fighting withdrawal from Normandy (after D-Day)

[chris]

I saw some videos lately about Normandy after the D-Day landings. The
following points were made very clearly.

1) The German commanders quickly realized they could not hold Normandy
and begged Hitler for permission to withdraw to a better position.

2) Hitler refused, ordering his army to stay in Normandy and "fight to
the last man".

3) The Germans stayed and gave the allies a VERY hard fight (much to the
allied surprise)

4) The Germans eventually withdrew with enormous losses, severely
compromising their ability to resist the allies later on.


Now then,
Suppose Hitler HAD allowed them to withdraw when they wanted to.
They would have gone to a "stronger position" they could defend more
effectively.

What position might that have been?
How might that have affected later conduct of the war?

Chris Allen.

[Michael Emrys]

Post by chris
What position might that have been?

The Westwall. Any location before that only means that they would be
defending a much longer front than they had in Normandy on terrain not
so favorable to defense. They might have paused briefly on the Seine to
give the forces in the South of France time to beat it back to the
Reich, but they couldn't have held that for very long once the Allies
had advanced in force and gotten supplies forward.

Michael

[Rich]

Post by chris
What position might that have been?

(snip) They might have paused briefly on the Seine to
give the forces in the South of France time to beat it back to the
Reich, but they couldn't have held that for very long once the Allies
had advanced in force and gotten supplies forward.

And that is what made it so problematic for the Allies. They assessed
that once they were securely ashore the only viable option for the
Germans was a steady delay to the Seine-Loire line and then the German
frontier. Unfortunately, Hitler refused to follow script, which led to
the seven-week near stalemate in Normandy. And also left the Allied
logistical build-up plans, which were already rickety, a shambles. I
suspect it turned out to be a wash.

Cheers!

[Bay Man]

Post by chris
I saw some videos lately about Normandy after the D-Day landings. The
following points were made very clearly.
1) The German commanders quickly realized they could not hold Normandy
and begged Hitler for permission to withdraw to a better position.
2) Hitler refused, ordering his army to stay in Normandy and "fight to
the last man".
3) The Germans stayed and gave the allies a VERY hard fight (much to
the allied surprise)
4) The Germans eventually withdrew with enormous losses, severely
compromising their ability to resist the allies later on.

Liddell Hart described Normandy as an operation that eventually went to plan
but not according to timetable.

Max Hastings:
"Overall Montgomery accomplished as much in Normandy as he could with the
forces available to him. He is owed a greater debt for his performance than
has been recognised in recent years, when his own untruths and boastfulness
have been allowed to confuse the issue, and when the root problem of the
limited abilities of his troops, and the dynamism of the Germans has often
been ignored"

Hastings does make a point that the Germans did not have a complete shield
around all of the beaches with the line facing the US forces not complete,
while the line to the east was fully complete. The Germans kept sending
units after unit into the British/Canadian sector with them being ground
down in the process. To the Germans this wes the natural point in which to
stop the enemy breaking out of Normandy, so would concenrate on this point.

Most of the German army in the west was destroyed by the British in
Normandy. If the Germans fell back Normandy would have left to be one big
staging area.

[Rich]

On Nov 20, 6:28 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Liddell Hart described Normandy as an operation that eventually went to plan
but not according to timetable.

Pretty much.

Post by Bay Man
"Overall Montgomery accomplished as much in Normandy as he could with the
forces available to him. He is owed a greater debt for his performance than
has been recognised in recent years, when his own untruths and boastfulness
have been allowed to confuse the issue, and when the root problem of the
limited abilities of his troops, and the dynamism of the Germans has often
been ignored"

Also quite true. Interesting, so far your clipped quotations from
people that obviously knew quite a bit more on the subject than you
are quite accurate...then we get to your "analysis", which of course
you claim is what they say, but that actually bears little relation to
what they really said. Not content with sullying "Toose's" reputation,
now you have at Hastings (admittedly not my favorite author).

Post by Bay Man
Hastings does make a point that the Germans did not have a complete shield
around all of the beaches with the line facing the US forces not complete,
while the line to the east was fully complete.

Where does he make that point? Which page or pages? And what "shield"
was that? Are you talking about the beach defenses or the
reinforcements? When?

Post by Bay Man
The Germans kept sending
units after unit into the British/Canadian sector with them being ground
down in the process.

I see, so then you're saying that they did not send "unit after unit"
to the American sector? Really? Do you have a table of the
reinforcements as to what, where, and when that proves that? And you
are also saying that the German units left facing the Americans were
not "ground down"? Do you have proof of that fact as well? Say the 10-
day casualty reports of 7. Armee? Perhaps the Allied POW counts?

Post by Bay Man
To the Germans this wes the natural point in which to
stop the enemy breaking out of Normandy, so would concenrate on this point.

Where does Hastings say that? It was not the "natural point" to stop
the Allies from breaking out; the Germans concentrated the majority of
their armored reserve to the east because that was the "natural point"
where it could assemble to execute the counterattack that would defeat
the Allied beachhead and force them to withdraw.

Post by Bay Man
Most of the German army in the west was destroyed by the British in
Normandy.

Where does Hastings say that? Again, do you have evidence to support
this remarkable contention? How many constitutes "most" in your
remarkable lexicon? How many did they lose? How many of those were to
Commonwealth arms (I note that not being satisfied with a calumny
against the Americans, you also chose to ignore the Commonwealth and
other Allies).

Post by Bay Man
If the Germans fell back Normandy would have left to be one big
staging area.

Nothing like stating the bleeding obvious.

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich
now you have at Hastings (admittedly not my favorite author).

Not mine either. Mine is a fellow named Adam Tooze.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
Hastings does make a point that the Germans did not have a complete
shield around all of the beaches with the line facing the US forces
not complete, while the line to the east was fully complete.

Where does he make that point?

In one of his books.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The Germans kept sending
units after unit into the British/Canadian sector with them being
ground down in the process.

I see, so then you're saying that they did not send "unit after unit"
to the American sector?

That is so.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
To the Germans this wes the natural point in which to
stop the enemy breaking out of Normandy, so would concenrate on this point.

Where does Hastings say that?

I think he said it was 50 miles further east, so 50 miles nearer Paris and
Germany. Which makes sense of course.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
Most of the German army in the west was destroyed by the British in
Normandy.

Where does Hastings say that?

I think it was in Overlord or in one of his Daily Telegraph articles.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
If the Germans fell back Normandy would have left to be one big
staging area.

Nothing like stating the bleeding obvious.

I see you got that then. Good.

[Rich]

On Nov 22, 12:13 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Not mine either. Mine is a fellow named Adam Tooze.

Why do you rely on an economic historian for military history? And
then refer to a journalist for your military history?

Post by Bay Man
In one of his books.

The part the troll clipped, since he is ignorant of the facts he is
unable to answer it: "Which page or pages? And what "shield"
was that? Are you talking about the beach defenses or the
reinforcements? When?"

Post by Bay Man
That is so.

You see the troll is also ignorant of the facts with regards to the
German reinforcements.

Post by Bay Man
I think he said it was 50 miles further east, so 50 miles nearer Paris and
Germany. Which makes sense of course.

No, it makes no sense whatsoever, which is unsurprising considering
you are the source. Of course, being a troll, yet again you have
miserably failed to identify where Hastings claims this.

Post by Bay Man
I think it was in Overlord or in one of his Daily Telegraph articles.

You "think" he wrote it in a book or a newspaper article? I think
you're a liar and simply like to rubbish authors unaware of your
blackening their reputations, by usingthem as faux validation for your
idiotic maunderings.

The part the troll snipped because of his inability to answer: Again,
do you have evidence to support this remarkable contention? How many
constitutes "most" in your remarkable lexicon? How many did they lose?
How many of those were to Commonwealth arms (I note that not being
satisfied with a calumny against the Americans, you also chose to
ignore the Commonwealth and other Allies).

Post by Bay Man
I see you got that then. Good.

Yes, I got it a long time ago, you're an internet troll; a serial liar
with the manners of a two-year old, and the intellect of a hamster.

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich
On Nov 22, 12:13 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Not mine either. Mine is a fellow named Adam Tooze.

Why do you rely on an economic historian for military history?

Because he specializes in warfare. He also got a hell of lot right upturning
50 years of many myths. He objectively looks at the big picture with more
info to hand, whch many writers clearly are unable to do. He also
emphasized the economic and supply situation which was critical.

< snip insulting babble >

[Rich]

On Nov 23, 12:52 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Because he specializes in warfare.

No, he specializes in economic history; he just happens to write about
the economic history of a nation, Nazi Germany, which was at war.

[Rich]

So then, I suppose we might as well explore some facts. They are
infinitely more interesting than the venomous lies of an internet
troll.

On Nov 22, 12:13 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The Germans kept sending
units after unit into the British/Canadian sector with them being
ground down in the process.

I see, so then you're saying that they did not send "unit after unit"
to the American sector?

That is so.

So then, in the initial operation, six American and six Commonwealth
divisions landed and engaged:

Western (USA) Sector: 91 LL ID, 709 ID, 352 ID
Eastern (Commonwealth) Sector: 716 ID, 21 PzD, 346 ID

By circa 15 June, German reinforcements included:

Western Sector: 3 FJD, 77 ID, 243 ID, 265 ID (KG), 275 ID (KG), 353
ID, 2 PzD, 17 SSPzD
Eastern Sector: PzLehrD, 2 SSPzD (KG), 12 SSPzD

By this point, American forces were facing the equivalent of about 9
2/3 German divisions. Commonwealth forces were facing five and 1/3.

By circa 30 June:
Western Sector: 266 ID (KG), PzLehrD (from Eastern Sector), 2 SSPzD(-)
Eastern Sector: 276 ID, 1 SSPzD, 2 PzD (from Western Sector), 9 SSPzD,
10 SSPzD; 716 ID withdrawn

By this point, American forces were facing 10 2/3 divisions, but the
fall of Cherbourg effectively destroyed 243 and 709 ID. Commonwealth
forces were facing 8 2/3. Given the Cherbourg losses, American and
Commonwealth forces were facing about the same opposition; roughly
equivalent to 8 2/3 divisions.

By circa 15 July:
Western Sector: 5 FJD
Eastern Sector: 16 FD (LW), 277 ID

By this point, American forces were facing 9 2/3 divisions;
Commonwealth forces 10 2/3.

By circa 30 July:
Western Sector: 275 ID (-), 326 ID, 116 PzD
Eastern Sector: 272 ID

By this point, American forces were facing 12 1/3 divisions;
Commonwealth forces 11 2/3.

I am sure this will engender endless arguments about "Tooze says
penzar dvisuns war better than infuntree disvuns" and "more better
Gruman Tigger tanks than Amerun Medum infantry tks". I can hardly
wait...

In any case, divisional counts as a measure are quite simple, but
fraught with interpretations. The thorniest are 2 PzD and PzLehr. They
were deployed to the Caumont Gap, so basically plugged the hole in the
German line and both divisions deployed elements against both Allied
armies at different times. Nonetheless, by late June and early July
they had effectively realigned with Lehr facing First US Army and 2
Panzer Second British Army.

Extending this beyond the end of July, COBRA caused a large scale
German realignment that stripped first 1. SSPz and 2 PzD away from the
Commonwealth front, and then 9 and 10 SSPz as well, while 708 ID and 6
FJD were shoved into the line south of Alencon in an effort to halt
Patton's exploitation. To facilitate that, two divisions, 85 and 89
ID, were inserted into the line facing the Commonwealth forces. So, by
15 August there were:

American Sector ("west and east" are a misnomer by this time): 18 1/3
divisions
Commonwealth Sector: 9 2/3 divisions

In other words oh intellectually challenged one, "that is so" ranks
amongst your silliest statements yet.

Post by Bay Man

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
Most of the German army in the west was destroyed by the British in
Normandy.

Where does Hastings say that?

I think it was in Overlord or in one of his Daily Telegraph articles.

Aside from wondering if bayman might ever get a clue, does anyone ever
wonder why the American campaign designated as "Normandy" runs from 6
June to 25 July 1944? The reason is that the defeat of the German Army
in Normandy, in absolute operational terms, may be said to have
occurred on that date and all else was window dressing. As of that
date American battle casualties may be estimated as 54,032, including
10,804 KIA and 40,596 WIA, 2,115 CAP, and 517 MIA (original reports as
of that date totaled 575 CAP and 4,507 MIA). Total British and
Commonwealth casualties to 28 July (25-27 July records are partially
missing), may be estimated as 7,458 KIA, 36,922 WIA, and 8,365 CAP/MIA
(these figures, unlike the American, have not been reconciled). So
there were an estimated 54,032 American and 52,745 Commonwealth losses
for a total of 106,777 Allied casualties. In other words, honors were
about even in terms of the cost of the victory.

The measure of the victory on the German side is more difficult to
ascertain because of the paucity of original German records. The best
we have is the OB West report for losses for 6 June-27 July, which
totaled 127,247. Those are probably substantially correct, since the
Allies counted cumulative German captured as of 31 July as 13,134 by
the Commonwealth and 69,386 by the Americans. So 82,520 of at least
127,247 German casualties were captured and more than half the total
German losses were inflicted by American arms.

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich
On Nov 20, 6:28 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Liddell Hart described Normandy as an
operation that eventually went to plan
but not according to timetable.

Pretty much.

Post by Bay Man
The Germans kept sending
units after unit into the British/Canadian
sector with them being ground
down in the process.

I see, so then you're saying that they did not send "unit after unit"
to the American sector?

No. Just as well as US armour was inferior to the British and Canadian. The
US had only one tank, a medium infantry tank, fine for infantry support, but
which was not suited to the more heavier tank war in NW Europe. The British
had a variety of tanks for differing roles. Such as, the Firefly and
Challenger with 17pdr guns - better at anti-tank than the 88mm, and also
used the 17pdr in anti-tank gun roles. Superior armour penetrating shells -
APDS.

The highly manoeuvrable Churchill had armour approx the same as the Tiger.
The Cromwell was very fast, superb engine, low profile and better armoured.

If the Germans poured the same level of armour into the Americans they did
the Brits, the US would have crumbled - the US armour was just not up to it,
as shown when German heavy armour poured through the Ardennes in Dec 44.

[Rich]

On Nov 22, 1:26 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
No. Just as well as US armour was inferior to the British and Canadian. The
US had only one tank, a medium infantry tank, fine for infantry support, but
which was not suited to the more heavier tank war in NW Europe. The British
had a variety of tanks for differing roles. Such as, the Firefly and
Challenger with 17pdr guns - better at anti-tank than the 88mm, and also
used the 17pdr in anti-tank gun roles. Superior armour penetrating shells -
APDS.

Um, no, sorry, but your stupidity is showing again. The M4 was a
Medium Tank, Infantry Tank was a British designation and distinction.
Montgomery better described the M4 as a "universal tank", i.e., a main
battle tank. The Firefly and Challenger were not really "tanks" of any
kind in the lexicon of the era, they were specialized tank destroyers
- really had to be such given the lack of HE capability in the 17-pdr,
the lack of bow machineguns, and the lack of armor protection in the
Challenger. Not to mention Challenger was a typical mid-war dogs
breakfast of a British design; so nearly unmaneuverable that it was
held out of combat until August, then issued in small numbers, and
then withdrawn again almost immediately for more fixes. It didn't see
any significant service until November 1944 and even then in small
numbers. Mind you, I'm curious how the Sherman IIc and Vc, AKA Sherman
17-pdr, was a "British tank" that was better than the M4?

Post by Bay Man
The highly manoeuvrable Churchill had armour approx the same as the Tiger.
The Cromwell was very fast, superb engine, low profile and better armoured.

The Churchill was very maneuverable in rough terrain and in climbing;
but it was also slow. The Cromwell was fast, since it was designed to
the outmoded Cruiser Tank concept, the engine was quite good, but then
so was the Ford GAA. Low profile? You seriously think inches matter a
800 yards? Better armored - no, not really.

Post by Bay Man
If the Germans poured the same level of armour into the Americans they did
the Brits, the US would have crumbled - the US armour was just not up to it,
as shown when German heavy armour poured through the Ardennes in Dec 44.

I see you are clueless as ever. The Germans "poured armor" into the
eastern sector and "poured infantry" into the western, for very good
reasons, the same reasons that caused the Allies to chose to land 7th
Armoured Division on D+1 in the British sector and the 30th Infantry
Division in the American sector, the terrain was simply better suited
for that deployment. I see you are as equally clueless about the
Ardennes as you are of every other aspect of World War II; color me
unsurprised.

Go back to piddling your pants little boy.

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich
On Nov 22, 1:26 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
No. Just as well as US armour was inferior to the British and Canadian. The
US had only one tank, a medium infantry tank, fine for infantry support, but
which was not suited to the more heavier tank war in NW Europe. The British
had a variety of tanks for differing roles. Such as, the Firefly and
Challenger with 17pdr guns - better at anti-tank than the 88mm, and also
used the 17pdr in anti-tank gun roles. Superior armour penetrating shells -
APDS.

Um, no, sorry, but your stupidity is showing again.

This arrogant one again. Here he goes....

Post by Rich
The M4 was a Medium Tank,

I wrote that above.

Post by Rich
Infantry Tank was a British designation and distinction.
Montgomery better described the M4 as a "universal tank",
i.e., a main battle tank.

For the British it was as they put a superior gun on it than the German 88mm
calling it the Firefly and used the smaller gun versions. The US rejected
the Firefly, so in their eyes they only had an "infantry tank".

Post by Rich
The Firefly and Challenger were not really "tanks" of any
kind in the lexicon of the era, they were specialized tank destroyers
- really had to be such given the lack of HE capability in the 17-pdr,

Not tanks? A new one on me. The 17pdr did have HE. You are right in that
the Challenger was more of a tank destroyer with an armoured turret. A
hybrid.

Post by Rich
it was held out of combat until August,

It was delayed into combat because it needed port facilities to get ashore
unable to be landed on beaches.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The highly manoeuvrable Churchill had armour
approx the same as the Tiger. The Cromwell was
very fast, superb engine, low profile and better armoured.

The Churchill was very maneuverable in rough
terrain and in climbing; but it was also slow.

At 18mph is wasn't that bad. Off-road it was not handicapped that much by
speed. The armour was eqiv to a Tiger and eventually superseded the Tiger.
With APDS shells in the 6pdr gun it could take on Tigers if need be, but was
not used for that role. The British had many tanks for differing roles.

Post by Rich
The Cromwell was fast, since it was designed to
the outmoded Cruiser Tank concept,

The cruiser tank concept never went away. It relied on speed, slanted
armour, etc, which was incorporated in many later designs. The fast
Crusader was dropped because of the pretty unreliable engine used - a WW1 US
plane engine made under license. The Cromwell's RR engine was superior to
any Ford. The RR Meteor was the best allied tank engine by a mile and
probably the best in WW2 of any.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
If the Germans poured the same level of armour into the Americans they did
the Brits, the US would have crumbled - the US armour was just not up to it,
as shown when German heavy armour poured through the Ardennes in Dec 44.

Your History Channel education is surfacing. US generals after the Bulge
were demanding nearly all the British production of APDS shells, they were
found so lacking in punching out German armour.

My point that if the roles were reversed in Normandy and the US had the
eastern beaches, The Germans would have driven them back to the beaches, the
US armour was so lacking to the German and British.

The Firefly was a great success and a number of on the ground US commanders
wished they had it. Who wouldn't? It knocked out Tigers and Panthers
regularly. It must have hurt to see one of their own tanks, the Sherman,
updated by their ally and they can't have one.

Interesting.....from Wiki............
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Firefly

"While the number of Panthers and Tigers only accounted for some 30% of the
nearly 2,500 German tanks deployed in Normandy (the rest being composed of
Panzer IVs, Sturmgeschütz IIIs and other tanks the standard Shermans were
able to effectively handle), Montgomery's strategy of drawing the bulk of
the German armour units around the vital town of Caen so the American units
could break out to the west meant that British and Commonwealth units had to
face over 70% of all German armour deployed during the Battle of Normandy,
as well as almost all the elite, well-equipped SS units which contained the
fearsome Tigers and Panthers. Thus, despite the relatively low number of
Panthers and Tigers deployed, they would almost all be facing British and
Commonwealth troops. As a result, the Sherman Firefly was perhaps the most
valued tank by British and Commonwealth commanders, as it was the only tank
in the British Army able to effectively defeat the Panthers and Tigers at
the standard combat ranges in Normandy."

Montgomery was able to draw the bulk of the German army and armour into him
to destroy it using superior British armour to the US, allowing the less
armoured US forces to break out to complete the encirclement. Monty knew he
had armour which was a match to the Tigers and Panthers and that the US
never. The Germans had about 800 Tigers and Panthers which took about 5
standard Shermans to knock out, and usually about two or three of those were
destroyed in the process. A Firefly could knock out a Tiger by itself and
did so on many occasions. In some instances two or three at a time.

The British idea of equal armour and firepower to a Tiger or Panther in the
attacking role and equal in the defensive proved successful.

Post by Rich
Go back to piddling your pants little boy.

I doubt you wear pants to piddle in. :)

[Rich]

On Nov 23, 12:52 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man

Post by Rich
The M4 was a Medium Tank,

I wrote that above.

No, you wrote it was a "medium infantry tank". I know the distinction
escapes you, as does any subtlety, but nonetheless your calling it
that is incorrect.

Post by Bay Man
For the British it was as they put a superior gun on it than the German 88mm
calling it the Firefly and used the smaller gun versions. The US rejected
the Firefly, so in their eyes they only had an "infantry tank".

No, because fitting the 17-pdr necessarily negated part of the tank
tankiness. The 17-pdr enhanced its ability to punch holes in other
tanks at the expense of doing well many of the other tasks that were
then considered important for tanks; like engaging infantry, artillery
weapons, fortifications (other than punching holes in concrete, which
isn't very satisfying), and the like. Installing the 17-pdr reduced
the universality of the tank rather than increased it.

Post by Bay Man
Not tanks? A new one on me. The 17pdr did have HE. You are right in that
the Challenger was more of a tank destroyer with an armoured turret. A
hybrid.

Something you didn't know? Who would have thought it was possible?
Yes, the 17pdr/77mm did have HE, which is why I said it lacked "HE
capability". In other words, the initial issue of HE was crap. For one
thing, total issue was insignificant, only 67,000 rounds were produced
in 1943 and 103,000 in 1944, compared to 1,697,000 rounds of AP and
APC in 1943 and 1,226,000 rounds of AP, APC, APCBC, and APDS in 1944.
Worse, the HE round was near useless, since it utilized a full
cartridge, thus firing a too high a velocity (eliminating graze and
leading to what explosive force produced being directed into the
ground) with a small burster, 1.08 pounds initially (75mm M48 HE for
the 75mm M2/M3 Gun employed 1.5 pounds in its burster). In 1944 a
reduced charge cartridge was introduced, with 160,000 produced, which
solved the velocity problem, but the burster remained anemic until
1945, when the High-Capacity was introduced with a 1.28 pound burster.
In 1945 63,000 reduced charge and 145,000 reduced charge, HC rounds
were produced, so 208,000 HE versus 329,000 APCBC and APDS. So by the
end of the war (only 41,000 RC HC HE rounds were produced by the end
of May) paltry numbers of effective HE rounds were finally available,
which meant that just as the war ended the Firefly was an effective
universal tank rather than a specialized antitank vehicle.

The Challenger, which was actually the original "Firefly" (a code
designation that included all 17-pdr SP experiments; along with, oddly
enough, the Wasp flamethrower), had all the same problems, plus never
really worked. It was intended as the "Firefly" to provide the
specialized antitank capability to the armoured reconnaissance
regiments equipped with Cromwell, but most soldiered on with Sherman
17-pdr until Comet made it obsolete in 22nd Armoured Brigade.

Post by Bay Man
It was delayed into combat because it needed port facilities to get ashore
unable to be landed on beaches.

Oh, so until "port facilities" were found no Allied tanks made it
ashore in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, or France? That's even more
astoundingly foolish than usual from you. Or are you making up things
again to cover your tracks?

Actually, the first confirmed issues of Challenegr were in July,
followed by their withdrawal in August for more fixes. They were
reissued in October; by December 1944 21 were with 11th Armoured and
Guards Armoured Division with 11 in depots. On 16 June 1945 46 were in
service: 11 with 7th Armoured, 22 with the Czechs, and 13 with the
Poles, plus 47 others in depots and apparently 5 in the UK. Among
other problems, the weight and length made it difficult to turn
without shedding its tracks. The problems led to it going some seven
months past its development schedule as fix after fix was put in,
luckily the stopgap "Firefly" project, Sherman 17-pdr, was around to
take up the slack.

Post by Bay Man
At 18mph is wasn't that bad. Off-road it was not handicapped that much by
speed. The armour was eqiv to a Tiger and eventually superseded the Tiger.
With APDS shells in the 6pdr gun it could take on Tigers if need be, but was
not used for that role. The British had many tanks for differing roles.

Sorry, but no, 17.3 MPH maximum road speed; it was 16.4 MPH over an
"average road"...for the Churchill I-VI. The uparmoured "heavy"
Churchill, the VII and VIII absolute maximum speed was 13.5 MPH.

Post by Bay Man
The cruiser tank concept never went away.

Sorry, but yes it did go away. The last tank designed to a Cruiser
Tank specification was A.41 Centurion.

Post by Bay Man
It relied on speed, slanted
armour, etc, which was incorporated in many later designs.

That was not what made a tank a cruiser tank.

Post by Bay Man
The fast
Crusader was dropped because of the pretty unreliable engine used - a WW1 US
plane engine made under license.

No, the Crusader was dropped because it was obsolescent; it's
successor, the Centaur, continued to use the Nuffield. Nor was the
Nuffield the real problem in the Crusader, it was poor packing for
ocean transport of the initial lot, combined with excessive wear due
to lack of transporters, and poor design of the engine air cleaners.

Post by Bay Man
The Cromwell's RR engine was superior to
any Ford. The RR Meteor was the best allied tank engine by a mile and
probably the best in WW2 of any.

No, the Meteor was superior to the Liberty, which is unsurprising
considering it was nearly a 20-year newer design. It was comparable to
the Ford GAA, which was a contemporary.

Post by Bay Man
Your History Channel education is surfacing. US generals after the Bulge
were demanding nearly all the British production of APDS shells, they were
found so lacking in punching out German armour.

Really? Where is your evidence for these demands - the Mythtry Channel
- another comic book? BTW, if they "rejected" the 17pdr, what were
they going to fire the APDS from - the 57mm?

Post by Bay Man
My point that if the roles were reversed in Normandy and the US had the
eastern beaches, The Germans would have driven them back to the beaches, the
US armour was so lacking to the German and British.

Why? What was the major German counterattack that nearly drove the
Commonwealth forces back to the beaches that was defeated only because
the "British" had Sherman 17-pdr. And how many 17-pdr did they have to
make this difference?

Post by Bay Man
The Firefly was a great success and a number of on the ground US commanders
wished they had it. Who wouldn't? It knocked out Tigers and Panthers
regularly. It must have hurt to see one of their own tanks, the Sherman,
updated by their ally and they can't have one.

Why did they wish to have it when you claimed they rejected it? And
are you saying that "Tigers and Panthers" weren't knocked out by
American forces?

(snip usual Wiki-blather)

Post by Bay Man
Montgomery was able to draw the bulk of the German army and armour into him
to destroy it using superior British armour to the US, allowing the less
armoured US forces to break out to complete the encirclement. Monty knew he
had armour which was a match to the Tigers and Panthers and that the US
never.

Yes indeedy, you are claiming that American tanks "never" knocked out
"Tigers and Panthers". How fascinating a fairy tale world you live in.

Post by Bay Man
The Germans had about 800 Tigers and Panthers which took about 5
standard Shermans to knock out, and usually about two or three of those were
destroyed in the process.

Er, no that is incorrect in all particulars.

Post by Bay Man
A Firefly could knock out a Tiger by itself and
did so on many occasions. In some instances two or three at a time.

Name these instances please. I can name at least two. Of course, how
that is relevant is beyond me.

Post by Bay Man
The British idea of equal armour and firepower to a Tiger or Panther in the
attacking role and equal in the defensive proved successful.

The Sherman 17-pdr had equal "armour" to Tiger and Panther? Really?
And we already established the 17-pdr did not compare to the firepower
of the Tiger (superior to the L56 and matching the L71 using AP
ammunition readily available, but vastly inferior HE capability) and
Panther (matching using AP ammunition readily available but inferior
HE capability). Did you forget you never addressed those inconvenient
facts?

Post by Bay Man
I doubt you wear pants to piddle in. :)

No, I'm smart enough to unzip my fly or drop trou before I pee; thanks
for confirming you aren't. :)

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich
On Nov 23, 12:52 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man

Post by Rich
The M4 was a Medium Tank,

I wrote that above.

No, you wrote it was a "medium infantry tank". I know the distinction
escapes you, as does any subtlety, but nonetheless your calling it
that is incorrect.

The Sherman was a medium tank. FACT!

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
For the British it was as they put a superior gun on it than the German 88mm
calling it the Firefly and used the smaller gun versions. The US rejected
the Firefly, so in their eyes they only had an "infantry tank".

No, because fitting the 17-pdr necessarily negated part of the tank
tankiness. The 17-pdr enhanced its ability to punch holes in other
tanks at the expense of doing well many of the other tasks that were
then considered important for tanks; like engaging infantry, artillery
weapons, fortifications (other than punching holes in concrete, which
isn't very satisfying), and the like. Installing the 17-pdr reduced
the universality of the tank rather than increased it.

The British had 4 or 5 small Shermans to each Firefly. The British had tanks
for differing roles.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
Not tanks? A new one on me. The 17pdr did have HE. You are right in that
the Challenger was more of a tank destroyer with an armoured turret. A
hybrid.

Something you didn't know? Who would have thought it was possible?
Yes, the 17pdr/77mm did have HE,

Thank you.

Post by Rich
the Firefly was an effective
universal tank rather than a specialized antitank vehicle.

About right. There is no such thing as a universal tank. Try using a Tiger
or Firefly in city streets. A Churchill with is manoeuvrability, heavy
armour and shorter gun was ideal.

Post by Rich
The Challenger, which was actually the original "Firefly"

In 43/44 the Brits looked at adapting the Sherman because it was available
via the US instantly and in quantities. They did things with it the US did
not, or never even thought of. To adapt say, the Cromwell, or Churchill
would mean making many Cromwell hulls when the production could be better
suited to making a Comet or the Centurion. It made sense to adapt a tank the
Brits were also familiar with - they were the first to use it combat. It
would have made sense to uprate the Churchill's engine to give it sat
30-35mph and assign APDS shells to them. Ina fluid design and R&D
environment which was the best way to go must have been difficult.

Post by Rich
but most soldiered on with Sherman
17-pdr until Comet made it obsolete in 22nd Armoured Brigade.

Yep.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
It was delayed into combat because it needed port facilities to get ashore
unable to be landed on beaches.

Oh, so until "port facilities" were found no Allied tanks made it
ashore in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, or France?

Read what I wrote again, is easy Rich, try. Then think a little after. The
Challenger could not be landed via landing craft on a beach.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
At 18mph is wasn't that bad. Off-road it was not handicapped that much by
speed. The armour was eqiv to a Tiger and eventually superseded the Tiger.
With APDS shells in the 6pdr gun it could take on Tigers if need be, but was
not used for that role. The British had many tanks for differing roles.

Sorry, but no, 17.3 MPH maximum road speed; it was 16.4 MPH over an
"average road"...for the Churchill I-VI. The uparmoured "heavy"
Churchill, the VII and VIII absolute maximum speed was 13.5 MPH.

Rich <gasp> Again..."Off-road it was not handicapped that much by speed"

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The cruiser tank concept never went away.

Sorry, but yes it did go away. The last tank designed to a Cruiser
Tank specification was A.41 Centurion.

The speed aspect was used in later tanks.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
It relied on speed, slanted
armour, etc, which was incorporated in many later designs.

That was not what made a tank a cruiser tank.

Speed was a prime point.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The fast
Crusader was dropped because of the pretty unreliable engine used - a WW1 US
plane engine made under license.

No, the Crusader was dropped because it was obsolescent; it's
successor, the Centaur, continued to use the Nuffield. Nor was the
Nuffield the real problem in the Crusader, it was poor packing for
ocean transport of the initial lot, combined with excessive wear due
to lack of transporters, and poor design of the engine air cleaners.

The engine tended to overheat in deserts, which it was not designed for.
The Crusader was not obsolete. Getting the engine problems right and it
would have performed well in Normandy with the 6pdr gun. British production
had moved on to more "universal" designs.

wiki again:

"The Crusader's mobility made it a favourite of British tank crews and its
Ordnance QF 6 pounder main gun made it more than a match for the early
Panzer III and Panzer IV tanks it faced in combat."

The Crusader was converted to AA use and used in Normandy. A pity the
Luftwaffe was not around much.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The Cromwell's RR engine was superior to
any Ford. The RR Meteor was the best allied tank engine by a mile and
probably the best in WW2 of any.

No, the Meteor was superior to the Liberty,

Rich, read above again. The Meteor was in production until the 1960s and
used until way after. It was used in the Centurion used by many nations. The
best tank engine in WW2 by any nation.

Post by Rich
if they "rejected" the 17pdr, what were
they going to fire the APDS from - the 57mm?

APDS was used in not just the 17pdr.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
My point that if the roles were reversed in Normandy and the US had the
eastern beaches, The Germans would have driven them back to the beaches, the
US armour was so lacking to the German and British.

Why? What was the major German counterattack that nearly drove the
Commonwealth forces back to the beaches

Rich, again, read above again and do a little thinking along the way.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The Firefly was a great success and a number of on the ground US commanders
wished they had it. Who wouldn't? It knocked out Tigers and Panthers
regularly. It must have hurt to see one of their own tanks, the Sherman,
updated by their ally and they can't have one.

Why did they wish to have it when you claimed they rejected it?

Rich, again read again,.."the ground US commanders" is the key.

Post by Rich
And are you saying that "Tigers and Panthers" weren't knocked out by
American forces?

With great difficulty at times.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
Montgomery was able to draw the bulk of the German army and armour into him
to destroy it using superior British armour to the US, allowing the less
armoured US forces to break out to complete the encirclement. Monty knew he
had armour which was a match to the Tigers and Panthers and that the US
never.

Yes indeedy, you are claiming that American tanks "never" knocked out
"Tigers and Panthers". How fascinating a fairy tale world you live in.

Rich, read again and think. Overall the British had superior armour than the
US. That is self evident.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The Germans had about 800 Tigers and Panthers which took about 5
standard Shermans to knock out, and usually about two or three of those were
destroyed in the process.

Er, no that is incorrect in all particulars.

Well they tended run from Tigers really. Very sensible to do.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
A Firefly could knock out a Tiger by itself and
did so on many occasions. In some instances two or three at a time.

Name these instances please. I can name at least two.

Rich, congrats, you got two.

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The British idea of equal armour and firepower to a Tiger or Panther in the
attacking role and equal in the defensive proved successful.

The Sherman 17-pdr had equal "armour" to Tiger and Panther? Really?

Rich, again read and think again. The British had a variety of armour. The
Firefly could knock out a Tiger an the Churchill had armour greater than a
Tiger.

Post by Rich
And we already established the 17-pdr did not compare to the firepower
of the Tiger

Rich, who are these we? The 17pdr could penetrate thicker armour than an
88mm. With APDS there was no contest - no German armour was impenetrable at
normal combat distances. Didn't you know that? The 88mm had greater HE
because the shells were bigger.

< snip Rich's futile attempt at brevity >

[Rich]

On Nov 24, 1:02 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The Sherman was a medium tank. FACT!

Yes, it was, but you just claimed it was a "medium infantry tank".
FACT! But it wasn't an "infantry tank" of any kind. FACT! "Infantry
tank" was a British doctrinal concept, not an American one. FACT!

Gee, it makes things ever so much more true when you capitalize
everything and add an exclaamation!

Post by Bay Man
The British had 4 or 5 small Shermans to each Firefly. The British had tanks
for differing roles.

Why do you imply the Sherman was "small" compared to the Firefly? They
were the same tank. Their size and weight were effectively no
different. And if you now confirm yet again that the "British had
tanks for differing roles" how can they have a "universal tank", which
is also what you say. The two are mutually exclusive; but then logic
has never been a strong suite for you.

Post by Bay Man
Thank you.

You're welcome. And since you did not dispute that the issue of 17-pdr
HE was miniscule until late 1944, and that the HE issued was only
marginally effective until the end of the war, I guess you are
acknowledging that it made no difference; the Sherman 17-pdr was not
strictly a "tank" as was understood then, was rarely employed as a
"tank", and most definitely did not qualify as a "universal tank".

Post by Bay Man
About right. There is no such thing as a universal tank. Try using a Tiger
or Firefly in city streets. A Churchill with is manoeuvrability, heavy
armour and shorter gun was ideal.

But you just claimed the Centurion was a universal tank. Are you now
saying it wasn't or are you now saying it didn't exist? You seem so
terribly confused.

Post by Bay Man
In 43/44 the Brits looked at adapting the Sherman because it was available
via the US instantly and in quantities.

Sigh. No, British Ordnance first rejected the notion of a 17-pdr
Sherman, since they were more interested in developing the Cromwell
with the Vivkers Hv 75mm. Unfortunately, in typical Brit fashion when
it came to wartime tank design, the Vickers Hv 75mm came out too big
to fit in the turret ring of the Cromwell. The interim solution was to
fit Cromwell with the Ordnance QF 75mm, which was an adaptation of the
American 75mm round into a British gun. In the meantime, Challenger
was to be the 17-pdr mount...except it was a dogs breakfast and by mid
1943 it was obvious it would never be ready in time for the Normandy
assault. That led to a reconsidersation of the Sherman, which led to
the crash program giving a bare minimum by D-Day.

Post by Bay Man
They did things with it the US did
not, or never even thought of.

Um, yes the US did, and earlier, which was the M4A1 (76mm), the first
attempt to get the 3"/76mm in the Sherman, a full year before the
British began dabbling with the 17-pdr. However, the 3"/76mm mount did
not fit well into the standard Sherman turret, just as the 17-pdr
didn't. The Americans chose to redesign the turret...the British did a
bodge job. Both worked.

Post by Bay Man
To adapt say, the Cromwell, or Churchill
would mean making many Cromwell hulls when the production could be better
suited to making a Comet or the Centurion.

No, to adapt the 17-pdr to the Cromwell would not work, which is why
the Brist pinned their hopes - ill-advisedly - on the Vickers Hv 75mm.
After that disaster they went to square one, and designed a gun based
on a new chamber and breech, mated to the 3" Vickers AA tube, firing a
smaller cased round utilizing the 17-pdr projectile. The cock up only
delayed entry of a Cromwell with high velocity gun in Europe - the
Comet - until February 1945, so small loss. And Black Prince was a
monstrosity all were glad to have die a decent death at tthe end of
the war.

Post by Bay Man
It made sense to adapt a tank the
Brits were also familiar with - they were the first to use it combat. It
would have made sense to uprate the Churchill's engine to give it sat
30-35mph and assign APDS shells to them. Ina fluid design and R&D
environment which was the best way to go must have been difficult.

Lovely, except the suspension was never designed for that speed. So
no, it doesn't make sense, which is I am sure a surprise to all who
follow your antics.

Post by Bay Man
Read what I wrote again, is easy Rich, try. Then think a little after. The
Challenger could not be landed via landing craft on a beach.

I did read it and I'm still trying to understand it. Please explain
why a tank could not be landed "via landing craft on a beach"?
Especially why Challenger couldn't. Was it afraid of getting its
tracks wet?

Post by Bay Man
Rich <gasp> Again..."Off-road it was not handicapped that much by speed"

Do you understand the difference between tactical maneuverability and
operational/strategic mobility? A 13.5 MPH speed was most definitely a
handicap. There certainly aren't many tanks designed with the notion
that a 13.5 MPH road speed was not a handicap.

Post by Bay Man
The speed aspect was used in later tanks.

Speed was an aspect used in later tanks? No, improved engine, drive
train, and suspension designs have enabled heavier tanks to attain
greater speeds; it wasn't because the designers were building tanks to
a cruiser tank specification.

Post by Bay Man
Speed was a prime point.

Sure, which at the time neccessitated less armor.

Post by Bay Man
The engine tended to overheat in deserts, which it was not designed for.

No, the engine overheated because the radiator fan motor was liable to
wear caused by the sandy environment. Not the engines fault. The same
engine in the Cocvenantor overheated in Britain because of a loopy
coolant design that was grafted onto it.

Post by Bay Man
The Crusader was not obsolete. Getting the engine problems right and it
would have performed well in Normandy with the 6pdr gun.

Um, no, too small and too lightly armored. The 6-pdr required a two-
man turret, which all agreed was problematic.

Post by Bay Man
British production
had moved on to more "universal" designs.

See? You just said there were no universal tanks, now there are - make
up your mind.
Sigh...

(snip)

Post by Bay Man
Rich, read above again. The Meteor was in production until the 1960s and
used until way after. It was used in the Centurion used by many nations. The
best tank engine in WW2 by any nation.

Yes, the Meteor was in production for 20 years...and the Liberty/
Nuffied for over 20 years. So what? As soon as the Israelis and other
could afford it they ripped out the Meteor from the Centurions and
replaced them with diesels - American Continental diesels and Allison
transmissions.

Post by Bay Man
APDS was used in not just the 17pdr.

Quite. But they already had sharing agreements in place for the 6-pdr/
57mm APDS.

Post by Bay Man
Rich, again, read above again and do a little thinking along the way.

I have, rather a lot more than you, but it doesn't answer my question.
What was the major German counterattack that nearly drove the
Commonwealth forces back to the beaches?

Post by Bay Man
Rich, again read again,.."the ground US commanders" is the key.

I have, but it doesn't answer my question (Why did they wish to have
it when you claimed they rejected it?); it's just your usual
gibberish.

Post by Bay Man
With great difficulty at times.

So they were knocked out? Do you know how many? Or how many and how
easily British forces knocked them out?

Post by Bay Man
Rich, read again and think. Overall the British had superior armour than the
US. That is self evident.

No, it is not "self evident"; it isn't even "self evident" that you
are a sentient creature, rather the opposite in fact. It is so "not
self evident" that you need to provide some evidence to prove it.

Post by Bay Man
Well they tended run from Tigers really. Very sensible to do.

They did? You have accounts? Commonwealth Shermans didn't "run from
Tigers"? Is that because they weren't sensible?

Post by Bay Man
Rich, congrats, you got two.

Yes, and you have zero; zero proof.

Post by Bay Man
Rich, again read and think again. The British had a variety of armour. The
Firefly could knock out a Tiger an the Churchill had armour greater than a
Tiger.

But Tigers weren't the problem for either the Commonwealth or
Americans, Panthers were. And Panthers couldn't be reliably knocked
out by any variety of 6-pdr/17-pdr/3"/76mm/77mm APCBC or APDS/HVAP
available to either the Commonwealth or the Americans...but all could
easily knock it out from the flank.

Post by Bay Man
Rich, who are these we?

Uh, Royal Ordnance, U.S. Army Ordnance...any number of studies that I
can name.

Post by Bay Man
The 17pdr could penetrate thicker armour than an
88mm.

Depends on which gun and which round...and for APDS - if it hits.

Post by Bay Man
With APDS there was no contest - no German armour was impenetrable at
normal combat distances. Didn't you know that?

Not according to tests against actual Panthers at Balleroy. Didn't you
know that?

Post by Bay Man
The 88mm had greater HE
because the shells were bigger.

Uh, yeah, and the 75mm had greater HE because it was the same size
(give or take 1.2 mm) but had a larger bursting cavity. And, since it
was fired at a lesser velocity its terminal bursting effect was
consdierably more effective.

Post by Bay Man
< snip Rich's futile attempt at brevity >

You snipped "brevity"? How curious...

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

In article

Post by Rich
The same
engine in the Cocvenantor overheated in Britain because of a loopy
coolant design that was grafted onto it.

That engine was the Meadows Flat 12 an enlarged version of that used in
the Tetrach. The adoption of that engine plus the layout of the coolant
system was adopted to reduce height. The main problem with the
Covenantor was not the engine overheating but the crew being cooked.

The main problem with the Liberty engine used in other cruisers was
the use of chain drives for the water and oil pumps that were only
accessible with the engine out of the tank as they were driven off the
crankshaft. In the desert there was also a problem with bore wear until
dust filters were fitted.



Ken Young

[Rich]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
That engine was the Meadows Flat 12 an enlarged version of that used in

Mere details Ken, evryone knows the real reason was because Tooze more
then circled FACT!

Or something like that. :)

Good information; I was too bored to dig out Chamberlain and Ellis and
went by memory.

Cheers!

[Rich]

On Nov 24, 1:02 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
About right. There is no such thing as a universal tank.

For those of you interested in reality rather than the comic book
world, the actual derivation of the "universal" tank and its armament
is fascinating. It is quite a bit much more complicated than the "us
good; them bad", "stupid US rejected 17-pdr", and other simian grunts
that populate the usual accounts of what happened.

Early in 1942, Vickers proposed a 75mm L/50 High Velocity Tank Gun as
a replacement for the ROF 6-pdr QF Gun. The 75mm HV was intended for
the Cromwell Cruiser Tank and as late as March 1943, the AFV Liaison
Committee was assured the gun would fit so six prototype guns were
ordered in April 1943. The Cromwell specification was let in January
1941 and the first prototype was completed in January 1942, ready to
be fit with the new guns when they were ready. However, in May 1943 it
was realized - sixteen months after the original specifications were
prepared - that the gun wouldn't fit in the Cromwell turret. (David
Fletcher, "Universal Tank", p. 39)

Nonetheless the decision was made to continue development of the 75mm
HV and to design a new tank, the A34 Comet Cruiser Tank around it. In
October 1943 it was announced that the gun was to be modified to fire
17-pdr (76.2mm) projectiles, and a month later it was officially
dubbed the 77mm. The first Comets were issued to the 11th Armoured
Division's 29th Armoured Brigade in December 1944, but were
immediately withdrawn and replaced by the brigade's Sherman tanks so
they could deploy to the Meuse bridges between Namur and Givet. The
delay caused by the German offensive meant that Comet issues were not
completed and it did not enter service until early February 1945.

The original 75mm HV design used the cartridge case of the 3 inch 20
cwt AA gun (developed in WW1, still in British service in WW2), necked
down from 76.2mm (3 inch) to 75mm. It was intended to use the
cartridge with the US 75mm projectiles: the M61 APCBC and the M48 HE
as used in the Tank Gun M2 and M3 (M3 and M4 Medium Tanks) and the
Aircraft Gun M4 and M5 (B-25G/H). Muzzle velocity with the M61 was
calculated to be 2,650 FPS in a new gun, compared to 2,030 FPS in the
Tank Gun M3, but it was felt that the M48 HE projectile wouldn't be
able to tolerate such a high chamber pressure so it was downloaded to
1,500 FPS (35,840 PSI rather than 49,280 PSI for the APCBC). Why the
same logic wasn't followed in the development of the 17-pdr HE
projectile and case remains a mystery.

Estimated armor penetration figures for the 75mm HV firing M61 APCBC
were prepared, which showed a figure of 87mm at 1000 yards/30 degrees
compared with c. 60mm for the Tank Gun M3. Therefore, the performance
of the 75mm HV was calculated to be about the same as the US 76mm Tank
Gun M1/M2 that was under development at the same time, although the
75mm M48 HE was much more effective than the 76mm's M42 HE. Of course,
this puts some events in a new perspective. The commonly accepted
version of the US "refusing" the 17-pdr makes more sense. At that
time, January 1941-October 1943 (when the 75mm HV became the 77mm),
the 17-pdr was a towed antitank gun and was only intended for
specialized SP antitank vehicles - the "Firefly" program. There was no
interest in the US for the 17-pdr - they already had specialized
antitank weapons existing or under development - and the 75mm HV
simply duplicated the American 76mm program. It may be fairly asked
why either the Americans or the British should have been expected to
drop their own programs to adopt another, equally untried gun?

In any case, the only difference between the 75mm HV and the
production 77mm was the fractional difference in caliber: the 77mm
cartridge case was exactly the same as that of the 3 inch 20 cwt AAA
gun, although the projectiles were different and the cartridge case
was loaded to a much higher performance. However, the 77mm APCBC
projectile, which was the 17-pdr APCBC, delivered far better
penetration than the 75mm HV: 108 mm at 1000 yards/30 degrees. With
APDS, penetration increased to 165mm. Conversely, the 77mm HE shell
was no better than the 76mm M42 HE. In both cases, they suffered from
thicker shell walls needed to resist the higher pressures and the 17-
pdr suffered the additional problem that it's cartridge case was
overloaded, thus producing a much higher muzzle velocity than was
desired. It wasn't until August-September 1944 that 17-pdr/77mm HE
shells became available that were more effective since they were
loaded to a lower velocity and pressure, and it wasn't until early
1945 that a thinner-walled high-capacity shell was produced.

Meanwhile, in May 1943, the British were left with coming up with a
75mm dual-purpose gun that could be fit into the turret of the
Cromwell. Luckily, earlier in December 1942, Captain David Morrell of
665 Tank Troops Workshop R.E.M.E. in support of 21st Tank Brigade in
the drive on Tunis came up with the idea of adapting the American 75mm
M3 Tank Gun from wrecked Sherman tanks to the Churchill. The
conversion was developed over the next three months and issues made to
the North Irish Horse in July.

The notion also filtered back to England and led to the crash program
for the Royal Ordnance 75mm Quick Fire, which was the breech of the 6-
pdr mated to a 75mm gun tube. The reason for not just using American
M3 75mm guns wholesale was that the American guns breech was right-
hand loading, but British tanks were designed for left-hand loading.
Morrell figured out how to do it in North Africa, but it required more
than a bit of crude handwork. That was suitable for converting 200
tanks over the course of six months or more, but unsuitable for mass
production for both Churchill and Comet tanks in large numbers in
England. It was serendipitous that the cartridge case and rim size of
the US 75mm and the British 6-pdr were identical.

It was also serendipitous that a 75mm tank gun was available to fit
the Cromwell and Churchill when Montgomery assumed command in December
1943 of 21st Army Group and British Second Army. Montgomery had made
it abundantly clear in North Africa that he was uninterested in 6-pdr
armed tanks and especially Churchill tanks with 6-pdr armament (he was
pretty much uninterested in Churchill tanks with any sort of
armament). Montgomery was dismissive of the Light/Cruiser/Infantry
tank divide and was promoting a "universal" tank (thus, the title of
Fletcher's second volume in his history of British World War II tank
development). Part of what he found "universal" was an effective dual-
purpose gun. The 6-pdr was obviously not that, but he believed the
75mm was - good HE capability and the same penetration as the 6-pdr AP
(APDS was months in the future). The Vickers 75mm/77mm would have been
a better choice...if its deployment hadn't been delayed until December
1944. Ironically, when deployed the Vickers 77mm was no longer the
chosen "universal" gun for the "universal" tank, the 17-pdr in the
Centurion was. Even more ironic, the 17-pdr in the Centurion retained
its "universal" status for only a short time before the 20-pdr and
later 105mm - a truly "universal" gun - replaced it.

(I am indebted to my friends Tony Williams, author of "Cannon, Machine
Guns and Ammunition", and David Fletcher, Tank Museum Historian, for
much of the research that generated these insights.)

Cheers!

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

In article

Post by Rich
they were specialized tank destroyers
- really had to be such given the lack of HE capability in the 17-pdr,
the lack of bow machineguns, and the lack of armor protection in the
Challenger.

There were two versions of the A30 with the Challenger being intended
to be a cruiser tank. The Avenger was the tank destroyer with an open
turret. Both had a maximum armour thickness of 101mm. The Avenger was
dropped in favour of a regunned M10 and as you said the Challenger was
never satisfactory and priority was given to the Comet.

British and American Tanks of World War II.

Ken Young

[Rich]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
There were two versions of the A30 with the Challenger being intended
to be a cruiser tank.

I know Ken, it was a cruiser tank by designation, just as the Sherman
was an M4 Medium Tank. However, it's intended role was as a
specialized "tank destroyer tank" supporting Cromwell in the armoured
reconnaissance regiment rather than as a "tank". Similar to the way
one of the roles of the Sherman was as a "medium infantry tank" :) in
the seperate tank battalion. The difference was that the Sherman
didn't have to be a different tank to assume another role, something
the Cromwell/Challenger couldn't manage.

Cheers!

[David H Thornley]

Post by Bay Man
No. Just as well as US armour was inferior to the British and Canadian.
The US had only one tank, a medium infantry tank,

If you're going to force the Sherman into British categories, it would
be more like a cruiser than an infantry tank. It had decent speed and
wasn't armored up to British infantry tank standards. (Except for the
Jumbos and those Shermans up-armored in the field, of course, which
did have such armor. The Sherman was very versatile.)

fine for infantry

Post by Bay Man
support, but which was not suited to the more heavier tank war in NW
Europe.

Seemed to work pretty well.

Post by Bay Man
The British had a variety of tanks for differing roles.

The alternative interpretation is that they couldn't produce a tank
comparable to the Sherman, T34, or Pz IV, so they split up tanks by
what roles they weren't good at.

Such

Post by Bay Man
as, the Firefly and Challenger with 17pdr guns - better at anti-tank
than the 88mm, and also used the 17pdr in anti-tank gun roles. Superior
armour penetrating shells - APDS.

The 17pdr was an excellent thing to shoot at tanks, although lacking
against infantry. It was superior to the US 76mm, which had a different
sort of tungsten-core shot. US HVAP was more accurate than the 17pdr
APDS, but considerably worse long-range performance. (Firing a small-
caliber tungsten shot from a larger gun barrel requires putting some
padding of sorts around the tungsten. Leave the padding on during
flight and you get more drag. Have the padding drop away in flight
caused accuracy issues. The Germans did experiment with just
compressing the padding in a few guns.)

The Firefly, was, of course, a Sherman the British imported. The
Challenger was a failure as a tank.

Post by Bay Man
The highly manoeuvrable Churchill had armour approx the same as the
Tiger. The Cromwell was very fast, superb engine, low profile and better
armoured.

The Churchill was slow. The Cromwell wasn't all that much faster than
the Sherman, the armor is arguable, and its gun couldn't be upgraded.
(Why do you praise speed in the Cromwell and ignore it for the
Churchill?)

The Churchill and Cromwell couldn't use guns more powerful than the 6pdr
or 75mm. The Brits were working on an infantry tank that could use
the 17pdr (the Black Prince), but it never went into service. They
worked on the notably more successful Comet and Centurion, which came
out some time later.

This is, I believe, a complete list of Western armored vehicles that
went into action with something better than the US 76mm gun:

Challenger (British design that was mostly a failure in the field)
Sherman Firefly (US tank with a British gun)
Archer (British self-propelled AT gun, gun pointing backwards)
Achilles (US M10 tank destroyer - Sherman chassis - with the 17pdr)
M36 tank destroyer (Sherman chassis)
M26 medium tank (US heavier tank)
Comet (really good British tank)

The Centurion was too late to see WWII combat. Later models proved
to be superb.

This suggests that the British were not all that good at designing
tanks that were used in this period. The Comet showed up later
and in limited numbers (IIRC, equipping one armoured division and
some extra by the end of the war), marking a very large improvement
in British tank design and production.

There's also the fact that tank quality, and particularly the glamor
stats of gun penetration, armor, and speed, is a lot less important
than many people seem to think it. (I'm a convert here, so please
forgive me if I get preachy.) Having reasonably good tanks and
using them well was far more important than the rather small difference
between, say, the T-34/85, Sherman, Cromwell, or Pz IV.

Post by Bay Man
If the Germans poured the same level of armour into the Americans they
did the Brits, the US would have crumbled - the US armour was just not
up to it, as shown when German heavy armour poured through the Ardennes
in Dec 44.

Tanks did not primarily fight other tanks, although that was where the
drama was. The US General McNair was correct about that, although he
didn't realize that a tank really should be able to fight other tanks.

The US line crumbled because it was hit with overwhelming force.
Despite crumbling, it held together remarkably well. With all their
troops and tanks, the Germans found it extremely hard to get a clean
breakthrough. Years of planning and training US infantry for an
offensive role, oddly, resulted in infantry that was unremarkable on
the attack and really tenacious on defense. I don't know of any
army that would have held up better under such attack.

[Rich]

Post by David H Thornley
If you're going to force the Sherman into British categories, it would
be more like a cruiser than an infantry tank. It had decent speed and
wasn't armored up to British infantry tank standards. (Except for the
Jumbos and those Shermans up-armored in the field, of course, which
did have such armor. The Sherman was very versatile.)

It is always problematic taking one countries designations and
doctrinal precepts and then trying to overlay them on another
country's. Of course problematic only if you aren't as abysmally
ignorant of the subject as bayman.

A case in point is mashing together the concept of "medium infantry
tank" for the US Army in World War II. Did the US Army have a doctrine
for tanks supporting infantry? Yes, but it was the ***same doctrine***
whether or not the tanks doing the supporting were part of a separate
tank battalion or part of an armored division's tank battalion. And,
conversely, the same pursuit doctrine applied whether or not they were
tanks of a separate tank battalion or an armored division doing the
pursuing. Was their a distinction between light and medium tanks? Yes,
but the distinction was purely about weight and, thus, the strategic
and tactical mobility of a given unit. Tactically, it was expected
that in any given terrain a lighter tank would be more maneuverable,
while a medium tank, while less maneuverable, would have more
firepower. Partly, it was common sense (something bayman obviously
lacks), but it was also a recognition of the reality of the American
communications system of the 1930s - large area with extremely
variegated terrain, poor and sparse road system, many unfordable
rivers and streams with a limited number of inadequate bridges. Not
that it was very different from much of Europe. In effect, the
American solution was to eschew significant heavy tank development
(aside from the T1), recognizing the limitations it would place on
strategic power projection and tactical maneuverability, concentrate
on light and medium tank development, and develop doctrine and
organizations that integrated the differently weighted tanks into a
universal tank concept. Light tanks were seen as advantageous in
reconnaissance, but were not limited to a reconnaissance role for
example - there were no "light reconnaissance tanks".

The British conception was slightly different and developed into three
distinct tank types and tactical roles. Light tanks were machine gun-
armed and intended to act as a tactical reconnaissance asset for
heavier tanks and for reinforcing the armored cars as an operational
and strategic reconnaissance asset. Cruiser tanks were the primary
means of armored exploitation and pursuit, requiring speed and gun
power enabling them to engage other tanks. Infantry tanks were just
that; intended for an infantry support role attached to infantry
formations. Although Matilda 1 was only machine gun-armed and
relatively light weight, it was quickly decided the role required
heavy armor and a gun capable of also engaging enemy tanks. In
essence, it was the antithesis of the American conception of a
universal light and medium tank. The American Stuart, Grant, and
Sherman tanks were all initially treated as Cruiser Tank substitutes,
but mied-1944 in NWE Montgomery's conception of a "universal" tank for
both armoured (i.e., exploitation and pursuit roles) and tank (i.e.,
infantry support roles) began to eclipse the Cruiser and Infantry
tanks. To an extent, the Churchill Infantry Tank brigades deployed to
France were kept in spite of Monty's opposition to the concept, while
7th Armoured Division and the Reconnaissance Regiments of Guards and
11th Armoured Divisions were only equipped with Cromwells (and 7th AD
with Comets in 1945) to - more or less - get some use out of a year's
worth of British tank production. By the end of the war British forces
deployed 15 armoured or tank brigades (not including 1st ABRE or 25th
AAB) and four independent armoured reconnaissance regiments; a total
of about 49 regiments, of which some 30 were Sherman-equipped, 12 were
Churchill-equipped, and only 7 were Cromwell or Comet-equipped.

The Soviets also developed a unique system. Tanks were light, medium,
and heavy, in terms of weight and armor, but also could be
differentiated to a tactical role. For example, the T26 and T50 were
"light infantry support" tanks. The BT-series (and initially the T-34)
were designed as light to medium "fast" (effectively cavalry) tanks.
Heavy tanks were intended to reinforce other tank and infantry forces
to effect a breakthrough of enemy defense positions. Experience led to
the diminution of the role of the light tank in any role by late 1943,
effectively resulting in the T-34 becoming a near "universal" tank as
did the M4 Medium in the American and British arsenal.

The German system was different still. Initially, the PzI and PzII
were simply training tanks, with the PzII also filling a tactical
reconnaissance role; although interestingly, there were attempts to
design the PzII as a specialized infantry support and cavalry tank
(the cavalry tank concept was dropped after the Polish Campaign and
the conversion of the 1.-4. lePzD, which were effectively "cavalry"
division holdovers). PzIII and PzIV were ***both*** medium tanks -
similar in weight and armor - but differently armed. The PzIII was
intended as the "light" maneuver battlefield element in the tank
company, while the PzIV provided a "medium" support element to the
company. PzVI was designed to the same role as the Soviet breakthrough
tanks, but its role transmogrified on the battlefield, mostly due to
its excellent optics and gun, which enabled it to become an excellent
defensive-offensive platform.

Post by David H Thornley
Seemed to work pretty well.

Yes, all the systems did...after they went through the crucible of
wartime testing. :) After 1943 the Americans relegated the Light Tank
more and more to reconnaissance and security missions, but even then
it took on other tasks, often very successfully. The M26 was developed
as effectively a heavy tank, but it was not a heavy tank in either the
British Infantry Tank or the German/Soviet Tiger/KV&IS mold; it was
deployed as a medium tank. The M4A3E2 was intended as a one-off for
the breakthrough tank role, but ended up also used as a universal
medium tank. By the end of the war the bulk of the tank forces were
comprised of universal tanks: the T34, M4, Centurion, and Panther that
presaged the MBT.

Post by David H Thornley
The alternative interpretation is that they couldn't produce a tank
comparable to the Sherman, T34, or Pz IV, so they split up tanks by
what roles they weren't good at.

Not really, splitting them up in different roles was to meet multiple
doctrinal requirements (even though the British Army didn't have
doctrine until the 1990s) that it took them a while to recognize could
be met by a universal tank. The problems with the Cruiser I-VII do not
mean they were incapable of turning out a good medium tank, Cromwell
and Comet were fine tanks after all.

Post by David H Thornley
Tanks did not primarily fight other tanks, although that was where the
drama was. The US General McNair was correct about that, although he
didn't realize that a tank really should be able to fight other tanks.

Bingo. And McNair might better be said to have believed that tanks
"should not" fight other tanks unless absolutely necessary. Where he
went wrong really was insisting on reverting to towed heavy antitank
guns and insisting that the tank destroyers be a separate non-
divisional asset. Most of the more outre doctrinal ideas about tank
destroyers were a product of BG Bruce and the TD Command and School,
which, by early 1944, had already lost most of its clout (as had the
Armored Force, demoted to a "Command", but that is a different story).

Post by David H Thornley
The US line crumbled because it was hit with overwhelming force.

Yes, it's rather remarkable what can happen when six divisions are
struck by about 24...

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich
the T-34 becoming a near "universal" tank as
did the M4 Medium in the American and British arsenal.

The M4 was not a universal tank in the US arsenal, only in the British, as
they did more with the hull than the US.

Post by Rich
By the end of the war the bulk of the tank forces were
comprised of universal tanks: the T34, M4, Centurion, and Panther that
presaged the MBT.

Rich, congrats. You got that right. But the US never had a universal tank.

Post by Rich

Post by David H Thornley
Tanks did not primarily fight other tanks, although that was where the
drama was. The US General McNair was correct about that, although he
didn't realize that a tank really should be able to fight other tanks.

Bingo. And McNair might better be said to have believed that tanks
"should not" fight other tanks unless absolutely necessary. Where he
went wrong really was insisting on reverting to towed heavy antitank
guns and insisting that the tank destroyers be a separate non-
divisional asset. Most of the more outre doctrinal ideas about tank
destroyers were a product of BG Bruce and the TD Command and School,
which, by early 1944, had already lost most of its clout (as had the
Armored Force, demoted to a "Command", but that is a different story).

Which is the reason the US armour in WW2 was vastly inferior to the British.

Post by Rich

Post by David H Thornley
The US line crumbled because it was hit with overwhelming force.

Yes, it's rather remarkable what can happen when six divisions are
struck by about 24...

When US forces came to rescue they still could not handle the German armour.

[Rich]

On Nov 24, 1:01 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The M4 was not a universal tank in the US arsenal, only in the British, as
they did more with the hull than the US.

But the Firefly was the opposite of a "universal" tank; it was
conceived as a specialized antitank weapon and had little tank
capabilities until the end of the war and the production of 17-pdr RC
HC HE. As has been explained to you before.

Post by Bay Man
Rich, congrats. You got that right. But the US never had a universal tank.

How is it that the Sherman made up the bulk of the Commonwealth tank
force and was "universal", but it made up the bulk of the US tank
force, which meant it was not "universal"? You really do have a
problem with logical consistancy, don't you?

Post by Bay Man
Which is the reason the US armour in WW2 was vastly inferior to the British.

Really? What was the purpose of the M10 3", M10 17-pdr, and Sherman 17-
pdr in the British Army? The first two were dedicated antitank weapons
meant to defeat enemy tanks, which were assigned to the RA Antitank
Regiments. The latter was the same weapons system with the same
intent, assigned to the RAC regiments. Where exactly is the
difference? Where is the "vast inferiority"?

Post by Bay Man
When US forces came to rescue they still could not handle the German armour.

Really? How many German Panzer, StuG, and JgPz did they lose? Compared
to the US armor losses? Surely you must know, since that is one of the
few ways you can derive such an assumption. Or you can describe how
the German attack continued to succeed after American forces "came to
the rescue"? Or something, other than wasting everyones time with the
same lame ass bullshit you eruct from your gapping yawp with such
regularity?

[Mario]

Post by Rich

Post by Bay Man
The M4 was not a universal tank in the US arsenal, only in
the British, as they did more with the hull than the US.

But the Firefly was the opposite of a "universal" tank; it was
conceived as a specialized antitank weapon and had little tank
capabilities until the end of the war and the production of
17-pdr RC HC HE. As has been explained to you before.

So I suppose in the battlefield a Firefly was always escorted by
a regular Sherman for protection from infantry antitank.
Am I right or wrong?

[Rich]

Post by Mario
So I suppose in the battlefield a Firefly was always escorted by
a regular Sherman for protection from infantry antitank.
Am I right or wrong?

It's an interesting question and one that plagued Commonwealth tankers
during the Normandy Campaign and wasn't resolved until late August
after the campaign ended. But the actual question was, more or less,
"now that we have these wonderful tank killers in our organization,
how do we meld them into the organization in the way best suited to
making good use of them?" You see, most of the regiments first saw the
Sherman 17-pdr within a few weeks of being loaded on LST for the
Normany landings. And no tactical tests had been done to determine
where in the regimental organization they should good. And, of course,
they were issued on a tiny scale; most of the assault brigades issued
Sherman 17-pdr had 36, so 12 per regiment. The lack of tactical
testing, and lack of single universal doctrine in the British Army,
meant it was up to the regimental commander how they were deployed.
Some grouped them as a headquarters troop, which had obvious tactical
limitations. Some decided to attach one per squadron or troop, except
the WE in effect had three squadrons of five troops of three tanks in
the regiment, which wasn't conducive to "even stevens" - someone would
be caught short. There was also the question of whether it should be
the mount of the squadron/troop commander or his 2iC. All this wasn't
resolved until early August when the various regimental commanders
were brought together for a RAC pow-wow. Among other things, they
decided that the regulation five-troop squadron didn't work and it was
decided to go with four four-tank troops and a squadron HQ troop.
Comparing notes it was felt that massing the Sherman 17-pdr at
squadron HQ was a bad idea too, so it was decided that one per troop
was a good start, but two per troop was better. The Sherman 17-pdr was
intended to provide overwatch and was usually the mount of the troop
2iC, with a regular troop Sherman, while the other two regular
Shermans under the troop commander maneuvered. Of course, given the
lack of British doctrine, regimental individuality continued to rule
the day for some time.

Cheers!

[Mario]

Post by Rich

Post by Mario
So I suppose in the battlefield a Firefly was always escorted
by a regular Sherman for protection from infantry antitank.
Am I right or wrong?

It's an interesting question and one that plagued Commonwealth
tankers during the Normandy Campaign and wasn't resolved until
late August after the campaign ended. But the actual question
was, more or less, "now that we have these wonderful tank
killers in our organization, how do we meld them into the
organization in the way best suited to making good use of
them?" You see, most of the regiments first saw the Sherman
17-pdr within a few weeks of being loaded on LST for the
Normany landings. And no tactical tests had been done to
determine where in the regimental organization they should
good. And, of course, they were issued on a tiny scale; most
of the assault brigades issued Sherman 17-pdr had 36, so 12
per regiment. The lack of tactical testing, and lack of single
universal doctrine in the British Army, meant it was up to the
regimental commander how they were deployed. Some grouped them
as a headquarters troop, which had obvious tactical
limitations. Some decided to attach one per squadron or troop,
except the WE in effect had three squadrons of five troops of
three tanks in the regiment, which wasn't conducive to "even
stevens" - someone would be caught short. There was also the
question of whether it should be the mount of the
squadron/troop commander or his 2iC. All this wasn't resolved
until early August when the various regimental commanders were
brought together for a RAC pow-wow. Among other things, they
decided that the regulation five-troop squadron didn't work
and it was decided to go with four four-tank troops and a
squadron HQ troop. Comparing notes it was felt that massing
the Sherman 17-pdr at squadron HQ was a bad idea too, so it
was decided that one per troop was a good start, but two per
troop was better. The Sherman 17-pdr was intended to provide
overwatch and was usually the mount of the troop 2iC, with a
regular troop Sherman, while the other two regular Shermans
under the troop commander maneuvered. Of course, given the
lack of British doctrine, regimental individuality continued
to rule the day for some time.
Cheers!

Interesting, thanks.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by David H Thornley
This is, I believe, a complete list of Western armored vehicles that

You missed the Avenger though that had most of the same problems as the
Challenger.

Ken Young

[Bay Man]

Post by David H Thornley

Post by Bay Man
No. Just as well as US armour was inferior to the British and Canadian.
The US had only one tank, a medium infantry tank,

Seemed to work pretty well.

The US Shermans did not work well against heavy armour. Pay attention.

Post by David H Thornley

Post by Bay Man
The British had a variety of tanks for differing roles.

The alternative interpretation is that they couldn't produce a tank
comparable to the Sherman, T34, or Pz IV, so they split up tanks by
what roles they weren't good at.

A warped interpretation. Again, "the British had a variety of tanks for
differing roles".

Post by David H Thornley
Such

Post by Bay Man
as, the Firefly and Challenger with 17pdr guns - better at anti-tank
than the 88mm, and also used the 17pdr in anti-tank gun roles. Superior
armour penetrating shells - APDS.

The 17pdr was an excellent thing to shoot at tanks, although lacking
against infantry. It was superior to the US 76mm,

It was superior to all anti-tank guns in tanks in NW Europe, German and
Allied.

Post by David H Thornley
The Firefly, was, of course, a Sherman the British imported. The
Challenger was a failure as a tank.

The Firefly was a tank the UK made using a US hull. The "Firefly" was not
imported from the USA. The hulls went into British factories to be made up
to British requirements. Next you will be saying the Mustang was a 100% US
plane.

Post by David H Thornley

Post by Bay Man
The highly manoeuvrable Churchill had armour approx the same as the
Tiger. The Cromwell was very fast, superb engine, low profile and better
armoured.

The Churchill was slow. The Cromwell wasn't all that much faster than
the Sherman, the armor is arguable, and its gun couldn't be upgraded.
(Why do you praise speed in the Cromwell and ignore it for the
Churchill?)

Different uses. At 18 mph the Churchill was OK for off-road use. Having
Churchill's in your army was great asset.

Post by David H Thornley
The Churchill and Cromwell couldn't use guns more powerful than the 6pdr
or 75mm. The Brits were working on an infantry tank that could use
the 17pdr (the Black Prince), but it never went into service. They
worked on the notably more successful Comet and Centurion, which came
out some time later.

The 6pdrs would use APDS shells which could knock out a Tiger, uprating the
Churchill near enough to a Tiger. Incidentally I was talking to a few army
gunners last night. They all agreed that the Tiger was little more than a
self-propelled gun, mentioning the SA80 as modem equiv, which should have
been manned ay artillery units not tankers.

The Black Prince was dropped because of the Centurion. They made one or two.
One is in Bovington.

Post by David H Thornley
The Centurion was too late to see WWII
combat. Later models proved to be superb.

The UK did not rush the R&D of the Centurion and were confident they had
nailed the "universal" tank. They had. The most successful tank ever.

Post by David H Thornley
This suggests that the British were not all that good at designing
tanks that were used in this period.

The British made tanks for many purposes, this appears to have gone over
your head. Many were heavily armoured.

Read above, the Centurion. Also look harder at the antiquated looking
Churchill. The Germans dismissed the Canadian Churchill's at Dieppe,
ignoring the fact half got over the Sea walls, which no German tank could
ever do. It could turn on its own axis and could go up mountains.

Post by David H Thornley

Post by Bay Man
If the Germans poured the same level of armour into the Americans they
did the Brits, the US would have crumbled - the US armour was just not
up to it, as shown when German heavy armour poured through the Ardennes
in Dec 44.

Tanks did not primarily fight other tanks, although that was where the
drama was. The US General McNair was correct about that, although he
didn't realize that a tank really should be able to fight other tanks.

That didn't sink in..."If the Germans poured the same level of armour into
the Americans they did the Brits, the US would have crumbled "

Post by David H Thornley
The US line crumbled because it was hit with overwhelming force.

Because US armour wasn't up to it.

Post by David H Thornley
Despite crumbling, it held together remarkably well. With all their
troops and tanks, the Germans found it extremely hard to get a clean
breakthrough. Years of planning and training US infantry for an
offensive role, oddly, resulted in infantry that was unremarkable on
the attack and really tenacious on defense. I don't know of any
army that would have held up better under such attack.

How odd. That is turning a defeat into a victory.

[Rich]

On Nov 24, 1:01 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The US Shermans did not work well against heavy armour. Pay attention.

No, children and morons need to be told to pay attention; David is
paying attention, but you need to pay attention and stop trolling and
lying. The M3 75mm Gun was not a good "hole puncher", since it never
really was intended to be. However, it made little difference to the
end of the war, no more difference than the lack of hole punching
ability in the F-34 76mm Gun of the Soviet T-34 did, the lack of hole
punching ability of the "British" 75mm did, or the lack of hole
punching ability of the 5cm Kwk 39 did. Nor did the Allies face "heavy
armour"; they faced a small number of heavily armored tanks, which is
rather different.

Post by Bay Man
A warped interpretation. Again, "the British had a variety of tanks for
differing roles".

Quite correct, which is why they did not have a "universal" tank
during the war...except for the Sherman.

Post by Bay Man
It was superior to all anti-tank guns in tanks in NW Europe, German and
Allied.

No, it was not and you have provided no evidence to support your
dubious thesis.

Post by Bay Man
The Firefly was a tank the UK made using a US hull. The "Firefly" was not
imported from the USA. The hulls went into British factories to be made up
to British requirements.

Uh, no, sorry that is also not correct. I suggest you add Mark
Hayward's "Firefly" to your collection of Tooze and comic books. The
conversion utilized the complete M4 and M4A2 and the modifications
concentrated on the turret, where an armored box was added to the
bustle to accomodate the radio and the complete 17-pdr was fitted into
the existing trunnions. Otherwise, the co-drivers position was
eliminated, along with his machine gun, for ammunition stowage. Nor
was it done in factories; it was done by Royal Ordnance Arsenals...I
can name them if you like?

Post by Bay Man
Next you will be saying the Mustang was a 100% US
plane.

Why not? It was.

Post by Bay Man
Different uses. At 18 mph the Churchill was OK for off-road use. Having
Churchill's in your army was great asset.

But at "18 mph" it wasn't armored as well, and protection was its
primary asset.

Post by Bay Man
The 6pdrs would use APDS shells which could knock out a Tiger, uprating the
Churchill near enough to a Tiger. Incidentally I was talking to a few army
gunners last night. They all agreed that the Tiger was little more than a
self-propelled gun, mentioning the SA80 as modem equiv, which should have
been manned ay artillery units not tankers.

Ah, the mythical "army vets" appear as usual. You're pathetically
predictable.

Post by Bay Man
That didn't sink in..."If the Germans poured the same level of armour into
the Americans they did the Brits, the US would have crumbled "

Oh, it sank in...that you're ignorant of the facts so rely on
repeating unsupported drivel for your argument. Where and when and by
whom was the German counterattack with the "same level of armor" that
was directed at the Commonwealth forces that would have crumbled the
US? You've been asked twice now; you're evasion leads one to suspect
you don't know, because you're making it up as you go along. Given
that everyone knows that's what you do, continuing to do it is pretty
stupid, since the same amount of energy put into reading and thinking
might help you make your points better.

Post by Bay Man
Because US armour wasn't up to it.

Really? So it was German armor that did it without the benefit of
infantry or artillery support? How do you know that?

Post by Bay Man
How odd. That is turning a defeat into a victory.

How typical that you would make such an idiotically obvious
observation as that. Warfare largely consists of "turning a defeat
into victory" along with turning victory into defeat; its rarer to
turn "victory into victory" and "defeat into defeat", although that is
the objective of the afficianados of "lighting wars" - which covers
quite a bit more than Blitzkrieg.

[Rich]

Post by David H Thornley
This is, I believe, a complete list of Western armored vehicles that

(snip)

Post by David H Thornley
There's also the fact that tank quality, and particularly the glamor

Exactly David, and even the "stats" on the 76mm are deceptive; it was
a perfectly good gun that suffered from a short-sighted Ordnance
bureaucracy that refused to increase the propellent in the existing
case and which had insufficently hardened APCBC projectiles (a problem
the Germans also went through with the 88mm).

[The Horny Goat]

On Tue, 20 Nov 2012 18:28:33 -0500, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Liddell Hart described Normandy as an operation that eventually went to plan
but not according to timetable.

Which is complete bovine fecal matter. Caen was supposed to be taken
the first day. And can anyone seriously argue the Falaise pocket was
planned?

I have a lot of regard for Liddell-Hart on quite a few things but to
make that claim is completely laughable.

Post by Bay Man
"Overall Montgomery accomplished as much in Normandy as he could with the
forces available to him. He is owed a greater debt for his performance than
has been recognised in recent years, when his own untruths and boastfulness
have been allowed to confuse the issue, and when the root problem of the
limited abilities of his troops, and the dynamism of the Germans has often
been ignored"

Again - even had Monty achieved his stated objectives, he completely
pooched Falaise as the pocket was his to close and he failed utterly.

Oh and by the way I am not one of those who argue that the US army won
the Western front single-handedly - I am a Canadian whose troops were
part of 21st Army Group. I find General Rohmer's book on Falaise
completely credible I'm sorryh to say.

Post by Bay Man
Hastings does make a point that the Germans did not have a complete shield
around all of the beaches with the line facing the US forces not complete,
while the line to the east was fully complete. The Germans kept sending
units after unit into the British/Canadian sector with them being ground
down in the process. To the Germans this wes the natural point in which to
stop the enemy breaking out of Normandy, so would concenrate on this point.
Most of the German army in the west was destroyed by the British in
Normandy. If the Germans fell back Normandy would have left to be one big
staging area.

Even if you're right you have to both destroy the enemy and take the
territory to win the war. The US Army did more of the latter in July /
August 1944 and their contribution cannot be overstated.

[MCGARRY]

Post by The Horny Goat
I have a lot of regard for Liddell-Hart on quite a few things but to
make that claim is completely laughable.

I can't find an example of Montgomery's phase lines, but if I remember
correctly, the Seine was the 90 day line and the allies got there in 80
days. So Montgomery's general idea was attained more rapidly than he had
hoped.

[Rich]

Post by MCGARRY
I can't find an example of Montgomery's phase lines, but if I remember
correctly, the Seine was the 90 day line and the allies got there in 80
days. So Montgomery's general idea was attained more rapidly than he had
hoped.

They weren't "Montgomery's phase lines" - he didn't want anything to
do with them. :) They were ETOUSA's and U.S. First Army's phase lines
and were part of the logistics assumptions, not the operational
planning. The thing was American staff procedures called for phase
line planning, while British staff procedures did not. Montgomery
believed they were too constraining, affected expectations, and wanted
them deleted, but finally went along with them to preserve Anglo-
American amity.

Of course though you are quite right, the Allied objectives were
attained more or less earlier than was planned, but mostly because
what was expected was a deliberate delaying action by the Germans to
the Seine-Loire line instead of a tenacious fixed defense in Normandy.

Cheers!

[MANITOBIAN]

Post by MCGARRY
I can't find an example of Montgomery's phase lines, but if I remember
correctly, the Seine was the 90 day line and the allies got there in 80
days. So Montgomery's general idea was attained more rapidly than he had
hoped.

The two phase lines and time in the original plan was to take Caen
on D-DAY, and reach the Seine on D+90 days.
Caen did not fall on D-DAY, and the US 79th Division crossed the Seine
at Mantes-Gassicourt on August 20-D+75.

The Battle of NORMANDY 1944
by
Robin Neillands

[Bay Man]

Post by The Horny Goat

Post by Bay Man
Hastings does make a point that the Germans did not have a complete shield
around all of the beaches with the line facing the US forces not complete,
while the line to the east was fully complete. The Germans kept sending
units after unit into the British/Canadian sector with them being ground
down in the process. To the Germans this wes the natural point in which to
stop the enemy breaking out of Normandy, so would concenrate on this point.
Most of the German army in the west was destroyed by the British in
Normandy. If the Germans fell back Normandy would have left to be one big
staging area.

Even if you're right you have to both destroy the enemy and take the
territory to win the war. The US Army did more of the latter in July /
August 1944 and their contribution cannot be overstated.

You missed it. The US took more territory because the Germans did not have a
full solid line around Normandy. The Brits/Canadians were attracting most of
the German army to release the US forces to take more territory. That
actually was the plan.

The aim was to destroy the enemy. Taking ground was way down the list. As
soon as ground was taken and secure it was handed over the French
authorities.

And as been stated, the Allies were ahead in D-Day plus 90. When they broke
out of Normandy not much was before them. The fastest advance ever of the
British Army up until then was the run up to the Belgian border.

[Rich]

On Nov 28, 11:47 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
You missed it. The US took more territory because the Germans did not have a
full solid line around Normandy. The Brits/Canadians were attracting most of
the German army to release the US forces to take more territory. That
actually was the plan.

No, in fact you missed it.

So then, in the initial operation, six American and six Commonwealth
divisions landed and engaged:

Western (USA) Sector: 91 LL ID, 709 ID, 352 ID
Eastern (Commonwealth) Sector: 716 ID, 21 PzD, 346 ID

By circa 15 June, German reinforcements included:

Western Sector: 3 FJD, 77 ID, 243 ID, 265 ID (KG), 275 ID (KG), 353
ID, 2 PzD, 17 SSPzD
Eastern Sector: PzLehrD, 2 SSPzD (KG), 12 SSPzD

By this point, American forces were facing the equivalent of about 9
2/3 German divisions. Commonwealth forces were facing five and 1/3.

By circa 30 June:
Western Sector: 266 ID (KG), PzLehrD (from Eastern Sector), 2 SSPzD(-)
Eastern Sector: 276 ID, 1 SSPzD, 2 PzD (from Western Sector), 9 SSPzD,
10 SSPzD; 716 ID withdrawn

By this point, American forces were facing 10 2/3 divisions, but the
fall of Cherbourg effectively destroyed 243 and 709 ID. Commonwealth
forces were facing 8 2/3. Given the Cherbourg losses, American and
Commonwealth forces were facing about the same opposition; roughly
equivalent to 8 2/3 divisions.

By circa 15 July:
Western Sector: 5 FJD
Eastern Sector: 16 FD (LW), 277 ID

By this point, American forces were facing 9 2/3 divisions;
Commonwealth forces 10 2/3.

By circa 30 July:
Western Sector: 275 ID (-), 326 ID, 116 PzD
Eastern Sector: 272 ID

By this point, American forces were facing 12 1/3 divisions;
Commonwealth forces 11 2/3.

Post by Bay Man
The aim was to destroy the enemy. Taking ground was way down the list. As
soon as ground was taken and secure it was handed over the French
authorities.

You missed it again.

The measure of the victory on the German side is more difficult to
ascertain because of the paucity of original German records. The best
we have is the OB West report for losses for 6 June-27 July, which
totaled 127,247. Those are probably substantially correct, since the
Allies counted cumulative German captured as of 31 July as 13,134 by
the Commonwealth and 69,386 by the Americans. So 82,520 of at least
127,247 German casualties were captured and more than half the total
German losses were inflicted by American arms.

Post by Bay Man
And as been stated, the Allies were ahead in D-Day plus 90. When they broke
out of Normandy not much was before them. The fastest advance ever of the
British Army up until then was the run up to the Belgian border.

Which has zero to do with your idiotically fallacious remarks about
the Normandy Campaign. Not that it is completely true either. When the
Allies "broke out of Normandy", which would be either c. 30 July or 21
August depending on what you mean, there was still quite a bit "before
them", but it was no longer the "full solid line around Normandy" that
you ignorantly prattle on about. Which is precisely the importance of
a break out.

In any case, instead of debating the facts you have yet again decided
to simply re-post lies.

[Bay Man]

Post by Rich
On Nov 28, 11:47 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
You missed it. The US took more territory because the Germans did not have a
full solid line around Normandy. The Brits/Canadians were attracting most of
the German army to release the US forces to take more territory. That
actually was the plan.

No, in fact you missed it.

Rich your confusion is getting the better of you again. What I wrote above
is true. 70% of German armour was pitted against the Brits and Canadians.

Rich I will have to snip your ramblings

< snip Rich >

[Rich]

On Nov 28, 12:51 pm, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man

Post by Rich
On Nov 28, 11:47 am, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
The Brits/Canadians were attracting most
of the German army to release

Rich your confusion is getting the better of you again. What I wrote above
is true. 70% of German armour was pitted against the Brits and Canadians.

And your lying, trolling ways are getting the better of you as usual.
What you wrote above is ***German army*** and is wrong. WRT "70% of
German armour", which you ***did not write*** you may be closer, but
it depends on when - and is irrelevant to what you ***actually***
claimed..

Try again:

Prove your stupidly silly notion that there was not a "full solid line
around Normandy".
Prove your stupidly silly notion that "most of the German army in the
west was destroyed by the British".
Prove ***any*** of your stupidly silly notions.

[Rich]

What [bayman] wrote ...[with regards to] "70% of
German armour" [being deployed against the Commonwealth forces] may be closer, but
it depends on when

Looks like I was right...for the middle of July. Here is an update on
deployments of divisions and other armored units, along with a rough
accounting of operational armored vehicles. PzIV is Panzer IV, P is
Panther, T is Tiger, StuG actually includes Sturmgeschuetze,
Sturmahaubitze, and Jagdpanzer types, BeutePz are captured French
types with a sprinkling of German Panzer III. Obviously this list
cannot be either complete or completely accurate since the daily
German operational strengths are not available for all units on all
days - ? are interpolations. Further, the deployment of German forces
at the inter-Allied army boundaries isn't precise, especially in June
when the "Caumont Gap" was covered by mixed combat groups from both 2.
Panzer and Lehr. The German habit of interlacing detachments from
Panzer formations with other units is also vexing. For example, in
this I count all Tigers versus Commonwealth formations,although we
know this is not correct; U.S. First Army counted a number of Tigers
"captured" in their zone before the breakout, but exactly who they
originated from is unlikely ever to be discovered.

Cheers!

6 June:
Western (USA) Sector:
91 LL ID - 100 PzAbtl - 30 BeutePz, 206 PzAbtl - 46 BeutePz
709 ID - none
352 ID - 10 StuG
Total 10 StuG, 76 BeutePz = 86 (47%)
3 divisions (50%)

Eastern (Commonwealth) Sector:
716 ID - none
21 PzD - 98 PzIV
346 ID - none
Total 98 PzIV (53%)
3 divisions (50%)

By circa 15 June:
Western Sector:
91 LL ID - none
709 ID - none
352 ID - 8? StuG
3 FJD- 12 FJ StuG Bde - 27 StuG
77 ID - none
243 ID - 10 StuG
265 ID (KG) - none
275 ID (KG) - none
353 ID - 10 StuG
2 PzD - 90 PzIV, 0 P, 14 StuG
17 SSPzD - 24 StuG
902 StuG Bde - 25 StuG
Total - 90 PzIV, 94 StuG = 184 (42%)
9 2/3 divisions (64%)

Eastern Sector:
716 ID - none
21 PzD - 85 PzIV
346 ID - 1 StuG
PzLehrD - 29 PzIV, 23 P, 10? StuG
2 SSPzD (KG) - none
12 SSPzD - 52 PzIV, 38 P
101 SS-sPzAbtl - 15 T
Total 166 PzIV, 61 P, 15 T, 11 StuG = 253 (58%)
5 1/3 divisions (36%)

By circa 30 June:
Western Sector:
91 LL ID - none
709 ID - destroyed
352 ID - 6? StuG
3 FJD - 12 FJ StuG Bde - 11 StuG
77 ID - none
243 ID - destroyed
265 ID (KG) - none
275 ID (KG) - none
353 ID - 8 StuG
266 ID (KG) - none
17 SSPzD - 18 StuG
PzLehrD (from Eastern Sector) - 36 PzIV, 32 P, 28 StuG
2 SSPzD(-) - 50 PzIV, 26 P, 36 StuG
902 StuG Bde - 30 StuG
Total 86 PzIV, 58 P, 137 StuG = 281 (39%)
8 2/3 divisions (51%)

Eastern Sector:
21 PzD - 61 PzIV
346 ID - 9 StuG
2 SSPzD (KG)
12 SSPzD - 32 PzIV, 24 P
276 ID - none
1 SSPzD - 30 PzIV, 25 P, 31 StuG
2 PzD (from Western Sector) - 85 PzIV, 21 P, 12 StuG
9 SSPzD - 9 PzIV, 27 P, 22 StuG
10 SSPzD - 20 PzIV, 25 StuG
101 SS-sPzAbtl - 11 T
716 ID withdrawn
Total 237 PzIV, 97 P, 11 T, 99 StuG = 444 (61%)
8 1/3 divisions (49%)

By circa 15 July:
Western Sector:
91 LL ID - none
352 ID - 4? StuG
3 FJD - 12 FJ StuG Bde - 11 StuG
77 ID - none
265 ID (KG) - none
275 ID (KG) - none
353 ID - 8 StuG
266 ID (KG) - none
17 SSPzD - 10 StuG
PzLehrD - 15 PzIV, 16 P, 17 StuG
2 SSPzD(-) - 37 PzIV, 41 P, 25 StuG
5 FJD - none
902 StuG Bde - 27 StuG
Total 52 PzIV, 57 P, 102 StuG = 211 (30%)
9 2/3 divisions (46%)

Eastern Sector:
21 PzD - 47 PzIV
346 ID - 8 StuG
2 SSPzD (KG) - none
12 SSPzD - 21 PzIV, 18 P
276 ID - none
1 SSPzD - 61 PzIV, 41 P, 42 StuG
272 ID - none
2 PzD - 47? PzIV, 15? P, 8? StuG
9 SSPzD- 19 PzIV, 38 P, 16 StuG
10 SSPzD - 17 PzIV, 13 StuG
16 FD (LW) - 2 StuG
277 ID - none
101 SS-sPzAbtl - 17 T
102 SS-sPzAbtl - 19 T
506 sPzAbtl - 40 T
Total 212 PzIV, 112 P, 76 T, 89 StuG = 489 (70%)
11 1/3 divisions (54%)

By circa 30 July:
Western Sector:
91 LL ID - none
352 ID - 2 StuG
3 FJD - 12 FJ StuG Bde - 10 StuG
77 ID - none
265 ID (KG) - none
275 ID - none
353 ID - 8 StuG
266 ID (KG) - none
17 SSPzD - 4? StuG
PzLehrD - 15 PzIV, 12 P, 6 StuG
2 SSPzD(-)- 20? PzIV, 20? P, 15? StuG
5 FJD - none
326 ID - 10 StuG
2 PzD - 45? PzIV, 15? P, 15 StuG
116 PzD - 30 PzIV, 32 P, 15 StuG
341 StuG Bde - 45 StuG
902 StuG Bde - 4 StuG
Total = 110 PzIV, 79 P, 134 StuG = 323 (43%)
13 divisions (58%)

Eastern Sector:
21 PzD - 41 PzIV
346 ID - 7 StuG
2 SSPzD (KG) - none
12 SSPzD - 39 PzIV, 12 P, 11 StuG
276 ID - none
1 SSPzD - 63 PzIV, 36 P, 29 StuG
9 SSPzD - 22 PzIV, 29 P, 27 StuG
10 SSPzD - 17 PzIV, 17 StuG
277 ID - none
272 ID - none
101 SS-sPzAbtl - 20 T
102 SS-sPzAbtl - 30 T
217 StuPzAbtl - 19 StuPz
506 sPzAbtl - 15 T
16 FD (LW) withdrawn
Total 182 PzIV, 77 P, 65 T, 91 StuG, 19 StuPz = 434 (57%)
9 1/3 divisions (42%)

[MCGARRY]

Post by chris
I saw some videos lately about Normandy after the D-Day landings. The
following points were made very clearly.
1) The German commanders quickly realized they could not hold Normandy
and begged Hitler for permission to withdraw to a better position.

in the early stages the German generals were asking to be allowed to
operate an "elastic defense", meaning having the posibility to pull back
locally under their own discretion. Hitler, who never visited his
impregnable "Atlantic wall" and never came to Normandy during Overlord,
dictated where the line should be.

Post by chris
2) Hitler refused, ordering his army to stay in Normandy and "fight to
the last man".
3) The Germans stayed and gave the allies a VERY hard fight (much to the
allied surprise)

The answer to 3) is partly due to 2). The "german" soldier (many of
them weren't German) had no choice but to fight where he was. Another
reason was the hold Hitler had on the mindset of the German soldier. The
Generals, who had direct contact with Hitler, got to know him
personnaly, and to such an extent that many of them realised that he had
to be done away with. The man in the fox hole only knew him through the
public meetings and speeches and propaganda, and admired him and had
faith in the secret weapon which was going to save them.

Post by chris
4) The Germans eventually withdrew with enormous losses, severely
compromising their ability to resist the allies later on.

[Chris Manteuffel]

On 11/20/2012 11:21 AM, chris wrote:

Trying to push this back to Mr. Allen's quite interesting original topic:

The German generals were terrific at losing the war more slowly than
Hitler.

Hitler was, at least from his seizure of power on, a gambler, convinced
that he was born under a lucky star and that everything would work out
for him in the end. His generals generally were more cautious- as were
the vast majority of the people on the planet, as Hitler really was an
enormously risky gambler.

The problem is that at least after the failure of the initial six months
of Barbarossa to defeat the USSR, there were no low-risk paths that
could lead to victory[1]. The only route to a Nazi victory was pulling
off a series of high-risk, high-reward gambles- and it would have to be
a series of them, one or even two successes on the scale of his imagined
success at the Battle of the Bulge, even, would not be sufficient to
defeat a fully mobilized and motivated USSR, US, and UK.

So this is why there's all sorts of times where various German generals
advised Hitler that he was doing something stupid and he went ahead and
did it anyway- doing the smart thing meant sure defeat more slowly,
while trying what Hitler did was very unlikely to work out, but if it
did could mean victory, whereas the smart thing never could.

In short, Hitler knew that any defeat of Germany was it for him and, he
convinced himself, the entire German 'race', so the magnitude of the
defeat was of no consequence, so he kept trying more and more risky
gambles to get victory.

Post by chris
They would have gone to a "stronger position" they could defend more
effectively.
What position might that have been?

This is a rather important question- actually the source of major
disagreement between Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and Field Marshal Gerd
von Rundstedt before D-Day. Rommel felt that given Allied superiority in
air power, logistics, and mechanized forces, offering battle inland was
impossible- the Allies would be able to break any defensive line or
counterattack in the interior of France too easily.

von Rundstedt felt that trying to defend the entire coastline was
splitting up the forces too much and allowing the Allies to mass
overwhelming force and firepower and defeat a small portion of the
defenders. Hitler saw the justice of both sides and so was unable to
make a decision, ending up with a terrible compromise that made little
sense and pleased no one (reserves not as far back as von Rundstedt
wanted, but not as far forward as Rommel wanted, at a distance where
they couldn't be immediately useful but also had to be split up so much
that they weren't able to achieve sufficient mass to have much effect).

As is often the case in terrible compromises, this was because there was
no good solution to the core problem; both von Rundstedt and Rommel were
exactly correct about the problems with the others plan. The Allies were
able to overwhelm the German defenders near the beaches, and an extra
division (about the most that Rommel's plan could have put there)
wouldn't have tipped the balance too much. And the Germans were
incapable of fighting a mobile battle against the Allies. As the quite
clever Canadian historian Erik Lund has noted, in the oil-age rich
armies beat poor armies in maneuver. Rich armies can afford more good
tanks, more good trucks, more good radios, and that wins maneuver
battles. In 1944, the United Nations were a rich army, and Nazi Germany
was a poor army.

Post by chris
How might that have affected later conduct of the war?

The most important effect is how it affects the Allied logistic system,
since that pretty much determines where the battle lines stop when the
Allies outrun their supplies. If the Germans withdraw more quickly is
the French rail net easier to bring back on line because the Allies
don't pound it as much? Are the channel ports more useful? Or does
trying to push farther with less time for logistic improvements around
the beaches mean that fewer supplies make it to the front lines? That's
a very hard question to answer, too many forces pushing in too many
directions for my analysis to figure it out.

[1]: Given what we know today, Barbarossa as the low-risk option seems
silly. In the winter of 1940-1 it didn't seem that way- the Germans had
beaten France in a few weeks, and Russia had been defeated already in
World War One, and only weakened (they imagined) by 20 years of
communism, so it should be quickly defeated. While that wasn't actually
true, it seems to have been the common assumption of almost everyone on
the Nazi side, from Hitler down to the Wehrmacht Soldaten. So they
didn't view the invasion of the USSR as nearly as risky a gamble as we
would today.

Chris Manteuffel

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Given what we know today, Barbarossa as the low-risk option seems
silly. In the winter of 1940-1 it didn't seem that way- the Germans had
beaten France in a few weeks, and Russia had been defeated already in
World War One, and only weakened (they imagined) by 20 years of
communism, so it should be quickly defeated.

To which could be added the reports
of the Winter War against Finland,
when what should have been an easy
victory for overwhelming Soviet
forces became an embarrassing fiasco.

One other question is raised in this
context: what did the Germans know
about the scope and effect of the
Great Purge on the Red Army?

One would think that the Abwehr would
attempt to compile a list of senior
Soviet commanders, with a profile of
each one... and if they were doing
that, they would notice when nearly
all of them were purged.

A truly diligent intelligence agency
would try to identify and profile as
many Soviet commanders as possible,
and, again, notice the extent of the
purges and the sudden elevation of
the replacements.

[Michael Emrys]

To which could be added the reports of the Winter War against
Finland, when what should have been an easy victory for overwhelming
Soviet forces became an embarrassing fiasco.

Which Hitler et al would have found very encouraging in their planning
for Barbarossa. What they failed to adequately take into account was
that the Soviets, however clumsy their bureaucracy might have been, were
capable of learning from their mistakes. The Red Army was being
reorganized and rearmed in light of lessons learned from the Winter War
as well as observations made of German successes on the Western Front,
not to mention their own successes against the Japanese on the
Mongolian-Manchurian border. The Red Army of 1941, although it still had
a ways to go, was not the same army of 1939.

Michael

[Bay Man]

To which could be added the reports of the Winter War against
Finland, when what should have been an easy victory for overwhelming
Soviet forces became an embarrassing fiasco.

Which Hitler et al would have found very encouraging in their planning for
Barbarossa. What they failed to adequately take into account was that the
Soviets, however clumsy their bureaucracy might have been, were capable of
learning from their mistakes. The Red Army was being reorganized and
rearmed in light of lessons learned from the Winter War as well as
observations made of German successes on the Western Front, not to mention
their own successes against the Japanese on the Mongolian-Manchurian
border. The Red Army of 1941, although it still had a ways to go, was not
the same army of 1939.

Best to give credit to the Finns. In 1944 in the "Continuation War", the
Soviets attacked the Finns just after D-Day to push them back from
Leningrad. The Soviets lost a lot of men and equipment and the Finns got the
Germans in to help them with planes and armour - it was worth the Germans
doing so. The Soviets made little ground over the well prepared Finnish
defenses.

But the Finns were just about out of supplies and talked peace with the USSR
and UK. The UK declared war on Finland which is one of only two incidents of
a democratic country declaring war on another. Finland banned some political
parties so democracy was rather token. So after the peace the Finns then
fought the Germans to get them out of Finland.

Finland was never taken up into the Communist block, like all others on the
USSRs borders, despite being a part of Russia until 1918. The two battles
made the USSR think twice. Strong neutrality agreements for Finland were
put in place by the Soviets after WW2.

Interestingly, in the 1939 Winter war the French and UK were thinking of
ways to help the Finns. The French were talking to the Turks about launching
massed French air strikes from Turkey on the Caucasus Oil Fields.

[Michael Emrys]

The French were talking to the Turks about launching massed French air
strikes from Turkey on the Caucasus Oil Fields.

I believe the French were talking the RAF into making the actual strikes
from bases in Iraq. Perhaps fortunately this never came off as before
the strikes could be launched, both France and the UK were busy elsewhere.

Michael

[The Horny Goat]

On Wed, 28 Nov 2012 12:11:12 -0500, "Bay Man"

Post by Bay Man
Finland was never taken up into the Communist block, like all others on the
USSRs borders, despite being a part of Russia until 1918. The two battles
made the USSR think twice. Strong neutrality agreements for Finland were
put in place by the Soviets after WW2.
Interestingly, in the 1939 Winter war the French and UK were thinking of
ways to help the Finns. The French were talking to the Turks about launching
massed French air strikes from Turkey on the Caucasus Oil Fields.

There were all kinds of hair-brained schemes to help the Finns during
the Winter war most of which foundered on the fact that between
Finland and the North Sea was Norway and Sweden neither of which were
keen to face Soviet wrath by allowing themselves to be used for arms
shipments.

An early version of one such plan involved the British seizure of
Narvik to push through Sweden with arms for Finland with or without
Swedish consent. This would undoubtedly have led to German
intervention and a huge fiasco as the direct railroute from Narvik to
Finland led directly across the Swedish iron ore fields (1) which were
of course the Swedish Crown Jewels as far as Germany was concerned.
Since the Swedish ports on the Baltic were often ice-bound during the
winter while Narvik usually is not, that was the main reason Hitler
was interested in preventing Allied seizure of Narvik.

This last fact was fairly critical as Hitler would have had no
interest at all in Norway had the Swedesh ports been ice-free in
winter. The Nazis did NOT need control of the fields themselves, they
'just' needed access to them in winter - the Swedes were perfectly
willing to sell iron ore to Germany.

(1) What an amazing coincidence! It has been suggested by several
historians that keeping these iron fields out of Hitler's hands was at
least as important as helping the Finns - certainly Allied control of
the Gallivare fields would have been a major blow to the Axis cause.

[Michael Emrys]

It has been suggested by several historians that keeping these iron
fields out of Hitler's hands was at least as important as helping the
Finns - certainly Allied control of the Gallivare fields would have
been a major blow to the Axis cause.

If what I've read is correct, seizure and retention of the fields (or
alternatively putting them out of production) was an integral part of
the plan.

Michael

[PatrikH]

On Wednesday, December 5, 2012 4:53:17 AM UTC+1,

Post by The Horny Goat
There were all kinds of hair-brained schemes to help the Finns
during the Winter war most of which foundered on the fact that
between Finland and the North Sea was Norway and Sweden neither
of which were keen to face Soviet wrath by allowing themselves
to be used for arms shipments.

I don't know much about about Norway but Sweden transferred
large amounts of armaments to Finland. Much of this came from
Swedish stocks and included:
25 aircraft (1/3 of the Swedish fighter force + bombers)
144 field guns
100 AA guns
92 AT guns
34 mortars
347 HMGs
450 BAR in 6.5 mm Swedish
135<UTF16-2009>k rifles
301k shells
51 million rifle cartridges

Much of this equipment was bought on credit or donated. Some
of the transfers were more informal e.g. the commander of 2nd
army corp gave the Boden garrison a standing order to help
resolve supply shortages.

142 aircraft bought by or given to Finland were picked up
by Swedish trucks in Petsamo and assembled in Sweden
before being flown to Finland. Much of the non-Swedish
artillery Finland recieved was shiped to Norway and then by
train through Sweden to Tornio.

To me this doesn't sound like a country that's too afraid to
antagonise the Soviets by shipping arms. The main worry of
the goverment was to keep the propaganda used to recruit
Swedish volunteers at a level designed not to upset the
Soviets.


/Patrik Holmström

[Rich]

Don't be silly Chris; don't you know only Tooze can answer Mr. Allen's
question? :)

Post by Chris Manteuffel
This is a rather important question- actually the source of major
disagreement between Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and Field Marshal Gerd
von Rundstedt before D-Day. Rommel felt that given Allied superiority in
air power, logistics, and mechanized forces, offering battle inland was
impossible- the Allies would be able to break any defensive line or
counterattack in the interior of France too easily.

One problem is that we have only a limited number of accounts of
exactly what went on in these discussions and what the various
viewpoints of the different principals were. Worse, the accounts we do
have are highly suspect. For example, Friedrich Ruge's "eyewitness"
account of the argument between Rommel, Geyr, and Guderian are most
interesting...especially since Ruge ***was not there*** to witness
them. :)

Another problem is that a lot of presumptions have been made over the
years as to what was meant by some of the disputants. A close
examination of Rommel's defensive planning shows that the close-in
mobile reserve supporting the static coastal zone that he was talking
about was ***not*** the Panzer divisions; rather, it was a belt of
mobile ***infantry*** forces. The Panzer divisions in his scheme were
intended as a mobile striking force to eliminate the enemy beachhead
forces after they were stalled in the 10-kilometer coastal defensive
belt and worn down by counterattacks from the mobile infantry reserves
backing the crust. Geyr, backed by his boss Guderian who was working
his own agenda, was obsessed with the threat of an allied aerial
desant on the Seine bridges at Paris. He believed the interdiction
campaign was meant to isolate Paris so that such a coup would
instantly sever the main connections between 15 AOK in the Pas de
Calais and the rest of the German forces west of the Seine (1 and 7
AOK). Rundstedt sided with Geyr and Guderian, possibly just to oppose
Rommel since it isn't clear that he actually thought Geyr's notion was
anything other than cloud cuckoo-land nonsense. Nor is it clear that
Guderian backed Geyr for anything other than his own reasons, which
were bizarre in his own way. Guderian was obsessed with the idea that
the Allied invasion threat was a sham, opining that they simply didn't
have the capability to support such an operation (shows what a genius
he was). Guderian's objective in any case was assembling a massive
reserve in the west of ten fully reconstituted Panzer divisions -
reinforced to a brigade-strength Panzer element - and then committing
them en masse against the expected Soviet summer offensive in a
decisive counterattack that would win the war.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
von Rundstedt felt that trying to defend the entire coastline was
splitting up the forces too much and allowing the Allies to mass
overwhelming force and firepower and defeat a small portion of the
defenders. Hitler saw the justice of both sides and so was unable to
make a decision, ending up with a terrible compromise that made little
sense and pleased no one (reserves not as far back as von Rundstedt
wanted, but not as far forward as Rommel wanted, at a distance where
they couldn't be immediately useful but also had to be split up so much
that they weren't able to achieve sufficient mass to have much effect).

I'm not sure that Hitler saw the "justice" of any side and he did in
fact make a decision; it was just a bad one. :) However, he did see a
chance at again asserting his strength as commander in chief by making
a Salomonic decision that satisfied no one. It wasn't the distance per
se that was the problem though, it was the convoluted chain of command
and decision making authority. Worse, it paid little heed to the
actual capabilities of the divisions concerned.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
As is often the case in terrible compromises, this was because there was
no good solution to the core problem; both von Rundstedt and Rommel were
exactly correct about the problems with the others plan.

Yep, and neither had a good solution.

Cheers!

[Chris Manteuffel]

Post by Rich
Another problem is that a lot of presumptions have been made over the
years as to what was meant by some of the disputants.

Do you have a good source for this? I would be fascinated to learn more.
Sadly, I am monolingual, so I would need it to be in English. I don't
recall anything from Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall on this topic, but
it is possible that I've forgotten it?

Post by Rich
The Panzer divisions in his scheme were
intended as a mobile striking force to eliminate the enemy beachhead
forces after they were stalled in the 10-kilometer coastal defensive
belt and worn down by counterattacks from the mobile infantry reserves
backing the crust.

That doesn't make much sense to me. It seems to me that when defending
against an amphibious assault if you are going to spread out and try to
defend near the coast, your best bet is along the beach, not immediately
inland. There the enemy is obligingly clustered together in small boats,
you have clear fields of fire, and it is very hard for them to fire
back. By focusing on defenses NEAR BUT NOT ON the beach it seems to me
that you expose yourself to having to split up your forces the same way
you would when defending the water line, and have to deal with enemy
naval firepower the same way, but also have the disadvantage that the
enemy can spread out, use cover, etc.

The only way that Rommel's defenses make sense to me is if he was
basically cribbing from his youth and the Hindenburg Line, which was a
10km belt with mobile infantry reserves. But he totally missed that the
Hindenburg Line was about shortening the defensive belt, not trying to
defend the entire Channel coast. And the Hindenburg Line was actually
breached, by Entente forces, during the Hundred Days offensive, using a
tank and artillery heavy approach that plays to all the strengths of the
Western Allies in the 1944 NW Europe campaign. [1]

Post by Rich
Geyr, backed by his boss Guderian who was working
his own agenda, was obsessed with the threat of an allied aerial
desant on the Seine bridges at Paris. He believed the interdiction
campaign was meant to isolate Paris so that such a coup would
instantly sever the main connections between 15 AOK in the Pas de
Calais and the rest of the German forces west of the Seine (1 and 7
AOK).

It is interesting to me to look at how the threat of a paratroop coup de
main drove a lot of planning, but they rarely pulled the trigger on it
for some very good reasons: paratroops once on the ground had no
strategic mobility, limited heavy weapons, and terrible resupply. At
best you could get a Crete- vastly more expensive than it was worth.

Given that it is clear that both the Axis and Allies strongly considered
a paratroop coup de main- both giving and receiving- it must have seemed
more reasonable to them. So is my perspective skewed by the failure of
Market-Garden (and not Crete, or Sicily, or Vyzama which would have
already happened when this discussion is taking place) or is it that
during the war no one had the chance to reconsider their doctrine in
light of wartime experience because they were too busy doing their
everyday work?

Or is it that the mobility that post-war helicopters offer show the
limitations of paratroops more clearly?

Post by Rich
Guderian's objective in any case was assembling a massive
reserve in the west of ten fully reconstituted Panzer divisions -
reinforced to a brigade-strength Panzer element - and then committing
them en masse against the expected Soviet summer offensive in a
decisive counterattack that would win the war.

Interesting. So Guderian is still attempting for victory, only his is
predicated on the Western Allies not attacking in the summer of 1944?
That seems like it was more an example of motivated reasoning (in order
for my plan to work, other people must do this and that, so they will)
than an actual conclusion based on evidence[2].

Of course, I have the advantage of hindsight and understanding of how
vast the forces arrayed against Germany were, and I can understand how
Guderian would have to mentally put that out of his mind in order to
keep fighting.

So Guderian was hoping to gather up approximately the forces that did
the Battle of the Bulge- 10 Pz.+ PzG divisions, plus supporting
infantry. Would that really have given the Germans victory in the East?
The Ten Victories of the Red Army just seems like it's going to
overwhelm the Germans no matter what- even if those forces were able to
blunt Bagration they couldn't stop it, and they can't do anything about
the rest of the front. It might improve the German situation compared to
what happened historically in July[3], but the Germans would still be
worse off than they were before the attack started.

[1]: von Rundstedt's attempt to do mobile warfare ALSO plays to the
strengths of the Western Allies in the 1944 NW Europe campaign. As
already established, there was no approach that gave the Germans the
advantage in the circumstances they were in.

[2]: Or as I call it, a "doing a MacArthur".

[3]: Not hard. Bagration was probably the single most devastating defeat
the Nazis ever had.

Chris Manteuffel

[Rich]

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Do you have a good source for this? I would be fascinated to learn more.
Sadly, I am monolingual, so I would need it to be in English. I don't
recall anything from Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall on this topic, but
it is possible that I've forgotten it?

There are quite a number of sources unfortunately and quite a few are
contradictory. One of the best is a series of articles that Geyr wrote
after the war that were published by an Irish (of all things) history
journal. They are fascinating. Then of course there are the Rommel
Diaries, which really aren't exactly diaries. There is also the
Fuehrer Directive that resolved the controversy. Finally, the body of
postwar German memoir accumulated by the USAEUR historians - David
Isby has published the English versions in a series of three books
that are pretty readily available. Unfortunately I don't have access
to some of my files and library right now, so I cannot give full
biblio data, but I'll see what I can do later. It wasn't really a
subject to touch on in CHAW.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
That doesn't make much sense to me. It seems to me that when defending
against an amphibious assault if you are going to spread out and try to
defend near the coast, your best bet is along the beach, not immediately
inland. There the enemy is obligingly clustered together in small boats,
you have clear fields of fire, and it is very hard for them to fire
back. By focusing on defenses NEAR BUT NOT ON the beach it seems to me
that you expose yourself to having to split up your forces the same way
you would when defending the water line, and have to deal with enemy
naval firepower the same way, but also have the disadvantage that the
enemy can spread out, use cover, etc.

Sorry, but I may have confused you with my abbreviated comments.
Rommel's actual scheme is found in the Diary and can be confirmed by
an analysis of the coastal organization as it was developing in May
and June. Most significantly, most of the references to "mobile
troops" are ***not*** to the Panzer divisions; they are to mobile
***infantry*** formations, which were to make up the "inner" zone
supporting the coastal crust of static formations. The structure can
actually be most easily seen in the 15 AOK zone. By June the KVA's
(the Coast Defense Sectors) were all held by static divisions under
the control of corps, with each backed by a mobile infantry division
echeloned in depth as an immediate counterattack reserve under the
corps commander. Behind that was a Panzer division as reinforcement
for the counterattack. The static zone ran from the low tide line to
about 10 kilometers inland. The mobile infantry extended that zone
another 20 to 30 kilometers and the Panzers were intended to be
deployed 20 to 30 kilometers deeper still.

What confirms this scheme is that from about January to late May,
after Rommel took command, a number of formerly static infantry
divisions were replaced on the coastal crust and re-equipped as
"behilfsmaessiges motorisierte" divisions - "extemporaneously
motorized", usually with requisitioned French civilian motor vehicles.
They were then redeployed on the inner line behind the static crust.
The redeployments of 91. Infanterie-Division (LL) and 352. Infanterie-
Division was also part of the scheme that was an adaptation to the
peculiar geography of the Cotentin. 91. was deployed as a central
reserve for the Cotentin, backstopping the 243. ID in Cherbourg and
the 709. ID defending the Varreville coastline. 352. ID's deployment
was forced by the simple lack of divisions. You also see in early June
that 116. Panzer Division, when declared provisionally operational,
moved to the Seine-Somme sector, taking some of 2. Panzer's former
zone - and then when 2. Panzer went to Normandy, it took it's entire
zone.

(snip)

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Or is it that the mobility that post-war helicopters offer show the
limitations of paratroops more clearly?

Actually in this case it was mostly driven by the German acceptance of
the FORTITUDE deception planning with regards to the notational Allied
airborne forces. Whereas the Allies actually had only three
operational divisions (1st British was not fully operational and they
didn't have the lift for it anyway); the Germans were convinced there
were at least eight and that they had a fleet of aircraft able to move
them all in a single lift. It is most interesting that both the major
TEWT's the Germans conducted in Ob.West in 1944 - one in February and
the second, more famous one scheduled at Nantes on 6 June - were anti-
airborne exercises. Ironic, especially for Maj.Gen. Falley, who was
killed by American paratroopers while he was returning from Nantes.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Interesting. So Guderian is still attempting for victory, only his is
predicated on the Western Allies not attacking in the summer of 1944?
That seems like it was more an example of motivated reasoning (in order
for my plan to work, other people must do this and that, so they will)
than an actual conclusion based on evidence[2].

The MacArthur comparison is apt I think. If you trace Guderian's
actions from June 1940 forward, you will find that he was single-
mindedly focused on the organization he had outlined in Achtung
Panzer! The AAR for the French Campaign is especially revealing. In
it, he advocated a ***return*** to the Panzer brigade structure in the
Panzer Division, claiming that a reduction in tanks was wrong. He
objected strenuously to the "dilution" of power that resulted from the
expansion of the Panzer divisions from ten to twenty. Then, in 1943
when appointed IG of Panzer Troops, he immediately began advocating
the creation of the Panzer Brigade (and regiment) Stab z.b.V. (staff
for special purposes) as the proper adjunct to the Panzer divisions.
Each was intended to command at least one or two separate Panther
battalions and a Tiger battalion and would be attached to Panzer
divisions, taking command of the divisional Panzer regiment, for
offensive operations. The prototype deployment of this type was at
Anzio in February, where Pz.Regt. Stab z.b.V. 69 deployed to command
I./Pz.Regt. 4 (Panthers) and s.Pz.Abtl. 508 (Tigers) in FISCHFANG.
More famous was the deployment of Pz.Brig. Stab z.b.V. 10 with
Pz.Regt. Stab z.b.V 39 and Pz. Abtl. 51 and 52 (Panthers) to Kursk in
July.

By early 1944 Guderian had convinced himself that an Allied invasion
of France was impractical, which conveniently allowed him to pursue
his agenda to launch a war-winning counteroffensive in the east
unfettered by the necessity for planning for a possible Second Front.
By his lights, keeping control of the Panzer divisions out of the
hands of Rommel and in the hands of Geyr made sense. Mailly le Camp
was already the main training ground outside of Germany for re-
equipping Panzer battalions with Panthers. The practice of then
***not*** returning those battalions to their parent divisions as
originally conceived was already firmly established. By June, six army
Panzer divisions - 2., 9., 11., 21., 116., and Lehr - and five SS
Panzer divisions - 1., 2., 9., 10., and 12. - were operational or
being reconstituted in France. Guderian's anticipated a Soviet
offensive in the June-July time frame and expected it would run its
course against the German defenses by early August. His plan was to
rail at least ten of the divisions in the west, reinforced by separate
Panther and Tiger battalions, east, where he would fling them against
the Soviets in a gigantic counteroffensive, destroying the Soviet
mobile forces...blah, blah, blah.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Of course, I have the advantage of hindsight and understanding of how
vast the forces arrayed against Germany were, and I can understand how
Guderian would have to mentally put that out of his mind in order to
keep fighting.

Yep. Pretty delusional, but we have our own perfect example of
delusional thinking in the face of even more substantial facts right
here. :)

Post by Chris Manteuffel
So Guderian was hoping to gather up approximately the forces that did
the Battle of the Bulge- 10 Pz.+ PzG divisions, plus supporting
infantry. Would that really have given the Germans victory in the East?

More than that. There were some 800-odd Panzers and StuG deployed in
the Ardennes. Guderian planned for about 2,000... :) And no, it
wouldn't have given them victory.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
The Ten Victories of the Red Army just seems like it's going to
overwhelm the Germans no matter what- even if those forces were able to
blunt Bagration they couldn't stop it, and they can't do anything about
the rest of the front. It might improve the German situation compared to
what happened historically in July[3], but the Germans would still be
worse off than they were before the attack started.

Yep. But he thought he would ***destroy*** the Soviet operational
forces facing the Germans in the east when their offensive had run its
course, which he never expected would so decisively defeat HG-Mitte.
Denial; it's not just a river in Egypt. :)

Cheers!

[MCGARRY]

.Gen. Falley, who was

killed while he was returning from Nantes.

The Kriegspiel was at Rennes. Falley was unfortunate in that instead of
entering his HQ by the front gate, he was going round the back of the
chateau to his mobile command truck where Lt Brannen happened to be.

[Rich]

Post by MCGARRY
The Kriegspiel was at Rennes.

Yes, of course he was, thanks for the correction. God alone knows why
Nantes popped into my head? At least they are both south of
Normandy... :)

Cheers!

[Chris Manteuffel]

Post by Rich
Unfortunately I don't have access
to some of my files and library right now, so I cannot give full
biblio data, but I'll see what I can do later.

If you get a chance, I would be interested.

Post by Rich
The mobile infantry extended that zone
another 20 to 30 kilometers and the Panzers were intended to be
deployed 20 to 30 kilometers deeper still.

So described that way, it seems like Rommel had total victory in his
argument with the rest of the Wehrmacht. If he triumphed in everything
(except that Hitler's permission was required to move the Panzer
divisions) then his failure on D-Day is complete. He pretty much got
exactly the fight he wanted and the Allies overwhelmed his defensive
positions anyway. And his defenses were mostly complete too, he had
called for them to be finished by June 22nd, so they were mostly
finished and ready, and the Allies still blasted through them in a few
hours, as CHAW makes clear.

It is also interesting, because the conventional wisdom is that after
the defeat in North Africa Rommel declined in prestige and power, but he
clearly had enough to triumph over most of the rest of the Wehrmacht. I
suppose that is post hoc, ergo prompter from his suicide.

Post by Rich
the Germans were convinced there
were at least eight and that they had a fleet of aircraft able to move
them all in a single lift.

My first thought was that would be an absolutely enormous fleet of
transport aircraft. Then I crunched some numbers, and I figure eight
divisions of airlift in a single day's lift (a night and a day lift like
Overlord did) would be something like 5,000 C-47's. And the US did
actually build more C-47's than that, so it wasn't unreasonable for the
Germans to suppose that the Allies had eight divisions plus lift ready
for the offensive. And if they had that many divisions ready to go, then
using them for a deeper, strategic target is really the only thing that
makes sense- you wouldn't create that many divisions, and concentrate
the strategic lift necessary to carry them around, and then use them
purely for tactical gain. So I take back some of what I said earlier-
worrying about a deeper, strategic use for airborne troops did make
sense for the Germans, given how badly informed their intelligence was.

Post by Rich
If you trace Guderian's
actions from June 1940 forward, you will find that he was single-
mindedly focused on the organization he had outlined in Achtung
Panzer!

So it sounds like Guderian was a dreamer who fell in love with his
beautiful vision and the same unwillingness to deviate from the dream
that kept him faithful in the dark years when no one else appreciated
him in the 1920's and meant that he stuck with it after everyone else
had moved on in the 1940's.

Post by Rich
By June, six army
Panzer divisions - 2., 9., 11., 21., 116., and Lehr - and five SS
Panzer divisions - 1., 2., 9., 10., and 12. - were operational or
being reconstituted in France.

It's a little unclear, but it appears from Ellis, _World War Two: A
Statistical Survey_ that 9th and 10th SS Panzer were still in the East
on D-Day. Wiki of a million lies seems to suggest that both of them were
part of Army Group North Ukraine, preparing to receive the Soviet summer
offensive, until ordered west a few days after D-Day. Are you sure of
this count?

A final observation: my source ("Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign
by Hesketh) puts the following divisions and locations for Panzer
divisions in the West on D-Day:

1st SS Panzer in Turnhout, Belgium
2nd Panzer in Amiens,
116th Panzer in Pontoise,
21st Panzer in Caen,
12 SS Panzer in Dreux,
Panzer Lehr in Chartres
17th SS PzG Poitiers,
2nd SS Panzer in Toulouse,
11th Panzer in Toulose,
9th Panzer in Avignon

As the crow flies, it is ~275 miles from Turnhout to Caen.
It is 130 miles from Amiens to Caen.
It is 110 miles from Pontoise to Caen.
It is 80 miles from Dreux to Caen.
It is 100 miles from Chartres to Caen.
It is 180 miles from Poitiers to Caen.
It is 400 miles from Toulouse to Caen.
It is 430 miles from Avignon to Caen.

Even if Rommel had total control of each of those divisions, they
weren't fooled by Fortitude South, and each of them were put in motion
immediately, given the delays necessitated by Allied air power and
SOE/OSS resistance, Hitlerjugend and Lehr had no chance of arriving
until at least the second day, by which time they had no chance of
throwing the Allies back into the sea. 12th SS Panzer did in fact enter
combat on the 7th, Lehr on the 8th. 17th SS PzG entered combat on June
11th. 2nd SS Panzer of course started for Normandy on June 7th, but took
some time off for some war crimes on the way.

116th didn't enter combat until July, but that was mostly because it was
still refitting from its losses on the Eastern front. 1st SS Panzer and
2nd Panzer both were delayed in entering battle largely due to Fortitude
South. What all of this means to me is that Hitler's famous sleeping
late on D-Day, one of the key points of "Longest Day", was of little
effect, and even Fortitude South, while helpful, certainly, wasn't
absolutely critical- the Allies still had to face and destroy LAH and
2nd Panzer before they could break out, and to some extent whether that
happened in June or August was of little overall consequence, because
neither could have possibly shown up before the Allies were established
too firmly to be evicted.

In short, the Western Allies strategic superiority for Overlord was so
great that they managed to use surprise and deception to confuse the
Germans AND SIMULTANEOUSLY had sufficient force to win even if that
surprise and deception had failed.

Chris Manteuffel--
"...the war situation has developed not necessarily
to Japan's advantage..." -Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945

Post by Rich

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Do you have a good source for this? I would be fascinated to learn more.
Sadly, I am monolingual, so I would need it to be in English. I don't
recall anything from Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall on this topic, but
it is possible that I've forgotten it?

There are quite a number of sources unfortunately and quite a few are
after the war that were published by an Irish (of all things) history
journal. They are fascinating. Then of course there are the Rommel
Diaries, which really aren't exactly diaries. There is also the
Fuehrer Directive that resolved the controversy. Finally, the body of
postwar German memoir accumulated by the USAEUR historians - David
Isby has published the English versions in a series of three books
that are pretty readily available. Unfortunately I don't have access
to some of my files and library right now, so I cannot give full
biblio data, but I'll see what I can do later. It wasn't really a
subject to touch on in CHAW.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
That doesn't make much sense to me. It seems to me that when defending
against an amphibious assault if you are going to spread out and try to
defend near the coast, your best bet is along the beach, not immediately
inland. There the enemy is obligingly clustered together in small boats,
you have clear fields of fire, and it is very hard for them to fire
back. By focusing on defenses NEAR BUT NOT ON the beach it seems to me
that you expose yourself to having to split up your forces the same way
you would when defending the water line, and have to deal with enemy
naval firepower the same way, but also have the disadvantage that the
enemy can spread out, use cover, etc.

Sorry, but I may have confused you with my abbreviated comments.
Rommel's actual scheme is found in the Diary and can be confirmed by
an analysis of the coastal organization as it was developing in May
and June. Most significantly, most of the references to "mobile
troops" are ***not*** to the Panzer divisions; they are to mobile
***infantry*** formations, which were to make up the "inner" zone
supporting the coastal crust of static formations. The structure can
actually be most easily seen in the 15 AOK zone. By June the KVA's
(the Coast Defense Sectors) were all held by static divisions under
the control of corps, with each backed by a mobile infantry division
echeloned in depth as an immediate counterattack reserve under the
corps commander. Behind that was a Panzer division as reinforcement
for the counterattack. The static zone ran from the low tide line to
about 10 kilometers inland. The mobile infantry extended that zone
another 20 to 30 kilometers and the Panzers were intended to be
deployed 20 to 30 kilometers deeper still.
What confirms this scheme is that from about January to late May,
after Rommel took command, a number of formerly static infantry
divisions were replaced on the coastal crust and re-equipped as
"behilfsmaessiges motorisierte" divisions - "extemporaneously
motorized", usually with requisitioned French civilian motor vehicles.
They were then redeployed on the inner line behind the static crust.
The redeployments of 91. Infanterie-Division (LL) and 352. Infanterie-
Division was also part of the scheme that was an adaptation to the
peculiar geography of the Cotentin. 91. was deployed as a central
reserve for the Cotentin, backstopping the 243. ID in Cherbourg and
the 709. ID defending the Varreville coastline. 352. ID's deployment
was forced by the simple lack of divisions. You also see in early June
that 116. Panzer Division, when declared provisionally operational,
moved to the Seine-Somme sector, taking some of 2. Panzer's former
zone - and then when 2. Panzer went to Normandy, it took it's entire
zone.
(snip)

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Or is it that the mobility that post-war helicopters offer show the
limitations of paratroops more clearly?

Actually in this case it was mostly driven by the German acceptance of
the FORTITUDE deception planning with regards to the notational Allied
airborne forces. Whereas the Allies actually had only three
operational divisions (1st British was not fully operational and they
didn't have the lift for it anyway); the Germans were convinced there
were at least eight and that they had a fleet of aircraft able to move
them all in a single lift. It is most interesting that both the major
TEWT's the Germans conducted in Ob.West in 1944 - one in February and
the second, more famous one scheduled at Nantes on 6 June - were anti-
airborne exercises. Ironic, especially for Maj.Gen. Falley, who was
killed by American paratroopers while he was returning from Nantes.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Interesting. So Guderian is still attempting for victory, only his is
predicated on the Western Allies not attacking in the summer of 1944?
That seems like it was more an example of motivated reasoning (in order
for my plan to work, other people must do this and that, so they will)
than an actual conclusion based on evidence[2].

Guderian's anticipated a Soviet

Post by Rich
offensive in the June-July time frame and expected it would run its
course against the German defenses by early August. His plan was to
rail at least ten of the divisions in the west, reinforced by separate
Panther and Tiger battalions, east, where he would fling them against
the Soviets in a gigantic counteroffensive, destroying the Soviet
mobile forces...blah, blah, blah.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Of course, I have the advantage of hindsight and understanding of how
vast the forces arrayed against Germany were, and I can understand how
Guderian would have to mentally put that out of his mind in order to
keep fighting.

Yep. Pretty delusional, but we have our own perfect example of
delusional thinking in the face of even more substantial facts right
here. :)

Post by Chris Manteuffel
So Guderian was hoping to gather up approximately the forces that did
the Battle of the Bulge- 10 Pz.+ PzG divisions, plus supporting
infantry. Would that really have given the Germans victory in the East?

More than that. There were some 800-odd Panzers and StuG deployed in
the Ardennes. Guderian planned for about 2,000... :) And no, it
wouldn't have given them victory.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
The Ten Victories of the Red Army just seems like it's going to
overwhelm the Germans no matter what- even if those forces were able to
blunt Bagration they couldn't stop it, and they can't do anything about
the rest of the front. It might improve the German situation compared to
what happened historically in July[3], but the Germans would still be
worse off than they were before the attack started.

Yep. But he thought he would ***destroy*** the Soviet operational
forces facing the Germans in the east when their offensive had run its
course, which he never expected would so decisively defeat HG-Mitte.
Denial; it's not just a river in Egypt. :)
Cheers!

[MCGARRY]

Post by Chris Manteuffel
positions anyway. And his defenses were mostly complete too, he had
called for them to be finished by June 22nd, so they were mostly
finished and ready,

That was hardly the case. Of the 11 strong points along the beach at
Omaha several weren't finished. WN64 had just the foundations of the
anti tank gun emplacement. It's twin on the Ruquets exit was knocked out
around 9:30, thus allowing the americans to open up the first exit.
WN66, on the Moulins exit, was in the same state. Millions of mines
hadn't been put in place.
Only 2 of the 4 planned casements at Pointe du Hoc had been finished, so
the guns which had been moved away in April had never come back. Mont
Fleury gun battery, over looking Gold, only had 2 of the 4 casements
finished. Longues gun battery couldn't use it's rangefinder as the fire
control position wasn't quite finished and had a pile of earth blocking
it's view. The range finder was stil in it's box anyway. The Rommel's
asparaguses at Pegasus bridge weren't complete. The Italian workers
installing them turned up to work on the 6th.
von Rundstedt had little confidence in the Atlantik wall and had done
little to get it built. Rommel accelerated the work from Novemeber 43
then even more in May when Hitler convinced him that Normandy was a
possible site for a landing.
Whether the Atlantik wall would have been more advanced a month later,
if Eisenhower had hestitated, is a matter of conjecture.

[Rich]

Post by Chris Manteuffel
If you get a chance, I would be interested.

I'll see what I can do tonight. Part of the problem is that I still
haven't set up my computer at home since my move.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
So described that way, it seems like Rommel had total victory in his
argument with the rest of the Wehrmacht.

Far from it. Rommel wanted operational control of all the available
reserve Panzers in his hands. Instead, he had control of 21. Panzer in
Normandy and 2. Panzer in the Pas de Calais. He also lost command
authority over 1 AOK in Bordeaux, which was placed by Hitler under
Armeegruppe G along with 19 AOK in Southern France. And they each got
their own Panzer reserve - 2. SS, 9. and 11.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
If he triumphed in everything
(except that Hitler's permission was required to move the Panzer
divisions) then his failure on D-Day is complete.

Hitler's permission - really OKW if they had the guts to do so on
their own authority - was only required for commitment of I SS-
Panzerkorps (1. SS, 12. SS, 17. SS, and Lehr). They did actually order
12. SS and Lehr to move on D-Day, but then countermanded and reordered
them to move...it's actually an exercise by itself to keep track of
when and what was orderd.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
Then I crunched some numbers, and I figure eight
divisions of airlift in a single day's lift (a night and a day lift like
Overlord did) would be something like 5,000 C-47's.

Probably. The 82nd and 101st flew 814 sorties on D-Day, but
significant elements arrived by sea (most of the Glider troops and a
significant pat of the artillery). So yes, 4,000-5,000 sorties would
be required, which is a substantial increase in airlift capability.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
It's a little unclear, but it appears from Ellis, _World War Two: A
Statistical Survey_ that 9th and 10th SS Panzer were still in the East
on D-Day. Wiki of a million lies seems to suggest that both of them were
part of Army Group North Ukraine, preparing to receive the Soviet summer
offensive, until ordered west a few days after D-Day. Are you sure of
this count?

Yes. 9. and 10. SS under II SS Panzerkorps were only on "loan" to the
Ostheer. They were dispatched in mid-April to rescue HG-Sued and were
supposed to return to complete refitting and organization (10. SS only
had a single Panzer battalion organized) and were preparing to do so
when the invasion occurred.

However, Guderian's pie in the sky depended on the unlikely
possibility that ***none*** of the divisions would be required for
emergencies ***somewhere*** before he unleashed his grand scheme. 1.
SS, 2. SS, 9. and 11. Panzer all required additional refitting of men
and equipment.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
A final observation: my source ("Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign
by Hesketh) puts the following divisions and locations for Panzer
1st SS Panzer in Turnhout, Belgium

1. SS was newly arrived from the East and was in bad shape. It was
ordered to the front c. 8 June, but that order was cancelled and it
spent an additional two weeks absorbing and training replacements
before it finally moved.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
2nd Panzer in Amiens,
116th Panzer in Pontoise,

116. was only ready for defensive operations and was not fully ready
until mid July, whereupon it shifted to HG-B reserve from the Pas de
Calais, where it had taken over for 2. Panzer.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
21st Panzer in Caen,

No, it was at Falaise.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
12 SS Panzer in Dreux,
Panzer Lehr in Chartres
17th SS PzG Poitiers,
2nd SS Panzer in Toulouse,
11th Panzer in Toulose,

11. Panzer was just arrived from the east and was absorbing a reserve
panzer formation. It had virtually nil capability until late August.
2. SS was also in bad shape and mobile elements were dispatched as
available.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
9th Panzer in Avignon

9. Panzer was in the same situation as 11.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
116th didn't enter combat until July, but that was mostly because it was
still refitting from its losses on the Eastern front. 1st SS Panzer and
2nd Panzer both were delayed in entering battle largely due to Fortitude
South. What all of this means to me is that Hitler's famous sleeping
late on D-Day, one of the key points of "Longest Day", was of little
effect, and even Fortitude South, while helpful, certainly, wasn't
absolutely critical-

It isn't even clear that Hitler ***was** sleeping. :) Nor is it clear
that the "Reserve Order" had the effect everyone thinks. 12. SS and
Lehr were both part of the Fuehrer Reserve but were dispatched on 6
June. 2. Panzer was not, it was under direct HG-B control,
subordinated to 15. Armee, but it was not ordered to move.

In any case, it was the lack of infantry that ultimately was critical
and the slow dispatch of infantry formations from other fronts that
caused the greater problem.

Post by Chris Manteuffel
In short, the Western Allies strategic superiority for Overlord was so
great that they managed to use surprise and deception to confuse the
Germans AND SIMULTANEOUSLY had sufficient force to win even if that
surprise and deception had failed.

Probably.

[MCGARRY]

Post by Rich

Post by Chris Manteuffel
21st Panzer in Caen,

No, it was at Falaise.

Feuchtinger's HQ was at St Pierre sur Dives, but elements of the 21st
were around Caen. Von Luck's PC was at Vimont just east of Caen.

[Rich]

Post by MCGARRY
Feuchtinger's HQ was at St Pierre sur Dives, but elements of the 21st
were around Caen. Von Luck's PC was at Vimont just east of Caen.

That's what I get for relying on my memory rather than my files.
Indeed the Gefechtsstand of the division was at St Pierre, Luck's was
at Vimont, Grams' (Pz.Gren.-Regt. 192) was at Thury-Harcourt, and
Huehne's (Pz.Artl.-Regt. 155) was at St. André-sur-Orne. OTOH, Pz.-
Regt 22 was at Aubigny, with its I. Abteilung at Jort and II.
Abteilung at Fresné-la-Mère...so it was a bit more spread out than
just saying it was "at Caen" indicates. :)

Cheers!

[Rich]

Post by Chris Manteuffel
If you get a chance, I would be interested.

Here's a general list.

Geyr von Schweppenburg, General Baron Leo Freiherr, "Invasion Without
Laurels", An Cosantoir, December 1949. (Geyr's first post-captivity
account.)

Geyr von Schweppenburg, General Baron Leo Freiherr, "Rommel and the
Normandy Invasion, 1944; Tank Expert States His Views", An Cosantoir,
December 1950. (Geyr's response to Ruge's article below.)

Isby, David C. (ed.), Fighting the Invasion: The German Army at D-Day,
Greenhill Books, 2000. (Contains the Foreign Military Studies accounts
dealing with the invasion.)

Meyer, Hubert, 12th SS: Vol. 1, the History of the Hitler Youth Panzer
Division, Stackpole Books, 2005, pp. 47-52. (Point of view of the
dispute from the division-level; they were firmly behind Geyr.)

Reardon, Mark J., Defending Fortress Europe: the War Diary of the
German 7th Army, 6 June-26 July 1944, Aberjona Press, 2012. (Only a
sketch of the dispute, but a must-have for those who haven't access to
the original in the U.S. National Archives.)

Ruge, Vice Admiral Friedrich Oskar, "Rommel and the Normandy Invasion,
1944", An Cosantoir, May 1950. (Ruge's early post-captivity account, I
suspect written to counter Geyr's.)

Stacey, Colonel C.P.E., The Campaign in North-West Europe, Information
from German Sources: Part I: German Defence Preparation in the West,
Report No. 40, Historical Section (G.S.) [Canadian] Army Headquarters,
28 April 1951, pp. 32-34. (Excellent - as always with Stacey - account
of the dispute from the original German sources.)

Wood, James A., Army of the West: the Weekly Reports of German Army
Group B from Normandy to the West Wall, Stackpole Books, 2007, pp.
3-5. (Somewhat dry, but like Reardon's work a must-have.)

Cheers!

[Chris Manteuffel]

Post by Rich
Cheers!

I would like to thank you and Mr. McGarry very much. I learned a lot
from both of you, and will definitely be checking out the sources you
mentioned.

Thanks!

Chris Manteuffel

[Rich]

Post by Chris Manteuffel
I would like to thank you and Mr. McGarry very much. I learned a lot
from both of you, and will definitely be checking out the sources you
mentioned.

You're welcome. This has been one of those rare cases where the
baymania actually stimulated me to do some re-digging and checking.
I've always meant to include a force comparison (divisions and armored
vehicles) over time in my long-gestating "The German Army in Normandy"
book and just have never gotten around to it before. And I know that
the figures fly in the face of the accepted wisdom that Monty's "plan"
"caused" the Germans to place "80%" of their armor versus the
Commonwealth forces. The thing is that assessment goes back to
histories that make assumptions about the German forces that are
fundamentally flawed. None of the popular authors that advocate that
view - certainly not the late Robin Neillands, Hastings, or Beevor -
have ever bothered to examine the original German documentation of the
battle.

Cheers!

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Post by Rich

Post by Chris Manteuffel
I would like to thank you and Mr. McGarry very much. I learned a lot
from both of you, and will definitely be checking out the sources you
mentioned.

You're welcome. This has been one of those rare cases where the
baymania actually stimulated me to do some re-digging and checking.
I've always meant to include a force comparison (divisions and armored
vehicles) over time in my long-gestating "The German Army in Normandy"
book and just have never gotten around to it before. And I know that
the figures fly in the face of the accepted wisdom that Monty's "plan"
"caused" the Germans to place "80%" of their armor versus the
Commonwealth forces.

The idea it was Montgomery and a plan has always been of interest,
given the phase lines had the allies well out of Normandy and therefore
the bocage well before historical. The D+25 line I have says the US
have St Malo and Rennes, with the border with second army being
at Alencon, with the line then running slightly beyond Argentan to
Lisieux to the channel. From what I can see that would mean US
forces holding about twice the front of the Commonwealth forces.
This expands to something like 4 times the frontage on D+35 as
Brittany is cut off, it reduces to 3 times the front on D+60 with
Brittany taken and the line running along the Loire from St Nazaire
to Tours then about straight to the channel at the mouth of the Seine.

Next comes the idea second army needed to initially attract German
forces as first army had to advance in two directions, towards Cherbourg
and towards St Lo and beyond. And then again do the attracting as
US forces again went two ways, into France and into Brittany.

At the same time looking at the map showed the best country for armour
was in front of second army at least until the bocage was cleared, so it
made sense to assume most of the German tanks would end up there.
More so as the allies stalled.

Kenneth Macksey points out the Panzer divisions wanted to stay in
the good tank country, that is in front of second army.

So somehow it always seemed the plan of attracting the German forces
to second army, not necessarily the armoured part, had some basis in pre
invasion thought and map reading, but really came about, especially the
armour part, after the landings and the realisation the battle was going to
be in Normandy for a while at least. Another successful Montgomery
plan/understanding of the situation, with the date altered to say it was
meant from the start (perfect planning), not an adaptation to or result of
the circumstances (sensible planning/understanding).

According to Major General Essame as of early to mid July 6 out of
8 active panzer divisions were said to be facing second army, a fact
which was recorded on second army battalion level intelligence maps
and widely known below that level, by order of Montgomery.

Post by Rich
The thing is that assessment goes back to
histories that make assumptions about the German forces that are
fundamentally flawed. None of the popular authors that advocate that
view - certainly not the late Robin Neillands, Hastings, or Beevor -
have ever bothered to examine the original German documentation of the
battle.

The concentration on the Panzer divisions seems to be a hangover from
Montgomery's noting of them at the time, then again how many people
can recite the Panzer divisions and their achievements versus say a similar
number of German infantry divisions. What seems to have gone missing
from the histories is the deployments of infantry units, which as expected
were more likely to be deployed in the bocage, thereby balancing German
combat power. In any case the Germans shuffled units according to their
perceptions of where the threats were, how effective the unit was and so
on, nothing was fixed.

Of course a key allied success was the panzer divisions being mainly in the
front line, not able to be in reserve.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Rich]

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
The concentration on the Panzer divisions seems to be a hangover from
Montgomery's noting of them at the time, then again how many people
can recite the Panzer divisions and their achievements versus say a similar
number of German infantry divisions. (snip agreement)

There is also the not so inconsiderable problem of terrain and the
constraints of time and space. A large part of the reason that 12. SS
and Lehr were sent and deployed in and around Caen is because they
were east and southeast of it, along the line Evreaux-Orleans, and
there were a limited number of roads and road space (the A11, A13, and
A88 highways did not exist then) for them to approach Caen. For 17. SS
and later 2. SS, the approach to the battlefront was from the south
and if they utilized the good roads approaching Caen from that
direction - the Tours-Le Mans-Alencon route - they cut ***across***
the approach routes from Paris. So they moved on the further western
route - Angers-Leval-Mayenne-Domfront.

Then you have the problem that the Allied landing dispositions simply
****asked*** for the Germans to concentrate on severing the connection
between the Americans and the British. That led to Panzergruppe West
being concentrated west of Caen to prepare for the decisive attack to
defeat the beachhead, which would be directed north between Caen and
Bayeux, and then west and east to roll up the beaches.

Further driving the decisions on the German side was the Caumont Gap -
the 20-kilometer area between the 352. Infantrie Division and 716.
Infanterie Division that developed on the night of 9/10 June when 352.
Division was forced to withdraw southwest, away from 716., under US
pressure. It was only "plugged" by the emergency insertion of elements
of 2. Panzer and Lehr.

Simply put, it was unlikely the Panzer divisions could have been
deployed in much different a way.

Post by Geoffrey Sinclair
Of course a key allied success was the panzer divisions being mainly in the
front line, not able to be in reserve.

Yes, as I alluded to, their inability to get sufficient infantry into
the fight. The situation with regard to armored vehicles remained
fairly stable and was more affected by the lack of German maintenance
capability than anything else. However, keeping them in the line
dispersed the available armor and wore down the Panzergrenadiers,
which the Panzers depended upon for both offensive and defensive
action.

Cheers!

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Chris Manteuffel
In short, the Western Allies strategic superiority for Overlord was so
great that they managed to use surprise and deception to confuse the
Germans AND SIMULTANEOUSLY had sufficient force to win even if that
surprise and deception had failed.

Are you really sure of this? Because there was a
distinct possibility of the entire deception
collapsing.

Much of the FORTITUDE misinformation was fed to the
Germans through "Double-Cross" agents whose Abwehr
controllers were based in Spain.

One of these controllers (British code name ARTIST)
decided in late 1943 that Germany was going to lose
the war and wanted to defect to the Allies. This would
be a disaster for the Double-Cross system, as he would
"expose" some of the most effective double agents.

ARTIST made his offer through an agent he had guessed
was really a double. British intelligence could neither
accept nor reject the offer safely. They played for
time - and then in early 1944 ARTIST was arrested by
the Gestapo.

ARTIST had named some of the key double agents to
establish his _bona fides_. The British had kept them
running. If ARTIST revealed this, it would be _proof_
that all the intelligence from those agents was false
- intended to deceive. That intelligence included a
huge amount of FORTITUDE information pointing to Pas
de Calais. Therefore, the Allies were _not_ going to
attack Pas de Calais, but somewhere else - and
Normandy was the most plausible alternative.

Fortunately, ARTIST had been arrested for embezzling
Abwehr funds, and apparently said nothing about his
attempted defection before D-Day. He was executed not
long after.

But if he _had_ talked? And if the Germans had made
the logical deductions from his admission?

Is it really clear that even if the Germans had been
undeceived, and had a month to reinforce and complete
the Normandy defenses, the Allied landings would still
succeed?

[MCGARRY]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Is it really clear that even if the Germans had been
undeceived, and had a month to reinforce and complete
the Normandy defenses, the Allied landings would still
succeed?

As it was, Bradley considered abandonning Omaha around midday, and even
on the evening of the 6th they still were'nt sure that they could hold
the area in the face of a counter attack. If the Germans had had just
24hrs notice that Normandy was THE landing, I'm sure that would have
tipped the balance.

[Chris Manteuffel]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Are you really sure of this? Because there was a
distinct possibility of the entire deception
collapsing.

I was thinking purely in the case of Fortitude South collapsing at the
moment of D-Day, so that the Panzers were all on the move as soon as the
invasion fleet showed up. I would think that one month of advance notice
would be just about the worst possible case- enough time for the Germans
to get everything ready, not enough time for the Allies to change their
plans and hit Pas-de-Calais instead. That is an interesting case, and
I'm not sure what would happen.

Chris Manteuffel