Post by SolomonWI have just finished reading Whirlwind "The air war against Japan
1942-1945" by Barrett Tillman. Its a good read.
One of his points is that Japan could have done more to prepare for the
strategic bombing.
Yes, this is usually the case, the question being what historical efforts
would have to stop in order to do the extra work.
Post by SolomonWDespite getting adequate intelligence of the B-29 as early as autumn 1943,
p40. The Japanese also had determined then how these B-29 would be used.
Tillman is saying the Japanese had figured out there would be night
fire raids?
Post by SolomonWAir defence was poor, little radar, little anti-aircraft guns poor
co-ordination, etc.
That applied to the Japanese positions just about everywhere. Japan
could not sustain a modern war, even without the Army-Navy feuds and
the failure to create an integrated air defence of Japan.
Post by SolomonWNo city in Japan seems to have adequate fire fighting, most were
volunteers. The fireman lacked modern equipment, even extension ladders and
used outdated tactics. Few air-raid shelters existed. Medical services were
inadequate.
Thoughts?
In 1939 I think Japan, with over 70 million people used about as much oil
as Australia with under 7 million. Away from a few key areas Japan's
economy was quite muscle, not machine powered.
There were plenty of volunteer fire fighters protecting cities in Europe
at the time, and there are still plenty of such fire fighters today.
How many Japanese buildings were tall enough to require extension
ladders?
A lot of the problems are due to the inability of the Japanese Military
authorities, the divided rule, the doctrine of always attack, the
propaganda that said Japan was winning well. Hard to say that if
major air raid protection works are going on. The air raid precautions
follow the theme of some Japanese, they always seemed to need a
few more months of preparation but the enemy was always that step
ahead.
The Japanese offensive in China in mid 1944 had as one of its
successful aims to take control of some airfields useful for B-29s.
Plus the sheer problems of supplying China limited missions.
Raids from Alaska would have supply problems but more
importantly weather problems, something both sides knew well.
Then add the weather over Japan, like Germany, plenty of days
unsuitable for visual bombing.
As long as the Marianas were held the B-29 could be kept out
of range or limited by supply and/or weather problems. So no
need for new air raid protection yet.
The first B-29 raid on Japan was 14 June 1944.
The US invaded the Marianas on 15 June 1944.
The first B-29 raid on Japan from the Marianas was on 24
November 1944.
The first test fire raid was against Nagoya on 3 January 1945.
The early B-29 raids had little effect and overall the planned
dispersal of Japanese industry is thought to have cost more
production than B-29 inflicted damage.
According to the USAAF Japanese fighters shot down 1.75%
of effective B-29 sorties in November 1944, 1% in December
and 1.5% in January. Radar stations on Iwo Jima helped warn
Japan. These losses were a worry to the USAAF but B-29
losses to enemy aircraft were never as high again.
Japanese AA was largely ineffective until the low level raids.
The first major fire raid was on 4 February 1945.
The US invaded Iwo Jima on 13 February 1945.
The B-29 campaign was another end weighted bomber
offensive, to the end of March 1945 the 20th had dropped only
18.7% of its eventual total B-29 wartime bomb tonnage, to end
May it was 43.3%, end June 62.5%, end July 87.6%.
The bomb tonnage dropped in June 1945 was slightly more
than the tonnage dropped June 1944 to March 1945.
The Japanese authorities could certainly have done more, even
given the problems they had, at the same time it is unlikely any
authority would have done the sort of measures that turned out
to be required without the evidence of actual raids and would
probably still be caught out by the expansion of the B-29 force
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.