Behind the V-1 Purpose Evolution

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

In Wilhelm Hellmold: "Die V1" (1988) is a lot of data about the V-1.
Some things I got in the last years gave me the idea to look on its
rational.

The Fieseler Direktor Lusser wrote a "Kurzbericht Fi 103" of 21. June 1943.
It was after some experimental flight trials. Here he claimed an accuracy
of 50 % hits in a circle with 5.7 km diameter and 10 % in 2.2 km.

Additional Lusser presented a table "Lieferplan Grosserie Fi 103, gemaess
Besprechung beim Industrierat am 16. Juni 1943". It said a production of
5100 till end 1943 and further 17500 till 5/1944. For June 1944 and later
5000 per month were planned.

With 6 km accuracy and such production rates the V-1 was a weapon to deal
with the expected invasion fleet. It seems the production numbers were
already decided. But Lusser had his accuracy numbers straight out of
thin air. He had not a single full range shot and no experimental trials
of the guidance system performance. Not even on an airplane.


Next in the V-1 history came an interesting Luftwaffe report. It was
written by Hauptmann Werner Dahms at 9. March 1944. He was at the staff
of Oberst Wachtel, chief of the V-1 field units. Wachtel used this report
a month later to his superiors. It was written after the field trials in
Polen and the Baltic. Dahms wrote:

"Whether and when the scatter of 6 x 6 km promised now by the industry
will be achieved is today an open question." The present accuracy was
"optimistic perhaps 20 x 20 km to assume". He argued that such a weapon
could only hit an area like London. It would terrorize the population
there that the people will sooner or later flee the city. That way the
whole production capacity in London would be taken out by destroying
only a small fraction of it.

For Dahms the destruction of houses and factories was only a "welcome side
effect". Nowhere he mentions vengeance or just terror as end in itself
(like Goering in 1940). And nowhere the bind of allied forces was mentioned.
The idea for his view he probably had from WW I. He wrote in () the
following sentence in his report:

"In this context it should be pointed out that 1918 as a result of
fire from long range guns over 1 Million inhabitants left the city
of Paris, despite then only 350 shells with 120 kg explosive each hit
the target area."

I never heard that about the Paris gun. He gave no source. The "120 kg
explosive each" was certainly wrong, was shell size. Explosive was less
than 10 kg. Did 1 Millions flee Paris and was that really of economic
impact? If only woman and children it may not be. The whole sentence
rather sounds from a post WW I justification of the crazy barbarous
Paris gun project.

Elsewhere I read 2 Millions left London in 1944 because of the V-1. Again,
was this of any significant economic impact? How many workforce was left
in London and what % of Allied economic production was it? Was it worth
the death toll?

On the German side it seems the V-1 was a weapon on search for a purpose.
The today interpretation as vengeance or enemy force binding was just
an intelligent invention after the 20 km accuracy revealed the weapon
as a military failure.

But the V-2 was even more revealing. It was developed with a promised
accuracy of 1 km in 250 km (Hellmold). The later real accuracy was such
abysmal poor that it seems the economic worst weapons project of
Germany ever. The responsible people (Dornberger and von Braun) got not
shoot but promoted by Hitler himself.

Speer described a scene after Hitler saw a movie about the V-2. Hitler
ignored all around, stayed in his chair and made with his mouth sounds
of weapons and explosions. Like a child. But was it really crazy? It
looks like a pleasure for destruction, like childs or youths sometimes
openly show. Such a pleasure for destruction was probably endemic in
the nazi leadership and in military culture in general. An educated
and intelligent man can better excuse such motivation to himself and
others by inventing a rational. The V weapons story seems the best
example.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[c***@gmail.com]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Some things I got in the last years gave me the idea to look on its
rational.

I don't think many people think that the weapons were rational, in the sense
that their benefits outweighed their costs. Had the Nazi's cared about that
they wouldn't have started the war in the first place.

Neufeld, _The Rocket and the Reich_ calculates that the V-2 program killed more
people in Camp Dora being forced to build the rocket than died from the rocket
falling on them, as just one example.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With 6 km accuracy and such production rates the V-1 was a weapon to deal
with the expected invasion fleet.

Unless there was plan to add terminal guidance to a V-1 I don't see how
this could work. Even though a V-1 had almost one ton of high explosives, it
would still take almost a direct hit to damage an enemy ship. Even an Allied
battleship only presents about 600m^2 of upward surface area. Assume that
the numerous smaller ships present a total target area of about 100 battleships
in that 5.7km circle and any given weapon fired has about 1/20th of 1% of
a chance of hitting a target. Halve that because that circle represented the
50 percent line and we are talking about 40 V-1 fired to get a 1% chance of a
hit.

And that's leaving aside that a V-1 was visible on radar, vulnerable to
fighters, AA guns, and that ships were capable of moving out of the way of a
unguided V-1 and I have a hard time seeing the V-1 as any threat to an Allied
invasion fleet, or of much use at all in tactical situations.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The whole sentence
rather sounds from a post WW I justification of the crazy barbarous
Paris gun project.

Neufeld, _Rocket and the Reich_, claims that after WW1 the German army was
largely dominated by artillery-men, because the role of artillery had been so
important during the war. Given those circumstances I can certainly see how a
pro-Artillery interpretation of the Paris Gun became the officially accepted
version of events within the German army. Like you, I don't suspect it had much
to do with reality.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Again,
was this of any significant economic impact? How many workforce was left
in London and what % of Allied economic production was it? Was it worth
the death toll?

Tracing economic impact from strategic bombing is not particularly easy. All
sorts of other complications make it difficult to tease out the impact of the
bombs. The post-war Strategic Bombing Survey had a team of more than a thousand
work for a year studying the impact, and though it called the impact 'decisive'
it clearly pointed out that German war production peaked in mid-1944, and that
afterwards the German economy had many reasons to collapse- the Soviet capture
of Ploesti, the liberation of the Ukraine, Poland, and France, the morale
effects of the destruction of Army Group Center and Army Group B, etc. and that
figuring out the exact contribution of bombing was impossible.

Then there is the even more difficult question of second order effects-
all those guns at home rather than at the front, the costs of moving factories
underground, etc. How serious those were it is hard to say, but they do need
to be factored into the question of whether the Allied bombing was worth the
cost to the Allies of the bombing.

If, even after 200 volumes of the Strategic Bombing Survey, it is unclear what
effect the massive Allied bombing campaigns had, figuring out the much less
studied and smaller to begin with effects of V-1 and V-2 attacks are much
harder.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
On the German side it seems the V-1 was a weapon on search for a purpose.

That was true of all the end-war German oddities. The Smithsonian has the
world's best collection of end-of-war German eccentrics (ME 262, Arado A-234,
Do 335, He 219, a Natter and a Komet off the top of my head) and none of them
really were good investments for the Germans.

Chris Manteuffel

[Michael Emrys]

...the costs of moving factories underground, etc.

There was another effect of the bombing, which was that it drove the
Germans to disperse their factories in order to protect them. But this
meant that sub-assemblies needed to be transported from many locations
around the country to final assembly plants. And once the USAAF's
Transport Plan really got rolling, that meant that these sub-assemblies
were vulnerable in transit. And once enough trains and canal barges had
been destroyed, they couldn't be moved at all. The war ended before the
Plan was quite that totally successful, but it was still another nail in
the coffin of the Third Reich.

Michael

[Chris Morton]

In article <PvOdnc-***@posted.olypeninternet>, Michael
Emrys says...

Post by Michael Emrys
There was another effect of the bombing, which was that it drove the
Germans to disperse their factories in order to protect them. But this
meant that sub-assemblies needed to be transported from many locations
around the country to final assembly plants. And once the USAAF's
Transport Plan really got rolling, that meant that these sub-assemblies
were vulnerable in transit. And once enough trains and canal barges had
been destroyed, they couldn't be moved at all. The war ended before the
Plan was quite that totally successful, but it was still another nail in
the coffin of the Third Reich.

Another effect was the quality of the raw materials and the products being
turned out. Even as output increased, quality decreased. You see a picture of
a Mustang that bellied in and you see the prop blades bent back. You see a
picture of an FW-190D that bellied in and you see the WOODEN blades broken off.

[Chris Morton]

In article <PvOdnc-***@posted.olypeninternet>, Michael
Emrys says...

Post by Michael Emrys
There was another effect of the bombing, which was that it drove the
Germans to disperse their factories in order to protect them. But this
meant that sub-assemblies needed to be transported from many locations
around the country to final assembly plants.

It did the same thing to the Japanese only with even more grave consequences.

They had a hard time producing things like inline aircraft engines to the proper
technical standards WITHOUT the bombing. Once the bombing started in earnest
and stuff started getting farmed out to little job shops, production of war
materiel became a nightmare.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by c***@gmail.com
Unless there was plan to add terminal guidance to a V-1 I don't see
how this could work. Even though a V-1 had almost one ton of high
explosives, it would still take almost a direct hit to damage an
enemy ship. Even an Allied battleship only presents about 600m^2 of
upward surface area. Assume that the numerous smaller ships present a
total target area of about 100 battleships in that 5.7km circle and
any given weapon fired has about 1/20th of 1% of a chance of hitting
a target. Halve that because that circle represented the 50 percent
line and we are talking about 40 V-1 fired to get a 1% chance of a
hit.
And that's leaving aside that a V-1 was visible on radar, vulnerable
to fighters, AA guns, and that ships were capable of moving out of
the way of a unguided V-1 and I have a hard time seeing the V-1 as
any threat to an Allied invasion fleet, or of much use at all in
tactical situations.

I don't believe there was much expectation that they would be sinking
many ships, and certainly not once they were underway. But if (and this
was a big if) they could saturate the ports where the invasion fleets
needed to gather and load up, they wouldn't need to actually hit many
ships to throw off the entire timetable, perhaps enough to delay the
invasion past the campaign season of 1944. That was the theory. But like
a lot of the theories the Nazis were coming up with, things just never
seemed to quite work out that way in practice. And aiming everything at
London meant they weren't even really trying.

Michael

[Chris Morton]

In article <***@posted.olypeninternet>, Michael
Emrys says...

Post by Michael Emrys
I don't believe there was much expectation that they would be sinking
many ships, and certainly not once they were underway. But if (and this
was a big if) they could saturate the ports where the invasion fleets
needed to gather and load up, they wouldn't need to actually hit many
ships to throw off the entire timetable, perhaps enough to delay the
invasion past the campaign season of 1944. That was the theory. But like
a lot of the theories the Nazis were coming up with, things just never
seemed to quite work out that way in practice. And aiming everything at
London meant they weren't even really trying.

As I recall, the U.S. planned to use Fi-103s (or Loon copies) and or captured
V2s against the Japanese during he invasion of Kyushu. Unless equipped with
chemical weapons (also on the table), I'm not sure what that would have
accomplished.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Chris Morton
As I recall, the U.S. planned to use Fi-103s (or Loon copies) and or captured
V2s against the Japanese during he invasion of Kyushu.

Do you have a cite for this?

Was this actually decided on, or just someone's
blue-sky proposal?

[Chris Morton]

In article
<rrostrom.21stcentury-***@mx05.eternal-september.org>, Rich
Rostrom says...

Post by Rich Rostrom
Do you have a cite for this?
Was this actually decided on, or just someone's
blue-sky proposal?

I believe it's mentioned in "Downfall".

[Bill Shatzer]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Chris Morton
As I recall, the U.S. planned to use Fi-103s (or Loon copies) and or captured
V2s against the Japanese during he invasion of Kyushu.

Do you have a cite for this?
Was this actually decided on, or just someone's
blue-sky proposal?

The planned use of the JB-2s (Loons) against Japan is noted in several
sources. See for instance:

http://pacificstorm.net/en/museum/jb2.php
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic-Ford_JB-2
http://everything2.com/title/JB-2+Loon

Almost 1,400 of these missiles were built and almost 12,00 ordered
before production was halted and the contracts cancelled in September
1945 after the Japanese surrender. 1,400 (let alone 12,000) is far more
than would be necessary for any experimental, development, or testing
program and indicates a genuine intention to use them in combat.

[Chris Morton]

Post by Bill Shatzer
Almost 1,400 of these missiles were built and almost 12,00 ordered
before production was halted and the contracts cancelled in September
1945 after the Japanese surrender. 1,400 (let alone 12,000) is far more
than would be necessary for any experimental, development, or testing
program and indicates a genuine intention to use them in combat.

And that of course brings us back to the issue of HOW they were to be employed
and what the targets would have been. They couldn't carry a nuclear weapon, and
their accuracy was so bad, I don't see them as having much utility delivering a
conventional warhead. That pretty much leaves chemical and biological weapons,
with the latter probably being ruled out as being as dangerous to the invading
troops as the defenders. Of course they might have had some utility in
delivering diseases of food crops, but there would have been no immediate
benefit in that to the invasion plans.

[news]

Post by Chris Morton

Post by Bill Shatzer
Almost 1,400 of these missiles were built and almost 12,00 ordered
before production was halted and the contracts cancelled in September
1945 after the Japanese surrender. 1,400 (let alone 12,000) is far more
than would be necessary for any experimental, development, or testing
program and indicates a genuine intention to use them in combat.

And that of course brings us back to the issue of HOW they were to be employed
and what the targets would have been. They couldn't carry a nuclear weapon, and
their accuracy was so bad, I don't see them as having much utility delivering a
conventional warhead. That pretty much leaves chemical and biological weapons,
with the latter probably being ruled out as being as dangerous to the invading
troops as the defenders. Of course they might have had some utility in
delivering diseases of food crops, but there would have been no immediate
benefit in that to the invasion plans.

why not use them on the smaller distributed targets? for the most part
Japans manufacturing was concentrated in the big cities and the
outlaying towns/cities didn't get touched...bomb them and you create
havoc and dissension in the larger population

[Alan Meyer]

On 10/10/2013 02:23 PM, news wrote:
...

Post by news
why not use them on the smaller distributed targets? for the most part
Japans manufacturing was concentrated in the big cities and the
outlaying towns/cities didn't get touched...bomb them and you create
havoc and dissension in the larger population

By some time in the summer of 1945, I don't remember the exact date, the
Japanese Air Force stopped contesting the air space over Japan. Their
losses were so high and their effect on the American bombers so
negligible that they withdrew and hid their remaining aircraft and
pilots as best they could, presumably intending to use them as kamikazis
when the invasion began.

One historian described the B-29 raids in June, July, and August as
being a lot like commercial airline flights. You loaded up the plane,
flew a straight course to the target, delivered the cargo (in this case
from up to 30,000 feet), and flew a straight course back to home base.
Losses due to accidents and aircraft malfunctions were a much more
serious threat than the Japanese, and those losses were growing smaller
as experience was gained.

Under the circumstances, it's hard to see any mission that could be
performed by the Loon that couldn't be done better, cheaper, and pretty
much just as safely by manned aircraft.

These are totally different circumstances from what the Germans faced
where the V-weapons were the only way to deliver bombs to England
without suffering more losses than gains.

Alan

[Chris Morton]

Post by news
why not use them on the smaller distributed targets? for the most part
Japans manufacturing was concentrated in the big cities and the
outlaying towns/cities didn't get touched...bomb them and you create
havoc and dissension in the larger population

Yes, but with what kind of warheads?

Conventional warheads would be an utter waste of time in that role. The little
job shops in Tokyo, Yokohama, etc. weren't touched until the switch was made to
area firebombing.

I'm not sure how effective the Loon would be in delivering incendiary devices.

[Alan Meyer]

On 10/10/2013 01:11 AM, Bill Shatzer wrote:

...

Post by Bill Shatzer
The planned use of the JB-2s (Loons) against Japan is noted in several
http://pacificstorm.net/en/museum/jb2.php
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic-Ford_JB-2
http://everything2.com/title/JB-2+Loon
Almost 1,400 of these missiles were built and almost 12,00 ordered
before production was halted and the contracts cancelled in September
1945 after the Japanese surrender. 1,400 (let alone 12,000) is far more
than would be necessary for any experimental, development, or testing
program and indicates a genuine intention to use them in combat.
On the German side it seems the V-1 was a weapon on search for a purpose.

It looks like the Loon was in the same category. Overflowing with
production capacity and technical talent, it appears that U.S. planners
couldn't resist the idea of employing such an advanced weapon even if
its value was dubious at best.

Alan

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by c***@gmail.com

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
With 6 km accuracy and such production rates the V-1 was a weapon to deal
with the expected invasion fleet.

Unless there was plan to add terminal guidance to a V-1 I don't see how
this could work. Even though a V-1 had almost one ton of high explosives, it
would still take almost a direct hit to damage an enemy ship. Even an Allied
battleship only presents about 600m^2 of upward surface area. Assume that
the numerous smaller ships present a total target area of about 100
battleships in that 5.7km circle and any given weapon fired has about 1/20th
of 1% of a chance of hitting a target. Halve that because that circle
represented the 50 percent line and we are talking about 40 V-1 fired to get
a 1% chance of a hit.
And that's leaving aside that a V-1 was visible on radar, vulnerable to
fighters, AA guns, and that ships were capable of moving out of the way of a
unguided V-1 and I have a hard time seeing the V-1 as any threat to an
Allied invasion fleet, or of much use at all in tactical situations.

I did some calculations and now I think you may be right. The (about 500?)
transports were the only useful targets. But heavy equipment could be
loaded elsewhere weeks before. For the loading of the soldiers no
elaborate port equipment was necessary. Could be done in a destroyed
port city. The ships were only for loading in the port and had fleet
assembly points several km away. No way to hit. To build the V-1 as a
sea skimmer may be an option but never mentioned anywhere.

Actually I never read any calculations what the 6 x 6 km V-1 could
achieve. Only that four ports in south England were desired targets. I
thought the 6 x 6 km V-1 was "of course" able to handle it. It seems I
was blind by the lot of data in Hellmolds book to not even to ask this
initial question. People who look in most books or the Wikipedia about
the V-1 will probably feel the same. Flushed away by a lot of overwhelming
favorable citations on the V-1 efficiency without asking the purpose.

Post by c***@gmail.com

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
On the German side it seems the V-1 was a weapon on search for a purpose.

That was true of all the end-war German oddities. The Smithsonian has the
world's best collection of end-of-war German eccentrics (ME 262, Arado
A-234, Do 335, He 219, a Natter and a Komet off the top of my head) and none
of them really were good investments for the Germans.
Chris Manteuffel

You are right. But only few will agree with us. (Well, still the majority
here I hope.) The book by Hellmold had about the opposite conclusion of
what I wrote. He cited a British source how efficient the V-1 was. That
it only cost 150 Million Reichsmark but the defense cost the Allies 570
Million Reichsmark. (Did the British study really used "Reichsmark"?).
The houses damaged was worth 300 Million Reichsmark. It damaged 750 000
homes of that 23 000 were not repairable. Imagine the people.
What a wonderful weapon :(

Nowhere is a hint that even a total flatted London would not have changed
the way of war even a single week. The only effect would be a more poor
Europe after the war!

Instead in his conclusion section Hellmold used the V-1 data only as
prelude for his main blow. He then gave the translation of an article
from an "American Magazine" of April 1946. Its a must read. I could not
find the English version. But it seems it was by US Senator
Elbert D. Thomas: "Sitting Ducks in our Air Force" in "The American Magazine".

It mentioned most of the weapons you had in mind above too. Thomas concluded
that Germany was only 6 months from victory. You have to read it to
believe me. It seems to me as part of a campaign of Eisenhower's "Military
Industrial Complex" to get its part of the federal budget in peace time.
A side effect is the still spread notion that German wunderwaffen were
close to win or end the war it undecided. Just a year ago I saw an US TV
documentary how the Horten flying wing stealth bomber (I never saw evidence
that it was really build to be stealth) was close to change the war.

Most people have no chance to see the nonsense in such tech discussions.
Even the basic information to assess the issues are not common knowledge
nor easy available. Most basic questions were usually not asked at all.
The argument of my initial article was that a psychological factor, an
unconsciously pleasure for destruction, was the motivation for the V-1
and V-2. That factor was endemic in Nazi Germany. That perspective seems
such strange for the audience here that nobody replied on it. Indeed, I
never read it in a WW II book. But I think its a perspective worth to
investigate further.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Michael Emrys]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The argument of my initial article was that a psychological factor,
an unconsciously pleasure for destruction, was the motivation for the
V-1 and V-2. That factor was endemic in Nazi Germany. That
perspective seems such strange for the audience here that nobody
replied on it. Indeed, I never read it in a WW II book. But I think
its a perspective worth to investigate further.

I for one agree with you. There is no doubt in my mind that most of the
driving considerations behind Nazi policies, including a lot of military
strategy, were completely irrational, neurotic, even psychotic. I also
think there is a substantial body of people who bother to interest
themselves in the history of WW II who would broadly agree with that
assertion.

The problem is that there is little or no way to quantify such factors
reliably. So discussions tend to revolve around those factors that can
be quantified to at least some meaningful degree. We can argue about and
present citations for how many of a certain model of tank were produced.
But how do you determine how much of an average German's motivation in
continuing the war was down to sheer madness? Such discussions tend to
go off into pure speculation in the first moments.

Michael

[Chris Morton]

In article <***@posted.olypeninternet>, Michael
Emrys says...

Post by Michael Emrys
I for one agree with you. There is no doubt in my mind that most of the
driving considerations behind Nazi policies, including a lot of military
strategy, were completely irrational, neurotic, even psychotic. I also
think there is a substantial body of people who bother to interest
themselves in the history of WW II who would broadly agree with that
assertion.

As the perennial question goes:

Q:"How could Hitler have won?"
A: "By being somebody else."

To a large extent, the factors which led to Germany and Japan starting the war
contributed substantially to their losing it.

Dictatorships are usually really good at making bad decisions quickly.

Hitler made bad decisions at a pace at which usually only a meth addict can
manage.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Michael Emrys

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
The argument of my initial article was that a psychological factor,
an unconsciously pleasure for destruction, was the motivation for the
V-1 and V-2. That factor was endemic in Nazi Germany. That
perspective seems such strange for the audience here that nobody
replied on it. Indeed, I never read it in a WW II book. But I think
its a perspective worth to investigate further.

I for one agree with you. There is no doubt in my mind that most of the
driving considerations behind Nazi policies, including a lot of military
strategy, were completely irrational, neurotic, even psychotic. I also
think there is a substantial body of people who bother to interest
themselves in the history of WW II who would broadly agree with that
assertion.
The problem is that there is little or no way to quantify such factors
reliably. So discussions tend to revolve around those factors that can
be quantified to at least some meaningful degree. We can argue about and
present citations for how many of a certain model of tank were produced.
But how do you determine how much of an average German's motivation in
continuing the war was down to sheer madness? Such discussions tend to
go off into pure speculation in the first moments.
Michael

Well, behavior, attitudes and unconscious feelings can be accessed by
numbers too. Some social science is based on this. But first the issue
has to be clearly identified. Maybe there already was a study on such a
"factor" we are talking about. The V weapons are just a prime entry
example.

The interesting point I see is that with V-1 and V-2 we have two very
large quantifiable military economic projects that seem according
calculations irrational based. It seems the discussion here (unlike
the general public opinion) agrees on this assessment.

For the (almost all none German) audience here it is not a problem to
assert Nazi Germany an endemic pleasure for destruction. But what if
I suggest the same unconscious feeling was endemic in the USAAF too?
This people were - I fairly assume - minded like most of the military
of today. We may end by a good part of our today western society too.

At a time the USAAF could hit every point in Germany at will by sufficient
accuracy they suggested to use the V-1 too. Soon later only Japan was
left as target. But they neither had a useful way to deliver it nor any
target rational. Like in Germany before, a wunderful terror weapon in
search for an excusatory purpose again. Look at the timetable:

At 13 June 1944 was the first impact of a V-1 in London. According Hellmold,
at 4th July the USAAF gave order to create a copy for mass production. The
US V-1 was called JB-2. The V-1 enthusiasm by the the USAAF is best
documented by Werrell, Kenneth P.: The Evolution of the Cruise Missile.
Maxwell AFB 1985:

before the end of July, General B . E . Meyers ordered 1,000 JB-2s

Before September ended, the AAF wanted production raised to 1,000 a
month, a rate which the AAF expected to reach by April 1945, with an
increase to 5,000 a month by September.

In December 1944, the airmen ordered a second 1,000 and expected not
only to reach the 1,000 per month production rate by April, but 5,000
a month by June; and they studied the feasibility of a rate of 1,000 a
day!

Assistant Secretary of War (Air), Robert Lovett, for example, wanted a
production rate of 3,000 a month. On 14 January 1945, Arnold ordered a
further 75,000 JB-2s; he wanted the ability to launch 100 a day by
September and 500 a day by January 1946. The next day the project
received an AA-1 priority, the same as that enjoyed by the B-29.

Spaatz, who stated in July that there was no requirement for a pilotless
aircraft in the ETO (European Theater of Operations), also noted the
device's usefulness during bad weather when he wanted to use it to
harass and demoralize the Germans. He believed it could be used perhaps
ten days a month with the firing of about 300 weapons per day of
operation.

In January 1945, General Myers learned that the proposed missile program
would not only cost $ 1.5 billion but would require one-fourth of Allies'
ETO shipping assets.

Consequently, on the last day of January, General Wolfe halted production
until a further investigation could be concluded. The Air Materiel Command
study that emerged in February affirmed the earlier dire projections.
Nevertheless, it did recommend a production rate of 1,000 per month
beginning in November 1945 with a total production run of 10,000.

In fact, the AAF ordered 10,000 more JB-2s in February, in addition to
the 2,000 ordered in 1944. The new plan called for a launch rate of 1,000
per month by January 1946. The end of the war resolved the numbers game.
When production terminated in September 1945, US industry had delivered
about 1,385 JB-2s to the War Department.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
At 13 June 1944 was the first impact of a V-1 in London. According Hellmold,
at 4th July the USAAF gave order to create a copy for mass production...
...before the end of July, General B . E . Meyers ordered 1,000 JB-2s
Before September ended, the AAF wanted production raised to 1,000 a
month, a rate which the AAF expected to reach by April 1945, with an
increase to 5,000 a month by September.
...the project received an AA-1 priority, the same as... the B-29.

Wow. Thanks for the detailed response. (Others too.)

This looks very much like a panic reaction combined
with institutional ax-grinding.

The effectiveness of this kind of weapon was grossly
exaggerated.

The Air Force was demanding (and had a chance of
getting) an enormous budget for this project.

And there was that Senator claiming the Germans
could have won the war with V-1s.

It fits in with what I have read about airpower
advocates talking about "push-button warfare"
in 1945-1950.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Rich Rostrom
And there was that Senator claiming the Germans
could have won the war with V-1s.

Well, he mentioned V-2, Me 262, 163 and Arado jet bombers too.
He said the Germans at D-Day were 6 months short of air supremacy
over south England. Nuts, ok. But we can not be sure whether he
really wrote that. Probably he did. It seems Hellmold only had a
German translation from somewhere. Its on the net in several sites.
But I was unable to find the English version, only references that
it existed. It was a call for a large scale air weapons development
along the way Germany had shown. Some of his sentences you may feel
hard to endure.


## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[j***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Michael Emrys
I for one agree with you. There is no doubt in my mind that most of
the driving considerations behind Nazi policies, including a lot of
military strategy, were completely irrational, neurotic, even
psychotic.

They started out as irrational, and became gradually worse as the war
was lost. The irrationality seems to stem from the Nazi distrust of
analysis of problems, and suchlike intellectual methods, in favour of
"instinct" and suchlike emotional justifications.

One can loosely model this by considering which option in a decision
would look more spectacular on a cinema screen, and expecting the Nazis
to select that. That, after all, was what they would expect Hitler to do.

[news]

Post by j***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by Michael Emrys
I for one agree with you. There is no doubt in my mind that most of
the driving considerations behind Nazi policies, including a lot of
military strategy, were completely irrational, neurotic, even
psychotic.

They started out as irrational, and became gradually worse as the war
was lost. The irrationality seems to stem from the Nazi distrust of
analysis of problems, and suchlike intellectual methods, in favour of
"instinct" and suchlike emotional justifications.
One can loosely model this by considering which option in a decision
would look more spectacular on a cinema screen, and expecting the Nazis
to select that. That, after all, was what they would expect Hitler to do.

one only has to look at the Nazi version of Titanic (the movie) to
understand how deeply irrational they were

[Roman W]

On Sun, 13 Oct 2013 15:22:30 -0400, "news"

Post by news
one only has to look at the Nazi version of Titanic (the movie) to
understand how deeply irrational they were

Where is it available to view?

RW

[Chris Morton]

Post by Roman W
Where is it available to view?

You might want to start out looking at the History Channel website.

They recently ran a documentary on the making of the film.

I don't know if it's actually available as a complete film or where, but that's
where I'd start.

[c***@gmail.com]

Post by Roman W
On Sun, 13 Oct 2013 15:22:30 -0400, "news"

[Re: 1943 German Titanic]

Post by Roman W
Where is it available to view?

Amazon will sell you a copy. It is also available for online
streaming from Amazon or Netflix, if you have those services.

I find that the searching for Titanic Schmitz [the name of the female
lead] allows me to cut aside all the more recent films.

As part of the History Channels efforts to make ever more documentaries
from their same stock of WW2 footage they made a documentary "Nazi Titanic"
which is also available on Amazon and gives the story of that film.

Chris Manteuffel

[Michael Emrys]

Post by j***@cix.compulink.co.uk
One can loosely model this by considering which option in a decision
would look more spectacular on a cinema screen, and expecting the Nazis
to select that. That, after all, was what they would expect Hitler to do.

Good thought. After all, the thing that the Nazis were best at was
pageantry, staging spectacular events such as the Nuremberg rallies,
torchlight marches, etc. They always seem to have been admiring
themselves in the mirror of the newsreel.

Michael

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Instead in his conclusion section Hellmold used the V-1 data only as
prelude for his main blow. He then gave the translation of an article
from an "American Magazine" of April 1946. Its a must read. I could not
find the English version. But it seems it was by US Senator
Elbert D. Thomas: "Sitting Ducks in our Air Force" in "The American Magazine".
It mentioned most of the weapons you had in mind above too. Thomas concluded
that Germany was only 6 months from victory. You have to read it to
believe me. It seems to me as part of a campaign of Eisenhower's "Military
Industrial Complex" to get its part of the federal budget in peace time.

In 1946?

The actual success of the atomic-bomb project
created an impression, which is still very strong,
that the invention of a new weapon or technique
could be a trump card - absolutely decisive in war.

Much of the history since WW II - including the
enormous funding provided to "Big Science"
programs - has been shaped by that impression.

In the post-WW-II era, there was a ferocious
battle in the U.S. over the peacetime military
budget; the nascent Air Force was pressing for
the lion's share.

(The USAF was created as a separate service
in 1948.)

Air Force advocates were asserting that air
power would be completely decisive in any
future war, and that the Army and Navy should
be cut back drastically. (They proposed to
abolish the US Marine Corps, and eliminate
all naval vessels except convoy escorts.)

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
A side effect is the still spread notion that German wunderwaffen were
close to win or end the war it undecided.

There is a lot of such gas.

It persists because it is more entertaining and
dramatic than the real history.

As an example - I recently read a 1958 thriller
by a British author. The premise of the story was
that Germany had an _operational_ nuclear-powered
submarine in _1941_.

There are persistent claims that Germany and
even Japan had successful atomic-bomb projects.

The German wunderwaffen fit right into that
thinking. Tigers and Komets are much more
colorful than Mark IVs and Fw 190s.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
Instead in his conclusion section Hellmold used the V-1 data only as
prelude for his main blow. He then gave the translation of an article
from an "American Magazine" of April 1946. Its a must read. I could not
find the English version. But it seems it was by US Senator
Elbert D. Thomas: "Sitting Ducks in our Air Force" in "The American Magazine".
It mentioned most of the weapons you had in mind above too. Thomas
concluded that Germany was only 6 months from victory. You have to read it
to believe me. It seems to me as part of a campaign of Eisenhower's
"Military Industrial Complex" to get its part of the federal budget in
peace time.

In 1946?

Yes

Post by Rich Rostrom
The actual success of the atomic-bomb project
created an impression, which is still very strong,
that the invention of a new weapon or technique
could be a trump card - absolutely decisive in war.
Much of the history since WW II - including the
enormous funding provided to "Big Science"
programs - has been shaped by that impression.

Yes, but not in 1946. The notion was already like you wrote but no need
to put it in any arms race then. In 1946 the USA was very close to achieve
eternal peace and supremacy. The A-Bomb was the universal tool in foreign
policy. The US even threaten the small war ruined Yugoslavia in 1946 with
the A-Bomb.

According Fletcher Prouty the CIA developed in 1947 a plan to political
control the former USSR by a rather small fleet of aircraft - after an
extensive nuclear strike. No need for large occupation forces. A Soviet
A-Bomb was impossible anyway. Foremost because they had no uranium -
General Groves declared.

By 1948 with the Berlin blockade this whole concept was exposed as fantasy
and by the Red Bomb in 1949 the arms race started. Then the general
perception was (and still is) like you wrote. As more destructive the
weapon as better secured the peace.

(...)

We all know the rivalry Navy / Army / Air Force in almost every state.
Further there is an industry what simply want to make money by arms.
And we have people who enjoy to develop and use any new weapon. It is
part of our western culture - at least for some generations. But the
V-1 enthusiasm example in Germany and the USAAF reveal some deeper
psychological factor. A factor we usually want to cover up by other
explanations. The V-1 story suggests we are just more intelligent
chimpanzees. We use our intelligence to deceive our self over our
real motivation.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de

Post by Rich Rostrom
The actual success of the atomic-bomb project
created an impression, which is still very strong,
that the invention of a new weapon or technique
could be a trump card - absolutely decisive in war.

Yes, but not in 1946. The notion was already like you wrote but no need
to put it in any arms race then. In 1946 the USA was very close to achieve
eternal peace and supremacy. The A-Bomb was the universal tool in foreign
policy.

I don't see that as a contradiction.

OK, there is a contradiction between two ideas:

That the Bomb is an absolutely supreme weapon
so U.S. dominance is total and will be perpetual.

That in the future, other new arms technology
could be supreme, and the U.S. must pursue them.

But they also fit together a bit, and the second
idea subverts the first.

I don't think anyone was really prepared to
stake the whole future on the premise that
no one else would ever invent another decisive
weapon or technology.

[S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de]

Post by Rich Rostrom
That the Bomb is an absolutely supreme weapon
so U.S. dominance is total and will be perpetual.
That in the future, other new arms technology
could be supreme, and the U.S. must pursue them.
But they also fit together a bit, and the second
idea subverts the first.
I don't think anyone was really prepared to
stake the whole future on the premise that
no one else would ever invent another decisive
weapon or technology.

I think we have to divide here between technology and physics.
Technology is always the application of physics. The physics of
the A-bomb was public knowledge around the world. See the Fluegge
paper for example. The Trinity test was still an experiment in
physics.

A physicist and Nobel laureate recently told that the whole field of
civil high energy physics like CERN is only financed to (find or)
be not surprised by new applications for weapons. That may well
be a rational born after the A-bomb shock. But the main money here
is still in civilian research.

What the Senator 1946 suggested seems the technological arms race like
we had since the late 1940s. Faster bigger bombers and fighters. This
arms race was totally uneccessary in the US supremacy world of 1946. Most
was uneccessary even in our timeline. It was the result of Eisenhower's
"Military Industrial Complex". It inevitably shaped the US culture and
economy to our present days. The cold war much supported that development.
But the Senators article in mind I now wonder whether it may have happen
even without the cold war. In that case our present world would be much
more the direct result of WW II than anyone would assume.



## CrossPoint v3.12d R ##

[j***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But the V-2 was even more revealing. It was developed with a promised
accuracy of 1 km in 250 km (Hellmold). The later real accuracy was
such abysmal poor that it seems the economic worst weapons project
of Germany ever.

Its cost was the problem. It cost about as much as a bomber, delivered
less explosive less accurately, and could only be used once.

Neufeld in _The Rocket and the Reich_ reckons that an important factor
keeping the project going was the fear that the Allies would produce
similar rockets, which couldn't be defended against, whereas defence was
at least possible against bombers.

[news]

Post by j***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But the V-2 was even more revealing. It was developed with a promised
accuracy of 1 km in 250 km (Hellmold). The later real accuracy was
such abysmal poor that it seems the economic worst weapons project
of Germany ever.

Its cost was the problem. It cost about as much as a bomber, delivered
less explosive less accurately, and could only be used once.
Neufeld in _The Rocket and the Reich_ reckons that an important factor
keeping the project going was the fear that the Allies would produce
similar rockets, which couldn't be defended against, whereas defence was
at least possible against bombers.

maybe it's too early for me or I'm having a brain-fart but how does that
make sense?

[Bob Martin]

Post by news

Post by j***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But the V-2 was even more revealing. It was developed with a promised
accuracy of 1 km in 250 km (Hellmold). The later real accuracy was
such abysmal poor that it seems the economic worst weapons project
of Germany ever.

Its cost was the problem. It cost about as much as a bomber, delivered
less explosive less accurately, and could only be used once.
Neufeld in _The Rocket and the Reich_ reckons that an important factor
keeping the project going was the fear that the Allies would produce
similar rockets, which couldn't be defended against, whereas defence was
at least possible against bombers.

maybe it's too early for me or I'm having a brain-fart but how does that
make sense?

It's not just you, I was thinking the same.

[Michele]

Post by news

Post by j***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Its cost was the problem. It cost about as much as a bomber, delivered
less explosive less accurately, and could only be used once.
Neufeld in _The Rocket and the Reich_ reckons that an important factor
keeping the project going was the fear that the Allies would produce
similar rockets, which couldn't be defended against, whereas defence was
at least possible against bombers.

maybe it's too early for me or I'm having a brain-fart but how does that
make sense?

It makes sense in the sense that if the enemy has a weapon that you really
really cannot defend against, the remaining alternative is having the same
weapon yourself.

it was the principle that led to the creation of bomber fleets in the 1930s.
"The bomber will always get through", the enemy will have bombers, so what
remains is also building yourself some bombers.

The same goes for ICBMs for most of the Cold War, you know. The
Soviets/Russians mightily disliked anti-missile defense systems because they
changed that balance.

You could object that in that case, both sides did have the missiles, while
in the case of the German rockets, the Allies did not have and would never
have such rockets. Yet, one the main reasons why the USA built the nukes was
that the Germans also had a nuclear program going and the Allies did not
want to get the second place.

[TeoZ]

It didn't need an experience crew (with slim chances or making more then a
one way trip at that stage of the war) nor hard to come by aviation fuel.
It's not like they were paying the workers or using strategic materials to
built V1's.

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
But the V-2 was even more revealing. It was developed with a promised
accuracy of 1 km in 250 km (Hellmold). The later real accuracy was
such abysmal poor that it seems the economic worst weapons project
of Germany ever.

Its cost was the problem. It cost about as much as a bomber, delivered
less explosive less accurately, and could only be used once.

[Rich Rostrom]

It didn't need an experience crew...

True...

(with slim chances or making more then a
one way trip at that stage of the war)

That's an exaggeration - even in 1944 the
chance of loss for a German plane attacking
Britain was probably no worse than 1 in 4.

(Hit-and-run night raid.)

But even that is not supportable.

nor hard to come by aviation fuel.

The jet fuel for a V-1 was just a different
flavor of distilled petroleum.

It's not like they were paying the workers...

Some of the labor was done by skilled non-slaves,
and even the slaves could have been doing other
useful work. There was also the cost of machinery
and buildings employed.

or using strategic materials to built V1's.

Steel was a strategical material, and IIRC the
V-1 required some special materials for its
engine.

Overall, the V-1 was relatively cheap, but it
wasn't free.

[Michael Kuettner]

***@argo.rhein-neckar.de wrote:
<snip>
As the other points of your post have already been addressed, I'll add

Post by S***@argo.rhein-neckar.de
"In this context it should be pointed out that 1918 as a result of
fire from long range guns over 1 Million inhabitants left the city
of Paris, despite then only 350 shells with 120 kg explosive each hit
the target area."
I never heard that about the Paris gun. He gave no source. The "120 kg
explosive each" was certainly wrong, was shell size. Explosive was less
than 10 kg. Did 1 Millions flee Paris and was that really of economic
impact? If only woman and children it may not be. The whole sentence
rather sounds from a post WW I justification of the crazy barbarous
Paris gun project.

<snip>
Oh, the Paris gun existed; see
<http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris-Gesch%C3%BCtz>.
But it seems to have been confused with the Dicke Bertha :
The 120 kg was certainly right for her; that was the light grenade.
The heavy grenades had a payload of 410 kg explosives.
The range of the gun was 10 - 14 kilometers.

The Paris gun had a range of ca. 130 kilometers, but :
The grenades had 106 kilograms and carried a payload of 7 kilograms of
explosives.

Cheers,

Michael Kuettner