? Formation of 8 aircraft

That CAS is not easy seems obvious. But at D-Day the Allies had already
considerable experience in CAS. The British were quite good with their
"cab rank" system of control developed in Italy. The ACC system the US
developed weeks after D-Day had similarities. The main issue was to let
the Forward Air Controller decide the target and guide the a/c. His
communication ability was (and is) the backbone of CAS.

At D-Day the US FAC was not even allowed to speak with the a/c to
abort friendly fire. Several historians thought that to be in need
of an explanation. You defended this blunder by (alleged) lack
of CAS communication basics that was not the case in mid 1944.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
An immediate request mission was required
as "soon as possible" (SAP) and action on the
request took priority over other activities.
...
On average it took 88 minutes from the time a
request was submitted until the ground unit
received notification on the status of the request.
Aircraft did not actually reach the target until an
average of nearly four hours after the request was
made.

The British in 1942 got it to 30 minutes from request to strike. The USMC
at war end had 15 minutes as requirement. Like the article describes,
some weeks after D-Day the new ACC system got it down to a few minutes
in France.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was much more
a burden than Luftwaffe.

No. What we have is someone not looking at what was going on,
or reading, to repeat
P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

Are you sure? Me sounds what you wrote above reffers to interdiction
missions, not Close Air Support the article is about. Look what Rich

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They had one ***squadron*** tasked on rotation as on call fighter-
bombers throughout the day for ***each beach***, i.e. 16 aircraft.
The rest of the hundreds of P-47 were on air superiority and
interdiction missions.

16 a/c per beach seems a good match to what this hyper complicated
US CAS system at D-Day was able to handle.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
During the day the fighter bombers flew 11 missions in response
to 8 Army requests. Another 5 requests were refused, 1 due to
no aircraft, 1 due to waiting results on current mission and 3 due
to weather and lateness of the hour.

Was the above the activity result of the CAS at Omaha? It would
somewhat fit the 16 a/c number of Rich.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Rich
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=cmh

Iss. 1, Article 2.
...the Americans sent their equivalent Air Support
Parties ashore with each of the Regimental
Combat Teams. However, the role of these parties
was to be extremely limited. The ASPs were
prohibited from using their VHF radios to contact
aircraft overhead unless they received prior
authorization to do so. The restrictions on
communications were so severe that the ASPs
were not even permitted to signal aircraft that
were attacking friendly troops or attacking the
wrong target.
The rationalization behind these
orders is not immediately understandable but
historian W.A. Jacobs postulates that the Air
Force did not want their forward attack control
to develop into target control, and thus erode the
doctrine which espoused a centralized system of
air support.
This are unbelievable orders but must be true. It screwed the whole
concept of close air support. What wonders most is that historians
had no direct explanation. Neither from written records nor interviews
or oral history. What Jacobs assumed may be the only explanation for
that blunder.

Actually they enforced the whole concept of close air support.
Rather than order, counter order, disorder.
Want to be a fighter commander with several ground controllers
trying to talk to you? Each presumably trying to tell you what to
do? Plus any Germans deciding to join in? Formation of 8 aircraft

That CAS is not easy seems obvious. But at D-Day the Allies had already
considerable experience in CAS.

In the Mediterranean, the ground and air units doing it in
Normandy were for the most part inexperienced. That showed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The British were quite good with their
"cab rank" system of control developed in Italy.

In Italy and meant as a high intensity operation, effectively support
for an attack, not day to day. So lots of small formations of aircraft
turning up on a regular basis.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The ACC system the US
developed weeks after D-Day had similarities.

Armoured Column Cover.

Weeks after the landings and it was the same system, refined by
doing things like putting the relevant radios in tanks so they could
be closer to the front and by the number of aircraft available in
conditions of air superiority heading for supremacy. It meant an
advancing column could have 4 fighter bombers overhead with
them relieved after 30 minutes. Provided the ground formation
actually had enough working radios. A problem early on in
Normandy.

Also note if the Luftwaffe was weak in Normandy it was a lot
weaker when its airfields had to be evacuated as the allies
broke out.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The main issue was to let
the Forward Air Controller decide the target and guide the a/c. His
communication ability was (and is) the backbone of CAS.

Actually there is a much higher level, deciding where the aircraft
are allocated. And which ones will talk to the controllers. The
forward controller is given control of the allocated aircraft, not
any aircraft in the area. The controller can then decide what
target those aircraft could hit, or simply be observers.

To put it another way the forward artillery observers could call in
all guns within range if they thought it required. The generals
decided how many guns would be within range and whether some
batteries would not respond to a call without some sort of command
permission.

Each day there was a planning mission at high level, requests for
air support would be dealt with, then came what other missions
would be flown and what ones of them could be diverted if
needed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
At D-Day the US FAC was not even allowed to speak with the a/c to
abort friendly fire. Several historians thought that to be in need
of an explanation. You defended this blunder by (alleged) lack
of CAS communication basics that was not the case in mid 1944.

No, I pointed out the system, with inexperienced units in play,
was quite clear about who could issue what orders, because of the
quite valid problems with communications and priorities. The
basics were there, the forward controllers could control their
aircraft and had to leave anyone else's alone. Otherwise there
is the risk of too much confusion in a time limited environment.

To put it another way how would the army feel if a local controller
redirected a strike on a priority target? Given it would take hours
for another attempt, given where the airfields were on D-Day.

The local controllers were allowed to control "their" aircraft,
that continued, what changed was the availability of those aircraft,
in much smaller formations and therefore much more likely to be
available. The communication delays were still present.

By the way I point out Jacobs' proposed explanation is wrong,
given what the forward controllers were expected to do, guide
their strikes. This becomes alleged lack of CAS communication
basics. You know like controlling your aircraft, not someone
else's, not deciding what you can see is so important as to
over ride the orders of units not under your control. They are
the basics, they existed.

Jacobs is wrong. You then decide any to any communication
is just what is required and should be no trouble.

Tell us all, later when the system was better, or earlier in the
Mediterranean, what authority did the forward controllers have
there and then to take control of aircraft not allocated to them?
Even to talk to aircraft not allocated to them? Since apparently
not doing so is an error.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
An immediate request mission was required
as "soon as possible" (SAP) and action on the
request took priority over other activities.
...
On average it took 88 minutes from the time a
request was submitted until the ground unit
received notification on the status of the request.
Aircraft did not actually reach the target until an
average of nearly four hours after the request was
made.

The British in 1942 got it to 30 minutes from request to strike.

How far were the air bases from the front line? How many
aircraft per forward controller? How big a strike formation?
How many in the air waiting a target?

In the Gazala battles the then system allowed bomber strikes
within 30 minutes of request, however that was because a
lot of pre planning had been done, these were not strikes at
just discovered targets.

Think about it, signal asking for strike, staff discussion and
agreement, signal to bombers who take maybe 15 or more
minutes to take off and climb to 10,000 feet. And remember
the aircraft topped out at a couple of sorties a day and were
limited in numbers, waiting for a target could mean they did
not fly a mission that day, a waste of resources.

In terms of quick strikes a major problem was forward
controllers rarely could find a location giving them the views
they really needed. The British added a senior enough
commander, often a Wing Commander, who plugged into
the radio network to short circuit urgent requests, this group
was meant as 1 per corps, and used about 6 vehicles to
enable it to essentially talk to "everyone" and keep track of
the situation. Meantime there were the forward controllers,
again requiring vehicles given their radio needs who were
the guides to the actual strike.

In 1944 the problems of correct use of codes was raised
and being able to handle all the signals remained a problem.
Where the bomb line was, where the controllers were, what
were the latest results, the latest aircraft available and so on.

In France the US generally used armed reconnaissance
sorties as the aircraft to divert to an urgent request.

The US helped overcome the problems of sighting targets
by using the small artillery spotter aircraft, distinctly marked,
to control strikes. Then they added ground control via radar.
The British followed these ideas.

Meantime every time a strike hit a friendly target the troops
became more wary of calling in support and would do things
like deploy air recognition panels all the time, which did not
help the pilots figure out the where the front line was. Making
sure the troops had the right information and things like the
correct smoke signals became more important the closer
the strike to the troops.

In the Netherlands the co-operation was good enough
aircraft were used instead at times instead of artillery, they
could strike closer to the troops than the guns.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The USMC
at war end had 15 minutes as requirement.

How big were the islands, how much danger was the Japanese
air arm? How many aircraft per forward controller? How big a
strike formation? How many in the air waiting for a target?

Note many were operating from aircraft carriers.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Like the article describes,
some weeks after D-Day the new ACC system got it down to a few minutes
in France.

Actually what the system did was send a continual stream of aircraft
from close bases so every few minutes there would be aircraft available
if the controller had a target.

The communications did not really speed up, the aircraft arrival
became more regular with shorter delays. The benefit of air
superiority.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was much more
a burden than Luftwaffe.

No. What we have is someone not looking at what was going on,
or reading, to repeat
P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

Are you sure?

When did the reports by the 9th Air Force of what it did
become unacceptable?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Me sounds what you wrote above reffers to interdiction
missions, not Close Air Support the article is about.

So now we find out what a very individual interpretation of close air
support means, does it include artillery firing on the troops? Because
that is what a number of the fighter bomber sorties on D-Day were after.
Or is it a case it must be around the front line?

Noted how far artillery pieces can fire?

You do understand if there was no request the fighter bombers
normally attacked a target before leaving.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Look what Rich

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They had one ***squadron*** tasked on rotation as on call fighter-
bombers throughout the day for ***each beach***, i.e. 16 aircraft.
The rest of the hundreds of P-47 were on air superiority and
interdiction missions.

Right, on call if a mission came in.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
16 a/c per beach seems a good match to what this hyper complicated
US CAS system at D-Day was able to handle.

16 aircraft at a time. Or is the idea the one squadron stayed there all
day?
Noted the word rotation in the quote?

And that hyper complicated CAS system was the one in use by the allies
in the Mediterranean, the one you praise, but at D Day they were very
worried about the Luftwaffe plus had an in built delay of up to an hour's
flying from the airfields, plus a similar return flight eating into range
and
loiter times. Then add the radios the forward controllers had were geared
to the shorter ranges in the Mediterranean and Desert and so they needed
to send requests via the offshore ships. It meant long delays to any
request and only had a few missions available for tasking.

Or to put it another way Dawn was around 04.00 GMT/Zulu, so dark would
be around 20.00, 2 hours loiter time times 2 beaches, 16 aircraft sized
missions equals 256 sorties (at 4 to 5 hours per sortie or 800 to 1,000
miles at P-47 cruise) and the 9th Air Force flew about twice that number of
fighter bomber sorties.

Yes, using the above simple calculation about half the fighter bomber effort
was devoted to being available for new missions, what seems to be called
a new, much more limited version, of close air support. The percentage of
effort is even more when you remove the pre arranged attacks done as part
of the landing bombardments.

So hyper complicated consisted of controllers with voice radios to contact
their aircraft and a second radio to contact HQ to ask for aircraft. The
complication for D-Day and for a time beyond was the HQ radio did not
have the range to reach England, so messages had to be relayed. The
only change to apparently make the system go from hyper complicated to
simple was the arrival of the HQ in France.

The real improvement was being prepared to send a steady number of
small aircraft formations to ask the forward controllers if there were any
local targets. Not the communication system for the controllers.

When it became "hyper complicated" was with the addition of airborne
controllers and radar controllers, along with the ground ones. That
increased complexity.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
During the day the fighter bombers flew 11 missions in response
to 8 Army requests. Another 5 requests were refused, 1 due to
no aircraft, 1 due to waiting results on current mission and 3 due
to weather and lateness of the hour.

Was the above the activity result of the CAS at Omaha? It would
somewhat fit the 16 a/c number of Rich.

No what it would fit is the idea the same 16 aircraft stayed over the
beach all day. Missions at squadron strength, the sort of minimum
formation the allies were prepared to risk on D-Day.

And the 9h Air Force fighter bombers hit a variety of targets the
army decided were problems in the invasion area, along with
pre arranged targets and opportunity targets.

And to make it clear, close air support includes strikes on
enemy artillery within range, that could be thousands of yards
from the front line.

The air support for Omaha attacked targets in the invasion areas,
a mixture of prearranged, opportunity and requested ones.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That CAS is not easy seems obvious. But at D-Day the Allies had already
considerable experience in CAS.

In the Mediterranean, the ground and air units doing it in
Normandy were for the most part inexperienced. That showed.

I would have expected that the US/UK for their most important operation
of WWII would assemble their most experienced man. Specialy for a job
like CAS were experience counts more than theory. The Med is not far
from England. Any idea why they did not?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The British were quite good with their
"cab rank" system of control developed in Italy.

In Italy and meant as a high intensity operation, effectively support
for an attack, not day to day. So lots of small formations of aircraft
turning up on a regular basis.

Exactly that was needed for D-Day. Was the British CAS on D-Day better
than the US?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was much more
a burden than Luftwaffe.

No. What we have is someone not looking at what was going on,
or reading, to repeat
P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

Are you sure?

When did the reports by the 9th Air Force of what it did
become unacceptable?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Me sounds what you wrote above reffers to interdiction
missions, not Close Air Support the article is about.

So now we find out what a very individual interpretation of close air
support means, does it include artillery firing on the troops?

No

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Because
that is what a number of the fighter bomber sorties on D-Day were after.
Or is it a case it must be around the front line?

CAS must be close (< 1 km, USMC even had something like < 200 m) to own
troops. Thats the definition in (later ?) 1944 and about today.
Anything else is called interdiction and is limited to an area on a map
beyond some HQ drawn "bombline". Beyond bombline they could take free
or pre planed targets or radio requests. Vogt (who I cited at the begin
of this thread) talked about his interdiction mission on D-Day. But this
was not CAS. If CAS had another meaning then - we could talk about this.
But please keep heer to the today meaning of the term.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Noted how far artillery pieces can fire?

As you wrote (in the part I deleted, I think I had to by rule) some
(even many?) CAS missions were more accurate than artillery.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You do understand if there was no request the fighter bombers
normally attacked a target before leaving.

Yes, that would be no CAS.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Look what Rich

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They had one ***squadron*** tasked on rotation as on call fighter-
bombers throughout the day for ***each beach***, i.e. 16 aircraft.
The rest of the hundreds of P-47 were on air superiority and
interdiction missions.

Right, on call if a mission came in.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
16 a/c per beach seems a good match to what this hyper complicated
US CAS system at D-Day was able to handle.

16 aircraft at a time. Or is the idea the one squadron stayed there all
day?
Noted the word rotation in the quote?
And that hyper complicated CAS system was the one in use by the allies
in the Mediterranean, the one you praise, but at D Day they were very
worried about the Luftwaffe

they had enough P-51 to deal with the remaining Luftwaffe. They had
air supremacy over Normandy already before D-Day. What was Luftwaffe
at D-Day? Two fighters over the beaches?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
plus had an in built delay of up to an hour's
flying from the airfields, plus a similar return flight eating into range
and
loiter times.

The cab rank system (and the later ones) meant a/c circling in a stand by
position near the battlefield waiting for requests. Normandy was close
to S England and loiter time of a P-47 in hours then.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then add the radios the forward controllers had were geared
to the shorter ranges in the Mediterranean and Desert and so they needed
to send requests via the offshore ships.

and from the ship to England, what an idea!

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
It meant long delays to any
request and only had a few missions available for tasking.
Or to put it another way Dawn was around 04.00 GMT/Zulu, so dark would
be around 20.00, 2 hours loiter time times 2 beaches, 16 aircraft sized
missions equals 256 sorties (at 4 to 5 hours per sortie or 800 to 1,000
miles at P-47 cruise) and the 9th Air Force flew about twice that number of
fighter bomber sorties.
Yes, using the above simple calculation about half the fighter bomber effort
was devoted to being available for new missions, what seems to be called
a new, much more limited version, of close air support. The percentage of
effort is even more when you remove the pre arranged attacks done as part
of the landing bombardments.
So hyper complicated consisted of controllers with voice radios to contact
their aircraft and a second radio to contact HQ to ask for aircraft. The
complication for D-Day and for a time beyond was the HQ radio did not
have the range to reach England, so messages had to be relayed. The
only change to apparently make the system go from hyper complicated to
simple was the arrival of the HQ in France.
The real improvement was being prepared to send a steady number of
small aircraft formations to ask the forward controllers if there were any
local targets. Not the communication system for the controllers.

That was like the British cab rank system. Of course it was more simple
and needed less comunication. The article author (and some others)
meant the US CAS system at D-Day was by wish of total control by higher
ranks. Your opinion is that it was the lack of suitable communication
equipment that created the US CAS D-Day system?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
When it became "hyper complicated" was with the addition of airborne
controllers and radar controllers, along with the ground ones. That
increased complexity.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
During the day the fighter bombers flew 11 missions in response
to 8 Army requests. Another 5 requests were refused, 1 due to
no aircraft, 1 due to waiting results on current mission and 3 due
to weather and lateness of the hour.

Was the above the activity result of the CAS at Omaha? It would
somewhat fit the 16 a/c number of Rich.

No what it would fit is the idea the same 16 aircraft stayed over the
beach all day. Missions at squadron strength, the sort of minimum
formation the allies were prepared to risk on D-Day.
And the 9h Air Force fighter bombers hit a variety of targets the
army decided were problems in the invasion area, along with
pre arranged targets and opportunity targets.
And to make it clear, close air support includes strikes on
enemy artillery within range, that could be thousands of yards
from the front line.
The air support for Omaha attacked targets in the invasion areas,
a mixture of prearranged, opportunity and requested ones.

My question was about CAS at Omaha. Do you have a source how many
CAS missions (by today definition) they got to the targets this day?


What area and time frame does this text by you covers:

P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

The 481+47 bomber sorties, were on pre planed targets?

The above mentione dive bombers at D-Day. An idea how many, what typ and
on what targets?



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Some deleted text,

"Want to be a fighter commander with several ground controllers
trying to talk to you? Each presumably trying to tell you what to
do? Plus any Germans deciding to join in?"

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That CAS is not easy seems obvious. But at D-Day the Allies had already
considerable experience in CAS.

In the Mediterranean, the ground and air units doing it in
Normandy were for the most part inexperienced. That showed.

I would have expected that the US/UK for their most important operation
of WWII would assemble their most experienced man. Specialy for a job
like CAS were experience counts more than theory. The Med is not far
from England. Any idea why they did not?

Yes, it is called they had lots of forces in England who were trained
and of course the shipping situation.

It was the ground and air formations, so is the idea most to all of the
8th and 5th armies, the Desert, 15th and 12th air forces should
have been sent to England and replaced by the forces from England?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The British were quite good with their
"cab rank" system of control developed in Italy.

In Italy and meant as a high intensity operation, effectively support
for an attack, not day to day. So lots of small formations of aircraft
turning up on a regular basis.

Exactly that was needed for D-Day. Was the British CAS on D-Day better
than the US?

In numbers it was worse, the distance from airfields was a bigger
worry for the RAF since its aircraft were usually shorter ranged,
fighters in particular.

The 2nd TAF flew 292 fighter bomber sorties, 227 attacking, 77.9
long tons of bombs dropped, 10 aircraft lost. Plus another 928
offensive sorties (escorts, sweeps, reconnaissance etc.) and 1,011
beach head protection sorties. So yes pushing half of the sorties
were specifically defensive and many of the offensive sorties were
things like fighter screens.

Essentially the size of the front, the expected Luftwaffe reaction and
the distance to the front dictated the missions flown in the first few
days of the invasion.

Bulk deleted text, to the next >

Weeks after the landings and it was the same system, refined by
doing things like putting the relevant radios in tanks so they could
be closer to the front and by the number of aircraft available in
conditions of air superiority heading for supremacy. It meant an
advancing column could have 4 fighter bombers overhead with
them relieved after 30 minutes. Provided the ground formation
actually had enough working radios. A problem early on in
Normandy.

Also note if the Luftwaffe was weak in Normandy it was a lot
weaker when its airfields had to be evacuated as the allies
broke out.

Actually there is a much higher level, deciding where the aircraft
are allocated. And which ones will talk to the controllers. The
forward controller is given control of the allocated aircraft, not
any aircraft in the area. The controller can then decide what
target those aircraft could hit, or simply be observers.

To put it another way the forward artillery observers could call in
all guns within range if they thought it required. The generals
decided how many guns would be within range and whether some
batteries would not respond to a call without some sort of command
permission.

Each day there was a planning mission at high level, requests for
air support would be dealt with, then came what other missions
would be flown and what ones of them could be diverted if
needed.

I pointed out the system, with inexperienced units in play,
was quite clear about who could issue what orders, because of the
quite valid problems with communications and priorities. The
basics were there, the forward controllers could control their
aircraft and had to leave anyone else's alone. Otherwise there
is the risk of too much confusion in a time limited environment.

To put it another way how would the army feel if a local controller
redirected a strike on a priority target? Given it would take hours
for another attempt, given where the airfields were on D-Day.

The local controllers were allowed to control "their" aircraft,
that continued, what changed was the availability of those aircraft,
in much smaller formations and therefore much more likely to be
available. The communication delays were still present.

By the way I point out Jacobs' proposed explanation is wrong,
given what the forward controllers were expected to do, guide
their strikes. This becomes alleged lack of CAS communication
basics. You know like controlling your aircraft, not someone
else's, not deciding what you can see is so important as to
over ride the orders of units not under your control. They are
the basics, they existed.

Jacobs is wrong. You then decide any to any communication
is just what is required and should be no trouble.

Tell us all, later when the system was better, or earlier in the
Mediterranean, what authority did the forward controllers have
there and then to take control of aircraft not allocated to them?
Even to talk to aircraft not allocated to them? Since apparently
not doing so is an error.

How far were the air bases from the front line? How many
aircraft per forward controller? How big a strike formation?
How many in the air waiting a target?

In the Gazala battles the then system allowed bomber strikes
within 30 minutes of request, however that was because a
lot of pre planning had been done, these were not strikes at
just discovered targets.

Think about it, signal asking for strike, staff discussion and
agreement, signal to bombers who take maybe 15 or more
minutes to take off and climb to 10,000 feet. And remember
the aircraft topped out at a couple of sorties a day and were
limited in numbers, waiting for a target could mean they did
not fly a mission that day, a waste of resources.

In terms of quick strikes a major problem was forward
controllers rarely could find a location giving them the views
they really needed. The British added a senior enough
commander, often a Wing Commander, who plugged into
the radio network to short circuit urgent requests, this group
was meant as 1 per corps, and used about 6 vehicles to
enable it to essentially talk to "everyone" and keep track of
the situation. Meantime there were the forward controllers,
again requiring vehicles given their radio needs who were
the guides to the actual strike.

In 1944 the problems of correct use of codes was raised
and being able to handle all the signals remained a problem.
Where the bomb line was, where the controllers were, what
were the latest results, the latest aircraft available and so on.

In France the US generally used armed reconnaissance
sorties as the aircraft to divert to an urgent request.

The US helped overcome the problems of sighting targets
by using the small artillery spotter aircraft, distinctly marked,
to control strikes. Then they added ground control via radar.
The British followed these ideas.

Meantime every time a strike hit a friendly target the troops
became more wary of calling in support and would do things
like deploy air recognition panels all the time, which did not
help the pilots figure out the where the front line was. Making
sure the troops had the right information and things like the
correct smoke signals became more important the closer
the strike to the troops.

In the Netherlands the co-operation was good enough
aircraft were used instead at times instead of artillery, they
could strike closer to the troops than the guns.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With such an restricted centralized CAS control system such a poor result
is no wonder. They had 100s (> 1000 ?) P-47 at D-Day but only a very
low number of CAS missions got through. Seems Army bureaucracy was
much
more
a burden than Luftwaffe.

No. What we have is someone not looking at what was going on,
or reading, to repeat
P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

Are you sure?

When did the reports by the 9th Air Force of what it did
become unacceptable?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Me sounds what you wrote above reffers to interdiction
missions, not Close Air Support the article is about.

So now we find out what a very individual interpretation of close air
support means, does it include artillery firing on the troops?

No

Congratulations, you have successfully defined close air support
to something different to what the allies were doing in 1944. Then
you decide they were not doing close air support.

No wonder you are sure they were doing it wrong, after defining
things so they were wrong.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Because
that is what a number of the fighter bomber sorties on D-Day were after.
Or is it a case it must be around the front line?

CAS must be close (< 1 km, USMC even had something like < 200 m) to own
troops. Thats the definition in (later ?) 1944 and about today.

Oh good, and definition of close air support in June 1944 was?
By the allies in England.

So the USMC hitting troops 250 metres from the front line was
not close support, distant support perhaps? Every thought the
distance might be minimum not maximum?

Also given the under 1,000 metres sort of thing, what is the definition
of a strike on artillery say 1,500 metres from the front?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Anything else is called interdiction and is limited to an area on a map
beyond some HQ drawn "bombline".

So hitting artillery or even machine gun positions more than 1,000 metres
from the front line is an interdiction strike. Well done. Interdicting the
projectiles they might fire?

By the way the bombline was in use for all strikes.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Beyond bombline they could take free
or pre planed targets or radio requests. Vogt (who I cited at the begin
of this thread) talked about his interdiction mission on D-Day. But this
was not CAS. If CAS had another meaning then - we could talk about this.
But please keep heer to the today meaning of the term.

Oh I see, having redefined close air support to something new we
must now use the new definition. How about using the one the allies
had in 1944, and believe me it included strikes on things like artillery
within range of the front line. Tanks as well.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Noted how far artillery pieces can fire?

As you wrote (in the part I deleted, I think I had to by rule) some
(even many?) CAS missions were more accurate than artillery.

Ah, I see, that the allies managed to do close air support well at
times is the answer to how far artillery can fire.

They also did anti submarine warfare quite well, I suppose that
negates panzer attacks? Or the need for fighter sorties?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You do understand if there was no request the fighter bombers
normally attacked a target before leaving.

Yes, that would be no CAS.

I see, even if the target is within the 1,000 metres?

So you are very extreme army, unless the troops can see the
aircraft attack plus it is on call it is not close air support.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Look what Rich

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They had one ***squadron*** tasked on rotation as on call fighter-
bombers throughout the day for ***each beach***, i.e. 16 aircraft.
The rest of the hundreds of P-47 were on air superiority and
interdiction missions.

Right, on call if a mission came in.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
16 a/c per beach seems a good match to what this hyper complicated
US CAS system at D-Day was able to handle.

16 aircraft at a time. Or is the idea the one squadron stayed there all
day?
Noted the word rotation in the quote?
And that hyper complicated CAS system was the one in use by the allies
in the Mediterranean, the one you praise, but at D Day they were very
worried about the Luftwaffe

they had enough P-51 to deal with the remaining Luftwaffe. They had
air supremacy over Normandy already before D-Day. What was Luftwaffe
at D-Day? Two fighters over the beaches?

I see, why not jump in your time machine and tell the commanders
on the day honestly, the Luftwaffe will mount under a couple of
hundred sorties on D-Day? I guarantee you can use the allied
fighters for something else. All those P-38's on invasion protection.
By the way Omaha beach defences will hold, do not tell the
destroyers to close the beach earlier, rather mount lots of airstrikes
on the positions despite the US troops there having almost no way
to signal the aircraft. Just send in more air controllers perhaps?

Does the same guarantee apply to naval attacks?

How about guaranteeing 21st Panzer will spend much of the day
awaiting clear orders?

We are talking about people planning about what will happen. They
decided the risk of the Luftwaffe appearing during the initial invasion
day was significant. They also laid on naval and landing craft based
fire support for the beach assaults, rather than expecting the fighter
bombers to do such attacks.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
plus had an in built delay of up to an hour's
flying from the airfields, plus a similar return flight eating into range
and loiter times.

The cab rank system (and the later ones) meant a/c circling in a stand by
position near the battlefield waiting for requests. Normandy was close
to S England and loiter time of a P-47 in hours then.

I suppose the fact there was a squadron of P-47's doing exactly that
per US beach is going to be ignored, they attacked the wrong targets,
mostly pre arranged but also artillery outside the defined close air
support boundary the allies did not have in June 1944.

And I simply note the way close to is used to describe the
distances. Bothered to compare it to the distances from the
airfields to the front lines in say Italy? Does that qualify as
very close, or extremely close? It really matters given the
ranges the aircraft had when carrying bombs.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then add the radios the forward controllers had were geared
to the shorter ranges in the Mediterranean and Desert and so they needed
to send requests via the offshore ships.

and from the ship to England, what an idea!

You would prefer no method until a HQ managed to go ashore
and set up a few days later? Noted when this did happen, like
nearly 2 weeks?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
It meant long delays to any
request and only had a few missions available for tasking.
Or to put it another way Dawn was around 04.00 GMT/Zulu, so dark would
be around 20.00, 2 hours loiter time times 2 beaches, 16 aircraft sized
missions equals 256 sorties (at 4 to 5 hours per sortie or 800 to 1,000
miles at P-47 cruise) and the 9th Air Force flew about twice that number of
fighter bomber sorties.
Yes, using the above simple calculation about half the fighter bomber effort
was devoted to being available for new missions, what seems to be called
a new, much more limited version, of close air support. The percentage of
effort is even more when you remove the pre arranged attacks done as part
of the landing bombardments.
So hyper complicated consisted of controllers with voice radios to contact
their aircraft and a second radio to contact HQ to ask for aircraft. The
complication for D-Day and for a time beyond was the HQ radio did not
have the range to reach England, so messages had to be relayed. The
only change to apparently make the system go from hyper complicated to
simple was the arrival of the HQ in France.
The real improvement was being prepared to send a steady number of
small aircraft formations to ask the forward controllers if there were any
local targets. Not the communication system for the controllers.

That was like the British cab rank system.

Armoured Column Cover, etc. And the cab rank system was known
to attack targets further than 1,000 metres from the front line. And the
system was in place in Normandy.

I note the failure to actually understand the point about complication.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Of course it was more simple
and needed less comunication.

Rather it needed less communication of urgent requests, as the
aircraft kept arriving, thereby allowing shorter delays. There were
plenty of requests for non urgent attacks, which were evaluated
at the relevant daily conference and decisions made about attacks.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The article author (and some others)
meant the US CAS system at D-Day was by wish of total control by higher
ranks.

The higher ranks kept control they allocated the aircraft on what
would be called a grand tactical sense in the day to day fighting,
on D-Day they were allocated according to the plan. Pre invasion
bombardment, Luftwaffe defence, paratrooper support, strikes
during the day on pre arranged targets and a squadron a beach
available at all times if the troops requested a mission. The
approval for the mission was made in England.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Your opinion is that it was the lack of suitable communication
equipment that created the US CAS D-Day system?

Actually what I am saying consistently was the communication systems
back to HQ and then to the airfields did not really speed up during the
war, instead the ability to send a continuous stream of small aircraft
formations made the big difference to response times.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
When it became "hyper complicated" was with the addition of airborne
controllers and radar controllers, along with the ground ones. That
increased complexity.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
During the day the fighter bombers flew 11 missions in response
to 8 Army requests. Another 5 requests were refused, 1 due to
no aircraft, 1 due to waiting results on current mission and 3 due
to weather and lateness of the hour.

I note how this information is asked for again.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Was the above the activity result of the CAS at Omaha? It would
somewhat fit the 16 a/c number of Rich.

No what it would fit is the idea the same 16 aircraft stayed over the
beach all day. Missions at squadron strength, the sort of minimum
formation the allies were prepared to risk on D-Day.
And the 9h Air Force fighter bombers hit a variety of targets the
army decided were problems in the invasion area, along with
pre arranged targets and opportunity targets.
And to make it clear, close air support includes strikes on
enemy artillery within range, that could be thousands of yards
from the front line.
The air support for Omaha attacked targets in the invasion areas,
a mixture of prearranged, opportunity and requested ones.

My question was about CAS at Omaha. Do you have a source how many
CAS missions (by today definition) they got to the targets this day?

Oh, I see, someone has to measure the distance from the front line
to the target, including of course the reports of fighters strafing
machine guns shooting at the allied troops.

The support was strafing and bombing.

So no, short of someone going through all the reports and plotting
the details on a map, there is no such data.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

D-Day, 6 June 1944, as has been stated.

Going to explain why 500 sorties is declared a small number?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The 481+47 bomber sorties, were on pre planed targets?

No, they were on a mixture of pre planned and targets requested
by the troops that day as reported before.

As reported before.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above mentione dive bombers at D-Day. An idea how many, what typ and
on what targets?

P-47. On pre arranged targets, including roads, rail, bridges, known
artillery positions, plus requested targets, usually artillery shooting at
the beach heads. As reported before.

To repeat myself,

Tell us all, later when the system was better, or earlier in the
Mediterranean, what authority did the forward controllers have
there and then to take control of aircraft not allocated to them?
Even to talk to aircraft not allocated to them? Since apparently
not doing so is an error.

Now to make it clear,

The allied air support system on D-Day was modeled on the one used
in the Mediterranean. It had major complications, the distance to the
airfields, the range of the radios and the expected Luftwaffe response.
It also considered strikes against weapons firing on the troops as support.

It also had many more aircraft available than in the Mediterranean and
it evolved to add things like spotter aircraft as controllers, radar guided
strikes and using tanks as the command vehicles. Overall however it
did NOT change the fundamentals of communication times and their
delays, also the command set up. The numbers of aircraft continually
arriving reduced the need to ask for urgent strikes.

On D-Day it followed the doctrine which included the rule that the
forward controllers were there to command the allocated aircraft,
not try to contact others or put out general requests for help.

The command teams back at HQ were involved, they had to allocate
the aircraft on a daily basis plus evaluate urgent requests, ones that
required diversions of aircraft. As experience grew, and the urgent
requests declined, things like deliberately having "spare" aircraft in
the air were done, things like armed reconnaissance, who could
"check in" with a controller and divert if required without major effect
on the overall air plan for the day and so not need HQ authority. That
is the system adapted to having many more resources along with
refinements from new equipment and experience, it meant strikes
could be made closer to friendly troops with greater safety.

On D-Day no fighter bomber strikes were planned or expected to
be within hundreds of yards of allied troops, the experience and
command control was not there. The warships (with their spotter
aircraft), landing craft mounted artillery and the weapons landed
on the beach were the line of contact support.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That CAS is not easy seems obvious. But at D-Day the Allies had already
considerable experience in CAS.

In the Mediterranean, the ground and air units doing it in
Normandy were for the most part inexperienced. That showed.

I would have expected that the US/UK for their most important operation
of WWII would assemble their most experienced man. Specialy for a job
like CAS were experience counts more than theory. The Med is not far
from England. Any idea why they did not?

Yes, it is called they had lots of forces in England who were trained
and of course the shipping situation.
It was the ground and air formations, so is the idea most to all of the
8th and 5th armies, the Desert, 15th and 12th air forces should
have been sent to England and replaced by the forces from England?

Experienced pilots are good. But the most crucial part in CAS are the
Forward Air Controllers. That I was talking about. Those experienced
FACs were left in the Med. What about "shipping situation" if we talk
about 100 or a few 100s men?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

D-Day, 6 June 1944, as has been stated.

What area? Omaha or the whole US section?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above mentione dive bombers at D-Day. An idea how many, what typ and
on what targets?

P-47. On pre arranged targets, including roads, rail, bridges, known
artillery positions, plus requested targets, usually artillery shooting at
the beach heads. As reported before.

I know the US had a P-51 version modified for dive bombing. Did a
modified P-47 version existed too? Or was it the free dive bombing
Rich mentioned with very very poor accuracy.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On D-Day no fighter bomber strikes were planned or expected to
be within hundreds of yards of allied troops, the experience and
command control was not there. The warships (with their spotter
aircraft), landing craft mounted artillery and the weapons landed
on the beach were the line of contact support.
Geoffrey Sinclair

That was the failure at Omaha that cost a lot of lives. Its today the
most TV popularized battle of the US in Europe WWII. At least in German
TV - here it may even be the most mentioned battle of WWII at all. The
lack of CAS on the beach was a serious mistake. It is covered
by you and some historians as a lack of experience. I do not agree and
suspect some other reason. Navy vs Army rivalry was blamed by one
historian. Another on Army vs USAAF. I'm not convinced yet of anything.
Just want to collect more facts.

Btw, "landing craft mounted artillery" means the rockets, or real guns?
Why did this fail?



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Stephen Graham]

The lack of CAS on the beach was a serious mistake.

I'm sorry but you seem to imagine that World War Two close air support
was as effective as modern-day laser-guided specialized weapons.

As I understand matters, the primary obstacle on Omaha was the
casemented artillery and machine-guns. This was all well protected, by
design, from attack from above. It was possible that a direct hit with
the heaviest-possible bomb might damage the emplacement. That's not what
the close support tactical aircraft were capable of carrying, leaving
aside the intrinsic lack of precision. There were perfectly good reasons
for not applying air power at extremely close range, which is what
you're calling for.

World War Two tactical airpower was good at hitting unarmored vehicles
and equipment either in the open or lightly protected.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Stephen Graham

The lack of CAS on the beach was a serious mistake.

I'm sorry but you seem to imagine that World War Two close air support
was as effective as modern-day laser-guided specialized weapons.
As I understand matters, the primary obstacle on Omaha was the
casemented artillery and machine-guns. This was all well protected, by
design, from attack from above. It was possible that a direct hit with
the heaviest-possible bomb might damage the emplacement. That's not what
the close support tactical aircraft were capable of carrying, leaving
aside the intrinsic lack of precision. There were perfectly good reasons
for not applying air power at extremely close range, which is what
you're calling for.
World War Two tactical airpower was good at hitting unarmored vehicles
and equipment either in the open or lightly protected.

We are talking about P-47. So rockets, bombs and 8 heavy MGs. Some P-47
were trained to bomb at low level to hit the side of a target. Thats
mentioned in an USAAF report. Other tactic mentioned there was on shallow
dive. Sounded for me like what the German Me-262 fighter bomber did. Was
there a chance to hit some beach pillboxes? I think obviously yes. The
question is how many to hit and with what effect.

It seems the USAAF intended to bomb the beaches by heavies. That would
exclude the use of P-47 till just before H hour. So any P-47 action
would only be possible with the first wave invasion troops already on
the beach. Thats when the pillboxes and the other bunkers had to be in
action.

It means the German defenders had to be at the openings (Schiessscharten,
whats the English term?) to shoot at the US infantry 500 m (600 yards)
away. The US troops needed just a few minutes to get in range of the
bunkers for their handgrandes, flamethrowers or whatever they had.

The visibility below 2 km was quite good and any P-47 over the beach
could well see the pillboxes. The main problem with CAS is to distinguish
enemy and friendly forces or to find the target at all. At the beach this
was no problem. A P-47 could there fly slow and low without fear of AAA.
Because any Flak had to be eleminated before anyway,

So had the P-47s a chance to suppress (to "mask") the defenders for some
minutes?

If a 1000 lb HE bomb explodes within 50 m of a pillbox it will not kill the
soldiers but certainly affect them for some time. Napalm would kill or
wound them. The rockets would force them to hide because they did not know
that there was no chance for a hit.

Now the MGs. Once a P-47 fires on the openings the pillbox crew has to
hide - even without any hit. I know from German descriptions that under
fire by a P-47 is an event only a close by bomb could exceed. They had
to hide, no doubt.

What were the chances for a hit? I heard interviews from survivors of
1945 death marches that sometimes Allied fighters came close down and
killed some of the SS guards covering the sides of the march. It had the
effect that guards even covered their uniforms. So we talk about hitting
a single soldier just around 10 m from friendly ones. I once saw a gun
camera footage from a P-47 that followed a single German soldier as he
run from a street in the woods. I saw that the pilot even corrected
his approach two times. He came within 1 m and I`m sorry for the poor
guy on the ground. Dont know whether he was hit.

At Omaha on of the German MG gunners mentioned they got rifle shoots
from the soldiers lying flat at the beach some 100s m away. One got
wounded and a bullet damaged the MG.

The eight .5 cal (12.7 mm) AN/M2 MGs of the P-47 had together 106
rounds per second. The lower speed limit of the P-47 was 45 m/s. So
in one pass from the water to the pillboxes it had around 10 seconds
fire time and could deliver 1000 rounds. It had enough ammo for 3 to 4
passes. The 8 MGs were adjusted to converge on one point some 300 m (?)
ahead.

The steel rounds delivered quite some energy per shoot. The pillboxes and
bunkers I saw there had no wood frames or sand bags opposite the opening.
Any round that entered the opening would have ricocheted inside the box
and wounded or killed the soldiers.

Nothing above needs necessarily any coordination by Forward Air Controllers
because the targets are obvious. Once the invasion troop reached the bunkers
and the cliff things would be more complicated and be real CAS - if needed.

Some user here suggested some years ago that a few P-47 would have made a
difference at Omaha. I think he was right. But there was no shortage of
P-47 then.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Stephen Graham

The lack of CAS on the beach was a serious mistake.

I'm sorry but you seem to imagine that World War Two close air support
was as effective as modern-day laser-guided specialized weapons.
As I understand matters, the primary obstacle on Omaha was the
casemented artillery and machine-guns. This was all well protected, by
design, from attack from above. It was possible that a direct hit with
the heaviest-possible bomb might damage the emplacement. That's not what
the close support tactical aircraft were capable of carrying, leaving
aside the intrinsic lack of precision. There were perfectly good reasons
for not applying air power at extremely close range, which is what
you're calling for.
World War Two tactical airpower was good at hitting unarmored vehicles
and equipment either in the open or lightly protected.

We are talking about P-47.

No, we are talking fighter bombers, which on D-Day in the US areas
were basically the P-47 as the P-38 was covering the shipping and
the P-51 doing air superiority.

And I note apparently P-47 is the answer to the fact

"World War Two tactical airpower was good at hitting unarmored vehicles
and equipment either in the open or lightly protected."

You can add WWI, for example the Turkish army retreat in 1918.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So rockets, bombs and 8 heavy MGs.

Bombs and machine guns, rockets were not used by the USAAF in
Europe until after D-Day.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Some P-47
were trained to bomb at low level to hit the side of a target. Thats
mentioned in an USAAF report. Other tactic mentioned there was on shallow
dive. Sounded for me like what the German Me-262 fighter bomber did.

Except we know the Me262 bomb errors were large.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Was
there a chance to hit some beach pillboxes? I think obviously yes. The
question is how many to hit and with what effect.

And all the evidence tells us the hit chances were small and the effects
of any hits also likely to be small. The bunkers were designed to take
hits. Then comes the chance of hitting friendlies.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It seems the USAAF intended to bomb the beaches by heavies.

Oh good, the misunderstanding continues. Beach defences were
bombed. Not the beaches.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That would
exclude the use of P-47 till just before H hour. So any P-47 action
would only be possible with the first wave invasion troops already on
the beach. Thats when the pillboxes and the other bunkers had to be in
action.

Actually they started shooting at the craft approaching the beach and
hit some of them. One web site suggests up to 60 light artillery pieces
were present but that seems to count anti tank guns as artillery.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It means the German defenders had to be at the openings (Schiessscharten,
whats the English term?) to shoot at the US infantry 500 m (600 yards)
away. The US troops needed just a few minutes to get in range of the
bunkers for their handgrandes, flamethrowers or whatever they had.

The defences were within range of their rifles and machine guns, the
problem was they needed to be at close range to be able to shoot
through the openings of things like pillboxes or deal with men and
guns largely hidden in things like trenches

There were some 14 defence positions and all up around 80 pillboxes
as part of the Omaha defences. Plus another 3 defence positions
slightly inland guarding the natural exists to the beach. At least 2 of
the defensive positions had a 2 cm AA gun.

The first waves had about 300 yards to the sea wall and/or shingle bank
marking high tide then up to another 200 yards to the bluffs, the latter
distance varied along the beach and was near zero in some places.
The defences were mainly designed for enfilade fire, though most could
engage in direct fire, and to ensure the shingle area and bank could not
provide much shelter.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The visibility below 2 km was quite good and any P-47 over the beach
could well see the pillboxes.

There is the latest error, the pillboxes were small and meant to blend
into the landscape, trenches would be more visible but again the
Germans understood the need to camouflage them, plus there were
the tunnels between the various positions.

WWI experience had come up with trench designs to minimise the
effects of artillery and strafing.

Then comes the smoke and dust from the various attacks making
it hard to identify small targets, the strong winds were actually
helping to clear the air below the clouds but the fighting kept pushing
up more material.

Given how we have been provided with the report from a squadron
of P-47s that orbited Omaha beach at low/medium altitude for 2
hours can it be explained why they apparently did not notice the
need to hit what are now claimed to be obvious defences?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The main problem with CAS is to distinguish
enemy and friendly forces or to find the target at all. At the beach this
was no problem. A P-47 could there fly slow and low without fear of AAA.
Because any Flak had to be eleminated before anyway,

Good, error is piled upon error. The Saving Private Ryan beach assault
at the start and the saving the day close in air strike at the end.

The beach defences were quite capable of shooting down low slow
flying aircraft. There were 48 machine guns besides those in the
main defence positions, all up 80 or so machine gun nests (not all
with guns).

Many of the defences had roofs, which largely negated the effects of
anything but a heavy direct hit, others were open positions and able
to see attacking aircraft.

Please show how the light AA was eliminated, given how long the
beach defences held out.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So had the P-47s a chance to suppress (to "mask") the defenders for some
minutes?

No. For a start work out the numbers of defensive positions and
available aircraft.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
If a 1000 lb HE bomb explodes within 50 m of a pillbox it will not kill the
soldiers but certainly affect them for some time. Napalm would kill or
wound them. The rockets would force them to hide because they did not know
that there was no chance for a hit.

So having decided the attacks could find the positions we up the
effects of the weapons used.

No napalm. No rockets. And the people inside the main beach defences,
with a solid roof over their head, are very unlikely to notice an aircraft
attacking them unless a direct hit is scored with a heavy enough bomb.

And in fact given the amount of firepower coming down in the area there
is a good chance they would not notice the source of a given attack.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Now the MGs. Once a P-47 fires on the openings the pillbox crew has to
hide - even without any hit. I know from German descriptions that under
fire by a P-47 is an event only a close by bomb could exceed. They had
to hide, no doubt.

Yes folks, they will see the P-47s coming and hide, not shoot back.

In summary the main defence positions are unlikely to see attacking
aircraft nor be affected by them. The positions without overhead
protection are more likely to see aircraft and shoot back and/or
duck more into the cover they are already in. The AA guns should
engage the aircraft.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What were the chances for a hit? I heard interviews from survivors of
1945 death marches that sometimes Allied fighters came close down and
killed some of the SS guards covering the sides of the march. It had the
effect that guards even covered their uniforms.

How about the RAF killing a number of British PoWs when they hit the
column being forced marched.

Please tell us all what the sources are that aircraft flew low and slow
enough that they could identify uniforms, then could pick out a man
close to prisoners and then open fire for exactly the right amount of
time with the correct aim to only hit the bad guys feet away from the
good guys.

Essentially the take out a single enemy soldier amongst friendlies
claims are junk.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So we talk about hitting
a single soldier just around 10 m from friendly ones.

No we imagine this could be done, just like shooting the gun out of
the bad guys hand.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I once saw a gun
camera footage from a P-47 that followed a single German soldier as he
run from a street in the woods. I saw that the pilot even corrected
his approach two times. He came within 1 m and I`m sorry for the poor
guy on the ground. Dont know whether he was hit.

So in other words the one case which proves it apparently missed,
required at least two aiming corrections and was against a person in
the open.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
At Omaha on of the German MG gunners mentioned they got rifle shoots
from the soldiers lying flat at the beach some 100s m away. One got
wounded and a bullet damaged the MG.

Yes, the defences were eventually taken or abandoned.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The eight .5 cal (12.7 mm) AN/M2 MGs of the P-47 had together 106
rounds per second. The lower speed limit of the P-47 was 45 m/s.

So the P-47 are flying in at 100 mph, which is the stalling speed with
flaps and undercarriage down, at about 12,500 pounds, try around
115 mph with the flaps and undercarriage up and of course to obtain
the weight there are no external loads.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So
in one pass from the water to the pillboxes it had around 10 seconds
fire time and could deliver 1000 rounds. It had enough ammo for 3 to 4
passes. The 8 MGs were adjusted to converge on one point some 300 m (?)
ahead.

Yes, now understand the point of the positions was to engage troops
along the beach, not in front of them, which makes the right angle
approach more a waste, not to mention the chances of hitting friendlies.

Strafing runs parallel to the beach were the ones most likely to put
bullets on targets and reduce the chance of friendly fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The steel rounds delivered quite some energy per shoot. The pillboxes and
bunkers I saw there had no wood frames or sand bags opposite the opening.
Any round that entered the opening would have ricocheted inside the box
and wounded or killed the soldiers.

So when did you inspect the beach defences, 5 June 1944?

And before we had the bullets punching through, eroding the pillbox
walls and roof, now they are going to bounce off. So outside they
do armour piercing, inside they do armour bouncing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Nothing above needs necessarily any coordination by Forward Air Controllers
because the targets are obvious. Once the invasion troop reached the bunkers
and the cliff things would be more complicated and be real CAS - if needed.
Some user here suggested some years ago that a few P-47 would have made a
difference at Omaha. I think he was right. But there was no shortage of
P-47 then.

Yes, we know you are are not going to change your conclusion, just
change the supporting evidence.

Now in a USAAF fighter bomber formation near you, the Lone Ranger
and Tonto or any other Hollywood western headline gunfighter, transferring
their legendary situational awareness and accuracy with pistols to P-47
attacks.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair
Given how we have been provided with the report from a squadron
of P-47s that orbited Omaha beach at low/medium altitude for 2
hours can it be explained why they apparently did not notice the
need to hit what are now claimed to be obvious defences?

Its now the second time you mentioned this idea. I first thought it
be irony. Like I cited before Vogt said his altitude block was 5000
to 15000 feet and they were waiting for Luftwaffe to arrive. He was
squadron leader and therefore more above his boys in the higher part.

He said he "of course witnessed the movements of the small vessels
bringing the troops ashore." That is far from grasping the tactical
situation of the troops there. Further he had no idea what to
expect there because he did not know the infantry plan. Had he given
radio order to go down and help things may have gone somewhat
better. But my suggestion was to have the P-47 attack just a few
minutes before the first troops arrived. And to operate there for
additional few minutes until the troops reached the fortifications.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The beach defences were quite capable of shooting down low slow
flying aircraft. There were 48 machine guns besides those in the
main defence positions, all up 80 or so machine gun nests (not all
with guns).
Many of the defences had roofs, which largely negated the effects of
anything but a heavy direct hit, others were open positions and able
to see attacking aircraft.

What is the chance to shoot down a P-47 with a handheld MG42?
Those pillboxes a P-47 would frontal engage had one MG42 against
the eight .5 cal Brownings. Who would win?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Please show how the light AA was eliminated, given how long the
beach defences held out.

P-47s were well able to eliminate light AA, even the "At least 2 of
the defensive positions had a 2 cm AA gun." you mentioned. For some
targets it was the tactical plan that a part of P-47s take on the AA
guns.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So had the P-47s a chance to suppress (to "mask") the defenders for some
minutes?

No. For a start work out the numbers of defensive positions and
available aircraft.

You wrote "There were some 14 defence positions and all up around 80
pillboxes as part of the Omaha defences." Several 100s P-47 were
available and the limit may rather the available airspace.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
No napalm. No rockets.

What was the fist use of both? Was there something in Allied inventory
before Napalm?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And the people inside the main beach defences,
with a solid roof over their head, are very unlikely to notice an aircraft
attacking them unless a direct hit is scored with a heavy enough bomb.
And in fact given the amount of firepower coming down in the area there
is a good chance they would not notice the source of a given attack.

I did not suggest to bomb any roof but the front or the beach in front
of the opening. The blast may not kill but take out the crew at least
for some time.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The steel rounds delivered quite some energy per shoot. The pillboxes and
bunkers I saw there had no wood frames or sand bags opposite the opening.
Any round that entered the opening would have ricocheted inside the box
and wounded or killed the soldiers.

So when did you inspect the beach defences, 5 June 1944?

I saw images from before D-Day and noted it.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And before we had the bullets punching through, eroding the pillbox
walls and roof, now they are going to bounce off. So outside they
do armour piercing, inside they do armour bouncing.

I never suggested to erode or melt a concrete pillbox (Rich). I once
saw a German (1943 ?) steel pillbox design in a museum. It was
impressive but I don't know whether such things were deployed at
Normandy.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Kenneth Young]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What is the chance to shoot down a P-47 with a handheld MG42?
Those pillboxes a P-47 would frontal engage had one MG42 against
the eight .5 cal Brownings. Who would win?

I suggest you actually find out about the defences instead of making
assumptions. The Germans made wide use of 20 and 37mm guns for light AA.
A large number of the defences made use of redundant tank turrets. They
were designed to resist anti-tank guns. The most useful fire support was
from cruisers and destroyers as their shells were heavy enough to destroy
bunkers without relying on a lucky hit.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair
Given how we have been provided with the report from a squadron
of P-47s that orbited Omaha beach at low/medium altitude for 2
hours can it be explained why they apparently did not notice the
need to hit what are now claimed to be obvious defences?

Its now the second time you mentioned this idea. I first thought it
be irony.

That would fit into the understanding shown.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Like I cited before Vogt said his altitude block was 5000
to 15000 feet and they were waiting for Luftwaffe to arrive. He was
squadron leader and therefore more above his boys in the higher part.

Really, can you show this? Can you explain why the people at
5,000 feet decided not to tell their leader what they were seeing
on the ground?

You are the one saying the defences were obvious, and now you
go back to saying they were not.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
He said he "of course witnessed the movements of the small vessels
bringing the troops ashore." That is far from grasping the tactical
situation of the troops there.

Correct, and I presume the idea is from 5,000 feet they could not
see the expected men and machines leaving the beach. You know
the obvious movement that says the beach defences have been
defeated.

So the new idea is the beach defences were obvious enough for
attack but the tanks etc. moving about could not be seen well
enough.

You know, your claim,

"The visibility below 2 km was quite good and any P-47 over the beach
could well see the pillboxes."

It was in the post you claim to be replying to.

2 km is about 6,600 feet, but now they cannot even see movement of
things like vehicles from 5,000 feet.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further he had no idea what to
expect there because he did not know the infantry plan. Had he given
radio order to go down and help things may have gone somewhat
better.

Right. The obvious beach defences now go to non obvious.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But my suggestion was to have the P-47 attack just a few
minutes before the first troops arrived. And to operate there for
additional few minutes until the troops reached the fortifications.

And as people have pointed out your suggestion makes no sense
and the continued need to delete the problems with it shows all you
can do is keep repeating the claim.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The beach defences were quite capable of shooting down low slow
flying aircraft. There were 48 machine guns besides those in the
main defence positions, all up 80 or so machine gun nests (not all
with guns).
Many of the defences had roofs, which largely negated the effects of
anything but a heavy direct hit, others were open positions and able
to see attacking aircraft.

What is the chance to shoot down a P-47 with a handheld MG42?
Those pillboxes a P-47 would frontal engage had one MG42 against
the eight .5 cal Brownings. Who would win?

Wow, does the P-47 call out the MG42, say at high noon on the main
street outside the saloon?

What if MG42 turns up with his friend 88?

Do you really think war is a set of one on one duels? Do you really
think only the weapon pit being attacked will be the only one shooting
back? And only light machine guns?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Please show how the light AA was eliminated, given how long the
beach defences held out.

P-47s were well able to eliminate light AA, even the "At least 2 of
the defensive positions had a 2 cm AA gun." you mentioned. For some
targets it was the tactical plan that a part of P-47s take on the AA
guns.

Right the P-47s are going to be granted all the abilities they need, they
will defeat the AA guns on request.

Like the claim in the post you claim to be replying to but deleted,
your words,

"A P-47 could there fly slow and low without fear of AAA.
Because any Flak had to be eleminated before anyway"

Why not put enough engines on an Iowa class and have it hover
over the beach, all those 40mm pieces alone and lots of immunity
from return fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So had the P-47s a chance to suppress (to "mask") the defenders for some
minutes?

No. For a start work out the numbers of defensive positions and
available aircraft.

You wrote "There were some 14 defence positions and all up around 80
pillboxes as part of the Omaha defences." Several 100s P-47 were
available and the limit may rather the available airspace.

Total P-47 sorties are put at 1,657, given most units tried for 2 operations
that day you could assume around an 830 aircraft force. Then comes turn
around times, by the looks of things a third of the force was "on station"
at
any one time in order to give cover from dawn to dusk. So we are down to
around 280 aircraft.

Now remember the 2 beaches. So Omaha has 140 aircraft. Now
we note say a 5 minute turn around from finishing 5 seconds of fire to
starting fire again. So to continually suppress one defensive position
we will need 60 aircraft, so it is always under attack. What the heck,
2 minute turn around, we only need 24, so we can suppress 6 of the
defensive positions but none of the machine gun nests, except the
reality is the defensive positions are the ones most likely to have
roofs, making the P-47 attacks likely to be unnoticed.

As a counterbalance the P-38 units sent 49 dive bomber sorties,
46 attacked, dropping 307.16 tons of bombs to help find those
extra aircraft.

Remember how long the beach was.

We now of course are not escorting paratroop aircraft for example.

To cap the silliness of course is the reality if the aircraft are all going
to be attacking continuously then one of two things must happen.
Either there will be a big gap in fighter bomber support as they fly
home from their 20 to 30 seconds of strafing to rearm at least,
or the number of aircraft attacking drops to a handful to ensure
there is at least some defences under air attack at all times.

To actually give 14 defence positions times 20 seconds of aircraft
ammunition times 10 minutes is about 420 aircraft overhead and
then at the end of the 10 minutes you need another 420 arriving
and so on. And that is assuming the aircraft have the ability to
stay in this continuous attack formation.

Then comes the need for aircraft reserves for on call operations etc.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
No napalm. No rockets.

What was the fist use of both? Was there something in Allied inventory
before Napalm?

I note the failure to actually admit the enhancements given the attackers.

The USAAF use of rockets in the ETO was post D-Day, not sure about
napalm.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And the people inside the main beach defences,
with a solid roof over their head, are very unlikely to notice an aircraft
attacking them unless a direct hit is scored with a heavy enough bomb.
And in fact given the amount of firepower coming down in the area there
is a good chance they would not notice the source of a given attack.

I did not suggest to bomb any roof but the front or the beach in front
of the opening. The blast may not kill but take out the crew at least
for some time.

Yes we know you really have zero idea of the ability to at least
neutralise a defensive position from the air and will ignore the
very real firepower coming from the ships to hand the lead role
to the air support.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The steel rounds delivered quite some energy per shoot. The pillboxes and
bunkers I saw there had no wood frames or sand bags opposite the opening.
Any round that entered the opening would have ricocheted inside the box
and wounded or killed the soldiers.

So when did you inspect the beach defences, 5 June 1944?

I saw images from before D-Day and noted it.

So you saw images of all the positions?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And before we had the bullets punching through, eroding the pillbox
walls and roof, now they are going to bounce off. So outside they
do armour piercing, inside they do armour bouncing.

I never suggested to erode or melt a concrete pillbox (Rich).

Oh good, blaming Rich for your words,

"The 8 MG of 12.7 mm size with
a capacity of 3400 rounds had a good chance to take out German pillboxes
and bunkers. It could "melt" small pillboxes and disable guns or destroy
MGs just by a few hits. Not to mention what happens to the German crew if
some rounds enter trough the opening and ricochet inside the bunker."

Or are you simply unable to remember your words from a month ago?

Or is the whole idea P-47s will defeat the beach defences, even if the
pilots have to land and pour fuel from their tanks on the defences then
set fire to the fuel?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I once
saw a German (1943 ?) steel pillbox design in a museum. It was
impressive but I don't know whether such things were deployed at
Normandy.

Ah, you have seen the images of the defences but are unsure about
whether a given design was in use but you are sure the defences
are of a type your P-47 fighter bombers can really hurt.

So we understand the P-47 is your current wonder weapon, and
Omaha beach will be moved to England if necessary to prove it.

Since you chose to delete the information I will put in a summary
here. The beach defences opened up on the approaching landing
craft. The smoke and dust from the various attacks obscured
things, but the wind helped clear the air. Are the claims about
being able to shoot only guards on prisoner marching columns
still believed? What sort of attack speeds are the P-47s going
now, still landing speed? By the way 5 to 10 metres is about
the distance needed for a bomb blast to affect something like
a pillbox, mainly via the blast/debris.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Kenneth Young]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
What sort of attack speeds are the P-47s going
now, still landing speed? By the way 5 to 10 metres is about
the distance needed for a bomb blast to affect something like
a pillbox, mainly via the blast/debris.

This is a British example Typhoons attacked an armoured column with
rockets and claimed several kills. The area was later captured and the
rocket hits checked. They had all missed. The main effect of RAF strikes
was disrupting German transport.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
As a counterbalance the P-38 units sent 49 dive bomber sorties,
46 attacked, dropping 307.16 tons of bombs to help find those
extra aircraft.

Correction time, P-38, 48 fighter bomber sorties, 46 attacking,
33.5 short tons of bombs, 2 aircraft missing.

P-47 (day), 481 fighter bomber sorties, 467 attacking, 307.16
short tons of bombs, 7 aircraft missing.

P-47 (night), 47 fighter bomber sorties, all attacked, 45.5 short
tons of bombs, no aircraft missing.

The perils of cutting the full text down to a subset.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair
You know, your claim,
"The visibility below 2 km was quite good and any P-47 over the beach
could well see the pillboxes."
It was in the post you claim to be replying to.
2 km is about 6,600 feet, but now they cannot even see movement of
things like vehicles from 5,000 feet.

I did not mean to see a pillbox at 2 km over the beach. I never suggested
to dive bomb from 2 km or any like. The weather allowed operations from
ground up to 2 km. A pillbox may not even be visible from 1 km. Some maybe
not from above but from the water side.

A P-47 mission to support the first assualt wave would first have to
try to eleminate the remaining artillery and light AA. Then as the
LCT doors open try to supress the remaining German MGs.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You wrote "There were some 14 defence positions and all up around 80
pillboxes as part of the Omaha defences." Several 100s P-47 were
available and the limit may rather the available airspace.

Total P-47 sorties are put at 1,657, given most units tried for 2 operations
that day you could assume around an 830 aircraft force. Then comes turn
around times, by the looks of things a third of the force was "on station"
at
any one time in order to give cover from dawn to dusk. So we are down to
around 280 aircraft.

The P-47 did other missions because it was decided not to use them at
the beaches. There was more than enough P-51 and P-38 to cover against
the Luftwaffe - that did not arrive before noon.

So we are at 800 aircraft.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Now remember the 2 beaches. So Omaha has 140 aircraft. Now

400

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
we note say a 5 minute turn around from finishing 5 seconds of fire to
starting fire again. So to continually suppress one defensive position
we will need 60 aircraft, so it is always under attack. What the heck,
2 minute turn around, we only need 24, so we can suppress 6 of the
defensive positions but none of the machine gun nests,

You assume the second plane had to fire when the other is still in
front of him. Give em 7 sec of fire and 3 sec pause to arrive at
a handy 10 sec per plane. For 180 sec one needs 18 planes per target.
With 400 in total we have enough for 400/18 = 22 targets.

So under the assumption that (of 14 defence positions and 80 pillboxes
at Omaha)
none was taken out by the Navy,
and none by USAAF heavies (probably true),
and none by medium bombers (true?),
and none by P-47 bombs,
and none by MG fire from P-47,

we can still suppress about a quarter of the sites and prevent them from
firing on the assault troops until they had a chance to reach them.
I think thats worth the mission.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
except the
reality is the defensive positions are the ones most likely to have
roofs, making the P-47 attacks likely to be unnoticed.

I did not understand the above. I`m German. What means roofs in this
context?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And before we had the bullets punching through, eroding the pillbox
walls and roof, now they are going to bounce off. So outside they
do armour piercing, inside they do armour bouncing.

I never suggested to erode or melt a concrete pillbox (Rich).

Oh good, blaming Rich for your words,
"The 8 MG of 12.7 mm size with
a capacity of 3400 rounds had a good chance to take out German pillboxes
and bunkers. It could "melt" small pillboxes and disable guns or destroy
MGs just by a few hits. Not to mention what happens to the German crew if
some rounds enter trough the opening and ricochet inside the bunker."
Or are you simply unable to remember your words from a month ago?

The _small_ pillboxes I saw were of steel:

I once
saw a German (1943 ?) steel pillbox design in a museum. It was
impressive but I don't know whether such things were deployed at
Normandy.

Normal size and larger were concrete. I think I should had to
have mention this intended meaning. I was not clear. Sorry for
your confusion.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Ah, you have seen the images of the defences but are unsure about
whether a given design was in use but you are sure the defences
are of a type your P-47 fighter bombers can really hurt.
So we understand the P-47 is your current wonder weapon, and
Omaha beach will be moved to England if necessary to prove it.

Yes. I would have build some target copies there for D-Day training.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Since you chose to delete the information I will put in a summary
here. The beach defences opened up on the approaching landing
craft. The smoke and dust from the various attacks obscured
things, but the wind helped clear the air. Are the claims about
being able to shoot only guards on prisoner marching columns
still believed?

No, according the report they were near the column.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
What sort of attack speeds are the P-47s going
now, still landing speed?

flaps down, 50 - 60 m/s, ok?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
By the way 5 to 10 metres is about
the distance needed for a bomb blast to affect something like
a pillbox, mainly via the blast/debris.

Depends on bomb size and what affect means. To affect the concrete
or the crew?
Where is that data from?
Rich mentioned a 1945 report about tests against German pillboxes.
Is the titel of the report known?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

deleted text,

Can you explain why the people at
5,000 feet decided not to tell their leader what they were seeing
on the ground?

You are the one saying the defences were obvious, and now you
go back to saying they were not.

I presume the idea is from 5,000 feet they could not
see the expected men and machines leaving the beach. You know
the obvious movement that says the beach defences have been
defeated.

So the new idea is the beach defences were obvious enough for
attack but the tanks etc. moving about could not be seen well
enough.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You know, your claim,
"The visibility below 2 km was quite good and any P-47 over the beach
could well see the pillboxes."
It was in the post you claim to be replying to.
2 km is about 6,600 feet, but now they cannot even see movement of
things like vehicles from 5,000 feet.

I did not mean to see a pillbox at 2 km over the beach. I never suggested
to dive bomb from 2 km or any like.

Actually you are all over the place, as things are defined as visible then
not so as required.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The weather allowed operations from
ground up to 2 km.

Actually it noted visibility in the air at under the relevant height was
good.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A pillbox may not even be visible from 1 km. Some maybe
not from above but from the water side.
A P-47 mission to support the first assualt wave would first have to
try to eleminate the remaining artillery and light AA. Then as the
LCT doors open try to supress the remaining German MGs.

Yes, we know this is the conclusion you arrived with and the one
you intend to leave with.

By the way is artillery still only allowed to be attacked on the front
line, or do we subtract the historical P-47 strikes on artillery within
range of the beaches?

More deleted text,

And as people have pointed out your suggestion makes no sense
and the continued need to delete the problems with it shows all you
can do is keep repeating the claim.

Do you really think war is a set of one on one duels? Do you really
think only the weapon pit being attacked will be the only one shooting
back? And only light machine guns?

Right the P-47s are going to be granted all the abilities they need, they
will defeat the AA guns on request.

Like the claim in the post you claim to be replying to but deleted,
your words,

"A P-47 could there fly slow and low without fear of AAA.
Because any Flak had to be eleminated before anyway"

Why not put enough engines on an Iowa class and have it hover
over the beach, all those 40mm pieces alone and lots of immunity
from return fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You wrote "There were some 14 defence positions and all up around 80
pillboxes as part of the Omaha defences." Several 100s P-47 were
available and the limit may rather the available airspace.

Total P-47 sorties are put at 1,657, given most units tried for 2 operations
that day you could assume around an 830 aircraft force. Then comes turn
around times, by the looks of things a third of the force was "on station"
at any one time in order to give cover from dawn to dusk. So we are down
to around 280 aircraft.

The P-47 did other missions because it was decided not to use them at
the beaches. There was more than enough P-51 and P-38 to cover against
the Luftwaffe - that did not arrive before noon.

Yes we know, you are going to use hindsight to the maximum.

And we also know you are going to ignore the detailed sortie list given.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So we are at 800 aircraft.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Now remember the 2 beaches. So Omaha has 140 aircraft. Now

400

Only with zero reserves but then of course we know these wonder
solutions never require a fall back option as they always work so
well.

Now tell us all how you are going to manage keeping 400 aircraft
over 5 to 6 miles, so say 30,000 feet, of beach, lining wing to wing
the 400 P-47s come in at around 16,000 feet.

deleted text,

To cap the silliness of course is the reality if the aircraft are all going
to be attacking continuously then one of two things must happen.
Either there will be a big gap in fighter bomber support as they fly
home from their 20 to 30 seconds of strafing to rearm at least,
or the number of aircraft attacking drops to a handful to ensure
there is at least some defences under air attack at all times.

To actually give 14 defence positions times 20 seconds of aircraft
ammunition times 10 minutes is about 420 aircraft overhead and
then at the end of the 10 minutes you need another 420 arriving
and so on. And that is assuming the aircraft have the ability to
stay in this continuous attack formation.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
we note say a 5 minute turn around from finishing 5 seconds of fire to
starting fire again. So to continually suppress one defensive position
we will need 60 aircraft, so it is always under attack. What the heck,
2 minute turn around, we only need 24, so we can suppress 6 of the
defensive positions but none of the machine gun nests,

You assume the second plane had to fire when the other is still in
front of him. Give em 7 sec of fire and 3 sec pause to arrive at
a handy 10 sec per plane. For 180 sec one needs 18 planes per target.
With 400 in total we have enough for 400/18 = 22 targets.

It is interesting to see how such an idea can be believed, all those
aircraft in precision combat flying.

So in other words the whole idea is all or nothing.

The P-47s are available for 10 or so minutes, after which ALL the
ground attack aircraft go home because they are out of ammunition.

If the beach defences hold then the troops are on their own.

So what happens then?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So under the assumption that (of 14 defence positions and 80 pillboxes
at Omaha)
none was taken out by the Navy,
and none by USAAF heavies (probably true),
and none by medium bombers (true?),

I suppose the list of targets I gave has been simply ignored to be able
to make the above claim.

Have you actually read any of the material presented, then actually
understood it?

If you are really going to do this the 14 positions are the ones that
are actually in the assault area beaches or just beyond, then comes
the 3 inland positions guarding the exits, plus the 4 field artillery
positions, the pillboxes. The Germans understood the idea of
defensive depth.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
and none by P-47 bombs,
and none by MG fire from P-47,
we can still suppress about a quarter of the sites and prevent them from
firing on the assault troops until they had a chance to reach them.
I think thats worth the mission.

And the rest of humanity simply points out over and over how wrong
you are, in terms of the timings, the doctrine and the allied planning.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
except the
reality is the defensive positions are the ones most likely to have
roofs, making the P-47 attacks likely to be unnoticed.

I did not understand the above. I`m German. What means roofs in this
context?

An overhead structure, likely to be at least medium bomb proof.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And before we had the bullets punching through, eroding the pillbox
walls and roof, now they are going to bounce off. So outside they
do armour piercing, inside they do armour bouncing.

I never suggested to erode or melt a concrete pillbox (Rich).

Oh good, blaming Rich for your words,
"The 8 MG of 12.7 mm size with
a capacity of 3400 rounds had a good chance to take out German pillboxes
and bunkers. It could "melt" small pillboxes and disable guns or destroy
MGs just by a few hits. Not to mention what happens to the German crew if
some rounds enter trough the opening and ricochet inside the bunker."
Or are you simply unable to remember your words from a month ago?

Ah I see, time to change the subject.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I once
saw a German (1943 ?) steel pillbox design in a museum. It was
impressive but I don't know whether such things were deployed at
Normandy.

Yes, time to change the subject in a big way.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Normal size and larger were concrete. I think I should had to
have mention this intended meaning. I was not clear. Sorry for
your confusion.

Sorry to let you know you have just failed a very big test. You decided
machine guns could melt small pillboxes, you decided to ignore what
you wrote.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Ah, you have seen the images of the defences but are unsure about
whether a given design was in use but you are sure the defences
are of a type your P-47 fighter bombers can really hurt.
So we understand the P-47 is your current wonder weapon, and
Omaha beach will be moved to England if necessary to prove it.

Yes. I would have build some target copies there for D-Day training.

Yes folks, it has not registered yet.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Since you chose to delete the information I will put in a summary
here. The beach defences opened up on the approaching landing
craft. The smoke and dust from the various attacks obscured
things, but the wind helped clear the air. Are the claims about
being able to shoot only guards on prisoner marching columns
still believed?

No, according the report they were near the column.

Oh good, nice to see yet again the way you cannot take
responsibility for your own words.

"I heard interviews from survivors of
1945 death marches that sometimes Allied fighters came close down and
killed some of the SS guards covering the sides of the march. It had the
effect that guards even covered their uniforms."

So now what is defined as close?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
What sort of attack speeds are the P-47s going
now, still landing speed?

flaps down, 50 - 60 m/s, ok?

Great, that should ensure terrible aiming as they are more worried
about staying in the air, that low, that slow, and then the recoil of
the guns and the blast radius of the bombs.

And sitting targets for the ground defences. Not to mention slow
to climb and fly back to the attack position.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
By the way 5 to 10 metres is about
the distance needed for a bomb blast to affect something like
a pillbox, mainly via the blast/debris.

Depends on bomb size and what affect means. To affect the concrete
or the crew?

Crew, direct hits are needed for the structure.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Where is that data from?

The reports mentioned, other reports of bomb damage.

Anyway you know the answer since you claim

"If a 1000 lb HE bomb explodes within 50 m of a pillbox it will not kill
the soldiers but certainly affect them for some time"

Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox,
the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rich mentioned a 1945 report about tests against German pillboxes.
Is the titel of the report known?

You mean you have not checked the relevant posts and asked Rich?

Go back through the various posts, pull out the lists of targets and
sorties and then put them all in a post showing how they fit your
ideas of D-Day attacks.

Meantime the rest of us will note yet again the bombers were after
specific targets, the defences, not the beaches, that massed fighter
bomber sorties on the beaches themselves was not in doctrine nor
possible from an air traffic control point of view, plus the main defences
were near immune to fighter bombers and even the open trenches
were hard enough targets, that the local defences were quite capable
of shooting down aircraft and even more so if they followed predictable
paths and were low and slow, could be totally negated by weather and
above all they were a one shot, fail and there is no backup airpower.

In short we will note your ideas about aircraft at D-Day are wrong,
and no amount of information here is going to change that. You read
a book, declared it the truth and everything is being fitted to that idea
of truth.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So we are at 800 aircraft.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Now remember the 2 beaches. So Omaha has 140 aircraft. Now

400

Only with zero reserves but then of course we know these wonder
solutions never require a fall back option as they always work so
well.

the reserve was not zero according the numbers you mentioned. I just
rounded down to 800

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Now tell us all how you are going to manage keeping 400 aircraft
over 5 to 6 miles, so say 30,000 feet, of beach, lining wing to wing
the 400 P-47s come in at around 16,000 feet.

16 kft are 3 km, who ever suggested that? Why wing to wing??

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
we note say a 5 minute turn around from finishing 5 seconds of fire to
starting fire again. So to continually suppress one defensive position
we will need 60 aircraft, so it is always under attack. What the heck,
2 minute turn around, we only need 24, so we can suppress 6 of the
defensive positions but none of the machine gun nests,

You assume the second plane had to fire when the other is still in
front of him. Give em 7 sec of fire and 3 sec pause to arrive at
a handy 10 sec per plane. For 180 sec one needs 18 planes per target.
With 400 in total we have enough for 400/18 = 22 targets.

It is interesting to see how such an idea can be believed, all those
aircraft in precision combat flying.

The calculation was your idea, not mine. I just pointed out it still
worked with the 400 number.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So in other words the whole idea is all or nothing.

Yes. The first minutes after the soldiers hit the shore were the
most critical. I think it was a mistake not to apply the P-47 here.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The P-47s are available for 10 or so minutes, after which ALL the
ground attack aircraft go home because they are out of ammunition.
If the beach defences hold then the troops are on their own.
So what happens then?

They were at the cliff and could handle the remaining beach
fortifications like they did. They had just with less losses.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
except the
reality is the defensive positions are the ones most likely to have
roofs, making the P-47 attacks likely to be unnoticed.

I did not understand the above. I`m German. What means roofs in this
context?

An overhead structure, likely to be at least medium bomb proof.

Thanks. But the idea was to affect the crew by the openings, like those
at the side then. If the bunkers had the ability to close all openings
than it would be the same effect to supress their action for some minutes.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
What sort of attack speeds are the P-47s going
now, still landing speed?

flaps down, 50 - 60 m/s, ok?

Great, that should ensure terrible aiming as they are more worried
about staying in the air, that low, that slow, and then the recoil of
the guns and the blast radius of the bombs.

We talked about a MG run. What speed would you suggest as lower limit?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And sitting targets for the ground defences. Not to mention slow
to climb and fly back to the attack position.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
By the way 5 to 10 metres is about
the distance needed for a bomb blast to affect something like
a pillbox, mainly via the blast/debris.

Depends on bomb size and what affect means. To affect the concrete
or the crew?

Crew, direct hits are needed for the structure.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Where is that data from?

The reports mentioned, other reports of bomb damage.

Can you give a title on those "others"?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Anyway you know the answer since you claim
"If a 1000 lb HE bomb explodes within 50 m of a pillbox it will not kill
the soldiers but certainly affect them for some time"
Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox,
the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?

It has only to do with the size of the opening. For those I saw at Omaha
a 500 kg blast in 50 m distance would affect the crew.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rich mentioned a 1945 report about tests against German pillboxes.
Is the titel of the report known?

You mean you have not checked the relevant posts and asked Rich?

Allow me to ask you what your source was.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Go back through the various posts, pull out the lists of targets and
sorties and then put them all in a post showing how they fit your
ideas of D-Day attacks.
Meantime the rest of us will note yet again the bombers were after
specific targets, the defences, not the beaches, that massed fighter
bomber sorties on the beaches themselves was not in doctrine

that is very true

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
nor
possible from an air traffic control point of view, plus the main defences
were near immune to fighter bombers and even the open trenches
were hard enough targets,

is this your assumption or is there some report that came to this
conclusion?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
that the local defences were quite capable
of shooting down aircraft and even more so if they followed predictable
paths and were low and slow,

You doubt P-47 could eleminate the few light AA before?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
could be totally negated by weather and

because their operational visible space was limit to 2 km altitude?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
above all they were a one shot, fail and there is no backup airpower.

There were still P-38 (even as fighter-bombers) and P-51 for Luftwaffe.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

Does your news software simply drop attributions or do they
go as part of the editing?

You cannot delete your way to your perfect plan.

deleted text (second time) (to the next >)

Can you explain why the people at
5,000 feet decided not to tell their leader what they were seeing
on the ground?

You are the one saying the defences were obvious, and now you
go back to saying they were not.

I presume the idea is from 5,000 feet they could not
see the expected men and machines leaving the beach. You know
the obvious movement that says the beach defences have been
defeated.

So the new idea is the beach defences were obvious enough for
attack but the tanks etc. moving about could not be seen well
enough.

And as people have pointed out your suggestion makes no sense
and the continued need to delete the problems with it shows all you
can do is keep repeating the claim.

Do you really think war is a set of one on one duels? Do you really
think only the weapon pit being attacked will be the only one shooting
back? And only light machine guns?

Right the P-47s are going to be granted all the abilities they need, they
will defeat the AA guns on request.

Like the claim in the post you claim to be replying to but deleted,
your words,

"A P-47 could there fly slow and low without fear of AAA.
Because any Flak had to be eleminated before anyway"

Why not put enough engines on an Iowa class and have it hover
over the beach, all those 40mm pieces alone and lots of immunity
from return fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So we are at 800 aircraft.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Now remember the 2 beaches. So Omaha has 140 aircraft. Now

400

Only with zero reserves but then of course we know these wonder
solutions never require a fall back option as they always work so
well.

the reserve was not zero according the numbers you mentioned. I just
rounded down to 800

Actually the reserves are zero as I made clear, there were around 800 P-47
available in the 9th AF that day, given the number of sorties reports. You
are
busy granting your wonder scenario all the numbers you think it needs.

So tell us all how many aircraft are in your non zero reserve?

How many?

more deleted text,

By the way is artillery still only allowed to be attacked on the front
line, or do we subtract the historical P-47 strikes on artillery within
range of the beaches?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Now tell us all how you are going to manage keeping 400 aircraft
over 5 to 6 miles, so say 30,000 feet, of beach, lining wing to wing
the 400 P-47s come in at around 16,000 feet.

16 kft are 3 km, who ever suggested that? Why wing to wing??

Now tell us all how you are going to manage keeping 400 aircraft
over 5 to 6 miles, so say 30,000 feet, of beach, lining wing to wing
the 400 P-47s come in at around 16,000 feet.

Turning circles of P-47 are hundreds of feet, comparable to the
warships offshore.

So once again, tell us how you are going to manage that many
aircraft in the confined airspace, all at about the same altitude.
Modern air traffic controllers really want to know, it would
revolutionise air travel.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
we note say a 5 minute turn around from finishing 5 seconds of fire to
starting fire again. So to continually suppress one defensive position
we will need 60 aircraft, so it is always under attack. What the heck,
2 minute turn around, we only need 24, so we can suppress 6 of the
defensive positions but none of the machine gun nests,

You assume the second plane had to fire when the other is still in
front of him. Give em 7 sec of fire and 3 sec pause to arrive at
a handy 10 sec per plane. For 180 sec one needs 18 planes per target.
With 400 in total we have enough for 400/18 = 22 targets.

It is interesting to see how such an idea can be believed, all those
aircraft in precision combat flying.

The calculation was your idea, not mine. I just pointed out it still
worked with the 400 number.

"To cap the silliness of course" but it seems you are unable to
see the obvious.

Your fighter bomber plan is so far wrong on the laws of physics,
before we talk about anything else.

Complain to Einstein, or Newton, or prove an aircraft is a
quantum particle, then the plan could happen.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
So in other words the whole idea is all or nothing.

Yes. The first minutes after the soldiers hit the shore were the
most critical. I think it was a mistake not to apply the P-47 here.

Yes we know, and since you think it is a wonder plan that is the
end of it.

No chance of a defence in depth, once the troops leave the
beaches they can start marching, not advancing, so no need
for any further air support until mid afternoon. No chance of
the plan failing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The P-47s are available for 10 or so minutes, after which ALL the
ground attack aircraft go home because they are out of ammunition.
If the beach defences hold then the troops are on their own.
So what happens then?

They were at the cliff and could handle the remaining beach
fortifications like they did. They had just with less losses.

Ah yes, the plan cannot fail it can only succeed a little less.

So try again, what happens if the defences hold.

You cannot wave a "they will win" card.

more deleted text,

I suppose the list of targets I gave has been simply ignored to be able
to make the above claim.

Have you actually read any of the material presented, then actually
understood it?

If you are really going to do this the 14 positions are the ones that
are actually in the assault area beaches or just beyond, then comes
the 3 inland positions guarding the exits, plus the 4 field artillery
positions, the pillboxes. The Germans understood the idea of
defensive depth.

And the rest of humanity simply points out over and over how wrong
you are, in terms of the timings, the doctrine and the allied planning.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
except the
reality is the defensive positions are the ones most likely to have
roofs, making the P-47 attacks likely to be unnoticed.

I did not understand the above. I`m German. What means roofs in this
context?

An overhead structure, likely to be at least medium bomb proof.

Thanks. But the idea was to affect the crew by the openings, like those
at the side then. If the bunkers had the ability to close all openings
than it would be the same effect to supress their action for some minutes.

Yes we fully understand you have decided the wonder air attack
will succeed and have no intention of actually coping with reality.

more deleted text,

Sorry to let you know you have just failed a very big test. You decided
machine guns could melt small pillboxes, you decided to ignore what
you wrote.

Oh good, nice to see yet again the way you cannot take
responsibility for your own words.

"I heard interviews from survivors of
1945 death marches that sometimes Allied fighters came close down and
killed some of the SS guards covering the sides of the march. It had the
effect that guards even covered their uniforms."

So now what is defined as close?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
What sort of attack speeds are the P-47s going
now, still landing speed?

flaps down, 50 - 60 m/s, ok?

Great, that should ensure terrible aiming as they are more worried
about staying in the air, that low, that slow, and then the recoil of
the guns and the blast radius of the bombs.

We talked about a MG run. What speed would you suggest as lower limit?

I will leave that up to you, given I know the whole idea is a joke.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And sitting targets for the ground defences. Not to mention slow
to climb and fly back to the attack position.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
By the way 5 to 10 metres is about
the distance needed for a bomb blast to affect something like
a pillbox, mainly via the blast/debris.

Depends on bomb size and what affect means. To affect the concrete
or the crew?

Crew, direct hits are needed for the structure.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Where is that data from?

The reports mentioned, other reports of bomb damage.

Can you give a title on those "others"?

No. Not without going back through notes from some years ago
and I simply do not expect you to be able to cope with the material.

You can do things like look up the USSBS reports online, lots of
bomb damage information there.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Anyway you know the answer since you claim
"If a 1000 lb HE bomb explodes within 50 m of a pillbox it will not kill
the soldiers but certainly affect them for some time"
Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox, the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?

It has only to do with the size of the opening. For those I saw at Omaha
a 500 kg blast in 50 m distance would affect the crew.

Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox, the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?

Also what report your 500 kg semi nuclear bomb is from?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Rich mentioned a 1945 report about tests against German pillboxes.
Is the titel of the report known?

You mean you have not checked the relevant posts and asked Rich?

Allow me to ask you what your source was.

You mean you have not checked the relevant posts and asked Rich?

deleted text,

Go back through the various posts, pull out the lists of targets and
sorties and then put them all in a post showing how they fit your
ideas of D-Day attacks.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Go back through the various posts, pull out the lists of targets and
sorties and then put them all in a post showing how they fit your
ideas of D-Day attacks.
Meantime the rest of us will note yet again the bombers were after
specific targets, the defences, not the beaches, that massed fighter
bomber sorties on the beaches themselves was not in doctrine

that is very true

Yet you simply assuming something else.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
nor
possible from an air traffic control point of view, plus the main defences
were near immune to fighter bombers and even the open trenches
were hard enough targets,

is this your assumption or is there some report that came to this
conclusion?

Tell you what, go talk to an air traffic controller, I do not index their
reports on what traffic density is possible.

And by the way, can you tell us all who would have ever put together
a report on 400 zero altitude fighter bombers operating in a confined
airspace? Perhaps since it is your idea you can show us all the WWII
air operations at that sort of density?

Instead of idea good, written proof to refute it only acceptable.

You might remember the 2nd Tactical Air Force intervened in the
Mortain battle, on 7 and 8 August 1944.

Quite a confined area and all day to cover, so the limit was about a
squadron at a time, so on the 7th a total of 390 fighter bomber sorties,
335 attacking, on the 8th 497, sorties, 437 attacking, note some of
these sorties were to other targets.

Surely if 400 aircraft could attack Omaha beach then 800 could do
the Mortain attacks? And only take 10 minutes to make the forward
positions somewhere between destroyed and useless? Correct?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
that the local defences were quite capable
of shooting down aircraft and even more so if they followed predictable
paths and were low and slow,

You doubt P-47 could eleminate the few light AA before?

that the local defences were quite capable
of shooting down aircraft and even more so if they followed predictable
paths and were low and slow,

I know the wonder attack will of course eliminate the AA guns first
and totally, real life is another matter.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
could be totally negated by weather and

because their operational visible space was limit to 2 km altitude?

Actually try pre D-Day planning.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
above all they were a one shot, fail and there is no backup airpower.

There were still P-38 (even as fighter-bombers) and P-51 for Luftwaffe.

Yes, we know, the plan is perfect, even if it requires every allied
fighter available, at 400 aircraft per 10 minutes, an hour only needs
2,400 fighters and so on.

more deleted text,

In short we will note your ideas about aircraft at D-Day are wrong,
and no amount of information here is going to change that. You read
a book, declared it the truth and everything is being fitted to that idea
of truth.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Does your news software simply drop attributions or do they
go as part of the editing?

I dont see any.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You cannot delete your way to your perfect plan.
deleted text (second time) (to the next >)

Geoffrey, I think I explained sufficiently my point in this detail.
Just to add my reply again would not enhance the thread.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
the reserve was not zero according the numbers you mentioned. I just
rounded down to 800

Actually the reserves are zero as I made clear, there were around 800 P-47
available in the 9th AF that day, given the number of sorties reports. You
are
busy granting your wonder scenario all the numbers you think it needs.
So tell us all how many aircraft are in your non zero reserve?
How many?

You wrote at 26.07.2015:

Total P-47 sorties are put at 1,657, given most units tried for 2
operations that day you could assume around an 830 aircraft force.

I rounded your 830 down to 800 like I wrote. The 30 means still
15 for Omaha "CAS" like the 16 they had for that job in reality.
If you think more reserve is needed, take some of the 800 for
your use. What is your point?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
If the beach defences hold then the troops are on their own.
So what happens then?

They were at the cliff and could handle the remaining beach
fortifications like they did. They had just with less losses.

Ah yes, the plan cannot fail it can only succeed a little less.
So try again, what happens if the defences hold.

The same like what happened in real 1944. The suggestion of this
whole thread is to use the P-47 as _additional_ force at the
beaches, not instead of the others.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"I heard interviews from survivors of
1945 death marches that sometimes Allied fighters came close down and
killed some of the SS guards covering the sides of the march. It had the
effect that guards even covered their uniforms."

So now what is defined as close?

I suggested 10 m as target separation. What would you suggest?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Anyway you know the answer since you claim
"If a 1000 lb HE bomb explodes within 50 m of a pillbox it will not kill
the soldiers but certainly affect them for some time"
Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox, the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?

It has only to do with the size of the opening. For those I saw at Omaha
a 500 kg blast in 50 m distance would affect the crew.

Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox, the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?
Also what report your 500 kg semi nuclear bomb is from?

None at all. It was from a military veteran who described such a blast
affect at a pillbox. He was a knowlegdable senior and quite convincing.
Those effects on the soldiers came in mind as I read the USAAF report.
They described it as "moral" effects. But there are physiological effects
involved. Unlike damage to a pillbox this seems not easy to quantify.
Thats why I asked about such a report.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
There were still P-38 (even as fighter-bombers) and P-51 for Luftwaffe.

Yes, we know, the plan is perfect, even if it requires every allied
fighter available, at 400 aircraft per 10 minutes, an hour only needs
2,400 fighters and so on.

The 400 in 10 minutes was the reply to your calculation of available
P-47. It was your calculation base to count only for P-47 MGs to
supress and to use the attacking aircraft like a conveyor belt.

A 10 km beach would indeed give each aircraft 25 m by a wing on wing
like attack. But nobody ever suggested that. One suggestion was a stream
attack on defence sites. With the objective to either destroy them or
make same none operational for 3 minutes. We did not talk yet about the
best tactic to apply the P-47 bombs prior or during these 3 minutes.
But anyway, I think it is clear the P-47 would make an effect on Omaha.




## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Does your news software simply drop attributions or do they
go as part of the editing?

I dont see any.

Then be very careful how you open a post at the least.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
You cannot delete your way to your perfect plan.
deleted text (second time) (to the next >)

Geoffrey, I think I explained sufficiently my point in this detail.
Just to add my reply again would not enhance the thread.

Yes, we know, the way you are unable to see you are
so far beyond what was actually possible is clear.

By the way you have NEVER replied to the text you have now
deleted for the third time. The reason the text stays in is you
have NEVER sufficiently explained the point.

You are not adding to your non reply, you are telling us all you
are ignoring the problems with it.

deleted text (third time) (to the next >)

Can you explain why the people at
5,000 feet decided not to tell their leader what they were seeing
on the ground?

You are the one saying the defences were obvious, and now you
go back to saying they were not.

I presume the idea is from 5,000 feet they could not
see the expected men and machines leaving the beach. You know
the obvious movement that says the beach defences have been
defeated.

So the new idea is the beach defences were obvious enough for
attack but the tanks etc. moving about could not be seen well
enough.

And as people have pointed out your suggestion makes no sense
and the continued need to delete the problems with it shows all you
can do is keep repeating the claim.

Do you really think war is a set of one on one duels? Do you really
think only the weapon pit being attacked will be the only one shooting
back? And only light machine guns?

Right the P-47s are going to be granted all the abilities they need, they
will defeat the AA guns on request.

Like the claim in the post you claim to be replying to but deleted,
your words,

"A P-47 could there fly slow and low without fear of AAA.
Because any Flak had to be eleminated before anyway"

Why not put enough engines on an Iowa class and have it hover
over the beach, all those 40mm pieces alone and lots of immunity
from return fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
the reserve was not zero according the numbers you mentioned. I just
rounded down to 800

Actually the reserves are zero as I made clear, there were around 800 P-47
available in the 9th AF that day, given the number of sorties reports.
You
are
busy granting your wonder scenario all the numbers you think it needs.
So tell us all how many aircraft are in your non zero reserve?
How many?

more deleted text,

By the way is artillery still only allowed to be attacked on the front
line, or do we subtract the historical P-47 strikes on artillery within
range of the beaches?

Now tell us all how you are going to manage keeping 400 aircraft
over 5 to 6 miles, so say 30,000 feet, of beach, lining wing to wing
the 400 P-47s come in at around 16,000 feet.

Turning circles of P-47 are hundreds of feet, comparable to the
warships offshore.

So once again, tell us how you are going to manage that many
aircraft in the confined airspace, all at about the same altitude.
Modern air traffic controllers really want to know, it would
revolutionise air travel.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Total P-47 sorties are put at 1,657, given most units tried for 2
operations that day you could assume around an 830 aircraft force.
I rounded your 830 down to 800 like I wrote. The 30 means still
15 for Omaha "CAS" like the 16 they had for that job in reality.

No, they did not have 16 "in reality" that was the first installment of
what was beach cover, protection from the Luftwaffe, then comes
the reliefs, they also had a whole lot more flying fighter bomber
missions, the ones already reported on. Then comes Utah beach
and so on.

30 reserve aircraft, where? England? Over the channel?

But you really want the aircraft to be quantum particles, able to be
in 2 places at once.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
If you think more reserve is needed, take some of the 800 for
your use. What is your point?

I think at its most basic is you have trouble counting. And I do
NOT want 400 or 800 fighter bombers attacking a beach
around H-hour.

I think you might want to note there are 5 beaches, so 800 fighter
bombers times 5 beaches it 4,000 fighters, even 400 per beach is
2,000.

I think you simply believe your idea is so wonderful, reality must alter.

So tell us all, how many fighter bombers are you going to put over
Omaha that morning, then multiply by 5 to account for the other
beaches then tell us all what aircraft are available after the 10
minutes of waterline type support fly away, to return that afternoon.

More deleted text,

No chance of a defence in depth, once the troops leave the
beaches they can start marching, not advancing, so no need
for any further air support until mid afternoon. No chance of
the plan failing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
If the beach defences hold then the troops are on their own.
So what happens then?

They were at the cliff and could handle the remaining beach
fortifications like they did. They had just with less losses.

Ah yes, the plan cannot fail it can only succeed a little less.
So try again, what happens if the defences hold.

The same like what happened in real 1944. The suggestion of this
whole thread is to use the P-47 as _additional_ force at the
beaches, not instead of the others.

And all those fighter bomber sorties run historically have been
eliminated in place of this idea. So of course the idea is this
new idea will have great effect but the historical sorties did not.

By the way, also the defences elsewhere need to be accounted for,
defence in depth, since you have removed the historical US fighter
bomber strikes on those targets.

more deleted text,

I suppose the list of targets I gave has been simply ignored to be able
to make the above claim.

Have you actually read any of the material presented, then actually
understood it?

If you are really going to do this the 14 positions are the ones that
are actually in the assault area beaches or just beyond, then comes
the 3 inland positions guarding the exits, plus the 4 field artillery
positions, the pillboxes. The Germans understood the idea of
defensive depth.

And the rest of humanity simply points out over and over how wrong
you are, in terms of the timings, the doctrine and the allied planning.
more deleted text,

Sorry to let you know you have just failed a very big test. You decided
machine guns could melt small pillboxes, you decided to ignore what
you wrote.

Oh good, nice to see yet again the way you cannot take
responsibility for your own words.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"I heard interviews from survivors of
1945 death marches that sometimes Allied fighters came close down and
killed some of the SS guards covering the sides of the march. It had the
effect that guards even covered their uniforms."

So now what is defined as close?

I suggested 10 m as target separation. What would you suggest?

No, you do not suggest, you tell us what the separation was, you
tell the world what the accuracy is, you do not suggest, you find the
facts. The story is clearly liked, despite no actual evidence it
actually happened in the way it has been described.

Do not SUGGEST a distance then go on to decide it must be right
because that fits to your preferred outcome, show it.

Add the number of times it happened including "friendly casualties"

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Anyway you know the answer since you claim
"If a 1000 lb HE bomb explodes within 50 m of a pillbox it will not kill
the soldiers but certainly affect them for some time"
Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox, the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?

It has only to do with the size of the opening. For those I saw at Omaha
a 500 kg blast in 50 m distance would affect the crew.

Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox, the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?
Also what report your 500 kg semi nuclear bomb is from?

None at all. It was from a military veteran who described such a blast
affect at a pillbox. He was a knowlegdable senior and quite convincing.

So in other words he was in pillboxes and was bombed many times and
measured the distances and bomb sizes, correct?

Can you tell us the size, shape, construction and orientation of the
pillbox, the number of crew and weapons in the pillbox?

The answer is obviously no, anecdotal evidence that is liked is supposed
to be proof.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Those effects on the soldiers came in mind as I read the USAAF report.
They described it as "moral" effects. But there are physiological effects
involved. Unlike damage to a pillbox this seems not easy to quantify.
Thats why I asked about such a report.

The people in the beach defences were being hit by multiple weapons,
the effect of the bombers is just part of that.

deleted text,

Go back through the various posts, pull out the lists of targets and
sorties and then put them all in a post showing how they fit your
ideas of D-Day attacks.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
There were still P-38 (even as fighter-bombers) and P-51 for Luftwaffe.

Yes, we know, the plan is perfect, even if it requires every allied
fighter available, at 400 aircraft per 10 minutes, an hour only needs
2,400 fighters and so on.

The 400 in 10 minutes was the reply to your calculation of available
P-47. It was your calculation base to count only for P-47 MGs to
supress and to use the attacking aircraft like a conveyor belt.

I really do like this, my pointing out how absurd the idea is, using
the numbers, is dismissed, other people's ideas are wrong, only
yours are right, evidence is irrelevant.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 10 km beach would indeed give each aircraft 25 m by a wing on wing
like attack. But nobody ever suggested that.

You see the idea is to absolutely ignore the restrictions the amount
of airspace available puts on the number of attackers. That ruins
the idea.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
One suggestion was a stream
attack on defence sites.

Really, one suggestion, please tell us all who, and when, and not
my showing it was absurd either.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With the objective to either destroy them or
make same none operational for 3 minutes.

And you still fail to understand the problems and therefore the chances
of success, even before we talk about allied doctrines.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We did not talk yet about the
best tactic to apply the P-47 bombs prior or during these 3 minutes.

I already have, land, pour fuel in the pillbox entrances and set it on fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But anyway, I think it is clear the P-47 would make an effect on Omaha.

Yes we know you came with the idea, are going to leave with the idea
and delete anything that does not fit.

The rest is the deleted text,

Tell you what, go talk to an air traffic controller, I do not index their
reports on what traffic density is possible.

And by the way, can you tell us all who would have ever put together
a report on 400 zero altitude fighter bombers operating in a confined
airspace? Perhaps since it is your idea you can show us all the WWII
air operations at that sort of density?

Instead of idea good, written proof to refute it only acceptable.

You might remember the 2nd Tactical Air Force intervened in the
Mortain battle, on 7 and 8 August 1944.

Quite a confined area and all day to cover, so the limit was about a
squadron at a time, so on the 7th a total of 390 fighter bomber sorties,
335 attacking, on the 8th 497, sorties, 437 attacking, note some of
these sorties were to other targets.

Surely if 400 aircraft could attack Omaha beach then 800 could do
the Mortain attacks? And only take 10 minutes to make the forward
positions somewhere between destroyed and useless? Correct?

Yes, we know, the plan is perfect, even if it requires every allied
fighter available, at 400 aircraft per 10 minutes, an hour only needs
2,400 fighters and so on.

In short we will note your ideas about aircraft at D-Day are wrong,
and no amount of information here is going to change that. You read
a book, declared it the truth and everything is being fitted to that idea
of truth.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[Rich]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I never suggested to erode or melt a concrete pillbox (Rich).

Are you intentionally trolling? Why are you insinuating I ever made such a
stupid comment when in fact it was you who made the statement? I suggest in
future you make correct attributions for the statements you allege others
made.

I gave you a real world case of just exactly what effect "steel-cored" .50
caliber BMG rounds had against reinforced concrete structures in World
War II from a ore accurate platform than a P-47. Kindly respond to what
I said instead of making up things from your fevered imagination.

Until you can manage to do so, our conversation is ended.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Rich

wrote: I never suggested to erode or melt a concrete pillbox (Rich).

Are you intentionally trolling? Why are you insinuating I ever made such a
stupid comment when in fact it was you who made the statement? I suggest in
future you make correct attributions for the statements you allege others
made.
I gave you a real world case of just exactly what effect "steel-cored" .50
caliber BMG rounds had against reinforced concrete structures in World
War II from a ore accurate platform than a P-47. Kindly respond to what
I said instead of making up things from your fevered imagination.
Until you can manage to do so, our conversation is ended.

My fault. Sorry Rich. It was Geoffry who suggested I thought to melt
concrete. I was not clear enough in my initial statement. I thought
your given example shall prove to me the impossibility to melt concrete.
But you had another intention. Again sorry I misunderstood you.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[yauming]

On Monday, 20 July 2015 03:36:27 UTC+8, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

I didn't realise that P47 squadrons were loitering around Omaha beach on D-Day.

Is there a good history book that documents the fighter bomber support on June 6th? Much appreciated.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by yauming
I didn't realise that P47 squadrons were loitering around Omaha beach on D-Day.
Is there a good history book that documents the fighter bomber support on
June 6th? Much appreciated.

There was a whole series of fighter patrols and fighter bomber sorties,
by all the air forces involved.

Aircraft for the Many by M J F Bowyer covers the RAF operations,
including serial numbers of aircraft, operations and casualties.
2nd Tactical Air Force by Shores should also cover the operations.

I know of no published work that has as much detail for the USAAF
operations as Bowyer. The 9th Air Force in World War II by K C Rust
has around half a dozen pages devoted to D-Day operations by the
9th Air Force.

The 8th Air Force June 1944 monthly report says it had 1,880 fighter
sorties on 6 June, including a number of fighter bomber sorties that
dropped 395x250 pound and 190x500 pound bombs, so under 100
short tons of bombs, or about a quarter the tonnage dropped by the
9th Air Force fighter bombers.

Otherwise it is things like the reports at the CARL website, like

Ninth Air Force April to November 1944.
Ninth Air Force Invasion Activities April thru June 1944
Air Cooperation with Troops in Normandy
The Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in the
European Theater.

Then comes the books and web sites on the individual fighter groups.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Ninth Air Force April to November 1944.
Ninth Air Force Invasion Activities April thru June 1944
Air Cooperation with Troops in Normandy
The Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in the
European Theater.

The US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) and the AF Historical
Studies Office (AFHSO) sites are also very useful, especially the
"numbered studies" reports at AFHRA.

#36 (U) Ninth Air Force, April to November 1944, by Robert H. George
(1945).
#70 (U) Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944-8 May
1945, Juliette Hennessy (1952).
#88 (U) The Employment of Strategic Bombers in a Tactical Role, 1941-1951,
by Robert W. Ackerman (1953).
#96 (U) The Army Air Forces in Amphibious Landings in World War II,
by Harry L. Coles (1953).

[Rich]

Sorry for the long lines.

On Saturday, July 18, 2015 at 5:30:58 PM UTC-6, ***@argo.rhein-neckar.de wrote:

I have hesitated to reply for some time, since I am on holiday and also
because this has become a ludicrous exercise in one poster ignoring
all evidence that doesn't fit his preconceived ignorant assumptions.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The eight .5 cal (12.7 mm) AN/M2 MGs of the P-47 had together 106
rounds per second. The lower speed limit of the P-47 was 45 m/s. So
in one pass from the water to the pillboxes it had around 10 seconds
fire time and could deliver 1000 rounds. It had enough ammo for 3 to 4
passes. The 8 MGs were adjusted to converge on one point some 300 m (?)
ahead.

Although the P-47 could carry 425 rounds per gun, it was rarely loaded
with more than 275 per to prevent jamming. Enough for 20 seconds per gun.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The steel rounds delivered quite some energy per shoot. The pillboxes and
bunkers I saw there had no wood frames or sand bags opposite the opening.
Any round that entered the opening would have ricocheted inside the box
and wounded or killed the soldiers.

A touch of real life seems needed. In December 1944 my father had four
quad .50 M16A1 and 8 water-cooled M2 under his command as a platoon leader
in Battery A, 537th AAA AW BN, positioned in the town of Rehlingen in the Saarland.
On the opposite side of the Saar, in underbrush,was a pillbox of
the Westwall. Its MG42 harassed my Dad's command, not causing casualties
but irritation. They knew where it was, but could not pinpoint it, so
finally one day Dad ordered all his guns to fire on it, essentially for
the entire day. After expending thousands of rounds, the result was
they silenced the gun...for about 15 minutes.

We were able to confirm that in fall 1968 when Dad was on his last tour
in Germany. We crossed on the new bridge and walked to the pillbox, which
was still there. The entire front was covered with pockmarks from Dad's barrage.
His comment? "Well we hit it. Didn't do a damned bit of good, but
we hit it."

I can't wait for the next response.

[William Clodius]

<snip>

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On D-Day no fighter bomber strikes were planned or expected to
be within hundreds of yards of allied troops, the experience and
command control was not there. The warships (with their spotter
aircraft), landing craft mounted artillery and the weapons landed
on the beach were the line of contact support.
Geoffrey Sinclair

That was the failure at Omaha that cost a lot of lives. Its today the
most TV popularized battle of the US in Europe WWII. At least in German
TV - here it may even be the most mentioned battle of WWII at all. The
lack of CAS on the beach was a serious mistake. It is covered
by you and some historians as a lack of experience. I do not agree and
suspect some other reason. Navy vs Army rivalry was blamed by one
historian. Another on Army vs USAAF. I'm not convinced yet of anything.
Just want to collect more facts.
Btw, "landing craft mounted artillery" means the rockets, or real guns?
Why did this fail?
## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

Wherever possible iit is desirable to reduce a problem to a single
variable and analyze the effects of that variable. But often a topic is
not simple enough for that approach to be useful, and battles are almost
invariably too messy to be reduced to a single variable. Omaha Beach
June 6, 1944 was particularly messy.

Insufficient CAS was not "the" failure that cost a lot of lives,
compared to everything else that went on at that place and time. Most of
your suggested improvements in the CAS require experience on the part of
the pilots and ground control, confidence in the new targetting
techniques, air bases closer to the front than was possible over the
Channel, reliable comminications from the front to the ground
controllers when FM and microwaves weree a novely, reasonably clear
weather to identify targets, certainty that the German Air Force would
not be a factor, a willingness to take great risks with German AAA, and
other assumptions that would take to long to discuss. Yes in an ideal
world CAS could have been much better, but it could never have been as
much better as you are claiming. and in retrospect there are other
things that might have been plausibly done that would have had a bigger
effect on the many casualties at Omaha Beach.

The most obvious useful change would have been to focus the attacks on
the centers off the bluffs between beach exits. These were not as well
defended as the exits, and in the end were the points where the American
attacks were most successful. This was proposed seriously by Gerow,
Huebner, and others, but was rejected by Bradley as a method of getting
off the beach as it was unlikely in this approach that the exits would
be cleared before early afternoon. In the event taking the exits failed
and the Americans had a longer delay at a higher cost. I suspect Gerow
may have hurt his proposal's chances by suggesting that two divisions be
landed at once, when there was barely enough craft for the one division.

The concerns about the German Naval gun batteries in the event proved
exagerated. The transport areas of the Western Task force could have
been moved closer to shore. This would have reduced the transit times
for the landing craft, which in turn should have reduced the effects of
sea sickness, leg cramps, landing errors due to poor visibility and sea
currents, and the swanping of LCT(A)s and DUKWs.

The descriptions of the problems of the howitzers transported on the
DUKWs sound so bad, that I wonder why it was considered at all
practical. The unused LVTs had a bigger capacity, and should have had a
better chance of getting them ashore.

In general tanks on LCTs had fewer problems with the crossing than the
DD tanks that were launched. Drooping the idea of DD tanks would have
saved many crew members and provided better support for the 16th RCT.

The initial assault teams could have been more lightly loaded with
equipment and munitions, relying on subsequent waves for more supplies.
Any weight reduction would have allowed them to get across to cover more
quickly. Well equipped dead/wounded men were of no use.

When the engineers failed to clear paths, landing craft forced their way
past the lighter obstacles, usually to no ill effect. I don't know if
that was possible for the initial assault, (it would be most effective
with the wooden obstacles, and not the Belgian gates, Czeck hedgehos,
etc) but if so it would have been usefule to reduce the slow transit to
shore by wading soldiers.

The engineering teams lost a lot of men to rubber rafts loaded with
explosives that were set off by hits from German munitions. Less
sensitive explosives, or smaller loads per raft might havee saved a
number of critical lives. Every engineer lost meant more delay and
exposure to fire for subsequent waves. This was after the earlier hevy
losses to the E-Boat attack in late April, and was compounded by the
delay in their support teams that were intended to provide cover from
the Germans. Ensuring that these support teams got off in time would
have also been a great help.

The radios were another big problem. They were heavy, drownig operators
disembarking in deeper water, fragile, and large enoug to become
targets. Unfortunately any change to make them more robust would likely
increase their size and weight.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Once again please keep the attributions in.

Some deleted text,

"Want to be a fighter commander with several ground controllers
trying to talk to you? Each presumably trying to tell you what to
do? Plus any Germans deciding to join in?"

Tell us all, later when the system was better, or earlier in the
Mediterranean, what authority did the forward controllers have
there and then to take control of aircraft not allocated to them?
Even to talk to aircraft not allocated to them? Since apparently
not doing so is an error.

Congratulations, you have successfully defined close air support
to something different to what the allies were doing in 1944. Then
you decide they were not doing close air support.

No wonder you are sure they were doing it wrong, after defining
things so they were wrong.

So hitting artillery or even machine gun positions more than 1,000 metres
from the front line is an interdiction strike. Well done. Interdicting the
projectiles they might fire?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That CAS is not easy seems obvious. But at D-Day the Allies had already
considerable experience in CAS.

In the Mediterranean, the ground and air units doing it in
Normandy were for the most part inexperienced. That showed.

I would have expected that the US/UK for their most important operation
of WWII would assemble their most experienced man. Specialy for a job
like CAS were experience counts more than theory. The Med is not far
from England. Any idea why they did not?

Yes, it is called they had lots of forces in England who were trained
and of course the shipping situation.
It was the ground and air formations, so is the idea most to all of the
8th and 5th armies, the Desert, 15th and 12th air forces should
have been sent to England and replaced by the forces from England?

Experienced pilots are good. But the most crucial part in CAS are the
Forward Air Controllers. That I was talking about. Those experienced
FACs were left in the Med. What about "shipping situation" if we talk
about 100 or a few 100s men?

Because it is not just the forward controllers. It is the people in the
system, including the pilots and ground troops. Simply deciding only
the air controllers matter is wrong.

The arrival times of the 9th Air Force units and the need for pre invasion
work meant it was ready to run exercises with 1st Army just as the
ground forces entered their pre invasion bases.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, 481 P-47 day and 47 night fighter bomber
sorties dropping some 352.66 short tons of bombs. I gather 500
sorties is a very low number. And ignoring the target of opportunity
orders for the other sorties.

D-Day, 6 June 1944, as has been stated.

What area? Omaha or the whole US section?

The assault area, what exactly are you now defining "assault area" as?

How did you conclude the 9th Air Force might only support one beach?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above mentione dive bombers at D-Day. An idea how many, what typ and
on what targets?

P-47. On pre arranged targets, including roads, rail, bridges, known
artillery positions, plus requested targets, usually artillery shooting at
the beach heads. As reported before.

I know the US had a P-51 version modified for dive bombing. Did a
modified P-47 version existed too? Or was it the free dive bombing
Rich mentioned with very very poor accuracy.

The A-36 was the attack version. There was no equivalent P-47
version.

And very very poor accuracy is an overstatement, the fighter bombers
were less accurate than true dive bombers but generally more
accurate than light, medium or heavy bombers.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
On D-Day no fighter bomber strikes were planned or expected to
be within hundreds of yards of allied troops, the experience and
command control was not there. The warships (with their spotter
aircraft), landing craft mounted artillery and the weapons landed
on the beach were the line of contact support.

That was the failure at Omaha that cost a lot of lives.

No, it is the failure of you to understand what was available and how
the plan unraveled the most at Omaha.

You really are announcing the modern USAF was available.

By the way the people on board the command ships had the
authority to allocate designated aircraft to targets requested
by the troops ashore without waiting for permission from England.
The delays in the links were understood.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Its today the
most TV popularized battle of the US in Europe WWII. At least in German
TV - here it may even be the most mentioned battle of WWII at all.

An interesting idea of importance.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The
lack of CAS on the beach was a serious mistake.

We know you arrived with the conclusion and will depart with it,
meantime we will chat amongst ourselves.

Your lack of understanding is the serious mistake, your repeated
failure to actually note what was possible indicates the mistake will
persist. Having decided it was a mistake you are hunting for an
acceptable reason and evidence is irrelevant to that. After defining
close air support to something not done in June 1944.

The fact you simply keep deleting the information that shows you are
wrong shows how little you are learning, while busily deciding people
agree with your idea of their words.

Want to note how much of my post being replied to actually made
it to the reply?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It is covered
by you and some historians as a lack of experience.

Quite correct, including mounting operations right on the front line,
even pre planned ones and even more so as unplanned requests,
as something not really thought very viable or safe.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I do not agree and
suspect some other reason.

Yes, we know, and it is also understood that evidence is irrelevant
to your conclusions.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Navy vs Army rivalry was blamed by one
historian. Another on Army vs USAAF. I'm not convinced yet of anything.
Just want to collect more facts.

No, you ignore the facts.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Btw, "landing craft mounted artillery" means the rockets, or real guns?
Why did this fail?

Rockets (the landing craft with (R) in their designation) and artillery
pieces
on DUKW and landing craft plus landing craft with (G) in their designation,
the guns have been mentioned several times and clearly ignored several
times. I realise I am writing these posts for everyone except the person
asking the questions.

Causes: Sinkings, swampings, lack of ability to find targets. The usual.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[William Clodius]

A few points;

Historic photos suggest that the grass fire that caused visibility
problems was relatively localized. Much of the beach, particularly the
tops of the bluffs, appears to be visible to the Naval gunners.

It was expected that the Naval gunnery would rely on spotters on the
beach to direct their fire. With people on the beach providing guidance,
visibility is not as critical. Unfortunately the radio sets were heavy
and relied on fragile tubes (and I suspect limited waterproofing), while
the spotters were in the first wave to provide targeting ASAP. The radio
operators carrying heavy packs on all beaches were obvious, and
particularly vulnerable, targets. The first wave on Omaha (with its
relatively sparse target set) was devastated, and those operators that
survived did not have useable radio sets. It took time for any of the
Naval gunners to adjust to the lack of ground direction. Eventually,
with the arrival of command posts, radios appeared, but their inital
operators were not trained guspotters, and I suspect they were initally
set up to communicate with other army personell and not the naval
gunners.

Overlord was the day after a storm and there was still significant cloud
cover. Clouds are generally more optically dense than smoke from a grass
fire, so visibility at altitude was not generally as good as you are
assuming. It could be improved by going under the clouds, but the lower
you go the more vulnerable you are to the many German AAA weapons. While
the casualty rate for infantry was bad, it was generally worse for air
crews. While the early 1944 air campaign had devastated the German air
force, the full extent was uncertain and some air cover was rightly
perceived as necessary, whle close air support was very vulnerable, not
only to AAA, but also to being "bounced" by enemy fightes. But if they
had to be prepared to deal with enemy fighters, bomb weight would be
limited to allow high speed and maneuverability in combat.

Remote radio controlled air guidance at that time was accurate compard
to the size of a city, but not compared to the size of a fortification.
I suspect McNair, for one, was briefly even more unhappy with the
bombing accuracy of the USAAF than he was with only being given a corps
command by Eisenhower.

Close air support takes training and practice, and benefits from radio
communications with the men on the ground. The best practice is real
life, so the most knowledgeable air crews (and ground spotters) were
those in the Meditteranean and Pacific that were already involved in
combat. There was a reluctance to pull them out of an area where they
were making a valuable contribution, to place them in Britain where they
might spend weeks sitting around and waiting for the invasion to begin.
As to the ground to air radio sets to give them guidance, they were
likely to suffer the same fate as the ground to ship radio sets.

For large fixed locations, such as the Naval gun position, or locations
near the beach where the ground spotters should proviide guidance, the
amount of lead the ships could deliver on site, would have effects very
comparable to what might be expected from close air support. What they
couldn't do is target reinforcements travelling to the beachead, away
from fixed locations and out of sight to the beach. Anything the air
crews could do to delay and weaken the arrival of the 21s Armored
Division, or Kampfgruppe Meyer was valuable, even if not of the
immediate value of beach ground support.

Given the expected poor accuracy of the pre invasion bombing, the
bombing relied on antipersonel bombs detonated above the surface. This
choice affects the largest possible area, and can be devatating on
personel in foxholes, trenches, and open tobruks if they are in the
affected regions. It however produces little if any cratering, While the
beach was a terget area, any expectation of cratering was unwarented. Of
course, in the event cloud cover caused the bombing to be moved further
from the planned landing beaches to avoid collateral damage to the
troops. This displacement was along the filght plan, and hence to the
south. For most beache with and east/west cost, the rsult was minimal
damage to the German forces, but for Utah, on the north/south Cotentin
coast, as the actual landing was south of the intended location and the
troops where they landed had been devastated.

[JL McClellan]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was often here the issue about the lack of any
fighter-bombers during early D-Day at Omaha Beach. After the
Private Rayen movie it is an obvious question. The suggested
answers range from suspected low visibility to institutional
barriers (Navy vs USAAF) were mainly speculations.
Lewis, Adrian R.: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory,
University of North Carolina Press (2001)
It is mainly about the history of Allied amphibious planning.
It is interesting in its condensed report about the problems
that raised at Omaha and how it got solved. Regarding air
"The bombers flying above the clouds at an altitude of
11,000 feet used radar to determine their bomb release time,
and because of the proximity to friendly troops, they added
an extra margin of safety to their calculations."
I often heard that and I think its a myth. I assume there was
never the intention to bomb the beaches and create the field of
craters promised to the troops. Such a field would have serious
hampered the later disembarkment of the heavy equipment. I
wonder why nobody ever mentioned this problem.
That the heavy bombers by H2X airborne radar were of no much
use against small and medium size beach fortifications seems
rather obvious. The author is right that no other doctrine of
their use was established then. But that should be a point of
his critic. There were technical means available to use them
another way. Ploesti showed they could be used at low altitude
in high precision attacks.
Further, the RAF and the USAAF had by 1944 highly accurate
radio controlled blind bombing systems. So there was a chance
to develop something. But in a German book I found the medium
bombers had some success against the large fortifications by
visual aiming from medium altitude. That was something the
heavies were able too. But all in all it seems the heavies were
not of much importance at the beaches anyway.
I understand the main killer at Omaha were German MGs from
small fortifications. Thats a target for fighter-bombers or
tanks. The tanks at early D-Day mainly failed by bad weather.
The winds were beyond prediction and well beyond operational
limit. That some got to the beaches at all was a small wonder.
The German guns there were 7.65 cm and larger. This were
perfect tank killers and I suspect they had AT ammunition
intended against ships too. So I have some doubts whether the
tanks had much chances without prior elimination of this guns.
This guns were a good target for fighter-bombers too. Instead
"Naval gunfire from destroyers proved to be the only reliable
part of the Joint Fire Plan since the Army Air ForceÆs
strategic bombers missed the target area and the tactical air
force was too poorly trained in close air support to assist."
I doubt that attacking the beaches in front of the first wave
would be "close air support" at all. This term is used for
situations were friendly and enemy force are close by and not
easy to distinguish or the target not easy to find or to see
from air. That was not the situation at the beach.
Visibility was an issue. But for the ships, not the air.
According a map in Lewis book the destroyers were 3000 yards
from the beach. I assume he meant the beach line at low tide
when the first wave was to arrive. At high tide it was 275 m or
300 yards further. The targets where still some 100 m or more
further inland. So it seems they intended to hit targets of
about 1 m size (about the height of an artillery bunker free
opening) at 3 km range.
That was possible in clear air. But in the morning mist and
various smoke sources they had to see through 3 km bad air. No
way this ever had a chance to work. Some blame it on the loss
of the radio equipment of the first wave. They not just lost
the radios but the officers trained on it too. But the main
work of the destroyers had to be completed before the first
wave landing ships even came in range of the German guns.
Hours later some destroyers came "close" to 1 km to the beach.
But even then not all targets were visible. They fired in the
approximate directions in hope for hits. A German book
mentioned a cruiser "Ajax" (I assume British, the one of Graf
Spee fame?) as the most successful in taking out several German
guns. The fire of the Ajax was directed by an airplane!
The USAAF had a lot of P-47 fighter-bombers at D-Day. They had
up to 500 kg bomb load. In summer 1944 they were about the
first to drop napalm bombs. More important I think was the MG
armament. The 8 MG of 12.7 mm size with a capacity of 3400
rounds had a good chance to take out German pillboxes and
bunkers. It could "melt" small pillboxes and disable guns or
destroy MGs just by a few hits. Not to mention what happens to
the German crew if some rounds enter trough the opening and
ricochet inside the bunker.
The issue of visibility is simple. From above you look through
some 10s m of mist and smoke. From the ships you have to look
through several km. So where were the P-47 at D-Day? They were
over Omaha beach and looked down as the first wave approached
General John W. Vogt: Let me talk about the isolation of the
Normandy beachhead. I happened to be involved in that
operation. I was a squadron commander of P-47 "Thunderbolts"
at the time of the Normandy operation, which, as I recall,
was June 6, 1944.
We were briefed the night before on the general outline of
the opera- tion. We knew that the transports had already set
sail and were on their way across the channel, that there
would be early shore bombardment, and that we would try to
put the troops ashore. We went out in squadron formations
that day in order to get the total coverage that was required
for the full period. My squadron was briefed along the
"We don't know what the enemy air reaction is going to be to
all of this. The Germans may be over the beachhead in great
numbers, so our number one job is to insure that we have air
superiority over the beach." I was given the altitude block
of 5,000 to 15,000 feet, right over Omaha Beach at daybreak.
We had to take off before daybreak to arrive over the
beachhead on time.
There was one twist: if no air opposition appeared, then we
had to be prepared to do the secondary mission, which was to
interdict the area in which the total operation was taking
place and to prevent the movement of German reinforcements
into the area. That meant we had to have the airplanes loaded
with bombs, even while we were doing the first portion of the
mission, which was the air superiority portion. The
instructions of course were, "jettison your ordnance if you
get into a battle with Focke- Wulf 190s."
We orbited over the beach for about two hours, and no German
air appeared. Then we went to the secondary portion of the
mission, which was the interdiction.
(...)
So we spent that morning, the remainder of our mission time,
methodically hitting the bridges over which we believed the
Germans would ultimately have to come.
Smart: Excuse me one minute. Would you give us the time line
for this mission? Was this on the day of the invasion?
Vogt: Yes, it was the morning of June 6. As I say, I arrived
over the beachhead at slightly before daybreak. We just
orbited there, watching the initial bombardment, the heavy
cruisers laying the fire support in, and of course witnessed
the movements of the small vessels bringing the troops
ashore. No German air forces appeared. (...)
Partridge, Earle E.: Air interdiction in World War II,
Korea, and
Vietnam. USAF, Washington (1986). pp. 23ff
I'm not aware of any other account about the P-47 over Omaha.
Lewis did not mention it and neither any of the many TV docus
about D-Day. Even Smart above did not trust his ears as he
heard it and inquired. Obviously he immediately understood the
implications but did not shared his thoughts.
I still can only assume why this blunder in the planning of
D-Day happened. It seems to me most likely what someone here
mentioned some time ago. That all beach operations were left to
the Navy as their sole operation. The Navy did the best they
could but had no fighter-bombers in Europe. The single point
failure was the decision to leave all to the Navy and avoid a
combined operation with the USAAF. It must be an early and high
level decision. Seems its too buried under the mountain of
papers and books about D-Day that even a specialized historian
like Lewis is no longer able to find it.
## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

On D-day the wind had, as forecast, moderated and the cloud was
well broken, with a base generally above 4,000 feet. This
afforded conditions which would permit of our airborne
operations, and during the hour preceding the landings from the
sea large areas of temporarily clear sky gave opportunities for
the visual bombing of the shore defenses. The sea was still
rough, and large numbers of our men were sick during the
crossing. The waves also caused some of the major landing craft
to lag astern, while other elements were forced to turn back.

As events proved, the decision to launch the assault at a time
when the weather was so unsettled was largely responsible for the
surprise which we achieved. The enemy had concluded that any
cross-Channel expedition was impossible while the seas ran so
high and, with his radar installations rendered ineffective as a
result of our air attacks, his consequent unpreparedness for our
arrival more than offset the difficulties which we experienced.

The weather was not the only circumstance surrounding the Allied
landings which was contrary to the enemy's expectations.
Apparently he had assumed that we should make our attempt only
when there was a new moon and on a high tide, and that in
choosing the place of main assault we should pick the immediate
neighborhood of a good harbor and avoid cliffs and shallow,
dangerous waters. In point of fact, we assaulted shortly after
low tide, when the moon was full; we landed away from large
harbors and at some points below sheer cliffs; and the waters
through which we approached the shore were so strewn with reefs
and subjected to strong currents that the German naval experts
had earlier declared them to be impassable for landing craft.

While our assault forces were tossing on the dark waters of the
Channel en route for France, the night bombers which were to
herald our approach passed overhead. Shortly after midnight the
bombing commenced, and by dawn 1,136 aircraft of RAF Bomber
Command had dropped 5,853 tons of bombs on 10 selected coastal
batteries lining the Bay of the Seine between Cherbourg and Le
Havre. As the day broke, the bombers of the US Eighth Air Force
took up the attacks, 1,083 aircraft dropping 1,763 tons on the
shore defenses during the half-hour preceding the touchdown. Then
medium, light, and fighter-bombers of the Allied Expeditionary
Air Force swarmed in to attack individual targets along the
shores and artillery positions farther inland. The seaborne
forces bore witness to the inspiring moral effect produced by
this spectacle of Allied air might and its results as they drew
in toward the beaches.

During the remainder of the day, the heavy bombers concentrated
their attacks upon the key centers of communication behind the
enemy's lines, through which he would have to bring up his
reinforcements. Fighters and fighter-bombers of the AEAF roamed
over the entire battle area, attacking the German defensive
positions, shooting up buildings known to house headquarters,
strafing troop concentrations, and destroying transport. During
the 24 hours of 6 June, the Strategic Air Forces flew 5,309
sorties to drop 10,395 tons of bombs, while aircraft of the
tactical forces flew a further 5,276 sorties.

The lightness of the losses which we sustained on all these
operations is eloquent of the feeble enemy air reactions and
testifies to the effectiveness of our diversionary operations.
Such reconnaissance and defense patrols as were flown by the
Germans were mainly over the Pas-de-Calais area while over the
assault beaches and their approaches only some 50 half-hearted
sorties were attempted. Our heavy bombers were permitted to carry
out their allotted tasks without any interference from enemy
fighters. One result of this absence of opposition was that our
own fighter-bombers were able to operate in small units of one or
two squadrons, thus permitting their all-important harassing
attacks to be more continuously maintained and their activities
to cover a wider field. Not until two days after the initial
landings did the enemy reinforce his air strength over the
invasion zone to any appreciable extent.

Despite the massive air and naval bombardments with which we
prefaced our attack, the coastal defenses in general were not
destroyed prior to the time when our men came ashore. Naval
gunfire proved effective in neutralizing the heavier batteries,
but failed to put them permanently out of action, thanks to the
enormous thickness of the concrete casemates. Air bombing proved
equally unable to penetrate the concrete, and after the action no
instances were found of damage done by bombs perforating the
covering shields. Such of the guns as were silenced had been so
reduced by shellfire through the ports. The pre-D-day bombing
had, nevertheless, delayed the completion of the defense works,
and the unfinished state of some of the gun emplacements rendered
them considerably less formidable than anticipated.

The defenses on the beaches themselves were also not destroyed
prior to H-hour as completely as had been hoped. The beach-
drenching air attacks, just before the landing, attained their
greatest success on Utah beach, where the Ninth Air Force bombed
visually below cloud level. But elsewhere patches of cloud forced
the aircraft to take extra safety precautions to avoid hitting
our own troops, with the result that their bombs sometimes fell
too far inland, especially at Omaha beach.

--From Eisenhower's report to the Joint Chiefs at the end of the
war

[William Clodius]

<snip>
The defenses on the beaches themselves were also not destroyed
prior to H-hour as completely as had been hoped. The beach-
drenching air attacks, just before the landing, attained their
greatest success on Utah beach, where the Ninth Air Force bombed
visually below cloud level. But elsewhere patches of cloud forced
the aircraft to take extra safety precautions to avoid hitting
our own troops, with the result that their bombs sometimes fell
too far inland, especially at Omaha beach.
--From Eisenhower's report to the Joint Chiefs at the end of the
war

This is the first claim I have seen that the better performance at Utah
was because of better visual sighting. I had assumed that to avoid
hitting the invasion forces, they had moved the bombing further south
along the flight path, and that the weapon nests to the south (where the
landings actually occured) were badly hit just due to the intensity of
the bombing. Was Eisenhower's interpretation of the effects at Utah
beach correct or was it just his assumption?

I have seen meany reports that the bombing at Omaha beach was
ineffective, but little on the effects on the Commonwealth beaches. Is
there a good reference on their effects on D-Day?

[Rich]

Post by William Clodius
This is the first claim I have seen that the better performance at Utah
was because of better visual sighting. I had assumed that to avoid

UTAH is interesting. It was not attacked by Eighth Air Force heavies, but
by Ninth Air Force mediums. Also, instead of flying north to south - perpendicular to the beach -as at the other four beach bombings, they
flew northwest to southeast - parallel to the beach. They also flew at
low altitudes under 7,000 feet.

However, despite all that the resulting effective bombings were still
effective only by chance. One of the bomb patterns struck squarely in
the middle of the WN centered on what became UTAH, stunning the defenders
and knocking out one of the guns. Otherwise, of the 26 bomb patterns
resulting, only six others hit any of the defended areas.

Post by William Clodius
I have seen meany reports that the bombing at Omaha beach was
ineffective, but little on the effects on the Commonwealth beaches. Is
there a good reference on their effects on D-Day?

None of them did.

[William Clodius]

<snip>

Post by William Clodius
I have seen meany reports that the bombing at Omaha beach was
ineffective, but little on the effects on the Commonwealth beaches. Is
there a good reference on their effects on D-Day?

None of them did.

I assume you mean none of them did much of anything at the Commonwealth
beaches and not none of the good references discuss their effects.

[Rich]

Post by William Clodius
I assume you mean none of them did much of anything at the Commonwealth
beaches and not none of the good references discuss their effects.

Sorry, I got interrupted writing and absentmindedly posted without
finishing. I meant none of the beach bombings by Eighth Air Force
appear to have any effect. Also, there are few original sources
directly addressing what fell where. In fact, AFAIK the ***only***
serious analysis that diagrammed where bomb patterns fell was by
Ninth Air Force for UTAH. Eighth Air Force appears to have simply
declared the bombs dropped effective and left it at that.

Anecdotally, the British analysis of the three Commonwealth
beaches indicate a few bombs may have had effect. IIRC it is
possible some bombs impacted in the Wurfgerate position near JUNO
and prevented them from being fired. Maybe.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was often here the issue about the lack of any fighter-bombers
during early D-Day at Omaha Beach.

It is not often.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
After the Private Rayen movie it is
an obvious question. The suggested answers range from suspected low
visibility to institutional barriers (Navy vs USAAF) were mainly
speculations.

Add the following, ever bothered to fly through an artillery barrage? It
would seem some of the allied spotting aircraft were shot down by
friendly naval fire. An aircraft hit by a 15 inch shell stays hit. Ever
worked out the trajectory of shells fired at multiple miles range?
Add the smoke generated by combat.

Fundamentally the plan was the bombers would attack first, well
before the landings, as they were the least accurate, the naval
ships would attack but as they also had to cease fire before the
troops landed the landing craft (rocket) would attack from close
in just before the the troops would land, hopefully keeping the
enemy troops suppressed for the vital few minutes, then add the
DD tanks.

The surviving beach defences would be dealt with by the troops
and supporting naval ships, including artillery pieces and forward
observers deployed on landing craft close to the beaches. The
aircraft post landings would mainly do interdiction, anti Luftwaffe
and targets of opportunity more inland.

The naval gunnery was more accurate than the aircraft and control
had been provided, including spotter aircraft. The spotters from the
RAF, RN and USN were largely flying Spitfires after experience in
the Mediterranean, one US cruiser lost 3 of its 4 scout floatplanes
at Sicily, the Germans were well aware of spotter aircraft importance.

Then comes the fundamental point the high/low tide at Cherbourg is
about 2 hours before Le Havre, mainly due to the effects of the channel
in resisting the Atlantic Ocean's request to visit the North Sea and vice
versa.

So to obtain the same tide conditions as the Commonwealth beaches
the US forces had to land noticeably earlier. Utah landings were around
06.30 as were Omaha, the Commonwealth landings started about an
hour later. I'm sure someone would decide Omaha landings could have
been done 30 minutes or so later, whether that would have made a
major difference is debatable, 2 battleships and 3 light cruisers plus
destroyers were hitting targets on and around the beach.

The bombardments of the Commonwealth beaches started at around
05.30 though some ships opened fire earlier, Utah and Omaha also
around 5.30. The ships off Utah were under fire before 05.30 but were
ordered to wait until the designated start time.

Finally the onshore wind was driving the water, causing the tide to
rise faster.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Lewis, Adrian R.: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory,
University of North Carolina Press (2001)

Unfortunately the book seems to have recommendations like the
allies should have done a second Dieppe style attack, take a port
on day 1. The author seems to have strong opinions on the right
way to do the operations.

Also even with daylight landings and considerable effort devoted to
keeping the landing craft on course plenty of troops were landed in
the wrong location. A night landing might provide more cover but
also more chances of being lost. The full moon was on the night of
the 6th/7th. It had risen around 18.37 on the 5th and set at 03.53 on
the 6th, however those times are GMT/Zulu, the allied clocks were
set at double summer time, so the above becomes 20.37 to 5.53.
Sunrise was 05.58.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It is mainly about the history of Allied amphibious planning. It is
interesting in its condensed report about the problems that raised at
Omaha and how it got solved.

How much does the book stress the race that was going on between
the Germans strengthening the beach defences and the allies
concentrating their forces for the attack? Assaulting any of the
beaches was easier in January than June. Rommel had his effect.
At some point the allies were committed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Regarding air support the book was a
"The bombers flying above the clouds at an altitude of 11,000 feet
used radar to determine their bomb release time, and because of the
proximity to friendly troops, they added an extra margin of safety
to their calculations."
I often heard that and I think its a myth.

Why with so many books available plus various official reports is
a myth declared when some basic checking would note they did
bomb long and were worried about hitting the ships?

Or how about 8th Air Force mission 394 saw 1,889 bombers sent
and 1,120 attacking, including 27 that hit Argentan as a target of
opportunity.

Mission 395 which was attacking the Caen, Laval and the
Commonwealth sector beaches that afternoon had 809 aircraft of
652 made it to the area of which 609 were credited with attacking.

The 8th Air Force weather report classifies the 6 June bombing
as blind bombing as does the attack reports I have.

How about arguing the bombers should have flown along the coast,
just figure out how to do that with so many aircraft in the air at the
time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I assume there was never the
intention to bomb the beaches and create the field of craters promised
to the troops. Such a field would have serious hampered the later
disembarkment of the heavy equipment. I wonder why nobody ever mentioned
this problem.

Craters made in sand tend not to last, any below the high tide mark will
rapidly fill for example. Cratering would only matter on the exit areas
inland from the beach.

Meantime here is the 6 June USAAF heavy bomber target list, by
target category

Industrial area, Caen
Rail Bridge, Pontaubault

Choke Point, Alencon, Almenche, Argentan, Caen, Conde-sur-Noireau,
Constance, Coutances, Falaise, Flers, Lisieux, Pont L'Evegue, St. Lo,
Thury Harcourt, Vire (619 sorties credited with attacking)

Coastal Installations, Arromanches, Colleville-sur-Orne, Longues,
Merville/Franceville, Molineaux, Mont Fluery, Ouistreham, Tailievilie,
Ver-sur-Mer (357 sorties credited with attacking)

Defended Locality, Asnelles-sur-Mer, Colleville-sur-Mer,
Courselles-sur-Mer, Pt. et Raz de la Percee, St. Lauret-sur-Mer,
Vierville-sur-Mer (417 sorties credited with attacking)

Strong Point, Berneires-sur-Mer, La Riviere, Le Hamel, Lyon-sur-Mer,
Meuvaines, Petit Enfer, Port en Bassin, St. Aurin-sur-Mer. (211 sorties
credited with attacking)

You will need a more detailed map than I have to definitively figure out
how many of the above were in the actual Omaha assault area, for
example Port en Bassin was about 2 miles from the Omaha beaches,
while Colleville-sur-Mer, St. Lauret-sur-Mer and Vierville-sur-Mer were
in the area. Others are in the Commonwealth sector as expected.

The 9th Air Force did the attacks in support of Utah.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That the heavy bombers by H2X airborne radar were of no much use against
small and medium size beach fortifications seems rather obvious. The
author is right that no other doctrine of their use was established then.
But that should be a point of his critic. There were technical means
available to use them another way. Ploesti showed they could be used at
low altitude in high precision attacks.

The times the US heavy bombers went low, Ploesti and the March 1945
supply drops saw major casualties.

H2X was actually at its best on a shore line, since the contrast between
the land and water was usually quite clear.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further, the RAF and the USAAF had by 1944 highly accurate radio controlled
blind bombing systems. So there was a chance to develop something.

I know this is stilly but have you measure the length of the beaches and
then added more distance to account for the ranges of the weapons
outside the actual beach areas?

Omaha was the best part of 5 miles/8km long.

Oboe could be quite accurate, in the above case it would be too
accurate, for once the allied bombers had to actually area bomb
to try and hit as many of the defences as they could. Or at least
try for multiple targets in the area, something Oboe was not set
up for.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But in
a German book I found the medium bombers had some success against the large
fortifications by visual aiming from medium altitude. That was something
the heavies were able too. But all in all it seems the heavies were not of
much importance at the beaches anyway.

See above for the heavy bomber targets.

It sort of goes like this, the 9th Air Force reports "weather and pathfinder
difficulties reduced the effectiveness of the attacks considerably." Yes
the medium and light bombers had the same sort of bombing aids as
the heavies. Of the 6 coastal batteries meant to be attacked 1 was
attacked by 1 B-26, 2 more by a combined total of 11 B-26, 2 other
attacks were rated good to excellent and the 6th "results unobserved"

The attacks on 7 "defended locations" in the Utah area were done from
between 3,500 to 7,000 feet, results difficult to determine but at least
the beach targets were well hit.

Meantime the 9th had 5 fighter groups assigned to beach head high
cover, 5 more as strike forces and 6 for air ground co-operation after
the landings, remembering the allies expected to drive several miles
inland on D-Day. The initial pre planned fighter bomber strikes were
against 2 coastal batteries, six bridges and a rail embankment, each
attack at squadron strength.

Note there were additional airborne operations to protect.

At least one urgent request for a strike on guns at Fontenay was
answered.

The 1st Army "Prearranged air and naval bombardment plan" of
10 April 1944 noted "Each corps will have available on call one
fighter bomber squadron on air alert."

The Ninth despatched 3,342 fighter, bomber and reconnaissance
sorties on 6 June, of which 3,050 attacked. Of these there were
481/467 P-47 day and 47/47 night fighter bomber sorties dropping
some 352.66 short tons of bombs.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I understand the main killer at Omaha were German MGs from small
fortifications.

Actually as usual the artillery and mortars probably caused more
casualties

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Thats a target for fighter-bombers or tanks.

No, the guns were set up to enfilade the beach and pill boxes make
hard targets for anyone.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The tanks
at early D-Day mainly failed by bad weather. The winds were beyond
prediction and well beyond operational limit. That some got to the
beaches at all was a small wonder. The German guns there were 7.65 cm
and larger.

I presume 7.62 is meant.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This were perfect tank killers and I suspect they had AT
ammunition intended against ships too. So I have some doubts whether
the tanks had much chances without prior elimination of this guns.

The guns on the beaches were set up to defend the beaches, the
heavier guns had the placement and the fire controls to try for ships.
Tanks did survive.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This guns were a good target for fighter-bombers too.

Only if they were in the open.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"Naval gunfire from destroyers proved to be the only reliable part of the
Joint Fire Plan since the Army Air ForceÆs strategic bombers missed the
target area and the tactical air force was too poorly trained in close
air support to assist."

The destroyers closed the beach, closer than had been anticipated
despite the danger from mines, that way they could more easily
identify targets.

The plan did not expect air support to be called down on the beaches
by the troops there, that was the role of the naval guns, plus army
guns in landing craft.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I doubt that attacking the beaches in front of the first wave would be
"close air support" at all. This term is used for situations were friendly
and enemy force are close by and not easy to distinguish or the target not
easy to find or to see from air. That was not the situation at the beach.

If the US is pinned down on the beach and the Germans are in the
high area off the beach then there is separation but simply not enough
for the forces employed to try front line air strikes.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Visibility was an issue. But for the ships, not the air. According a map
in Lewis book the destroyers were 3000 yards from the beach. I assume he
meant the beach line at low tide when the first wave was to arrive. At
high tide it was 275 m or 300 yards further. The targets where still
some 100 m or more further inland. So it seems they intended to hit
targets of about 1 m size (about the height of an artillery bunker free
opening) at 3 km range.

The original plan was to stand off as the Germans were quite capable of
shooting back, plus the mine risk. For example USS Corry mined at
06.37 then taken under fire

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That was possible in clear air. But in the morning mist and various smoke
sources they had to see through 3 km bad air.

The general rule is the more fighting the less visibility, the advantage of
the strong wind was the smoke was being dispersed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
No way this ever had a chance
to work. Some blame it on the loss of the radio equipment of the first wave.
They not just lost the radios but the officers trained on it too. But the
main work of the destroyers had to be completed before the first wave
landing ships even came in range of the German guns.

The main work was done as far as the planning was concerned, actual
landing time support was down to the weapons in the landing craft, the
rockets and artillery. The ships bombarded a list of targets as per the
plan. That just about all allied attacks, including the rockets, at Omaha
effectively missed the beach defences meant the troops assaulting
probably the hardest beach to move out from were going in against
about the best infantry the allies encountered on D-Day in largely
intact defences. Now add the DD tanks not making it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Hours later some destroyers came "close" to 1 km to the beach. But even
then not all targets were visible.

Give the Germans some credit for defense designs.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They fired in the approximate directions
in hope for hits.

They most definitely did not do that, a warship has around an hours
supply of ammunition, they could not afford to waste it, and the whole
point of closing the beach was to identify targets and it is clear they
did do so.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A German book mentioned a cruiser "Ajax" (I assume British,
the one of Graf Spee fame?) as the most successful in taking out several
German guns. The fire of the Ajax was directed by an airplane!

All the allied major warships were given observer aircraft, usually
Spitfires flying in pairs. Yes it was Ajax from 1939 and it was firing
at targets closer to Gold than Omaha.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The USAAF had a lot of P-47 fighter-bombers at D-Day. They had up to 500 kg
bomb load. In summer 1944 they were about the first to drop napalm bombs.
More important I think was the MG armament. The 8 MG of 12.7 mm size with
a capacity of 3400 rounds had a good chance to take out German pillboxes
and bunkers.

Carrying a full ammunition load meant fewer external stores in
order to remain within weight limits.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It could "melt" small pillboxes and disable guns or destroy
MGs just by a few hits. Not to mention what happens to the German crew if
some rounds enter trough the opening and ricochet inside the bunker.

The short answer here is the idea of melting concrete with heavy
machine gun fire is wrong, also a fighter will normally put the bullets
into an area around the target, it has problems in staying on target
for long enough and still being able to pull out.

The ground forces were the ones who had to identify and destroy
the bunkers.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The issue of visibility is simple. From above you look through some 10s m of
mist and smoke.

I will give you several km of the ground level visibility that day to under
500 metres of cloud.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From the ships you have to look through several km.

Except as you note the bigger ships had observer aircraft and the
destroyers closed the beach.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So
where were the P-47 at D-Day?

As noted above they were very active but mostly on the assumption
the Luftwaffe would make a major effort, or battlefield interdiction
was very important.

P-47: 809 assault area cover sorties, 288 troop carrier escort, 32
dive bomber escort, plus the fighter bomber sorties.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They were over Omaha beach and looked down
General John W. Vogt: Let me talk about the isolation of the Normandy
beachhead. I happened to be involved in that operation. I was a squadron
commander of P-47 "Thunderbolts" at the time of the Normandy operation,
which, as I recall, was June 6, 1944.
We were briefed the night before on the general outline of the opera-
tion. We knew that the transports had already set sail and were on their
way across the channel, that there would be early shore bombardment, and
that we would try to put the troops ashore. We went out in squadron
formations that day in order to get the total coverage that was required
"We don't know what the enemy air reaction is going to be to all of this.
The Germans may be over the beachhead in great numbers, so our number one
job is to insure that we have air superiority over the beach." I was given
the altitude block of 5,000 to 15,000 feet, right over Omaha Beach at
daybreak. We had to take off before daybreak to arrive over the beachhead
on time.
There was one twist: if no air opposition appeared, then we had to be
prepared to do the secondary mission, which was to interdict the area in
which the total operation was taking place and to prevent the movement of
German reinforcements into the area. That meant we had to have the
airplanes loaded with bombs, even while we were doing the first portion of
the mission, which was the air superiority portion. The instructions of
course were, "jettison your ordnance if you get into a battle with Focke-
Wulf 190s."
We orbited over the beach for about two hours, and no German air appeared.
Then we went to the secondary portion of the mission, which was the
interdiction.
(...)
So we spent that morning, the remainder of our mission time, methodically
hitting the bridges over which we believed the Germans would ultimately
have to come.
Smart: Excuse me one minute. Would you give us the time line for this
mission? Was this on the day of the invasion?
Vogt: Yes, it was the morning of June 6. As I say, I arrived over the
beachhead at slightly before daybreak. We just orbited there, watching
the initial bombardment, the heavy cruisers laying the fire support in,
and of course witnessed the movements of the small vessels bringing the
troops ashore. No German air forces appeared. (...)
Partridge, Earle E.: Air interdiction in World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam. USAF, Washington (1986). pp. 23ff
I'm not aware of any other account about the P-47 over Omaha.

I presume we should understand that as not read any 9th Air Force
histories.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Lewis did
not mention it and neither any of the many TV docus about D-Day.

Mainly as the air force was not involved in the major drama, that of
Omaha beach, nor in the actual fighting on other beaches.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Even
Smart above did not trust his ears as he heard it and inquired. Obviously
he immediately understood the implications but did not shared his thoughts.

No obviously we have yet another reading in of the preferred outcome
onto someone else, asking to clarify the date and time is not
"understanding the implications" of the pet theory.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I still can only assume why this blunder in the planning of D-Day happened.

Mainly as no evidence has been sourced.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It seems to me most likely what someone here mentioned some time ago. That
all beach operations were left to the Navy as their sole operation. The
Navy did the best they could but had no fighter-bombers in Europe. The
single point failure was the decision to leave all to the Navy and avoid
a combined operation with the USAAF. It must be an early and high level
decision. Seems its too buried under the mountain of papers and books
about D-Day that even a specialized historian like Lewis is no longer
able to find it.

Ah, the great flaw from way back that no one can find. Even though it
was built in from the start.

It rather goes like this. The air forces did the first bombardment, the
navy the second one, the landing craft the third, after which, according
to the plans the troops would land and clear the beach promptly. With
the navy and its observer aircraft plus the army troops with artillery in
landing craft being tasked to help defeat any beach/coastal defence
positions causing trouble. The air force meantime would keep the
Luftwaffe away and interdict the approaches to the beaches as the
allies were well aware how easy it seemed to be to contain landings,
they did leave some fighter bombers for at call ground support, but
with an expectation of hitting targets behind the front line, not on it.

Air support of troops in combat was available, but nowhere near the
level of expertise later acquired and not expected to be required to
clear the beaches.

Note by the way the person orbiting Omaha for two hours then went
off and found interdiction targets as per orders. You would have
thought if aircraft could easily acquire a really clear idea of the beach
fighting they would have gone and attacked targets there, they had 2
hours to watch and figure things out and as low as 5,000 feet.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Meantime here is the 6 June USAAF heavy bomber target list, by
target category

(snip)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Coastal Installations, Arromanches, Colleville-sur-Orne, Longues,
Merville/Franceville, Molineaux, Mont Fluery, Ouistreham, Tailievilie,
Ver-sur-Mer (357 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to SWORD and GOLD.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Defended Locality, Asnelles-sur-Mer, Colleville-sur-Mer,
Courselles-sur-Mer, Pt. et Raz de la Percee, St. Lauret-sur-Mer,
Vierville-sur-Mer (417 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to OMAHA and JUNO.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Strong Point, Berneires-sur-Mer, La Riviere, Le Hamel, Lyon-sur-Mer,
Meuvaines, Petit Enfer, Port en Bassin, St. Aurin-sur-Mer. (211 sorties
credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to GOLD.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Rich

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
(357 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to SWORD and GOLD.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
(417 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to OMAHA and JUNO.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
(211 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to GOLD.

So... 568 sorties against SWORD and GOLD, and
and half of 417 against JUNO, against half of
417 against OMAHA and none against UTAH.

And that's the USAAF target list. One presumes
that Bomber Command would not attack UTAH and
OMAHA while the USAAF attacked GOLD-JUNO-SWORD.

It would appear that heavy bomber support was
_very_ heavily skewed to GOLD-JUNO-SWORD. Is
that a correct inference?

[Rich]

Post by Rich Rostrom
It would appear that heavy bomber support was
_very_ heavily skewed to GOLD-JUNO-SWORD. Is
that a correct inference?

It looks that way schematically...but it wasn't. Essentially,
each of the four beaches assigned to Eighth Air Force was
targeted for 860-tons of bombs. The way they did it was by
splitting the three bomb divisions in 225 6-aircraft squadrons
and assigning roughly 56 to each beach.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
(357 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to SWORD and GOLD.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
(417 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to OMAHA and JUNO.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
(211 sorties credited with attacking)

Those are all targets linked to GOLD.

So... 568 sorties against SWORD and GOLD, and
and half of 417 against JUNO, against half of
417 against OMAHA and none against UTAH.
And that's the USAAF target list.

No, it is the 8th Air Force list. The 9th Air Force had 3 groups
of A-20 and 8 groups of B-26.

By the way I have probably misspelled some of the French
place names, but the different references can also disagree
on the spelling.

Post by Rich Rostrom
One presumes
that Bomber Command would not attack UTAH and
OMAHA while the USAAF attacked GOLD-JUNO-SWORD.

Bomber Command was attacking far too early to be considered
useful as defence suppression. Instead it went after the bigger
coastal batteries. Interestingly most raids used Oboe, though
different references give different accounts of aiming methods.
Most of the Mosquitoes listed below are pathfinders

Grisbecq, 92 out of 96 Lancasters, 2 of 5 Mosquitoes, 10/10
thin cloud. Bombing on Target Indicator reflections through
the cloud. West of Utah beach.

Houlgate, 102 out of 106 Halifaxes, 5 of 5 Lancasters, 4 of 5
Mosquitoes, marking appears to have been rather scattered.
East of Sword beach

La Pernelle,108 out of 122 Lancasters, 8 of 9 Mosquitoes,
bombed through 6-10/10 cloud, first markers scattered,
remarking was successful. (Well) North and West of Utah beach.

Longues, 91 of 94 Lancasters, 4 of 5 Mosquitoes, 9/10 cloud
prevailed, markers somewhat scattered, bombing lacked a
good concentration. Between Omaha and Gold beaches.
By the way Wiki says the RAF dropped around 1,500 tons of
bombs on it, the RAF says 535.7 long tons.

Maisy, 100 out of 105 Halifaxes, 5 of 5 Lancasters, 5 of 5
Mosquitoes. Good weather, 8-10/10 cloud at 17-20,000 feet,
2-3/10 cloud at 5-6,000 feet. About half way between Omaha
and Utah beaches.

Merville/Franceville, 70 out of 86 Halifaxes, 15 of 18 Lancasters,
3 of 5 Mosquitoes. 10/10 cloud, markers disappeared into the
cloud and crews bombed on the glow beneath. Assessment
of the results impossible. East of Sword beach.

Mont Fleury, 99 out of 114 Halifaxes, 5 of 5 Lancasters, 5 of 5
Mosquitoes, through 10/10 cloud at 9,000 feet. Bombed on
glow of target indicators. Gold Beach.

Ouistreham, 105 out of 106 Lancasters, 8 of 10 Mosquitoes, thin
patchy cloud allowed some visual identification. Sword beach.

Pointe du Hoe/St. Pierre du Mont, 105 of 115 Lancasters, 7 of 9
Mosquitoes, attacked through 5-10/10 cloud. Just west of Omaha.

St. Martin-de-Varreville, 94 out of 95 Lancasters, 5 of 5 Mosquitoes
through 10/10 cloud. Bombing on Target Indicator reflections through
the cloud. Utah beach.

8,662 by 1,000 pound and 5,987 by 500 pound bombs, or 5,198.4
long tons. Plus 12 by 1,000 pound and 214 by 500 pound target
indicators.

Then add the various diversion and support sorties.

Post by Rich Rostrom
It would appear that heavy bomber support was
_very_ heavily skewed to GOLD-JUNO-SWORD. Is
that a correct inference?

Yes, the 9th Air Force did the bombing support for Utah.

9th Air Force,

18 bombers each to attack 3 coastal batteries, 1 near Bennerville
(well) west of Sword beach, 2 at Ouistreham, Sword beach, then
Pont Du Hoe, Maisy and finally near Barfleur which is very well
north and west of Utah.

Then comes attacks against 7 defended areas in the Utah beach
area, 3 by 36 and 4 by 54 aircraft. Locations mentioned are
Dunes de Varreville, St. Martin de Varreville, La Madeleine and
Beau Gillot. At least 2 of these are right on Utah beach.

In addition a squadron of fighter bombers would attack Maisy
battery (actually Maisy II, the other bombers attacked Maisy I)
and another squadron the nearby battery at Gefosse.

Other fighter bomber designated targets were 6 bridges at
Beuzeville (road), Etienneville (road), Courpeville (rail), St.
Sauveur de Pierre Pont (rail), St. Sauveur le Vicomte (road)
and Nehou (road) and a rail embankment at La Sangeuriere.
These are in the general area southwest of St. Mere Eglise
and in proximity to St. Sauveur le Vicomte.

Note Barfleur, casemates under construction for four 170mm guns,
already attacked 4 times in May.

Maisy I, four emplacements for 155mm howitzers, open circular
pits 35 feet in diameter with concrete platform. Attacked in May
using blind bombing, no damage. Casemates under construction.

Ponte du Hoe, emplacements with six 155 mm guns, casemates
under construction, 3 attacks in April, May and June reported to
have damaged four of the positions.

Benerville, six gun 155mm battery with 4 casemates under
construction, 4 previous attacks caused only minor damage.

Ouistrehem I, six gun 155mm battery with 4 casemates under
construction, 2 previous attacks severely damaged 2 casemates.

Ouistrehem II, six gun 155mm battery with 4 casemates under
construction, no damage from prior attack.

Les Dunes de Varreville, infantry position on coast, 2 pillboxes, 5
shelters, possibly 1 anti tank gun. Anti tank ditch and wire on
landward side.

Madeleine, infantry position on coast, 2 pillboxes, 3 shelters, possibly
2 150mm guns. Wire on landward side.

St. Martin de Varreville, infantry position on coast, 4 pillboxes, 1
shelter, 3 anti tank guns and 1 light (75mm?) gun. Wire on landward
side.

St. Martin de Varreville the second, infantry position on coast, 3
pillboxes, 6 shelters. Wire on landward side.

La Madeleine, small infantry position slightly inland, surrounded by wire.

Beau Guillot, small infantry position inland from coast. Probable
platoon HQ.

Beau Guillot the second, infantry position on coast in front of dyke,
2 pillboxes.

Fighter bombers,

Gefosse-Fontenay, new four gun battery emplaced in a row of trees
lining a road, as of 24 may no minor defences or wire had been
installed, believed to be a field battery.

Maisy IIa probable 75mm field guns in rough open earthen
emplacements 20 to 25 feet in diameter sited in open field.

During the day the fighter bombers flew 11 missions in response
to 8 Army requests. Another 5 requests were refused, 1 due to
no aircraft, 1 due to waiting results on current mission and 3 due
to weather and lateness of the hour.

On 6 June 2nd TAF sent 292 fighter bomber sorties (77.9 long
tons of bombs dropped) but its bomber force (2 Group) was held
for night operations except for 31 sorties to lay smoke on D-Day.
2 Group had dropped 109 long tons of bombs on the 5th/6th and
would drop 196.9 long tons on the 6th/7th. At least some of the
bombers had been fitted with GH.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich Rostrom]

One presumes that Bomber Command would not attack
UTAH and OMAHA while the USAAF attacked GOLD-JUNO-SWORD.

But one would presume wrong!

Mr. Sinclair's very detailed list includes

Grisbecq, 92 out of 96 Lancasters... West of Utah beach.
La Pernelle, 108 out of 122 Lancasters... (Well) North
and West of Utah beach.
Maisy, 100 out of 105 Halifaxes, 5 of 5 Lancasters...
About half way between Omaha and Utah beaches.
Pointe du Hoe/St. Pierre du Mont, 105 of 115
Lancasters... Just west of Omaha.

This is a _lot_ of Bomber Command support for American
sectors. I'd never heard that Bomber Command was in
any way involved in the Pointe du Hoe attack.

Waddaya know?

[Rich]

Post by Rich Rostrom
This is a _lot_ of Bomber Command support for American
sectors. I'd never heard that Bomber Command was in
any way involved in the Pointe du Hoe attack.

Well, you might notice they are also all artillery positions,
most of them well inland, and all the strikes were well before
H-Hour.

[Bob Martin]

Post by Rich Rostrom

One presumes that Bomber Command would not attack
UTAH and OMAHA while the USAAF attacked GOLD-JUNO-SWORD.

But one would presume wrong!
Mr. Sinclair's very detailed list includes

Grisbecq, 92 out of 96 Lancasters... West of Utah beach.
La Pernelle, 108 out of 122 Lancasters... (Well) North
and West of Utah beach.
Maisy, 100 out of 105 Halifaxes, 5 of 5 Lancasters...
About half way between Omaha and Utah beaches.
Pointe du Hoe/St. Pierre du Mont, 105 of 115
Lancasters... Just west of Omaha.

This is a _lot_ of Bomber Command support for American
sectors. I'd never heard that Bomber Command was in
any way involved in the Pointe du Hoe attack.

It's "Pointe du Hoc".

[Rich]

Post by Bob Martin
It's "Pointe du Hoc".

Yep, except in all contemporary American and Commonwealth
documentation it is transcribed as "Hoe" and is always
referred to that way by veterans. Like most of the other
odd spellings of French place names it was due to a
misreading of a poorly reproduced French map. It is one
of those things that once begun is impossible to stop. :)

Cheers!

[Rich]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Meantime here is the 6 June USAAF heavy bomber target list, by
target category

(snip)

Well, I managed to screw that up. I just realized the list was
organized by target type. The actual breakdown by beach was:

OMAHA Targets (2nd Bomb Division)
St Laurent sur Mer
Colleville sur Mer
Pt et Raz de la Percee
Vierville sur Mer
309 sorties

GOLD Targets (1st Bomb Division)
Pont en Bessin
Asnelles sur Mer
La Riviere
Le Hamel
Mont Fleury
Ver sur Mer
Longues sur Mer
211 sorties

JUNO (1st Bomb Division)
Bernieries sur Mer
Courseulles sur Mer
St Aubin sur Mer
213 sorties

SWORD (1st Bomb Division)
Colleville sur Orne
Lion sur Mer
Ouistreham
Petit Enfer
109 sorties

That only totals to 842 sorties, whereas the Eighth Air Force 1,015
of the 1,198 dispatched against "beach installations" were
effective. And, of course, the Eighth Air Force accounts are all
contradictory. Then, it is impossible to tell where some of these
targets really were. "Tailieville" was probably Tailleville,
Douvres-la-Délivrand - the German radar station. It is considerably
inland so calling it a coastal installation is odd. I also have
no idea where "Molineaux" might be. The first could add 13 sorties
to JUNO and the second 12 to ?, leaving it still well short of 842.

2d Bomb Division utilized four Combat Wings (20th, 2d, 14th, and
46th) in its mission. 1st Bomb Division also used four (40th, 41st,
94th, and 1st). 3rd Bomb Wing used five (45th, 4th, 92d, 93d, and
13th).

Meanwhile, 3rd Bomb Division attacked Caen and other choke points
without much success.

[JL McClellan]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was often here the issue about the lack of any
fighter-bombers during early D-Day at Omaha Beach. After the
Private Rayen movie it is an obvious question. The suggested
answers range from suspected low visibility to institutional
barriers (Navy vs USAAF) were mainly speculations.

[snip]

The following is excerpted from an article published in Impact,
an AAF publication that was classified during the war, and
republished in the January, 1946, issue of Flying.
http://www.legendsintheirowntime.com/Content/1946/Fl_4601_TAC.html
These paragraphs are the ones pertinent to tactical air on D-
Day.

D-Day Air Plan

On April 15, 1944, the plan for the invasion which set forth the
part all Britain-based aircraft would play was formally issued by
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces. It called for
maximum effort by the RAF Bomber and Fighter Commands, the RAF
Coastal Command, the Air Defense of Great Britain, two American
and one British airborne divisions, the 8th Bomber and Fighter
Commands, the 9th Bomber Command and the 9th and 19th Tactical
Air Commands. Its size and complexity made it a sobering
document. Consider, for example, the responsibilities of a single
one of these organizations, the 9th TAC:

During preparatory phase (D minus 30 to D minus 1):

Be employed in training and preparation for the invasion
role.
Provide fighter escort for bomber attacks of US Strategic Air
Forces and 9th Bomber Command.
Provide fighter bombers for offensive operations as directed
by 9th Air Force.
Provide tactical reconnaissance supplemented by photo
reconnaissance, as directed by the 9th Air Force.
Provide necessary units and personnel to implement fighter
control of fighter units of the command.
Establish liaison with the First US Army and execute the
necessary details incidental to future joint operations.
Coordinate with the commanding general, 19th TAC, in training
and preparation of those units of his command which will be
attached to 9th TAC in future operations.
During assault, build-up, and subsequent phases:
Provide a force of Thunderbolt aircraft as high cover over
the assault beach area.
Provide a force of Lightning aircraft in convoy cover, and
coordinate the participation of a force of Lightning aircraft of
the 8th Fighter Command in the convoy cover.
Provide a force of Lightning aircraft and a force of
Thunderbolt aircraft for direct air support of the ground forces.
Coordinate the employment of certain groups of Thunderbolt
aircraft and certain groups of Mustang aircraft of the 8th
Fighter Command in the provision of bomber escort for the 9th
Bomber Command.
Maintain certain groups of Thunderbolt aircraft and Mustang
aircraft in reserve for use as directed by the Commanding
General, 9th Air Force. It is probable that the major part of
these groups will be used as fighter bombers for attacking coast
defense batteries and other strong points in the enemy's defense
system.
Be prepared to operate all fighter and fighter bomber groups
on a scale of four group sorties a day.
Be prepared to furnish escort for troop carrier operations on
D-Day and D plus 1.
Provide a force of tactical reconnaissance aircraft to
execute tactical reconnaissance missions in direct support of the
ground forces, on a scale of three group sorties a day.
Be responsible for night tighter control through the 85th
Group until relieved by the 9th Air Defense Command.
Be responsible for aircraft warning and day fighter control
activities in the American sector.
As soon as R & R (refueling and re-arming) strips are
available, coordinate their use by fighter groups of the command
for the execution of such missions as may be ordered by the
commanding general, 9th Air Force.
As advance landing grounds and airfields become available,
occupy them with fighter groups and execute fighter and fighter
bomber missions in support of the First US Army, and such other
missions as may be ordered by the commanding General, 9th Air
Force.
Provide the necessary headquarters personnel and operational
agencies to conduct operational control and command of all 9th
Air Force units located on the far shore, until such time as the
commanding general, 9th Air Force, establishes his operating
headquarters on the far shore and announces his assumption of
command.

Phew!

The responsibilities of the other Air Commands were equally
comprehensive.

There was now a month and a half left, D-Day having been set for
June 5 (it was later postponed 24 hours because of bad weather),
and the landing area identified as a strip of beach on the
Normandy coast between Cherbourg and Le Havre. This had been
chosen after long examinations of the coastline and of the
defenses erected thereon by the Germans; Also, its location with
relation to the Seine and Loire rivers suggested that it could be
isolated by cutting the bridges across them. Furthermore,
enlargement of the beachhead there would result in possible early
capture of the ports of Le Havre and Cherbourg. The perfect place
for the assault would have been Calais, where the Channel is
narrowest, where the beaches are the best for such a landing, and
where excellent ports are near at hand. However, Calais beaches
were much more strongly defended than Normandy and were on the
wrong side of the Seine for successful implementation of the
interdiction plan contemplated.

It was now necessary to obtain a more detailed knowledge of the
beaches selected. Vertical photography had shown intricate
barricades in the shallow water and on the sand, but could not
show how strong these were, whether made of wood or concrete,
whether anchored deep in the sand, whether they could be overrun
by landing craft, or avoided by infantrymen storming the beach.
The extreme hazard of taking low-level pictures of a strip so
formidably defended made the invasion commanders hesitate to
order any "dicing" runs until General Quesada, commanding the 9th
TAC, offered to talk to members of his photo reconnaissance
group, the 10th. He went down that night ready to suggest
practice missions and diversionary attacks, but was met with such
a blast of "He1l no. We're ready now. Just tell us what you want
and we'll get it," that he went away and left the details to the
group.

The first "dicing" mission was flown on May 6 in an F-5, a light,
unarmed version of the Lightning, with a camera so mounted in the
nose that it took a picture every five seconds, ahead and to the
side of the plane. Earlier, Lightning pilots had been told that
they might have to take photographs from as low as 29,000 feet.
But that morning, 2nd Lieut Albert Lanker crossed the Channel at
15 feet. He reached the other side at Bercq-sur-Mer, turning
around a large sand dune to lessen his chances of being hit
during the turn. His pictures later showed this dune to be an
enemy gun position.

Then the superbuzz started. He encountered five groups of men at
work on the beach defenses, "heading straight for each group just
to watch them scatter and roll. They were completely surprised --
didn't see me until I was almost on top of them." He was fired on
repeatedly at point blank range by riflemen, but was not hit. He
scaled a cliff at the end of his run, clearing the top by six
feet, and got home safely. Later promoted to 1st lieutenant, he
has been missing in action since December 26, [1944 --JLM] during
an attempt to drop photographs from minimum altitude to the
beleaguered American troops at Bastogne.

All together 11 dicing missions were flown and superb photographs
obtained from Calais to Cap de la Hague. The inherent danger of
this work is indicated by the fact that the pilot on the second
mission, Lieut Fred Hayes, was never heard from again. On the
third, Lieut Allen R Keith collided with a seagull, which stuck
in the glass in front of his bulletproof windshield, causing
"limited visibility." But the assault forces got what they
wanted. Mines with trip wires were detected attached to the tops
of posts, gun positions were revealed in the sides of cliffs,
weak spots in the defenses located. Thousands of copies of these
pictures were distributed throughout the invasion army. The 10th
Group received a Presidential citation.
Isolating the Battlefield

Also on May 6, the focus of bomber attacks on rails was
considerably narrowed. From the 15th on, airfield attacks were
confined to those within a 130-mile radius of Caen, to compel
German fighters to operate from bases at least as far distant
from the beachhead as those of the Allies. During the last few
days innumerable last-minute preparations were made and in an
atmosphere of mounting tension the plans for interdicting the
landing area were activated.

The geography of northwest France lends itself to such a plan.
Two rivers, the Seine and Loire, completely cut off Normandy and
Brittany, with the exception of a small gap near Paris, from the
rest of the country. If the rail bridges across these rivers
could be knocked down the enemy would have to spend an enormous
amount of time unloading freight and troops, taking them across
the rivers by boat or pontoon bridge, and then reloading them on
trains waiting on the other side, Not only would this slow up
movement but it would tie up a much greater number of locomotives
and cars. Further, the rolling stock within the area of
interdiction (which could not be replaced with fresh stock as
long as the bridges were down) could gradually be reduced by
bomber and fighter attack until there was so little of it left in
the area that the rail system would have to be abandoned and road
transport resorted to. This was not desirable from a German point
of view for two reasons. First, road transport is much less
efficient than rail transport. Second, the strategic bombing
campaign had begun to create shortages in trucks and tires, and
above all in gasoline, a shortage which was soon to interrupt
German dreams of victory with nightmares of the most fiendish
nature.

Accordingly, a bridge campaign was laid on. By D-Day all the rail
bridges on the Seine from Paris to the sea were down and, more
important, kept down by a variety of attackers from fighters to
heavy bombers. One bridge at Rouen was smashed and rebuilt seven
times without ever staying up long enough to be of use to the
enemy. The Vernon bridge was knocked out by four skip-bombing
Thunderbolts, the first time such a thing had been accomplished
in the theater. The other ships in the squadron which did the job
scored direct hits on a munitions factory and came staggering
home with their wings full of rocks from the tremendous
explosions which resulted. Their triumph was completely
overlooked in the excitement over the Vernon bridge. An analysis
of results of the bridge attacks bears out the contention of the
8th Air Force that high-altitude operations by it against such
narrow targets would not be rewarding in proportion to the effort
expended. It showed that skip-bombing by fighters on the deck was
the most effective (although most dangerous), followed by dive
bombing and last by precision bombing from high altitudes.
Nevertheless, the necessity of completing this job influenced
SHAEF in putting all available forces on it and on a few 11th-
hour rail yard attacks.
The Invasion

For D-Day itself an air plan of great complexity and scope was
developed. The RAF Coastal Command would patrol the Channel for
submarines. A constant fighter cover to protect the convoy from
the air would be flown, directed from a control ship in the
Channel. During the night two American airborne divisions would
drop near the base of the Cherbourg peninsula and a British
parachute division on the Orne river near Caen. Also during the
night the RAF Bomber Command would saturate with its entire
strength five selected rail yards in the immediate invasion area.
At dawn, 1,200 8th Air Force heavies would begin to plaster the
beach defenses themselves.

This latter operation was a delicate one. It was realized that
direct hits on defense installations with more than five per cent
of the bomb load were unlikely and that confusion and panic among
the defenders would be the real dividend from the operation, For
this reason, it would be necessary for the invasion fleet to hit
the beach immediately after the bombing while confusion was still
at its height. It was planned to wait 1,000 yards offshore during
the attack and drive to the beach five minutes after the last
plane had dropped its bombs, if the weather were good, 10 minutes
if it were bad. In the latter event, the heavies would use radar
bombing methods, approaching the coast at right angles and
depending on the clear demarkation line between land and water
which would show up on their radar scopes to enable them to drop
sufficiently near the water to be effective, and at the same time
avoid hitting ships on the water.

Finally, the great day came, and the electric phrase "this is it"
was heard in hundreds of briefing rooms. The invasion armada
steamed out of the British ports, the parachutists and glider
troops droned off into the night, and the RAF went to work,
dropping over 5,000 tons on five rail yards, at that time the
greatest single lift in air warfare. By first light the American
heavies had commenced their job, and at H-Hour the first assault
troops crashed through barbed wire and mine fields onto French
soil. As expected, the defenders in most places were dazed by the
bombing.

But bitter fighting ensued along the entire coast, particularly
in one zone of American responsibility where a complete German
division had by pure chance moved in the day before for beach
maneuvers. But the landing stuck. In two days it was clear that
no immediate counterattack by enemy troops already in the area
could be expected to push us back into the sea. Air had played
its part. The GAF, as noted earlier, made only a puny effort,
considering the cosmic nature of our attack. German submarines
failed utterly to penetrate the shipping lane protected so
carefully by naval forces and by the RAF Coastal Command. Careful
study of the enemy reaction immediately preceding and during the
invasion makes it plain that complete surprise had been achieved
by our forces, due in large part to a magnificently executed
campaign on the part of the RAF to liquidate all enemy radar
installations along the coast. It also appears that our aerial
blows around Calais and down in the Nantes area were not wasted.
For weeks the Germans believed that the Normandy effort was a
feint and the real thrust would come to the east where we had for
a long time been planting bombs like nasturtium seeds.

Air followed ground right into the beachhead. By D plus 2, an
emergency fighter strip had been cleared by aviation engineers
who had one company defending the strip while the rest of the
battalion worked on it. Others soon followed, and the 9th TAC,
whose mission was to cooperate with the First American Army,
moved in while the fields were still under fire. One of them
endured heavy mortar fire for three weeks and also showers of
fragments from our own flak, which went up like a curtain
whenever an enemy plane appeared. As units reached the continent
they came under the command of Gen E R Quesada, commanding the
9th TAC. Those remaining in England were operated by Gen O P
Weyland, commanding the 19th TAC.

During the early days of the beachhead all went well. The British
held the line along the Orne river, while the Americans fanned
west and reduced the Cherbourg peninsula. But as our ground
forces worked their way inland they ran into a type of terrain
which put them further and further behind schedule. That section
of Normandy, known as the Bocage country, is characterized by
small fields edged with deep drainage ditches and stout,
impenetrable hedges. The narrow winding roads are also hedge-
lined. Each hedge became a fortress, each field a dangerous open
space across which withering enemy fire spattered in such a way
as to discourage frontal assaults. The Germans had succeeded,
despite our rail attacks, in bringing up a ring of troops which
contained our forces in the hedgerows for weeks. These were well
dug in, their camouflage discipline excellent, offering few
targets for fighter bombers. They moved only at night. The
greatest success our air forces can claim for this period is in
driving back the GAF from western France.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by JL McClellan
The following is excerpted from an article published in Impact,
an AAF publication that was classified during the war, and
republished in the January, 1946, issue of Flying.
http://www.legendsintheirowntime.com/Content/1946/Fl_4601_TAC.html
These paragraphs are the ones pertinent to tactical air on D-
Day.
D-Day Air Plan

Very interesting, thanks!

Post by JL McClellan
At dawn, 1,200 8th Air Force heavies would begin to plaster the
beach defenses themselves.
This latter operation was a delicate one. It was realized that
direct hits on defense installations with more than five per cent
of the bomb load were unlikely and that confusion and panic among
the defenders would be the real dividend from the operation, For
this reason, it would be necessary for the invasion fleet to hit
the beach immediately after the bombing while confusion was still
at its height. It was planned to wait 1,000 yards offshore during
the attack and drive to the beach five minutes after the last
plane had dropped its bombs, if the weather were good, 10 minutes
if it were bad. In the latter event, the heavies would use radar
bombing methods, approaching the coast at right angles and
depending on the clear demarkation line between land and water
which would show up on their radar scopes to enable them to drop
sufficiently near the water to be effective, and at the same time
avoid hitting ships on the water.

The above seems the heavies plan for Omaha. But look what Rich wrote about
it:

(First me about the failure of the heavies plan)

Post by JL McClellan

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I often heard that and I think its a myth. I assume there was never the
intention to bomb the beaches and create the field of craters promised
to the troops. Such a field would have serious hampered the later
disembarkment of the heavy equipment. I wonder why nobody ever mentioned
this problem.

Why, given the D-Day air plan is available in any number of original
sources, as are the actual operations and results, would you ever
think its a "myth"?
What is a "myth" is the idea the air plan ever included a "promise"
of craters. That was a misreading by some of the ground forces
embarked prior to the assault.

First, what I thought to be a myth is the claim that the airmen of the
heavy bombers at Omaha delayed the drop by several seconds to protect
the landing force. Any airmen would well have known that it would totaly
failed the mission. It would not hit the beach at all. So this explanation
seems untrue, a myth.

I understood the reply by Rich in a way that there never was the intention
to crater Omaha beach. That seems reasonable. But what you got from the
"D-Day Air Plan" tells the opposite. Maybe Rich can explain?




## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by JL McClellan
The following is excerpted from an article published in Impact,
an AAF publication that was classified during the war, and
republished in the January, 1946, issue of Flying.
http://www.legendsintheirowntime.com/Content/1946/Fl_4601_TAC.html
These paragraphs are the ones pertinent to tactical air on D-
Day.
D-Day Air Plan

Very interesting, thanks!

Post by JL McClellan
At dawn, 1,200 8th Air Force heavies would begin to plaster the
beach defenses themselves.
This latter operation was a delicate one. It was realized that
direct hits on defense installations with more than five per cent
of the bomb load were unlikely and that confusion and panic among
the defenders would be the real dividend from the operation, For
this reason, it would be necessary for the invasion fleet to hit
the beach immediately after the bombing while confusion was still
at its height. It was planned to wait 1,000 yards offshore during
the attack and drive to the beach five minutes after the last
plane had dropped its bombs, if the weather were good, 10 minutes
if it were bad. In the latter event, the heavies would use radar
bombing methods, approaching the coast at right angles and
depending on the clear demarkation line between land and water
which would show up on their radar scopes to enable them to drop
sufficiently near the water to be effective, and at the same time
avoid hitting ships on the water.

The above seems the heavies plan for Omaha.

Yes it is, plus the other beaches.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(First me about the failure of the heavies plan)

Post by JL McClellan

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I often heard that and I think its a myth. I assume there was never the
intention to bomb the beaches and create the field of craters promised
to the troops. Such a field would have serious hampered the later
disembarkment of the heavy equipment. I wonder why nobody ever mentioned
this problem.

Why, given the D-Day air plan is available in any number of original
sources, as are the actual operations and results, would you ever
think its a "myth"?
What is a "myth" is the idea the air plan ever included a "promise"
of craters. That was a misreading by some of the ground forces
embarked prior to the assault.

First, what I thought to be a myth is the claim that the airmen of the
heavy bombers at Omaha delayed the drop by several seconds to protect
the landing force. Any airmen would well have known that it would totaly
failed the mission.

They were attacking their targets, missing them would be a mission
failure.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It would not hit the beach at all. So this explanation
seems untrue, a myth.

The accuracy of the radar bombers was well known. If the bomb sighting
was non visual the bombings were to be finished 10 minutes before
H-hour, if the visual bombing it would be 5 minutes, as noted above.

Then came the decision to add a further delay in order to keep the Mean
Point of (Bomb) Impact no less than 1,000 yards from the forward wave
of the landing craft. So the following bomb release delay schedule was
created,

Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

Remember the bomber formations had width and depth.

Then comes the problem of finding the actual bomb release times
of the Mission 394 2nd Bombardment Division B-24s assigned to
Omaha Beach defences, times that would vary at least by group
and probably by squadron given the formations being flown. Times
that appear to be in the mission reports and absent from the published
histories.

As for the web, it is on auto repeat, Mission 394, At first light...

The 448th Bomb Group sent four elements of 6 B-24, taking off at 6
minute intervals, they were to bomb line abreast and were meant to
hit the beach defences at Cerisy at 06.28 or 2 minutes before H hour.

There would be no second bomb runs. Radar operators were warned
to expect returns from lots of surface vessels near the shoreline.

Note the attack time versus the planned bombing stop time. As of
06.28 the landing craft would be 400 yards to 1 mile offshore.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I understood the reply by Rich in a way that there never was the intention
to crater Omaha beach. That seems reasonable. But what you got from the
"D-Day Air Plan" tells the opposite. Maybe Rich can explain?

The bombs were light and fused for instant detonation to minimise
cratering. At the same time it was understood attacking the beach
defences would create bomb craters.

They were trying to bomb the beach area, they were trying to do
so while creating the minimum number of craters.

You do understand the rockets, the naval shells and the landing
craft mounted support artillery (most of which was lost) would
create craters where their rounds landed?

Once more, the allies mounted air, naval and army artillery attacks on
the beach defences, they accepted this would create things like craters
but tried to keep the number and size of them down. They decided
the bombers risking missing the beach defences was an acceptable
trade off to reduce the risk of bombing the landing craft approaching
the beach.

Essentially at Omaha the bombers missed, the rockets missed, the
naval bombardment was mainly against known artillery batteries and
the support artillery and tanks were largely lost. All against the beach
with the most restricted exits, the best defending infantry and probably
the best fixed defences.

The destroyers ended up filling the gaps.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[William Clodius]

<snip>
Note the attack time versus the planned bombing stop time. As of
06.28 the landing craft would be 400 yards to 1 mile offshore.
<sni5>

Actually by 6:29 US snits were on the beach. By 6:28 the DD tanks were
expected to be on the beach. They were late but one landed at 6:29.
Unexpected was "On the left of Easy Red, one team led the entire
invasion by at least five minutes. The commander of Team 14, 2d Lt.
Phill C. Wood, Jr., was under the impression that H-hour was 0620
instead of 0630. Under his entreaties, the Navy coxswain brought the LCM
in at 0625."[1]

[1] Alfred M. Beck, Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, Lida Mayo, and Ralph F.
Weld, "The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany", Chapter XV,
"The landings on UTAH an OMAHA", U.S. Army in World War II
CMH Pub 10-2.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The accuracy of the radar bombers was well known. If the bomb sighting
was non visual the bombings were to be finished 10 minutes before
H-hour, if the visual bombing it would be 5 minutes, as noted above.
Then came the decision to add a further delay in order to keep the Mean
Point of (Bomb) Impact no less than 1,000 yards from the forward wave
of the landing craft. So the following bomb release delay schedule was
created,
Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

I assume this is the bombardment plan for Omaha Beach. Target is water line -
at zero time 0630 near low tide. From low tide line to the pillboxes were
around 500 m beach. The 50 % hit circle by H2X radar to a water line was,
hm, ?, guess 400 m? Was it mentioned in your source?

A bomber here may had a speed of 60 m/s (depends on altitude, load, weather
and safety, just my best guess). A 10 sec delay means a shift of the drop
circle center by 600 m. The 15 sec be 900 m and 30 sec 1800 m. What we
have seems a 5 wave bomardment plan that moves over the beach like a
moving artillery barrage of WWI. Thats a very interesting plan I never
heard before.

If that was the plan, its obvious why no fighter bombers were send to
the beach before Zero hour. The bomb blasts and dirt clouds could be too
much a danger.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Remember the bomber formations had width and depth.
Then comes the problem of finding the actual bomb release times
of the Mission 394 2nd Bombardment Division B-24s assigned to
Omaha Beach defences, times that would vary at least by group
and probably by squadron given the formations being flown. Times
that appear to be in the mission reports and absent from the published
histories.
As for the web, it is on auto repeat, Mission 394, At first light...
The 448th Bomb Group sent four elements of 6 B-24, taking off at 6
minute intervals, they were to bomb line abreast and were meant to
hit the beach defences at Cerisy at 06.28 or 2 minutes before H hour.
There would be no second bomb runs. Radar operators were warned
to expect returns from lots of surface vessels near the shoreline.
Note the attack time versus the planned bombing stop time. As of
06.28 the landing craft would be 400 yards to 1 mile offshore.

Above you reported the strike of the 5th and last wave. According
the plan it had to hit 30 seconds (c. 1800 m) inland, well off the
beach. But what about the other 4 waves before? Why came no bomber to
hit the beach? Did they miss their time slot? Coordination error? What
went wrong?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I understood the reply by Rich in a way that there never was the intention
to crater Omaha beach. That seems reasonable. But what you got from the
"D-Day Air Plan" tells the opposite. Maybe Rich can explain?

The bombs were light and fused for instant detonation to minimise
cratering. At the same time it was understood attacking the beach
defences would create bomb craters.

Even instant fuse may allow a sufficient deep crater to give infantry
some temporary cover. A way to close up to still active pillboxes. So
the initial question "why no fighter bombers?" gets more to "why failed
the heavies?". Had the above 5 wave plan succeeded the need for CAS on
the beach would be somewhat limited indeed.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The accuracy of the radar bombers was well known. If the bomb sighting
was non visual the bombings were to be finished 10 minutes before
H-hour, if the visual bombing it would be 5 minutes, as noted above.
Then came the decision to add a further delay in order to keep the Mean
Point of (Bomb) Impact no less than 1,000 yards from the forward wave
of the landing craft. So the following bomb release delay schedule was
created,
Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

I assume this is the bombardment plan for Omaha Beach.

For all the beaches.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Target is water line -
at zero time 0630 near low tide.

Did you actually bother to read the various target lists? They were
the coastal defences, not the beach.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From low tide line to the pillboxes were
around 500 m beach. The 50 % hit circle by H2X radar to a water line was,
hm, ?, guess 400 m? Was it mentioned in your source?

H2X accuracy was not fixed, it tended to depend on the amount of
cloud and how distinguishable the target return was. Hence the
bomb delays ordered.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A bomber here may had a speed of 60 m/s (depends on altitude, load, weather
and safety, just my best guess).

The 8th AF heavies tended to be going at about 50% more than
that speed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 10 sec delay means a shift of the drop
circle center by 600 m. The 15 sec be 900 m and 30 sec 1800 m. What we
have seems a 5 wave bomardment plan that moves over the beach like a
moving artillery barrage of WWI.
Thats a very interesting plan I never heard before.

Congratulations on yet another invention.

It shows just how complete the misunderstanding is.

I presume you do remember the strong winds? Things that tend to alter
aircraft ground speeds?

The bombers tried hard to hit the targets at the appointed times but the
sheer number of aircraft present meant they had little option to adjust
things if they were early or late. Remember how far apart the aircraft
needed to be to avoid each others' turbulence. A formation of heavy
bombers took a lot of airspace given their slipstreams.

There were no 5 waves, there were a series of time delays built in
to allow for aircraft arriving late. Repeat, there were no 5 waves.

Do you remember how long the different beaches were? How far
does 1,000 bomber loads go over miles of beaches? The bombers
tried to hit the coastal defences, each unit had a specific target.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
If that was the plan, its obvious why no fighter bombers were send to
the beach before Zero hour. The bomb blasts and dirt clouds could be too
much a danger.

It is good to see despite all the information provided no change
has been made to the wrong conclusions. The various allied bomb
carrying aircraft were assigned targets according to perceived
capabilities and need. In addition some fighter bomber squadrons
were tasked with lingering in case someone called for a specific
mission otherwise attacking a prearranged target or one of opportunity.

By the way, how about the naval guns and the landing craft based
artillery dropping shells into the area versus low flying aircraft?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Remember the bomber formations had width and depth.
Then comes the problem of finding the actual bomb release times
of the Mission 394 2nd Bombardment Division B-24s assigned to
Omaha Beach defences, times that would vary at least by group
and probably by squadron given the formations being flown. Times
that appear to be in the mission reports and absent from the published
histories.
As for the web, it is on auto repeat, Mission 394, At first light...
The 448th Bomb Group sent four elements of 6 B-24, taking off at 6
minute intervals, they were to bomb line abreast and were meant to
hit the beach defences at Cerisy at 06.28 or 2 minutes before H hour.
There would be no second bomb runs. Radar operators were warned
to expect returns from lots of surface vessels near the shoreline.
Note the attack time versus the planned bombing stop time. As of
06.28 the landing craft would be 400 yards to 1 mile offshore.

Above you reported the strike of the 5th and last wave.

No, I reported the time delays in bombing depending on how close to
H hour the bombing occurred.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
According
the plan it had to hit 30 seconds (c. 1800 m) inland, well off the
beach.

Assuming the bombers were actually right on target then added
that delay given the time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But what about the other 4 waves before?

No 4 previous waves.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Why came no bomber to
hit the beach?

Because there was only the one wave in effect when you only have
a thousand bombers for miles of beaches.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Did they miss their time slot? Coordination error?

They missed the coastal defences they were targeting.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
What
went wrong?

What went wrong is someone blatantly failing to understand the
information being provided.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I understood the reply by Rich in a way that there never was the intention
to crater Omaha beach. That seems reasonable. But what you got from the
"D-Day Air Plan" tells the opposite. Maybe Rich can explain?

The bombs were light and fused for instant detonation to minimise
cratering. At the same time it was understood attacking the beach
defences would create bomb craters.

Even instant fuse may allow a sufficient deep crater to give infantry
some temporary cover.

Good, now note yet again the army did not want a lot of craters in
an area they expected to push through in a few hours, given the
craters would hamper the deployment of the vehicles being landed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A way to close up to still active pillboxes. So
the initial question "why no fighter bombers?" gets more to "why failed
the heavies?".

The weather and bomb times.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Had the above 5 wave plan succeeded the need for CAS on
the beach would be somewhat limited indeed.

Had someone been comprehending the material the need for this
continual correction would be somewhat limited indeed.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The accuracy of the radar bombers was well known. If the bomb sighting
was non visual the bombings were to be finished 10 minutes before
H-hour, if the visual bombing it would be 5 minutes, as noted above.
Then came the decision to add a further delay in order to keep the Mean
Point of (Bomb) Impact no less than 1,000 yards from the forward wave
of the landing craft. So the following bomb release delay schedule was
created,
Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

I assume this is the bombardment plan for Omaha Beach.

For all the beaches.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Target is water line -
at zero time 0630 near low tide.

Did you actually bother to read the various target lists?

None of my books had what you wrote above. It is very interesting.
Thats why I ask.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They were
the coastal defences, not the beach.

? You mean the intention was to hit the coastal defences, not the plain
beaches. The cratering of the beaches would just be a side effect.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From low tide line to the pillboxes were
around 500 m beach. The 50 % hit circle by H2X radar to a water line was,
hm, ?, guess 400 m? Was it mentioned in your source?

H2X accuracy was not fixed, it tended to depend on the amount of
cloud and how distinguishable the target return was. Hence the
bomb delays ordered.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A bomber here may had a speed of 60 m/s (depends on altitude, load, weather
and safety, just my best guess).

The 8th AF heavies tended to be going at about 50% more than
that speed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 10 sec delay means a shift of the drop
circle center by 600 m. The 15 sec be 900 m and 30 sec 1800 m. What we
have seems a 5 wave bomardment plan that moves over the beach like a
moving artillery barrage of WWI.
Thats a very interesting plan I never heard before.

Congratulations on yet another invention.
It shows just how complete the misunderstanding is.
I presume you do remember the strong winds? Things that tend to alter
aircraft ground speeds?
The bombers tried hard to hit the targets at the appointed times but the
sheer number of aircraft present meant they had little option to adjust
things if they were early or late. Remember how far apart the aircraft
needed to be to avoid each others' turbulence. A formation of heavy
bombers took a lot of airspace given their slipstreams.
There were no 5 waves, there were a series of time delays built in
to allow for aircraft arriving late. Repeat, there were no 5 waves.

You reported a heavy strike on Omaha section at 2 minutes before H hour.
Like planned they delayed by 30 seconds and therefore hit an area
several km inland.
My simple question: Why no attack before in the shorter and the zero
delay time slots?



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

<***@argo.rhein-neckar.de> wrote in message news:***@argo.rhein-neckar.de...

Please keep the attributions in.

Actually I wrote the first paragraphs,

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The accuracy of the radar bombers was well known. If the bomb sighting
was non visual the bombings were to be finished 10 minutes before
H-hour, if the visual bombing it would be 5 minutes, as noted above.
Then came the decision to add a further delay in order to keep the Mean
Point of (Bomb) Impact no less than 1,000 yards from the forward wave
of the landing craft. So the following bomb release delay schedule was
created,
Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

I assume this is the bombardment plan for Omaha Beach.

For all the beaches.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Target is water line -
at zero time 0630 near low tide.

Did you actually bother to read the various target lists?

None of my books had what you wrote above. It is very interesting.
Thats why I ask.

And it seems not absorbed the information.

Is there now an understanding there was only 1 wave of bombers?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They were
the coastal defences, not the beach.

? You mean the intention was to hit the coastal defences, not the plain
beaches. The cratering of the beaches would just be a side effect.

That is what everybody has been saying. With cratering being
kept to a minimum.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
From low tide line to the pillboxes were
around 500 m beach. The 50 % hit circle by H2X radar to a water line was,
hm, ?, guess 400 m? Was it mentioned in your source?

H2X accuracy was not fixed, it tended to depend on the amount of
cloud and how distinguishable the target return was. Hence the
bomb delays ordered.

Is this now understood? And so why safety margins were increased
in bad weather?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A bomber here may had a speed of 60 m/s (depends on altitude, load, weather
and safety, just my best guess).

The 8th AF heavies tended to be going at about 50% more than
that speed.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A 10 sec delay means a shift of the drop
circle center by 600 m. The 15 sec be 900 m and 30 sec 1800 m. What we
have seems a 5 wave bomardment plan that moves over the beach like a
moving artillery barrage of WWI.
Thats a very interesting plan I never heard before.

Congratulations on yet another invention.
It shows just how complete the misunderstanding is.
I presume you do remember the strong winds? Things that tend to alter
aircraft ground speeds?
The bombers tried hard to hit the targets at the appointed times but the
sheer number of aircraft present meant they had little option to adjust
things if they were early or late. Remember how far apart the aircraft
needed to be to avoid each others' turbulence. A formation of heavy
bombers took a lot of airspace given their slipstreams.
There were no 5 waves, there were a series of time delays built in
to allow for aircraft arriving late. Repeat, there were no 5 waves.

deleted text,

"Do you remember how long the different beaches were? How far
does 1,000 bomber loads go over miles of beaches? The bombers
tried to hit the coastal defences, each unit had a specific target."

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You reported a heavy strike on Omaha section at 2 minutes before H hour.

Planned for.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Like planned they delayed by 30 seconds and therefore hit an area
several km inland.

Quite possibly, if they followed the delay orders and arrived at the
relevant time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
My simple question: Why no attack before in the shorter and the zero
delay time slots?

Ah I see, a complete failure to even consider the trade offs.

Too soon and the defences recover in time to defend against the
assault.

Too late and you risk bombing the assault troops.

With maybe 3,000 aircraft trying to attack and defend the beach
areas have you ever bothered to figure out the amount of airspace
required? Bothered to note the deliberate decision to avoid over
flying the invasion shipping routes, with the loss of that airspace?

Put all that together and you end up with the situation the 448th
aircraft took off around 3 hours before they bombed, to make it
from central England to Normandy, well under 2 hours flying at
the normal fast cruise, but a lot more given the flight path to
assemble into the relevant formations at the correct times.

As for "no attack" I have given the times for 1 bomb group out
of 14 assigned to the second Bombardment Division, since you
ask the question please detail the targets and times of attacks
of the other 13 groups, you MUST have them to ask the question.

By the way the US heavy bomber group formations minimum was
about a quarter of a mile wide and up to about half a mile. Factor
that into assigning airspace.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Is there now an understanding there was only 1 wave of bombers?

Yes, only the last time slot was used. Therefore my question was
why the earlier slots were not used.

(...)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You reported a heavy strike on Omaha section at 2 minutes before H hour.

Planned for.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Like planned they delayed by 30 seconds and therefore hit an area
several km inland.

Quite possibly, if they followed the delay orders and arrived at the
relevant time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
My simple question: Why no attack before in the shorter and the zero
delay time slots?

Ah I see, a complete failure to even consider the trade offs.
Too soon and the defences recover in time to defend against the
assault.
Too late and you risk bombing the assault troops.
With maybe 3,000 aircraft trying to attack and defend the beach
areas have you ever bothered to figure out the amount of airspace
required? Bothered to note the deliberate decision to avoid over
flying the invasion shipping routes, with the loss of that airspace?
Put all that together and you end up with the situation the 448th
aircraft took off around 3 hours before they bombed, to make it
from central England to Normandy, well under 2 hours flying at
the normal fast cruise, but a lot more given the flight path to
assemble into the relevant formations at the correct times.
By the way the US heavy bomber group formations minimum was
about a quarter of a mile wide and up to about half a mile. Factor
that into assigning airspace.

All the problems above were well known before the attack and therefore
part of the plan. It was the "too soon" vs "too late" problem why the
time delay slot plan was created:

Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.

It sounds like someone thought a lot about this problem then.
Now you suggest the air space traffic restrictions was the cause
why only the last slot was used. Is that your assumption or is it
suggested in some book you had?

Further, could you please give me the source you used for the above
time delay slot plan.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
As for "no attack" I have given the times for 1 bomb group out
of 14 assigned to the second Bombardment Division, since you
ask the question please detail the targets and times of attacks
of the other 13 groups, you MUST have them to ask the question.

You wrote above regarding the time delay slot plan there was only one
wave. I understand your replies that only the last slot with 30 sec delay
was used at Omaha (and we talk about 4 enginged bombers). Is that still
correct?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Once again please leave the attributions in. I wrote the first line.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Is there now an understanding there was only 1 wave of bombers?

Yes, only the last time slot was used. Therefore my question was
why the earlier slots were not used.

No, 1 group used the given time slot. No idea whether it was
the last to bomb.

I gather the facts about how much airspace the heavy bomber
formations took up and how much airspace was available is
simply ignored. Now we seem to have all the 2nd Division
bomber attacks hitting the beach at the same time.

Maybe, given the size of the beach, they could have landed after
dropping the bombs and provided close air support with their
heavy machine guns, or landed and thrown the bombs at the
defences. Very close air support. That seems to be about the
level of understanding being displayed.

Now tell us all how why did you conclude all the bombers attacked
at the same time and at the last moment?

Bothered to look up air traffic control and aircraft separations and
why the distances are there?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
(...)

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You reported a heavy strike on Omaha section at 2 minutes before H hour.

Planned for.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Like planned they delayed by 30 seconds and therefore hit an area
several km inland.

Quite possibly, if they followed the delay orders and arrived at the
relevant time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
My simple question: Why no attack before in the shorter and the zero
delay time slots?

Ah I see, a complete failure to even consider the trade offs.
Too soon and the defences recover in time to defend against the
assault.
Too late and you risk bombing the assault troops.
With maybe 3,000 aircraft trying to attack and defend the beach
areas have you ever bothered to figure out the amount of airspace
required? Bothered to note the deliberate decision to avoid over
flying the invasion shipping routes, with the loss of that airspace?
Put all that together and you end up with the situation the 448th
aircraft took off around 3 hours before they bombed, to make it
from central England to Normandy, well under 2 hours flying at
the normal fast cruise, but a lot more given the flight path to
assemble into the relevant formations at the correct times.
By the way the US heavy bomber group formations minimum was
about a quarter of a mile wide and up to about half a mile. Factor
that into assigning airspace.

All the problems above were well known before the attack and therefore
part of the plan.

Now tell us all, what does it mean to the ability to actually put
large numbers of bombers over a confined amount of ground?

Go on, with particular emphasis on bombing times.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was the "too soon" vs "too late" problem why the

You can add the weather, given the winds aloft would be
an unknown to the planners.

Why repeat my table here instead of leaving it in from when
I reported it?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Zero minus 75 to zero minus 20 minutes, no delay
Zero minus 20 to zero minus 15 minutes, 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 to zero minus 10 minutes, 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 to zero minus 5 minutes, 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 to zero hour, 30 second delay.
It sounds like someone thought a lot about this problem then.

Quite right as already reported, trading off the risk of missing the
defences versus hitting friendlies.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Now you suggest the air space traffic restrictions was the cause
why only the last slot was used.

No, what I did was actually point out I had ONE bombing time
out of the entire division's attacks, it had FOURTEEN bomb
groups assigned to the attacks. I then waited to see yet again
ONE attack being turned into EVERY attack and LAST time
slot followed by the fiction being attributed to me.

Please explain how the conclusion was reached.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Is that your assumption or is it
suggested in some book you had?

Ah I see, a complete failure to even consider the trade offs.

Too soon and the defences recover in time to defend against the
assault.

Ah I see, a complete failure to even consider the trade offs.

Too soon and the defences recover in time to defend against the
assault.

I can keep repeating things but cannot give comprehension.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further, could you please give me the source you used for the above
time delay slot plan.

Why?

The effectiveness of third phase tactical air operations in the
European Theater 5 May 1944 to 8 May 1945, prepared by the
Army Air Force Evaluation Board in the European Theater of
Operations, August 1945. Page 45. It is on the CARL website.

By the way table 2 on page 61 is incorrect. See below.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
As for "no attack" I have given the times for 1 bomb group out
of 14 assigned to the second Bombardment Division, since you
ask the question please detail the targets and times of attacks
of the other 13 groups, you MUST have them to ask the question.

You wrote above regarding the time delay slot plan there was only one
wave. I understand your replies that only the last slot with 30 sec delay
was used at Omaha (and we talk about 4 enginged bombers). Is that still
correct?

Still correct? It was NEVER correct Please reread my paragraph and
tell us all why my report of ONE bombing time is turned into FOURTEEN
(or more) times?

You know how you managed to totally disregard the information of how
much airspace was needed versus available. And then not thinking
through what that must mean to the attack times.

Meantime, regarding the table on page 61.

I agree the target classifications are arbitrary and it does look like a
post raid
decision was made to try and give them a category and a place name, rather
than the grid reference and probably a generic description on the strike
plans.

Page 61:

1,361 bombers in the initial strike, 1,206 beaches, 155 Caen. 1,038
attacked,
including 47 Caen, 2,944 tons of bombs. Then it all falls to pieces,
totaling the
numbers listed in the text and using short tons the bombs come to 2,446.1 HE
and 35.34 Frag, total 2,481.44, from 1,083 attacking. So the first obvious
error
is in sortie totals, then comes bomb tonnage. No one seems to have proofed
the numbers and we have yet to look at the table which has its own set of
problems, like the first strike having 1,083 attacking but none credited
with
entering airspace within range of the enemy.

Unfortunately I do not have a breakdown of the bomb loads that day.

The table on page 61 effectively matches the one in the 8th Air Force June
1944 monthly report, which is (despatch, credit, attack, HE, Fragmentation,
total bombs short tons, my raid designation), the morning was mission
394, the afternoon 395.

1361 / 1330 / 1083 / 2637.1 / 307.5 / 2944.6 / AM part 1 (3 a/c lost)
528 / 508 / 37 / 109.2 / 0.0 /109.2 / AM part 2
439 / 374 / 361 / 1020.8 / 0.0 / 1020.8 / PM part 1
73 / 71 / 56 / 155.8 / 0.0 / 155.8 / PM part 2
297 / 207 / 192 / 547.2 / 0.0 / 547.2 / PM part 3

So that seems to be the source of the page 61 figures. The June 1944 report
also has pages with more details of most raids. "AM 1" is categorised as an
attack on Coastal defence, the rest as attacks on City and industrial,
tactical.

The summary page has different names for the non coastal defence attacks
than does the pages giving more details, so (summary page / details page)

AM 1 Title: Caen, Cherbourg, Le Havre areas & assault beaches (both pages)
AM 2 Title: Cities of Caen, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Laval / Argentan
PM 1 Title: Cities in Laval area / Laval area
PM 2 Title: City of Caen / Caen
PM 3 Title: Cities - road junctions / Road Junctions

This would appear to be the numbers available at the time and used in the
report.

The target list from Richard Davis have already been posted. Davis reports
at
least some revisions to the raid reports as part of the final accounting.

PRO Air 22/319 is the 8th Air Force target list, clearly compiled as part of
the
final reporting. It uses the same sort of target types as Davis, and
unsurprisingly
I think, basically agrees with him.

It took a while to put all the target list 6th June raids together, the Caen
I/A is
under French targets, the rest are under French tactical targets, Caen and
Pontaubault are under their own headings, Merville is under Pas De Calais,
the rest under Cherbourg Peninsula. It does leave the possibility of
missing
some. The only difference with Davis is the raid on the Caen I/A is given
in the
target list as 47 attacking 182 tons of bombs (3.9 tons each), versus
56/155.8
(2.8 tons each) in Davis, the target list looks wrong, otherwise they would
be
carrying a much heavier load than any other strike.

Using the Davis data he reports another 189.2 tons of HE dropped in the
morning
from an additional 60 attacking sorties but 132 tons less from 58 less
sorties in
the afternoon versus the 8th AF June 1944 report.

I had a look at the Davis figures and summed all the non choke point AM
attacks
and came up short versus the June 1944 summary, adding the choke point raids
that lost an aircraft or dropped fragmentation bombs and I end up with
larger totals
than the June 1944 summary. And no obvious way to adjust things, even if I
were
to remove "AM 2" from the Davis Argentan entry.

So it seems clear there was a significant revision, page 61 is using the
original
June 1944 figures but has clearly made mistakes when reporting the numbers.
In
this case I would say Davis is probably the most accurate.

RG 18 Entry 7 Box 5678, 8th AF Bombing accuracy Jan to Jun 1944.
No entries for any 6 June raid. "D-Day has been excluded because it
has been impossible on the basis of available records to segregate with
certainty the genuine visual sightings from the PFF sightings."

As for post attack analysis, PRO AIR 22/320, 8th Air Force Target Damage
Report Chronological index.

SA reports = strike photographs, K is the standard report, it had an
"immediate" sub category, issued the morning after the raid. I think
the F report was probably F(PH)otographic. PRU Photographic
Reconnaissance Unit.

Mission 393, Assault beaches, no PRU requested. SA.1965 on 7 June
(mission number is actually for leaflet raid of 5/6 June)

Mission 394 Argentan, no PRU requested, SA.1966, K.2330 (Imm) both
on 7 June, F.587 on 8 June, however the "PRU photos on" column does
have the date 6 June, possibly the SA does not use the PRU, the K does.

Mission 395, the Caen raid has SA.1967 and K.2325. Mission 396, Argentan,
Conde-sur-Noireau, Coutances, Falaise, Lisieux, Ponteubeult, Pont L'Evegue,
St. Lo, Thury Harcourt and Vire all are SA.1968 and all have K (Imm)
reports,
Argentan also has an F report, number 587 as per mission 394, so presumably
both raids will be present in F.587. All reports mostly issued by the 9th,
photographs taken between the 6th and 8th except for Thury Harcourt which
had to wait until the 12th and its K report is dated the 13th.

Again mission 396 is actually a leaflet raid for 6/7 June.

Davis figures, Mission 394, morning, location \ target type \ attacking \
HE \ frag \ total (short tons)

Arromanches \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 115 \ 364.2 \ - \ 364.2
Asnelles-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 48 \ 96.2 \ - \ 96.2
Berneires-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 29 \ 53.2 \ - \ 53.2
Colleville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 79 \ 168.0 \ 42.7 \
210.7
Colleville-sur-Orne \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 6 \ 18.0 \ - \ 18.0
Courselles-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 60 \ 111.8 \ - \ 111.8
La Riviere \ T/T Strong Points \ 29 \ 54.2 \ - \ 54.2
Le Hamel \ T/T Strong Points \ 24 \ 45.2 \ - \ 45.2
Longues \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 36 \ 107.5 \ - \ 107.5
Lyon-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 37 \ 102.0 \ - \ 102.0
Merville/Franceville \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 73 \ 261.0 \ - \
261.0
Meuvaines \ T/T Strong Points \ 13 \ 23.8 \ - \ 23.8
Molineaux \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 12 \ 34.5 \ - \ 34.5
Mont Fluery \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 12 \ 29.2 \ - \ 29.2
Ouistreham \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 42 \ 139.8 \ - \ 139.8
Petit Enfer \ T/T Strong Points \ 24 \ 72.0 \ - \ 72.0
Port en Bassin \ T/T Strong Points \ 14 \ 39.5 \ - \ 39.5
Pt. et Raz de la Percee \ T/T Defended Localities \ 23 \ 45.0 \ 25.0 \
70.0
St. Aurin-sur-Mer \ T/T Strong Points \ 41 \ 115.5 \ - \ 115.5
St. Lauret-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 124 \ 168.2 \ 163.8 \
332.0
Tailievilie \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 13 \ 34.2 \ - \ 34.2
Ver-sur-Mer \ T/T Coastal Installations \ 48 \ 114.3 \ - \ 114.3
Vierville-sur-Mer \ T/T Defended Localities \ 83 \ 155.4 \ 69.8 \ 225.2

Mission 395, afternoon

Alencon \ T/T Choke Point \ 9 \ 19.2 \ - \ 19.2
Almenche \ T/T Choke Point \ 9 \ 27.0 \ - \ 27.0
Argentan \ T/T Choke Point \ 95 \ 255.2 \ - \ 255.2
Caen \ T/T Choke Point \ 102 \ 247.6 \ - \ 247.6
Caen \ I/A \ 56 \ 155.8 \ - \ 155.8
Conde-sur-Noireau \ T/T Choke Point \ 45 \ 133.5 \ - \ 133.5
Constance \ T/T Choke Point \ 1 \ 3.0 \ - \ 3.0
Coutances \ T/T Choke Point \ 38 \ 108.0 \ - \ 108.0
Falaise \ T/T Choke Point \ 75 \ 204.4 \ 6.2 \ 210.6
Flers \ T/T Choke Point \ 26 \ 73.3 \ - \ 73.3
Lisieux \ T/T Choke Point \ 25 \ 73.5 \ - \ 73.5
Pont L'Evegue \ T/T Choke Point \ 35 \ 99.0 \ - \ 99.0
Pontaubault \ RR/Br \ 67 \ 191.8 \ - \ 191.8
St. Lo \ T/T Choke Point \ 35 \ 100.4 \ - \ 100.4
Thury Harcourt \ T/T Choke Point \ 55 \ 157.0 \ - \ 157.0
Vire \ T/T Choke Point \ 69 \ 211.5 \ - \ 211.5

The above to point out be careful, the different sources can give very
different
results.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Once again please leave the attributions in. I wrote the first line.

I removed nothing, it was not created. I reply to

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

This not about P-47 but the heavies of 8th USAAF at D-Day.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further, could you please give me the source you used for the above
time delay slot plan.

Why?

After what you cited I expected more interesting stuff there

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The effectiveness of third phase tactical air operations in the
European Theater 5 May 1944 to 8 May 1945, prepared by the
Army Air Force Evaluation Board in the European Theater of
Operations, August 1945. Page 45. It is on the CARL website.

Thank you!

It is a book by the USAAF of 20th Aug. 1945 and classified as Secret.
It only went to highest ranks of other services and even the UK. It
gave some insights I never read before. Specially for D-Day.

The CARL website is http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org
Its at the site in over 20 pdf files. Some pdfs I downloaded had missing
pages. The book is at amazon and like but if someone knows a free source
in one single pdf that would be fine.

The book gives a summary of planning, activities and results of USAAF
in tactical missions. A part is D-Day. I never before read that the
USAAF thought Omaha was their fault. The date it was declassified is
not visible. I assume in the 1970s or 80s. I would be surprised if
it happened later. But I wonder why it was not cited in Lewis: Omaha
Beach: A Flawed Victory (2001). It contradicts some of what he wrote.

Here I cited from the pdfs the parts I found to D-Day / Omaha. I
keep the original line layout from 1945:


Air participation during the assault phase was exe-
cuted as planned by heavy and medium bombers, fighter-
bombers, and fighter patrols. Weather was poor and pre-
vented visual operations in most cases except by low alti-
tude missions. Because of concentrated fire by air, ground,
and naval forces on the assault area, the results of air ac-
tivity can only be evaluated as a dominating but indis-
tinguishable part of the combined operation. The beaches
were bombed without friendly casualties although cloud
conditions had imposed the necessity of delaying the bomb
release until after the normal visual release point had
been reached., This was a serious disadvantage to the
assaulting troops because most of the bombs fell some
distance behind the beach area, and the non-effectiveness
of the heavy bombardment of Omaha Beach contributed
to the difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold in
that sector.
p. 41

Omaha Beach was not bombed as scheduled, and the
difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold here in itself
demonstrates the net value which resulted from air
attacks in other sectors.
p. 42

On the Omaha beach, however,
"Naval gunfire and drenching bombardment from the
air had not been able to smother opposition, and the
troops going ashore suffered numerous casualties."
p.72


It was agreed that air coordination should aim
primarily at the demoralization of front-line enemy
troops. A possible bonus would be in the destruction
of barbed wire and other obstacles. Army commanders
were informed of the possibility of bombing errors
causing casualties among the troops in assault craft
and this was accepted as a necessary risk.
p. 43


Accordingly, it
was decided that, if cloud cover should prevent visual
synchronization, bombs would be dropped on Path-
finder indications in the normal manner except that
the release would be delayed so the Mean Point of
Impact would not be less than 1000 yards from the
forward wave of the waterborne assault forces. This
was to be accomplished by adherence to the follow-
ing schedule:

Target Times. Bomb Release Delay
Zero minus 75 min. to zero minus 20 min. No delay
Zero minus 20 min. to zero minus 15 min. 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 min. to zero minus 10 min. 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 min. to zero minus 5 min. 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 min. to zero 30 second delay

The probability that through-the-overcast
bombing methods would be used led to the further
decision to fuse all bombs, with the exception of a
small percentage of the 100 HE types, with instan-
taneous fuzes in the nose and no tail fuzes. This mea-
sure was taken to avoid possible cratering of the
beaches on which landings were to be made, cogni-
zance being taken of the limitations in the accuracy
of pathfinder bombing methods as compared with
visual sightings.

Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
saturation bombing of the beach areas could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers.
p. 45


All three Allied Air Forces pounded coastal
defense positions for several days in advance of D-Day,
and this phase of the campaign reached a climax in
the hours just before the landing in Normandy when
1053 RAF heavies dropped over 6200 tons on coastal
batteries in the assault area, 1077 Eighth Air Force
bombers attacked similar targets with over 3000 tons,
and some 2000 AEAF bombers and fighter-bombers
including Ninth Air Force units operated over the
assault area.
...
By D-Day, the majority of coastal batteries
within the area had been subjected to attack, and on
four of the five beaches, landings took place with con-
siderably less opposition from prepared positions
than had been anticipated. On the 5th beach, the only
area where aerial bombing appeared less effective,
there was considerable opposition. To measure the
effectiveness of these attacks, due consideration must
be given to the damage to the ancillary equipment
such as signal communications and radar control
positions, as well as the gun-crew quarters.
p. 54



The principal reasons for the failure of units to attack as
planned were the inability to locate the H2X leaders,
poor definition on the Pathfinder scope, and absence
of assigned Pathfinder aircraft as in the case of the
3rd Bomb Division units assigned to the Caen tar-
gets. On the whole, the bombing runs were well
executed and all attacks were well within the allotted
periods.
p.61

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF EIGHTH AIR FORCE HEAVY
BOMBER OPERATIONS ù 6 JUNE 1944
(showed they only had 69 Pathfinder aircraft with H2X radar)

...
1364.pdf p. 374f:

H2X: H2X is airborne radar. It transmits high
frequency electrical impulses downward through a
revolving antenna. These impulses are reflected back
to the antenna by various objects on the earth. The
H2X set converts these reflected impulses into light
patterns on the scope of the set. By matching these
patterns with scope photographs of the actual inva-
sion coast, the bombers were able to hit their narrow
target with satisfactory results.
...
This was the technique used on D-Day. Eighteen
to thirty-six aircraft were flown abreast with the H2X
aircraft in the center of the formation. H2X operators
carried maps and scope photographs of the invasion
coast. Long familiarization with vertical and scope
photographs of the English and French coast lines
enabled them to identify the shipping and shore-line
patterns in their H2X scopes.

The H2X scope was useless for most categories
of close-in air cooperation targets. It was, however,
useful in special situations such as bombing from over
water towards a land target. In this case, the shore
line was clearly indicated on the scope.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
From the the above we can see they had the intention to bomb the

beach from the shore line till 30 seconds (over 2 km) inland by the
time delay slot plan mentioned on p. 45. It went wrong because the
bombers could not find their H2X Pathfinder in time. Or was it "poor
definition on the Pathfinder scope"?. Bad they went not in details.

This is the end of the myth that "airmen" delayed the bomb release
to save own troops. Those in the air bombed according the time slot
plan but failed to be on schedule. The plan was created in cooperation
and agreement by USAAF, Army and Navy.

The plan was interesting but the task to meet the Pathfinders seems
too ambitious for some crews. How often was it trained? Never?

I always heard that the strong German infantry division at Omaha
was the main factor for the bloody assault. That was known to the
USAAF writers too. They had all reports regarding Omaha available.
Still they maintained their failed bombing be the cause.

This book reads like a summary of summaries. There must be a then
secret USAAF report on Omaha with more details. How to find it?
Seems not easy considering that Lewis for his Flawed Victory (2001)
used a lot of archive records but not even the above.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Once again please leave the attributions in. I wrote the first line.

I removed nothing, it was not created. I reply to

People can go back and see the above statement is incorrect.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

My name stays but almost none of my text.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This not about P-47 but the heavies of 8th USAAF at D-Day.

I presume in this post, not the preferred close air support idea
in other posts.

I presume the ideas about all heavy bombers attacking at
once are now discarded?

Actually looked at the required airspace?

Going to tell us how you arrived at your conclusions about them
all attacking at once?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Further, could you please give me the source you used for the above
time delay slot plan.

Why?

After what you cited I expected more interesting stuff there

And my expectation of it being misunderstood is correct.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The effectiveness of third phase tactical air operations in the
European Theater 5 May 1944 to 8 May 1945, prepared by the
Army Air Force Evaluation Board in the European Theater of
Operations, August 1945. Page 45. It is on the CARL website.

Thank you!
It is a book by the USAAF of 20th Aug. 1945 and classified as Secret.
It only went to highest ranks of other services and even the UK. It
gave some insights I never read before. Specially for D-Day.

It was a post battle report in effect and I suppose you noted the
problems in terms of its figures?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The CARL website is http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org
Its at the site in over 20 pdf files. Some pdfs I downloaded had missing
pages. The book is at amazon and like but if someone knows a free source
in one single pdf that would be fine.

CARL is the place, I can only suggest putting the exact title into
search engines to look for other sites.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The book gives a summary of planning, activities and results of USAAF
in tactical missions. A part is D-Day. I never before read that the
USAAF thought Omaha was their fault.

It is good to know yet again the wrong conclusion is drawn.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The date it was declassified is
not visible. I assume in the 1970s or 80s. I would be surprised if
it happened later. But I wonder why it was not cited in Lewis: Omaha
Beach: A Flawed Victory (2001). It contradicts some of what he wrote.

There is a lot of information on D-Day, it is not surprising if
some reports are missed or discounted for others.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Here I cited from the pdfs the parts I found to D-Day / Omaha. I

And I need to remove some for quoting rule purposes.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Air participation during the assault phase was exe-
cuted as planned by heavy and medium bombers, fighter-
bombers, and fighter patrols. Weather was poor and pre-
vented visual operations in most cases except by low alti-
tude missions. Because of concentrated fire by air, ground,
and naval forces on the assault area, the results of air ac-
tivity can only be evaluated as a dominating but indis-
tinguishable part of the combined operation. The beaches
were bombed without friendly casualties although cloud
conditions had imposed the necessity of delaying the bomb
release until after the normal visual release point had
been reached., This was a serious disadvantage to the
assaulting troops because most of the bombs fell some
distance behind the beach area, and the non-effectiveness
of the heavy bombardment of Omaha Beach contributed
to the difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold in
that sector. p. 41
Omaha Beach was not bombed as scheduled, and the
difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold here in itself
demonstrates the net value which resulted from air
attacks in other sectors. p. 42
On the Omaha beach, however,
"Naval gunfire and drenching bombardment from the
air had not been able to smother opposition, and the
troops going ashore suffered numerous casualties." p.72
It was agreed that air coordination should aim
primarily at the demoralization of front-line enemy
troops. A possible bonus would be in the destruction
of barbed wire and other obstacles. Army commanders
were informed of the possibility of bombing errors
causing casualties among the troops in assault craft
and this was accepted as a necessary risk. p. 43

(snip delay table, fusing methods, Caen attack, and attacks
before the 8th AF ones)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
saturation bombing of the beach areas could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45
By D-Day, the majority of coastal batteries
within the area had been subjected to attack, and on
four of the five beaches, landings took place with con-
siderably less opposition from prepared positions
than had been anticipated. On the 5th beach, the only
area where aerial bombing appeared less effective,
there was considerable opposition. To measure the
effectiveness of these attacks, due consideration must
be given to the damage to the ancillary equipment
such as signal communications and radar control
positions, as well as the gun-crew quarters. p. 54
The principal reasons for the failure of units to attack as
planned were the inability to locate the H2X leaders,
poor definition on the Pathfinder scope, and absence
of assigned Pathfinder aircraft as in the case of the
3rd Bomb Division units assigned to the Caen tar-
gets. On the whole, the bombing runs were well
executed and all attacks were well within the allotted
periods. p.61
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF EIGHTH AIR FORCE HEAVY
BOMBER OPERATIONS ù 6 JUNE 1944
(showed they only had 69 Pathfinder aircraft with H2X radar)

yes, there were only 3 or so per target. The 8th AF was so
big the requirements for radars were more than the production
could cope with in mid 1944, along with trained operators.

Essentially the original pathfinder group was required to
undertake operations on D-Day, instead of continuing
radar training.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
H2X: H2X is airborne radar. It transmits high
frequency electrical impulses downward through a
revolving antenna. These impulses are reflected back
to the antenna by various objects on the earth. The
H2X set converts these reflected impulses into light
patterns on the scope of the set. By matching these
patterns with scope photographs of the actual inva-
sion coast, the bombers were able to hit their narrow
target with satisfactory results.
...
This was the technique used on D-Day. Eighteen
to thirty-six aircraft were flown abreast with the H2X
aircraft in the center of the formation. H2X operators
carried maps and scope photographs of the invasion
coast. Long familiarization with vertical and scope
photographs of the English and French coast lines
enabled them to identify the shipping and shore-line
patterns in their H2X scopes.
The H2X scope was useless for most categories
of close-in air cooperation targets. It was, however,
useful in special situations such as bombing from over
water towards a land target. In this case, the shore
line was clearly indicated on the scope.
From the the above we can see they had the intention to bomb the
beach from the shore line till 30 seconds (over 2 km) inland by the
time delay slot plan mentioned on p. 45.

I see, there is a provision in the plan to delay release of bombs
depending on the time and weather. The bombers had specific
targets they are trying for.

So now comes the stick things together bit, no it was not the
specific targets the bombers were after it is claimed, they wanted
to bomb the beach from shoreline to 2,000 metres inland.

After all why look at the data posted on what the bombers attacked,
why bother with the inconvenient fact pointed out so many times,
the bombers were after the defences, not the beach from the "shore
line".

No, the conclusion was reached some time ago, the bombers
were after the beach, all those nice craters to hide in, remember?
now with new wonder extension, they were also trying to lay bombs
and presumably craters all the way inland as well.

So we try once again. The "delay table" is all about removing the
risk of friendly fire, replacing it with the risk of missing the BEACH
DEFENCES the bombers were after.

End of story.

Or to put it another way, several miles of beach times 1.5 miles
of depth equals how many bombers to create craters all over?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It went wrong because the
bombers could not find their H2X Pathfinder in time. Or was it "poor
definition on the Pathfinder scope"?. Bad they went not in details.

Ah yes.

The principle reasons are in the conditions of the time some
bombers did not see their radar equipped leaders, those cloud
things you know. Then comes the fact the shoreline did not
show up as well as thought for some aircraft, like for example
the way water and land contrast but not as much if the land
has been flooded. See inland beach defences.

They went into the details, you did not understand them.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This is the end of the myth that "airmen" delayed the bomb release
to save own troops. Those in the air bombed according the time slot
plan but failed to be on schedule. The plan was created in cooperation
and agreement by USAAF, Army and Navy.

I see, "all attacks were well within the allotted periods." but not all
were exactly on time. However in order to lay the 2 km deep
bomb carpets they did have to be on schedule. Do not worry about
the contradiction, just admire the conclusion.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The plan was interesting but the task to meet the Pathfinders seems
too ambitious for some crews. How often was it trained? Never?

I see, with thousands of aircraft in the air, a rare night take off and
formation, with bad weather the idea some might fail to sight their
leaders at least at the bomb release point MUST mean the crews
are at fault, why? No need to ask why, it just flows from the lack
of evidence presented.

Note one reason there were a number of H2X sets per attack
was the sets did fail.

I believe,

" Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
saturation bombing of the beach areas could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45"

I gather the fact experiments were done proves they were
never practiced. And of course there were other raids pre
D-Day that used H2X.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I always heard that the strong German infantry division at Omaha
was the main factor for the bloody assault.

And it is a fundamental part of the reasons. Other infantry was
more inclined to stop fighting.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That was known to the
USAAF writers too. They had all reports regarding Omaha available.
Still they maintained their failed bombing be the cause.

No, you have found the one phrase to rule them all and have
come up with your junk conclusion.

"the non-effectiveness
of the heavy bombardment of Omaha Beach contributed
to the difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold in
that sector."

Becomes

"the non-effectiveness of the heavy bombardment of Omaha
WAS THE REASON FOR the difficulty experienced in gaining
a foothold in that sector."

I do like the way the words can appear in one section and then
be changed just below.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This book reads like a summary of summaries. There must be a then
secret USAAF report on Omaha with more details. How to find it?

Yes folks, the no evidence proof is really on display. Since the
report is declared to read in a certain way there must be others
but wait, there's more, it must be secret.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Seems not easy considering that Lewis for his Flawed Victory (2001)
used a lot of archive records but not even the above.

Seems not easy as it is really an imagined report.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

This is not about P-47 but the heavies of 8th USAAF at D-Day.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It went wrong because the
bombers could not find their H2X Pathfinder in time. Or was it "poor
definition on the Pathfinder scope"?. Bad they went not in details.

Ah yes.
The principle reasons are in the conditions of the time some
bombers did not see their radar equipped leaders, those cloud
things you know. Then comes the fact the shoreline did not
show up as well as thought for some aircraft, like for example
the way water and land contrast but not as much if the land
has been flooded. See inland beach defences.
They went into the details, you did not understand them.

They went not in this details and you simply speculated the above
may count for Omaha.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I see, "all attacks were well within the allotted periods."

Who ever claimed that?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
but not all
were exactly on time. However in order to lay the 2 km deep
bomb carpets they did have to be on schedule. Do not worry about
the contradiction, just admire the conclusion.

H2X Target was the water line.
We had 5 time slots:

Target Times. Bomb Release Delay

Zero minus 75 min. to zero minus 20 min. No delay
Zero minus 20 min. to zero minus 15 min. 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 min. to zero minus 10 min. 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 min. to zero minus 5 min. 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 min. to zero 30 second delay

Objective was to saturate the beach area (where the defences were):

Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate

_saturation bombing_ of the _beach areas_ could be ac-

complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers.
p. 45

We do not know yet what number of planes were scheduled to what
time slot. Just that at Omaha all or most were in the last slots.
Whether those scheduled for the first and second slot bombed in the
last or not at all I could not see in the available data. Could you?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The plan was interesting but the task to meet the Pathfinders seems
too ambitious for some crews. How often was it trained? Never?

I see, with thousands of aircraft in the air, a rare night take off and
formation, with bad weather the idea some might fail to sight their
leaders at least at the bomb release point MUST mean the crews
are at fault, why? No need to ask why, it just flows from the lack
of evidence presented.
Note one reason there were a number of H2X sets per attack
was the sets did fail.
I believe,
" Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
saturation bombing of the beach areas could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45"
I gather the fact experiments were done proves they were
never practiced.

No, it does not prove that night / early dawn take off, formation
and rendevous was never practiced. It just says they did experiments
to develop the plan. After they had the plan a few trainings might
have been necessary. The 8th was a daylight force and without training
I still think that was an too ambitious task.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That was known to the
USAAF writers too. They had all reports regarding Omaha available.
Still they maintained their failed bombing be the cause.

No, you have found the one phrase to rule them all and have
come up with your junk conclusion.
"the non-effectiveness
of the heavy bombardment of Omaha Beach contributed
to the difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold in
that sector."
Becomes
"the non-effectiveness of the heavy bombardment of Omaha
WAS THE REASON FOR the difficulty experienced in gaining
a foothold in that sector."

that was your wording. The USAAF wrote it was the "dominating" cause:

tude missions. Because of concentrated fire by air, ground,
and naval forces on the assault area, the results of air ac-
tivity can only be evaluated as a _dominating_ but indis-
tinguishable part of the combined operation. The beaches

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This book reads like a summary of summaries. There must be a then
secret USAAF report on Omaha with more details. How to find it?

Yes folks, the no evidence proof is really on display. Since the
report is declared to read in a certain way there must be others
but wait, there's more, it must be secret.

It was for sure secret _then_ like I wrote. Otherwise it would be
mentioned in most published D-Day books since 1944.

The above USAAF report you introduced must be based on several
after battle reports from 1944 regarding 8th AF on D-Day. They
must be all declassified by now. But how to find the titles?

Where is a database for USAAF reports regarding D-Day?
Or for declassified secret USAAF reports?



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Target Times. Bomb Release Delay
Zero minus 75 min. to zero minus 20 min. No delay
Zero minus 20 min. to zero minus 15 min. 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 min. to zero minus 10 min. 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 min. to zero minus 5 min. 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 min. to zero 30 second delay

You continue to refuse to understand what those "time slots" were.

It worked like this. If the bomber formation arrived at its
drop point between H-75 and H-20 it would impose no delay on the
drop. If it arrived at between H-20 and H-15 then a 5 second delay
was to be imposed. And so on. Do you understand?

Each bomber formation was comprised X number of six-plane squadrons
flying abreast to the width of the beach. Each formation including
H2X equipped aircraft to direct the bombing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We do not know yet what number of planes were scheduled to what
time slot.

THEY. WERE. NOT. "TIME." "SLOTS."

Apologies for the shouting, but you continue to misunderstand this very
important point. The planners could not be sure of the exact time of
arrival for each of the "bomber waves" so each "wave" was required to
following the delay schedule dependent upon WHEN IT ARRIVED AT THE AIM
POINT. Again, apologies, but you have failed to comprehend this important
point after numerous attempts to correct your misapprehension.

Do you understand now?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was for sure secret _then_ like I wrote. Otherwise it would be
mentioned in most published D-Day books since 1944.

Yes, as published in August 1945 the document was SECRET then
downgraded to RESTRICTED 11 March 1949 and finally UNCLASSIFIED on
20 January 1961? (the DECLASS notation is nearly illegible). So
quite a bit of time for scholars to peruse it since 1945.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above USAAF report you introduced must be based on several
after battle reports from 1944 regarding 8th AF on D-Day. They
must be all declassified by now. But how to find the titles?

They were based on the numbered mission reports, which Geoffrey has
already synopsized. Did you miss those?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Where is a database for USAAF reports regarding D-Day?
Or for declassified secret USAAF reports?

Maxwell AFB.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Re to Rich

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Target Times. Bomb Release Delay
Zero minus 75 min. to zero minus 20 min. No delay
Zero minus 20 min. to zero minus 15 min. 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 min. to zero minus 10 min. 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 min. to zero minus 5 min. 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 min. to zero 30 second delay

You continue to refuse to understand what those "time slots" were.
It worked like this. If the bomber formation arrived at its
drop point between H-75 and H-20 it would impose no delay on the
drop. If it arrived at between H-20 and H-15 then a 5 second delay
was to be imposed. And so on. Do you understand?

Yes, I always did.

Post by Rich
Each bomber formation was comprised X number of six-plane squadrons
flying abreast to the width of the beach. Each formation including
H2X equipped aircraft to direct the bombing.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We do not know yet what number of planes were scheduled to what
time slot.

THEY. WERE. NOT. "TIME." "SLOTS."
Apologies for the shouting, but you continue to misunderstand this very
important point. The planners could not be sure of the exact time of
arrival for each of the "bomber waves" so each "wave" was required to
following the delay schedule dependent upon WHEN IT ARRIVED AT THE AIM
POINT. Again, apologies, but you have failed to comprehend this important
point after numerous attempts to correct your misapprehension.
Do you understand now?

Yes. But what was my misapprehension? I choose first the name "time
delay slot" and nobody objected. Now I called them time slots. I suspect
now there is a language problem. You know I'm no native English speaker.
I did my best to choose this words. You are more qualified. What is your
suggested name for the five "somethings"?

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It was for sure secret _then_ like I wrote. Otherwise it would be
mentioned in most published D-Day books since 1944.

Yes, as published in August 1945 the document was SECRET then
downgraded to RESTRICTED 11 March 1949 and finally UNCLASSIFIED on
20 January 1961? (the DECLASS notation is nearly illegible). So

Thank you! Got you read that from the pdf or is there some other source?

Post by Rich
quite a bit of time for scholars to peruse it since 1945.

Indeed. Wonders me even more why the author of the 2001 university
book on Omaha had never read it.

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Where is a database for USAAF reports regarding D-Day?
Or for declassified secret USAAF reports?

Maxwell AFB.

I did an intense look there. They have A LOT of material. But I could
not find a database or list of USAAF reports online. Even a
declassification list with the titles would help. Do you know any url?



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes, I always did.

That is not obvious from your replies before or your reply now.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes. But what was my misapprehension? I choose first the name "time
delay slot" and nobody objected. Now I called them time slots. I suspect
now there is a language problem. You know I'm no native English speaker.
I did my best to choose this words. You are more qualified. What is your
suggested name for the five "somethings"?

"Nobody objected"? I'm afraid both Geoffrey and I have objecting since we
first explained the plan and saw what interpretation you were making of it.
And no, I am afraid what you first called it was a "moving barrage" like
"World War I". You keep getting it muddled no matter how we explain it.

My "suggested name" is what it was a "time delay schedule".

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Thank you! Got you read that from the pdf or is there some other source?

It is on the cover page of the PDF...if you know what you are looking at.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Indeed. Wonders me even more why the author of the 2001 university
book on Omaha had never read it.

Which "university book" is that? Could you be a bit clearer? It makes it
very difficult to understand you.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I did an intense look there. They have A LOT of material. But I could
not find a database or list of USAAF reports online. Even a
declassification list with the titles would help. Do you know any url?

No, you have to go there and look. Like Geoffrey did.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Re to Rich

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes. But what was my misapprehension? I choose first the name "time
delay slot" and nobody objected. Now I called them time slots. I suspect
now there is a language problem. You know I'm no native English speaker.
I did my best to choose this words. You are more qualified. What is your
suggested name for the five "somethings"?

"Nobody objected"? I'm afraid both Geoffrey and I have objecting since we
first explained the plan and saw what interpretation you were making of it.
And no, I am afraid what you first called it was a "moving barrage" like
"World War I". You keep getting it muddled no matter how we explain it.

I still think it was intended as something like a "moving barrage". Thats
how I read the USAAF post war report I cited a lot. I understand that most
here never heard that view. Most books on D-Day would not support my view.
But this USAAF report gave a more convincing plan than what was suggested
here.

For example the report says that only the water line was visible in H2X with
good accuracy. To use a time delay to hit the defence sites at the beach end
makes sense. More than the suggestion to still aim the defences by H2X and
add any delay to protect own troops. The shortest delay, 5 seconds, would
miss the aim point by 500 meter and make the whole bomb run a failure.

Instead the 5 seconds from the water line would put the impact at the
beach end where the German sites where. A side effect of this plan (with
zero and 5 seconds delay in the first and second slot) would be a
saturation bombing of the beach area like the USAAF report wrote. That
all makes sense as a plan.

Post by Rich
My "suggested name" is what it was a "time delay schedule".

Ok. And lets call the 5 delays just "slots". You know its a common
term in aeronautics. I see not that it precludes any interpretation.

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Indeed. Wonders me even more why the author of the 2001 university
book on Omaha had never read it.

Which "university book" is that? Could you be a bit clearer? It makes it
very difficult to understand you.

It was

Lewis, Adrian R.: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory,
University of North Carolina Press (2001)

I mentioned it in my first post on this thread. Like I you were not in
praise of it either. But it seems the present scholarly level.

Post by Rich
Extensive tests were done by Ordnance against field and fixed
fortifications typical of beach defenses...in 1945. The results aren't
encouraging. A direct hit on most of the bunkers used by the Germans
would have had zero measurable effect unless an AP bomb
in the 1,000-lb range were used.

Do you have the title of this 1945 report? I would like to read it.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I still think it was intended as something like a "moving barrage".

So in other words, despite none of the planning or after action reports describing it as a "moving barrage" and despite all the explanations you
have been given, you will persist in your belief that it WAS a moving
barrage?

I'm afraid you are beyond help.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Instead the 5 seconds from the water line would put the impact at the
beach end where the German sites where.

You have been told exactly what the 11 targets were. Why do you persist
in pretending they were something they weren't? You have also been told
repeatedly, THE WATER LINE WAS NOT THE AIM POINT. Ignorantly continuing
to assert it was is simple trolling.

Once you demonstrate you understand how H2X blind bombing worked we
can continue this.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Ok. And lets call the 5 delays just "slots". You know its a common
term in aeronautics. I see not that it precludes any interpretation.

Your interpretation that those slots were allocated to waves of bombers
is incorrect. They were not "slots" in that sense. They were time delays.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Lewis, Adrian R.: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory,
University of North Carolina Press (2001)

Do you understand you would create less confusion if you simply said
"Lewis's book" or "Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory" than randomly
mentioning a "university book"? How many thousands of those do you
think there are on this subject?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I mentioned it in my first post on this thread. Like I you were not in
praise of it either. But it seems the present scholarly level.

Actually, no, there are any number better written before and since it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Do you have the title of this 1945 report? I would like to read it.

U.S. Army Ordnance Department Terminal Ballistics Data, Volume III, August
1945. I can't wait to see what hash you make of it.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Do you have the title of this 1945 report? I would like to read it.

U.S. Army Ordnance Department Terminal Ballistics Data, Volume III, August
1945. I can't wait to see what hash you make of it.

Thank you Rich.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Re to Rich

Rich wrote the second paragraph.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Yes. But what was my misapprehension? I choose first the name "time
delay slot" and nobody objected. Now I called them time slots. I suspect
now there is a language problem. You know I'm no native English speaker.
I did my best to choose this words. You are more qualified. What is your
suggested name for the five "somethings"?

"Nobody objected"? I'm afraid both Geoffrey and I have objecting since we
first explained the plan and saw what interpretation you were making of it.
And no, I am afraid what you first called it was a "moving barrage" like
"World War I". You keep getting it muddled no matter how we explain it.

I still think it was intended as something like a "moving barrage".

And you are wrong.

The idea was to attack the given defence positions, the AMOUNT OF
AIRSPACE NEEDED, the difficulties of TIMING so many attacks meant
the attacks would take place over a period of time. Before we talk about
the chances of aircraft being early or late.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Thats
how I read the USAAF post war report I cited a lot.

And you are wrong.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
I understand that most
here never heard that view. Most books on D-Day would not support my view.
But this USAAF report gave a more convincing plan than what was suggested
here.

This is because you are staying with fixed conclusions and trying to
fit the report to it.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
For example the report says that only the water line was visible in H2X with
good accuracy.

Actually the water line was expected to be the MOST visible, but you
seem only able handle absolutes, it must be 100% or 0, nothing in
between.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
To use a time delay to hit the defence sites at the beach end
makes sense.

No, the ordered delays were all about reducing the chances of friendly
fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
More than the suggestion to still aim the defences by H2X and
add any delay to protect own troops. The shortest delay, 5 seconds, would
miss the aim point by 500 meter and make the whole bomb run a failure.

Assuming of course the aiming point was correctly identified. Which was
the POINT of the delay requirement, to reduce friendly fire.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Instead the 5 seconds from the water line would put the impact at the
beach end where the German sites where.

Ah, I see, the water line, despite the water saturated sand, is absolutely,
impossible to miss, accurately picked up by H2X, so the idea is to bomb
the beach because you are going to delay your bomb drop, that way you
are GUARANTEED to bomb the right target. Because you are going to
arrive at exactly the right time for the correct delay to be used. Omaha
beach will be conveniently the relevant number of hundred meters deep.

Simple really, perfect equipment, perfect aiming, perfect result.

Perfect junk.

Perhaps the following is in order, 8th Air Force bombing accuracy,
September to December 1944, when there were more H2X sets
available and better trained operators. H2X in 4 to 5/10 cloud,
percentage of bomb tonnage, 4.4% within 1,000 feet, 22.8% within
0.5 miles, 48.5% within 1 mile. H2X in 10/10 cloud, 0.2% within
1,000 feet, 1.2% within 0.5 miles, 5.6% within 1 mile.

These are for all targets and the 4 to 5/10 cloud attacks covers the
dropping of 3,978 short tons of bombs, the 10/10 cloud attacks
dropped 56,172 short tons of bombs.

Also accuracy attacking the same target, versus bombing order,
bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point, 1st 82%, 2nd 60%,
3rd 48%, 4th 47%, 5th etc. 30% etc. The problems of smoke
and dust obscuring visibility.

Certainly a coast area should have above average H2X accuracy,
but these are the sorts of average accuracy the heavy bombers
were actually achieving.

In case you are wondering, visual bombing in good to fair
visibility, 30% within 1,000 feet, 64.3% within 0.5 miles, 82.4%
within 1 mile. So this is the average result in the best conditions.

There was a very good reason for delaying bomb drops near
H-hour, work out what a 0.5 mile short drop would hit.

Remember how small screens were in 1944? And at altitude
the H2X set "saw" the ground for miles around the aircraft.

So now, before deciding once again there are slots, or some
other term to keep what I call the "delay table" as some sort
of barrage plan or wonder idea for bombing the defences,
state clearly,

1) What were the official bomb times for the attacking heavy bombers.
2) The point of delaying the bomb releases based on how close the
time was to H-Hour.
3) What the chances were of short bombing given even the good
visibility accuracies listed above.

The "delay table" has NOTHING to do with a planned barrage,
or what to attack, etc. etc. etc., it has EVERYTHING to do with
friendly fire chances and the known accuracy of the bombers.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A side effect of this plan (with
zero and 5 seconds delay in the first and second slot)

THERE ARE NO SLOTS.

Can that thought ever penetrate?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
would be a
saturation bombing of the beach area like the USAAF report wrote. That
all makes sense as a plan.

And again, you are so sure you know what the USAAF bombed you
have no idea what they bombed, but are sure one line in a summary
report is all you need to know.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Rich
My "suggested name" is what it was a "time delay schedule".

Ok. And lets call the 5 delays just "slots".

No, no, no.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
You know its a common
term in aeronautics. I see not that it precludes any interpretation.

Of course you cannot see what is wrong, that is too obvious.

Now read the text again. The delays ordered had NOTHING to do
with TIMING attacks, the bombers had their official bombing times,
if they were close enough to H-hour they were ordered to ADD the
relevant time before dropping their bombs on their identified target.
It is designed to cope with bombers arriving when the landing craft
were close to the shore etc., it has NOTHING to do with sequencing
attacks, that was done in the bomb times given to each group, you
know the ones you said you had but refused to confirm when asked.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Rich

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Indeed. Wonders me even more why the author of the 2001 university
book on Omaha had never read it.

Which "university book" is that? Could you be a bit clearer? It makes it
very difficult to understand you.

It was
Lewis, Adrian R.: Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory,
University of North Carolina Press (2001)
I mentioned it in my first post on this thread. Like I you were not in
praise of it either. But it seems the present scholarly level.

No actually, it is the book you have read and are deciding bits of
it fit.

The rest of the post is Richard Andersons' more detailed list of
targets, training and tactics,

"For the 11 targets specified in "OMAHA Beach" proper the distance
is roughly 8 kilometers. Those were:

Pointe et Raz de la Percee
The "Fortified House"
Vierville Draw (D-1)
Hamel au Pretre
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) West
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) East
St Laurent Draw (E-1) West
St Laurent Draw (E-1) East
Colleville Draw (E-3) West
Colleville Draw (E-3) East
Cabourg Draw (F-1)

Each were targeted by one B-24 group comprised of six six-aircraft
squadrons, which were scheduled to attack between H-25 and H-5.

While each group was described as being "on line abreast" it appears
what actually was used was a modified 36-aircraft group box. While
the standard formation was 520 yards wide the modified was double
that...i.e., roughly a kilometer wide (the exact layout of the
formation is still in question). Add in the complication the B-24
was difficult to fly in tight formations and the actual width was
probably greater.

So for the "beach" proper, 11 kilometers width of formations to attack
8 kilometers width of targets. Which meant the formations would attack
in succession as they approached on their 20 minute attack window, but
each was responsible for coordinating their actual arrival to the delay
requirements.

There were also two additional formations, one of four and the other
of five squadrons, targeting Port en Bessin west and east respectively.
Combined they represented another 1.5 kilometer-wide formation.

BTW, in terms of training for the mission, the first hand-made H2X sets
were delivered for operational testing in October 1943, but production
sets were only available beginning in February. Operational training
for the mission began in April at Alconbury, which was a four week
course. The actual practice missions couldn't be done until May.

Quite a few aircraft for such a constricted airspace."

End quote.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The idea was to attack the given defence positions, the AMOUNT OF
AIRSPACE NEEDED, the difficulties of TIMING so many attacks meant
the attacks would take place over a period of time. Before we talk about
the chances of aircraft being early or late.

Exactly. What keeps getting missed is that there are TWO SETS of timing
referenced. The first is the TIME SLOT (singular) in which ALL bomb
groups were ordered to attack. That TIME SLOT was H-25 to H-5. For all
groups attacking the designated 11 beach defense positions.

The TIME DELAY was broken down into five different time bands in which
the aircraft would ACTUALLY arrive. It was anticipated, given years of
experience in timing air ops, the groups could ACTUALLY arrive at ANY
time within their ordered window and could even arrive BEFORE or AFTER
the window. Given that the similar experience with amphibious ops was
that the timing for the landing ships and craft could be more precise
THEIR TIMING determined the aircraft delay instead of vice versa
because craft's average speed was under 10 knots compared to the
aircraft's 150 knots or so.

The bombing timing WAS a "time slot" the bomb delay was not. It was
additive to the SINGLE bombing time slot and was solely intended to
prevent accidental bombing of the approaching landing waves.

Why such a simple concept continues to elude the OP is beyond me unless
it remains a deliberate act intended to falsify the conclusions. Given
it has been explained over and over again and that he has presented zero
evidence to justify his conclusion then I must assume he is attempting
to deliberately falsify the history to fit his own agenda despite his
protests to the contrary.

Rich Anderson

[Kenneth Young]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Quite a few aircraft for such a constricted airspace."

Personally I felt the USAAF report was part of the struggle to get post
war funding and full of special pleading. The USAAF post war reports on
strategic bombing were certainly intended for that.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Geoffrey Sinclair

Actually the first words are not mine.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This is not about P-47 but the heavies of 8th USAAF at D-Day.

Deleted text, to the next >

I presume the ideas about all heavy bombers attacking at
once are now discarded?

Actually looked at the required airspace?

Going to tell us how you arrived at your conclusions about them
all attacking at once?

I see, there is a provision in the plan to delay release of bombs
depending on the time and weather. The bombers had specific
targets they are trying for.

So now comes the stick things together bit, no it was not the
specific targets the bombers were after it is claimed, they wanted
to bomb the beach from shoreline to 2,000 metres inland.

After all why look at the data posted on what the bombers attacked,
why bother with the inconvenient fact pointed out so many times,
the bombers were after the defences, not the beach from the "shore
line".

No, the conclusion was reached some time ago, the bombers
were after the beach, all those nice craters to hide in, remember?
now with new wonder extension, they were also trying to lay bombs
and presumably craters all the way inland as well.

So we try once again. The "delay table" is all about removing the
risk of friendly fire, replacing it with the risk of missing the BEACH
DEFENCES the bombers were after.

End of story.

Or to put it another way, several miles of beach times 1.5 miles
of depth equals how many bombers to create craters all over?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It went wrong because the
bombers could not find their H2X Pathfinder in time. Or was it "poor
definition on the Pathfinder scope"?. Bad they went not in details.

Ah yes.
The principle reasons are in the conditions of the time some
bombers did not see their radar equipped leaders, those cloud
things you know. Then comes the fact the shoreline did not
show up as well as thought for some aircraft, like for example
the way water and land contrast but not as much if the land
has been flooded. See inland beach defences.
They went into the details, you did not understand them.

They went not in this details and you simply speculated the above
may count for Omaha.

No I actually looked at the report being quoted, but I see after
quoting a work you have at best forgotten it, at worst simply
unable to understand.

You ever thought of reading the words you quote?

"The principal reasons for the failure of units to attack as
planned were the inability to locate the H2X leaders,
poor definition on the Pathfinder scope"

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I see, "all attacks were well within the allotted periods."

Who ever claimed that?

The report you claimed to read and quote.

"On the whole, the bombing runs were well
executed and all attacks were well within the allotted
periods. p.61"

You posted the quote, now please explain how you forgot it
so quickly.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
but not all
were exactly on time. However in order to lay the 2 km deep
bomb carpets they did have to be on schedule. Do not worry about
the contradiction, just admire the conclusion.

H2X Target was the water line.

No.

No.

No.

The targets have been given, and you have ignored them.

The waterline was expected to show up clearly as H2X was usually
good at distinguishing land from water.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Target Times. Bomb Release Delay
Zero minus 75 min. to zero minus 20 min. No delay
Zero minus 20 min. to zero minus 15 min. 5 second delay
Zero minus 15 min. to zero minus 10 min. 10 second delay
Zero minus 10 min. to zero minus 5 min. 15 second delay
Zero minus 5 min. to zero 30 second delay

No.

No.

No.

There was a delay table which the bombers were to use if they
arrived at the designated times.

This has been explained several times now but you simply have
not bothered to understand it.

Essentially you are shown a picture of a cat, another of a dog
and announce you have discovered a goat, but no ordinary goat,
this one can do maths.
No.

No.

No.

The targets have been given.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
_saturation bombing_ of the _beach areas_ could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45

I see, you decide one phrase from a report is proof and are
going to ignore what the mission reports say. You know the
documents that actually show what the bombers tried to hit
and what they say they attacked, plus any post raid checks.

No worries, the raid reports do not support the pet theory so
they will be ignored. After all none of the targets say Omaha
Beach but that must be a mistake, a phrase summarising the
overall mission must be much more accurate.

Very good.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We do not know yet what number of planes were scheduled to what
time slot.

We do.

None

None

None

As there were no such "time slots" as you have defined them.

There was a requirement to delay dropping by a defined amount if the
bombers arrived at the given time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Just that at Omaha all or most were in the last slots.

Ah yes, I found out 1 bomb time. This of course is automatically
decided to be for ALL attacks. It simplifies the fiction.

So tell us, since you know the time slots of Omaha please
list them,

Bomb Group, squadron, time,

The full list.

Complete.

And none of this I do not know, above you are saying "at Omaha all
or most were in the last slots."

Either that or admit you are inventing facts.

Choose.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Whether those scheduled for the first and second slot bombed in the
last or not at all I could not see in the available data. Could you?

I am sorry, it is your work of fiction, you need to decide just how
many laws of nature you are going to suspend in order to make
the fiction likeable to you.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The plan was interesting but the task to meet the Pathfinders seems
too ambitious for some crews. How often was it trained? Never?

I see, with thousands of aircraft in the air, a rare night take off and
formation, with bad weather the idea some might fail to sight their
leaders at least at the bomb release point MUST mean the crews
are at fault, why? No need to ask why, it just flows from the lack
of evidence presented.
Note one reason there were a number of H2X sets per attack
was the sets did fail.

No reply here.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I believe,
" Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
saturation bombing of the beach areas could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45"
I gather the fact experiments were done proves they were
never practiced.

No, it does not prove that night / early dawn take off, formation
and rendevous was never practiced.

Yet you decided it must.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It just says they did experiments
to develop the plan. After they had the plan a few trainings might
have been necessary. The 8th was a daylight force and without training
I still think that was an too ambitious task.

Would it surprise you to know that with the invasion a high priority
the relevant units did do some training?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
That was known to the
USAAF writers too. They had all reports regarding Omaha available.
Still they maintained their failed bombing be the cause.

No, you have found the one phrase to rule them all and have
come up with your junk conclusion.

No reply here.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
"the non-effectiveness
of the heavy bombardment of Omaha Beach contributed
to the difficulty experienced in gaining a foothold in
that sector."
Becomes
"the non-effectiveness of the heavy bombardment of Omaha
WAS THE REASON FOR the difficulty experienced in gaining
a foothold in that sector."

that was your wording.

Actually it is clearly your conclusion.

"Still they maintained their failed bombing be the cause" and I point
out the only supporting evidence needs a rewrite of the report.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
tude missions. Because of concentrated fire by air, ground,
and naval forces on the assault area, the results of air ac-
tivity can only be evaluated as a _dominating_ but indis-
tinguishable part of the combined operation. The beaches

Oh I see, the Air Force claims it is a big player in the operation,
you decide is does not dominate the operation but does dominate
the reasons for your defined failures.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This book reads like a summary of summaries. There must be a then
secret USAAF report on Omaha with more details. How to find it?

Yes folks, the no evidence proof is really on display. Since the
report is declared to read in a certain way there must be others
but wait, there's more, it must be secret.

It was for sure secret _then_ like I wrote. Otherwise it would be
mentioned in most published D-Day books since 1944.

If you actually look at the front of the report you can see it being
declassified, complete with dates. And there is a huge amount
of reports done about the invasion, which makes it very hard to
find and then understand ALL the material.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above USAAF report you introduced must be based on several
after battle reports from 1944 regarding 8th AF on D-Day. They
must be all declassified by now. But how to find the titles?

Oh I am sorry, I gave them, so you have not found them.

Heard of mission reports? The ones I listed?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Where is a database for USAAF reports regarding D-Day?
Or for declassified secret USAAF reports?

The US National Archives.

The various USAF archives in the US, AFHRA at Maxwell
AF base to start with.

Even the various Bomb Group web sites that detail the missions.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

This is not about P-47 but the heavies of 8th USAAF at D-Day.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It went wrong because the
bombers could not find their H2X Pathfinder in time. Or was it "poor
definition on the Pathfinder scope"?. Bad they went not in details.

Ah yes.
The principle reasons are in the conditions of the time some
bombers did not see their radar equipped leaders, those cloud
things you know. Then comes the fact the shoreline did not
show up as well as thought for some aircraft, like for example
the way water and land contrast but not as much if the land
has been flooded. See inland beach defences.

we are talking about Omaha beach and there was no "flooded land"
there

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They went into the details, you did not understand them.

They went not in this details and you simply speculated the above
may count for Omaha.

No I actually looked at the report being quoted, but I see after
quoting a work you have at best forgotten it, at worst simply
unable to understand.
You ever thought of reading the words you quote?
"The principal reasons for the failure of units to attack as
planned were the inability to locate the H2X leaders,
poor definition on the Pathfinder scope"

This are two different reasons. Wich one was for Omaha? Both?
And why were they unable to locate the leaders? Or why scope
poor when they claimed the H2X target was good before? One
can speculate a lot but can you cite any 1944 report that answers
this questions?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I see, "all attacks were well within the allotted periods."

Who ever claimed that?

The report you claimed to read and quote.
"On the whole, the bombing runs were well
executed and all attacks were well within the allotted
periods. p.61"
You posted the quote, now please explain how you forgot it
so quickly.

Exact before this citation they mentioned what went wrong. So
"On the whole" means all beaches except Omaha. That Omaha was
the exception they mentioned some pages before.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
_saturation bombing_ of the _beach areas_ could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45

I see, you decide one phrase from a report is proof and are
going to ignore what the mission reports say. You know the
documents that actually show what the bombers tried to hit
and what they say they attacked, plus any post raid checks.

Please give the titles of the original reports you have in mind
here.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
No worries, the raid reports do not support the pet theory so
they will be ignored. After all none of the targets say Omaha
Beach but that must be a mistake, a phrase summarising the
overall mission must be much more accurate.

None said Omaha because they had specific target areas at Omaha.
They did not try to bomb all of Omaha from the waterline upwards.
They had not that number of planes and none ever suggested that.
Instead they had target maps for the lateral position they had to
attack. Read what I cited before:


p. 374f:

patterns on the scope of the set. By matching these
patterns with scope photographs of the actual inva-
sion coast, the bombers were able to hit their narrow
target with satisfactory results.
...
This was the technique used on D-Day. Eighteen
to thirty-six aircraft were flown abreast with the H2X
aircraft in the center of the formation. H2X operators
carried maps and scope photographs of the invasion
coast. Long familiarization with vertical and scope
photographs of the English and French coast lines
enabled them to identify the shipping and shore-line
patterns in their H2X scopes.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Very good.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We do not know yet what number of planes were scheduled to what
time slot.

We do.
None
None
None
As there were no such "time slots" as you have defined them.
There was a requirement to delay dropping by a defined amount if the
bombers arrived at the given time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Just that at Omaha all or most were in the last slots.

Ah yes, I found out 1 bomb time. This of course is automatically
decided to be for ALL attacks. It simplifies the fiction.
So tell us, since you know the time slots of Omaha please
list them,
Bomb Group, squadron, time,
The full list.
Complete.

I asked you about that. But I was more polite.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And none of this I do not know, above you are saying "at Omaha all
or most were in the last slots."
Either that or admit you are inventing facts.
Choose.

We already had a month ago the original citation by Ike. Thanks to

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
visually below cloud level. But elsewhere patches of cloud forced
the aircraft to take extra safety precautions to avoid hitting
our own troops, with the result that their bombs sometimes fell
too far inland, especially at Omaha beach.
--From Eisenhower's report to the Joint Chiefs at the end of the
war

So I see some agreement by Ike with the USAAF report that it fell
too far inland. The USAAF "not on shedule" would agree with that.
Is there any report that any 8th AF bombs hit between the waterline
and the first 100 m of the cliff?

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I believe,
" Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
saturation bombing of the beach areas could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45"
I gather the fact experiments were done proves they were
never practiced.

No, it does not prove that night / early dawn take off, formation
and rendevous was never practiced.

Yet you decided it must.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It just says they did experiments
to develop the plan. After they had the plan a few trainings might
have been necessary. The 8th was a daylight force and without training
I still think that was an too ambitious task.

Would it surprise you to know that with the invasion a high priority
the relevant units did do some training?

You are sometimes answering almost like a politician or a lawyer. "the
relevant units" means the H2X Pathfinders here I suppose. Of course they
did. But we talked about the bombers who faild to find them.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This book reads like a summary of summaries. There must be a then
secret USAAF report on Omaha with more details. How to find it?

Yes folks, the no evidence proof is really on display. Since the
report is declared to read in a certain way there must be others
but wait, there's more, it must be secret.

It was for sure secret _then_ like I wrote. Otherwise it would be
mentioned in most published D-Day books since 1944.

If you actually look at the front of the report you can see it being
declassified, complete with dates. And there is a huge amount
of reports done about the invasion, which makes it very hard to
find and then understand ALL the material.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above USAAF report you introduced must be based on several
after battle reports from 1944 regarding 8th AF on D-Day. They
must be all declassified by now. But how to find the titles?

Oh I am sorry, I gave them, so you have not found them.
Heard of mission reports? The ones I listed?

You realy mean this USAAF after war report was direct compiled
by single mission reports? No you don't? There must be a one
or more USAAF 8th AF D-Day reports that summarize the plan,
execution and evaluation. I want to look for it.

About mission reports you cited several but what is at least one
complete title?



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Reply to Geoffrey Sinclair

Would you please simply leave the attributions alone, per what your
software should be doing?

Deleted text, for the second time, to the next >

I presume the ideas about all heavy bombers attacking at
once are now discarded?

Actually looked at the required airspace?

Going to tell us how you arrived at your conclusions about them
all attacking at once?

I see, there is a provision in the plan to delay release of bombs
depending on the time and weather. The bombers had specific
targets they are trying for.

So now comes the stick things together bit, no it was not the
specific targets the bombers were after it is claimed, they wanted
to bomb the beach from shoreline to 2,000 metres inland.

After all why look at the data posted on what the bombers attacked,
why bother with the inconvenient fact pointed out so many times,
the bombers were after the defences, not the beach from the "shore
line".

No, the conclusion was reached some time ago, the bombers
were after the beach, all those nice craters to hide in, remember?
now with new wonder extension, they were also trying to lay bombs
and presumably craters all the way inland as well.

So we try once again. The "delay table" is all about removing the
risk of friendly fire, replacing it with the risk of missing the BEACH
DEFENCES the bombers were after.

End of story.

Or to put it another way, several miles of beach times 1.5 miles
of depth equals how many bombers to create craters all over?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This is not about P-47 but the heavies of 8th USAAF at D-Day.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It went wrong because the
bombers could not find their H2X Pathfinder in time. Or was it "poor
definition on the Pathfinder scope"?. Bad they went not in details.

Ah yes.
The principle reasons are in the conditions of the time some
bombers did not see their radar equipped leaders, those cloud
things you know. Then comes the fact the shoreline did not
show up as well as thought for some aircraft, like for example
the way water and land contrast but not as much if the land
has been flooded. See inland beach defences.

we are talking about Omaha beach and there was no "flooded land"
there

Thanks for telling us you have not looked at a map, the Aure river, the
marshes outside of Treviers for example.

Yes, it was in range, why do you think H2X was described as really
being a navigation aid, not a bomb aiming device?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
They went into the details, you did not understand them.

They went not in this details and you simply speculated the above
may count for Omaha.

No I actually looked at the report being quoted, but I see after
quoting a work you have at best forgotten it, at worst simply
unable to understand.
You ever thought of reading the words you quote?
"The principal reasons for the failure of units to attack as
planned were the inability to locate the H2X leaders,
poor definition on the Pathfinder scope"

This are two different reasons. Wich one was for Omaha? Both?
And why were they unable to locate the leaders? Or why scope
poor when they claimed the H2X target was good before? One
can speculate a lot but can you cite any 1944 report that answers
this questions?

"The principal reasons for the failure of units to attack as
planned were the inability to locate the H2X leaders,
poor definition on the Pathfinder scope" It was not a 1944
report of course.

Now tell us all why, with so many attacks going on, you have decided
ALL the failures at one beach are for the SAME reason?

And I simply note I have been talking about the mission reports
and listed them but once again YOU IGNORE them, instead
essentially insisting I fly to America take copies, type them in
here and even then it is clear you are not listening.

Is it possible for you to understand two things at once?

1) H2X was not a precision device.

2) It worked best when there was a clear contrast, like water and land.
It did not work perfectly, hence the bombing delay orders.

The report you have been quoting notes the failures, you decide that
is not good enough and someone else should fix this.

By the way, can you actually, in any reply, acknowledge the following,

1) The heavy bombers had to take off and formate in the dark.
2) The weather was bad, which made it harder again to end up
where the bombers should be.

Now after doing the acknowledgement, can you then think about
what the above 2 conditions meant to the chances of finding the
correct H2X leader? That with so many attacks at least some
would fail to formate correctly, H2X leaders would fail to correctly
pick their target and some H2X sets would fail?

Is that possible, instead of essentially ignoring the information
presented and asking once again for it?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I see, "all attacks were well within the allotted periods."

Who ever claimed that?

The report you claimed to read and quote.
"On the whole, the bombing runs were well
executed and all attacks were well within the allotted
periods. p.61"
You posted the quote, now please explain how you forgot it
so quickly.

Exact before this citation they mentioned what went wrong.

Do you ever answer a question? Now please explain how you
forgot it so quickly.

Not change the subject.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
So
"On the whole" means all beaches except Omaha. That Omaha was
the exception they mentioned some pages before.

I see, actually they are unsure about how much damage the heavy
bombers on all the beaches, the 3 Commonwealth ones and
Omaha, given the ground fighting, the shelling and the night attacks
and then the afternoon raids.

Please provide the quote that says only at Omaha.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
_saturation bombing_ of the _beach areas_ could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45

I see, you decide one phrase from a report is proof and are
going to ignore what the mission reports say. You know the
documents that actually show what the bombers tried to hit
and what they say they attacked, plus any post raid checks.

Please give the titles of the original reports you have in mind
here.

Once again, the 8th Air Force Mission Reports.

Once again, the 8th Air Force Mission Reports.

Once again, the 8th Air Force Mission Reports.

Do you now understand?

deleted text,

"> H2X Target was the water line.

No.

No.

No.

The targets have been given, and you have ignored them.

The waterline was expected to show up clearly as H2X was usually
good at distinguishing land from water.
No.

No.

No.

The targets have been given."

End of deleted text.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
No worries, the raid reports do not support the pet theory so
they will be ignored. After all none of the targets say Omaha
Beach but that must be a mistake, a phrase summarising the
overall mission must be much more accurate.

None said Omaha because they had specific target areas at Omaha.
They did not try to bomb all of Omaha from the waterline upwards.

Great finally a reversal.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
They had not that number of planes and none ever suggested that.

Do you really even read your own words?

"H2X Target was the water line."
"Objective was to saturate the beach area (where the defences were):"

It is nice to see you delete your own words than claim you did not
say them.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Instead they had target maps for the lateral position they had to

Congratulations on another change of subject, that has nothing
to do with the fact you are misusing a report, looking for that
one phrase or sentence that fits.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
patterns on the scope of the set. By matching these
patterns with scope photographs of the actual inva-
sion coast, the bombers were able to hit their narrow
target with satisfactory results.
...

But, but but, you claimed the had unsatisfactory results on
Omaha, now it is all satisfactory.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This was the technique used on D-Day. Eighteen
to thirty-six aircraft were flown abreast with the H2X
aircraft in the center of the formation. H2X operators
carried maps and scope photographs of the invasion
coast. Long familiarization with vertical and scope
photographs of the English and French coast lines
enabled them to identify the shipping and shore-line
patterns in their H2X scopes.

Now tell us all how any of the quoted text is relevant to your
claims of bombing the beach not the defences?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Very good.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
We do not know yet what number of planes were scheduled to what
time slot.

We do.
None
None
None
As there were no such "time slots" as you have defined them.
There was a requirement to delay dropping by a defined amount if the
bombers arrived at the given time.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Just that at Omaha all or most were in the last slots.

Ah yes, I found out 1 bomb time. This of course is automatically
decided to be for ALL attacks. It simplifies the fiction.
So tell us, since you know the time slots of Omaha please
list them,
Bomb Group, squadron, time,
The full list.
Complete.

I asked you about that. But I was more polite.

You see I have a graded response mechanism, when I post one time
and someone makes it every time, and I keep telling them I only have
the one time and the keep making it every time and I keep telling them
I only have the one time, I conclude I need to make it clear what is going
on in a way they have to deal with.

YOUR claim,

"Just that at Omaha all or most were in the last slots."

So tell us, since you know the time slots of Omaha please
list them,

Bomb Group, squadron, time,

The full list.

Complete.

Back your claims.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
And none of this I do not know, above you are saying "at Omaha all
or most were in the last slots."
Either that or admit you are inventing facts.
Choose.

We already had a month ago the original citation by Ike.

So I am supposed to go and find titles and quote reports and you
are allowed to change the subject rather than provide information.

"And none of this I do not know, above you are saying "at Omaha all
or most were in the last slots."

Either that or admit you are inventing facts.

Choose.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Thanks to

What, no name or title?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
visually below cloud level. But elsewhere patches of cloud forced
the aircraft to take extra safety precautions to avoid hitting
our own troops, with the result that their bombs sometimes fell
too far inland, especially at Omaha beach.
--From Eisenhower's report to the Joint Chiefs at the end of the
war

So I see some agreement by Ike with the USAAF report that it fell
too far inland. The USAAF "not on shedule" would agree with that.

Actually all I see is someone changing the subject, running away from
what they are claiming rather than admit a mistake.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Is there any report that any 8th AF bombs hit between the waterline
and the first 100 m of the cliff?

let us see now, I post a list of mission reports, which tell where the
bombs dropped, or at least estimates of, I post a list of photo
sorties related to the bombings. I explain what is in those reports.

Now we are asked about where there is a report on where the bombs
dropped.

very good.

Sorry no reports on where the bombs dropped. Odds are now
being drawn up that the mission reports will be embraced as the
place to see where the bombs dropped.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
I believe,
" Experiments in pre-dawn assembly had led
to the conclusion that the most practicable tactical
unit was the squadron of six aircraft. Accordingly,
the 1350 heavy bombers were to form 225 such
squadrons. It had also been determined that adequate
saturation bombing of the beach areas could be ac-
complished by 198 squadrons. To relieve possible
congestion in the limited area the remaining 27 squad-
rons were to be directed against strategic choke-
points in the town of Caen in accordance with pro-
visions in the Overall Air Plan for the use of surplus
bombers. p. 45"
I gather the fact experiments were done proves they were
never practiced.

No, it does not prove that night / early dawn take off, formation
and rendevous was never practiced.

Yet you decided it must.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
It just says they did experiments
to develop the plan. After they had the plan a few trainings might
have been necessary. The 8th was a daylight force and without training
I still think that was an too ambitious task.

Would it surprise you to know that with the invasion a high priority
the relevant units did do some training?

You are sometimes answering almost like a politician or a lawyer.

Sorry you are way ahead of everyone else here on that score.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"the
relevant units" means the H2X Pathfinders here I suppose. Of course they
did. But we talked about the bombers who faild to find them.

I see,

Some bombers failed to find their H2X leader in bad weather and dark.
Of course that must equal no training, it is so obviously wrong.

Why exactly must everything work perfectly or else you decide the people
involved failed to do enough work/training?

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
This book reads like a summary of summaries. There must be a then
secret USAAF report on Omaha with more details. How to find it?

Yes folks, the no evidence proof is really on display. Since the
report is declared to read in a certain way there must be others
but wait, there's more, it must be secret.

It was for sure secret _then_ like I wrote. Otherwise it would be
mentioned in most published D-Day books since 1944.

If you actually look at the front of the report you can see it being
declassified, complete with dates. And there is a huge amount
of reports done about the invasion, which makes it very hard to
find and then understand ALL the material.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The above USAAF report you introduced must be based on several
after battle reports from 1944 regarding 8th AF on D-Day. They
must be all declassified by now. But how to find the titles?

Oh I am sorry, I gave them, so you have not found them.
Heard of mission reports? The ones I listed?

You realy mean this USAAF after war report was direct compiled
by single mission reports? No you don't? There must be a one
or more USAAF 8th AF D-Day reports that summarize the plan,
execution and evaluation. I want to look for it.

You have been quoting from such a report.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
About mission reports you cited several but what is at least one
complete title?

What exactly do you think a mission report is?

So we try again.

Every squadron and group and wing put in their mission reports, these
were compiled into the air force mission report, noted the two mission
numbers for D-Day? So yes there are hundreds of Air Force level
mission reports, thousands of wing level and even more group and
squadron level.

You know, the locations I put in my post so they could be deleted
and the information asked for again.

There is more deleted text I have not bothered to restore, but the
final part of my post being non replied to was,

The US National Archives.

The various USAF archives in the US, AFHRA at Maxwell
AF base to start with.

Even the various Bomb Group web sites that detail the missions.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Actually looked at the required airspace?

Yep. :) For the 11 targets specified in "OMAHA Beach" proper the distance
is roughly 8 kilometers. Those were:

Pointe et Raz de la Percee
The "Fortified House"
Vierville Draw (D-1)
Hamel au Pretre
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) West
Les Moulins Draw (D-3) East
St Laurent Draw (E-1) West
St Laurent Draw (E-1) East
Colleville Draw (E-3) West
Colleville Draw (E-3) East
Cabourg Draw (F-1)

Each were targeted by one B-24 group comprised of six six-aircraft
squadrons, which were scheduled to attack between H-25 and H-5.

While each group was described as being "on line abreast" it appears
what actually was used was a modified 36-aircraft group box. While
the standard formation was 520 yards wide the modified was double
that...i.e., roughly a kilometer wide (the exact layout of the
formation is still in question). Add in the complication the B-24
was difficult to fly in tight formations and the actual width was
probably greater.

So for the "beach" proper, 11 kilometers width of formations to attack
8 kilometers width of targets. Which meant the formations would attack in succession as they approached on their 20 minute attack window, but each
was responsible for coordinating their actual arrival to the delay
requirements.

There were also two additional formations, one of four and the other
of five squadrons, targeting Port en Bessin west and east respectively.
Combined they represented another 1.5 kilometer-wide formation.

BTW, in terms of training for the mission, the first hand-made H2X sets
were delivered for operational testing in October 1943, but production
sets were only available beginning in February. Operational training
for the mission began in April at Alconbury, which was a four week
course. The actual practice missions couldn't be done until May.

Quite a few aircraft for such a constricted airspace.