Airplane Losses in oceans

[Mario]

Are there any statistics on airplane and personnel losses WRT
trans-atlantic/pacific transfers and long range patrols?

Were transfers organized in groups/formations or as single
airplanes?

(Birds often fly in a V formation as it saves energy)

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Mario
Are there any statistics on airplane and personnel losses WRT
trans-atlantic/pacific transfers and long range patrols?
Were transfers organized in groups/formations or as single
airplanes?
(Birds often fly in a V formation as it saves energy)

There were few attempts to fly formation given the fuel
costs of maintaining the formation and the distances
involved. Though there were various attempts at a
lead plane with followers, chiefly fighters.

The 1945 USAAF Statistical Digest, Table 108, at

http://www.afhso.af.mil/usafstatistics/

Gives aircraft losses en route from the US to theatres,
but it probably includes those lost when the ship they
were on was lost as well as on flights.

Table 204 gives some idea of the USAAF transport service
losses but that is on all services, not just trans ocean.

See also Table 206 for losses on Air Transport Command
ferrying operations.

Table 64 gives crew casualties en route from the US but again
it probably includes losses on ships.

You then have to add the USN flights and of course the
British etc. flights, for example Britain to the Middle East.
No public statistics available for these as far as I am aware.

Books on Lend Lease aircraft can mention losses en route,
Air Arsenal North America by Butler and Hagedorn, Lend
Lease Aircraft in World War II by Percy for example. Are
losses on the ALSIB (Alaska Siberia) route wanted?

As for long range patrols there are literally thousands of
them given the anti submarine operations. That will need
another set of documents, RCAF, RAF, USN and USAAF
as a minimum. What is long range defined as?

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Table 64 gives crew casualties en route from the US but again
it probably includes losses on ships.

Yabbut "losses on ships" could be completely
independent for crews and planes. They would
not even be on the same ships, usually. Also
any personnel losses would be the responsibility
of the Navy and/or Merchant Marine.

I think maybe the table is for losses by air
incidents. That would make more sense for the
Air Force to be tracking.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Table 64 gives crew casualties en route from the US but again
it probably includes losses on ships.

Yabbut "losses on ships" could be completely
independent for crews and planes.

Yeah but there is absolutely no information on what the
table covers. You have downloaded the digest and seen
if there are any explanatory notes?

Post by Rich Rostrom
They would
not even be on the same ships, usually.

And how is this relevant to whether the table in question
includes personnel lost at sea en route to combat theatres?

You know once again you have chopped a whole lot of
data out?

Including table 108,

"Gives aircraft losses en route from the US to theatres,
but it probably includes those lost when the ship they
were on was lost as well as on flights."

Post by Rich Rostrom
Also
any personnel losses would be the responsibility
of the Navy and/or Merchant Marine.

So a USAAF personnel loss is not a loss when in the care
of other services? Does the same apply to all those army
personnel lost when their sea transport was hit or sunk?
Or their USAAF transport crashed?

Post by Rich Rostrom
I think maybe the table is for losses by air
incidents. That would make more sense for the
Air Force to be tracking.

Well good, now any evidence?

Noted table 64 title? Crew losses Enroute from US to
Overseas Theatres? And how a literal reading says 10
man crew in things like heavy bombers and each loss
was the whole crew? No survivors?

We can combine the table 64 and 108 figures for 1944
and find,
Total 214 aircraft and 108 crew losses.
Very Heavy bomber, 8 aircraft, 3 crews
Heavy bomber, 101 aircraft, 48 crews,
Medium and light bombers, 62 aircraft, 20 crews,
Fighter, 13 aircraft, 0 crews,
Transport, 24 aircraft, 7 crews,
Reconnaissance, 4 aircraft, 30 crews,
Communications, 2 aircraft, 0 crews.

27 of the reconnaissance crews were lost going to the
Mediterranean, for no aircraft losses, another 3 crews lost
going to the Far East Air Forces, which lost 1 aircraft en
route. The European Theatre reports the other 3
reconnaissance aircraft losses.

Most fighters, communications, light and medium bombers
went by sea.

Perhaps another way, what was the air route from the US to
the Mediterranean in 1942 for fighters, medium/light bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft? How about the air route from
the US to India in 1943 for fighters? How do we explain the
148 fighter losses en route to the Mediterranean in 1943?

And given the strong indication aircraft losses are non arrivals
regardless of whether they flew or not what does that imply
for the personnel losses? Unless we have evidence otherwise?

As far as I am aware the USAAF ran two ferry operations, crews
assigned to a theatre with an appropriate aircraft flew it there,
then comes the ATC operations, using ferry crews. The Aircraft
losses en route are 483 in 1943, 214 in 1944 and 48 in 1945,
the ATC ferry losses are 255 in 1943, 212 in 1944 and 68 in
1945 (table 206), some would have involved personnel losses.
Table 204 gives ATC non ferry operation aircraft losses, 420 in
1944 and 180 in 1945, some would be on overseas sorties,
some would involve personnel losses. Though note the 1945 losses
are for aircraft assigned to the ATC and this is assumed to NOT
include aircraft being ferried.

In short the warning stands, be aware of what is being reported.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[john Szalay]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Perhaps another way, what was the air route from the US to
the Mediterranean in 1942 for fighters, medium/light bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft? How about the air route from
the US to India in 1943 for fighters? How do we explain the
148 fighter losses en route to the Mediterranean in 1943?
Geoffrey Sinclair

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_air_ferry_route_in_World_War_I
I#/media/File:AirFerryRoutesOfWWII.png

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by john Szalay

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Perhaps another way, what was the air route from the US to
the Mediterranean in 1942 for fighters, medium/light bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft? How about the air route from
the US to India in 1943 for fighters? How do we explain the
148 fighter losses en route to the Mediterranean in 1943?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_air_ferry_route_in_World_War_I
I#/media/File:AirFerryRoutesOfWWII.png

But in 1942 the allies could not use the Azores. Note the length of
the Bermuda Azores stretch. The map is of routes used at some
time during WWII.

They could not transfer aircraft via Tunisia in 1942.

They could not use the Philippines to make it to India in 1942.

The map is also incomplete, aircraft did deploy from Britain to
North Africa and flew through Ascension to link up with the
central cross Africa route, which was set up to transfer fighters
from Takoradi on the west coast to Egypt, then extended to
move aircraft to India, later a route from the Persian Gulf to
the southern USSR was added. Also note a number of US
units deployed to Britain via the South Atlantic route, which
lead to a number of bombers being shot down after ending
up over or near France.

No ALSIB route on the map Also there were no major
movements through the Faroes, it was Iceland to Northern
Ireland or Scotland, or direct from Canada.

As the accompanying Wikipedia makes it clear these are US
routes only.

Then there are the RAF routes, like UK to Gibraltar then either direct
to Middle East or via Malta as well as via Takoradi. The first trans
Atlantic delivery was in November 1940, Gander to Prestwick.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Haydn]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then there are the RAF routes, like UK to Gibraltar then either direct
to Middle East or via Malta as well as via Takoradi. The first trans
Atlantic delivery was in November 1940, Gander to Prestwick.

I've read that the Takoradi route would entail a 3% aircraft loss rate
(wear & tear, accidents etc.). Can you confirm this figure?

Haydn

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Haydn

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Then there are the RAF routes, like UK to Gibraltar then either direct
to Middle East or via Malta as well as via Takoradi. The first trans
Atlantic delivery was in November 1940, Gander to Prestwick.

I've read that the Takoradi route would entail a 3% aircraft loss rate
(wear & tear, accidents etc.). Can you confirm this figure?

Not off hand, the weekly reports tend to have despatched and
arrived figures, with some possibly en route or under repair
somewhere along the line. Also losses at Takoradi, like test
flights or write offs as damaged while being transported come
into play. Above all I do not have a complete set of reports.

The 17 March 1941 report, cumulative totals, 90 Blenheim
arrived in the Middle East from Takoradi, 2 lost en route, 133
Hurricanes arrived, 5 lost en route, 7 Glenn Martin arrived, 1 lost,
1 Mohawk lost probably at Takoradi. That is the end of the
reports I have which have an explicit lost in transit figure.

The UK to Malta route as of the same date had 58 Blenheims
arrived, 9 lost, 92 Wellingtons arrived, 8 lost, 8 Glenn Martins
arrived, 4 lost, 2 Bombays arrived.

As of 16 January 1942 the air route UK to Gibraltar then Malta
or direct to Malta, 101 Beaufighter arrived, 10 lost, 343 Blenheim
arrived, 21 lost, 1 Maryland arrived, 4 lost, 22 Beaufort arrived,
2 lost, 382 Wellington arrived, 28 lost, 24 Bombay arrived, 3 lost,
4 Fortress and 2 Mosquito arrived. Note a few of the losses
could in fact have arrived but not yet reported as such. The Fortress
were sent in the week ending 31 October 1941, the Mosquito week
ending 16 January 1942.

The Sea/Air operations to send Hurricanes to Malta saw 323
arrive, 50 lost, or at least not reported delivered as of 16
January 1942.

The 16 January 1942 report for Takoradi,
Hurricane, 1,110 despatched to Takoradi, 867 arrived, 748
arrived in the Middle East. (note Hurricanes diverted to far
east removed from totals)
Tomahawk 226 to Takoradi, 222 arrived, 190 arrived M.E.
Blenheim, 672 to Takoradi, 597 arrived, 493 arrived M.E.
Maryland/Glenn Martin, 80 to Takoradi, 66 arrived, 55 arrived M.E.

Some of the above had been lost en route, some were still
on the way and some were at Takoradi being assembled and/or
repaired.

The sea route to the Middle East via the cape had 71 Hurricanes
sent, 64 arrived, 318 Tomahawks sent, all arrived, 407 Kittyhawk
sent 277 arrived, 41 Maryland, 40 arrived, 116 Boston III, all
arrived, 90 Baltimore sent 24 arrived, most of the non arrivals
would be still at sea. Again as of 16 January 1942.

April 1940 to December 1945 Britain exported 279 aircraft to
Gibraltar, 4,616 to the Mediterranean Allied Air Force, 4,381
to the Mediterranean Air Command, 1,922 to the Mediterranean,
8,674 to the Middle East and 829 to North Africa. This is out
of 47,558 total exports. The total includes returning to the US
the USAAF P-59 Airacomet originally sent for testing.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich Rostrom]

"Geoffrey Sinclair" <***@froggy.com.au> wrote:

These ferry routes apparently could be as hazardous
as combat operations.

58 Blenheims arrived, 9 lost, 92 Wellingtons arrived, 8 lost...

Ow. 10%-15% losses just on a ferry movement.

8 Glenn Martins arrived, 4 lost

OWWW! _33%_ lost?

101 Beaufighter arrived, 10 lost, 343 Blenheim arrived, 21 lost,

Ow. Even 10% or 6% stings.

1 Maryland arrived, 4 lost

OWW!

22 Beaufort arrived, 2 lost, 382 Wellington arrived, 28 lost,
24 Bombay arrived, 3 lost...

The famous combat mission quota for 8th AF was 25.
My father commented that after he completed his
quota, the Air Force didn't know what to do with
him - they weren't expected to survive.

But 25 _ferry_ missions like this would be just as grim.

Note a few of the losses could in fact have arrived but
not yet reported as such.

One certainly hopes so.

As always, thanks for the information. This is surprising.

[The Horny Goat]

On Tue, 28 Jun 2016 15:40:40 -0400, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
The famous combat mission quota for 8th AF was 25.
My father commented that after he completed his
quota, the Air Force didn't know what to do with
him - they weren't expected to survive.

Further - this quota was well known thus the dark humor when the
commander in Catch-22 (which was written around 1960-61 and therefore
would have been read by numerous USAAF veterans and others who knew
very well what the quota was) steadily increased the required number
of missions several times to what I recall was 70 by the end of the
book.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom

22 Beaufort arrived, 2 lost, 382 Wellington arrived, 28 lost,
24 Bombay arrived, 3 lost...

The famous combat mission quota for 8th AF was 25.
My father commented that after he completed his
quota, the Air Force didn't know what to do with
him - they weren't expected to survive.
But 25 _ferry_ missions like this would be just as grim.

Yes but be aware lost includes crashed just after take off
from England. Then comes flying through the combat
zone around Malta and landing successfully, the more
axis control of the air around Malta the more the ferry
movements were at night, making Malta even easier
to miss.

So aircraft were lost before actually leaving English
air space and en route to Gibraltar or crashed on
arrival there, or were stuck awaiting repairs at report
time The approach to Malta risked encounters with
axis aircraft and Malta airfields were often damaged.

Note the most senior RAF officer taken prisoner in WWII
was on a direct flight from the UK to Malta in a Wellington.

And of course early in WWII the RAF rather over rated
its navigation abilities.

Post by Rich Rostrom
The famous combat mission quota for 8th AF was 25.
My father commented that after he completed his
quota, the Air Force didn't know what to do with
him - they weren't expected to survive.
But 25 _ferry_ missions like this would be just as grim.

The crews on the early ferry missions tended to stay at
the destination, one reason Arthur Harris was reluctant
to send bombers given the aircraft had a crew and he
was short of both, even in 1943, in his eyes anyway.

The 8th Air Force combat tour was 25 missions at the
start, raised to 30 then 35 in 1944. The obvious point
is what dates did your father fly combat with the 8th Air
Force? If on the unescorted strikes in 1943 I can
understand the sentiment but at the same time the
USAAF wanted experienced people back in the US in
the training system given the major expansion going on.
Or for that matter for the various USAAF support
formations, HQ's etc.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The 8th Air Force combat tour was 25 missions at the
start, raised to 30 then 35 in 1944. The obvious point
is what dates did your father fly combat with the 8th Air
Force?

Mid-1944. He arrived not long after D-Day,
flew on the COBRA "carpet bomb mission",
two missions to Berlin, Schweinfurt once,
and others. According to him, the quota
was 25, but he volunteered for 10 extra
missions to get promotion to captain.

Then the squadron got a new commander, who
thought only pilots should be captains (Dad
was a bombardier). So Dad withdrew after
the five extra missions. (He made captain
in the post-war AF Reserve.)

As to "not expected to survive", that's
probably an exaggeration - but even a
4% loss rate x 25 missions = 100%. Also,
the AF's expectations had been formed
earlier, so when more crew survived their
25 missions, the AF would not have been
prepared for it at first.

[Dave Smith]

Post by Rich Rostrom
As to "not expected to survive", that's
probably an exaggeration - but even a
4% loss rate x 25 missions = 100%. Also,
the AF's expectations had been formed
earlier, so when more crew survived their
25 missions, the AF would not have been
prepared for it at first.

On the flip side of that..... inexperienced crews seem to have
experienced higher casualty rates than those with experience. One of my
uncles was killed on his first operational flight. There plane had been
badly damaged, missed their first landing attempt, circled to try again
and crashed. My father's pilot had flown more 50 operational flights.
He had once bailed out when their plane iced up and fell, landed in the
English Channel and swam 11 miles to shore. Dad was on his 19th
operational flight when their plane was shot down.

I don't know the details of the rest of the crew, but one the night
their plane was shot down they had an extra crew member, a new pilot
with the squadron. He had been assigned to fly with Dad's crew because
they were the most experienced in the squadron and it was his first
operational flight. Dad was the flight engineer (co-pilot) so he was
reassigned so the new guy could sit in his seat. That was unfortunate
for him. Dad was the only one to get out. It was his 19th mission.

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by Rich Rostrom
As to "not expected to survive", that's
probably an exaggeration - but even a
4% loss rate x 25 missions = 100%. Also,
the AF's expectations had been formed
earlier, so when more crew survived their
25 missions, the AF would not have been
prepared for it at first.

To pick a nit, that's not how cumulative probability is calculated.

Given a probability of surviving a single mission of 96% (a 4% chance of
loss), then the chances of surviving 25 missions would be 0.96 x 0.96
twenty-five times, or;

0.96 x 0.96 x 0.96 x 0.96 x 096 .... x 0.96

Or slightly more than a 36% chance of surviving 25 missions.

Not great of course, but significantly better than the zero survival
rate which the simple 4% loss rate times 25 missions calculation would
presume.

[Mario]

Post by Bill Shatzer

Post by Rich Rostrom
As to "not expected to survive", that's
probably an exaggeration - but even a
4% loss rate x 25 missions = 100%. Also,
the AF's expectations had been formed
earlier, so when more crew survived their
25 missions, the AF would not have been
prepared for it at first.

To pick a nit, that's not how cumulative probability is
calculated.
Given a probability of surviving a single mission of 96% (a
4% chance of loss), then the chances of surviving 25 missions
would be 0.96 x 0.96 twenty-five times, or;
0.96 x 0.96 x 0.96 x 0.96 x 096 .... x 0.96
Or slightly more than a 36% chance of surviving 25 missions.
Not great of course, but significantly better than the zero
survival rate which the simple 4% loss rate times 25 missions
calculation would presume.

~1:2

Note that 25% less losses (4->3%) increase survival to 46.7%
(~1:1)

20% more losses (4->5%) survival down to 27.7%.
(~1:3)

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The 8th Air Force combat tour was 25 missions at the
start, raised to 30 then 35 in 1944. The obvious point
is what dates did your father fly combat with the 8th Air
Force?

Mid-1944. He arrived not long after D-Day,
flew on the COBRA "carpet bomb mission",
two missions to Berlin, Schweinfurt once,
and others. According to him, the quota
was 25, but he volunteered for 10 extra
missions to get promotion to captain.

Roger Freeman in Mighty 8th War Diary notes the tour
in early 1944 for heavy bomber aircrew was defined as
25 missions, in April 1944 it was raised to 30 but a sliding
scale was used for those who had already completed over
15 missions, the closer to 25 the fewer additional missions
had to be flown.

In late May the number was raised to 35 missions.

There was continual juggling about what constituted a
tour, if you used missions then a mission to Calais
was the same as one to Berlin for example.

In June 1944 USAAF Washington issued a directive
that 8th Air Force could not take a man off without
evidence of positive combat fatigue. The 8th
modified the order by mandating a medical by at
the latest the end of the 35th mission for heavy
bomber units.

So someone arriving in June 1944 should have
expected to do 35 missions from the start, if
Freeman is correct.

The 8th went to Schweinfurt post June 1944 on 19 July
1944 (173 attacking), 21 July (99 attacking) and 9 October
(329 attacking).

Berlin raids were 21 June 1944, 6 August, 6 October,
5 December 1944, 3 and 26 February 1945, 18 and
28 March.

Post by Rich Rostrom
Then the squadron got a new commander, who
thought only pilots should be captains (Dad
was a bombardier). So Dad withdrew after
the five extra missions. (He made captain
in the post-war AF Reserve.)

So he did 30 missions?

Post by Rich Rostrom
As to "not expected to survive", that's
probably an exaggeration - but even a
4% loss rate x 25 missions = 100%. Also,
the AF's expectations had been formed
earlier, so when more crew survived their
25 missions, the AF would not have been
prepared for it at first.

As has been pointed out the mathematics say the
survival chance at 4% losses is 0.96 to the power
of the number missions (25, 30, 35) as in 2 to the
power 3 is 2x2x2=8

And as has also been pointed out the operational
results say inexperienced people suffer higher losses,
the USN learnt to carefully look after people on their
first combat mission.

In terms of monthly figures 8th Air Force heavy bomber
losses on combat missions varied between 2.39 and
0.72% June 1944 to April 1945, an average 1.38% of
effective sorties, the kind that counted towards a tour.
With of course the note not all aircraft losses meant
crew losses.

At 1.38% average loss, 70.65% of crews would finish
a tour of 25 missions, 65.9% 30 missions and 61.5%
35 missions, assuming pure randomness in the losses
and every aircraft loss is a crew loss.

If you plug in the average heavy bomber loss rate for
August 1942 to October 1943 of 6.07% of effective sorties
you had a 20.9% chance of surviving a 25 mission tour.

The average heavy bomber loss rate November 1943
to May 1944 inclusive was 3.57% of effective sorties.
June 1944 saw the first under 2% loss rate, 1.41%.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[The Horny Goat]

On Wed, 29 Jun 2016 16:48:04 -0400, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
As to "not expected to survive", that's
probably an exaggeration - but even a
4% loss rate x 25 missions = 100%. Also,
the AF's expectations had been formed
earlier, so when more crew survived their
25 missions, the AF would not have been
prepared for it at first.

Well actually a 4% loss rate means 36.0% for 25 missions and 23.9% for
35 missions so 'not expected to survive' isn't a huge exaggeration.

However to be fair - "loss" does not equal "KIA" (could mean wounded
or captured) so while the crew might be lost to the war effort that's
not fatal.

(70 missions = 5.7% so I somewhat understand Yossarian going over the
wall)

[Haydn]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Above all I do not have a complete set of reports.

Even so, an impressive gathering of detailed information. Thank you
heartily.

It appears the Takoradi route was pretty expensive, more than I thought.

Haydn

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Haydn

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Above all I do not have a complete set of reports.

Even so, an impressive gathering of detailed information. Thank you
heartily.

Have camera, visit archive.

Post by Haydn
It appears the Takoradi route was pretty expensive, more than I thought.

Certainly early, it was a new route and we know aircraft accident rates
went way up early in the war. Remembering normal accident rates in
1930's were above modern.

US scheduled domestic airline passenger fatalities, year / number of
passengers / number of passenger fatalities / number per 100 million
passenger miles. (So crew fatalities not counted)

1932 476,041 / 19 / 14.96
1933 502,218 / 8 / 4.61
1934 475,461 /17 / 9.05
1935 762,820 / 15 / 4.78
1936 1,042,042 / 44 / 10.1
1937 1,130,338 / 40 / 8.39
1938 1,363,706 / 25 / 4.48
1939 1,895,793 / 9 / 1.2
1940 3,038,619 / 35 / 3.05
1941 4,141,748 / 35 / 2.35
1942 3,559,369 / 55 / 3.71
1943 3,484,203 / 22 / 1.54
1944 4,761,313 / 48 / 2.12
1945 7,605,360 / 76 / 2.23
1946 13,705,360 / 75 / 1.24
1947 12,890,208 / 199 / 3.21
1948 13,168,105 / 83 / 1.3

Note to 1946 figures include revenue and non revenue passengers,
from 1947 onwards only revenue passengers.

The raw numbers to not look high but we are talking only the airlines,
not general aviation. The decline of the rate is noticeable but the
numbers are small enough that one crash can make a big difference.

When talking US civil aviation in 1932,

January to June, there were all up 914 accidents or one per 63,885
miles flown, of which 105 fatal accidents or one every 556,100 miles
flown, 82 pilots killed. This can be broken down into,

a) Non scheduled operations, general aviation, 847 accidents or one
per 39,814 miles, 94 fatal accidents or one every 358,752 miles flown,
72 pilots killed.
b) Scheduled transport services figures were 67 accidents or one per
368,185 miles, 11 fatal accidents or one per 2,242,583 miles flown,
10 pilots killed.

Miles flown scheduled services, 24,668,414, other flying 33,722,685.

July to December, there were all up 1,152 accidents or one per 61,389
miles flown, of which 119 fatal accidents or one every 594,290 miles
flown, 99 pilots killed. This can be broken down into,

a) Non scheduled operations, general aviation, 1,104 accidents or one
per 40,286 miles, 113 fatal accidents or one every 393,416 miles flown,
94 pilots killed.
b) Scheduled transport services figures were 48 accidents or one per
547,178 miles, 6 fatal accidents or one per 4,377,425 miles flown,
5 pilots killed.

Miles flown scheduled services, 26,264,553, other flying 44,456,015.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[Don Phillipson]

Post by john Szalay

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Perhaps another way, what was the air route from the US to
the Mediterranean in 1942 for fighters, medium/light bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft? How about the air route from
the US to India in 1943 for fighters? How do we explain the
148 fighter losses en route to the Mediterranean in 1943?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_air_ferry_route_in_World_War_I
I#/media/File:AirFerryRoutesOfWWII.png

Better "South Atlantic air ferry route in World War II" at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Atlantic_air_ferry_route_in_World_War_II
mainly across the Caribbean and then to Bahia, Brazil,
then across the ocean to Takoradi on the coast of Ghana: thereafter
either east to Khartoum or else north towards Algiers, depending
on the date (and location of the front line in Africa.) Wiki says
both Pan American Airways and Imperial Airways pioneered
this route before the war.

[john Szalay]

"Geoffrey Sinclair" <***@froggy.com.au> wrote in news:R7qdnZpIe-t
by sea.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Perhaps another way, what was the air route from the US to
the Mediterranean in 1942 for fighters, medium/light bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft? How about the air route from
the US to India in 1943 for fighters? How do we explain the
148 fighter losses en route to the Mediterranean in 1943?
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_air_ferry_route_in_World_War_I
I#/media/File:AirFerryRoutesOfWWII.png

[David Wilma]

Dad flew in the Air Transport command '43 to '46 and
although he was on only one transatlantic mission (alone)
they did a lot of ferrying of aircraft, particularly fighters,
in sloppy groups rather than formations. Dad was
trained by the RAF (Ponca City, Oklahoma) and had a good
grounding in navigation. The AAF grads and the WASPs
were not so fortunate. They would have one pilot good
at navigating lead the other, but with little attention to formation.

Serious formation flying is tough on fuel consumption
as pilots are constantly adjusting speed. In the sloppy groups
you just had to keep track of the rest.

[Dave Smith]

Post by David Wilma
Serious formation flying is tough on fuel consumption
as pilots are constantly adjusting speed. In the sloppy groups
you just had to keep track of the rest.

I thought that the serious formation flying was many for fighter
formations in combat, to help them cover each other and to keep in touch
by signals when radios were unreliable, and for American bomber
formations. The latter used a tight pattern in order to maximize their
mutual defense against fighters, allowing the most guns to be trained on
attackers without shooting each other.

[John Dallman]

Post by Dave Smith
I thought that the serious formation flying was many for fighter
formations in combat, to help them cover each other and to keep in
touch by signals when radios were unreliable

Those need to be fairly loose formations. The RAF started the Battle of
Britain flying in tight formations, and found that the pilots needed to
concentrate on each other, and hadn't the spare attention to spot the
enemy.

Post by Dave Smith
and for American bomber formations. The latter used a tight pattern
in order to maximize their mutual defense against fighters, allowing
the most guns to be trained on attackers without shooting each other.

Different situation. The pilots can concentrate on formation flying, and
the gunners on lookout and shooting.

John

[David Wilma]

Some units counted the number of hours flown to determine a
tour. 600 hours was the goal over The Hump and for Mustang
units in England.